Street Signals

Brendan Greeley on the private origins of the dollar and the Fed's political role

49 min Listen to the original Episode page
Federal ReserveDollar HistoryBankingMonetary PolicyEurodollarsEconomic EducationPerry MehrlingMoney Creation

Summary

Brendan Greeley argues that money emerges from private habits rather than state decree, tracing the dollar's history to global trade and Spanish coinage. He distinguishes between 'big money' for wholesale banking and 'little money' for retail, noting banks prefer higher-margin wholesale transactions. Greeley critiques the Federal Reserve for ignoring its mandate to distinguish productive loans and for using policies like QE that inherently favor asset holders. He highlights the Eurodollar system's role in allowing large firms to bypass domestic monetary tightening. The discussion also covers the flawed economic education on bank money creation and Perry Mehrling's balance-sheet approach to understanding the dollar system.

Key takeaways

  1. 1
    Quantitative Easing is a political action that increases the value of existing assets (stocks, homes) for asset holders.

    Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) · 18:46

Episode sections

  1. 0:33 – 3:02

    Introduction and Guest Background

    Kayla Cedar introduces Brendan Greeley, former FT economics editor and Princeton PhD candidate, discussing his book 'The Almighty Dollar'. She highlights the resurgence of concerns regarding US dollar dominance and the need to understand its historical roots beyond just the US state.

  2. 3:02 – 5:05

    Private Money Creation vs State Fiat

    Greeley argues that money is not solely a creature of the state but emerges from private habits and innovation. He notes that the state often regulates or catches up to private money creation, citing his research into ledgers and historical usage.

  3. 5:05 – 6:53

    Historical Origins of the Dollar

    Greeley explains that the dollar's history predates the US, tracing back to the Spanish Taler coin from Czech silver mines. He emphasizes that the dollar's value and usage have always been influenced by global actors, not just domestic US policy.

  4. 6:53 – 8:35

    Big Money vs Little Money

    Greeley distinguishes between 'big money' (wholesale, interbank, reserves) and 'little money' (retail, consumer deposits). He argues these are distinct systems with different economic behaviors, not just denominations of the same currency.

  5. 8:35 – 12:35

    Banking Margins and Customer Bias

    Drawing on Carlo Cipola, Greeley explains that banks prefer 'big money' transactions because they have higher margins (brassage). This leads banks to consciously or unconsciously drive away poorer customers who use 'little money', recreating historical inequalities.

  6. 12:35 – 17:27

    Andrew Brimmer and Eurodollars

    Greeley profiles economist Andrew Brimmer, who understood that the Eurodollar system allowed large corporations to bypass Fed tightening by borrowing offshore. This created a 'K-shaped' effect where monetary policy impacted small borrowers but not large firms.

  7. 17:27 – 22:59

    Fed Mandate and Political Neutrality

    Greeley claims the Fed ignores its Congressional mandate to distinguish productive loans, preferring to claim neutrality. He argues that policies like Quantitative Easing are inherently political as they boost asset prices for the wealthy, yet the Fed denies this responsibility.

  8. 22:59 – 29:14

    Local Money and Deflation

    Greeley discusses historical 'hard times money' printed by local municipalities during deflations. He argues that the FDIC and modern central banking eliminated these local experiments, leaving the Fed as the sole issuer and reducing democratic debate over money.

  9. 29:14 – 30:12

    Consumer Sentiment and Monetary Literacy

    Speaker 1 notes that consumer inflation expectations data showed Republicans expecting deflation, highlighting a public misunderstanding of monetary policy nuances. Speaker 2 agrees, contrasting 18th-century financial literacy with modern gaps, attributing part of the issue to how economists teach money creation.

  10. 30:12 – 35:01

    Critique of Economic Education on Money Creation

    Speaker 2 argues that introductory macroeconomics textbooks provide a flawed narrative where the Fed 'poofs' money into existence, ignoring that banks create their own dollars through lending. He asserts the Fed is essentially a large bank chartered to control smaller banks, a concept he claims is omitted from basic economics curricula.

  11. 35:01 – 40:56

    Treasuries as Cash vs. Securities

    Speaker 1 asks about the role of treasuries in the dollar system. Speaker 2 explains that while traders view treasuries as cash, he argues they are securities. He warns that treating them as money issuance is dangerous if market confidence in the U.S. ability to meet debt obligations wavers, causing them to revert to functioning as volatile securities.

  12. 40:56 – 45:02

    Hamiltonian System and Political Choice

    Speaker 2 critiques the musical Hamilton for presenting the U.S. debt system as inevitable, arguing instead that the shift from colonial treasury notes (debt to citizens) to the Hamiltonian system (debt to investors) was a deliberate political choice to provide safe securities to investors, requiring specific tax and growth structures to maintain.

  13. 45:02 – 49:06

    Perry Mehrling and the Money View

    Speaker 2 recommends the work of the late economist Perry Mehrling, who died recently. He highlights Mehrling's 'money view,' which analyzes monetary systems through balance sheets and the nesting of liabilities and assets, citing books like 'The New Lombard Street' and 'Money and Empire' as essential for understanding the modern dollar system.

Assets discussed

AssetKindStanceContext
US dollarUSDcurrencyneutralWe discuss the dollar's many forms and how its history challenges conventional thinking

“Stance” is how the speakers talked about the asset, not a recommendation.

Claims worth verifying

Brendan Greeley is a former Financial Times U.S. economics editor and is pursuing a PhD in economic history at Princeton.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·0:52

How to verify: Check Brendan Greeley's LinkedIn profile or Princeton University faculty/staff directory for his PhD candidacy and former FT role. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Brendan Greeley published a book titled 'The Almighty Dollar: 500 Years of the World's Most Powerful Money'.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·0:52

How to verify: Search Amazon or library catalogs for the book title and author. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Andrew Brimmer grew up in Tensas Parish, Louisiana, and his parents were sharecroppers.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·12:45

How to verify: Check Andrew Brimmer's obituary in The New York Times (2026) or biographical entries in Federal Reserve historical archives. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Andrew Brimmer missed the opening of his University of Washington entrance exam by an hour due to a ferry delay but still passed.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·13:11

How to verify: Verify through Andrew Brimmer's biographical accounts or university records from the University of Washington. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The Eurodollar system involves banks abroad trading access to American deposits and making new loans denominated in dollars outside US regulation.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·15:11

How to verify: Review Bank for International Settlements (BIS) statistics on Eurocurrency deposits or Federal Reserve historical papers on Eurodollars. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Andrew Brimmer proposed that the Fed be given ways to distinguish between different kinds of loans to ensure equal tightening.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·16:48

