Historical analysis of bonds from Venice to modern money markets highlights debt's role in state-building and financial stability
Summary
Robin Wigglesworth and Robert Brokamp trace the evolution of bond markets from 12th-century Venice to the modern US financial system. They argue that sovereign and corporate debt have historically been essential tools for infrastructure, empire-building, and political cohesion, rather than mere burdens. The speakers discuss the 1873 railway panic, the creation of money market funds, and the 2008 Reserve Fund collapse as key inflection points. Wigglesworth contends that while US debt servicing costs are rising, the dollar's reserve status provides resilience, though political gridlock may delay necessary corrections.
Episode sections
- 1:26 – 6:26
Venetian Bonds and the Origins of the Bond Market
Robin Wigglesworth explains that the first bond market emerged in 12th-century Venice to fund wars against Constantinople. The Venetians forced a war wealth tax on citizens, structured as a loan paying 5% annually with tradable receipts, creating the first liquid financial asset and binding citizens to the state's survival.
- 6:26 – 8:31
Dutch Finance and the Rise of Corporate Bonds
The Dutch created the first true bond market with multiple issuers, financing infrastructure like dikes and their war for independence against Spain. The Dutch East India Company issued the first corporate bonds to fund its global empire, allowing the Netherlands to sustain debt at 3% while Spain defaulted repeatedly under Philip II.
- 8:31 – 11:30
Macaulay's 'Fabulous Debt' vs. Debt Scolds
The speakers discuss Thomas Babington Macaulay's 1848 argument that national debt is an economic boon rather than a curse. Wigglesworth notes that Macaulay correctly identified that conflating household debt with government debt is a mistake, as sovereign debt can lubricate trade and bind societies together through shared credit.
- 11:30 – 16:53
Alexander Hamilton and the Binding of the United States
Alexander Hamilton used bonds to consolidate state debts into federal bonds, restoring America's creditworthiness and creating a liquid asset that functioned as money. By making citizens creditors of the federal government, Hamilton bound the states together, giving them a vested interest in the survival of the union.
- 16:53 – 23:14
Railway Mania and the Panic of 1873
Railway expansion in the US was largely financed by bonds, attracting foreign investment. A European financial crisis in 1873 caused investors to sell US railway bonds, leading to the collapse of Jay Cooke & Co. and triggering the 'Long Depression,' the longest economic downturn in US history at that time.
- 23:14 – 26:12
The Creation and Role of Money Market Funds
Money market funds were created in the 1960s to bypass Regulation Q interest rate caps, democratizing access to treasury bills and commercial paper. They grew into a critical component of the US financial system, lubricating transactions and helping asset managers like Vanguard and Fidelity survive the 1970s and 80s.
- 26:12 – 31:19
The Collapse of the First Reserve Fund
The First Reserve Fund, once conservative, began buying asset-backed commercial paper and became heavily exposed to Bear Stearns. When Bear Stearns failed in 2008, the fund 'broke the buck' (NAV fell below $1), triggering a $40 billion bank run that forced the US government to guarantee the entire money market fund industry.
- 31:19 – 33:08
Ferguson's Law and US Debt Servicing
Ferguson's Law suggests that when a nation spends more on debt interest than defense, it signals decline. Wigglesworth notes that the US violated this law in 2024, spending more on interest payments than its entire military budget, a trend that continued into the recording period.
- 33:08 – 35:17
US Debt Sustainability and Historical Precedents
Robin Wigglesworth argues that while the US debt level is high, the US economy's size and the dollar's status provide resilience. He notes that debt servicing costs are currently around 3.5% of GDP but will mechanically rise as older, cheaper debt is refinanced at higher rates.
- 35:17 – 36:27
International Debt Management Case Studies
The speaker cites the UK and Canada as examples of nations that successfully reduced debt-to-GDP ratios through bipartisan agreements to cut spending and raise taxes. Canada reduced its debt servicing from nearly 10% of GDP in the mid-90s back to AAA status.
- 36:27 – 38:20
US Political Constraints and Future Outlook
Wigglesworth suggests the US is less pressured by bond markets than the UK or France due to the dollar's unique status, but this lack of pressure may reduce political will to address deficits. He predicts debt will continue to inflate for the next generation due to political gridlock.
- 38:20 – 41:16
Social Security and Long-term Resolution
Robert Brokamp identifies the 2032 Social Security Trust fund depletion as a key test for US political cooperation. Wigglesworth remains optimistic that eventually, the high cost of interest payments will force a bipartisan correction, though he sees no immediate action.
