The Geopolitics of Business

Prof Helen Thompson argues AI dominance is an energy competition, highlighting US gas advantage and Europe's structural vulnerability

48 min Listen to the original Episode page
GeopoliticsEnergy MarketsArtificial IntelligenceNatural GasChinaEuropeUK EconomyNuclear Energy

Summary

Professor Helen Thompson asserts that the global competition for AI dominance is fundamentally a competition for energy, with natural gas serving as the primary power source for US data centers. She characterizes the current geopolitical landscape as a gas shock rather than an oil shock, driven by disruptions in LNG supplies from Qatar and US naval embargoes on Chinese oil imports from Iran. Thompson contrasts China's strategic preparedness, including stockpiling and electrification, with Europe's vulnerability due to declining North Sea production and rigid legal frameworks. The discussion highlights 'Altman's choice,' positing a trade-off between net-zero goals and the abundant energy required for AI, leaving Europe at a structural disadvantage compared to the US and China.

Key takeaways

  1. 1
    AI competition is explicitly framed as an energy competition, linking tech dominance directly to energy infrastructure and supply security.

    Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) · 0:09

  2. 2
    Domestic energy production acts as a hedge against trade deficits and currency depreciation, critical for the UK given its recent currency weakness.

    Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) · 31:39

Episode sections

  1. 0:09 – 1:30

    Introduction and AI-Energy Nexus

    Speaker_0 asserts that AI competition is fundamentally an energy competition. Sam Gyimah introduces Professor Helen Thompson, who outlines a geopolitical logic in US pressure on regions where China has energy dependencies, identifying gas as the primary energy source for powering AI in the US.

  2. 1:30 – 3:27

    The Iran Conflict and Gas Shock

    Speaker_0 explains that while oil flows from Iran are near pre-war levels, liquefied natural gas (LNG) from Qatar remains severely disrupted due to force majeure declarations. She characterizes the current crisis as a gas shock rather than an oil shock, with Asia bearing the brunt of the impact similar to Europe in the 1970s.

  3. 3:27 – 5:09

    US Naval Blockade and China

    Speaker_0 describes a US naval embargo on China's ability to import oil from Iran, effectively blockading China's access to a major oil exporter. She notes this is a war outcome that pressures China, contrasting with the 1970s when China was oil self-sufficient.

  4. 5:09 – 9:34

    Macroeconomic and Political Impacts

    The discussion covers the Bank of England's interest rate hikes and rising bond yields, which constrain fiscal policy. Speaker_0 highlights low gas storage in Europe and the potential for inflation if winter demand is high, while noting the Trump administration's concern over bond yields and gasoline prices.

  5. 9:34 – 11:57

    Geopolitical Strategy: US vs. China and Russia

    Speaker_0 argues the Trump administration's actions follow a geopolitical logic to pressure China's energy dependencies, including in Iran and Greenland. She contrasts this with the US-Russia dynamic, where the US has won the European gas market but faces a looming peak in US shale oil production.

  6. 11:57 – 23:48

    China's Strategic Preparedness and Electrification

    China is described as well-prepared for the Iran conflict due to strategic stockpiling since mid-2025. Speaker_0 highlights China's superior progress in electrification, with electricity comprising roughly a third of its energy consumption, compared to the UK's stagnant 20%.

  7. 23:48 – 28:37

    Europe's Vulnerability and AI Disadvantage

    Europe is characterized as highly vulnerable due to declining North Sea production and increasing dependence on US gas. This energy dependency complicates Europe's AI ambitions, as it faces higher industrial electricity prices than China and the US, hindering its technological competitiveness.

  8. 28:37 – 31:39

    UK Legal Constraints and Net Zero

    Speaker_0 criticizes the UK's tight legal framework under the Climate Change Act of 2008, which makes it difficult to pursue pragmatic energy decisions like expanding North Sea gas production. She argues this legal rigidity hinders responsiveness to energy security needs and economic growth.

  9. 31:39 – 32:42

    Macroeconomic impact of domestic energy production

    Speaker_0 argues that increasing domestic oil and gas production reduces trade deficits and currency pressure, which is critical for the UK given its recent currency weakness. While North Sea production is in decline, marginal increases can improve macroeconomic stability.

  10. 32:42 – 36:14

    UK gas pricing mechanism and grid infrastructure challenges

    Speaker_0 criticizes the UK's gas pricing model, where LNG prices often set the price for North Sea gas, suggesting a review is needed. Sam Gyimah and Speaker_0 discuss the high capital intensity and logistical difficulties of upgrading the aging UK grid to handle decentralized renewable energy sources.

  11. 36:14 – 40:13

    AI as an energy competition and regional disparities

    Sam Gyimah introduces 'Altman's choice': the trade-off between achieving net zero by 2050 and having abundant energy for AI. Speaker_0 agrees, noting China's advantage via ultra-high voltage lines for renewables, while the US relies on private gas/nuclear capacity for data centers, leaving Europe at a structural disadvantage due to high costs and lack of domestic supply.

  12. 40:13 – 41:50

    Energy shocks, democratic discontent, and political risk

    Speaker_0 explains that energy price shocks quickly translate into cost-of-living crises, affecting food prices and fuel costs, leading to rapid democratic discontent. This political risk is compounded by public skepticism regarding AI's benefits and job impact, creating a 'lethal mix' for policymakers.

  13. 41:50 – 47:36

    NVIDIA story, US-China tech competition, and board-level risks

    The discussion covers the immediate market reaction to the NVIDIA story, highlighting fears that democratic politics could impede the AI boom. Speaker_0 notes deep elite division in the US over China dependency versus export controls. For corporate boards, the key risk is ignoring voter unhappiness about AI and energy costs, which can lead to significant political disruption.