How to verify: Check Federal Reserve Board minutes or historical records of Brimmer's tenure on the Board of Governors (2026-2026). For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The Fed's Congressional mandate is to expand monetary and credit aggregates to increase production.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·17:44

How to verify: Read the Federal Reserve Act, specifically 12 U.S.C. § 248, which outlines the Board's duties. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Quantitative Easing raises the value of existing assets like stocks and homes.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·18:46

How to verify: Analyze S&P 500 index data and Case-Shiller Home Price Index during periods of Federal Reserve asset purchases (e.g., 2026-2026, 2026-2026). For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Before the Constitution, states printed their own notes, and Pennsylvania and Maryland had responsible monetary policies.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·23:55

How to verify: Review historical records of colonial state bank notes or economic histories of the Articles of Confederation period. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

During the 1930s Depression, many towns printed their own 'hard times money' or scrip.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·26:56

How to verify: Search for historical examples of Local Scrip or 'Hard Times Currency' in municipal archives or economic history texts on the Great Depression. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Republicans were expecting deflation in University of Michigan consumer inflation expectations data at one point last year.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·29:14

How to verify: Check University of Michigan Survey of Consumers historical data for the period prior to 2026-11-19, specifically looking for partisan breakdowns of inflation expectations. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Introductory macroeconomics textbooks teach that the Fed 'poofs' money into existence and banks use a money multiplier.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·31:03

How to verify: Review standard first-year macroeconomics textbooks (e.g., Mankiw, Blanchard) for the section on money creation and the money multiplier. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The Federal Reserve is a bank that creates reserves when it buys assets.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·32:01

How to verify: Check Federal Reserve publications on monetary policy operations, specifically regarding open market operations and reserve creation. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Ben Bernanke said in a 2008 60 Minutes interview that the Fed 'just marks up the dollars' or creates 'brand new dollars.'

Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·33:01

How to verify: Search for the CBS 60 Minutes interview with Ben Bernanke from 2026 and review the transcript or video for the specific phrasing regarding money creation. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

For traders, 'cash' is mostly treasuries, not physical currency.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·35:47

How to verify: Review financial market structure literature or interviews with traders regarding the definition of 'cash' in institutional portfolios, which often includes short-term government securities. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) is the modern instance of chartalism.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·36:29

How to verify: Check academic literature on MMT (e.g., works by Stephanie Kelton, Warren Mosler) and their references to Georg Friedrich Knapp's chartalism. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

Perry Mehrling died about a month ago from an accident in his early 60s.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·45:45

How to verify: Search for obituaries or news reports regarding Perry Mehrling's death around October 2026, verifying age and cause of death. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Perry Mehrling wrote 'The New Lombard Street' and 'Money and Empire.'

Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·46:29

How to verify: Check bibliographic records for Perry Mehrling's published works, verifying titles and publication dates. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Do your own research

  • Review Brendan Greeley's book 'The Almighty Dollar' for primary sources on colonial ledgers and historical money creation.
  • Analyze Federal Reserve H.4.1 reports for reserves data and M1/M2 reports for bank deposits to verify distinctions between 'big' and 'little' money.
  • Check Bank for International Settlements (BIS) data on Eurocurrency markets to understand the scale of offshore dollar lending.
  • Read the Federal Reserve Act (12 U.S.C. § 248) to compare the Congressional mandate with the Fed's stated dual mandate.
  • Review historical state bank notes or municipal bond records from the 1930s Depression era to verify the existence of 'hard times money'.
  • Examine Federal Reserve balance sheet changes and S&P 500 or Case-Shiller index performance during QE periods to assess asset price impacts.
  • Read Perry Mehrling's 'The New Lombard Street' and 'Money and Empire' to understand the balance-sheet 'money view'.
  • Check Harvard Business School archives or Federal Reserve historical records for biographical details on Andrew Brimmer and his work on Eurodollars.
Full transcriptexpand

0:03Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): This

0:03Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): is Street Signals, a weekly conversation about markets and macro brought to you by State Street Markets. I'm your host, Tim Graff, Head of Macro Strategy for Europe. Each week we talk about the latest insights from our award-winning research, as well as the current thinking from our strategists, traders, business leaders, clients, and other experts from financial markets.

0:23Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): If

0:23Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you listen to us and like what you're hearing, please subscribe, leave us a good review. get in touch, it all helps us to improve what we offer. With that, here's what's on our minds this week.

0:33Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Hi, I'm Kayla Cedar, Senior Macro Multiasset Strategist, filling in for Tim while he takes some well-deserved time off. In recent years, concerns about erosion and US dollar dominance have resurfaced. And to better understand why the dollar became dominant in the first place, I turn to Brendan Greeley. former U.S. economics editor at the Financial Times and journalist at Bloomberg and The Economist. Brendan is now pursuing his PhD in economic history at Princeton, and he recently published a book titled The Almighty Dollar: 500 Years of the World's Most Powerful Money. We discuss the dollar's many forms and how its history challenges conventional thinking about money, revealing a system of far bigger than the United States itself. Hey Brandon

1:19Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): All right, there are two dogs in the room. There was just no better way to manage them than to leave them here. So

1:24Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I told a colleague that I was interviewing you

1:26Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and

1:27Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): they told me about JK Growling.

1:29Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): How did your colleague no that's ancient that that's

1:32Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): 10 years

1:33Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): old. I

1:34Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): think

1:34Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it just stands out.

1:35Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): But he's 10 now. I can't believe that that story still exists

1:39Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Well, and I was so excited because my dog's name is Dave Growl.

1:42Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Oh, that's I'm sorry, just laughing in your ear. That's funny.

1:47Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Love the pun, pun dog name.

1:50Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): That's amazing.

1:51Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): So today I'm so excited to have Brendan Greeley with us today. He was a journalist for over 20 years at you know places that Tim and I and the rest of this. the Street Signals listeners really follow: The Financial Times, Bloomberg, The Economist, covering economics and the Fed. Currently, he's getting his PhD at Princeton and with all that extra time, still finds time to contribute to the FT. He's also written a book called The Almighty Dollar: 500 Years of the World's Most Powerful Money. And I was so excited to have you on, Brendan, because you know, I think what this book does is it helps us think a little differently about money. Even as someone who works in financial markets, there's so much here that I hadn't considered just about how much the dollar really transcends more than just the US dollar. And so

2:47Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): kind

2:47Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): of to kick things off, I'm curious why. 500 years, you know, it's the US dollar, but it's not the US dollar. Tell me a little bit around how you decided where to start this story and why.