Claims worth verifying
Venice was founded by refugees fleeing the Vandals and Visigoths, settling in a swampy area with no natural resources.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·2:01
How to verify: Historical records of Venice's founding; check encyclopedias or historical texts on the fall of the Western Roman Empire and the establishment of the Venetian Lagoon settlements. For recent events, verify 2026-08-14 through 2026-11-14. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Venetian bonds paid 5% a year and were backed by customs duties.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·4:04
How to verify: Historical financial records of the Venetian Republic; check academic histories of early bond markets or the book 'A Fabulous Debt' cited by the speaker. For recent events, verify 2026-08-14 through 2026-11-14. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Philip II of Spain defaulted on sovereign debt three or four times during his reign.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·7:25
How to verify: Historical records of Spanish sovereign debt; check economic history databases or academic papers on Habsburg Spain's fiscal crises. For recent events, verify 2026-08-14 through 2026-11-14. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The Dutch East India Company issued the first corporate bonds.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·7:05
How to verify: Historical records of the Dutch East India Company (VOC); check financial history archives or the company's historical prospectuses and bond issuances. For recent events, verify 2026-08-14 through 2026-11-14. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Thomas Babington Macaulay wrote a book in 1848 titled 'A Fabulous Debt' or similar arguing debt was an economic boon.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·8:31
How to verify: Bibliographic records of Thomas Babington Macaulay's works; check library catalogs or academic databases for his 1848 publications on political economy. For recent events, verify 2026-08-14 through 2026-11-14. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The Panic of 1873 was triggered by a financial crisis in Germany and Austria that caused European investors to sell US railway bonds.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·19:46
How to verify: Historical economic data on the Panic of 1873; check Federal Reserve historical documents or academic analyses of the 1873 financial crisis and international capital flows. For recent events, verify 2026-08-14 through 2026-11-14. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The First Reserve Fund broke the buck in 2008, losing money when Lehman Brothers went under.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·28:31
How to verify: SEC filings for the First Reserve Fund; check news archives from September 2026 regarding the fund's NAV dropping below $1 and the subsequent government bailout. For recent events, verify 2026-08-14 through 2026-11-14. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceThe US spent more on debt interest than its entire military budget in 2024.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·32:57
How to verify: US Treasury Department data on interest payments; check the US Treasury's monthly statements on the public debt and the Department of Defense budget for fiscal year 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-14 through 2026-11-14. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Money market funds hold approximately $7-8 trillion in the United States.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·25:48
How to verify: Investment Company Institute (ICI) data on money market fund assets; check ICI's monthly reports on money market assets. For recent events, verify 2026-08-14 through 2026-11-14. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Ferguson's Law states that when a country spends more on debt interest than defense, it leads to decline.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·31:47
How to verify: Academic works by Niall Ferguson; check his book 'Civilization: The West and the Rest' or related articles where he defines this 'law'. For recent events, verify 2026-08-14 through 2026-11-14. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The US nominal debt is approximately $40 trillion.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·33:47
How to verify: US Treasury Department daily debt limit data; Federal Reserve H.4.1 Statistical Release. For recent events, verify 2026-08-14 through 2026-11-14. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
In the late 1990s, the US stopped auctioning 30-year Treasuries due to large budget deficits.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·34:07
How to verify: Historical US Treasury auction records; Federal Reserve historical data on Treasury securities outstanding. For recent events, verify 2026-08-14 through 2026-11-14. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The US spends around 3.5% of its GDP on servicing its debt.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·34:44
How to verify: US Treasury Department monthly debt service data; Bureau of Economic Analysis GDP data. For recent events, verify 2026-08-14 through 2026-11-14. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The UK spent 5% of GDP on servicing debt in 1980.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·35:17
How to verify: UK Office for National Statistics historical public sector debt and interest payment data. For recent events, verify 2026-08-14 through 2026-11-14. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Canada spent 9.6% of GDP on debt servicing in the mid-1990s.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·35:37
How to verify: Bank of Canada historical debt-to-GDP and interest payment data; IMF Country Reports for Canada 2026-2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-14 through 2026-11-14. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Canada achieved a AAA credit rating after reducing its debt in the mid-1990s.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·36:17
How to verify: Historical credit rating announcements from S&P, Moody's, and Fitch for Canada. For recent events, verify 2026-08-14 through 2026-11-14. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The UK felt bond market pressure in 2022.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·36:48
How to verify: News reports on the UK Mini-Budget crisis and Bank of England intervention in September 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-14 through 2026-11-14. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Social Security Trust funds are projected to go bust around 2032.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·38:20
How to verify: Social Security Administration Trustees Report annual projections. For recent events, verify 2026-08-14 through 2026-11-14. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The US does not tax as much as many other developed countries as a percent of GDP.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·34:24
How to verify: OECD Revenue Statistics comparing tax-to-GDP ratios across member countries. For recent events, verify 2026-08-14 through 2026-11-14. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Canada's credit rating dropped to single A and returned to AAA.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·36:17
How to verify: Historical credit rating changes for Canada from major rating agencies. For recent events, verify 2026-08-14 through 2026-11-14. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Do your own research
- Verify US debt-to-GDP ratios and interest coverage ratios using Federal Reserve H.15 data or Treasury.gov.
- Check the current NAV of major money market funds (e.g., Vanguard VMXX, Fidelity SPAXX) to assess stability.
- Review the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) long-term budget outlook for projections on debt servicing costs.
- Analyze the Bank of England's 2022 gilt market crisis reports to understand reserve currency vulnerabilities.
- Examine the Social Security Trustees Report for the current status of the Trust Fund depletion date.
- Compare US debt servicing costs to defense spending using Department of Defense budget documents.
- Research the UK's 1980s debt restructuring under Thatcher for historical precedent on fiscal consolidation.
- Check Canada's debt-to-GDP ratio trends from Statistics Canada to validate the bipartisan austerity success story.
Full transcriptexpand
- 0:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): How Bonds Built the Modern World this week on the Personal Finance Edition of the Motley Pool Hidden Gems Investing Podcast.
- 0:20
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I'm
- 0:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Robert Brocamp, Bro camp, though I go by the nickname of Bro. And let's face it, many people find bonds boring. After all, there's a reason. Ian Fleming gave his fictional spy the last name of Bond. He called it, quote, the dullest name I've ever heard. However, dig into the history of bonds and you will find that it is a centuries-long story of wars, empires, innovations, fear, greed,
- 0:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and an interesting cast of characters. Here to talk to us about the intersection of human history and bond history is Robin Wigglesworth, the editor of the Financial Times finance blog Alphaville, and the author of a fascinating and dare I say rollicking new book, A Fabulous Debt: The Epic Story of How Bonds Built the Modern World. Robin, welcome to the show.