Assets discussed

AssetKindStanceContext
Crude oilcommodityneutralyour currency, which has obviously been an issue in the U UK in recent years. And that is a worry in itself because a weaker currency means that that supply of oil that you need to buy in dollars becomes more expensive. So

“Stance” is how the speakers talked about the asset, not a recommendation.

Claims worth verifying

Liquefied natural gas (LNG) from Qatar is not getting through at pre-war scales due to force majeure declarations, creating a medium-to-long-term gas shock.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·2:12

How to verify: Check Qatar Energy's official announcements or press releases regarding force majeure declarations on LNG contracts during the 2026 conflict period. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

90% of oil from the Persian Gulf was going to Asia, not Europe, making Asia the primary victim of the energy shock.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·2:32

How to verify: Review global oil trade flow data from the International Energy Agency (IEA) or OPEC for the period 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The Trump administration imposed a naval embargo on China's ability to import oil from Iran.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·4:07

How to verify: Check US Department of Defense statements, Treasury sanctions lists, or news reports on naval blockades in the Strait of Hormuz during 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

China was stockpiling oil at scale since at least the summer of 2025.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·11:57

How to verify: Analyze China's official strategic petroleum reserve (SPR) data releases or independent estimates from the IEA or Oil Change International. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The peak of the US shale oil boom is expected by the end of this decade, possibly as early as 2028.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·16:20

How to verify: Review production forecasts from the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) or major US shale producers like ExxonMobil and Chevron. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Approximately one-third of China's energy consumption is electricity, compared to 20% in the UK.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·22:51

How to verify: Compare energy consumption statistics from China's National Bureau of Statistics and the UK's Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy (BEIS) or ONS. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Germany is entering winter with about 60% gas storage, below the EU target of 80%.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·29:25

How to verify: Check European Gas Storage reports from ENTSOG (European Network of Transmission System Operators for Gas) for the 2026 winter period. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The UK's gas storage is around 30%, significantly lower than Germany's.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·29:25

How to verify: Review reports from National Grid ESO or UK gas storage operators like Rough Field (if operational) or other storage facilities for 2026 levels. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The Climate Change Act of 2008, amended in 2019, legally binds the UK to net zero by 2050, making pragmatic energy decisions legally challenging.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·29:30

How to verify: Read the text of the UK Climate Change Act 2008 and the Climate Change and Sustainable Development Act 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Taiwan is bound to an investment deal in Alaska to develop LNG.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·26:47

How to verify: Search for press releases or news articles regarding Alaska LNG development deals involving Taiwanese entities or companies in 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

A weaker UK currency makes dollar-denominated oil imports more expensive, exacerbating economic pressure.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·31:59

How to verify: Check UK Bank of England data on currency fluctuations and ONS data on import prices and trade deficits for the relevant period. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The UK's gas pricing mechanism, where LNG prices set domestic gas prices, is a product of events in the 1990s.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·33:25

How to verify: Review UK government energy policy documents and historical reports on the liberalization of the UK gas market from the 1990s. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

China uses ultra-high voltage lines to supply data centers with renewable energy, particularly solar.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·38:05

How to verify: Search for reports from China's State Grid Corporation regarding ultra-high voltage (UHV) transmission projects and renewable energy integration. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Microsoft is involved in a project to reopen the Three Mile Island nuclear project.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·38:40

How to verify: Check Microsoft's press releases or news reports from 2026-08-20 to 2026-11-20 regarding nuclear energy partnerships and the Three Mile Island site. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

The NVIDIA story caused AI tech stocks to hit within 24 hours, reflecting fears that democratic politics could impede the AI boom.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·42:06

How to verify: Check stock market data for major AI tech indices (e.g., SOX, XLK) and news archives for the period following the NVIDIA story in late 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

There is deep division within the US elite regarding whether to encourage China's dependency on the US or implement tight export controls to limit China's technological development.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·43:06

How to verify: Review US government policy statements, congressional hearing transcripts, and major news editorials from 2026-08-20 to 2026-11-20 on US-China tech policy. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Do your own research

  • Verify Qatar's LNG export volumes and force majeure declarations via QatarEnergy official reports or Platts LNG assessments.
  • Check US Customs and Border Protection data for Chinese oil import volumes from Iran to confirm embargo impact.
  • Review the UK Climate Change Act 2008 and subsequent amendments to assess legal constraints on North Sea gas expansion.
  • Analyze Microsoft's Three Mile Island nuclear project filings and power purchase agreements to verify private sector nuclear investments.
  • Compare industrial electricity prices in the EU, US, and China using Eurostat, EIA, and National Bureau of Statistics of China data.
  • Assess China's strategic petroleum reserve levels through IEA monthly reports or official Chinese government releases.
  • Evaluate the UK grid infrastructure upgrade costs and timelines via National Grid ESO annual reports and Ofgem regulatory filings.
Full transcriptexpand

0:09Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): AI competition is energy competition.

0:13Sam Gyimah: Professor Helen Thompson, Professor of Political Economy at Cambridge.

0:18Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): There is a certain geopolitical logic to the Trump administration.

0:23Sam Gyimah: One of the world's leading authorities at the intersection of energy, economics, and geopolitics.

0:30Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): You can see a clear pattern to the administration, which is to put pressure in those parts of the world in which China has energy dependencies.

0:41Sam Gyimah: We explore how the battle for energy is redrawing the geopolitical map.

