Sleepy Stock Market

Speakers analyze Japan's 1980s asset bubble, attributing it to domestic banking incentives rather than the Plaza Accord.

1h 12m Listen to the original Episode page
Japan BubbleBank of JapanKeiretsuAsset PricesBanking CrisisZombie LendingPlaza AccordFinancial Regulation

Summary

The episode details the rise and fall of Japan's asset price bubble, citing the Nikkei's 1989 peak of 38,915 and extreme valuations. Speakers argue that domestic factors, specifically Bank of Japan window guidance and Keiretsu cross-shareholding, drove the boom more than the Plaza Accord. The narrative covers the subsequent burst, triggered by monetary tightening and credit controls, leading to the 'Lost Decade' and banking crises. It highlights the role of political corruption, such as the Recruit scandal, and the long-term economic stagnation caused by zombie lending.

Key takeaways

  1. 1
    Japanese shares traded at 60-70 times earnings in 1989, compared to a long-run US average of 15, indicating extreme valuation.

    Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) · 0:42

  2. 2
    Cross-shareholding rose to 67% of listed shares by the 1980s, meaning only a small fraction of stock was available for trading, amplifying price moves.

    Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) · 4:41

Episode sections

  1. 0:00 – 1:57

    The Peak of the Bubble

    Nikkei closed at 38,915.87 on Dec 29, 1989, with 60-70x earnings. Ginza land cost $220k/sqm. Market took 34 years to recover.

  2. 1:57 – 6:24

    Post-War Reconstruction and Keiretsu

    Japan became 2nd largest economy by 1980s. Keiretsu cross-shareholding rose from 39% (1950) to 67% (1980s), reducing float.

  3. 6:24 – 9:28

    Deregulation and Bank Lending Pressure

    Deregulation allowed manufacturers to raise capital directly, leaving banks with excess deposits. BOJ window guidance forced lending to property developers.

  4. 9:28 – 15:52

    The Plaza Accord and Economic Stimulus

    1985 Plaza Accord strengthened yen, causing 'Endaka' recession. BOJ cut rates five times to 2.5% (1986-87). Government launched >6 trillion yen fiscal stimulus.

  5. 15:52 – 19:29

    Window Guidance and Credit Expansion

    BOJ set quarterly loan growth targets. Banks lent to property developers/small firms using land as collateral, creating a self-reinforcing loop.

  6. 19:29 – 33:14

    Land Myth and Trophy Assets

    Land prices never fell post-war, enabling 100% LTV lending. Tax incentives encouraged borrowing. Companies used 'Zaitaku' to buy stocks and trophy assets like Rockefeller Center.

  7. 33:14 – 37:03

    The Toad and Market Manipulation

    Nui Onoue provided tips to Nomura, Yamichi, IBA executives. Controlled ~$20bn exposure using forged CDs from Toyo Shinkin.

  8. 37:03 – 40:09

    Banking Scandal and Political Corruption

    Toyo Shinkin and IBA collapsed. Recruit scandal revealed politicians/bureaucrats received discounted shares, showing regulatory complicity.

  9. 40:09 – 43:13

    Policy Shifts and Monetary Tightening

    Consumption tax and Land Basic Law signaled bubble awareness. BOJ Governor Yasushi Mieno raised discount rate from 2.5% to 6% (late 1989) over 15 months.

  10. 43:13 – 46:01

    Credit Controls and Market Peak

    Ministry of Finance issued Total Lending Amount Regulation (March 1990), capping property loan growth. Nikkei peaked Dec 29, 1989.

  11. 46:01 – 51:51

    Market Decline and Brokerage Scandals

    Nikkei fell >40% in 1990, nearly 2/3 by Aug 1992. Brokerages (Nomura, Yamichi, Nikko, Daiwa) compensated corporate clients for losses, creating a two-tier market.

  12. 51:51 – 57:43

    Zombie Lending and the Jusen Crisis

    Jusen collapsed, requiring 680 billion yen bailout. Politicians delayed addressing bad loans in commercial banks, leading to a decade of zombie lending.

  13. 57:43 – 57:46

    The Crash and Aftermath

    Bubble burst caused massive losses. Mitsubishi lost ~$600m on Rockefeller Center. Sony wrote off $2.7bn on Columbia Pictures. Esutani lost $340m on Pebble Beach.

