Michael Howell argues global liquidity peaked in late 2025, predicting a 2027 inflection favoring bonds over equities.
Summary
Michael Howell asserts that the global liquidity cycle peaked in late 2025 and is now declining, shifting markets from a speculative to a turbulence phase. He highlights a looming debt maturity wall for advanced economies between 2026 and 2030, where refinancing at higher rates strains financial systems. Howell predicts a significant economic slowdown in 2027, driven by high oil prices and tightening liquidity, which he believes will force the Federal Reserve to ease policy. Consequently, he recommends shifting portfolios toward long-duration government bonds and defensive equities, while maintaining a tepid view on liquidity-sensitive assets like equities and commodities.
Key takeaways
- 1 The global liquidity cycle measures the growth rate of liquidity into financial markets, not the absolute level; it peaked in late 2025 after a three-year upward run and has since inflected downward, signaling a transition to a 'turbulence phase' characterized by high volatility and poor risk-adjusted returns.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) · 1:06
- 2 The funding structure for AI has flipped: whereas it was previously expected that 80% of AI funding would come from corporate cash flow, Howell asserts that 80% now comes from financial markets (debt and equity issuance), placing significant strain on market capacity.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) · 4:19
- 3 bootstrapped a crude price from diesel prices. So the equivalent. oil price, looking at diesel, is over $160 a barrel. That clearly impinges on the economy.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) · 47:57
Episode sections
- 0:00 – 2:36
Introduction and Liquidity Cycle Overview
Jack Farley introduces Michael Howell, who states the global liquidity cycle peaked in late 2025 and is now turning down, marking a shift from speculative to turbulence phases. Howell notes that while liquidity levels remain high, the growth rate is slowing, leading to high volatility and poor quality returns in equities, with defensive sectors outperforming.
- 2:36 – 8:08
AI Funding and Debt Maturity Wall
Howell argues that AI infrastructure is a massive consumer of liquidity, requiring nearly $1 trillion in annual debt financing, with 80% of funding now coming from markets rather than cash flow. He highlights a looming 'debt maturity wall' for advanced economies from 2026 to 2030, where existing debt must be refinanced at higher rates, creating significant refinancing tensions.
- 8:08 – 15:06
Debt-Liquidity Nexus and Financial Crises
The speaker explains that the global financial system relies on a 'debt-liquidity nexus' where 77% of lending is collateral-backed. He posits a 16-year cycle in the debt-to-liquidity ratio, suggesting the system is swinging from an 'everything bubble' (excess liquidity) toward an 'everything bust' (refinancing crises) as liquidity declines relative to exponential debt growth.
- 15:06 – 25:02
Fed and Treasury Liquidity Management
Howell describes a shift in Federal Reserve policy from abundant QE to a 'managed ample reserve' framework, using Reserve Management Purchases (RMP) to stabilize repo markets and target $3 trillion in bank reserves. He argues the Treasury is also managing liquidity by issuing more short-term bills and conducting buybacks to cap volatility, effectively creating 'Treasury QE'.
- 25:02 – 33:52
Treasury QE and Real vs. Financial Economy
The discussion defines 'Treasury QE' as the liquidity effect of issuing short-term debt, which Howell claims is equivalent to $3 trillion in stimulus. He presents a seesaw relationship where money in the real economy crowds out financial market liquidity, explaining that the falling liquidity cycle coincides with a hot real economy and flattening yield curves.
- 33:52 – 38:46
Yield Curve Dynamics and Term Premia
Speaker 1 argues that the flattening US and Japanese yield curves are driven by falling term premia and nominal GDP growth expectations, rather than fiscal fragility or inflation fears. He contrasts this with media narratives predicting steepening curves due to debt concerns.
- 38:46 – 40:08
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Speaker 2 promotes the Sarmaya Partners LENS ETF, highlighting its focus on tangible assets like energy, materials, and precious metals as a hedge against inflation and geopolitical risk, noting that these sectors have been underinvested.
- 40:08 – 42:04
Historical Interest Rate Context and Bond Outlook
Speaker 1 cites Bank of England and US Treasury data back to the 1700s and Sidney Homer's 'A History of Interest Rates' to argue that current ultra-low rates were anomalous. He suggests bonds are now behaving normally and may be attractive as the market enters a 'turbulence' phase.
- 42:04 – 46:26
Liquidity Phases and Asset Allocation
Speaker 1 outlines a four-quadrant model of liquidity and yield curve slopes: Rebound, Calm, Speculation, and Turbulence. He identifies the current market as moving from Speculation to Turbulence, recommending defensive assets like long-duration government debt and defensive stocks (healthcare, staples).
- 46:26 – 50:03
Economic Slowdown Indicators and Fed Policy
Speaker 1 uses a z-score of bond volatility, the DXY, and bootstrapped crude oil prices to predict a vicious economic inflection in 2027. He argues this slowdown will force the Fed to ease policy, despite current high nominal GDP growth.
- 50:03 – 53:49
Federal Reserve Priorities and Treasury Market Stability
Speaker 1 claims the Fed's primary mandate is Treasury market stability, not just inflation control. He compares Chair Walsh to Greenspan, suggesting the Fed will prioritize liquidity and avoid tightening to manage the $40 trillion debt mountain, potentially using 'Treasury QE'.
- 53:49 – 57:32
Treasury Buybacks and Volatility Management
Speaker 1 distinguishes between yield levels and volatility, arguing the Treasury buyback program aims to reduce collateral volatility rather than cap yields. He notes a correlation between buyback announcements and the MOVE index, suggesting buybacks help stabilize the market.
- 57:32 – 1:05:40
Federal Reserve Balance Sheet Trajectory
Speaker 1 predicts the Fed balance sheet will grow in parallel with federal debt, rejecting the idea of a significant balance sheet reduction. He argues that shrinking the balance sheet is 'fanciful' and that the Fed will accumulate securities to manage refinancing risks.
- 1:05:40 – 1:29:08
Equity and Commodity Market Dynamics
Speaker 1 notes a strong correlation between commodity markets (CRB index) and the global business cycle, with earnings growth (S&P) tracking ISM data. He predicts an economic cooldown in 2027, which would signal a warning for equity markets.
Assets discussed
| Asset | Kind | Stance | Context |
|---|---|---|---|
| BitcoinBTC | crypto | mixed | He's calling for a sharp slowdown in 2027, for Bitcoin to retest 70,000, for bonds to beat stocks, and a bottom in liquidity by late 2027. |
| US dollarUSD | currency | neutral | basically to say, look, this is the US. dollar, this is the DXY, this is purely a chart of the dollar, okay? Trade weighted dollar, and you can see that what the dollar has been doing, certainly in terms of the way that I've drawn the trend lines, is it's been trending higher. |
| Gold | commodity | mixed | fairly strongly at the beginning of the year was that if gold prices have gone up as much as they had, you were likely to see very strong gains in commodity markets this year |
| Crude oil | commodity | neutral | fairly strongly at the beginning of the year was that if gold prices have gone up as much as they had, you were likely to see very strong gains in commodity markets this year, and you would see strong gains in oil. |
“Stance” is how the speakers talked about the asset, not a recommendation.
Claims worth verifying
The global liquidity cycle peaked in late 2025 and has inflected downwards.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·1:06
How to verify: Check Michael Howell's 'Capital Wars' Substack data series for the Global Liquidity Index (GLI) trend from late 2025 to present. For recent events, verify 2026-08-02 through 2026-11-02. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
AI infrastructure requires close to $1 trillion in debt financing annually for the next two years.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·4:19
How to verify: Review capital expenditure guidance and debt issuance filings from major hyperscalers (e.g., Microsoft, Amazon, Google, Meta) for 2026-2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-02 through 2026-11-02. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary source80% of AI funding now comes from financial markets rather than cash flow.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·4:19
How to verify: Analyze quarterly cash flow statements and equity/debt issuance reports of major AI-capex companies to determine the ratio of internal cash flow to external market financing. For recent events, verify 2026-08-02 through 2026-11-02. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The debt maturity wall for advanced economies is significant from 2026 to 2030.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·6:18
How to verify: Consult IMF Global Debt Database or BIS (Bank for International Settlements) data on debt maturity profiles for advanced economies. For recent events, verify 2026-08-02 through 2026-11-02. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
77% of all global lending is collateral-backed.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·9:31
How to verify: Search World Bank Global Financial Development Report or World Bank Open Data for statistics on collateralized lending. For recent events, verify 2026-08-02 through 2026-11-02. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The debt-to-liquidity ratio follows a 16-year cycle.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·11:44
How to verify: Plot historical data for total debt-to-GDP and global liquidity metrics (e.g., M2, central bank balance sheets) for major advanced economies and perform spectral analysis or visual inspection for cyclical patterns. For recent events, verify 2026-08-02 through 2026-11-02. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The Federal Reserve targets approximately $3 trillion in bank reserves.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·17:35
How to verify: Check Federal Reserve H.4.1 Statistical Release for 'Reserves of Depository Institutions' historical and current levels. For recent events, verify 2026-08-02 through 2026-11-02. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The Treasury is targeting a 30% share of bills in total federal debt outstanding.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·27:57
How to verify: Review US Treasury Department reports on debt outstanding and issuance schedules to calculate the ratio of short-term bills to total debt. For recent events, verify 2026-08-02 through 2026-11-02. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
A 5 percentage point increase in the bill share of total debt is equivalent to $3 trillion in net liquidity stimulus.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·28:36
How to verify: This is a proprietary calculation by Howell; verify by reviewing his 'Capital Wars' Substack methodology notes or contacting the author for the specific formula used. For recent events, verify 2026-08-02 through 2026-11-02. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
US domestic liquidity precedes changes in the Treasury yield curve slope by approximately nine months.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·32:13
How to verify: Perform a cross-correlation analysis between Howell's Global Liquidity Index (or US-specific liquidity proxy) and the average slope of the US Treasury yield curve over the past 20 years. For recent events, verify 2026-08-02 through 2026-11-02. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The US yield curve is flattening because term premia are coming down, not because of fiscal fragility or inflation fears.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·33:52
How to verify: Check US Treasury yield curve data (10s2s spread) and term premium estimates from the New York Fed or Michael Howell's published data. For recent events, verify 2026-08-02 through 2026-11-02. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Term premia in the German Bund, US Treasury, and Chinese government bond markets have flatlined or shrunk through 2025.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·35:55
How to verify: Compare term premium estimates from the New York Fed (for US) and similar central bank or academic sources for Germany and China. For recent events, verify 2026-08-02 through 2026-11-02. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Risk-adjusted US Treasury 10-year yields (yield minus term premium) align with nominal GDP growth since the 1951 Treasury-Fed Accord.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·37:00
How to verify: Calculate the difference between the 10-year Treasury yield and the NY Fed's term premium estimate, then compare the trend to US Nominal GDP growth data from the BEA. For recent events, verify 2026-08-02 through 2026-11-02. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
AI capex spending has been responsible for about a third of US economic growth over the last few years.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·38:00
How to verify: Review US GDP components from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) to isolate 'nonresidential fixed investment' in 'equipment' and 'structures' attributed to IT/AI, and compare to total GDP growth. For recent events, verify 2026-08-02 through 2026-11-02. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The S&P 500 has more than a third of its weight in tech, while energy, materials, and precious metals make up about 5%.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·38:46
How to verify: Check the sector weightings of the S&P 500 from S&P Dow Jones Indices or a financial data provider like Bloomberg/Refinitiv. For recent events, verify 2026-08-02 through 2026-11-02. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
US Treasury yields have been in a 70-year cycle, with a low point in 2021 around 0.5%.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·40:44
How to verify: Plot US 10-year Treasury yield data from the Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) database from 2026 to present. For recent events, verify 2026-08-02 through 2026-11-02. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Bootstrapped crude oil prices from diesel prices are over $160 per barrel.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·47:57
How to verify: Compare US diesel prices (EIA data) to crude oil prices (WTI/Brent) to derive a crack spread and infer the implied crude price, or check Michael Howell's specific calculation methodology. For recent events, verify 2026-08-02 through 2026-11-02. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The Federal Reserve's primary priority is Treasury market stability, not just inflation control.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·51:47
How to verify: Review the Federal Reserve Act's dual mandate and recent speeches by Chair Powell or Vice Chair Waller regarding financial stability and Treasury market functioning. For recent events, verify 2026-08-02 through 2026-11-02. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceThe Treasury buyback program aims to reduce volatility in off-the-run treasuries, not to influence yield levels.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·55:57
How to verify: Review the US Treasury's official statements on the buyback program and compare MOVE index movements with buyback announcement dates. For recent events, verify 2026-08-02 through 2026-11-02. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The Fed balance sheet will grow in parallel with federal debt to manage refinancing risks.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·1:00:46
How to verify: Compare the growth rate of the Fed's balance sheet (H.4.1 report) with the growth of total federal debt outstanding. For recent events, verify 2026-08-02 through 2026-11-02. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The CRB commodity index increase is consistent with the global business cycle and economic tempo.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·1:05:40
How to verify: Compare CRB Index price action with Global Business Cycle Index data from Bloomberg or Refinitiv for the period 2026-01-01 to 2026-10-29. For recent events, verify 2026-08-02 through 2026-11-02. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceEarnings growth in the S&P 500 is strong and consistent with ISM data.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·1:06:00
How to verify: Compare S&P 500 reported earnings growth rates with ISM Manufacturing/Services PMI data for 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-02 through 2026-11-02. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The economy will cool in 2027, causing equity warnings.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·1:06:19
How to verify: Monitor US GDP growth forecasts and equity index performance (S&P 500) in 2027 against historical recession indicators. For recent events, verify 2026-08-02 through 2026-11-02. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
PE multiples are falling due to falling liquidity and rising bond yields, while EPS growth has been unusually strong and late in the cycle.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·1:06:41
How to verify: Analyze S&P 500 PE ratio trends and EPS growth rates against Global Liquidity Index (GLI) and US Treasury yields for 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-02 through 2026-11-02. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Term premiums have been net flat over the last twelve months, while rate expectations drove yields.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·1:07:41
How to verify: Calculate the change in the 10-year Treasury Inflation-Indexed Yield (TIPS) spread (term premium) and compare with nominal 10-year yield changes from 2026-10-29 to 2026-10-29. For recent events, verify 2026-08-02 through 2026-11-02. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Do your own research
- Verify the World Bank's statistic on collateral-backed lending (77% of global lending) using their latest Global Financial Development Report or World Bank Open Data.