0:46Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): The energy source that is the easiest bet for the US to power AI is gas.

0:55Sam Gyimah: What's happening inside China and how they're preparing for the energy future?

1:00Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): They have a leadership that thinks very strategically about energy questions.

1:05Sam Gyimah: How things look closer to home?

1:07Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I think Europe is really

1:09Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Uh

1:09Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it's really vulnerable.

1:10Sam Gyimah: And what this all means for the future of democracies around the world.

1:15Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I don't think you can just like run roughshod over how much unhappiness there is among voters about AI.

1:23Sam Gyimah: Helen Thompson, welcome to the Geopolitics of Business.

1:26Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Thank you, Sam. Pleasure to be here.

1:28Sam Gyimah: So let's dive

1:29Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in.

1:30Sam Gyimah: Iran and the Strait of Omoose. Can you just tell me about the energy shock we we're are facing? It's coming up to about a year now since the Hosanna. hostilities began. There's no sign of a resolution. And

1:44Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I

1:44Sam Gyimah: just want to understand kind of the scale of what's happening, what fuels are getting through, what is not getting through.

1:52Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well,

1:52Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I think if we look where things are now, is outside Iran's own production of oil, quite a lot of oil is now getting through. In fact, probably getting close to where it was before the war started. The thing that's really still not getting through anything like the scale that it was before is liquefied natural gas. And that's because Qatar was hit by Iran in the early part of the war. Qatar had to declare force majeure Major on a number of its contracts. Things have improved there even in the last month or so. But in that sense, the biggest medium to long-term shock has come from actually from gas rather than from oil. I'm not saying that to minimize the effects of the oil shock on Asian countries in particular, given that 90% of the oil that was coming out of the Persian Gulf was going through to Asia rather than to Europe or anywhere else. But I think now the core of the shock that is still being experienced is actually a gas shock.

2:53Sam Gyimah: It's a gas shock. And where is this being felt the most globally?

2:57Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I think in Asia. I think that this is the thing that people have to understand about the energy shock that's gone on during the course of 2026. For Asian countries, this is like much more the European shock of the nineteen seventies. So I think in in Europe. sometimes people can think, well, this looks pretty bad. It's the worst geopolitical disruption around the Strait of War Moose that there's ever been in peacetime conditions. When I say peacetime conditions, I mean global peacetime

3:26Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): conditions.

3:27Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Outside like world wars. Why isn't it worse? Well the answer is is because Asia is the centre of the trade, energy trade with the Persian Gulf and not Europe as it was in the nineteen seventies. And what's really striking about this time as a point of comparison is 1979 in the nineteen eighties, that didn't involve China. China was self-sufficient oil country at the time when obviously its economic growth and economic development was much less than what it is now. What we're now seeing, and I think that this is an under remarked development and what's gone on this year is is that the Americans are imposing a naval embargo on China's ability to import oil from Iran. Because in having a essentially a blockade, a naval blockade of the Iranian economy, which has been the case, there was about a six week period in the middle of the year when it wasn't yeah wasn't there, but it's still like back in place. Iran can't really export oil out of the Strait of Hormis and most of the oil that Iran was exporting, more than ninety percent of it before the war began was going to China. So effectively the Trump administration is blockading China's access to what had been a significant

4:47oil exporter for it. And that in that sense

4:51Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So it was never

4:52Sam Gyimah: stated as um a war aim.

4:54Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): No it wasn't, but it's no doubt that it's a war outcome.

4:57Sam Gyimah: A war outcome. So I mean you you you've already started hinting at some of the geopolitical factors that are at play here. But before we go into that, just unpack for me the impact on households. Politicians, For example here in the UK like John Healy mentioned Iran a lot in the in the most recent budget. But how is this impacting interest rates policy decisions domestically and in households?

5:23Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Well, we've seen that the the Bank of England has made one raise in interest rates so far and it's strongly suggesting that more interest rate increases will be forthcoming. It was actually late compared to other central banks. Yes. in in raising interest rates. I think that we can see that the the pressure on bond yields that has been there, not just in Britain but

5:49Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that's in the

5:49Sam Gyimah: US.

5:50Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah, across the board really means that the overall fiscal outlook is worse than it would otherwise Wise be, and that obviously reduces the Chancellor's room for fiscal manoeuvre, the headspace, because it means that the debt that's being issued by the government is going to yield a higher rate of interest than it would have done before the the war started, already starting obviously from quite high bond yields, not by a long term historical perspective, but by recent perspective. And then although it is the case, the inflationary hit hasn't been quite as large as it. might have been, is there's still I think considerable potential for it to rise. And that's in part because the supply of gas to European countries, well the gas that's been stored for the winter, is significantly lower than it's been in recent years. That means that in a cold winter and in a winter in which wind in North Europe is low, which we've seen already some of through the course of November, that the demand for gas for electricity is likely to

7:01be

7:02Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): on

7:02Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the higher side rather than on the the lower side. So any more disruption

7:08Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in

7:09Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the liquefied natural gas markets has got the potential to translate into inflation. And then you've got the problem that then

7:16Sam Gyimah: you've got the policy of response to inflation and whether or not that could tip us into recession.

7:21Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Absolutely. Is is then there's a question of like whether the interest rate increases actually will have that effect or not.

7:28Sam Gyimah: So how much pressure is President Trump under to find a solution to the Iran war? Because it doesn't appear that America is hurting us much, right? So

7:39Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I don't think

7:40Sam Gyimah: other than obviously the bond yields issues.