  14. 57:46 – 1:11:54

    The November 1997 Banking Crisis

    Sanyo Securities defaulted, Hokkaido Takushoku Bank collapsed, Yamichi Securities closed. 'Japan Premium' rose as international lenders demanded higher rates.

Claims worth verifying

The Nikkei closed at 38,915.87 on December 29, 1989, its highest point ever.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·0:26

How to verify: Historical Nikkei index data from Nikkei Inc. or financial data providers like Bloomberg/Reuters. For recent events, verify 2026-08-14 through 2026-11-14. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Japanese shares traded at 60 to 70 times earnings in 1989, compared to a long-run US average of about 15.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·0:42

How to verify: Historical P/E ratio data for the Nikkei 225 and S&P 500 from financial archives. For recent events, verify 2026-08-14 through 2026-11-14. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Land in Ginza cost $220,000 per square meter in 1989.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·0:58

How to verify: Historical land price surveys by the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT) or Bank of Japan. For recent events, verify 2026-08-14 through 2026-11-14. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Cross-shareholding rose from 39% of listed shares in 1950 to 67% by the 1980s.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·4:41

How to verify: Bank of Japan Financial System Survey or academic studies on Japanese corporate governance history. For recent events, verify 2026-08-14 through 2026-11-14. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The yen traded at 237 to the dollar in Sept 1985, falling to 128 by end of 1987.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·10:15

How to verify: Federal Reserve H.10 statistical releases or Bank of Japan exchange rate data. For recent events, verify 2026-08-14 through 2026-11-14. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The Bank of Japan cut the discount rate five times between Jan 1986 and Feb 1987, ending at 2.5%.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·12:02

How to verify: Bank of Japan monetary policy records or historical central bank rate tables. For recent events, verify 2026-08-14 through 2026-11-14. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The Bank of Japan held the rate at 2.5% for 27 months after Oct 1987.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·15:19

How to verify: Bank of Japan monetary policy announcements and rate history. For recent events, verify 2026-08-14 through 2026-11-14. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The Imperial Palace grounds (1.15 sq km) were valued at more than all real estate in California.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·23:47

How to verify: Calculation using 2026 Ginza land prices vs. California total assessed property value from 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-14 through 2026-11-14. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Mitsubishi Estate purchased Rockefeller Center for ~$850 million in Oct 1989.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·30:01

How to verify: Mitsubishi Estate historical press releases or SEC filings if applicable, or major news archives from 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-14 through 2026-11-14. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

Sony wrote off $2.7 billion on Columbia Pictures in 1994.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·32:47

How to verify: Sony Corporation annual financial reports for fiscal year 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-14 through 2026-11-14. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

By 1991, the Industrial Bank of Japan had lent 240 billion yen to a single entity, with total network exposure close to 2.77 trillion yen.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·37:03

How to verify: Search for historical records of the Toyo Shinkin scandal and Industrial Bank of Japan loan exposures in Japanese financial archives or news reports from 1991-2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-14 through 2026-11-14. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The borrower from Toyo Shinkin was arrested on August 13, 1991, and sentenced to twelve years in prison.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·37:27

How to verify: Check Japanese court records or news archives for the arrest and sentencing of the Toyo Shinkin fraud case in 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-14 through 2026-11-14. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Finance Minister Kaiichi Miyasawa resigned on December 9, 1988, due to the Recruit scandal.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·39:16

How to verify: Verify via Japanese government archives or major news outlets (e.g., Asahi Shimbun, Yomiuri Shimbun) for the resignation date of Finance Minister Miyasawa. For recent events, verify 2026-08-14 through 2026-11-14. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

A 3% national consumption tax came into force on April 1, 1989.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·40:10

How to verify: Check Japanese tax law history or Ministry of Finance records for the implementation date and rate of the first consumption tax. For recent events, verify 2026-08-14 through 2026-11-14. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The Bank of Japan raised its official discount rate from 3.75% to 4.25% on December 25, 1989.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·41:35

How to verify: Consult Bank of Japan historical monetary policy records or financial news archives for the specific rate change date and amounts. For recent events, verify 2026-08-14 through 2026-11-14. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The Nikkei printed its all-time high of 38,915 on December 29, 1989.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·41:56

How to verify: Check Nikkei historical price data from the Tokyo Stock Exchange or financial data providers like Bloomberg/Reuters. For recent events, verify 2026-08-14 through 2026-11-14. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