- Check the US Treasury's debt issuance schedule and maturity profile for 2026-2030 to assess the size of the 'debt maturity wall' and refinancing needs.
- Review Federal Reserve H.4.1 reports to confirm the level of bank reserves and the usage of Reserve Management Purchases (RMP) to see if they are targeting $3 trillion.
- Analyze the composition of AI capex spending using company earnings reports and industry data to verify if 80% of funding is coming from financial markets rather than cash flow.
- Compare the 10-year Treasury yield minus term premium against nominal GDP growth data from the BEA to test the historical correlation cited.
- Monitor the PBOC's balance sheet and gold reserve data to verify the claim that Chinese liquidity doubled since 2022 and drives gold prices.
- Check the correlation between Bitcoin price action and global M2 growth or other liquidity metrics to assess its validity as a leading indicator.
- Review the Treasury's buyback program announcements and their impact on the MOVE index to evaluate the claim that buybacks stabilize collateral volatility rather than cap yields.
Full transcriptexpand
- 0:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): The AI build-out is draining liquidity, and Michael Howell says the global liquidity cycle has turned. He's calling for a sharp slowdown in 2027, for Bitcoin to retest 70,000, for bonds to beat stocks, and a bottom in liquidity by late 2027. Monetary Matters viewers get 20% off an annual subscription to Michael Howell's Capital
- 0:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Wars Substack. Link in the description. First, a word from today's sponsor. This episode is brought to you by Sarmaya Partners. who manages the Return to Tangibles ETF lens ticker L-E-N-S, the Sarmaya Thematics ETF, built for a return to tangibles. Learn more at SarmayaETF.com and see the show notes for disclosures. Let's get into it. I'm
- 0:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): joined once again by the liquidity godfather Michael Howell of the Capital Wars Substack. Michael, great to see you.
- 0:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Always a pleasure to be here.
- 0:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): How are you thinking about markets right now? Just had the Fed meeting, some balance sheet announcements, but how are you measuring liquidity across the various indices that you look at central bank liquidity, cross-border, private sector, the rest, and then its implications for asset markets? Just give us a broad view to start out with. Well,
- 1:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I think the broad picture is that the liquidity cycle is going down. I mean, that that's for sure. It peaked in late 2025. And that was after an upward run of pretty much three years. So it's inflected downwards. The important thing to say is that this is really measuring the growth of liquidity into financial markets. So it's not looking at the level. The level is still relatively high. But what we're seeing is a
- 1:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): very clear slowdown. And I would contend that those features are becoming more apparent in markets. And the backdrop is that we're moving through the investment phases we've just come through that and maybe ended the phase three. that we tend to describe as speculative. And that's really been going on for almost a year now. And that phase is really saying that it's
- 1:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): kind of late cycle. You can still make money in markets, but the volatility is high. So the quality of those returns is pretty poor. And really underneath you've got a lot of mixed performance. So I think we've seen that really across many of the indexes. I mean the Russell 2000 looks like is it's in a bear market. You're seeing a lot of defensive stocks really outperforming now. So things are
- 2:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): healthcare, energy's clearly been on a roll through most of this year. Again, all sort of late cycle features. And we're moving into, let's say, the fourth phase, which is basically saying this is a turbulence phase where things get worse, where liquidity gets crimped more, and it becomes more of a struggle for people to make money. And you really want more
- 2:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): defensiveness, in particular and particularly a longer duration government bonds, which kind of flies in the face of many press headlines over the recent month. But nonetheless, that's what the data tell us.
- 2:36
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 2:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): think you've got to put that in the context of yesterday's Fed meeting as well. I mean, what is the Fed uh really trying to do in all this?
- 2:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So, in terms of liquidity, the vast sums that AI is consuming of capital to invest in data centers and ships, chips, that sounds positive and it is for the data center build out. But the point, I guess, for our purposes here is that that is a consumer of liquidity. It is not a producer of liquidity.
- 2:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, I mean that's a plain fact. And I think if you look at previous booms with what you might call transformative technologies, while they're clearly fantastic over the long term and that they're really world-changing, the fact is they typically end in recessions or financial crises. And we've seen that so often in the past. And I think the question is to dig down as to why that is why that is the case. And I
- 3:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): think the first thing to say is that, you know, as far as I can see, every capital-intensive industry is basically cyclical at the end of the day. And that's what we've got to remember. But the trouble is that most investors and most proponents of AI or SI or whatever you want to call it, basically see this as a long-term trend, not as a cycle. The fact is that
- 3:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): capital-intensive industries, period, are cyclical. That's the reality we've got to face. Go back to fiber optic cable back 20 years ago. I mean, that was seen as a huge boom, but it turned out to be remarkably cyclical with some of the major leading companies in chapter 11 within five years. So I think you've got that warning. And then the other thing is you
- 3:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): highlight these things have got to be financed. And the sort of numbers that are being have crunched. been for the debt is basically eye watering. And we're talking at uh maybe not quite at a trillion dollars, but we're getting pretty close to a trillion dollars both this year and next year in terms of the financing demands. Now, if you go back probably not twelve months or maybe even eighteen months,
- 4:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the story was very much 8020 in terms of saying 80% of the funding for the AR AI build out will become out of cash flow. Now it's seems to be very much the other way. It's flipped. And 20% is cash flow. And maybe 80% is actually coming out of the markets. And we've spoken about the debt load. I mean the debt load is clearly big, but then there's an
- 4:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): equity parallel which is coming in pretty close behind. So, you know, there's a lot of financing demands really to come out. And it's that question which I think we've got to tackle. Is there the capacity in the markets to really to deal with that? And you've got not just this new financing demand coming through on US capital markets, but you've also got the echo
- 4:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): effect of the thing called the debt maturity wall, which is really the echo from the COVID years when a lot of debt was turned out, when policymakers recklessly pushed interest rates down to near zero levels, and in cases below zero, encouraging borrowers to take on not only more debt, but to turn term out existing debt. And a lot of that debt is coming back into the
- 5:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): system to be refinanced at higher rates, one would add, in the next few years. So the debt pile is really growing. If you look, if you evidence this chart, this chart is basically showing the debt maturity wall. Bear in mind this is not new debt, this is existing debt that is being refinanced. And the whole essence or the problem that
- 5:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): we face. in financial markets is that financial markets are no longer purely new capital raising mechanisms, they're predominantly mechanisms for rolling over existing debt. They're refinancing systems. And what the chart basically shows is the annual increments worldwide for the advanced economies of how much this
- 5:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): refinancing wall grows or shrinks year by year. And you can see what I've highlighted there is that the GFC and the COVID crisis were basically big years for debt rollovers, and those were clearly causing a lot of tensions. And policymakers responded in both cases. And they added liquidity
- 6:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): to the system when you got these refinancing problems. But if you look at the red bars that I put in there for the twenty 26 six through twenty 2030 thirty. period, and again I stress once more, this is not new debt, this is existing debt that's coming back into the system to be refinanced. And the reason it looks, you know, worrisome is that first of all,
- 6:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you've got to recognize that that really offsets the negative years in 21-22 and the low years in 23-24 when you had debt being termed out with low interest rates. So that's kind of. coming back into the system now. And the other thing is it's coming back at much higher interest rates. So what you've got is the debt
- 6:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): burden is growing all the time. And that's what you see in this chart. So it's not just the new debt, which I put in the annotation, that you've also got to think about two trillion per annum of new federal debt, and you've got potentially a trillion per annum of hyperscalar debt. So these are big, big numbers.
- 7:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And so a positive on this indicates a large amount of borrowing and refinancing. And I guess a negative intro means a reduction in the debt stock. So more debt is being paid back than is being borrowed. Would that be correct?
- 7:28
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah.
- 7:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): In other words, the debt role is negative. So in other words, what's happened is that debt has been termed turned out. So basically it's been replaced. And therefore for the next few years you can get a very low number in terms of the debt roll.
- 7:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And I guess w one one single stock or two stock analysis for this is like SPs and Moody's, which is obviously credit rating businesses. I see this chart or a version of this on their investor decks because they're basically advertising to investors: hey, all this debt has to be refinanced, so we're going to be paid to rate it. So I guess that is a bull case for a very small segment of the market.