7:41Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah, no, the

7:42Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): bond yield issues. But that would be there anyway, I think. There's no doubt that the the Trump administration, the second Trump administration from day one, has been worried about bond yields and been worried about interest rates. Like long before it got to the Iran war, it wanted lower. It

7:57Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): wanted lower rates rates So

7:58Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and now it's ended up with higher rates, and that is a problem for it given the size of the the amount of debt that the US has been sh is scheduled to issue over the next decade. Or so I think though if you look at the impact of the disruption to the energy trade on the US, it's not that much. What it is is an increase in gasoline prices. I mean, 'cause the gas market for the US is obviously separate. They're they're not importing gas. And I don't think there's any doubt that it significantly hurt the Republicans in the in the midterm elections. But I think you can also say that people were saying that from the first weeks of the war and that that would be a reason why Trump would have to backtrack. And uh he wouldn't be able to continue with the war. And that wasn't the case. I I mean I was never really convinced that Trump cared that much about the outcome of the midterm elections. There's no evidence that he really subordinated decision making about Iran to the risk

9:07of the Republicans losing control of Congress. And indeed, at the point when it looked like maybe that he was in retreat at a certain point like in the summer, actually in the end the response was to tighten the naval blockade and to concentrate on trying to provide naval support to transit through the the Strait of Hormuz rather than the retreat option. Now I think that

9:32Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So

9:32Sam Gyimah: what did he care about?

9:34Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I I

9:34Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Well I think that's a very good question. But I think that there is a certain um what's the way of putting this geopolitical logic to the Trump administration. And I'm now deliberately stressing the administration rather than him because I think it's quite hard at times to like follow.

9:53Sam Gyimah: What's a personal whim?

9:54Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): What's

9:55Sam Gyimah: a an alliance?

9:57Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And his words or his language is never a very good guide to that. In fact, it's usually a fairly useless guide to what might be like going on. But I I think you can see a clear pattern to the administration, which is to put pressure in those parts of the world in which China has energy dependencies.

10:16Sam Gyimah: And this is the structural geopolitical,

10:19Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you can see that in relation to Iran, you can see that for the long term in relation to Greenland. And I think and obviously Iran does doesn't fit into this, but the other two do, is you can see a quite serious attempt to try to push China out energy and resource wise of the Western Hemisphere to sort of have a mentality and a framework for policy where the Western Hemisphere's resources, energy and metals serve the United States and that they don't serve China, and that China had been w working on activating certain alliances in Latin America in particular, but to some extent it had been engaging with Greenland, and I think there's and Canada, and there's serious pushback against um all that.

11:06Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And

11:06Sam Gyimah: yeah, if you think about it that way, you know, there there is a a geopolitical game at play here. Then you could also see some of the disruption that is going on. It's a it's a price to pay to win that geopolitical game. Do you do you do you think that's what's at play in terms of how the US is thinking about

11:24Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it? I think

11:24Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that there's definitely something of that going on in the sense that I think that even if it's not a primary objective of war against Iran that causing China another problem

11:37Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in

11:37Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): relation to oil. more significant than the one that was caused in relation to Venezuela is is quite significant. Now, I think that China or the Chinese leadership understand that quite well. In fact I think they understand it very well. And I think in a way the evidence that there is some geopolitical logic to this can be seen in the fact that China was so well prepared for this war, that China had been stockpiling oil at scale. since at least the Israel and US attacks the summer of 2025, the twelve-day attacks against Iran. That is why China is able to take at times more than five million barrels a day out of its oil

12:20Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): import

12:21Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): demand, because it was well prepared. For it to be well prepared, it had to think strategically in general. and geopolitically about what US intentions might be.

12:31Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And I

12:31Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): think we can see that they thought that this was something that was at least quite possible as an outcome that the US would go to war in regard to Iran. And I think as well, if you think a bit more long term than that, is you know there is a reality that

12:49Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh

12:50Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): AI competition is energy competition.

12:54Sam Gyimah: It's it's an AI today for me is an energy

12:56Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): story

12:57Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): story. And that the energy source that is

13:04Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the

13:04Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): easiest bet for the US to power AI is gas. Now for the next ten to twenty years the US is is fine.

13:15Sam Gyimah: And and

13:16Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the

13:16Sam Gyimah: administration's policy when it comes to energies, energy dominance.

13:19Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Absolutely.

13:19Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It's

13:20Sam Gyimah: not energy abundance,

13:21Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): which is

13:21Sam Gyimah: where it was before.

13:22Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well

13:22Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I think there's an interesting tension there, Sam, because I think it wants I I I think that it wants energy abundance and energy dominance and they don't always they're not always align like that well. But we should remember that for the long term, you know, Iran is sitting on large scale gas reserves. Between them, Russia and Iran are sitting on more than half the gas reserves in the world. And so who in twenty years' time is in a dominant position in relation to Iran between the US and China is of some significance, I think.

13:54Sam Gyimah: So so so let me let me try and get something straight here. The United States and China are tech rivals. The United States and Russia are energy rivals. The three of them are competing for influence in resource-rich uh parts of the world from the Middle East to the Arctic.

14:10Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And

14:10Sam Gyimah: that lies at the heart of most of what is going on. Now, this podcast is called The Geopolitics of Business, and I think about this and I wonder whether we should be called the Geopolitics of Energy, whether that's that's really the heart of the matter, what's going on.