- 1:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Thanks for having me on, bro. I've been looking forward to it.
- 1:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So your book covers many ways that bonds funded big events and developments over the course of history. But I have to say that my first impression after reading, particularly the first third or so of the book, is that bonds funded a lot of wars, or defense, depending on how you look at it. And this includes the very first bond market in Venice. So let's start with that
- 1:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): story. Tell us about how bonds got birthed in Italy.
- 1:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yes, I can't remember which Greek philosopher that first said that war is the mother and father of all invention, uh, but it's certainly true for pretty much everything. But certainly in the financial realm, war has been, you know, brought out the worst. and the best in human ingenuity. Uh, so Venice, uh, this is the 12th century. Uh, Venice is a weird city. Have you been there,
- 1:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): bro?
- 1:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I have indeed. It's beautiful. And I was just struck at how um, frankly, very focused on mercantilism. Uh, and it's
- 1:57
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it
- 1:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): occurred to me reading your book that that's been that way for centuries.
- 2:00
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well,
- 2:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): so I visited once when I was at Effect. a effectless student, essentially, and I I wish I appreciated the history more because it's it's a unique city. It was it was it was found by refugees fleeing the Vandals, basically some Visigoths, some German barbarians. Uh and they settled where they settled because nobody else wanted it. It was a swampy
- 2:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): hellhole. It had zero natural resources, no farmland, no nothing.
- 2:25
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Uh
- 2:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): so And there were. they were left to peace there. And they realized they had to live off their wits. And the Venetians became really the Mediterranean's most brilliant merchants, the traders. And they were kind of well positioned between East and West. So they had no natural resources, but they were very smart. They
- 2:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): were very cunning, very driven, very ambitious. uh, And they were perfectly positioned between
- 2:50
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the east.
- 2:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): east and west. So they were technically part of the Byzantine Empire, based in Constantinople, or today's Istanbul, but they're also part of Italy, of course, and they owed some fealty to the Pope. But essentially they their only loyalty was to money. They liked making money. And it was one of those rare places where there was lots of social mobility as well. So there's
- 3:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): doges who roll the the town that you could literally go within a several several generations go from being a slave to being the head of the city. If you were good enough at business, that's really the only thing that mattered. But this really annoyed everybody else uh in Europe at the time. These are these nouveau reach uppity merchants. Nobody likes merchants,
- 3:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): right? Um, so they ended up in war with Constantinople at one point, their liege, and they needed a ton of money uh to fight that war. Wars are very expensive.
- 3:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): and more money than they could just um borrow from the local banks,
- 3:44
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): or
- 3:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): really banks in the weather we understand, but local moneylenders. They were called banks or banky because of the wooden tables they had. Um and they therefore forced everybody in the town to pay a proportional war wealth tax, taxes essentially. actually. So they assessed everybody's wealth and made them pay a forcible loan to the government to soften the blow. It
- 4:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): was a republic. So, you know, to soften the blow, they made it a loan, paid 5% a year, and made the receipts tradable. And that was the crucial bit.
- 4:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah, because loans have been around for centuries before then. It was the tradable part that was important
- 4:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): because it then became a financial asset. And And you had people with both liabilities and assets.
- 4:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that were sort of the key to its success. And it kind of gave a sense of uh, especially the more affluent people, feeling like they had a stake in what was going on.
- 4:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, and this was Dara said the magical bit that I hadn't quite appreciated before doing the research on a fabulous debt, uh, was how bonds quite literally have bound countries, states, cities, people. the governed and the government together. Venice lost that war against Constantinople. The
- 4:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): doge was murdered by his own citizens on the streets of Venice for his sins. And this loan, this in theory, temporary war loan, became a permanent debt. But in fact, that proved a blessing because the Venetians, because they were great merchants, they realized, well, it's really valuable. You can buy an income stream. So Venice couldn't repay the
- 5:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): loan, but it could keep paying the 5% from the taxes it raised from its customs duties and so on. And being able to buy an income stream was hugely powerful. And you could sell that income stream as well. And then therefore you could use it as collateral for trade. So it kind of became like money uh, in a world that was always desperately short of something that
- 5:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): people accepted as money. So Venetian. balls were broadly accepted around the world because Venice was good for it. Uh, and and therefore this monument to the failure with the Venetians or this embarrassing war became a monument to their commercial genius, really. Uh, and it was incredible. And then you saw the Itali other Italian city-states quickly quickly copied this
- 5:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): invention and it spread around Europe and and took off from there.
- 6:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Your book is not only a history of bonds, but to a certain degree a history of which countries were more powerful, which countries had empires. You know, there's a bit about Spain and its empire. And one of the subjects of that empire was the Netherlands. Um, but eventually they were to get their independence
- 6:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): with the help of bonds. So tell us a little bit about Dutch finance.
