The Contrarian Capitalist Podcast

Tom Bradshaw warns S&P 500 near 1929 valuation peaks with 60% downside risk

21 min Listen to the original Episode page
Market ValuationFederal Reserve PolicyHistorical ComparisonsMargin DebtSector RotationInflationRisk Management

Summary

Guest Tom Bradshaw argues the S&P 500 is trading near historical valuation extremes comparable to 1929, citing a 150% premium over its 100-year average. He highlights that adjusted margin debt is three times higher than in 1929 and that current 4% inflation prevents the Federal Reserve from injecting liquidity to soften a crash. Bradshaw points to sector rotation into defensives and short-term Treasuries as early warning signs of market caution. He suggests a break below the 7,000 support level would signal a structural failure of the bull market.

Episode sections

  1. 0:02 – 1:17

    Intro and Valuation Chart Overview

    Speaker 0 introduces guest Tom Bradshaw and the episode date. Bradshaw presents a chart comparing current S&P 500 valuations to historical peaks, noting the market is near 1929 levels.

  2. 1:17 – 4:14

    Historical Comparisons and Crash Probabilities

    Bradshaw details S&P 500 peaks in 1929, 1937, 2000, and 1965, noting the current level is significantly above previous highs. He cites historical crashes of 50-86% following these peaks, suggesting a similar downturn is possible.

  3. 4:14 – 6:01

    Market Structure and Key Support Levels

    Speaker 0 acknowledges the market could rise further, but Bradshaw identifies 7,000 as a critical technical level. He argues that holding above 7,000 maintains a bullish bias, while a break below signals a failure of the market's structure.

  4. 6:01 – 9:54

    1937 and 1965 Historical Context

    Bradshaw explains the 1937 crash was caused by Federal Reserve tightening and sterilized gold inflows, leading to a deep recession. He contrasts this with the 1965 peak, which resulted in a slow rollover due to persistent inflation rather than deflation.

  5. 9:54 – 12:32

    Inflation Constraints on Federal Reserve Policy

    Bradshaw argues that current inflation around 4% prevents the Fed from injecting liquidity to soften a market crash. He suggests this constraint makes a rapid, violent correction more likely than a slow decline.

  6. 12:32 – 15:02

    1929 Comparisons and Margin Debt

    Addressing skepticism about 1929 comparisons, Bradshaw highlights that adjusted margin debt is three times higher today. He also notes similarities in technological hype (AI vs. radios/autos) and investor complacency regarding government bailouts.

  7. 15:02 – 17:32

    Valuation Metrics and Risk Management

    Bradshaw references Warren Buffett’s valuation metric, stating the S&P 500 is approximately 150% above its 100-year average. He emphasizes the mathematical difficulty of recovering from a 50% loss, advocating for de-risking.

  8. 17:32 – 21:23

    Sector Rotation and Yield Curve Signals

    Bradshaw identifies 7,002 as the key pivot high from January 2026. He observes sector rotation from tech to defensive assets and short-term Treasuries, suggesting investors are cautious but not yet fleeing equities entirely.

Assets discussed

AssetKindStanceContext
US dollarUSDcurrencyneutralObviously, there's been some, you know, that there has, I mean, the US dollar has surged recently.

“Stance” is how the speakers talked about the asset, not a recommendation.

Claims worth verifying

The S&P 500 is around 650 points from the 1929 peak and above the peaks of 2000 (4,700), 1937 (5,800), and 1965 (3,850).

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·1:17

How to verify: Check historical S&P 500 data adjusted for US GNP on Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) or S&P Dow Jones Indices. For recent events, verify 2026-08-17 through 2026-11-17. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The S&P 500 dropped 86% following the 1929 peak over three years.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·2:14

How to verify: Review historical S&P 500 total return data from 1929 to 2026 via S&P Dow Jones Indices or CRSP. For recent events, verify 2026-08-17 through 2026-11-17. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The S&P 500 dropped approximately 50% following the 1937 and 2000 peaks.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·2:51

How to verify: Review historical S&P 500 data for 1937-2026 and 2000-2026 via S&P Dow Jones Indices or CRSP. For recent events, verify 2026-08-17 through 2026-11-17. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The 1937-1938 recession was caused by the Federal Reserve raising reserve requirements and the government sterilizing gold inflows.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·7:11