3:02Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): So, first of all, thank you. I'm excited to do this. I last year at Princeton, we held a conference called How to Write the Biography of a Currency.

3:10Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And

3:11Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): it was a bunch of different people who'd all been attacking the same problem from different directions. My advisor, Harold James, was writing a history of the Polish zlaty. What we realized is the biography of a currency traditionally has been the biography of a country. So if you want to tell the story of that currency, you tell it through institutional developments, you know, the creation of a central bank, the governance of that central bank, the actions of the treasury, the response to crises. That stuff's important, but it presupposes thinking about money in a certain way, which is that money is a creature of the state. It comes from the state. And one of the challenges of this book for me is that I'd learned certain ways of thinking about money from economists. And I suspect we all learned that same way of thinking about money. We all took macro in college. And I've gone back and looked at a bunch of macroeconomics textbooks. They tend to tell the same story. which is that money is fiat, which means

4:05Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it's

4:05Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): just, it comes from the diktat of the state. The challenge for that is when you start to look into the history of money, particularly when you look at primary sources, when you sit down and look at ledgers, try to figure them out, how people used money, how they thought about money, you end up realizing that a lot of this happens in the form of private money creation and private innovation. And often the state is running to catch up with what people are doing in their own lives. So I'm not arguing that money is inherently private. I think money has always been private habits that are necessarily regulated by the state. And the state also participates as well. And the state does some money creation. But this idea that the state does it all, I think doesn't capture money, and it also doesn't capture how money. changes. So the goal of the book was to try and figure out what were all these private habits that that sort of changed decade by decade and century by century about how people used the dollar. And what that led me to to actually answer your question is, you know, I started thinking I'm gonna start this book in 1971 when the US left the gold standard. And then I realized I can't really do that because I don't have a good explanation for why the dollar continued to have value. And then I thought, okay. I'll start it in 1913 with the creation of the Federal Reserve. And then I realized, well, what happened before the Federal Reserve? And was there any continuity? And it turns out there was. And then of course you get back to

5:251789, the Constitution, you realize, well, why did they make money that way? And then if you keep pulling on that thread, eventually what I ended up doing was literally going to the bottom of the silver mine in the Czech Republic to look at, to talk to a miner. about the origins of the silver that created the first coin that we call the Yachem's Toller, which became known as the Toller, and then eventually in English the dollar, and was copied all over the world and became a silver coin minted by the Spanish Empire that ended up being a form of money that was used by merchants in the American colonies. All of this says to me, the story of the dollar often intersects with the story. of the United States of America, but it has its own history. And to get to that history, we had to start well before the United States. We also had to understand, even now, ways in which the United States is pulled abroad with its dollar, that people outside of the United States have as much agency over what we think of as the dollar as people domestically inside the United States. This is a much bigger story than America. It's a much more complex story than America.

6:26Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And I think one thing that you hinted at that I certainly got from the book was just the different ways people use money or the different purposes the dollar serves. And you talk a little bit around little money versus big money. And that seems to be something that really s has been around since the beginning of the dollar. Can you talk a little bit about how that evolved and what are some of the patterns you still see maybe today?

6:53Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Yeah. When you know I get a little pedantic about this, but I I hope pedantic in a useful way. When people say what's going on with the dollar, my answer is always like, which dollar? There are lots of different kinds of dollars. And I think it's really important not to just treat them all as fungible. Those distinctions are important. And so, you know, we have reserves held at the Fed. That's a kind of deposit that bankers keep at the Federal Reserve Bank. banks. That's a form of dollar that you and I can't use. We know about it. We can write about it, but we don't touch reserves. That's something that banks use. The treasuries serve as a kind of dollar for global investors. Most of the dollars you and I use are created by our banks. Those are bank dollars. They're held on uh the ledgers of commercial banks, but they're also created when those bank makes new banks make new loans. Some people without bank accounts. use money in a completely different kind of way, which is that they take checks from their employers and they cash them. This is sort of a uniquely American thing. Most other countries have figured this out, but they cash them at check caching joints in town, which give them Federal Reserve notes at a discount for their for their money, for their their checks. So the point is, dollars work in different ways for different people, and there are different kinds of dollars for different people. And so all of this. says to me, we have to figure out why different people use different kinds of money. And that gets to the distinction that you just pointed out between big money and little money. I read this book by an Italian

8:13medievalist named Carlo Cipola, and it was about money and prices in the Mediterranean world during the middle and early modern period. That book, I found it just by chasing down footnotes, but it turns out a lot of other people think that book's important too. A lot of I keep running into other financial historians who were like, oh my God, you read Carlo Cipola.

8:33Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Fangirling over him.

8:35Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We are exactly all

8:36Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): sitting around fangirling over Carlo Cipola. It turns out that he made incredibly important distinctions that I think are useful for money now. And what he pointed out was that there were always two different kinds of money, two different kinds of coins. There was uh what he called Moneta monete Grossa, Italian for big money. and then little money or or or or petty coins. These weren't just distinctions in size, these were distinctions in kind. So it's tempting when we look back at coins to think about everything fitting neatly into a hole. We've got pennies and nickels and dimes, and they fit into quarters, and the quarters fit into dollars, and that all of this is exchangeable at par in a predictable way. That is not how money has always worked. And in particular, big coins were meant for

9:16Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the

9:16Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): wholesale trade, international commerce. They were large, they tended to be more pure. Little money was meant for the retail trade, for just purchases as you might make on a daily basis. And importantly, at the mint, this is really crucial,

9:31Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the

9:31Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): smaller coins had what they call a higher brassage. They had a higher cost of production, which meant that mints Mintz would rather produce big. coins than little coins because their margins were better. I think this is still true today. We rely on banks to produce our money. The margins, as we know, are better on big loans than they are on small loans, better on big deposits and small deposits, better on big transfers and little little transfers. And that means that uh the brassage, again, as it has been for the last 800 years, is higher on small deposits, small loans, which means we've recreated a very old problem with a modern banking system, which is that banks tend to care about their wealthier customers. They tend not to care about their poorer customers. And in fact, they will often almost consciously drive those poorer customers out of the business because they don't want to serve them. And so we are still stuck with this problem. And I think everywhere you look in history, you can see these distinctions between the way money works for large large-scale scale. wholesale merchants and the wealthy and the way money works for small scale retail purchases. These are two fundamentally different systems. And again, they don't line up neatly. You can't always necessarily just cleanly exchange small

10:38coins for big coins. They are they are complementary systems, but you'll often see completely different systems within the same economy. I've spent a lot of time looking at the records of Colonial Maryland. It's one of the chapters of the book, but Colonial Maryland. had three different currency systems, which used three different kinds of money. That seems complicated and wasteful now, but at the time, everybody there understood it. And it was, to them, an efficient way to think about these different purchases. Things you bought from England were bought in sterling. Taxes you paid to the colonial government were paid in another currency. Most of the co transactions you made around town were held in a third currency, which used different kinds of money. And we can walk through these different kinds of money. But the overarching point is exactly as you point out, I'm glad that you pulled that from the book, because for me it was a revelation. And I sort of ended up going back and rewriting a bunch of things once I figured that out as a theme. Every economy, even ours now, uses different kinds of money, and different people in that economy use different kinds of money. And if we're going to analyze what a dollar is now, we have to understand it's lots of different things for lots of different people.