- 6:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah. though the bond, the pristiti, it was called in Italy, uh, spread around Europe. Uh, everybody copied it because people were always keen to borrow. But I think it was really the Dutch that first created what we'd understand to be a bond market, in that there were lots of different issuers. So the Dutch first use it to finance the
- 6:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): incredibly elaborate system of dikes that they have built to keep their country dry. And then over the time, cities, provinces, towns, villages would issue more and more bonds and they'd lend to each other. So people in Amsterdam, Amsterdam would buy Utrecht bonds and vice versa. Ultimately, when they also invented the
- 7:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): first listed public company, the Dutch East India Company, they the Dutch East India Company also issued the first corporate bonds. So they'd issue bonds to finance the their activities. So the Dutch first then financed their war for independence against Spain at the time with bonds. They could fund themselves almost to infinity and
- 7:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): beyond at 3% a year. Whilst the Spanish crown, you know, was infamous for defaulting. Philip II The second defaulted, I think, three or four times in his life, which is, I mean, a world record, which you have to read. respect. But he's the goated sovereign debt defaulter in history. Um, and because of that, Spain
- 7:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): just had to periodically kind of deal with its finances whilst the Dutch could keep on fighting. So they won independence and then they built the global empire actually on the back of bonds. The Dutch East India Company only Sold sold shares once, but its activities, its colonies, its chips, its soldiers were financed by. bond sales. And that's why
- 8:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I think the Dutch managed to evolve from what people slightly cruelly cruelly, but not inaccurately called the bog of Europe, to be one of the great powers on
- 8:17
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in
- 8:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the world, really.
- 8:20
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Your
- 8:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): book then moves on to other empires, including the British Empire and the console market. And I think one of the interesting aspects. of the book is that you address how people react to the debt. In fact, the title of
- 8:31
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
- 8:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): book comes from a book written in 1848 by Thomas Babbington Macaulay. I hope I'm responding uh pronouncing that right, in which he, you know, there were a lot of people who were decrying the high levels of debt. I think you labeled them debt scolds and saying that you know bankruptcy and ruin were at hand. But that didn't happen. And instead Macaulay Bacaulay argued that a bond market could
- 8:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): actually be an economic boon, which is why he called it a fabulous debt. So what do the debt scolds get wrong, or did they get wrong?
- 9:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Well, actually, a lot of the arguments that Thomas Babbington Macaulay was countering, you can see to this very day. Um, first of all, it's the conflation of household debt with government debt. Uh it's a classic mistake. but a government is not a country. There are aspects around it. Every country is different, every
- 9:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): financial system is different, but it is different. We don't borrow money from Mars or Venus. We borrow money from ourselves. Um and and that's why he thought that that obvious that naked obsession with just the level, the nominal level of the debt, is a distraction. What I think Thomas Babbington Bammington Macaulay also captured so brilliantly
- 9:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): is that a national debt can also be a national blessing to steal uh the wording of another character in my book because you can use it as collateral, you can use it to lubricate trade, you can use it to grease commerce. Credit, really, credit, as you said, like it predates uh everything else in finance.
- 10:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): It predates money. Credit has pretty much always been around with us. And it is the countries that use credit to sort of get commerce flowing that tend to be richer, they tend to be more successful, they tend to be therefore also be more powerful. And Thomas Babington Macaulay saw that the massive debts that Britain had
- 10:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): gradually incurred fighting so many wars in Europe because there was always a war,
- 10:26
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
- 10:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): actually. had not led to the ruin of Britain. In fact, Britain had gotten richer and richer and richer every time. It would occasionally pay down some of those debts and then there'd be a new war and they'd inflate again. But broadly speaking, this actually was an asset to Britain, not a curse. And uh that's why I I still think to this day that, you know, it wouldn't be
- 10:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): human not to worry occasionally about debt levels and how much debt governments today are. uh have incurred. But I also think it's important to remember the nuances that this is not a household. Uh and um
- 10:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): debt can be a tool, it can be a bit abuse, but broadly speaking, it's arguably the most valuable social technology we've invented, certainly the most valuable financial technology we've invented.
- 11:12
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You
- 11:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): mentioned earlier that the bond market could actually bind a society or a country together.
- 11:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah.
- 11:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Which brings us to the start of the United States, which, you know, um, you know, in 1783, the Treaty of Paris was signed. The the new uh country had an awful lot of debt.
- 11:30
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yes. In
- 11:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): comes Alexander Hamilton, the first head of the newly created Treasury Department. What did he do that set America up for success?
- 11:39
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You
- 11:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): notice how I did the foreshadowing there and said talked about a mass national blessing? Yeah. Quite happy about how I did that. So Alexander Hamilton was, I think, an incandescent genius. I mean, we we know he was brilliant, of course, we but I think having now read some of his papers, his letters, um, not just the
- 11:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): biographies, but some of the the underlying writings, it is incredible. how prescient he was. And he had studied the British financial system whilst he was still fighting in the the Revolutionary War and had realized that Britain's sea of credit was not a weakness as many other American Americans thought. It was actually a source of Britain's
- 12:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): strength. And he suggested ways that maybe America could try to weaken it. But when he became uh the first Treasury Secretary, uh he his first job really was, you know, apart from hiring two assistants uh and getting one emergency loan from a bank in Philadelphia, was to present a report to Congress about what to
- 12:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): do with
- 12:39
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
- 12:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): all the debts that the various states or the colonies until then had incurred in fighting this war. And that was a mix of of greenbacks and and dollars, basically currency continental. uh dollars, continentals that they'd issued, uh, and um bonds they'd sold both to American investors and to overseas investors,
- 12:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): primarily in France and uh and the Netherlands. And I think his genius was realizing that this problem actually could solve two problems at once. First of all,
- 13:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): he
- 13:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): and he can't couched this very much in the terms of this is the price of liberty. We want to be seen as a serious country, held uh hold our head up aloft among all the other serious countries on on the world, and serious countries they pay their debts. These were debts we incurred fighting for liberty, we have to pay it. We will restore America's credit
- 13:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): noteworthiness and we will be respected by other countries. That was the one of the main public uh rationales. Uh there were two other ones that were more subtle. One is I think he also realized that credit or these corpor these bonds, that by s taking responsibility for all the state debts, uh Washington
- 13:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): wasn't Washington then, but like the new federal government in New York at the time could issue new bonds, and those bonds, as long as they were current, would get treated like money. And and that was hugely important in a country where the economy was a shambles. I mean, it'd been wrecked by the war. It was cut off from its biggest trading partner, Britain, pretty much its only trading partner.
