Chad Bown and Speaker_0 discuss trade war dynamics, US tariffs on Canada, and the need for new global trade institutions.
Summary
Chad P. Bown argues that while no one truly wins a trade war, China is currently 'winning' due to its coherent strategy, whereas democracies struggle with long-term consistency. He highlights how the breakdown of the WTO system has led to a new era of subsidies and discriminatory tariffs, with Canada facing existential threats from US tariffs on its manufacturing sector. Speaker_0 adds that US tariffs harm Canadian consumers and that middle powers failed to coordinate resistance due to security dependencies and divergent interests regarding China. The speakers propose structural reforms, including an 'Organization for Watching Liability' (OWL) to manage legitimate industrial concentrations and prevent broader trade wars.
Key takeaways
- 1 States of coercing that potential partners, Canada, are going to say, uh, I'm going to be hesitant to do anything with you unless you make some changes to convince me that you're not going to treat me like that again in the future. And again, that's going to require domestic reform in the United States. It's ultimately going to require Congress taking away or modifying some of the authorities that the executive branch currently enjoys. that has been delegated to the executive branch over the decades to make sure that that kind of thing doesn't happen in the future.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) · 35:40
Episode sections
- 0:01 – 2:09
Introduction and the Definition of Winning a Trade War
Patrick Bryden introduces Chad P. Bown, who argues that while no one truly wins a trade war, the goal is to minimize damage. Bown suggests that China is currently 'winning' by having a clear strategy, whereas other nations are still figuring out their approach.
- 2:09 – 7:36
Breakdown of the Rules-Based Trading System
Bown explains that the old WTO system broke down due to the geographic concentration of production in China, creating vulnerabilities exposed by pandemics and geopolitical tensions. This led to a shift where subsidies and discriminatory tariffs are now used to secure supply chains, replacing the previous rules against such practices.
- 7:36 – 10:49
Lessons from China's Industrial Policy
Bown highlights China's 'dual circulation' strategy to reduce dependence on the West while maintaining Western dependence on China. He advises Western nations to learn from China's domestic competition policies, which drive innovation and cost reduction, rather than adopting China's authoritarian economic model.
- 10:49 – 15:49
Challenges of Democratic Policy Implementation
Bown discusses his time in the Biden administration, noting that U.S. industrial policy requires alignment between the executive and Congress, which is difficult in a divided government. He contrasts this with China's ability to maintain long-term consistency, highlighting the difficulty democracies face in sustaining long-term economic strategies.
- 15:49 – 19:18
Trade as National Security and Existential Threats
Bown argues that trade and national security are now merged. He describes U.S. tariffs on Canada as an existential threat to Canadian manufacturing due to just-in-time supply chain integration. He also notes China's weaponization of essential inputs like permanent magnets, which could halt automotive production.
- 19:18 – 24:25
Canada's Failed Retaliation and Economic Pivot
Bown explains that Canada's traditional retaliation strategy failed in the second Trump term because the U.S. administration was willing to absorb higher prices. Consequently, Canada is pivoting toward diversifying its economy into energy and critical minerals, requiring significant government support to compete with China's market dominance.
- 24:25 – 26:27
U.S. Political Dynamics and Tariff Removal
Bown analyzes the U.S. midterm elections, noting that removing executive trade authority requires a two-thirds congressional majority, which is unlikely. He distinguishes between Section 232 national security tariffs, which are harder to remove but economically critical for Canada, and Section 301 tariffs, which are easier to remove but less impactful.
- 26:27 – 32:27
Investment Uncertainty and Global Diversification
Bown criticizes the U.S. administration's use of uncertainty as a feature, which discourages long-term scale investments. He advises Canada to diversify not just trading partners but economic output, targeting markets like Europe and Korea for critical minerals, while acknowledging the need for new policy tools to counter China's predatory practices.
- 32:27 – 34:41
US Tariffs and Canadian Consumer Impact
Speaker_0 argues that US tariffs forcing manufacturing back to the US harm Canada by removing local jobs and inputs, forcing Canadian consumers to pay higher prices for vehicles without receiving local economic benefits. This loss of scale for US automakers could ultimately harm the US ability to compete globally with China.
- 34:41 – 36:32
Long-term Trust Deficit and US Domestic Reform
Speaker_0 suggests that the relationship between the US and partners like Canada has fundamentally changed, with a lasting trust deficit. He argues that future US administrations cannot simply revert to pre-2016 policies, and that the US may need domestic reforms, such as Congress modifying executive branch authorities, to reassure partners.
- 36:32 – 38:02
Political Polarization vs Economic Nuance
Speaker_0 expresses concern that political polarization in the US prevents nuanced policy discussions, making it difficult for policymakers to understand the complex realities of trade and tariffs. He believes politics and strategic concerns often overpower economic fundamentals like comparative advantage.
- 38:02 – 40:37
Failure of Middle Power Coordination
Speaker_0 explains that middle powers failed to coordinate against US tariffs due to self-interest and security dependencies. Europe accepted unfavorable trade terms to maintain US security support regarding Russia, while Asian nations like Vietnam and Indonesia accepted tariffs to attract supply chains moving out of China.
- 40:37 – 42:15
Divergent Interests Regarding China
Speaker_0 notes that aligning countries on China policy is difficult because nations have different domestic needs. For example, Australia lacks a manufacturing sector and benefits from cheap Chinese goods for its green transition, making it hard to build a unified front against China's market dominance.
- 42:15 – 47:10
Long-term Challenges and OWL Proposal
Speaker_0 states that trade challenges with China are long-term and will not be fixed by short-term elections. He proposes an international body called OWL (Organization for Watching Liability) to identify legitimate geographic concentrations of production, allowing governments to use industrial policy in those specific areas without triggering broader trade wars.
Claims worth verifying
Chad P. Bown is the Reginald Jones Senior Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics and former chief economist at the U.S. Department of State.
Patrick Bryden ·1:09
How to verify: Peterson Institute for International Economics staff page; U.S. State Department archives. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Bown is co-author of the book 'How to Win a Trade War'.