11:40Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And how do you think about the parallels between people using money in different ways, or little money versus big money, relative to you in the book there you also mentioned the economist Andrew Brimmer. I think his last name is Brimmer. And he talks a little bit about uh how there's different interest rates in impacting different people or different parts of the economy. I think we see this a lot today too with stories about the K-shaped economy, or even, you know, right now we have a ton of hyperscaler issuance and there's discussions around, okay, maybe there's probably a different, you know, let's say R star for hyperscalers than there are for small cap companies or things like that. Is there a parallel between the equilibrium cost of capital for different parts of the economy and the way different parts of the economy use dollars?

12:35Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Yeah, absolutely. I'm so glad you brought up Andrew Brimmer. He is a fascinating person and I think he needs his own biography. I think he needs his own movie. He uh you know he

12:44Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): grew up in

12:45Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Tensus Tensas Parish, Louisiana, that's northeastern Louisiana, a pretty poor part of the country. His parents were sharecroppers. He uh spent World War II uh first pulling cable at a shipyard uh in Washington State and then eventually enlisted in the army. You know, he seems to have been recognized everywhere he went as extraordinary. There's this amazing story where he got out of the army, he decided he wanted to be a banker, all the bank jobs were taken, and everybody said, Well, look, you gotta got to get a college degree. He didn't know how to get a college degree, so his uncle told him you should think about the G. GI bill. He went to go take the entrance exam for the University of Washington. And there was a ferry delay, and he missed the opening of the entrance exam by an hour. And he said, Well, can I just take it and we'll see what happens? So he took it with

13:28Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): an

13:29Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): hour left and passed and got in. You know, at Washington, at the University of Washington, his professors immediately recognized how how smart he was and his capacity. for work. And they said, Well, you're going to go to Berkeley and get a PhD in economics. And then he went out to Washington, D.C. And everybody there had gone to Harvard, and they were like, No, sir, you're going to go to Harvard. And all this time, it's important to point out that he's black. And that at that time meant that he must have been extraordinarily capable in order to sort of just, I don't mean to imply that it was easy for him, but sort of barriers that existed at the time seemed to have melted away in front of him because everybody who encountered him recognized just how smart he was and just how capable he was. So he had this amazing career where he really trained as an economist. He went to Harvard, trained under Nobel Prize winners, but ended up being an expert in monetary policy and international finance. So at the same time, he had worked in manual labor. He had pulled cable at a shipyard. He had picked cotton as a boy. You know, his parents were very important in the parish because they could read. And so they ended up doing a lot

14:29of work, ordering things from catalogs for other families. And I think I suspect, and I think this is this needs more proof and this needs more biographical work. All of his uh archives are at the university or at uh Harvard Business School. And they're there. He kept every scrap of paper he ever, he ever touched. I suspect his own story helped him understand. the ways in which the economy worked differently for different people. And one of the things he recognized is that they're, they're, they're, you, you're going to be familiar with this, but it's usually helpful to explain it. It's called the Eurodollar system. In the 50s and 60s, banks abroad started trading access to American deposits. And they treated it as a kind of reserve and they used use it to pay each other. And then what they started doing is just making their own brand new loans denominated. in dollars. Again, if you've been told the fiat story where every government creates its own money, this is very hard to understand. But if you just under if you just see, if you look, if you use a different frame where you see that banks all create their own dollars, then then then what you start to be able to recognize is banks abroad can do this as well. So

15:31eventually the the Fed and the Treasury recognized that this was happening and encouraged it in subtle ways. But in the very beginning you've got all these stories of people from the Fed going over to the city of London, coming back and saying, You are not going to believe what's happening over there. The Fed was really confused and trying to figure it out. Brimmer went over, he talked to the Bank of England about it, he talked to a bunch of city traders. I love this story. Somebody from the Bank of England got in touch with the administration. This was before Brimer was at the Fed. He was working in the Commerce Department. And they said, Look, clearly the only person in America who understands. the Eurodollar system is Andrew Brimmer. Can you please put him on the Fed? So he's on the Fed, and what he begins to recognize is that when the Fed tightens, it only tightens for certain groups of Americans. So if you're a large corporation and the Fed tightens, you've got access to large international banks. Those large international banks have access to euro dollars abroad, and they end up doing this complicated. thing where they're borrowing abroad in Euro dollars. This is offshore dollars created by banks that are not regulated by the United States, and then finding ways to sort of move those loans back into the US. There's no tightening for large firms. The tightening happens at the local level. It happens for families trying to take out mortgages and cities trying to borrow as well. And so you end up with selective tightening because if you don't

16:48have access to euro dollars, then you have to follow what the Fed does. And he proposed that the Fed be given by Congress ways of distinguishing between different kinds of loans so that everybody tightens equally. Man, the banks hated that. And the Fed hated that because the banks hated it because it opened the possibility of somebody saying, make these loans, don't make those loans. And the Fed hated it because it put the Fed in the position of doing things that were political, which makes the Fed very uncomfortable. And so the ability to recognize that, I think, was important. What we do about it, I think is a valuable small D democratic conversation that we need to have. What happened after Bremer, however, was that together, the Fed and the bankers just shut the conversation down. So we no longer have a conversation about different kinds of loans for different people. The problem is it's in the Fed's charter. So the Fed's actual mandate from Congress is that they expand uh monetary and credit aggregates in a way that increases production.

17:44Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): That's

17:44Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): paraphrase, but that's roughly what it is. I wish I had

17:46Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it

17:47Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): in front of

17:47Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): me.

17:47Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): That's the shall. That's what Congress has instructed the Fed to do. The Fed goes to Congress and says, well, we need to maintain, uh we need to maintain full employment and stable prices. The Fed chose that's mandate. It's like the Fed's going to Congress and saying, we made up our own home. homework, we graded ourselves. And guess what? We get an A, yay.