14:25Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I think a lot of it is that and I I think that in terms of the US Russia aspect of it, there's if you like a tension between the energy dominance and the energy abundance ambitions, because in terms of energy dominance the US has been competing with Russia in terms particularly of Europe's gas. markets. And the United States has won that hands down. Like you know, if you look at where things were

14:58Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): at

14:58Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the beginning of the 2010s, before the US had started exporting gas, which it does really from the middle of the decade, Russia was a very dominant position. It had these long-term long term pipeline contracts with a lot of European countries are in infrastructure around that. In terms of gas problems, it's quite embedded in a way in the German industrial complex. And now we're in a position, Europe's in a position where Germany is somewhat dependent upon the United States for imports of gas. It's more dependent upon Norway, But nonetheless, it has a dependency upon the US. where it used to have a very strong dependency upon Russia. If we though think about oil, and we think about the fact that since 2024 election, the president of the US has been not the slightest bit interested in an energy transition away from oil.

16:00Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So

16:00Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it's not really been pursuing the electrification agenda. that the Biden administration was doing. Is I think the energy series people in the administration understand very well that the peak of the US shale oil boom is in within sight. It will probably be by the end of this decade. I mean, there are people who think it'd be a little bit earlier than that, maybe 2028. twenty twenty eight. And nobody really knows whether it's going to be a stagnant. stagnation or whether there's going to be a a sharp decline once the once it does peak. But if you're not interested in electrifying transportation that uses oil and y you're facing peak shale, then there has to be an alternative in terms of the volume that's going to be lost from shale at a certain point. And the best bet medium to long term for more energy or oil abundance is Russia. It's Russian shale. Now, nobody really knows whether Russian shale is oil is going

17:02Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): to deliver because that's

17:04Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the only place outside the United States that's actually made shale oil work is Argentina and nothing.

17:08Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I mean that's

17:09Sam Gyimah: what I was about to say.

17:09Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah, it's nothing

17:10Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): like the same scale as like the US. But i it's one or the other if you see what I mean. You've either got to be in the business of electrifying transportation to reduce the oil demand, or when the shale US shale oil has peaked, you've there's got to be s there's gotta be something else. But

17:25Sam Gyimah: by the way, just something small. I noticed when you talk about the transition, you couched it in terms of electrification rather than broad based renewables. And um that's that's an interesting distinction, right? What do you think about that?

17:36Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well I think the

17:37Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): thing is is that I think that in this country we're quite bad at generalizing about the energy transition. Often well I say qu we in this country, what I mean is I think the politicians are often quite bad when they're talking about the energy transition because it's two very different things. The first of them is decarbonising electricity and that's something that's easier to do within certain limits. And then there's a question of electrification, of actually where oil and gas are being used as primary energy using electricity instead. So you can do electrification without decarbonising the electricity supply, but if you're going to be doing serious about the energy transition, you want to be decarbonising electricity and doing electrification. So the new electricity demand that you're generating is coming from always or is being sourced by renewables and nuclear and it's not being sourced by coal. and um gas. But there's no evidence whatsoever that the Trump administration is interested in pursuing either decarbonising electricity, nuclear aside, or electrification of transport.

18:39Sam Gyimah: But but there is seems to be evidence that he wants to hug the bear, the Russian bear, as it were.

18:44Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,

18:44Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and I think in a way that is the corollary of not being interested in electrification for the medium to long term. because you have to think post US shale oil if you're not committed to electrification because the world economy has been saved by shale oil, US shale oil for the last decade and a half. And there was been a otherwise there's been a stagnation of conventional oil production since the middle of the first decade of this century.

19:18Sam Gyimah: Rather than let's let's call it a more a tabloid version, which would be Trump likes strong men and hanging out with strong men.

19:27Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But

19:27Sam Gyimah: of course, both arguments could be true at the same time. But um if I hear you correctly, you're saying these structural forces are quite powerful, and even if it wasn't Trump. the United States will be thinking about some of these issues in the same way.

19:42Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah, I I think that it's the case that the Trump administration and Trump himself in this case came into office this time round determined to reset relations with Russia for energy reasons. I I I'm reasonably clear about that in my mind, and that they imagined that the the US oil companies, particularly X and Mobile. Mobil, could be back in Russia like relatively quickly. They just weren't able to either put enough pressure on Ukraine or enough pressure on Russia in order for that outcome to ensue. But if you remember, Sam, when in the days b leading up to the Trump's return, it was all when the Ukraine wars could gonna be over in 48 forty eight hours.

20:25Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And

20:26Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I I think that

20:27Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): there was

20:28Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): a sense that the the energy company, the oil companies were, you know, ready to go in in in terms of being able to go back into Russia and that's both on the opportunities in the Arctic but also the medium to long term shale opportunity. Now I think it would be more difficult for a democratic administration to go down that road absolutely not least because the commitment to the intrinsic commitment to Ukraine is higher than it ever has been with Trump. Nonetheless, I think we shouldn't forget that actually Congress to all intents and purposes cut off funding for Ukraine or new funding for Ukraine during the Biden process. presidency, not because it's what Biden wanted, but there was enough bipartisan consensus in Congress to make that difficult for quite a substantial period. Forget

21:23Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that, didn't we? Yeah.

21:25Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): A substantial period of time. And

21:29Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): even

21:29Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): if you have a Democrat in the White House who's much more committed to electrification, that electrification of transportation has to succeed.

21:38Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And if it

21:38Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): doesn't quickly, then you're still the

21:41Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): key word being

21:41Sam Gyimah: kicked quickly, right? Because that's a long term game.

21:44Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah, that then you're still

21:45Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): huge

21:45Sam Gyimah: amounts of investment.

21:46Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Then you s yeah, then you're still up against the issue of well, is the US shale oil boom gonna stagnate

21:56Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): or

21:57Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): is it going to s you know crash? I when I say crash, I I don't think it actually will crash, but it could be on a quite sharp demise. And and if it's a sharp demise and you haven't really done much to get overall world oil demand down, then that's a big problem.