How to verify: Consult Federal Reserve historical records on reserve requirements and Treasury gold operations from 2026-2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-17 through 2026-11-17. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Inflation is currently around 4%, which is double the Fed's target.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·10:05

How to verify: Check the latest US CPI or PCE inflation data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) or Federal Reserve. For recent events, verify 2026-08-17 through 2026-11-17. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Adjusted margin debt is three times higher today than in 1929.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·13:04

How to verify: Compare current FINRA margin debt data with historical margin debt figures from 2026, adjusting for derivatives. For recent events, verify 2026-08-17 through 2026-11-17. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The S&P 500 is trading around 7,600 points, which is 150% above its 100-year average.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·4:57

How to verify: Calculate the current S&P 500 level against the 100-year geometric mean of S&P 500 valuations using S&P Dow Jones Indices data. For recent events, verify 2026-08-17 through 2026-11-17. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The 7,002 level is the January 2026 pivot high for the S&P 500.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·17:51

How to verify: Check S&P 500 price action for January 2026 to identify the highest point reached. For recent events, verify 2026-08-17 through 2026-11-17. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The US dollar has surged recently, and investors are moving into short-term Treasury bonds.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·19:25

How to verify: Check the DXY (US Dollar Index) and US Treasury yield curves for late 2026 via Bloomberg or Federal Reserve H.15 data. For recent events, verify 2026-08-17 through 2026-11-17. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The 1965 peak resulted in a slow rollover rather than a crash because inflation remained at 1-3%.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·8:51

How to verify: Review US inflation data from 2026-2026 and S&P 500 performance during that period via FRED and S&P Dow Jones Indices. For recent events, verify 2026-08-17 through 2026-11-17. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Do your own research