18:06Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um,

18:06Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): we're the best. And so they've completely ignored the part in their mandate where they have to think about which loans are productive and which loans aren't. Where they have to think about which aggregates matter, which credit aggregates, which monetary aggregates. And they don't do that. They really do not think that way. And they don't think they should have to. The problem is like, that's what Congress told them to do. And so you have this problem where, yes, it is. fraught to think about how the Fed might be political and what that politicization politicization might mean. At the same time, the Fed is already highly political, but it's highly political in quiet ways over which we have no control. If you think about quantitative easing, very political action. I mean, the Fed thinks that buying treasuries and putting it on its own balance sheet isn't political. What that does, of course, is it interacts with a few very large banks, which then hold on to reserves, which then make them powerful. Um, and then it also raises the value of existing assets. So quantitative easing is a Fed policy that makes your stock portfolio worth more and your home worth more. And so if like that's insanely political, but the Fed doesn't like to think that

19:06it does political things. And so it says, Well, we have no choice, we have to buy treasuries. So I don't know what the answer is. In the way that Andrew Brimmer also was not sure what the answer is, what do you do? when Fed policy affects different people in different ways? What I wish is that we were at the very least having a conversation about it. Like let's recognize that there are disparate effects on disparate people when you pull the same level lever. And the Fed doesn't like to do that. The Fed just likes to pull one lever and say, We're not being political. All we did was pull on the lever. We're not responsible for what happens. And I think that's I don't know. I I I think that's ducking responsibility.

19:37Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,

19:38Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): absolutely. I mean the implications of a rather blunt tool when, you know, maybe you there is the option. The Fed can be incredibly creative. You know,

19:47Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I think a

19:47Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): lot of times we take for granted that,

19:49Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): you

19:50Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): know,

19:50Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): even right now, communications, right? Communications are changing so much and taking for granted that, you know, what did communication look like in the days of Andrew Brimmer? It looked much different than it looks today. And they can change and they can be dynamic.

20:04Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,

20:04Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): absolutely. You've said two really important things. Absolutely. The Fed can change over time. And the Fed has changed over time. What it puts on its balance sheet has changed over time. The Fed didn't always just put treasuries on its balance sheet. And also, you're absolutely right. The Fed is incredibly creative in a crisis. So

20:21Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): when they

20:21Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): feel like they've got to save the financial system, they'll buy anything. They're super creative, and they're to

20:26Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): be

20:26Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): competitive. commended for that. I don't think that's wrong. Like I'm not saying bailouts are wrong. I do think that when there's not a crisis, but they could be making their policy better, they don't feel the same urgency to be creative. And I think that manifests itself in a crisis when you look at what happened during COVID. The Fed was part of a series of agencies, the as the uh small business administration, treasury, that were together all trying to get cash out to people in America. Because they had never thought that way, they were terrible at it. We were th I mean this is sort of one of the for me, because I was covering the Fed at the time, one of the lessons of COVID was that the Fed's really good at rescuing the global Eurodoll system. And I'm not saying they shouldn't. They should be good at it. They are and and and and they make it work. The problem is they're not good at moving dollars under stress to Americans, trying to figure out how to make banks lend more when they really don't want to lend more. And I think that's in part policy, and in part that's just practice. The Fed did not understand really how to reach out to community banks or how to reach out to normal consumers. I have

21:32empathy for the Fed. This is hard. Politics is hard, and politics are uncomfortable and it makes Congress angry. I I I do understand the consequences of that, but that's you know, that's your job. And the Fed needs all tools. And I I think it when you said the Fed is a blunt instrument, uh, I have heard that a lot. I think the Fed likes to think of itself as a blunt instrument because it doesn't want the responsibility of improving its tools. And it could be a better instrument. But that instrument the opposite of a blunt instrument is not a sharp instrument, it's a political instrument. It's making political decisions. And I think the Fed doesn't want to do that. So they prefer that they just be stuck with this blunt instrument that they that they can't make better. And I I I think I think we can do better than that. But it takes Congress and the Treasury and, you know, a real political movement to change that. The Fed can't change that on its own.

22:18Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I I actually have two questions related to the Fed. And so in terms of the Fed's getting people to spend dollars to put dollars to work, it seems

22:28Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): like

22:29Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): this is something that is not a new issue. Uh in the book, there were a couple of really creative local solutions that

22:36Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): people

22:36Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): came up with. But then it seems like with the creation of the FDIC or things like that, like regulation stepped in and made some of those ideas not necessary.

22:46Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I

22:47Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): guess can you talk about things like script dollars or there's just all these really unique solutions people come up with that regulations seem to maybe make not necessary? Or you know, what are some of the takeaways from that?

22:59Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): That is a really good question. And it's a really nice frame for the book. And it's one I I sort of recognize, but I also didn't see until uh after the book was out. Yeah. One of the reasons that it's hard to see what we could be doing now is that we've forgotten what happened before. often for macroeconomists in particular, history begins in the 1950s. Right? So we did a bunch of things and they there were experiments and they didn't really work out, but we really locked it down when the Fed declared independence from the Treasury in 1951. We sort of developed our modern open market tools. Before the Fed even existed, people made their own monetary policy. And so in America, you know, before the Constitution, states actually printed their own notes. And economic historians often treat this as sort of a chaotic, inefficient, unreliable inflationary system. It wasn't really. It worked. There were some states that were chaotic. Rhode Island somehow consistently throughout the entire colonial period mismanaged its money, but Pennsylvania had pretty good monetary policy, and they issued notes in ways that were reliable. and recalled them in ways that were reliable and made sure the financing worked. Maryland, my home state, also pretty responsible with money. New York, New Jersey, these monetary systems worked. And so the Constitution shut them all down, basically said, we do not

24:15want states in the business of issuing their own notes. This was not a decision of inherent efficiency. This was a political decision. The political decision embedded in the Constitution was we do not want states. to have the power to produce their own money for farmers and citizens. We want banks to have the power to produce money for merchants. And so that's what we did. So the system we have now is not an inherently better system. It was just the system we chose because those were the people who had political power to choose it. So the bank system, you know, when we we basically gave banks the ability to create money in the United States, the exclusive right to do it. States very quickly figured out that if they wanted a circulating currency, they were going to have to charter banks. And so that's what they did. Time of the Constitution, there are two banks in America. There are several hundred by the Panic of 1837. This system wasn't inherently less chaotic because banks fail all the time. This is the problem. Banks create brand new money. Um they issued their own physical notes, they issued their own deposits. These were the this was the circulating currency, but they did this by backing it well. with loans. And those loans, when they fail, then the deposits and the notes fail. This is a very old problem. It's basically the basic problem of banking. Americans weren't immune to it. What we saw when these uh when these bank notes and bank deposits failed in widespread ways, people created in the 19th century what they called hard times money. The hard