- 14:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And it was a desperate shortage of anything that kind of looked took and quirked like uh quacked like money. And these bonds, and there's a great line actually in the musical which mentions this obliquely, but uh Alexander Hamilton ran. raps in the musical, this will be a financial enema for the American economy, which is quite evocative, right? Uh, but
- 14:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): very true, and that's how it functioned. And I think the third reason is this this binding issue that you you mentioned. Uh I hadn't found any of evidence he studied the Venetians, but he'd studied Of the Dutch as well. And he you saw that by lending to each other, you can bind countries together. So in in Venice, for example, once
- 14:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you borrowed money from your citizens, the town or the city, well, the citizens had a vested interest in your good governance, but also a vested interest in your continued survival. Same thing with the Dutch, the Dutch towns became kind of a country by lending to each other. Britain, again, also became a United Kingdom by setting up a
- 15:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): consolidated industry. annuities market. It was called the console market, Will's first treasury bonds, really. And he saw that with a very, very vulnerable, weak federal government, and he wanted a strong one, you could actually give all Americans who also held this debt a vested interest in the federal government surviving by making them creditors.
- 15:33
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 15:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): by exchanging all these defaulted bonds in new, fresh, printed, well not printed. at the time, but fresh treasury bonds, uh, you could actually give the the federal government a fighting chance. Because now we think of history as a series of natural and inescapable conclusions. One B follows A and C follows B.
- 15:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): History doesn't work that way. It's just a series of accidents. It was not written in the stars that America would become the mighty country it is. It was were there were 13. squabbling colonies that didn't always get on, and it was not assured that it would emerge as one country or stay as one country. In fact, there was a civil war, of course, later.
- 16:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): But I think a lot of the steps Alexander Hamilton made in those first fateful few years were hugely impactful in binding the country together, healing the economy, and restoring America's credit around the world.
- 16:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Nowadays, we're talking a lot about the AI build out and the increasing role that bonds are playing. And when people look back at history for maybe a comparable period, some have suggested the build out of the railroads, which you cover in your book. So tell us about how bonds built the rails and led to one of the worst. economic downturns in US history.
- 16:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yes, it was a humdinger.
- 16:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I love traveling by rail. I'd much rather travel by rail anytime I can. So so I that chapter was fun. And we think a rail was a very sort of uh everyday old-fashioned uh transportation now, but it was a revolutionary technology. It was hard to fathom thrust. for us today how
- 17:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): awestruck people were at this new invention and the impact it had. I mean, everything from the the the AI fears we have today, people feared that the railway, that the human body wasn't spilt built for these kind of mad cap speeds. People thought that there were lots of newspapers that write about people going mad at speeds over 30 miles an hour. And
- 17:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): at 40, 50 miles, I think, they they fear feared the body. might disintegrate. Because we just weren't built, us, humans weren't built for those sort of magical speeds. Um, but everywhere in the world went railway mad. Uh, Britain, of course, started, but it spread around Europe, Tsaris, Russia, even China. But nowhere on the planet went as railway mad as
- 17:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Americans because it was kind of the perfect lab thread. for it. It was the mix of America's kind of can can-do do dream. dreaming spirit, a country that was vast in geography, but quite sparsely populated and quite spread split spread out and quite balkanized as well.
- 18:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And also, you know, they started building railways before the Civil War. But after the Civil War, it became a very potent symbol of unifying the country after this horrific uh civil war. Uh, so the transcontinental railways became this potent sign of America and its belief in the future.
- 18:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): These were kind of like,
- 18:36
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
- 18:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): in the Fabius Debt, I call them like a series of Apollo programs, these kind of big Titanic civilizational missions, and that's how they were seen. But
- 18:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): unfortunately, they were almost all financed by debt. So the there were railway stocks as well, and there were people would sign, paid locals in the town would finance it by signing up for shares. But the vast majority of the financing came from the bond market because the American banking system was a bit of a mess. There was no Federal Reserve then, there
- 19:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): was no central bank. It was just a series of very small state-by-state banks that would collapse very quickly. Um, So bonds financial. financed a lot of it. Uh, and people went a little bit mad. Uh foreigners also chucked money at the American bond market, the railway bond market. So they were financing everything. The Dutch, Brits,
- 19:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Germans, Austrians, Spanish, everybody would buy railway bonds, American railway bonds. And in 1873, ironically, it wasn't really America's fault, though there were all sorts of scandals around the whale railways. ways There with was so much corruption. Even the vice president was implicated at one point. So people are worried about the railway boom. But there was a financial crisis in Europe, here
- 19:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): in Germany and Austria, that essentially caused massive, massive stock market drop in Germany and Austria that caused all these European investors. And as you know, in a crisis, you don't sell what you want to sell, you sell what you can sell.