- 8:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): But what are the broad implications? of this fact that all this debt has to be refinanced over the next five to six years?
- 8:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Well I mean the question is is there the liquidity to do it? And the point being is that what we come back to at the end of the day is that if you look at if you look at the the liquidity cycle, which is basically the flow of money through financial markets. Now the point about that as I've already suggested is that that cycle is turning down. It peaked in late 2025.
- 8:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): This is essentially a debt refinancing cycle,
- 8:32
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
- 8:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that's what's really driving the tempo of the fluctuations. So the cycle tends to be between five and six years in terms of length, which is the average maturity of global debt. So that sort of fits into this whole refinancing frame. And if you've got declining liquidity, what you tend to find is increasing. tensions in
- 8:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): refinancing markets. This particular slide is the essence of the of the problem. And the problem is that the the financial system that has evolved principally since the GFC, although it was evolving before, but the GFC accelerated developments is that what you've got at the heart of the global
- 9:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): monetary system or global financial system is this debt liquidity nexus. And the point being is that debt needs liquidity to roll itself over, in other words, for refinancing because of this term issue. And liquidity needs debt for the simple reason that liquidity is collateral based now. And as you see in the top left, according to the
- 9:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): World Bank, 77% of all global lending is now collateral backed. And a lot of that collateral backing is existing debt. a lot of it government debt, a lot of it US Treasuries, but that clearly is important. So you can see that this particular nexus can spin out of control if you get an inability to turn debt into
- 9:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): liquidity or an inability to refinance debt with new liquidity. And you get tensions in the repo collateral markets on the left, which you can spot by looking at the move index or sofa spread. spreads, or you get problems in refinance, the refinancing leg, where you start to see credit spreads blowing out and term premium beginning to drop,
- 10:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): term premium being the risk premium on government debt, essentially. And I would argue that you're beginning to see those cracks emerging. Now, if you look at the longer-term picture, what you find is that this is the ratio. of debt to liquidity for the major advanced economies. And
- 10:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): this is basically saying when you have a harmony or an equilibrium at about two times debt to liquidity, anything significantly above that causes refinancing problems, which I've annotated there in terms of the various financial crises that you've seen before. I would venture that
- 10:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): all financial crises that we've witnessed over that period have been predominantly refinancing crises and inability to roll debt with liquidity in some form. And then when you go to the other side of that of that boundary, in other words, below the dotted line, what you find there is that you've got too much liquidity relative to debt.
- 11:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): In other words, there's surplus cash, and the vent for that. tends to be asset market bubbles. What we've just come through is this huge asset market bubble because there's been ample liquidity in the system for various reasons. Now, what I've done here is to basically try and put that debt-liquidity ratio into a cyclical
- 11:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): context. And, you know, this is maybe slightly heroic, but it's trying to say, well, okay, if you fit assignment. a sine wave to that data, is there any sense in that? And it seems that you get something like
- 11:44
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a
- 11:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): 16 year cycle
- 11:46
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in
- 11:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): this debt liquidity ratio. I mean, that may be, as I say, a big step, but nonetheless, it seems to fit the data quite well. And you've got these very prominent bubbles and these very prominent crises that and I've identified. And maybe what we're swinging from is the everything bubble. towards the everything bust. So what one's got to look at very
- 12:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): closely is the capacity of the financial system to facilitate debt rollover in particular. I mean, the burden that we're carrying on our shoulders of all this debt, you know, clearly has a cost at some stage.
- 12:19
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 12:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that cost is not necessarily of just this higher interest rates, the cost is actually financial functioning or economic functioning. And that's the danger. that we're basically running into. And it may be to sort of to have a segue ultimately into what the Fed is doing is maybe what the Fed is suggesting in really between the lines.
- 12:37
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 12:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): so Michael, this change from debt to liquidity ratio, it was an extremely, extremely small ratio in 2020, meaning that liquidity was very abundant relative to the debt. Since then, there's been more debt relative to the liquidity as assets have been issued and
- 12:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): refinanced, and the Federal Reserve has shrunk its balance sheet and other things we can get into, but it still is below the dotted line, which I guess would be average. So my question to you is what are the consequences when liquidity and the debt to liquidity ratio it goes from ample liquidity to just slightly less ample liquidity because
- 13:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): when people hear from everything bubble to everything bust, they might think that we're, you know, on the other side of the chart, this 240% of refinancing tension. But I don't think this chart shows that we're quite there yet. You're just projecting that in, you know, four to five years, if we're on this thing, then it will go on the other line of the chart. Just can you speak to just kind of the slow moving tensions
- 13:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and where we are right now?
- 13:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, absolutely. I mean, you've got to ally that with this observation about liquidity.
- 13:45
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 13:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): liquidity cycle is going down. And the important thing I think to stress here is the liquidity is cyclical and debt is exponential. So you can see why there are always refinancing tensions in the system. One of the reasons that liquidity, or perhaps the main reason that liquidity is going down, is not because central banks
- 14:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): are tightening, particularly. And I think all the evidence tells us that central banks don't want to tighten. I mean, they're very, very reluctant. They're being sort of pulled, kicking, and screaming by the markets to try and tighten. Austerity is not the sort of watchword here. And what they want to do is basically keep the plate spinning as best they can. As I
- 14:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): remember, my former boss, Henry Cam. Kaufman from Salomon Brothers said a few years ago that uh in fact three or four years ago, when the Federal Reserve came up with the word transitory from inflation, but I think it's a very good summary of the last five years, he said this is clearly a Federal Reserve that doesn't want to tighten. And I think the evidence is that you've got so much debt out
- 14:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): there that it's very, very dangerous for policy policymakers makers to even think about tightening aggressively again.
- 14:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Michael, is it just my eyes playing tricks on me, or do I actually see a small little upsurge, just a tiny little blip of that black line indicating that the GLI, the global liquidity index, maybe has bottomed this year and that it has gone up?
- 15:06
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well,
- 15:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I think there's an that's an interesting observation. And I think if you drill into the data and you find out what is causing that blip, the answer is predominantly what the Fed Federal Reserve was doing last month. And the Federal Reserve has basically added more liquidity to the system. And my read of what the Fed is doing is that they're
- 15:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): managing a liquidity very closely. And they don't want to engineer a major slump in liquidity in markets. And that's why I think one's got to look beyond Fed funds and and uh you know. Fed presser and all this sort of the ridiculous pantomime that goes around it and actually try and understand more deeply what the
- 15:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Federal Reserve and I would also add the Treasury as well are actually doing to try and manage liquidity conditions in the system. I think that's what their main focus really is. They want to maintain the integrity of the funding markets, and that's key.
- 15:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): What has the Fed and the Treasury as well? What have they done this year? Tell us, and then also tell us your projection for what could be coming in the future, especially based on the October Fed meeting, which did contain a note about the balance sheet. We'll get into that.
- 16:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah. So if you look at this chart, this is one of the charts that I noted at the beginning is well worth monitoring.
- 16:23
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 16:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): this is looking
- 16:24
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): at
- 16:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): imbalances in the repo. markets. And what we're looking at here is the SOFA, which is the overnight repo rate, minus interest and overnight reserve balances for banks. Take the latter mnemonic as equivalent to Fed funds or more or less. And so what this is showing is what the market is
- 16:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): pricing relative to what the Federal Reserve wants or aims in terms of Fed funds rates. Now I put on that chart a sort of corridor, a gray corridor, which you can argue is sort of a normal zone for this spread. And it's always slightly negative, and that's because sofa rates are collateralized rates. What
- 17:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you can see on the chart around the end of 2025 is a significant jump or blowout in the spread, which takes us above what I've indicated there as the danger zone.
- 17:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Now that's suggesting that you get a breakdown in funding conditions. That coincided with a lot of trade fails in terms of inability to deliver securities in bond markets. So there were clearly tensions that were going on. And the Federal Reserve reacted very quickly to that. The target level for
- 17:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): bank reserves is around $3 trillion. So the Federal Reserve. is basically targeting something like $3 trillion for bank reserves. And the orange line is therefore monitoring or telling us how much there is a surplus or a shortfall against that level. And what you can see is around
- 17:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): September, October of last year, there became a very big shortfall. Now that was a time when the Federal Reserve was talking boldly. about shrinking its balance sheet. And seasonal movements in terms of Treasury General Account and various other things basically meant that they could allow bank
- 18:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): reserves to drop, money market liquidity to shrink by this magnitude. It was down about 400 billion relative to benchmark levels. Now, what that then caused was big spikes in repo. rates. And as you can see, what I've done is to plot the repo spread again inverted on that right scale. And then what you
- 18:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): see is the development of a new policy, which was QE by another name, which was called RMP. So the Fed's acronym department was working late into the night. And that was basically referring to reserve management purchases. And the RMP program basically restored Fed liquidity
- 18:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): to those levels or bank reserves to those levels that you see, and you can more or less identify through this year a very small fluctuations. Now, if you go back over the last
- 19:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): four years, the average deviation around away from bank reserves target, the time. target level or the minimum level of bank reserves that I identify is around 300 billion on average. So there are some big fluctuations. In the last
- 19:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): nine months, those average fluctuations have fallen significantly to under ninety billion. So it looks like this is on a weekly basis. So what you can see there is, I think, a deliberate attempt to try and target the banks' reserves. Now, what this is really telling us is this is money market liquidity. So they're saying what they want is
- 19:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): stable money markets, and they're making sure that there is an ample bank reserve regime. And I think what we're moving to is a managed framework. And the other side of that is looking at this chart, which is move volatility. And I would argue this is what the Treasury
- 20:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): is focused on very clearly, is what they really want is a stable funding environment because they've got a role ultimately or refinance ultimately 40 trillion and outstanding debt. Obviously not at once, but the burdens are clearly growing, and you're looking at very, very big weekly auctions potentially
- 20:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): upcoming. Now, what this is telling us is the volatility across the yield curve or term structure in the US. And the move index is basically rather like the VIX index for equities, but this is measuring bond market volatility. And what I try and show there is it seems to be in a deliberate attempt to move that
- 20:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): to uh move index, so to speak, back into its normal zone. And the Treasury does think. that through a variety of mechanisms, one being increased issuance of bills, so they're starving the market of coupon issuance. And the second thing is to do these Treasury buybacks. Now, my interpretation of the Treasury buyback program
- 21:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): is it's nothing to do with trying to get yields down, or certainly not directly. I don't think Scott Besson being you know an experienced market operator would be as naive as to think that he could get away with that. What he's actually trying to do is to reduce volatility in the system. He's doing that often quite successfully, managing to buy,
- 21:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): in some cases, you know, retire off the run bonds at 60 cents in the dollar, which is a great win for US taxpayers. So I think that you know he comes into a lot of bad press, but I think ultimately what's going on here is a very sensible policy. They're capping volatility in the market. These are the key collateral markets, and they're basically giving
- 21:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the system what liquidity they need in the repo markets. And if you've got a repo collateral system that is the heart at financing, that's exactly what you need to do. And so what I would argue is that beneath the surface, there's a much more subtle policy that is going on at the Federal Reserve. And you know, Kevin Walsh basically, I
- 22:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): think, was trying to say that in the meeting yesterday. He wasn't particularly clear, but I think that goes back to the famous Greenspan line of when with when whenever that was with '87, when he said, you know, if I seem unduly clear, you must have misunderstood what I was saying. And I think that you can attribute that to maybe Kevin
- 22:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Walsh yesterday, because he wasn't. it entirely clear. But I think reading between the lines, he's talking about this sort of new monetary medicine that has been administered. And I think that's basically this sort of three legged stool. You set policy rates, you target money market liquidity, and you try and reduce the bond
- 22:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): market volatility. And I think all those three factors are key measures of what the Fed struck treasury. are really trying to do in the markets.