22:13Sam Gyimah: How is China strategically positioned to respond?

22:16Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I think China is in a good position compared to everybody else, in the sense that they have a leadership that thinks very strategically about energy questions. I think their preparation for the war in Iran is good evidence of that. They're also doing better, significantly better at electrification than Western countries or the m the larger Western countries at least. I mean, obviously one has to be a little bit sceptical about some of the official figures, but you know, it's quite possible that somewhere around a third of China's energy consumption is actually electricity. Whereas you take this country as a comparison, it's about twenty percent and is not really moving. Indeed, our electricity production has been going down, you know, for quite some time. And China when it pushes solar in particular, it doesn't have the problems of foreign dependency that European countries like Britain do when we push solar because China dominates solar panel production. When China pushes electric vehicles, it doesn't have to think about what the effects of are on deindustrialised parts of the Chinese economy because

23:35China's the world's top producer of electric vehicles. They are technologically better than anybody else, like at it.

23:43Sam Gyimah: Yes. So so that's where China is. And how vulnerable is Europe?

23:48Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I think Europe is really it's really vulnerable, both because it's in a period in which its fossil fuel energy dependence on outside the continent is increasing that's a function of the overall decline of the North Sea. And that comes on top of what has been a a century's worth of problems of oil dependency that European countries has faced. In in that sense

24:19Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the

24:20Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): North Sea aside, Europe's story of the twentieth 20th century is rather pit your poison. Do you want to be dependent upon Russia or the Soviet Union prior to that? Do you want to be dependent upon the Middle East, or do you want to be dependent upon the United States? And we're in a moment in which the dependency upon the United States is is going upwards at just the moment. Well

24:46Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): actually the

24:46Sam Gyimah: thing is it's not by intent, right? It's just as a ri response to

24:50Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): events.

24:51Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Response to events at the same time as the desire for strategic autonomy from the United States is higher than it's been for quite some time. And so And

25:02Sam Gyimah: they need to stand up to Russia.

25:03Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Then there's the Russia question, but then there's the way in which the energy problems, as we said, feed into the AI problems. problem. So Europe might be technologically well behind. on AI, which it is clearly, but that problem is compounded by the fact that it has comparatively high industrial electricity prices compared to both China, in part because China is still very happy to burn a lot of coal for electricity, and compared to the United States, which has cheap domestic gas. So the

25:39Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So Europe

25:39Sam Gyimah: is in real bind right now. It can't do that. And but so it's more reliant on the US at the time, same time as it's talking about strategic autonomy from the US. And you've got sort of very tense trade relationships going on.

26:00Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah, and you can see that before we even got to the events of this year, that the US administration under Trump is very keen on intensifying that gas dependency upon the US. Look at the way in which the the EU trade deal from last year included liquefied natural gas clauses in it. Now whether they're enforceable or not is another like matter, but it shows the intent that actually the the Trump administration was quite happy t to encourage the dependency of European countries on the US for L and G. Indeed, it's not just European countries, it's quite happy to encourage other seeming allies dependency. I mean I think Taiwan's a good example of that. Taiwan is now bound to an investment deal in Alaska in developing LNG out of Alaska. So it's not just buying this gas in the future, but actually pouring investment capital into developing Alaskan

27:01Sam Gyimah: LNG. So in the context of this European dependence on the US, what does it really mean when Europe talks about standing up to the United States? What does this mean for NATO, for example?

27:16Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I mean I think that it's it's very, very difficult to stand up for any power or any c group of states to a state on which you have energy dependency because at the moment of of crisis they can put the pressure upon you. And they can do that in some fairly indirect ways as well. I mean if you take the example of the Suez crisis in in nineteen fifty-six, Britain didn't have a military problem fighting that war against Egypt with France and Israel. It was brought to an end because of the the pressure that the Eisen intense pressure the Eisenhower administration put on Anthony Eden. Not actually about the provision of oil itself, but the provision of dollars in order to buy emergency oil in dollars. So and obviously

28:05Sam Gyimah: it can be weaponized against

28:07Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it can be weaponized and not just the actual supply but the actual ability to pay for it.

28:11Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It's

28:11Sam Gyimah: a very different way of thinking

28:12Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): of

28:12Sam Gyimah: choke points, right? This is just something that could be weaponized against

28:15Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you I

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28:33Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): for the geopolitics of business. Now, back to the conversation.

28:37Sam Gyimah: And then you you you you look at where the UK is. It sort of makes our discussion of energy, energy security rather quaint, right? We're still talking about net zero, net zero target. targets, you know, um big victory for some when the Burnham government said, you know, the jack taught gas field could go ahead. But we are incredibly vulnerable. Even within Europe, we are more vulnerable than others.

29:05Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): We we are, I think, more vulnerable in part because our gas storage is so like poor. I mean I think that the Germany's going into the winter. with about sixty percent gas storage when it was supposed to be aiming under EU rules or the EU framework for 80%. I think we're more like 30%. And I think that the other problem that we have is that net zero via the Climate Change Act of 2008, which is really the ultimate framework for this, because the net zero amendment of twenty nineteen is an amendment to the Climate Change Act. The problem is, I think, that the the legal framework is very tight in the UK. It actually makes it very difficult to be pragmatic about these questions because any decision that isn't actually net zero twenty fifty compatible can be legally challenged.

30:01Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And

30:02Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and so that responsiveness of actually saying, actually, we need to stop and think about how we're going about the energy transition, how we're going about net zero and what the timeframes for thinking about these questions should be, is that's now very difficult in the UK because we're we're legally quite bound in

30:22Sam Gyimah: North Sea production can't w it's not compatible with our net zero targets?