- 20:00
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 20:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): they sold American railway bonds. And
- 20:02
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): then
- 20:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): suddenly you had a series of American banks who were in an extremely precarious position because the prices of these bonds were cratering. They had them on the balance sheet. And primarily there was this one bank called Jay Cook and Co. Cook and Co. And this was he was the John Pierre Point Morgan of his era. He was the giant financier that had helped bankroll
- 20:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the North's North victor in the Civil War. He was the most famous, most powerful. man in American business at the time. And and his bank went kind of like belly up. And the shot must have been incredible. I mean I there's all sorts of newspaper reports about the panic that gripped New York when this happened, when they literally barred the doors, because that's how a bank would
- 20:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): basically say, We're shut for business. You can't pull your money out. Uh but it's a bit like if JP Morgan today suddenly said, Oh, we're bankrupt. Well I mean, that's how big a shock it was. And then that financial crisis just cut, I mean, everything collapsed and that ricocheted back in Europe. And you have a classic thing where things start feeding on themselves. And it was for a long
- 21:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): time called the Great Depression, until we actually had the Great Depression. And now we call it typically the long recession or the long depression, because it's still the longest economic downturn in American history. Um, and it was all because the railway bonds was the was the real culprit there.
- 21:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): It's another example of uh, you know, there can be overinvestment, there can be a mania, there can be a bubble, but in the end, what came out on the other end was still very beneficial.
- 21:32
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
- 21:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I mean it's a great point, isn't it? I mean, we financial crises are no fun. I I I've lived through
- 21:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): one and a half, or well, I mean two and a half, depending on I wasn't old enough to remember the sum of them. Um
- 21:45
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
- 21:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): they are destructive and socially debilitating, but they are probably unavoidable. And quite often that kind of mania, like one of the things I I often like to say is that the optimal number of financial crises crisis is not zero. That we occasionally need investors to take leave of their senses to dream. dream, not worry about what could go wrong,
- 22:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): but think of all the amazing things that could go right. Because they pour money into new technologies and quite often they lose money. And sometimes they lose so much money it causes a financial crisis. But quite often, what they finance, that's how we make these big leaps forward. And the railways is an amazing example. I mean, this was this made America's America a
- 22:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): superpower. It was not really recognized in America at the time. It was only really seen by the world, the contours of it by World War One. So 50 years after this big crash, but the railway
- 22:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): system became this physical skeleton of the American economy. It transformed America.
- 22:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And I I think you cannot underestimate how impactful it was in in creating the United States of America. we know today. And yes, it to use a technical word sucked for a few years and lots of people lost a lot of money. Uh, but long term these manias
- 23:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): are actually quite good for society as a whole. Not always, but most of the
- 23:09
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): time.
- 23:10
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Your
- 23:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): book is an interesting history of how things used to be, right? And not really
- 23:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): all
- 23:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that long. ago. So I think a good example of that is the rise of money market funds.
- 23:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah. So
- 23:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): tell us the story of Bruce Bent and Henry Brown and the conditions of the 1960s that led to the creation of the modern money market fund, which I guess starts with a depression era law known as regulation Q.
- 23:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah. So uh I often paraphrase one of my favorite bands from when I was younger, Wu Tang Clan. that said certain money rules everything around us, cash rules everything around us, sorry. But I say financial arbitrage rules everything around us. Uh and the US after in World War II and afterwards had something called regulation queue that regulated
- 23:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): how much interest you could get in a bank account. And if you're a big institution, a big company, or very wealthy person, you could buy treasury bonds that paid a higher interest rate, uh, you could buy lots of things that would pay you above inflation interest rates. But most people were stuck in deposit accounts that paid you know far below inflation. So
- 24:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): so they invented the first money market fund. But basically using the the m the mutual fund technology as a way of pooling lots of money so they could buy treasury bills, bonds, commercial paper, ASPAC commercial paper, uh certificates of deposit, the whole thing. So really to bring uh
- 24:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): democratize access to some of these products that wealthy people and and and companies will already have access to. And I think it was a hugely valuable thing. Uh then the money market funds eventually kind of morphed into something almost like the
- 24:48
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): if
- 24:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): we think of credit as the lifeblood for any. sort of real economy, the money market funds, especially in America, is kind of the bloodstream of the blood that goes through the US financial system. Because they grew so big so quickly. Even when Regulation Q was scrapped, it just became a a a huge part of the
- 25:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): American financial industry. It was basically bailed out a lot of asset managers marriages in in the the 70s and 80s when there was really struggling. It was growth of mutual funds and money money market funds really helped like Vanguard survive many lean years in the 80s. Fidelity as well might not have been around if they didn't have uh the money
- 25:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): market fund franchise. Uh and now it's kind of this dark Arc force that binds the entire financial system together. It's what seven, eight trillion dollars just so. in the United States? It's how vast amounts of finance and financial transactions gets lubricated every day. It's
- 25:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): really a financial wonder of the world.
- 25:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): What I love about the story is that, first of all, it's the vision of two guys sharing an office. One had to basically put a second mortgage on his home to for the business to continue.
- 26:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): It succeeds. They have the oldest money market fund, but the reserve primary fund. But in the end, that didn't come to such a great ending.
- 26:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): No.
- 26:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Money market fund complex. They were hugely successful. They were copied by everybody else who had like these vast asset management groups like Fidelity and State Street. But they were the plucky outsider, the plucky pioneer. And they were for a long time exceptionally conservative. So the two
- 26:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): founders felt that money market funds should be conservative. This is all about capital protection and making it work a little bit from you, but being careful. But as money market funds started buying commercial paper and then ultimately, so this is short-term IOUs issued by big companies like RBM or GE,
- 27:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): um
- 27:01
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): they
- 27:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): also started buying asset-backed commercial paper, which was short short-term IOUs that investment banks used to lubricate their securitization engines before 2008. That was a bit of a disaster. And the first reserve fund, famously, that one of the founders said that I don't do drugs, I don't do booze,
- 27:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I don't cheat, and I don't do buy commercial paper.
- 27:25
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Or
- 27:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): some it was to that effect. They were very conservative, very long, but they eventually obviously lost market share.