Patrick Bryden ·1:09
How to verify: Book publication records, publisher website, or library catalog. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The rules-based trading system under the World Trade Organization began in the mid-1990s.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·2:50
How to verify: WTO historical records or official establishment dates. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
TSMC is a Taiwanese company that produces high-end semiconductors.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·3:10
How to verify: Company website or SEC filings if listed; general business knowledge. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceChina supplies 95% of the world's production of permanent magnets.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·18:25
How to verify: U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) Mineral Commodity Summaries or industry reports on rare earth magnets. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The Biden administration's industrial policy initiatives were eliminated in January 2025.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·13:34
How to verify: U.S. Federal Register, executive orders, or news archives from January 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Canada is part of the CPTPP (Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership).
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·31:28
How to verify: Government of Canada trade agreements page or CPTPP official site. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The average holding period in the S&P 500 is less than half a year.
Patrick Bryden ·14:03
How to verify: Financial industry studies, e.g., J.P. Morgan or Charles Schwab research on turnover rates. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Section 232 tariffs apply to steel, aluminum, and automobiles based on national security.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·25:54
How to verify: U.S. Code Title 19, Section 1862; U.S. Trade Representative announcements. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Section 301 tariffs are currently hitting Canada.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·26:15
How to verify: U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) list of tariff actions; Customs and Border Protection data. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The US population is 340 million.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·33:23
How to verify: US Census Bureau population estimates for 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Europe accepted a 15% tariff from the US.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·38:41
How to verify: US Treasury Department or Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) announcements regarding trade agreements with EU member states post-April 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Asian nations like Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand accepted tariffs of 19-20% from the US.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·39:41
How to verify: USTR tariff schedules and press releases for specific countries in 2026-2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
ASML is the only maker of EUV machines for producing chips needed for artificial intelligence.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·44:30
How to verify: ASML Holding N.V. investor relations materials and technical specifications for EUV lithography systems. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
TSMC makes all the best chips.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·44:30
How to verify: Semiconductor industry reports (e.g., from Gartner or IDC) on market share for advanced logic chips. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The speaker is the Reginald Jones Senior Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·46:38
How to verify: Peterson Institute for International Economics staff directory. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The speaker is co-author of How to Win a Trade War.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·46:38
How to verify: Book publication records and author bios for Chad P. Bown and Sumea Choudhury. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Do your own research
- Verify Chad Bown's current affiliation with the Peterson Institute for International Economics and his past role in the Biden administration to assess potential conflicts of interest.
- Check the specific Section 232 and Section 301 tariff rates currently applied to Canadian automotive and steel/aluminum exports via the US Customs and Border Protection website.
- Research the 'dual circulation' strategy details in official Chinese Five-Year Plans to verify claims about China's economic independence goals.
- Analyze Canadian manufacturing employment data and vehicle production volumes to assess the impact of US tariffs on local jobs and supply chains.
- Review the legislative history of US executive trade authorities (e.g., Trade Expansion Act of 1962) to evaluate the feasibility of Congress modifying these powers.
- Investigate the proposed 'Organization for Watching Liability' (OWL) concept for academic or policy papers discussing legitimate vs. illegitimate industrial monopolies.
- Compare trade agreement terms between the US and EU, and US and Asian nations like Vietnam/Indonesia, to verify claims about tariff acceptance and security dependencies.
- Examine Australian import data for Chinese EVs and solar panels to validate claims about reliance on cheap Chinese goods for green transition goals.
Full transcriptexpand
0:01Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Nobody wins a trade war, right? It would be better if we all agreed to not engage in these things. But given that you're having that's no longer a choice, and the trade wars are being thrust upon us, you do have to do something about it. And so winning here means minimizing your wounds, doing the best that you can.
0:17Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Welcome
0:17Patrick Bryden: to the Growth Lens by Scotia Growth Institute, a podcast about ideas, investments, and decisions shaping Canada's economic future. For decades, global trade was built around a common set of rules, growing economic integration, and the market-driven pursuit of efficient supply chains. But that system is being reshaped. Tariffs, export restrictions, and access to critical resources are increasingly being used as tools of economic and geopolitical power. Trade policy is no longer. only about commerce, it is also a matter of national security. For Canada, a country deeply connected to the United States but rich in many of the resources the world needs, this changing environment presents both significant risks and important strategic choices. In this episode, I speak with Chad P. Ed Baume, Reginald Jones Senior Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, former economist for the U.S. State Department, and co-author of the book How to Win a Trade War. We discuss what is replacing the old rules-based trading system, how the growing competition between the United States and China is reshaping the global economy, and what
1:29these changes mean for Canada. We also explore how Canada can protect its economic interests, strengthen its position in critical sectors, and build the relationships and resilience needed. to compete in a more fragmented world. I'm Patrick Bryden. Now, here's our conversation.
1:46Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Welcome to Canada, and thanks for joining us.
1:48Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Thanks for having me.
1:49Patrick Bryden: Let's start with the book itself. It obviously suggests that you can win a trade war as a country. And so I want to step back and maybe just ask kind of the fundamental, obvious question: why do trade war? wars happen? And then in particular, why is it happening globally in the manner that it is right now? And I'm also interested to understand what winning truly means. And if you were to pick anyone who is winning right now, who would that be?