- 22:52
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 22:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we'll get into the Treasury in a moment, but just sticking with the Fed, how have you interpreted the reserve management purchases from the Fed, which I believe were at 40 billion? And then they did 25 billion, 10 billion, like injecting new liquidity in the markets to prevent the stress that you were referencing. And now I don't think they're doing anything.
- 23:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So what's your current read of
- 23:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): current Fed liquidity? And why is it that the market needed 40 billion per month a year ago, but now the market's fine with zero?
- 23:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Well a lot of it was broadly seasonal. I mean it's
- 23:29
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): R
- 23:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): and P have picked up a little bit since again. But you know, I would imagine that that's going to be something that would change in tempo. And if there are shortages, I mean let's see what they do. But my contention would be is they've got certainly one eye on the stability of the repo markets. And they don't want another event like
- 23:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): late twenty-five. And everything I see them doing is actually trying to manage stability in those markets. And those are really key for not just refinancing the debt, but also underpinning the program that I've tried to explain through this sort of term Treasury QE. And I think that what you've got
- 24:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): is a deliberate shift from what people would have previously characterized as FedQE, which is an abundant regime in the banks, where the Federal Reserve just basically pumps QE into the system, to shift away from that, which was an abundant reserve backdrop, to what you may call a more subtle
- 24:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): ample reserve framework, where they're giving enough liquidity to the financial markets, not a lot more. They're keeping things stable. But that stability lends itself to this additional program, which is clearly fueling federal debt, which is Treasury QE. And this really fits in with the idea that
- 24:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Besson said Wall Street's had a its sort of day in the sun. It's now Main Street's turn. We want to try and boost Main Street. And what you've seen is a very significant increase in what I call
- 25:01
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a
- 25:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Treasury QE. For the record, this is looking at the impulse that is coming from either the Federal Reserve or the Treasury through these various mechanisms. Now, Treasury. QE is basically the liquidity equivalent effect of changing the mix of
- 25:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): debt that is being issued by the Treasury. And the reason that that is an important factor to think about is that liquidity is broadly equal to assets divided by their average duration. So if you think about what the Treasury is doing, it's first of all increasing private sector
- 25:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): assets by issuing debt to the private sector. But what's more, it's issuing that debt at much, much shorter maturities. So what you've got is the ratio of assets in the private sector to average duration basically rising quite strongly. And that's the equivalent of a liquidity impulse. So what I've shown on this chart is
- 26:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): conventional Fed QE, which is clearly a, by definition, a straight liquidity injection into the private sector. I've split that Fed QE into conventional, which is balance sheet expansion. What I also term not QE QE, which is sort of a more subtle thing of saying there are various programs on the Fed balance sheet
- 26:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that are more liquidity creating than others. So let's separate those out. And then the Treasury QE, which is changing the mix of issuance, which is the black line. And if you look at those scale, those programs, what you can see is that basically the Fed QE becomes de minimis over time.
- 26:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And in looking into 27, it basically, well, I say almost disappears, but it's still there, but in small size. Whereas Treasury QE becomes the dominant part. And it's that which is really driving the real economy and explaining in many cases why you've got very strong phenomenal growth in US GDP right now.
- 26:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And so that what you call Treasury QE is the Treasury issuing shorter term debt, Treasury bills rather than Treasury notes, coupons, longer term debt or you know a higher ratio of of shorter-term shorter term correct debt.
- 27:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Tell us exactly
- 27:15
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): what
- 27:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Bessent has done and what the numbers indicate there, as well as his willingness to continue doing this policy.
- 27:24
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well
- 27:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I think that my view would be that what they're trying to do here, and this clearly flies in the face of Scott Besson's original criticisms of Janet Yellen
- 27:33
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
- 27:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): two or three years ago when she was doing it. He's copying the policy
- 27:38
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): having
- 27:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): not less because he can, and not least because it's quite effective. And by the way, other governments are also following this model as well of doing a lot of issues at the front end. Now basically if you put that down, you try and explain what that means in sort of hard numbers, currently Bill's Treasury bills, very
- 27:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): short-dated govern federal debt account for about 23% of total federal debt outstanding. I think that's going to be pushed up to 30%. That's not the highest it's ever been, it's been a lot higher in the past, but let's say 30 is a target. And so I would characterize a sort of the best policy headline, not just as
- 28:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): 333, if you remember, but much more 3330. And I think 30, which is the target level, maybe the target level for bill issuance, is where they're headed. heading. And to put that in context, if you think about this Treasury QE impulse, something like a five percentage point
- 28:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): increase in the share of bills in total debt outstanding, we reckon is the equivalent of about three trillion dollars of net liquidity stimulus. So the these are sorry, three trillion dollars. These these are these are big numbers. These are
- 28:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): big numbers. but not enough. It's not liquidity enhancing enough for you and your models.
- 28:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Well, I mean, let's be clear about this. This is money that's going into the real economy, not money that's going into financial markets. And what I do is I separate out those two aspects. And I think that's an important debate right now to have as to what's happening in the economy, because a lot of these things are kind of difficult to understand because people tend to think that
- 29:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you've got one pot of money and don't really discriminate between the two. And it's going to move on to a chart which hopefully explains that, which is this one. And what you know, what this chart basically tells us is there is a pool of money in financial markets, which I measure by the red line, the liquidity cycle. So global
- 29:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): liquidity, for my definition, is money in financial markets. And the yellow line that you see shadowing behind that, a step out of sequence, is money that's in the real economy. Now, all money that's anywhere must be somewhere.
- 29:49
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 29:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): if it's in the real economy, it's not in financial markets. And if it's in financial markets, it's not in the real economy. And what you see is a sort of seesaw Or effect. So basically, what this chart is telling us is that the liquidity cycle is a cycle. But often when that liquidity cycle goes down, the money that's in the real economy is going up. So
- 30:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): money is being crowded out or sucked out of financial markets by a strong real economy. And I'll come on to the red dots there because they refer to yield curve inflection points. But I think that's a very good reference at some stage. But what this is basically saying is that as the liquidity cycle falls, what you're getting is more and more evidence that
- 30:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the real economy is really going, is really hotting up. And that's what I think the story really is. It's not so much the Fed is tightening and causing that red line to come down, rather, the contrary in the last few weeks. What's actually happening is a strong real economy is crowding financial markets, financial liquidity. Now I can hopefully show
- 30:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that here, which is looking at the actual data.
- 30:53
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): This
- 30:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): actual data is for the world, not for the US, but clearly the US is a dominant part of this. And what it illustrates is my estimates of liquidity flowing through financial markets, which is the orange line. The black line is the world business cycle, which is purely an aggregation of
- 31:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): all the key. business surveys worldwide, from the US ISM through to the Japanese Tancan survey, weighted by GDP and basically shown there as the black line. Now I've cheated a tad, but not much, by just shifting the black line slightly, but by a few months. But you get the idea that what that's really trying to
- 31:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): show is that those cycles are pretty much entirely out of step. So when you get very strong liquidity, it often coincides with economic recession or very, very weak growth, and equally vice versa. So what we're looking at in the markets right now is very, very consistent with a late cycle period
- 31:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): where the real economy is picking up and when financial liquidity This year is going down. And what you would expect to see, and I sort of foreshadowed this, I think, a little bit later. later, too. If you look at what the yield curves are saying, I think this is an important consideration because the one consensus view in
- 32:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): January of this year, or one of the consensus views, but particularly strong one, were that yield curves were going to steepen worldwide. And actually they've flattened. What it illustrates is that movements in US domestic liquidity basically basically precede by around nine months changes in the
- 32:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): slope of the Treasury yield curve. Now, what I've used is the average slope. So this is the area under the yield curve, without necessarily looking at any particular spread like 10, 2 or 510 or whatever. But this gives the average. But what it seems to show is unambiguously a strong correlation between these two series. So as
- 32:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): liquidity comes down, you would expect the yield curve to flatten. Now that's an important consideration once you start to factor in a lot of the wilder assertions that are coming out of the media about what's going on in the bond markets. And what's going on in the bond market is actually absolutely normal. This is a very, very normal bond market
- 33:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): cycle. And you can see evidence. This is looking at daily data for the 10-5 yield curve spread in the US. But again, what you see is from the beginning of this year, there's been a noticeable flattening. And the dominant part of the 510 spread is term premier. So you've actually got here declining term
- 33:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): premia. Now, the head scratching point is that if you've got declining term premium, which is what I are argue is going on, and not just in the US, but increasingly worldwide, that tells us there is an increasing demand for safety of safe assets in the system. Now, this may be the ginnings of that, but I think you can see evidence of
- 33:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it. But what's more, it flies in the face of all those media comments that say the reason that bond yields are going up is all because people are scared about the fragility of fiscal finances, concerned about debt, worried about Bessend or
- 34:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): are frightened by Trump. And this is simply not the case. What's happening is something very, very different. The yield curve is flattening in the US, and it's flattening here in Japan. And look at what's happening in the JGB 10-2 Two curve.
- 34:21
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Right,
- 34:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Michael, just to just explain. So so the media, and I'll include myself for in the media, there's a narrative in the media.
- 34:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that the reason that long term government bond yields are surging are about worries about fiscal sustainability as well as the ability of central banks to control inflation. So that would lead to a steeper yield curve. And yes, maybe the two year would go up, but the 10 year and the 30 year would go up the most because that is where the
- 34:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): concentration of the concern is. But your work shows that. actually the two year and the five year have gone up more than the 10 year and the 30 year. So really the market is just worried about inflation and it's pricing in that central banks are going to have to tighten interest rates sufficiently to fight that inflation.
- 35:05
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 35:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): think what they're saying is that the fact is that if there was a major inflation concern, you'd expect the yield curve to be steepening
- 35:13
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
- 35:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it's not. It's going the other way.
- 35:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And basically, what's driving the yield curve is if you dig deeply into it, is its term premia one of the main factors coming down. And this is true in terms of Japan as well. I can evidence what's happening to term premia, and this is my estimates of term premia daily from the
- 35:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): beginning of 2025 across all the major markets. Now, even if you look closely at that top red dotted line, which is the French oat market, that's been one of the most elevated, clearly, because there is concern in France about fiscal fragility, which I go along with, but that's not
- 35:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): worsening. It's basically going sideways Waste to coming down. The three big markets
- 36:01
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): at
- 36:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the bottom, which are the German Bundesmarket, the US Treasury market, and the Chinese government bond market, basically have seen their term premia flatline to shrink through this year. What you're seeing is, I think, evidence that there is an increasing demand for safety in the system. And
- 36:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): what's driving bond yields is much more nominal GDP. So it's rate expectations. that are that are really pushing things up. It's not the term premia element in the bond market. Now, if this chart explains that, or hopefully it does explain it, this is showing nominal GDP growth, which is shown as the
- 36:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): black line, which is the underlying four year average of N GDP in the US. And the orange line is risk adjusted. in other words, Treasury 10-year yields taking off the term premia. So this is the average interest rate, policy rate that's expected over that period.