25:34times money were often local solutions. So local cities were would print their own dollar notes. I spent a lot of time in New Orleans looking at how the city did this. They did this in a pretty responsible way. There was real financing behind it. They assessed taxes and coins later on that they could use to buy back the notes. They had what they called a sinking fund. It kind of worked. So you get all of these local experiments where people recognize Is that in a deflation, which is what's going on when all these notes are called out of circulation or fail. people don't really like deflations. We've forgotten about deflations because as you point out, we have this policy that we have lots of policies to prevent deflations from happening. So we see inflation as the main problem, but people do not like deflations. Often economists now will look back, Bitcoiners will look back and they'll say, like, you know, the most powerful way to manage money is to make sure that uh it's always worth the, you know, that there's always a uh the the same standard. You have money that's sound, it can always trade for the same value, which means that often you need to deflate to get back down to where the value was. Man,

26:36Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you

26:36Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): can say that's an elegant theory, but historically, I'm telling you, people hate it. And they hate it so much they will create their own money. In the Depression, lots of towns printed their own dollars along these same lines of the hard times money of the 19th century. These are ways of printing. your own money at the municipal level that go back to colonial times. People really understood how to do this. So as you point out, all of this local experimentation was lost with, I think the advent of the FDIC, I agree with you. I think that was the most important innovation. Once every bank, once the Fed is issuing, is the only issuer of notes. And once every bank has guaranteed deposits, they're guaranteed by a federal insurance system, the dollar becomes pretty stable. I mean, you don't have these deflationary incidents. And so we lose the, you know, we've lost this ability to be creative at the local level, but we haven't replaced it with the understanding of how creative we need to be at the national level. What happens is money used to be a thing that we fought about at every, you know, we we fought about it at the city level, at the state level, at the bank chartering level. at the national level. Money historically has been, you know, the substance of political, uh of political fights. National elections in the 19th century were about money, what our money was going to be, who it was going to be for, how are we going to make it have value, who was going to get the benefit of that value. It's

27:55almost always farmers versus merchants, by the way. And so now we end up by the 50s with this very opaque. and technical process that is managed by ultimately a few economists inside the Fed. You get a move within the Federal Reserve away from business people and bankers towards economists. And these become very difficult to understand, technical decisions that I think now don't always really work out for people, but we don't have the language to fight what they're doing or figure out how to change what they're doing. democratically. I think there are like three people in Congress who understand what the Fed does. There's French Hill on the Republican side, Elizabeth Warren on the Democratic side. There must be somebody else, so I'll

28:37Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): just

28:37Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): like leave that open. I don't know who it is. But when you look at the Humphrey Hawkins testimony in the Fed when the chair goes up to Capitol Hill, the questions are terrible.

28:45Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): It's painful to watch Humphrey Hawkins. It is painful. Yeah, I totally agree with you.

28:51Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Right. So, like, I mean, you tell me what frustrates

28:54Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you.

28:54Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Well, I think it's it's just this lack of understanding that really perforates throughout the rest of the economy. So, you know, one thing I thought that was really interesting is in the book is that even in the 1730s, the average person was talking about monetary policy. They might not have known it was called monetary policy, but they knew what it meant. And

29:14Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): now

29:14Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): to today, I think that's that's missing in the regular zeitgeist of the average person. The reason I know this is because when I look at things like University of Michigan's consumer inflation expectations data, at one point last year, Republicans were expecting not just disinflation, but deflation. And to your point, deflation is painful. People forget, or f they don't forget because they've never experienced it, I suppose. But you know, it's not a good situation to be in. And so I think that's also paralleled in Humphrey Hawkins, where you have people that don't understand the nuances of monetary policy. They don't understand how to read a balance sheet or think about how that flows through into the economy. And uh that's why it ends up being this non market event because you kind of just have to discount or take into account that these questions are political and

30:10Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it

30:10Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it it's frustrating.

30:12Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Yeah. I mean, I think we we can yeah, absolutely. I mean, conversations about money in the eighteenth century, as you point out, I agree. They were like they were sophisticated. Yeah. Really understood, you know, uh discounting foreign exchange, sinking funds. Like these are really these are things that I often, you know, I I've read a lot of colonial newspapers, and it's often it's like reading a research note. They're really like it's the sort of stuff that the average reader could understand, but you know, I you and I have to be trained to understand now. So I think part of it is the safety that you pointed out. I think once money becomes reliable, we worry about it less. I also think part of the blame goes to economists. And I I sort of have to be careful not to make them a punching bag. But in particular, the way economists teach us about money leaves us unprepared to understand the Fed.

31:00Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And

31:00Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): I've

31:01Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Okay, tell

31:01Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): me more about that. What

31:02Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): do you mean?

31:03Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): I think I mentioned earlier I've I've gone back and looked at a lot of introductory textbooks, sort of first year macro. And they all tell the same story. You know, that money, you know, once upon a time it was gold, and then, you know, people had slips of paper. that represented the gold, and then the gold went away. And now it's just something we call fiat. That fiat happens to be issued by the Federal Reserve. Man, that is a terrible story. And I understand that all histories are necessarily simplifications and that all models are necessarily simplifications. Like we we cannot speak fully about the sum of the world. We have to abstract and simplify. I think that particular abstraction and simplification. is unhelpful. It's also just

31:41Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): not

31:41Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): right because it leaves out the role of how banks create new money. It says the Fed just sort of poofs money into existence and then there's a money multiplier and banks have leverage and then they they they sort of take advantage of the money that's created. Banks create their own dollars. They do it without the Fed. If we didn't have a Fed and before we had the Fed, banks created their own dollars. The Fed is an attempt, is a bank itself. Again, we also forget that the Fed is a bank. Reserves held at the Fed are just deposits. The Fed creates them when it buys assets. This is super normal banking behavior. So the Fed is just I I the Fed is just a big bank that we chartered because we needed a big bank to control all the little banks because they, you know, they they frequently blew up in unpredictable and damaging ways. And so we have to understand that money comes from banks and that the Fed itself is just a special bank that belongs to us. None of that is taught in basic economics, and it should be. Like this should be a thing that we teach in macro because it helps us understand other things. Unfortunately, economics and macroeconomics in general have just moved away from money. Despite everything that's happened since 2008, they have moved away from thinking structures. structurally about money, what money is, or how it comes about. And so you get these quotes like Ben Bernanke in 2008 is interviewed on 60 Minutes and he said something like, you know, we just mark up the dollars.