2:16Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Trade wars can happen for all kinds of reasons. And we're seeing a lot of different trade wars today. Um, whether it's countries being hit with import restrictions and tariffs uh like we're seeing these the United States and the Trump administration doing,
2:29Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh,
2:30Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): or countries being hit with export restrictions, losing access to essential inputs that they need to make their economies run, like what China is doing at the moment. I think in the current context, what led to this moment of the trade wars of today was maybe a combination of factors. One, um, we were living in this rule. rules-based trading system with really low trade barriers for a period of, you know, roughly 20 years. So under the World Trade Organization beginning in the mid-1990s. And what that resulted in was a pretty efficient allocation of production globally. So you had these supply chains that popped up all over the world where it made sense to make. things. But oftentimes that led to the geographic concentration of production. And for a lot of products, that doesn't matter. But for some, it really did start to seem like it mattered. And so whether it was, you know, high-end semiconductors in Taiwan, right? All being done in one place by this Taiwanese company called TSMC, or, you know, all of the critical minerals of the world. that are essential for the green transition and a lot of consumer electronics and automakers, things like that, being refined in China. You got the geographic concentration of production. All of a sudden it makes you say, well,
3:50in a world with pandemics, earthquakes, climate-related shocks, weather, droughts, floods, that's not really good. And then you layer on top of that so much of this stuff happening in China, and China's a
4:02Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): not
4:02Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): really. transparent place. And then rising geopolitical concerns that, well, we don't really can't see what's happening in China, and we're increasingly worried about what China's interests are over the long run, both economically and then militarily, foreign policy. I think that led policymakers to be really, really concerned and then to want to do something about it. But to me, that's sort of why we ended up
4:25Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): where
4:25Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we did. It was a conversation. combination of economic forces, which led to supply chains creating some vulnerabilities that you might be concerned about. And then the rise of China, its economic model, but also the concerns over China for lots of other reasons too.
4:39Patrick Bryden: And any winners, so to
4:41Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): speak at
4:41Patrick Bryden: this point.
4:42Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): In in the book, to be clear, we've kind of redefined winning. Nobody wins a trade war, right? It would be better if we all agreed to not engage in these things. But given that you're having that's no longer a choice and the trade wars are being thrust upon us, you do have to do something about it. And so winning here means minimizing your wounds, kind of doing the best that you can. I think at the moment, China's winning in the sense that it's clearly thought out a strategy for how to engage in this world. And everybody else is very much still figuring it out. That being said, we're still in the middle of it. So uh there's still a long way to go. Um, and we'll have to see how how countries go from here.
5:19Patrick Bryden: Interesting. So you and your co-author, economist Sumea Keynes, argue that waiting for the old rules-based order is not a strategy. Basically, it's not coming back. And if that era is over, so to speak, what is replacing it?
5:33Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I think we're still very much at the intermediate stage. And so the I think the first thing to try to explain is why the rules broke down. Um and the rules under the World Trade Organization basically said that, you know, we're all going to agree not to use subsidies or industrial policy and not to have discriminatory use of tariffs. Right. You can have some tariffs relatively are low. We'll try to reduce them reciprocally, but try to keep treat everybody the same. If you recognize that in the new world that we're in, we are really concerned about the geographic concentration of production and a lot of that stuff happening in China in particular. And so governments around the world want to establish uh new sources of supply for whether it's semiconductors, critical minerals, batteries, a lot of other technologies outside of China, because you're worried about China's concentration of production in market. dominance. The policies that you have to use or that are most efficient for you to use to achieve that objective are subsidies and discriminatory tariffs. So those are kind of two of the fundamental rules of the old system would be constraining what you would want to be uh actively engaged in. So that's why the rules broke. We're still trying to figure out now, we the West collectively. And so the question is how are we going to do industrial policy either
6:53individually in countries or collectively? That's what we're still working through. And we don't have an institutional structure to help us get there. So we see countries doing a little bit on their own. Maybe they'll try to coordinate with each other. But how they're going to coordinate, whether it's in regional blocks, whether it's some sort of values-based, we don't know, right? And that's what we're, I think, trying to figure out at the moment, but there is no set path forward on this.
7:16Patrick Bryden: It's it's amazing. There's sort of emerging playbooks, and we'll see what happens, basically. Yeah. Let's maybe talk about some of the lessons that should have been learned by now and how to better respond. Like, what are the hard lessons Western governments should understand with respect to China now? And what can be done? How long might it take to kind of solve these problems without in particular, compromising the essential features of our economic systems?
7:45Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So I think, you know, whether it was intentional or not, and this may be a little bit of revisionist history, but I think it's to crystallize it, for me at least, I go back to a speech um that President Xi Jinping gave in 2020. This is known as his dual circulation speech, where he sets out a vision for China for the future, in which he wants China not to be dependent on the rest of the world for its supply chains, for all the essential inputs that China's going to need to make its economy run, doesn't want to be dependent on the West. But he very much wants the West, so the United States, Canada, Europe, Japan, Asia to be dependent on China for our supply chains. So I think the first thing that we have to do is recognize that that's the new world in which. we live, right? That that may be their objective. It's certainly what China has managed to achieve in a number of areas that are essential, right? Critical inputs, whether it's critical minerals, they're heading that direction on semiconductors, at least low-end semiconductors, batteries, and a lot of other technologies.
8:46Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
8:46Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): if that's what you're worried about, right, Um, then you say, okay, we need to use. some sort of industrial policy tariffs to help us create alternative sources of supply outside of China. What can we learn about from China what it's managed to achieve so far? Totally.
9:01Patrick Bryden: And
9:01Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): what you realize is, well, we don't want to become like China, right? China's got its own economic problems. It's got, you know, this real estate crisis, it's got bad demographics. It's an autocracy. We don't want that. So we don't want the Chinese system writ large. But what can we learn from the Chinese system that we can adapt for ourselves?
9:19Patrick Bryden: Right.
9:19Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): One thing I think we can learn is what seems to have made China very effective in its own use of industrial policy, for example. It is really, really worried and interested in ensuring there's competition amongst its domestic firms. Yeah. Right. So you look at electric vehicles
9:35Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): today.
9:37Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): It's not like China's not the Soviet Union, right? Where it's some sort of uh monolith with you know shortages and just state-owned enterprises running things. Yes, they have state-owned enterprises of certain products. Um for electric vehicles, while it that they may have um barriers to trade with the rest of the world, they've made uh clear that they're going to ensure massive demand. domestic competition. In fact, arguably too much domestic competition, right? They should allow some of these firms to fail. Uh, they're relying on them being able to export to continue their economic growth. But when you have a lot of domestic competition, that encourages innovation and encourages them to cut costs. And in some of these industries, this is why, in addition to their planning and industrial policy, uh China is now at the technological frontier, right? So the idea is if we we're gonna be forced to do some industrial policy in the West, more government intervention than we have done previously, we need to make sure to maintain uh elements of competition amongst our firms so they don't get fat and lazy, um, but they continue to innovate and to to try to do better. And I think so things like that, you know, we can learn from from the Chinese experience and adapt it to our own.