- 37:00
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 37:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you can argue that those two numbers align pretty well, certainly since the 1951 Treasury Fed Accord, when basically the Fed became more independent. And you can see that what that would suggest is. that you're moving up to test 6% or thereabouts in terms of treasury yields. Now,
- 37:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): what's the reason for that? The reason is not because of fiscal fragility or whatever else it is, it's purely because of strong economic growth. And what you can see on the black line is the fastest rate of NGDP N GDP growth since the mid-1980s. mid 1980s. Now, it may not feel like that. but that's what the data is
- 37:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): telling us. And that's because you've got an inflation element in there. You know, this is not denying the fact that you've got a K-shaped economy everywhere, but certain elements of that growth are being driven by things like fiscal spending, big deficit as we know, and the AI capex cap expand, spend, which has been largely responsible
- 38:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): for about a third of that growth over the last few years. So, you know, you've got factors which are pulling the economy up, but they're also increasing financing demands.
- 38:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So you're projecting the risk-adjusted tenure yield to continue to go up?
- 38:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Well, no, I think it's about pretty much where it is. And I think that if you factored in my estimates, which are not the same as many others, but I mean I do term premium premier calculations differently. But if you look at that chart, you'd see that my calculation calculations are suggesting that the term premier on the US Treasury mark is about negative 50 basis points. So if
- 38:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you add that to that, you're looking at a target rate
- 38:37
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): of
- 38:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): somewhere between five and a half and six for the 10 year treasury, which is pretty much where it's got to. But I would think that's a decent fair Some value for it right now.
- 38:46
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- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): adding where they see opportunity and trimming themes that look overextended. Miners, energy, precious metals, critical metals, all in one actively managed ticker, Lens. When inflation runs, stocks and bonds can fit. fall together. Lens adds real asset exposure with the potential to diversify both the stock side and the bond side against
- 39:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): inflation and geopolitical risk. Learn more about the Lens ETF and their full data and comparison, including performance, at SurmayaTF.com. Investing involves risk, including possible loss of principal. The funds, investment objectives, risk charges, and expenses must be considered carefully before investing. This and other important information is contained in the prospectus, which may be obtained at SirmayaETF.com. Please read the prospectus carefully before
- 40:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): investing. Thanks for listening. Let's get back to today's interview.
- 40:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So, what's your outlook on bonds right now in terms of are you bullish on them or bearish? And where is your view of them as a role in a portfolio? Because when yields were incredibly low, of course you were very bearish on them, which was obviously the right call. What's your view now?
- 40:23
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well,
- 40:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I think the first thing to say is let's put this in context. So this is using Bank of England US Treasury data. This data, which I pulled from their website, basically shows data on British console yields going back to seventeen hundred. And I've spliced that with US Treasury data, I think started in the eighteen thirties.
- 40:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): So what this basically shows is us the long long-term, term, a hybrid long long-term term US US-UK UK interest rate. Now if you look at that data very closely, you'll probably see there are something like 70-year cycles in that. But broadly speaking, where we got to in the post-GFC COVID years, and I think
- 41:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the low point on that chart is 2021, if I remember, when we got down to you know, whatever it was a half percent on treasury yields or thereabouts, that was clearly an. anomalous figure. I mean, it's just crazy numbers. And I think I've probably said this before, but when I was at Salaman Brothers, the book that we were sort of schooled on
- 41:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): was A History of Interest Rates by Sidney Homer. And that looks at 5,000 years of interest rate history, a great call for insomnia, but nonetheless it's factual. And what that shows is no evidence at all of those low, ultra-low. ultra low or negative interest rates. This is an anomaly in world history. And what it's
- 41:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): done is caused this disruption in the bond markets and in the debt markets. But where we are now is we're back above the long-term average just. And so it's actually worth thinking about putting bonds in your portfolio for the first time in a long, long time. And what I would say is that bonds are behaving pretty normally. Now if I come back
- 42:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): to this chart, this is looking at what happens to yield curves. And what I would venture is that what you're looking at in markets right now is a very, very normal bond market cycle. And I tend to think of it in terms of the liquidity phases and the slope of the yield curve, but this is basically telling you what's going on. So if you look at
- 42:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the four quadrants, the top left is my rebound phase, which is early cycle upswing. Calm is when you're above average and rising in terms of liquidity. Speculation is the late cycle phase that we've been in for much of the last 12 months. And turbulence is what we're coming into. Now, if you look at that movement, it
- 42:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): correlates with the economic cycle shown in the middle: recession, recovery, boom, slowing growth. So speculation. it aligns with boom, and that's what you normally see: a bare flattening of the curve. And that's exactly what we've been seeing through this year. It's been a speculative type market, and the bond markets have really judged that correctly.
- 43:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Prior to that, we had this bare steepening
- 43:07
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in
- 43:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the curve, which was up until late last year, and that's given way to the bare flattening. And the next phase up, it typically is a turbulence phase on the bottom left, which is when you start to get a bull flattening in the curve when longer rates start to come down. Now, I'm not hopeful we're going to get big drops in yields like we
- 43:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): saw during the COVID years, but I think we will see some attenuation. And part of the reason for that is that everything is cyclical.
- 43:36
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You
- 43:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): know, despite the fact we all agree that. maybe there are some compelling long-term trends in terms of monetization of debt, which is something we've got to bear in mind. On top of that, embroidered on top, are very clear cycles. And we've got to be cognizant of those cycles because that often destroys
- 43:56
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
- 43:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): sort of trend investing that many people are doing. We've got to understand that process. And I think we're coming to that juncture now. where we're looking at this downturn. I think the Fed is trying to maybe trying to understand that and maybe trying to fight that. Whether they do that, I'm not so sure whether they succeed. But the fact is that the downswing
- 44:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): is what we've got to face up to. And in that environment, you want defensive assets. And if you come back to the asset allocation diagram, this is what we always recommend
- 44:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): investors to do in different phases of the market. And this this doesn't change from cycle to cycle, it's pretty much embedded. But what you can see there is
- 44:38
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a
- 44:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): traffic light, if you like, of assets on the left. So these are traffic lights that refer to what you should do in different uh environments. So red is stop, green is go, amber is proceed with green. caution on that basis if we're moving into turbulence i mean the only asset class that looks a decent one
- 44:58
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
- 44:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): is longer duration government debt and equally if you start to look at the industry groups you want defensive stocks now it's very interesting I think is if you start to look at um you know what's leading the boards in terms of momentum is things like healthcare Energy has clearly been up there through this year, consumer staples are getting
- 45:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): a bid, you're getting things like Russell 2000 being very weak,
- 45:22
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you know,
- 45:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): tech is well, let's say best mixed.
- 45:26
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 45:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you sort of get the idea that maybe we're rotating
- 45:29
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in
- 45:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the markets, and the level may be still elevated of the indexes, but there's a lot of vicious rotation going on beneath the surface. And in my view,
- 45:39
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): if
- 45:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you look at the credit markets, credit's really starting to feel the icy winds of slow liquidity right now.
- 45:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): It absolutely is. You're having high yield bonds, unsecured bonds like Core Weave, their spreads absolutely blew out in October. And Michael, to completely with the Russell 2000 small cap capital index, it has just such a massively positive correlation with short-term interest rates. I just track it every day the market pricing the Fed to be hawkish. So two year went up and
- 46:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the Russell went down. It really is just a massively positive correlation. So, Michael, the consequences of us being in a speculation phase, advancing towards a turbulence phase, and how that is a scenario for a potential bull steepening. So long-term rates fall, but short-term rates fall more, help us understand how.
- 46:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): is Walsh going to be dovish if the price of oil is at a hundred bucks or even higher and nominal GDP growth is just so high? Does the economy have to slow down?
- 46:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Number one is to say that the way to judge Fed policy is not purely through Fed funds, and that's probably the main point I'm trying to argue here is you've got to look at a range of different indicators about what the Fed is doing.
- 46:48
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 46:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): don't think the Fed wants to tighten, I think the Fed may need to tighten again in terms of at least the dimension of higher Fed funds,
- 46:57
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
- 46:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): know, if you get continued economic momentum. But what I would argue is that the seeds are already being sown for a slower economy next year. And there's maybe a way I can try and articulate that with another couple of charts, basically to say, look, this is the US. dollar, this is the DXY, this is purely a chart
- 47:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): of the dollar, okay? Trade weighted dollar, and you can see that what the dollar has been doing, certainly in terms of the way that I've drawn the trend lines, is it's been trending higher. Okay, it may be hitting the top of that, but we've had a stronger dollar. We've also had oil prices that have gone up, and one of the things that I
- 47:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): argued
- 47:38
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Freddie.
- 47:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): fairly strongly at the beginning of the year was that if gold prices have gone up as much as they had, you were likely to see very strong gains in commodity markets this year, and you would see strong gains in oil. And I think you're getting that, but you're getting it mostly through product prices. And if you look at the orange line on that chart, what I've done is I've
- 47:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): bootstrapped a crude price from diesel prices. So the equivalent. oil price, looking at diesel, is over $160 a barrel. That clearly impinges on the economy. And another indicator that you might look at is looking at volatility in the bond market, itself tends to be not a bad
- 48:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): indicator of future economic growth. And what I've done is look at the move inverted here against the US ISN. ISM. So if you've got heightened bond volatility, which is clearly that's jumped up lately, you've got a stronger dollar and you've got higher oil prices. Put those indicators together, those three, and do
- 48:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): a z-score of them, which I've done in orange. So this is purely a z-score of those three factors, put on top of the world economy. And what you find is that it seems to match not a bad fit for. what happens in terms of business cycle. Now if that's correct, what we're seeing is a surge in economic growth now. And that
- 48:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): will be the black lines already probably moving a lot higher. But then you start to see an inflection in quite a vicious one in 2027. And if you add to that fact the fiscal stimulus is probably waning a bit, the AI capex boom,
- 49:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): who
- 49:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): knows? but that may be compromised by higher rates itself. You could be seeing a slower economy. And that that would facilitate Chair Walsh basically moving to an easy attack.
- 49:26
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 49:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I think that's the way you get there. But the bond markets always get there first. And that's pretty much what the bond markets are telling us Else is going
- 49:33
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): on. So
- 49:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Michael, as long as I've been following your work, I don't think you've ever been worried about a recession or had fears about a recession that were greater than the market. Certainly the market was worried about a recession in 2022 and 2023, and you defiantly were saying no, the economy is going to be strong because of your liquidity readings as well as other work you've done. Are you
- 49:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): now saying that your concern about an economic slowdown and a potential recession is higher than what is implied by financial markets?
- 50:03
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well,
- 50:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I mean, I'm not saying recession, but I think that we would always dance around on the head of a pin about probabilities. But it clearly the probability has increased. My best guess would see a slowdown and maybe a noticeable slowdown of the sort of pace of economic growth right now.
- 50:17
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 50:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I think that's the factor which basically enables For the Federal Reserve to move to maybe a more benign tack. But I still say right up front that I don't think this is a Fed that wants to tighten anyway.