30:27Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Well uh technically it's not in the sense that anything that increases domestic emissions is not compatible with our net zero targets. Now there was ways that can be sort of those questions like can be fudged. But nonetheless, I think that anything in that space will be open to legal challenge.

30:46Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I

30:47Sam Gyimah: mean I frame my question in terms of vulnerability and security, but there is also a point here about economic growth. And at a time when energy supplies are constricted and higher and your economy is flatlining, it's a precarious position to be in in the name of net zero by twenty fifty, isn't it?

31:10Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It

31:10Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): is. I mean I think th the other thing that has to be considered in is the macroeconomic effect of being reliant upon imports.

31:22Sam Gyimah: Yes.

31:23Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And now the emissions issue, not in legal terms because our legal framework distinguishes between domestic emissions and emissions abroad, but in actual emissions like terms, we're better off doing it taking oil and gas produced domestically, even if you just think about that as a transportation issue in terms of emissions. But the payoff macroeconomically, the more that you can produce at home is the the less that you have a trade deficit and then the less pressure the trade deficit is putting on your currency, which has obviously been an issue in the U UK in recent years. And that is a worry in itself because a weaker currency means that that supply of oil that you need to buy in dollars becomes more expensive. So whilst one can still recognise, in fact one should recognise that more production from the North Sea is not some kind of panacea. here because the North Sea generally is in decline. Um it can still make enough macroeconomic difference at the margins to make the economic situation a bit

32:39less precarious than I think it than it actually is.

32:42Sam Gyimah: And what can we do on the gas side?

32:45Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Well 'cause

32:45Sam Gyimah: th th that that also gets conflated, right, when we talk about

32:48Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it.

32:48Sam Gyimah: it

32:48Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): does. I mean one

32:48Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): of the things that we could do on the gas side is to like revisit the way in which we price gas in the sense that we have ended up with the way in which gas enters the UK market, particularly in regard to electricity, that allows

33:06Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a

33:06Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): lot of the time the LNG price to set the price that for gas that's coming from the North Sea. Uh now that's not a very sensible situation that we've got ourselves into. I mean it's the product of like what happened in the in the nineteen nineties and it could do I think with being reviewed because we don't want to be in a position where we're we're paying more for gas that's coming from the North Sea than we need to be doing.

33:35Sam Gyimah: Indeed. Indeed. And kind of obviously I deal with a lot of investors who have appetite to invest. They have appetite to invest in electrification, storage, the grid. So we know what the answers

33:49Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): are.

33:50Sam Gyimah: But not much of that seems to be happening, right? Or certainly from government sort of incentivizing a lot of that in terms of its industrial strategy.

33:58Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,

33:58Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I mean I think I think one of the reasons why it's i hard is because that actually transforming the grid and at that a grid that was aging anyway to deal with very different kind of electricity generation is just capital intensive and logistically hard. And I I think that that's the thing that's constantly lost when we have people saying, including various ministers, oh, solar and wind are cheaper. Well obviously they are at a unit level, but at the system level that's a whole other

34:44Sam Gyimah: intensive, it's long term, yes.

34:46Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And including because actually

34:50Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the fact

34:57Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): To sustain the same electricity output on a daily basis than you do if you were using coal, gas and nuclear as the basis of the the grid, and because it's much more decentralized just in terms of the physical infrastructure of it. in terms of of the inputs, rather than having X number of power stations in various relatively concentrated places. You've got all this offshore wind that's got to be brought on land, you've got onshore wind coming from Scotland, from fairly remote parts of Scotland, needing to move to population centres in the the south of England. That That's a really complicated thing to work out how you're going to have a grid that works on that basis. And so I think that in that sense the the narrative of like net zero is that this is a way to cheaper energy was quite distorting. Not because of anything you can say about where it might end up, you know, like twenty years' time, thirty years' time, but the sheer upheaval of reconfiguring how we deliver electricity in this country is both time consuming but it's also very expensive.

36:14Sam Gyimah: So so let's look at AI. Because th th th this is the other bugbear of mine. Okay, we both agree I think that AI is really an energy story. memory And we talk about it as in the media as this is this new technology that is going to try transform the way we live and work and scientific research and everything. But today it's a very classic old industry story, right? How are you going to power AI? Now I have this thing which I play with I call Altman's choice, as in after Sam Altman, the founder of OpenAI, which is you can have net zero by 2050, twenty fifty, or you can have abundant energy to power AI. but you can't have both.

36:53Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And

36:53Sam Gyimah: kind of in that if that's true, and I'd like to get you kind of what your reaction is to

36:58Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it,

36:58Sam Gyimah: where does that leave Europe, UK, US, China, etc., in terms of the AI competition? Because this is a transformational technology, it's pretty clear that country countries want to control it because of what it can do. And so therefore, energy has to be part of where you end, a story of where you end up in the AI race.

37:25Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Completely. And you you can see that in the very fact that when people are talking about data centers, they almost always um use an energy measure or a power measure of gigawatt for capacity. They don't use a computing capacity. Figure that that tells you that ultimately it's an electricity competition question. I I think that it is right that it is a choice between electricity abundance and net zero by twenty fifty. It might not be or less so I think for China in this sense is the China because it is able via its ultra high voltage lines to actually supply data centers using the grid with renewable with solar particularly contributing to that. That gives China some options that I don't think are there in the case of European countries and the United States in particular. And if you look at what's happening in the United States, you can see that for the long term, the companies, the hyperscalers, they want nuclear. Including to the point where Microsoft is

38:40involved in a project to open three Mile Island nuclear project again. to gain. And what they will do in the short to medium term is gas. new g gas power capacity. And they want it essentially private because they don't trust waiting for the grid for however long that that's gonna take. So they think about it.