10:49Patrick Bryden: So let let's turn to your personal experience and travels in government. Um, you served as chief economist at the State Department under the Biden-Harris administration and as senior economist on President Obama's Council of Economic Advisors. What did you see from the inside, particularly with how trade decisions actually get made?
11:09Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um,
11:09Patrick Bryden: and maybe how markets and the public don't always see how that all works. It might and misunderstand a few things about that process. You
11:17Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): know, so as an economist going into government, at least in the American system, you're typically an advisor, right? So they, you know, I think a lot of our economist friends think about the role of economists in government when you're in central banking or maybe finance ministries. You're the ones that are ultimately making decisions. Certainly in the world of trade and where I've been in government, that's not the case. You're, you know, providing information about supply chains or strategies and giving advice, but ultimately it's the more the politicians that are going to consider that advice, maybe dismiss it, but ultimately make their own decision. So you're kind of advising, but you're not the ultimate decision maker.
11:54Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
11:54Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that's one. Um, I think the other big lesson that I took um from this last stint in government. So, as you mentioned, I was the chief economist at the State Department. in the Biden administration. I went in relatively late. So in the sense that the Biden administration did a lot on industrial policy, right? My job in government was then basically to explain to partners and allies around the world what the United States was doing. The decisions had already been made by the time I got in. So I wasn't part of the decision making. But what I was in charge of was to work with other countries on alignment, right? And what you realize is. the US went first, right? We have our own particular system. Things like industrial policy in the United States require alignment between the executive branch and Congress. That doesn't always happen, right? In the United States, right now we're gonna be moving into a period where the Trump administration and Congress is divided. Democrats control Congress, the administration is Republican. Probably not gonna going to see a whole lot of alignment on things like industrial policy. In Biden, there was. But that happens rarely. Other countries, their government systems operate on their own timelines. And so a lot of what was happening then was catching up, right? Other Canada, Europe
13:03implementing their own forms of that, and then trying to ensure that there was some broad alignment on incentives. So if that's the new world in which we're heading, and to deal with this China challenge, we collectively in the West needs
13:14Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): to be able to do that.
13:14Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): need to do things like industrial policy differently than we've done in the past. We also need to align it together. What you then realize that's really, really hard. Because as soon as I left government, January of 2025, a lot of the Biden administration's initiatives and policies were eliminated. So what you realize in our democracies, it's really, really hard to continue these long long-term term policies in
13:37Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the same sort of way. that
13:39Patrick Bryden: friction.
13:40Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah, that China is able to. And so implementing them, communicating them with other partners that you want to have them do similar things that are in alignment, this is going to be a tough slog for us to be able to do. And I think that was maybe the the big lesson that I took away from this, from this last anyway. Aaron
13:56Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Powell
13:56Patrick Bryden: Do you think Western governments are inherently capable of that? Like if you look at, you know, just
14:02Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): holding
14:03Patrick Bryden: periods in the marketplace, for example, you know, the average holding period in the SP 500 is less than half a year typically. You look at government cycles being two, four, six years, roughly, monetary cycles, all all of our cycles are quite short-term. You think that long-term planning is uh a muscle that can be built?
14:23Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): We have shown very little success at it so far in the current. environment. Now that being said, I think part of it is recognition, at least in the United States, I could speak to that best because that's where I'm from, um, about what the underlying challenge is. And until we recognize that the underlying challenge really is China, and that's what we're collectively trying to reorient our economic policy apparatus to address, and we kind of commit to that on a bipartisan basis, you're likely to see this flip-flopping back and forth. If we can overcome it and set a common objective that everyone is on board with, then you could at least get consistency from the United States, and maybe you'll be more likely to get consistency with other partners and allies as well. It's possible, right? When I was in government, this was, you know, 23, 24. Even at that stage, the rest of the world. hadn't really recognized and caught up to where the United States was in terms of thinking about the China's long term challenge and willingness to deal with it. Canada was early. Canada was the exception. Canada's been the one partner the United States has always had, at least previous to the current administration, recognizing the common challenge and willing to do something about it in terms of alignment of policy. But when I went to Europe or when I went to Asia, they weren't quite there yet. They have since I think caught up to now being confronted with other challenging trade
15:42wars and policies, including from the United States. So we'll see. But it is really, really hard. Democracies are messy.
15:49Patrick Bryden: Totally. So I I want to jump into kind of economic trade and security. Uh, when we think about things like rare earths, critical minerals, chips ships we've touched on. These have become tools of statecraft, maybe. in a way that none of us really envisioned. Uh and when we think about questions of natural resource abundance versus scarcity for various economies and a world that is more dominated by great powers and obviously intensive technological competition, do you think trade conflicts truly are akin to war? And I'll just add to that. Prime Minister Mark Kearney here in Canada has said that we have been attacked. What do you see in your time in government that might help kind of mitigate those types of situations so they don't devolve into more intensive forms of conflict around the globe?
16:41Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You
16:41Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): know, maybe over the last two, three, four decades, I think there was this cleavage between trade and and um and national security stuff. They were just in different lanes and treated separately. And so we would always have, you know, what we in the even during that, those good old times, trade wars of some sort. Of course, there's always these trade frictions out there, trade wars. Irritants. Irritants, but it was confined. Today is different. So I guess it's important to try to for us to understand why it's different. I think one way it's different is scale. So, you know, what the United States administration right now is doing to cancel. Canada with the tariffs. You might look at that and say, well, it's just tariffs, it's just like the old days, trade irritant. No, unfortunately not, right? This
17:25Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): is
17:25Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): potentially an existential threat to the Canadian manufacturing sector, right? Canada's manufacturing economy is so integrated with that of the United States because of just-in-time just in time supply chains, that if these U.S. territories tariffs remain in place, it's gonna be very difficult for Canadian manufacturing to survive, to remain competitive. Canada is just too far away from Asia and their just-in-time supply chains, or Europe and their just-in-time supply chains. So, in that sense, right, it's a much bigger deal, right? It it affects a much larger share of the Canadian economy than the traditional trade irritants would. And similar stories, I think, happen when you come to this weaponization. of essential inputs, like what China is doing nowadays, right? When they're threatening to cut off permanent magnets. So permanent magnets are these essential inputs that auto industries need, right? They're what makes your seat go backward and forward, the window you push the button, it goes up and down, the windshield wipers go back. If you don't have these things called permanent magnets, you can't make a car that consumers would want to buy. And China supplies ninety 95% five percent of the world's production of these things. Kind
18:27Patrick Bryden: of important.