- 50:29
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 50:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): think that you look back at the track record, the focus is much more on the stability of the Treasury market. And that's really the key policy priority. And after all, the cynic in me says, look, it's been six years, almost six years, since they hit their 2% inflation target. Chair will say they're doubling down on that, but I can't really see the evidence. If they were doubling down,
- 50:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that'd they'd have raised. interest rates yesterday. And they didn't.
- 50:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): What do you make of Kevin Warsh and the differences in his leadership style and uh how his different philosophy is impacting the actions of the Federal Reserve, both for rates as well as balance sheet and liquidity?
- 51:07
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well,
- 51:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I think in terms of maybe I sort of foreshadowed at the beginning, I think if there's a parallel, it's much more greenspan-like, and certainly his. utterances are more greenspan-like. So I think that that's one marker. I think that in terms of what he's really saying is to step back. I always thought he was put in to the Fed anyway, not
- 51:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): necessarily to cut rates, but to keep rates as near where they were as possible. And I think he's more or less fulfilling that role. The whole emphasis is that the Fed is working a lot more closely with the Treasury. Best Bessant and Walsh are a sort of couple here. And what they're doing is they're trying together to maintain the stability of the Treasury market. And at the end of the day,
- 51:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): this is really the key criteria. It's Congress gives the Fed two mandates for sure, but it says that they've got to operate within those mandates within a framework of Treasury Marity. market stability. And I think that's the number one priority given the backdrop of. this huge debt mountain that we've got to refinance, you know, 40 trillion and
- 52:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): growing, and that's just the federal debt backdrop. Now just look for evidence as to what happened in Britain when you got this Liz Truss moment. The Bank of England switched from QT to QE overnight. And you can see this so is evident among central banks. And that's what they'll do. I mean, look at what's going on in France and Europe.
- 52:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): at the moment.
- 52:28
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 52:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you know, we haven't covered Europe, but I mean there may be some interesting comments to make about what Europe looks like next year. But the fact is that the ECB were all too willing to argue that they would be there backstopping any significant widening in spreads that were occurring in the Euro system as a result of this sort of French debacle.
- 52:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): They will use their TPI program. I'm sure, if need be. Doesn't they don't need to do it yet. There's not the same there's not the sort of degree of of stress as we speak in in the markets, but they will. And I think this shows what central banks are trying to do, or policymakers in general are trying to do. They don't want to tighten.
- 53:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Any thought of austerity is just not there anymore. And what you've got is to sort of take the sort of bigger picture, I mean, we're in a world I've described as being capital wars, where effectively the West, or more particularly the US, is in a struggle against China. And it's inconvenient to have
- 53:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): disruptive financial markets and recessions. That's not what the aim of the game is. We need to push forward with the development of strategic industries. And that's why this treasury QE is so important.
- 53:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And what's more, if the Treasury QE is important, then the integrity of funding via the Treasury market is absolutely crucial. And that's what I think the name of the game
- 53:48
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): is.
- 53:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Michael, earlier you said that there's a difference between Treasury yields going up and the Treasury volatility. So Besson wouldn't mind if yields went up. He just doesn't want them to go up in a disorderly way. And I I understand your point. but to me, they seem quite correlated. Like if there's a crash in bond prices and a crash up in yields, it probably
- 54:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): will be extremely disorderly. And so you don't think that Besson is trying to cap longer term interest rates by doing the enhanced treasury buyback program? And also, how significant in your calculus is this treasury buyback program of you know, Yellen started it and
- 54:26
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): best.
- 54:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Beston's predecessor, and now Bestend is stepping it up big time in a big way. How does that compare to your Treasury QE or the Federal Reserve's programs as
- 54:36
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): well?
- 54:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I think that there's a number of ways to address that. I mean, the first thing to say is that if you look at Treasury yields and volatility, there's not a great correlation between them. So they're separate factors. Despite the fact that I take your point that intuitively you think there'll be a closer connection. Basically, treasury volatility is important because it affects what I call the collateral
- 54:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): multiplier in the system, which is basically saying how many times can you leverage or how efficiently can you leverage collateral? And if you get a lot of volatility in the collateral base, in other words, in the treasury market, your ability to leverage is compromised. And it's very clear that that has a negative liquidity effect on the system. So what they want is to minimize
- 55:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): volatility and try and you know have collateral use as efficiently as possible. And I think that's a key consideration. How they're doing that is in my view by putting more bills into the system. Bills are obviously by definition less volatile than coupons, particularly if you move out to longer durations. And secondly they're
- 55:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): doing it through buybacks. Now I think it would be, you know, I I don't think Scott Besson is as naive as to think that doing a six billion dollar buyback program is in any way going to influence yields on a $40 trillion market. Okay. Particularly when he's you know he's focused on on retiring off
- 55:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Off-the-run the run treasuries. So that's not the issue. I think what he can control is volatility. And you know, I know this is not perfect, but I mean one of the things that I was I've been trying to do over the last few months is to correlate movements in buyback announcements with changes in the move index. And there's certainly some degree of
- 56:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): correlation. And it basically says whenever you get a spike in the move, what you find is that buybacks seem to go up. So I think there is this linkage.
- 56:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): You approve of their actions, but you do acknowledge that the results have been mixed, certainly. With I mean, we did have a historic bond crash in September.
- 56:37
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well,
- 56:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): yeah, but I mean I think they again say a bond crash. I mean, I think the thing is that they can't control. I mean, I don't believe that they have got any expectation about controlling the level of yields. I mean, this is not like previous Fed. Feds where they thought uh, you know, going back to the famous conundrum where if the Fed changed interest rates, the Federal Reserve was
- 56:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): puzzled as to why the long end of the market moved the other way. I think they've moved on from that and they now realize that the market is really very much in control. I mean, in fact, Walsh said that yesterday. He said, you know, we're we're not controlling those interest rates. I think that that's pretty clear they're not. They can encourage
- 57:13
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
- 57:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): right sort of backdrop for the markets to operate, which is a liquid market, and a liquid market both from the perspective of having sufficient funds there in the repo markets and being liquid enough at the longer end so you don't get too many off-the-run treasuries.
- 57:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): That makes sense. So Michael, I think you've made quite clear your outlook of the treasury policy to be quite a accommodative in in 2027. You're forward looking. Looking at the going back to the Federal Reserve balance sheet, it certainly is no secret that Fed chair Kevin Walsh was in his statements before he had any power and was just, you know, a commentator, that he was extremely
- 57:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): hawkish on the balance sheet. He did not think it was appropriate for the Fed to have a large balance sheet. And as such, you know, one expected that the balance sheet could decline severely once he is in power. He set up all these task forces this year. What is your expectation of what those task forces might say and the degree to
- 58:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): which the Fed is going to implement them and what the Fed might do for its balance sheet? You know, is it going to just do runoff? Is it going to be an active seller of securities? Is it going to be doing more RMPs, reserve benefit purposes? And what are the broader consequences that you expect? on broader liquidity conditions over the next few years?
- 58:31
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well,
- 58:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I think the way that I see it is very clear in the sense that if you've got a rising debt pool, which you clearly have, I mean every country has, you you've got to have an increasingly large central bank balance sheet to manage that. And you know, it's purely fanciful to say that we want a radically
- 58:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): smaller Fed balance sheet. I think you can argue that you want a smaller Fed footprint in the markets, and that's not inconsistent in the sense that you don't want to do forward guidance, you don't want everyone sort of, you know, you want the Fed to surprise at certain times. I think I get all that. But I think in terms of managing the debt markets, which is really the crucial
- 59:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): thing, you need to have that balance sheet capacity. You need the ability for the federal Reserve to move in size. And therefore you need that potential balance sheet capacity. So shrinking the Fed balance sheet, I just think is a no-no. I can't see how they could do it. And the last time they tried tentatively to do that, back in Q4 of last year, what
- 59:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you basically saw there was a big sell-off in the repo markets. And that's you know, that's that's clearly a problem.
- 59:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So do you expect the Federal Reserve to be a seller of securities to reduce its balance sheet? Or is it merely going to do the far less hawkish thing and just say, oh, we're actually just going to roll it off, which could take a ridiculously long period of time. And isn't that hawkish?
- 59:52
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well,
- 59:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I don't think they'll I mean, my view is they're gonna be accumulating securities, not selling
- 59:57
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): them. I
- 59:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): mean, the balance sheet will be bigger by 2030 than it is now. And I think that the task force will basically come down with that view.
- 1:00:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Really? So you think that the task force is going to say, actually, we need a big balance sheet, we're going to do QE again?
- 1:00:12
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 1:00:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): think that they will not. I mean, okay, there are two statements there. Are we going to do QE again? I think that they would do, I mean, in my terms, yes, but I think that publicly they would never admit they're going to do QE again. I mean that it'll be buried in terms of some other acronym for sure. Do they want to were they
- 1:00:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): sanctioned a larger balance sheet? I would think yes, because I think the fact is that you know you look at how much debt has gone up since the GFC, the stock of treasury debt, and basically you need the Federal Reserve to grow in parallel to that.
- 1:00:46
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 1:00:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Fed balance sheet has got to move para pursue with the increase in debt, in my view.
- 1:00:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Otherwise it becomes unmanageable. You need that capacity. And what I've argued the whole time is that the ratio between debt and liquidity is crucial. And what's in particular crucial within the crucial bid is that federal debt and Federal Reserve balance sheet are key components of the debt and
- 1:01:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the liquidity
- 1:01:13
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): parts
- 1:01:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): of that quotient. So you need the two to grow together. Otherwise, you'll get problems. You get clear refinancing problems.
- 1:01:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yes. And the reason that there's refinancing issues and that there's a
- 1:01:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): squeeze, such as we saw in September 2019, is because banks demand so many reserves for a variety of reasons. And so if the Fed actually wants to reduce the Fed's balance sheet, they have to reduce the demand for reserves. And
- 1:01:41
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Daryl
- 1:01:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Duffy, professor of Stanford, had a paper on this and there are four mechanisms.
- 1:01:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So people should check that out if they want more interest. Michael, I want to get into your implications of your liquidity cycle view and all of this on asset markets. But before I do, tell us about the Capital War substack and the work that you do and what clients get there. The
- 1:02:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Capital War Substack. Wars is basically a way of expressing these views.
- 1:02:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): The term capital wars came from a book I wrote about five years ago, which was really arguing that the dominant trends in the world economy were moving towards this sort of conflict between the US and China and how it would exercise itself around the control of financial markets and currency. And you would see the increasing polarization towards the
- 1:02:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): dollar area and a yuan-based area. And a lot of the thinking comes around that. So it's about control of liquidity and capital flow. And that particular substack, again, as I say, stress-called capital wars, provides both data and narrative for investors. It's written in not
- 1:02:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): too complicated a way. It's supposed to be clear. in terms of what the messages are. We could advise some asset allocation and also describe what's going on in financial markets. And then we produce data as well. So there are basically at least three pieces a week. One data orientated and two more narrative about what's going on.
- 1:03:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): We include analysis of Bitcoin and bond markets and the economic cycle. So
- 1:03:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it's an analysis of liquidity through the lens of what we're talking about from policy, but also collateral values, the dollar, oil, and how that impacts liquidity conditions. Monetary Matters can get a 20% discount on an annual subscription by clicking a link in the description. Michael, now let's talk about asset markets. So, what is your
- 1:03:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): impact on risk assets right now? Stocks, gold, bitcoin. and how is that being shaped by your liquidity framework and what we've been talking about so far?