33:01They're just brand new dollars. And he sort of, it sort of looks like magic the way he describes it. Now, Ben Bernanke obviously knows that banks create money, right? Like he he won his Nobel Prize for explaining, you know, how banks uh you know fail to make loans during a crisis because of of they don't have. enough information to make the new loans, right? He he's

33:17Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): he's

33:17Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): not making this up. He's also not lying. He's using a simplification. I think that simplification is no longer helpful. I think citizens have to know the banks create our new dollars and the Fed creates new dollars too. And those things interact in ways that we can understand as civilians and expect our our democracy to make work for us. So I think half of it is, as you point out, money's more reliable, so we don't have to worry about it. But the other half of it is economists moved away from money, and economists are responsible for teaching us how money works. And I think we need to ask them to tell better stories. I think we need to do a better job of teaching undergraduates how this works. Because you and I had the same experience, and we all have this experience. We go out of the working world and we're like, wait, what? The banks make the money? Nobody talks.

34:02Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): told

34:03Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): me. I've had conversations with undergraduates at Princeton, seniors who are graduating with a degree in economics.

34:09Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And

34:09Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): I, you know, I've had to explain, no, banks create the brand new dollars. We're like diagramming balance sheets on a whiteboard. And finally, like we get to the end of it, and one undergraduate, again, a senior economics major was like, I can't believe they let the banks do that. And I was like, You and me both. Like, I

34:25Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): can't

34:25Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): believe

34:25Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): either, but we should know so that we can like again, this isn't a policy prescription. Like

34:32Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): this recognition does not lead necessarily to conservative or liberal

34:36Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): policies. I just want

34:37Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): to improve the quality of the fights we're having in our democracy

34:39Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): so that

34:40Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): we

34:40Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): know how money works.

34:42Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Absolutely. And do you think maybe an extension of that? And maybe this is too lofty of a goal, but how do we think about treasuries? and their role in the dollar? Because right now, and especially now with conversations about stable coin or you know things like that, where yes, you have money multipliers, but I think you also have treasury multipliers and how much treasuries can be used to stimulate the economy. And this is, you know, perhaps really relevant now with with with the Fed and you this, just I guess maybe all. roads lead back to the Fed, but also all roads lead back to the treasury or back to treasuries as well. In some sense, how do you think about the education or the way people think about treasuries? Or do they maybe not think about treasuries the way

35:27Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): they should

35:27Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): they do? I always think there's this huge distinction between the way financial markets think about money and the way economists think about money. Treasuries are so hard to pin down theoretically. And I sort of recognize how complex that is. And I think there are a lot of val different competing and valid arguments about them. One of the things that always stuck with me early on when I was covering finance and just trying to figure out how things worked was that I asked what cash was for traders. And it's a little bit of deposits, but mostly it's treasuries. So in financial markets, if you're if you're going to go to cash, like you're not going to the bank and taking out a a a bag of cash It's not, it's not a briefcase like in a drug transaction. It's you're holding treasuries.

36:07Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah.

36:07Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): So to certain investors, treasuries are dollars. That recognition of treasuries as cash leads to there's a school of thought. You might call it chartalism for say, you know, basically the this is chartalism is the broad theory that uh money is uh just a ticket, the Latin is uh charta is Latin for ticket, that the treasury spends into the economy and then taxes back out.

36:29Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

36:29Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): sort of modern instance of chartalism or the strongest movement right now is what we call modern monetary theory. Um, I don't agree with it, but I'd also like want to try to do justice to this argument because they're not stupid. What they're arguing is essentially you could say that the United States sells treasuries, right? This is a debt instrument that it sells into global markets for for bank cash. That's how I think of treasuries. Their argument is the United States government issues treasuries. It is they are essentially dollars. And the mechanics of how the Fed then sort of transfers, you know, cash from other banks through reserves into the treasury general account to pay for treasuries is interesting but not important. That essentially all of it is this vestigial tale of And what's actually happening. is the United States is intro issuing brand new negotiable debt instruments that are money.

37:20Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I

37:20Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): think it's really helpful to think about treasuries as securities and not money. And I understand the distinction between the that there's there's a gray distinction between the two. I I think it's important, particularly now when we look at treasuries under stress, we begin to understand that so long as as there's an assumption that America will always be able to meet its debt obligations, that it will always be able to tax in enough bank dollars to either buy back its securities on schedule or pay what it owes on them, then they function like cash. The problem is if you just assume that they're cash because they function like cash, then you lose the ability to think about what happens when maybe financial markets are no longer 100% confident. that America is growing in a way that guarantees that it will that it will be able to roll over this this debt indefinitely, and that it is taxing in a way that guarantees this. So the second, again, I am not saying that there's any kind of generalized panic over treasuries. We saw that just now, right? As there's a, you know, over the course of the last month, we've seen a very classic flight to quality

38:23and

38:23Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): an

38:23Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): improvement in conditions for treasuries. However, earlier, this year, we went from 100% certain that uh that the United States could meet its debt debt obligations to 99.99995%. And the second we sort of lose that fraction of a fraction of a percent, then

38:43Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh

38:44Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): then we have to think about treasuries as securities. And so I I think um again, uh I I I really like. your frame earlier that as money gets simple as get as money gets more reliable, we forget how it works, right? Since the FDIC, we haven't had to think about deposits.

38:59Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I

38:59Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): think treasuries got so reliable we had we for we stopped thinking about them as securities, and we we built new theories around them as money issuance. And I I I I don't I can't I can't buy those theories precisely because the second people become less than 100% certain, they start functioning like securities again. And we have to see them as securities. And we also have to see like literally what is it that's paying down our debt? What is it that's meeting debt obligations? What is it that's uh rolling over debt at the right time? They're bank dollars. People transfer from their banks taxes in the form of reserves. Those reserves then go into the Treasury General account, which is used to then pay banks back. as as treasury holders to roll over the debt. That's how that works. And so I think the mechanics say this is the United States participating in debt markets so that it has access to the same bank dollars that the rest of us use. I can see the other theory, though, that says the United States is just issuing dollars. But for the reasons that I pointed out, particularly in moments of stress, that theory I think breaks down. And we need to and then we need to return to thinking about treasuries as securities.

40:07Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah.

40:07Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And I think that's probably a conversation that we might continue to have. You know, I think one thing that took markets off guard a little bit is when you start to have those questions around, you know, that fraction of a percentage of doubt, what's the alternative? Where do you go instead? And I think maybe that's part of. you know a couple months after the fact, you when you see that flight to safety, that flight back into treasuries, and you're reminded of okay, there's still a lot of confidence here. But I I think we could see the let the last six months play out over and over again. And it kind of, you know, in some ways, maybe it supports treasuries from the perspective of what's the cleanest, dirty shirt. But that's talking about it like a security. That's talking about it relative to other securities in the market.