18:28Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Kind of important. Um, because why? Well, there's, you know, in the United States, a million people that work in just-in-time automotive supply chains. And if you lose access to that essential input, all those people are going to be out of work, right? In Canada, it's similar proportionate numbers. So all of a sudden, you know, the weaponization of access to essential inputs through the use of export restrictions is a really, really big deal as well. It's more than just a trade irritant. So I think there is a concern. These economic issues could escalate to being bigger deals. Obviously we don't want it to spill over into war war and military conflict, but that is something that we kind of have to recognize As as as a potential you know, reality if they can and can't be confined right? Um, in the way that they have been confinable in the past as as trade irritants.
19:18Patrick Bryden: Let's turn our attention to Canada to talk about some of the challenges and opportunities. Using your books framework, how would you assess the state of affairs between Canada and the US, particularly as you think about the recent midterm election results and how this impacts the calculus of the trade war?
19:35Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Canada started off uh responding to the Trump. administration in early 2025 when the Trump administration started um imposing tariffs on Canada using the old playbook. And what I mean by that is Canada started retaliating with tariffs on American exports in traditionally politically sensitive areas of the United States. And in the past, this had worked, right? So looking back at the first Trump administration. when President Trump in 2018 imposed tariffs on Canadian steel and aluminum, Canada retaliated, hitting American farm products. That mattered and it was effective at the time because what happened then is they were in the midst of renegotiating then NAFTA into the new USMCA or Kuzma,
20:22Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I guess
20:22Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you sort
20:23Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): of call that here.
20:24Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And that was President Trump's signature. trade agreement. But to make it happen in the United States, he had to get it passed through Congress. So that effectively gave Canada leverage. To get it passed through Congress, the Republican senators had to agree. And they all said, Well, uh, Mr. President, we need you to convince Canada to take off its tariffs on our farm exports. And that meant the Trump administration had to remove the tariffs on Canadian steel and aluminum. So the old playbook worked back then. Canada tried that this time around, and it didn't work. And I think that's for a couple of reasons. One, there was nothing equivalent this time around that the president was going to need Congress for, that going after the traditional parts of the American political system would be an effective strategy over. The president this time around is just much more wedded to the idea that he was going to do tariffs and even acknowledged early on in the administration in a way that he didn't do the first time around, that this was going to be costly to Americans. Right. Americans were going to get need to get used to the idea that they were gonna pay higher prices for things. Right. There was this famous quip that uh he said, you know, you may only need to be able to buy, you know, three Barbie dolls um for your kids for for Christmas this year instead of you know twenty 20 or something like that. That's implicit recognition that Americans are going to pay
21:42Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): for the
21:43Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): tariffs this time in a way. He he never said anything like that in the first administration. So this was just different. And in response to that, I think Canada then reacted, as you said, fluid and said, okay, these tariffs aren't effectively changing American behavior. They're hurting us. So let's dial them back in in places where they're actually costly to Canadians that make makes sense. And in the period since, worried that this may be the new reality for Canada, that these tariffs may not be going away. These American tariffs may not be going away. Thinking about the longer-term strategy for Canada. And if it's not going to be able to be part of just in time North American supply chains anymore, and part of a manufacturing anymore, if that part of the Canadian economy is going to slowly be phased out, that needs other parts of the Canadian economy need to grow. And Canada does other amazing things, services, financial services, but also it has a lot of natural resources, right? Energy products. It has a lot of these critical minerals in the ground. But if the Canadian economy is going to start to try to take advantage of those things, it needs a lot more investment, both from the private sector and it's going to need government policies that are going to support the further development of those sectors. And so infrastructure projects over the long term, whether it's new pipelines to get the oil that's currently
23:02flowing mainly north-south to the United States, to suddenly flow east-west, either to get it to Asian markets for export or maybe to Europe. If you wanna want to do critical minerals, that means you're gonna going to be competing with China. China has monopoly power over this stuff. They may be restricting it, our access to it today. But as soon as our companies would enter into this space, I think they would suddenly find a flood of Chinese product out in world markets driving down prices and making those returns non viable. If that's the long-term Canadian strategy, there's going to be a need for government policy to help our private sectors withstand that, right? So thinking about things like price support and offtake agreements and long term price guarantees. Now, obviously
23:44Patrick Bryden: stockpiles.
23:45Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah, stockpiling. Canada is still a relatively small country, and there's going to be global demand for this stuff. And so this is, again, probably going to involve Canada working with other partners and countries and allies out there in the world that are all concerned about China and similar things. But the main point is what the current Canadian administration has been doing to react to what's coming out of the United States, it's consistent at least with recognition that those underlying problems, this may be the longer-term solution for Canada. It's gonna be hard. It's gonna require transformation of the Canadian economy, but at least Canada is being set up to pursue that path if the United States continues to pursue the path that it seems to be on currently. Now, the midterm. question, we'll we'll we'll have to wait and see. The midterm election was surprising in terms of how overwhelmingly positive it was for the Democrats. The number of seats that they got in the Senate was larger than anticipated in particular. But any change on trade policy at the
24:45moment is going to require the Congress taking away executive authority from the president. That's going to require a two-thirds majority in both the House and the Senate. Because if they didn't have it, President Trump would just veto it. It's not clear how many Republicans. Currently, I think 55 or so Democrats, we're still counting the votes at the moment, but might have 55, you need 67 total. Would there be 12 Republicans who might be willing to defect to rein in some of these executive authorities on trade policy? We'll see. That's going to be the main issue, you know, confronting uh the next Congress. One can be hopeful that you might get some reform in the United States. Um, but I think we also have to be realistic as well. And who knows, times could change. There could be other economic shocks, foreign policy shocks that create new challenges.