- 1:03:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Okay, well, if we go back to the diagram we had. So this is how we envision
- 1:03:50
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
- 1:03:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): world unfolding. You have a liquidity cycle shown in red, and in orange, we show there basically the economic cycle shadowing
- 1:04:00
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that.
- 1:04:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): That is a sequential process. and you'll see there are four different phases that we identify there in terms of investment regimes, turbulence, rebound calm, speculation. That identifies with this asset allocation traffic light that we looked at before. And as we shift between the regimes, the bias
- 1:04:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): towards various areas changes, and that's what we try and articulate. So we've been arguably in the speculation area this year. It shows that the areas that we were emphasizing in not we did not get the technology liftoff in Q2 or whenever
- 1:04:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): correct. Technology has surprised us by having that sort of second surge. But nonetheless, I think a lot of other things have been correct and not least the big run up in commodity prices. this year and the recent failing of credit. So that's how we tend to look at the world. And if you
- 1:05:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): want sort of further insight as to maybe what's going on, let me dis illustrate some of the other points. This is what's happening to credit spreads right now. So we are not in credit right now. We think that credit may be worth picking out as we move through this turbulence phase if yields start to
- 1:05:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): move up appreciably more. So we'd be looking to buy, but we're certainly not there yet. We're more in net seller of the credit space still. And you can see here the orange line, which is showing the junk versus high yield spread, and then the black line, which is looking at a hybrid average for corporate spreads, corporate yields again. against five-year
- 1:05:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): treasury yields. So both are sort of looking a little bit exercise now. This is looking at the CRB commodity index and the world business cycle to show what you've seen this year as a phenomenal increase in commodity markets, pretty much consistent with that economic tempo. So this is the real
- 1:06:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): economy element, and not surprisingly. you should have also seen strong growth in earnings. And this is looking at the ISM and US reported earnings growth in the SP. So you've seen this sort of cyclical background unfolding. So we would be arguing now, if you look into
- 1:06:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): 2027, that the economy will cool to some extent, and that black line would ultimately maybe as. it moves up a little bit more in the next few months, but it begins to roll over again as we move into 27. So that would be a warning for looking at the equity markets. This is looking at what's been going on in
- 1:06:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): equities from a world perspective.
- 1:06:41
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 1:06:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): this is showing the two components of equity market returns: a PE multiple, which is shown in orange, the change in the PE multiple, I should add, and then the growth in earnings per share, which is shown as the dotted line. I would argue that what's different this time is not the PE multiple change. That seems to be moving pretty much
- 1:07:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): consistently what you'd expect with falling liquidity and rising bond yields. So PE multiples are coming down. What is unusual usual is the strength and the lateness in earnings per share growth, which are coming through much later. in the cycle and arguably in bigger size. And that's what's causing equity indexes to hold
- 1:07:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): up. So that may be, as I argue, that may be cracking now. And then looking at the treasury market, where we look at the two key elements term premium, premia, which is shown in orange, and the black line is looking at rate expectations in the US. which is trying to understand what the
- 1:07:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): peak terminal policy rate is for the Fed in the curve. But that's basically saying that what's driven bond yields of late has been the black line, not really the orange line. So term premia admittedly been volatile, but the net net over the last twelve months has Have been pretty flat. It's really been rate expectations keyed off a
- 1:08:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): much stronger economy that have would been the key thing.
- 1:08:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So your views on asset markets are broadly in line with the changes from a speculation to a turbulent. So you like cash, you like bonds, you don't like credit, you don't like equities or beta?
- 1:08:17
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
- 1:08:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I mean the answer is that in speculation we're paring down our equities. I mean, we were very positive on commodities through this year, so I think we made a lot more money in commodities than. we missed on by pairing back equities. Fixed income, we've been, you know, through speculation, you know, wanting to move there, beginning with
- 1:08:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): shorter duration. And now we're starting to move longer duration in some of our bond positioning. And beginning to pare down commodities. I mean, commodities shouldn't perform well if this is turbulence. That's another way to look at it. So if you look at commodity markets versus TLT or something, that may be a very good gauge as to what's going
- 1:08:56
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): on.
- 1:08:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): What would it take for you to get bullish on beta and equities again? What would you have to see?
- 1:09:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Without any question, a turn in the liquidity cycle.
- 1:09:08
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 1:09:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): what would the signs of that be?
- 1:09:11
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well,
- 1:09:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I think it would be confirmation would be a change in direction of yield curves. So that would more or less confirm that we'd seen something. I think another thing, this is looking at the two-year Treasury note shown in orange, and the black line is SOFA, so that's repo, overnight repo
- 1:09:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): rates.
- 1:09:31
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 1:09:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): what I've done is I've I backfilled that chart pre-repo with Euro dollar rates, which is as many people recall, were uh replaced by SOFA. And what that chart indicates is that the orange line, the treasury market, is a very good predictor both on the upside and the downside
- 1:09:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): of what happens to sofa rates and, by implication, Fed funds. And that's saying that rates are basically going up. But if you scale that relative to what happened during the Powell
- 1:10:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): chairmanship of the Fed, when PAL tightened through 21 22, you'll see there's a very significant difference. And this is why I say that if you look at what the Fed under Kevin Walsh is doing, it may be tightening, but it's doing it at a much slower pace. And I think we've got to remember that. This is much gentler in that
- 1:10:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): sense. Doesn't mean to say that it won't matter,
- 1:10:29
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): but
- 1:10:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it's not a short, sharp, sudden burst. And everything I see is this is a Fed that's kind of dragging its feet and reluctant to tighten. It may still be having to do some more tightening in some avenues, but I think that we're, yeah, we're we're if you can look at that, you can say we're sort of late in that period. And what we've got to start to
- 1:10:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): anticipate is when you get that inflection. Now, that inflection may well be 27. I always pencil within the second half of 2027 for an inflection in the liquidity cycle, and that's what the normal tempo would say. But it may well be that this occurs sooner,
- 1:11:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): given these developments. Now, the other one I'm going to put up, which is a lot more controversial, is looking at this. which is Bitcoin. And Bitcoin is an excellent barometer of liquidity. Okay. I think it really pays attention to watch because looking at all the evidence and the statistical work
- 1:11:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): we've done, we confirm that Bitcoin is the most liquidity sensitive asset on the planet. So it's very sensitive to movements in liquidity. And look where
- 1:11:39
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
- 1:11:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): know Bitcoin peaked. It peaked shortly after our liquidity cycle, basically peaked as well. So you got that sudden collapse in Bitcoin, and what it's doing now is it's stabilizing. Now I'm not sure why it's stabilizing,
- 1:11:55
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): but
- 1:11:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it may be responding to that flick-up in liquidity that you saw from the Fed. Now I'm not 100% sure that's going to continue, but I'm open-minded. And I am open-minded, not least because I would venture that in 27 the economy slows down, and therefore the need for a much more
- 1:12:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): aggressive Fed may be mitigated.
- 1:12:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): By the way, Michael, your gold and Bitcoin are below where they were when we did our previous interviews over the past year, whether they were this. spring or in October of last year. That is interesting. Obviously, we had a huge bull run from October to February 2026. But
- 1:12:34
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): yeah,
- 1:12:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): gold has been trading quite weakly. What is your outlook on these sensitive assets, gold and Bitcoin, right now? I understand you're saying that okay, they could get some help if the liquidity cycle turns, but I mean, wouldn't a consequence of where we are in the liquidity cycle by your reading be that it's bearish for gold and Bitcoin?
- 1:12:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, there's no question about that. What I'm saying is that you've got to use those indicators as well as a way of understanding rather better where we are on the cycle. So I would envision that you see Bitcoin coming down to test the 70,000 level on this chart. That would be my expectation, okay, where the
- 1:13:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): channels are. drawn. If it holds that level, I think that may be the beginnings of base. And that may be telling us that we're a lot nearer some sort of liftoff
- 1:13:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): than not. And therefore, you know, the next up cycle, I think, in Bitcoin is going to be significant because it's going gonna to all policymakers are going gonna to throw the towel in. They're going gonna to have to. There's an awful lot of refinancing to do. And I just refer back to this chart which is a scary one. And that's a big refinancing demand. And they've got to
- 1:13:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): print money in some large size ultimately to get through this process. And that is gonna happen. So this is why you want these monetary inflation hedges. The question is timing and we could be dancing on the head of a pin here because at the end of the day, if the Bitcoin price triples from here, who cares whether it goes back to
- 1:14:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): 70,000? But what I'm trying to say is the information
- 1:14:11
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that
- 1:14:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): we get back from the markets, looking at how Bitcoin performs, is very valuable information. I think it's going to drop further now. I mean, the indication of this chart channel is that you retest 70,000. But if it holds, that's important information. And if we maybe turn to gold, I'm going to show you my
- 1:14:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): analysis of gold right at the back, which is not anything to do with Fed liquidity, it's all about China. And I think the key factor to watch is this one. And this is looking at people's bank liquidity and the gold price. Now, I mean, this is going down another rabbit hole, which is probably too deep to explain.
- 1:14:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): explore. But the point here is that if you think that debt is a problem for the West, and debt has been a problem for countries like Japan, debt is a huge, huge problem for China. And they need to devalue a huge amount of their debt. And the only way they can do that is by printing money. And I think they've started to do that. That's what the evidence
- 1:15:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): shows here. The level of PBOC liquidity, people's bank liquidity.
- 1:15:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): from 2022 to now has virtually doubled. That's caused the gold market to go up. I don't believe that the gold market has been propelled by these other elements like Western debasement or the idea of sanctioning Russian gold. I don't think that's the issue. The real issue has been Chinese money printing domestically. And if you look at what happened this year,
- 1:15:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): curiously, the peaks in the gold market more or less coincide. when China allowed the PBOC balance sheet to flatline from about February, March of this year. And that policy may well be tied up with the Iran conflict, rather. I'm not sure, but it basically
- 1:15:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): seems to attest to that. And if you want a more
- 1:15:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): fire higher frequency analysis, take a look at that. And that's looking at six-week changes in PBOC liquidity and the gold price, which, you know, it's sufficiently close to make people think about what's going
- 1:16:11
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): on.
- 1:16:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah, you your work has been really pressured on the correlation between Chinese liquidity and the gold price. Do you have any outlook about where Chinese liquidity is going?
- 1:16:21
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
- 1:16:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I think it's going up because it has to go up. I mean, they've got no other choice. They either go down the Japan road of two lost decades. I mean, that's possible. But I don't think the Chinese population will accept that because what they want is the PRC to deliver prosperity. So I think they're going to have to do something. And
- 1:16:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the experience of every single debt burden throughout history is the only way you get rid of debt in a credit money economy is to devalue it. You've got another no choice. other You can't default because that's your collateral. So you basically have to monetize. And I think what China is engineering right now, as I've described it before, is a dual circulation system where
- 1:17:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): they're basically keeping the external and the internal values of the yuan different and separate, and the internal value of the yuan, UAR. in other words, the purchasing power level of prices and wages are kept very distinct from.
- 1:17:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the external value through capital controls, compliance state banks, and huge foreign exchange reserves. And I think that's how they manage
- 1:17:23
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it.