40:56Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): I think one of the things that, again, everything we know about markets, we tend to, in first instance, learn from economists. And economists sort of don't do origin stories. They don't

41:07Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): sort

41:07Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): of they everything that we use now, all of our assumptions, they all have a history. Um that doesn't mean they're wrong, but it does mean to under it's important. to understand that they all came about as the result of choices that were made in the moment. I was with a group of uh American historians, we were at a dinner, and I was complaining about the musical Hamilton. I was not complaining about the music.

41:26Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Uh I have uh

41:27Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): I have two teenage daughters, they're massive fans. We took them to the Kennedy Center when it came through. But w what I don't like is the assumption that comes from Chernow's biography that that Hamilton's financial system was inherently awesome and superior and better. So I was saying this, and one of the other historians said, You are the only historian I've met who think who thinks that musical is problematic because of the finance. But I I do think it's problematical, problematic. And the reason why is before the Constitution, American states and American colonies issued their debt direct. directly to citizens. So they had this system where we had treasury notes, essentially. The general assemblies of the colonies, their treasuries, when they owed people money, they would often pay them in little slips of paper that looked like promissory notes that were, you know, nicely printed, that were basically treasury obligations. Those treasury obligations were taken seriously. The financing behind them, like I said, was actually pretty sophisticated. They had ways of taxing them back in, and they had ways of sort of collecting port duties in coins so that they could have sinking funds so that they could buy them back. But they worked. But it was issuing debt directly to citizens. The Constitution forbade the states from doing that. And then we end up with a Hamiltonian system where instead of issuing debt to citizens,

42:47we end up issuing debt to investors.

42:49Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): My

42:50Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): whole point is that was a choice. It was not inevitability. We made a choice with the Hamiltonian system that we want investors to have safe securities so that the state can borrow money. I don't know. We just need to recognize that as a choice.

43:06Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah. Uh,

43:07Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): right? We built this system for a reason. It functions in certain ways for a reason. I'm not saying we need to go back to treasury notes. but we need to recognize that this system was created for a reason to give investors safe debt. And we need to ask ourselves: like, what is the cost to us of continuing to make sure that we issue that debt? What do we need to do? Make what, you know, what kind of taxes do we need to assess? Do we need to continue to take in to make sure that those treasuries are always unimpeachable? What kind of growth and productivity do we? need in the United States to make sure those treasuries continue to be unimpeachable? You know, if we are in fact still carrying out the Hamiltonian system, let's take it seriously as a system that he designed, which we're still in, which means like we do need to think about taxes as funding government, right? We do need to think about taxes as paying down treasuries. Uh, we do need to think about productivity growth as ensuring future tax revenue. This stuff is really important. And I think if we just simply say, you know, we're paying money out into the system, it doesn't matter how the mechanics are irrelevant, and then we're taxing it back in, we miss the nuance of the system we made a decision to use.

44:13Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah.

44:13Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And I think, you know, maybe the cost of not doing what you're saying is just higher term premia, which ends up being,

44:19Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you

44:19Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): know, higher cost to everyone.

44:21Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Yeah. And those higher term premiers, premia, as you point out, like cause treasuries to lose their moneyness. I hate that word, but it is a word people use, right? It's money so long as we don't have to think about what the premium is, so long as it's always unimpeachable. The second those term premias start to shoot up, the second the cost of debt servicing starts to rise, the moneyness starts to disappear.

44:42Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I

44:42Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): think that's probably a conversation that we'll be having for a while. I know it's top of mind for us moving forward. So we're pretty much on time. I have one more. question for you. What are you reading right now? And is there anything that you really you have have what's sticking with you? What are you excited about?

45:02Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Right now I'm going back and I'm reading Perry Maryland.

45:05Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Ah.

45:05Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): So uh Perry was a an economist who became a historian essentially. He never stopped being an economist but the way he worked was as a historian. And he uh he came up with a a really sort of thoughtful way of thinking about money that I I owe a lot of my own understanding to. He called it the money view, where we look at money the way bankers do, you know, using balance sheets and trying to figure out what are the obligations, sorry, what are the liabilities and what are the assets, and how do all these different systems of liabilities and assets either sit on top of each other or nest in with each other to make our money. monetary systems work. I think this is a really powerful way of thinking about money. Um, I have balance sheets in the book. I owe that

45:45Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): to

45:45Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Perry Merling. I teach when I teach students about money, I send them up to the chalkboard to draw out balance sheets so we can see the differences between the Bank of Amsterdam in the early 17th century and the Bank of England in the late 17th century. I think this is a really powerful way to sort of understand money historically. Perry Merling died young, an accident about a month ago. He

46:03Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): was

46:03Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): in his early 60s. And, you know, I knew him not well. He was incredibly helpful and thoughtful. He came to this uh conference that I was telling you about at Princeton about how to write the biography of a currency. And I've, you know, I had read his papers, but I had not read his books. I'm going back, I have them on my desk right now. I have a stack of three of them. Here they are. So I'm going back and I'm reading back through the money, interest, and the public The Money, Interest, and the Public Interest by Perry Merling, sort of where. he lays out how American monetary thought changed in the 20th century. We have the new Lombard Street, how the Fed became the dealer of last resort. And then, you know, more recently, he wrote uh five or six years ago Um Money and Empire. It's an intellectual history of Charles Kindleberger and how we got the modern dollar system. Man, methodologically, as as a historian, he does intellectual history, even though he's trained as an economist. And like I said, these are all just really powerful tools for thinking about it. And honestly, I I'm sad because he he I know he was working on a book. I don't know how far along it was. And it was his magnum opus about money. And I feel like we like like we're we're missing Willie Nelson's final album, like, you know, true, Through you

47:09a true, beautiful, uh, uh a genius that we're not gonna going to be able to see. So I'm reading back through uh sort of I realized that I began to think about his theories as I was writing the dollar book. It took took me seven years to write, and I think now, you know, I find myself, ironically, a fully converted Perry Merling money guy, and he's not around to continue to explain it. So that's uh sorry to bring you down. That's what I'm reading. But man, I recommend these books, and they are sort of an amazing together three three-part part history of the dollar.

47:37Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Not bringing us down at all. It's important to, you know, talk about good research. And, you know, maybe it's not all roads lead back to the Fed, maybe it's all roads lead back to balance sheets.

47:47Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Yeah.

47:47Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): So I think that's a good

47:48Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): place to

47:48Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): close.

47:49Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Amen.

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