25:31Patrick Bryden: And there's a spectrum of tariff tools that basically ladder out uh, I would say, probabilities, or as you might
25:39Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): have. And
25:39Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I the most damaging US tariffs at the moment from the Canadian perspective are also the most difficult ones to remove in the sense that they have not been successfully challenged
25:52Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in the
25:53Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): course.
25:54Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): These would be the
25:54Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Section 232 national security tariffs on steel, aluminum, automobiles, parts, the really important um sectors for the Canadian economic. economy. Getting Congress to rein in those authorities will be hard. It might be easier to get rid of some of the other tariffs, the Section 338 tariffs that are currently hitting Canada. And while those are are institutionally and politically important, they're unfortunately just not as economically important from the Canadian perspective. And so, yeah, really di d dialing back the current US tariffs that are hurting Canada are also gonna be, I think, some of the most politically difficult as well.
26:27Patrick Bryden: Let's talk about that, like living with these uncertainties. Um you know, we've touched on the Canada, US, Mexico agreement, whatever we want to call that, USMCA, Kuzma or TMEC, but um uh
26:39Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
26:40Patrick Bryden: know, it now faces annual reviews instead of uh instead of a nice 16 year long duration that uh gives a lot of certainty. How should Canadian companies navigate all of those uncertainties? Do you think it's possible for some of these materially affected sectors, such as industrials, manufacturing, or the associated metals to maintain competitiveness or seek new markets? Or do you believe a more structural transformation will be required in some of these businesses to basically adapt to these new realities?
27:10Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I think it's probably adapting to the new realities. President Trump and in the the administration view the uncertainty that's generated by their policies as a feature, not a bug. The uncertainty about what the U.S. trading relationship with the world is going to be, uh, they see that as well. Uh the response to that should be that you should just invest here in the United States. I think that's a mistake. I think eventually some firms and industries maybe force. may be forced to make that choice. They just can't wait it out any longer for that uncertainty to be resolved, and they do end up making the decision to invest in the United States. But they do so in a way that's not kind of fully throated because they don't know what their long-term access to any of these markets are going to be. They know they get access, okay, to 340 a million Americans. Um, but what's the long-term access to the Canadian market, to the Mexican market? the European market, right? And for a lot of these industries, scale is really, really important, especially the industries that find themselves competing globally with China. Right. So if you think about automakers today, their big competition is China. They need to figure out the technologies of the future, whether it's the battery chemistry or how they're going gonna to also stick all these consumer electronics into vehicles to make them popular with consumers.
28:27Uh, so that makes them need to understand the technology mix and then to make the the massive long-term fixed cost investments in new facilities, but to be able to produce at scale, but producing at scale for 340 million consumers versus potentially a billion consumers, if you could aggregate up to include Europe in and your friend group, Canada, Japan, Korea are two entirely different things. And the fact the administration is not is is leaving all that uncertainty out there. You know, how big that final market is going to be, I think ultimately is doing a disservice, obviously, to the industry. So they don't know how to make those investments,
29:07Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): but
29:07Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): also to long-run American and Western ally strategy, Yeah. uh, and and the ability to kind of pull off that strategy if. effectively too.
29:15Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Yeah, let's talk about that. Um, you know, there's obviously proactive things that have happened here coming out of the United States. And then there's uh varied responses out of a multitude of countries, and they range. And so in Canada, there's kind of this balance between diversification and geographic realities. Canada's diversifying towards Europe, Asia, and Indone. Indo-Pacific. Is it realistic for a country like Canada to try to even go beyond its geography when clearly it's been so tied historically to the United States?
29:48Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So I think diversification can work if it's not just diversification of trading partners, but it's also diversification of what your economy is doing. It's going to be, again, very difficult for Canada to be able to be part of the just-in-time automotive supply chains of Europe or Asia because you're just too far away. But if you're talking about diversification of your economy toward the other things that Canada is good at and has a comparative advantage in energy, critical minerals, and the resources that are going to be in huge demand of the future. And if you're thinking about global markets there and the economies that are going to be driving that, you're going to be competing with China. So again, you're going to need to make investments and deal with that policy environment. But the other economies of the world that are going to be craving those resources are Europe. The second best quote unquote firms in the battery and electric vehicle space at the moment outside of China are the Koreans, right? So recognizing that, and they need you know, a lot of these critical minerals. and they would prefer them to be sourced from somewhere outside of China too. If Canada can diversify and engage in those kinds of new partnerships, I think there is a path forward. That's what I would be advising. But that being said, it has to be recognition that, oh, we're gonna have to do more than just
31:08go out and sign traditional trade deals like we've done in the past with these new partners. No, you're gonna have going to. to do more. You're going to have to recognize the predatory nature of China that is currently enjoying market dominance of all these essential inputs. Even if you do a partnership with Korea, Japan, you know, or the EU, EU CPTPP, right? This big Asian trade deal that Canada is a part of. You're going to have to accompany that with these new tools to create alternative sources of supply out. outside of China, or else you're going to be stuck with the same sort of coercion or the fear of coercion that Canada is even dealing with today, too, from the Chinese, right? It may help you solve your problem with the United States, but it's not going to help you solve the bigger challenge that everybody's facing with China.
31:53Patrick Bryden: If I can ask you, like if you were in the leadership's position here in Canada, is there anything you would be doing differently?