  • Verify current S&P 500 price and compare against the 100-year historical average using Yahoo Finance or S&P Global data.
  • Check the latest Federal Reserve balance sheet and M2 money supply data to assess liquidity constraints.
  • Review the latest FRED data for US inflation (CPI/PCE) to confirm the 4% claim.
  • Analyze FINRA margin debt statistics to verify the claim that adjusted margin debt is three times 1929 levels.
  • Research the 1937-1938 recession causes using NBER historical data to validate the sterilized gold inflow argument.
  • Monitor the S&P 500 performance relative to the 7,002 technical level identified in January 2026.
  • Compare current sector rotation trends using ETF flows (e.g., XLK vs. XLP) to assess defensive positioning.
  • Read Warren Buffett's Berkshire Hathaway shareholder letters for context on the 'Buffett Indicator' valuation metric.
Full transcriptexpand
0:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Welcome to the contrarian capitalists. Welcome to Crash of the Century Inbound. We're going to look at a fantastic chart today. And of course, to do that, the chart has been provided by Tom Bradshaw of Beyond the Headlines. Four bits of housekeeping before we get started. Number one, we are recording this video on Tuesday, the
0:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): 17th of November 2026. Number two, do not take any of what we say as investment or trading advice. We are not financial advisors. Number three, please always do continue to provide feedback. So if there's something you'd like us to look at or talk about, let us know because we do read that feedback. And number four, please do subscribe to Tom
0:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Bradshaw on both LinkedIn and of course Substack, and the Contrarian Capitalist on Substack as well. Tom, great to have you back here and as per usual, you have an excellent chart that is going to highlight some issues within the SP 500.
0:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yes, I do. And I'll I'll share that chart right away because it's um really is quite quite mind-blowing where we are today. Um, in relation to over a hundred years of data, uh, this chart goes back. And what's absolutely sensational about this chart is that we're only
1:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): around 650 points from the 1929 peak, which is absolutely unbelievable. I mean, it it far surpasses what we saw in 2000 in the dot com peak, where we peaked around 4,700 points. The 1937 peak was only around 5,800 points, and then the
1:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Nifty 50 peak of the mid-1960s was only about 3,850 points. So we are well above those three previous levels. And I think I think the thing that sticks out the most is what happened last time. We were above 7,500 points, which was only 1929. That's that's the only time the SP's Has
1:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): been above 7,500 points in adjusted for USGNP. US GNP, uh, which is gross national product, uh, which is the total size of the US economy. So it is kind of like a it's it's a alternative to the sort of buffer indicator. Uh
2:13
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): but
2:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): when the SP, I mean, in 1929, the SP dropped 86% uh following this peak, which is only around 10% higher uh than the 7,600-point peak. we were at in Q3. It's worth noting the SP today is around 7,300 points. It was at
2:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): 7,600 points if we look at the whole quarter, the previous quarter, because this is quarterly data, so it is slightly backward looking at this stage. But obviously for the peak, it's useful to to look at the to look at the kind of peak of this particular cycle. But the SP dropped 86%.
2:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): following the 1929 peak over three years. Are we going to see that again? Well, I mean, basically we are, you know, 1937, we saw around a 50% crash in the SP over one year, following that peak. And the 2000 dot-com peak, we saw around a 50% crash again over a couple of years. So again,
3:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I mean, we are, you know, you know, whenever we peak a above 4,000, uh even above 7,000, we are talking about 50 to perhaps even 86% crashes. So I think what's very clear is based on where we are today, a 50% plus crash is on the cards. It's just whether we get
3:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): something, you know, a lot more severe than say 50, something closer to what we saw in 1929.
3:39
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well I
3:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): think it's quite a compelling chart, Tom, as per usual. Thank you for highlighting the discrepancy there in the points. Because I was going to ask you about that. So thank you for highlighting the fact that that's quarterly data. I think that
3:54
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a
3:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): couple of things I take away from this is that number one, it just doesn't it doesn't look healthy. And as much as we can sit here and say yes, the odds of this crashing are you know relatively high, I think we should um certainly in my case acknowledge that this could also again go higher. There is still room to run
4:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): if we're going back to that nineteen twenty-nine comparison. So this this bubble could get bubblier, basically.
4:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Absolutely. Yeah, I mean, I mean it's very hard to call a top. I mean, personally, I think seven. 7,000 is a very key level for the SP to hold. Um, that's my kind of key line line in the sand. So I think if we do remain above 7,000 points, I think there is a potential to go all the way up to 8,300 points. So that's so that is in my mind. At the moment, it's
4:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): neutral to bullish bias, I think, if you look at the if you look on a technical basis, but obviously you've got to have in mind that the market is extremely overvalued. I mean, we should be at around 3,150 points,
4:57
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
4:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): we're at 7,600 points. I mean, that's that's about 150% above the average going back a hundred years. So I mean, it's not this isn't an ordinary size bubble. I mean, the market is basically basically needs to crash approximately 60% to get back to its average based on where it is today.
5:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Based, you know, well, well, this well, the recent peak of 7,600. I think today it's it's probably closer to 55%, but it's still, you know, losing half half your money on the market, um, you know, more than half your money to get back to fair value is quite a damning statistic, I would say.
5:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I I I totally agree. And uh just going through the previous peaks here, 1929, I I think most people are going to be familiar with with what happened there. 2000, again, I think most people are going to be familiar. Today's peak, again, I think most people are going to be familiar. 1937 and 1965. Now they're interesting to me because I don't think they're years that
5:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we have covered ever before in any of the videos. So
6:01
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): are
6:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): there any particular reasons as to why there was such a decline in 1937 and 1965? Admittedly, for the people that cannot see the chart, the drop in 1965, um it wasn't ridiculously dramatic in comparison to every other peak here. I just want to point out 1937 37
6:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): is probably the one that interests me the most. That's quite a dramatic drop. Uh any particular reason why that was the case?
6:29
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
6:29
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it's a good question. I I mean, I mean, from my research that I've done, I mean, obviously the Great Depression unfolded during the 30s, and what you had, you had a really, I mean, you had the deepest um recession, you know, in US history between 1929 and 1933. Then you had, then obviously gold was revalued, and that allowed a lot
6:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): of money to be created.
6:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): uh, sort of 1933 to 1935 time. I mean, that was the time Roosevelt took over as uh president, and then you had a big flood of liquidity. And obviously that kind of explains why the market kind of then surged up between sort of 1932 and 1937. But then you had then you had
7:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): a situation where you actually had what's called in monetary. policy, sorry, monetary policy preemptive tightening, where what occurred was the Federal Reserve cut reserve requirements on, sorry, raised reserve requirements on banks. So essentially tighten policy. And then the government sterilized
7:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): gold inflows at the same time. And that cut the money supply. And then what you had is a very deep. recession between 1937 and 1938. And actually, it was, I mean, you had basically you had you know, you know, the top three worst recessions in US history are basically
7:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the worst is 1929 to 33. That was the great contraction. You then had the post-World War I recession, which was between 1920 and 1921, which was very severe as well. And then the third worst was actually 1937 to 1938. And this is in this is basically, this includes up until now.
8:12
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): So the so the previous recession that was the deepest was 37 to 38, uh, basically. But that was caused by there being a huge amount of monetary tightening around that time, which obviously meant that the market went down. We had deflation as well. in 1938, I believe. I think, I think we had, I think the CBI dropped to around minus
8:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): 3%. So that was another factor. I think what you'll find with the 1965 peak you were mentioning, Rob, you know, the reason we didn't get a big crash was because inflation remained sort of remained at one, two, three percent around that time after we peaked. We never got we never got that kind of huge deflationary. impulse in
8:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the market. So even though we peaked, it was kind of a it was a peak in sort of in real terms, but in nominal terms, the market made higher highs into 1973. So it was more of a sort of stealth sort of bear market what we had between 65 and 73.
9:09
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
9:10
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): obviously it's
9:11
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): so
9:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it's so so this can happen in different ways, but I think that's a very good point, Rob, in terms of you know, the the 65 peak being more of a slow rollover and the other peaks being more of a dramatic sort of decline.
9:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And then just going on to the LinkedIn post, because you've posted this on LinkedIn and I've
9:32
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
9:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): hypertexted Did that in the substack post that comes with this. So just a couple of questions from there, Tom, that I think are worth exploring. Um, we've got uh Jeffrey Diamond saying that he doesn't anticipate a pop, but more of a slow leak. Do you think that that's possible that that could happen from today onwards? Or
9:52
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): what's your views on
9:53
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that?
9:54
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
9:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): think it depends on where inflation really sits. It Because I think at the moment, I mean, my concern in terms of having a bigger crash is the fact that we've got inflation. at the moment around 4%.
10:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): So the Fed aren't really in a position where they can sort of inject liquidity, which I think would potentially soften the blow, would make this bear market potentially roll over and not be as violent and as quick. But I think when you've got inflation double the target, you've got pressure coming from the long end of the yield curve, they're not really in a position where they can suddenly just
10:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): create money because obviously. long term interest rates could really spike if the market interprets, you know, you know, extra liquidity being injected by the Fed as potentially more inflation in the system that's, you know, you've already got inflation at 4%, which is double the target. So,
10:42
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
10:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): know, I'm I'm kind of in the camp where I think we'll we might get something more, you know, more like uh the 2000 dot com peak or maybe even 37. or 29. I mean, I'd look, look, 1929 is kind of in its own class. I d I wouldn't like to say we'll get a repeat of that, but I certainly the dot com peak, you know, the way we rolled over there, the sort of
11:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it's quite a I think I think something more like that could be on the cards, something a bit more um, you know, you know, a bit quicker. I think what we've seen in this septical sector of the bull markets, we have seen the S SP P have these very quick crashes. So I think we could see some waterfall you know sell-offs, which happen quite quickly. Um, that would
11:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): be my, but again, I mean, there's
11:24
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh I
11:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): mean obviously if the inflationary outlook does change and we see inflation coming down, it will give the Fed more more sort of room to maneuver with policy.
11:33
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well,
11:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I think I think that that inflation argument's interesting. I think that a lot of things that are gonna move the needle on that are gonna be related around uh gasoline, diesel, oil, basically. But that's that's not a conversation for for this particular video. Uh then uh the second comment I found interesting, I just want to get your opinion on
11:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): is so this is from uh Jason Ben Dixon, uh again on on on LinkedIn, uh who says he's he's always suspect of these comparisons to nineteen twenty-nine. twenty nine. Um how can anyone think we have a market close to what we had then? Uh there were next to no regulations, no banking rules, no safety nets, and the economy and jobs market were vastly different than what we have today.
12:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Plus the government is much more likely to jump in today in ways that I that it could never or would never have done back in nineteen 1929. twenty nine. Uh do you see some similarities uh to 1929 or is it completely different and does that change your outlook at
12:31
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): all?
12:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Very good. Yeah. Yeah, that was a very good question, actually. I'm I'm I'm sort of trying to remember how I answered it now on LinkedIn because it's a it's a difficult question to answer. But I think, I think to be honest, the margin debt today is is really significant. Um, you know, I think I think when you factor in, because obviously we've got derivatives. derivative products and we got a lot
12:52
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): more of those sort of things than we had back in 29. So I think margin debt, if you adjust for all the extra ways in which you can get margin debt today is around three times higher than it was in 29.
13:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): You know, but but obviously if you look at pure margin debt, it's a lot, you know, it's a lot smaller. So
13:11
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
13:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): would say margin debt's one of the things that's very similar. I I would also say that that there is, I mean, obviously, obviously this AI boom. I mean we had obviously, you know, radios, automobiles in the 20s. So there is that kind of technological advancement, um, you know, which investors are getting really excited about, which is AI in this particular generation.
13:31
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
13:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that's quite similar. I'd I'd also say there is, I mean, I mean I'd actually say the risk this cycle might be greater from the fact that there's this kind of complacency that that the government and the central bank are going to bail the markets out if they have any issues. Uh, whereas in thinking twenty nine, it was it was more sort of obviously cheap money and credit, you
13:52
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): know, filled the bubble. But the Fed actually from nineteen twenty I think if it was I think it was late nineteen 1927, twenty seven, they began to tighten policy. So they tighten tightened policy for around eighteen 18 months before the 29 peak occurred. Uh so I think that's slightly different. I think, I mean, you can't really ever compare two different bubbles. What I would say
14:12
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): though is
14:13
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I,
14:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you know, I think I think sometimes it's it's very easy to say that we live in this new environment today, but I do think we do repeat a lot of the mistakes of the past. And that's partly to do with the fact that, you know. generationally, people haven't lived through 1929 around today. So we don't really remember the mistakes
14:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): of that era. Because we don't, you know, unless unless we obviously, you know, have have sort of bedtime stories from our grandparents that we might remember, there's not much not much to go off for it. Uh So it's it is it is a tricky one, um, you know, you know, to really to really kind of look backwards and have.
14:53
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Um I think I think though to be honest, I think I think I sort of class today as its own sort of its own bubble, but I think
15:01
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
15:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): think I mean this this indicator is is kind of an alternative. It's very similar to the Buffett indicator. And obviously Warren, you know, the you know Warren Buffett measures the whole um the whole of the US equity. market against the size, total size of the US economy. Now, this is just the SP, but this is quite similar. And he did say it was
15:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): he did say it was the single best way of measuring where stock valuations are at any given point. So, you know, I would take that reasonably seriously. And what also springs to mind is that Warren Buffett says um the first rule of investing is not to lose money, and the second rule is not. to forget the first rule.
15:41
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
15:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it is, I mean, I think I think de-risking, to be honest, is probably not the worst. I mean, obviously, I'm not um I'm not here to give uh financial advice, but I I certainly wouldn't want to have to pick myself up from a potential 50% drawdown back to, you know, just to get back to the average, we're talking about around a
16:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): 50% drawdown. So, or even 55%. That's not um, you know, a lot of people, it's worth it was worth bearing in mind if you drop 50%, you then have to double your investment to get back to where you started. Um a lot of people don't realize that, but actually once you get over 50%, you need to more than double to get back to
16:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): square one. So I think compounding wealth is not just about making money, it's also about making sure that you avoid catastrophic losses because that can really slow down your wealth accumulation over the long term.
16:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah, 100%. I think that's something that most people are going to resonate with there, Tom. So thank you for going into that. Uh just uh one last question uh on this end is that if we go back and look at 1929, 1937, and 2000, when that proverbial hit the fan, uh, you can see it hit the fan quite quickly, albeit
16:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I think 1931 to 33. I think if I'm not mistaken, if I remember my history, it sort of bounced back a little bit and then it yeah, again, uh the proverbial hit the fan. I know you mentioned about the 7621 points we can see on this chart, and you mentioned that the SP today, about
17:16
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): 7300 give or take. At what point or what numbers are you looking at on the SP 500 that would give you a cause for concern if it broke down to the downside, for example?
17:31
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
17:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that's a very good question, Rob, From because to be honest, I mean, we talk about these valuation risks, but the point is where would it be worth? just kind of completely exiting the market and having nothing to do with it, uh, potentially if it does go down uh at the beginning of the Seclica Bear, potentially starting. But I, to be honest, see
17:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): 7,000 points as being the key level. It's it's it's 7,002 points. That's the January 2026 pivot highs. Now, if we go back to 2009. one thing that's happened throughout this bull market is when we formed a major pivot high, whether it was the 2015 pivot high, whether it was the
18:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): uh 2020 pivot high, whether it was the you know, January 2022 pivot high or February 2025 pivot high, one of those, we have subsequently corrected, you know, 10 to 30 percent, but when we broke we've broken out above that pivot high later, we've then, you know, further on
18:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): retested that pivot high, but we've never broken below it.
18:35
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Okay.
18:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Now, and that's something that's kind of like, you know, you know, that's sort of the bullish structure of the market. And what we don't want to see is a situation where we,
18:45
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
18:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): know, where we break back below it, because that's a false breakout, technically, if we break back below seven 7,000, thousand. because that's a key standout pivot high back from January. So for me, that's the key level. And I think, I mean, what you're seeing in the SP at the moment is a bit of sector rotation. People are going out of tech, but they're going into more defensive assets.
19:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Uh, so there is people aren't completely throwing in the towel. Uh, it's important to stress that because the SP can actually still be hold up if investors just show. shift capital away to a different part of side of the market, essentially. Obviously, there's been some, you know, that there has, I mean, the US dollar has surged recently. We've obviously seen
19:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): some money moving into short-term uh treasury bonds. The long end of the yield curve, you know, long-term rates have gone up. So obviously, investors aren't putting money so much into that area. But I think it's kind of cash liquid alternatives. So the dollar short term. short-term T-bills, those two areas seem to be collecting some investor demand away from the market. But obviously I
19:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): think there has been some sector rotation. So until I start seeing investors really, I think I think it's interesting to watch what long-term bond yields do. Because if you see long-term bond yields really crashing, I think that does show that investors are really, you know, running from equities and going into bonds, which
20:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): hasn't really happened so much so far, I don't think. So I think it remains to be seen if this is if we have seen the peak. I think
20:14
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
20:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): think what's quite interesting is in back in back in the dot-com bubble in 2000, we sort of chopped around for around sort of six to nine months before we broke down. The sort of the peak took time to develop. I think. if if say that I mean, after that initial move during the spring, we kind of since June, we've we have trended down,
20:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): but between June and October, we kind of just went sideways. So the question is, are we going to peak sort of late this year? You know, or have we peaked already? But are we going to see the rollover next year following sort of six to nine months of sideways chop like we saw in the dot-com bubble? So I think that's but we'll only know I think when we break below 7,000, whether we have
20:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): peaks. That would be my sort of bias.
20:58
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well,
20:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Tom, I appreciate that. At least it gives people a key number to look out for moving forward. So I just want to say thank you again for this excellent chart and look forward to catching up at the end of November, where, as per usual, we are going to have a lot to talk
21:12
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): about.
21:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Absolutely a hundred 100%. percent. Really looking forward to it. And yeah, hope hopefully won't hopefully won't have any more to talk about because at the moment there's enough, I think.
This page was produced automatically: the audio was transcribed with nvidia/parakeet-tdt-0.6b-v3+sortformer-v2.1 and interpreted by Qwen3.6-35B-A3B-UD-IQ3_S.gguf. Transcription and interpretation can contain errors; always confirm against the original episode. Nothing here is investment advice.

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