- 27:32
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 27:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): this is It's just a tragedy that you see happen again and again. And even as I was researching this and I could see where things were heading, I was almost shouting to myself, please don't do it, don't do it. And then they did it. Literally in 2007, they take out a line from their prospectus where they say we don't buy commercial paper and
- 27:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): started buying commercial paper. And then first were exposed to some of the Beer Stearns funds that first were went belly up in the summer of 2007. Then, more problematic, they were. extremely exposed to Beer Stearns itself when they went belly up in March 2008. But beer got kind of bailed out by JP Morgan,
- 28:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): which had basically the Federal Reserve kind of pushing them together. But by the time Lehman went under,
- 28:18
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh,
- 28:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): they still hadn't gotten out of it. They'd still basically kind of been s trying to kind of squeeze more and more yield out, had been lending more and more to risky stuff, and and they lost money
- 28:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): when Lieman went under. And obviously, in dollar terms, the loss was not big, but they broke the buck. Like obviously their net asset value went below one. And to many people in the stock market or bond market world, that sounds inconsequential. Sequential, Like, oh, you've lost 0.02% of your money.
- 28:49
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
- 28:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): of course. this is not where you're supposed to lose money. This is supposed to be the equ the financial financial equivalent of a steel vault. And and obviously it causes this kind of incentive that you want to get out. It's a bank run incentive. Because if you can get out quickly, you can get out that the NAV quite often. But of course, that causes everybody to rush for the exit It because they want to get their money
- 29:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): out first from the bank. And that's what happened. And and the first reserve fund basically suddenly had when Lehman went bust and they broke the buck, they had, I think, something like 40 billion dollars of outflows. Uh like it's like an electronic bank run uh in a matter of uh a few days, and they had to gate and shut, and that
- 29:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): just paralyzed the entire industry. And because so much of the financial machinery depends on money market funds to lubricate things, and things were not good. in September 2008 either. It forced the government to basically bail out the entire industry. I mean, they didn't send the money, but they basically said, look, it's better for us to just
- 29:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): guarantee all money market funds. We guarantee the federal government stands by on all of them to prevent this already cataclysmic event um escalating into a I guess being Norwegian, something I call a financial Ragnarok. It would have been horrifically bad. 2008
- 30:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): was bad. If the money market fund industry had been allowed to collapse, it would have been immeasurably worse. It would quite possibly have been something like uh the Great Depression, it all over again.
- 30:26
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- 30:46
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- 30:57
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 30:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): your book talks a lot about, again, the benefits of the debt, but also has some of these stories of where too much debt was a problem. The final chapter of your book is titled How Much Is Too Much? And you point out that if you add up all the world's debt, government, corporate, banks, personal debt, we're like like four hundred and three hundred and forty
- 31:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): trillion dollars.
- 31:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And
- 31:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): in that chapter you introduce something called Ferguson's Law. So tell us about the law and your answer to how much is too much.
- 31:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yes, I think we're at 350 trillion now. So it's already gone up a bit since the book came out uh since the book was uh edited, I guess. Um so Ferguson's law is coined action actually by Neil Ferguson, uh, the financial historian, but he actually dedicates it to uh uh a kind of almost an intellectual
- 31:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): predecessor called Adam Ferguson, who was the Scottish uh philosopher who first uh said that debt was one of the main sources of ruin for all great nations. So Neil Ferguson took that observation and turned it into an idea or suggestion. a or a thesis, or he calls it a law, that says that when a country spends more on
- 32:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): simply paying the interest on its debt than it does on defence, it tends to lead to decline. So this is in the context of great powers, superpowers, but also great powers. So when England essentially was paying, had borrowed so much money after World War One I that it wasn't able to pay to maintain its empire.
- 32:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): its military, its navy, and had to shrink, it tended to hasten that decline. It made the country poorer and then it starts feeding on themselves.
- 32:37
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Uh
- 32:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): and the reason why this is so resonant now is America for the first time in a century, because occasionally you can violate the law because you suddenly jack up uh interest payments because all you're borrowing a lot of money or whatever. But America violated the law, focusedness law in 2024, so two years ago, and is still in
- 32:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): violation of it now, is spending more just servicing its debts, not paying it down, just paying the interest than than it does on its entire military.
- 33:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So given your review of the history of how debt has both contributed to the rise, but also maybe the undermining of empires. What's your advice for America? Is there a there's no easy solution? Is it just you have to bite the bullet for a while and get it under control?