32:00Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Not really. Positioning yourself to be able to react to the US administration if they wake up and change their priorities. Let me explain as an American why I think what the Trump administration is doing that's incorrect with respect to their treatment of Canada. To me, you put these trade barriers on Canada, and it's essentially the Trump administration recognizing there's going to only be so much manufacturing in the world that takes place outside of China. That's a new reality that we face. There's only so much that's going to take place in North America. We want all of it to take place here in the United States. I think that's wrong. I think if you cut the Canadian economy off from North American manufacturing,
32:39Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): all
32:40Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): of a sudden Canadian consumers are going to wake up and say, we could continue to buy those cars that used to be made in North America. Yeah, they're more expensive, but in the old days when they were more expensive, we got to enjoy the some of the benefits of them being more expensive. There were jobs here in Canada that were being supported by them. There were inputs. Auto parts suppliers were here. The steel and aluminum that was going into those cars were made here. We were enjoying some of the benefits locally of paying those higher prices for North American vehicles. If it's now just the Americans that are benefiting from higher prices because all the jobs and all the inputs are coming out of the United States. Why do we want to pay higher prices? Let's just buy the cheaper vehicles out there that China has on offer to us, right? So in the end, the Trump administration, by pulling all the manufacturing into the United States, loses access to the Canadian consumer. And why that's important is you then, if you're the United States, are losing access to scale. To compete with China globally, we need as many consumers as we can. We've only got 340 million of them in the United States. We need the Canadian consumers.
33:43We need the European consumers and the Japanese and the Koreans as well. That I think is the short sighted view of the current US administration and where it's ultimately going to come back to harm us. So, but that's a reality that I think Canada has to deal with. That they may end up facing that policy. And if so, what it is they're they're pursuing in terms of keeping their eye options open at the moment seems to be, to me at least, the rational strategy for them to be pursuing.
34:08Patrick Bryden: You're an economist. Maybe I can just ask you this. I mean, I'm probably asking you to put on the hat of a psychologist, but it's been remarkable to look at a lot of the responses. Some have acquiesced in certain countries or trading blocks, and others have chose to fought. Canada's one that is obviously still going through negotiations. and discussions, however you want to phrase it. It feels like there's almost a generational impact. It's going to take a long time to have memories kind of forget. How long do you think that might take to clear up, if ever?
34:41Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): That's a great question. I don't know. Even uh the first time around, right? So the first Trump administration was so different. The Biden administration came in, and again, I was not in initially. I didn't was until year three that I I kind of came in. But you could tell from the outside that things didn't happen right away. You know, there was just a repairing of the relationship that needed to take place. And also a recognition at that stage, I think, from the rest of the world that, oh, the Biden people weren't asking us to just go back to the way things were in 2015. twenty fifteen. And that's partly recognizing that the world has changed. There is this bigger China issue out there. I think the world, Canada, Europe, has recognized that today. Right. So there isn't a, you know, in 2028, 2029, if a new US administration comes in, it won't be, oh, we're going to go back to 2015 again, or we're even going to go back to 2024 again. I think the rest of the world has has recognized that. But we now have some such a history in the United States of coercing that potential partners, Canada, are going to say, uh, I'm going to be hesitant to do anything with you unless you make some changes to convince me that you're not going to treat me like that again in the future. And again, that's going to require domestic reform in the United States. It's ultimately going to require Congress taking away or modifying some of the
36:00authorities that the executive branch currently enjoys. that has been delegated to the executive branch over the decades to make sure that that kind of thing doesn't happen in the future. And I'm not sure American policymakers realize that yet.
36:13Patrick Bryden: As an economist, do you think that
36:16Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
36:17Patrick Bryden: kind of cold realities of those economics will eventually win? Or do you think the politics and the strategic still overpower what I think you would probably hold in your heart as comparative advantage and you know the real fundamental tenets of what drives economies globally.
36:32Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I fear the economics may not ultimately win. As I try to explain this to policymakers, it's really, really difficult for them to understand because the arguments are are much more nuanced, right? And this is as we were writing this book, it's easy to say tariffs are amazing or tariffs. are the worst thing ever, when the reality is it's more difficult than that. Yeah. Right. And we're now living in the more difficult world where we have to, as a society, be willing to engage in the nuance. And in the American political system at the moment, it's really, really difficult to engage on the nuance in terms of policy.
37:07Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
37:07Patrick Bryden: putting your finger on that, it's it's polarization and the truth is probably always in between. The solutions are probably always in between, but it's difficult. to separate
37:16Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
37:16Patrick Bryden: polarity.
37:17Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah.
37:17Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And we're not in a good space politically to make progress.
37:20Patrick Bryden: Shifting over to because we touched on this, the the middle powers in the whole equation here, Canada, but also countries like Mexico, the UK, Japan, Korea, Australia, even the EU, I would say, have all engaged with Washington for the most part bilateral. Why did the middle powers and other prominent powers fail to coordinate initially? And do you see more medium-term strategies potentially coming together? I mean, we touched on the CPTPP-EU as something that might potentially be effective. Have you seen any evidence that working together for some of these middle powers might actually progress things in a constructive way?
38:02Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
38:02Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the original. reason why the middle powers weren't able to coalesce, right? And I agree. I was, you know, watching uh the global reaction to the President Trump's Liberation Day tariffs of April 2025. You had leaders all over the world saying we were going to band together, and nobody did. I think largely that was self-interest. It's even it's difficult to talk about a lot of this trade stuff. We can't talk about it in isolation. So you ask you would ask, why didn't Europe stand up to to President Trump and his bullying? And why did they ultimately accept a 15% tariff and having to open up their own market to American exports? Part of the answer there is the linkage between trade and other stuff, right? Europe remains incredibly reliant on the United States for its security protection. And they're dealing right now. with, you know, first and foremost, Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the threats associated with that. At the time, they were worried about losing access to American support, both budgetarily, lost that, but access to military equipment they need to prosecute the war, uh, losing access to the intelligence that they need to get, you know, the information. There's just bigger deals out there, and they were. sort of having to be willing to accept a bad deal on trade to sustain sustain some of that other stuff. In Asia, you
39:21look at, you know, why did countries like Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand all accept bad deals from their perspective? They initially, as part of ASEAN, On sent signals that they might try to bargain collectively. They all ended up accepting tariffs of 19, 20%. Why? When it came down to it, what they realized is hmm, the United States seems to be going through this. It's going to impose really high tariffs on China. What's more important to us is that we look like a second best alternative for all the multinationals that are going to be moving their supply chains out of China. So long as we end up with a US tariff that's lower than China and we get it relatively soon, maybe we can lock in as these big multinationals. are making their decisions about where to land next, we can ensure that it's Vietnam as opposed to Indonesia, right? So they're all, you know, willing to give up on the collective good to try to make themselves individually more attractive in an economic sense.