39:00Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So this is

39:01Sam Gyimah: their sort of bring your own power, right?

39:03Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah, it is is you you build a data center and you build the electricity capacity to sustain that. And it's and it's gonna be a gas reactor that is going to be um doing that. Now, if you're a European country that's already got your technological difficulties with AI and then you look at what the electricity costs are and that your electricity costs are much higher, it is that it's quite difficult to make putting these data centres or very large data centres in your country attractive. And you don't have the option that China has of using coal because we've said for net zero reasons that that's out. And you don't have the domestic supply of gas that the the US does for building cheap new gas power stations for the hyperscalers or indeed for anybody else for that matter. matters. So I I think it puts European countries in in real difficulty. Well

40:02Sam Gyimah: puts it them at a structural disadvantage, I'd say, in terms of where we go with AI. But the immediate shock of this until I'm to bring this to a close is affected by it affects pocketbook issues, right, for voters, and that's uh has an impact on democracy.

40:22Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It

40:22Sam Gyimah: would be good to get your sort of your long lens on sort of why energy price shocks are so difficult. destabilizing for democracies.

40:30Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I I think it's because they translate very directly into cost of living. People are well aware of both the price that they pay for petrol or gasoline in the United States and they're well aware of their energy bills. And I think increasingly people understand, and they particularly do this in energy crisis. crises moments that it affects the price of food. So they can notice that actually when their electricity bills are going up that food inflation is happening at the same time. And so I think that anything that's sort of materially existential that these things are translates into democratic discontent like very quickly. And then if that is happening at the same time as there seems to be this big new almost like competing demand for electricity via AI and people don't many people don't really see what the benefit for them is

41:31they don't like it and they not only don't really see what the benefit is going to be, they think it actually might be very destructive of their jobs and sense of what a human being is in some quite deep sense, then that's a fairly lethal mix to be in. And I think that did play out during the US midterm elections.

41:50Sam Gyimah: And um just sort of on a word on on the midterms, how do we see that? Because very quickly after the midterms we went into this big NVIDIA story and the other stories. Just sort of how do you frame what happened then and what the how we look at the concept

42:05Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): of the side. Well, I think that

42:06Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): is this there's two different bits to this, isn't there? There's the fact that very quickly within 24 hours or less than 24 hours, it translated into an AI tech stock hit. The sense that actually democratic politics might be an impediment to the AI boom because of resistance to data centres in particular. And that would have been the case even without the NVIDIA story. And then whoever's behind the NVIDIA story entering the media in the way in which it like did has put onto the table the whole question of the AI competition between US and China, not necessarily here in energy terms, but in computing power. terms, and the fact that there i is clearly quite deep division within the US at elite level about how that should play out, whether some level of dependency of China on the US should be encouraged, or whether actually the policy should be very tight export controls and trying to limit China's technological development. And I I think it's quite difficult, certainly sitting on this side of Atlantic and not having like knowledge as to like quite how the

43:25Nvidia story developed as quickly as it did, understanding quite what's going on in terms of that, if you like.

43:32Sam Gyimah: How he got into the the the media blast

43:34Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): streaming the way that it didn't

43:36Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the factional competition at the top level of the the

43:43Sam Gyimah: If you and I were speaking to a board of a company given what we've been discussing so far, w what are the kind of financial political risks that they should be aware of?

43:56Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Well I think that you know that they are, where AI is concerned, like very significant in the political sense. because I don't think you can just like run roughshod over how much unhappiness there is among voters about AI, particularly in a context in which cost of living and energy cost of living is very much to the fore, and where we've just lived through anyway, sort of a decade and a half of democratic political disruption in Western countries that's come in part from the gap between the way in which many politicians think about certain questions and the way in which many voters think about certain questions. And I I think that for the political class, if you like to say actually AI is just a good thing for productivity, for technology. technological like development and we're just gonna do this, regardless of what the voters think. I I I think that that is is asking for trouble. And I I don't think that the the politics of it can be contained.

45:04Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So

45:04Sam Gyimah: when I think about it, I absolutely agree with that we we've had the financial crisis. At some level I think we're still living through the aftershocks of the two 2008 thousand and eight financial crisis. We had the pandemic and now we've got this new technology set against a backdrop of energy and great power competition. What makes you optimistic for the next decade?

45:27Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I

45:28Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I I think that the underlying material conditions around energy, there's a lot of reasons to be pessimistic. Just because there's all these different things that are going on that are all quite difficult. I think one of the things that is better than it was is that I think many more people now have energy awareness than was the case. I think that it's better when energy is part of the democratic political debate of political contest than when energy is there. all the time under the surface of politics and not rising into democratic politics. Just because I think that we need to be our societies is as energy aware as we can be, because there are so many things that are constrained by what has to happen in order for energy demand to be. met.

46:28Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So

46:28Sam Gyimah: the geopolitics of energy, I think, is a conversation we should continue. Helen Thompson, thank you for joining me on the geopolitics of business.

46:36Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It's

46:36Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): been a pleasure, Sam. Thanks very much for having

46:39Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): me.

46:40Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): You'll find many more useful insights in our archive. I've spoken to leaders including Nick Clegg, former President of Meta and the UK Deputy Prime Minister, and Dame Fiona Murray, Mari, Chief. Chairman of the NATO Innovation Fund.

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