- 1:17:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And so this work actually is is bullish gold.
- 1:17:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Very, very bullish gold. Very
- 1:17:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): bullish gold. Okay. So how do you square your broad liquidity cycle view, which is negative for liquidity liquidity-centered sensitive assets such as Bitcoin and gold with this Chinese data that's bullish for gold? Net net how do they balance out?
- 1:17:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Let's be clear: the Chinese data is not bullish right now because it's going sideways. But at least the gold price is holding at the moment around the 4,000 mark, which is consistent with what that level of Chinese liquidity is. If Chinese liquidity goes down from here, the gold price will go down, in my view, because I think the Chinese retail
- 1:17:58
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): is
- 1:17:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the marginal buyer of gold. If Chinese liquidity goes up, from here,
- 1:18:04
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): then
- 1:18:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it'll be very bullish. China is a key component of the global liquidity cycle. Is it likely to move independently of the US? It could, although all the evidence is through this year that they won't. So it may be that the Fed is the key catalyst, and then you'll see the Chinese joining in. But at some stage, the Chinese have got to
- 1:18:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): print money again. And you can see that they have done it in the past. And I think they're perfectly capable of doing it in the future. And why are they doubling down on things like capital controls? Why are they making it more and more difficult to invest in crypto? Because they don't want that money leaving China. And that's because they're printing a lot of it. And that
- 1:18:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): would adversely affect the exchange rate.
- 1:18:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So so are you more bullish on gold now than you are on Bitcoin and stocks? because of this Chinese factor?
- 1:18:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I'm more bullish on Bitcoin and gold than I am on stocks because I think stocks are much more a factor of of
- 1:19:01
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): of
- 1:19:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the liquidity cycle or maybe the mid-liquidity cycle, and where we will be at best by the middle of next year is in the early cycle phases again, which is where the Bitcoin and gold tend to move up. Am I bullish, more bullish on Bitcoin? or more bullish on gold? What I would say is defer that answer by saying I'm bullish on both. Bitcoin is a lot more
- 1:19:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): sensitive to liquidity, but we've only had a 10, 15 year track record on that. So we don't really know. Whereas we had 5,000 years history on gold. And if you look at the multipliers, in other words, the elasticities elasticity is relative to a 10% move in liquidity, gold is about 15%
- 1:19:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): per 10% rise. Bitcoin is about 45 to 50%. So the magnitude for Bitcoin is hugely more, although that factor is coming down all the time, but that's what its historic elasticity has been. Therefore, what I would argue is you hold both in your portfolio and you weight it by the relative volatility of each. But given the fact
- 1:20:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that Bitcoin is increasingly likely to be institutionalized, that volatility may come down and afford a bigger proportion in portfolios.
- 1:20:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Michael, earlier right before you went to the Bitcoin slide and right before you said this chart may be controversial, you said something about timing. And could you just say that again and share your kind of timing view for 2027 of kind of your framework for when this stuff might happen, of the liquidity cycle worsening and then getting better, and the corresponding
- 1:20:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): effects on asset prices.
- 1:20:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Okay, let me go back to the liquidity cycle. So it's here.
- 1:20:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): The
- 1:20:40
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
- 1:20:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): helpful, the wealth warning with this is that whenever you try and predict liquidity, it's always fraught with problems because you don't really need to, because liquidity itself is a leading indicator. So, this is the best way to be proved wrong is to try and predict it. So I'm going to tread carefully. But what I would say is that if you look at that sine
- 1:21:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): wave,
- 1:21:01
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): what
- 1:21:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the sine wave is telling you is that you would get typically a bottom in that liquidity cycle sometime in the second half of 2027, and that's what it was always foreshadowing.
- 1:21:13
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 1:21:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): think that could be. brought forward a bit. And it may be that you're seeing the first signs of bottoming out now. If you look historically through that data, you'll see that you never really go straight up. I mean, there are occasions when you might, or you do occasionally, but pretty much you sort of chop around for a while, particularly if you're around the mid-cycle point, which we are now.
- 1:21:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): So it's quite possible that we sort of remain a bit volatile over coming months. and then maybe push up through first half of next year. That's possible. But I would expect to see that. Where would you see that first? I would look at Bitcoin as a very good barometer, but just bear in mind that's not suggesting that you're going to
- 1:21:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): miss the Bitcoin rally. You may miss the first 10% of it. But if this thing is going to double or triple, then so what? That doesn't matter. It's a very good guide. as to what's happening. And I think with all investment, you need context. And that's what this framework is already designed to do.
- 1:22:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And so that nadir, that bottom in liquidity in 2026 or maybe late 2025, of how it just dipped below 30 on the global liquidity index GLI,
- 1:22:21
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
- 1:22:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that has since gone up. Do you expect that to be a local bottom and then that it to further go down? And so the absolute bottom of that chart will be lower, or do you think we already have reached the actual bottom in the GLI?
- 1:22:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Well, I would say with some with confidence that that line is going to come down again, right?
- 1:22:39
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): That
- 1:22:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): black line will come down again. Will it go below that 28 reading that we saw before? I'm not sure about that, but I think we're gonna going to dance around these sort of mid-levels. I don't see the case yet for any significant plunge in liquidity, like we saw before, if you go back to
- 1:22:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): 2023 with that big tightening that we got. Clearly, there are challenges out there. Make no mistake that there's a bigger refinancing burden to come. And it may be that policymakers mess up, say never. But I think that what they need to do. and what history tends to show is that when you get these big
- 1:23:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): refinancing burdens, they tend to try and push liquidity into the system because the system needs it. They may misjudge that,
- 1:23:26
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): they
- 1:23:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): may overreg it, and they may underestimate it, but they'll at least try in in directional terms.
- 1:23:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Michael, when on this chart is the time that it's a bullish sign for risk assets? Is it when do you want to buy it from when it goes from 10 to 80? Do you want to buy it from when it goes from 40 on the upside to 40 on the downside? What exactly is kind of the the signal here of interpreting this data for its implications on asset prices?
- 1:23:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Okay, well I'll tell you how we use it. Maybe that's the best help. I mean clearly, you know, if you're looking at single data points, single months, you're going gonna to be precisely wrong.
- 1:24:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And this by the nature of the volatility in the data, we'd much prefer to be approximately right than precisely wrong. So what we do is to tend to look at changes maybe over three or six months and use that. So in other words, put a moving average through his data and see when you've got a definitive turn. And if you miss the first bit, so what? Not least because
- 1:24:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): liquidity tends to lead most asset markets by around six months. Bitcoin maybe a tad less, but of that sort of magnitude. So broadly, we would want to see, let's say, three data points that show a definitive pickup. If that's the case, then the upswing, assuming the upswing then continues, is very
- 1:24:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): bullish for risk assets. Equities tend to do best from the second phase. So the first phase, the rebound phase. So if you look at the calm phase, that's when equities really do well. They can do well in rebound as well, but you really want to be if you look at the beta exposure,
- 1:25:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you'll sort of proceed with caution in rebound because of the uncertainty about the position in the cycle. And then once you get to calm, it's full green. And, you know, so that would have been let's say the rebound phase. Rebound tends to last maybe
- 1:25:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): around about nine, twelve months. Calm is the longest phase, reassuringly. Speculation tends to be about nine, twelve months. Turbulence a bit shorter than that, typically. And you know, if you're in the rebound phase, I mean if you miss the first couple of months, that doesn't matter too much. You Yeah, know, the whole point is context. And
- 1:25:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you don't want things like commodities. One of the things that I'm saying, which is a very unappealing recommendation, I suppose, given the fact that in the long term we're still very bullish on commodities. We think we're going to a world where real asset investment is great. But the trouble is that for the next six months, I don't think that's going to be the case. So I wouldn't be
- 1:26:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): exposed to commodities here. I think they're pulling back.
- 1:26:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And I would be thinking much more of government debt.
- 1:26:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So you like long-term government bonds. That's very interesting. And you said that the cycle is probably going to bottom in Q2 of 2027. Michael, do you think that what causes the cycle to bottom is kind of a panic among policymakers? Because to me, the only thing that could cause Kevin
- 1:26:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Walsh to be like, yes, I am buying government bonds and I'm returning like doing it 2020 all over again would be a financial crisis. And it seems like to me things would have to get pretty bad to prompt that response. I'm curious your reaction to that.
- 1:26:40
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well,
- 1:26:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I I can only agree with that. I think that's a fair point. I'm not suggesting that there won't be pain in the next few months, that's for sure. I'm equivocal about that.
- 1:26:51
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
- 1:26:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I think that we're moving into a phase which is defined, as I say, by turbulence. If you look at the liquidity cycle, it's not every liquidity cycle where you see financial crises, okay? So it's not every downswing where there's a financial crisis. You can get hurt in asset markets in the downswings. But what I'm saying
- 1:27:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): is if you go to this longer-term longer term one, it tends to be that the big downswings are longer frequency or more extended. So it's possible that we're moving towards this everything bust, but that might not be this cycle. That might be, as you can see there, that might be in the early 2030s by the time you get
- 1:27:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): to that. So there may be one more cycle we go through first. Who knows?
- 1:27:36
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
- 1:27:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the problem is what I'm trying to articulate. there is the problem that we face with this is
- 1:27:42
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): this
- 1:27:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): is the big debt burden that we've got to get through. And it's not new debt only, it's refinancing of existing debt. And that's the key problem. And the fact is that you've got such huge demands being placed on capital markets now. And the little annotation here confirms that you're looking at close to a trillion dollars of
- 1:28:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): hyperscaling. hyperscaler debt in each of the next two years, and you've got similar equity funding coming behind it. So I mean these are big demands on markets.
- 1:28:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): They really are. And you showed the chart earlier of triple C spreads versus single B, and basically that spread is widening almost every single day. That line was alarmingly straight.
- 1:28:22
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
- 1:28:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): and that there may be specific risk in those triple C issuers, but the point is that the credit market is where you see these tensions emerge first. Well,
- 1:28:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Michael, thank you so much. People can find your work on X at Cross Border Cap, and your sub stack is Capital Wars. Monetary Matters listeners for a limited time can get a 20% discount to an annual subscription. Link is in the description. Until next time.
- 1:28:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Hope you enjoyed that. Want to say a big thank you to today's sponsor, Lens Ticker L L-ENS, E N S, the Sarmaya thematic ET. ETF, which gives real asset exposure and the potential to diversify a 60-40 portfolio. Read the perspectives at SarmayaETF.com. Disclosures in the show notes. Thanks for watching.
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The Bond Squeeze | Jan van Eck on >5% Treasury Yields, Semis, Anthropic, and Gold
Episode discussion: Jan van Eck on bond yields, AI infrastructure, and gold as currency
Speakers’ claims: Jan van Eck outlines a macro framework where US fiscal deficits and strong growth drive a 'bond squeeze,' pushing 10-year Treasury yields above 5.25%. He distinguishes between AI semiconductor demand and infrastructure needs, projecting 62GW of compute demand by 2030 while citing China's cheap electricity as a competitive risk. Van Eck discusses private credit resilience, gold's resurgence as a global currency driven by government spending, and the valuation dynamics of Anthropic's IPO. He concludes that despite market concerns, valuations remain reasonable with stable fiscal and monetary policies.