40:15Patrick Bryden: So domestic nationalist.
40:17Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah.
40:17Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And I think that's you know what it all cut came down to in the short run. Um, a lot of that wasn't surprising to me. You know, having just been in government and my again, my job was to go around the world. and ask partners and allies, mainly, what are you seeing with China that, you know, has you worried? Has your economy concerned? And can we do something collectively about it? And it was really, really difficult, right? Because a lot of countries, okay, Australia, don't really have manufacturing sectors. Um, you try to explain well, we're concerned about China's market dominance, its exertion of monopoly power, restricting access to these essential inputs. Yeah, but it's unlikely to happen. And we really, really like these, you know, cheap Chinese electric vehicles, solar panels, all that kind of stuff. They're really important for our green transition. And we're not going to suffer a lot of lost jobs because we don't have manufacturing. The point being, it was just incredibly difficult to align all these countries on that issue, on the China issue. So the idea. that they were all going to get aligned on the Trump issue, it wasn't surprising to me when they weren't able to coalesce. Over the longer term, maybe they will be able to, but I think it will still come back to oftentimes what is it that we need domestically that might make us not willing to align.
41:32Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
41:32Patrick Bryden: maybe just some final perspectives. Personally, I really like how the book ends, in particular. that final chapter, it basically reinforces the historical perspectives, patterns that have been investigated in how to win a trade war, but it's also contemplated future scenarios. And I really appreciated how two authors provide interplay of ideas and perspectives, with Sumea perhaps positioned position more as someone who is a bit on the cynical side, and you cast as more optimistic. So maybe I can ask you, given your life's work and as things stand today, what are your feelings about the future? And do you have any final words of wisdom for uh us that we haven't covered yet?
42:15Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I think what we tried to do in in the concluding chapter is to say, is to be realistic, right? Even our future scenarios are well off into the future, right? We're talking about 2050, the main point being. this stuff is not going away anytime soon. The challenge, whether it's from Canada's perspective or the world's perspective, are not going to be fixed by the 2026 midterm elections. It's not going to be fixed by a 2028 election in the next administration after President Trump. These challenges, especially with China, are here to stay. That's the first point.
42:48Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
42:49Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the second is in some of the one of the scenarios at least, we try to identify what the underlying challenge is that we're going to have to fix collectively. What would it take, best case scenario, to come to a longer-term arrangement with China that would accommodate what both sides seem to be worried about at the moment? And so there, I think the traditional challenges of global imbalances and how we might have to do things differently there in on the macro side. There's traditional challenges of the Chinese economy not, you know, we don't ever assume that China is going to become like us in a democracy and market-oriented. So we need some more safeguards and rules to deal with surges of imports. Fine. But the other big thing that we have to tackle is this concern that you end up with the geographic concentration of production leading to market dominance and monopoly power. It's just not okay. And that is the big concern I think that policymakers are facing today. We confront that challenge in our domestic economies and we have antitrust authorities to deal with that. So the idea is, well, what would it, what could we pull off at an international level that might help us deal with that? Now, you're never going to cede, you know, authority to some global regulator, fine. But you could imagine an international institution that might come up and the one that we come up with is called OWL, the Organization for Watching Liability. So OWL, they because
44:08they can see things.
44:09Patrick Bryden: Certain amount of wisdom.
44:10Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah. Um, it would identify where there is instances in which it's legitimate that there are these, you know, globally concentrated productive sectors. And it's not just in China, too. From China's perspective, it might say rationally, right? Okay, yeah, we've got all the rare earths and critical minerals, um, but you all. have, you know, ASML. You're the only ones that, you know, make the EUV machines to produce the chips needed for artificial intelligence. And all the best chips are being made at this by TSMC, right? You have these globally concentrated areas of production as well. So the point being that there would be some international body that would recognize those. And where they're acknowledged to exist, governments would be allowed to tackle that problem. through industrial policy, tariffs, what have you, in ways that would allow for the extraordinary use of policy, but that wouldn't lead to World War III or trade war three, right? It would just sort of identify you can do crazy stuff in that area for a purpose. And then once you fixed it, you would kind of go back to the status quo. But the idea would be
45:11to let's recognize the underlying challenge and let's create a system, even with China being part of that, with the West, that would allow us to engage on those sorts of challenge without having to worry that it spills over to military conflict and other other areas. In that scenario, to be clear, I think Samea kills me off too. So it's not all positive, even from Chad's perspective, the
45:34Patrick Bryden: optimist. But you you are hopeful, you would say, or how do you
45:38Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
45:39Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): have to be hopeful, right? I'm a I'm an optimist by nature. Um, I have to think about policy design to get us to a better place. Um it's it I don't think it's happening anytime soon. But that being said, I think my job as a policy analyst is to create the ideas so that if ever there is a political opportunity to make progress, to make sure it's not the ideas that are holding us back. So in that sense, yeah. Do
46:03Patrick Bryden: you think it's the economics at the end of the day that forces that? I
46:06Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): think the economics play a huge role. Yeah. Right. Because ultimately these solutions need to be sustainable. Yeah. They need to be sustainable. We need to recognize the politics of sustainability. We need to recognize the differences in our international institutions. You know, China's just different, right? So it has to be sustainable from the perspective of their economy and their political system. Um, but
46:25Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it also
46:26Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): needs to
46:26Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): be a good idea.
46:27Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): be sustainable economically. And so we're not going to give up on the economics of all of this.
46:32Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
46:32Patrick Bryden: agree with
46:33Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you.
46:34Patrick Bryden: Thank you so much.
46:35Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Thanks for having
46:36Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): me.
46:38Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): I've been speaking with Chad Peaboun, Reginald Jones Senior Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics and co-author of How to Win a Trade War. For more research and insights from Scotia Growth Institute, visit Scotiagrowth Institute.com. If you enjoyed the podcast, consider leaving a review. It helps more people discover the show and supports future conversations like this one. I'm Patrick Bryden. Thanks for listening.