- 33:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Well, the paraphrase um Warren Buffett, it's an easy solution. It's just very hard to do. Uh the easy solution is to increase taxes. a little bit and spend, cut spending a little bit. America, I am actually, I mean, I'll I'll bro, I'll bring you good news. I'm not that worried about America. I think the the
- 33:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): size of the economy, people stare too much at um just the nominal size of the debt, 40 trillion. I mean, that that is a scary amount of debt. Uh, and how quickly a lot of that has come just in the past 10, 20 years. And don't forget in the 90s. we remember the 90s. People were worried about the American financial system, how it would function with
- 34:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): zero treasuries. America had such big budget deficits as recently as the late 90s that they stopped auctioning 30-year treasuries and people genuinely worried what, like how do things even work without treasuries if America pays down all its debts? That obviously sounds
- 34:24
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): like I
- 34:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): mean fancy land today. Uh, but it's just to show that things can change quite quickly. And America still has an incredibly vibrant, dynamic economy. Uh, and and frankly, does not tax nearly as much as many other developed countries do. So, in percent of GDP, America spends around 3.5% of
- 34:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): its GDP on servicing its debts. And that is almost mechanically going to go up because the budget deficit. is huge and is not narrowed, and interest rates are higher now than they were. So it's refinanced. The US is constantly repaying treasuries it issued 10 years ago at 2% a year that now costs at 5% a year. So it's just
- 35:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): mechanically going to go up, probably to four or 5%. That is again, that has been fine for many other countries before it. They're around 5%, it can start snowballing it. a bit. Um
- 35:17
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
- 35:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that's what we've saw, for example, happen in the UK. They hit 5% of the spend 5% of GDP on servicing estates in 1980. Then you had Margaret Thatcher came into power. She turned the ship around, things changed there. Uh Canada, hilariously enough, because we don't really think of Canada as sort of financially profligate,
- 35:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): but Canada had a huge debt problem. They spent 10% of GDP or 9.6% of GDP in the mid-90s. And then they had a bipartisan agreement to say, well, this is kind of silly. It's just wasteful to spend so much of our financial of our budgets and our economic wealth on just paying our debts. So there
- 35:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): was a bipartisan agreement to cut spending and increase taxes. They did at a time when the economic economy was growing fairly well. So the austerity was painful, but it was fine. And within a few years, Canada had turned the financial ship around. And it went from a triple A country to a single A country and back to AAA. Those are the grades that the credit
- 36:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): rating agencies use. And those countries have have the advantage that they borrow in British pounds or Canadian dollars.
- 36:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): But, you know, I like Canadian dollars and I like British pounds, but the American dollar is unique. I think America has far more capacity to borrow than anybody else on the planet. Now, the downside of that, this is why I am a little bit worried about the US on the other hand, because of that
- 36:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): advantage,
- 36:48
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it
- 36:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): kind of makes America a little bit immune to. all those other pressures that other countries can feel. Like the US, UK in 2022 felt the heat of the bond market.
- 36:58
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 36:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): they haven't turned the ship around, but at least they learned that you maybe they're in the danger zone and they need to get out of it. France is now butting up against that as well. They're also getting a little bit worried about uh the bond market and then that they might rebel. Uh, Canada also felt this a little bit the 1990s. But America, I just think
- 37:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): interest rates can go up, bond yields can go up, borrowing costs can go up. I just don't think they're going to go up as much enough to put enough pressure what looks to me, if I'm being honest, like a fairly broken political system. Or uh
- 37:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it struggles that kind of bipartisan agreement that you saw in Canada.
- 37:38
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 37:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): struggle. I'm not a political scientist, but I struggle to see in America today. Uh so therefore, the most likely outcome, I suspect, is that America totters on. And there will be maybe some more b budgetary uh discipline at some point. It'll wax and wane, interest rates will go up, they'll go down. But over the next
- 37:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): 10, 20 years, America's debts will keep inflating. with not enough pressure on the other side, no political will to increase taxes enough or cut spending enough that the debts will just keep on inflating for the next generation or two. And maybe at some point there will be enough political to change things. Uh but I don't think it's
- 38:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): going to happen anytime soon.
- 38:20
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
- 38:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I think one of the earliest tests of it will be when the Social Security Trust funds go uh bust in, you know, twenty thirty-two or so. At some point, there's gonna have to be a hard choice there. And I think it'll test your theory of whether we can get enough bipartisan agreement to solve something.
- 38:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah. I mean, look, I I'm an optimist. I I I generally think that I gener by profession, I love bad news. I love it when I love financial crisis. crises. It sounds horrific to say, but they are professional. professionally fascinating. I I I I get my rocks off with big crises. But as a human being, I'm actually quite so I I am inherently
- 38:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): cynical as a journalist, but as a human being, and I actually think humans, we don't things don't move in the straight line and we mess up things all the time. But I I actually do believe that at some point America will feel, will look and say, well, look, we're spending five 5% percent of GDP or 10% of the budget. on just paying interest on our debts. That is silly. There are so
- 39:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): many other things we want to spend money on. We want to spend more money on healthcare, education, AI data centers, rockets to the moon, to Mars, whatever. And there will be some sort of bipartisan agreement to cut spending and increase increased taxes. And America actually doesn't. We're not talking about swinging to budget surplus tomorrow. That'd
- 39:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): be economic. economically devastating. But just getting the lines pointing in the right direction would not take that much effort. And getting them pointing forcefully in the right direction will take a bit of an effort, but one I think is entirely possible. But right now feels uh hard to predict uh that it's going to happen
- 39:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): anytime soon. But I I think it'll be fine. Um countries have had those kind of positions with pension savings. I think that's going to be quite difficult. But
- 40:08
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
- 40:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): know, Americans have have have triumphed through harder challenges than this. So I believe in you guys.
- 40:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Thank you, Robin. I appreciate that confidence, and I certainly hope that you are right. Um, well, congrats on the book. I really enjoyed it, and thanks so much for joining us.
- 40:25
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): No,
- 40:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): no, bro. Thanks so much for having me on and left me bang on about the bond market. It is my favorite subject on the whole in the whole world, as you can probably tell.
- 40:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Thank you so much.
- 40:36
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 40:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that's the show. Thank you so much for spending part of your weekend with us, and thanks to Parts Channel, as always, the engineer for this episode. People on the program may have interest in the investments they talk about, and the Molly Motley Pool Fool may have formal recommendations for or against, so don't buy or sell investment. investments based solely on what you hear. All personal finance content follows Motley Fool editorial standards and is not approved by advertisers.
- 40:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Advertisements are sponsored content and provided for informational purposes only. To see our full advertising disclosure, please check out our show notes. I'm Robert Brokamp. Fool on everybody.
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