On March 27, 1990, the Ministry of Finance issued the Total Lending Amount Regulation.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·43:13

How to verify: Search Ministry of Finance administrative orders or Japanese financial regulatory archives for the 'Total Lending Amount Regulation' (Sashikasei) issuance date. For recent events, verify 2026-08-14 through 2026-11-14. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

By August 19, 1992, the Nikkei stood at 14,338, a fall of nearly two-thirds from the peak.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·48:21

How to verify: Verify Nikkei historical price data for August 19, 2026, and calculate the percentage decline from the Dec 2026 peak. For recent events, verify 2026-08-14 through 2026-11-14. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Yamichi Securities announced it was shutting down on November 24, 1997, after hiding 260 billion yen in losses.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·1:00:17

How to verify: Check news archives from November 2026 for Yamichi Securities' bankruptcy announcement and the reported amount of hidden losses. For recent events, verify 2026-08-14 through 2026-11-14. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The Nikkei closed at 39,098.68 on February 22, 2024, above its 1989 peak of 38,915.87.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·1:07:15

How to verify: Check Nikkei historical price data for February 22, 2024, and compare with the December 29, 2026 closing price. For recent events, verify 2026-08-14 through 2026-11-14. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Do your own research

  • Verify Nikkei 225 historical price data for December 29, 1989, and February 2024 from Yahoo Finance or Nikkei Inc.
  • Check Bank of Japan discount rate history from 1986-1990 via BOJ statistical databases.
  • Review the Recruit scandal court documents or Ministry of Finance reports for details on discounted share allocations.
  • Analyze the 'Total Lending Amount Regulation' text from the Ministry of Finance (1990) to understand credit caps.
  • Research 'Zaitaku' accounting practices in Japanese corporate filings from the late 1980s.
  • Compare US P/E ratios in 1989 with Japanese P/E ratios using historical market data from Bloomberg or Refinitiv.
  • Investigate the 'Japan Premium' data from 1997 via Bank of Japan financial system reports.
  • Check the Financial Revitalization Law of 1998 for specific capital injection amounts and bank eligibility criteria.
Full transcriptexpand
0:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): The 29th of December, 1989.
0:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): The last trading day of the decade. In Tokyo, the dealing rooms had been lit since before dawn. Outside, the winter air was cold and clear, the kind of sharp December day that makes a city look very certain of itself.
0:21
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
0:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the city was certain. It had earned the right to be.
0:26
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): When
0:26
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the bell rang that afternoon, the Nikkei stood at 38,915.87, the highest number it had ever printed. The highest, most people in those rooms believed, it would ever need to
0:41
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): be.
0:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Two figures will tell you everything about that moment. Japanese shares were trading at 60 to 70 times their company's annual earnings. The long-run American average for comparison is about 15.
0:58
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
0:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): in the Ginsa district of central Tokyo, a single square meter of land was changing hands for 30 million yen, about $220,000 for a patch of earth roughly the size of a dining table. That closing number, thirty-eight thousand nine hundred and fifteen,
1:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): would not be seen again for thirty-four years.
1:23
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
1:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the question at the heart of this story is a simple one, with a very long answer. How does the second largest economy on earth talk itself into believing that land cannot fall?
1:35
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
1:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): what does it cost a country to find out otherwise?
1:40
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Turn off the lights, close your portfolio, and plug in your earphones. Join us tonight as we delve into the dark side of the markets.
1:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): To begin somewhere unexpected. You have to begin in rubble.
2:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): In nineteen forty five, Japan's major cities were largely destroyed.
2:09
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
2:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): factories were gone, the railways were broken, whole urban districts had been burned to the ground.
2:17
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
2:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): country had lost, by some estimates, a quarter of its national wealth in the war. And yet, within a single generation, Japan had rebuilt itself into something the world had genuinely never seen before.
2:35
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): By
2:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the early 1980s, it was the second largest economy on the planet, and it had arrived there faster than any country in history.
2:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): The miracle was real. The reconstruction was real. Thirty years. of extraordinary growth, of rising wages and expanding industry and technological achievement, all of it real.
2:59
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
2:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it had produced, by the nineteen eighties, a mood of very deep confidence. Not arrogance exactly, but something close to certainty. The system works, it has always worked.
3:13
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): There is
3:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): no reason to believe. it will stop.
3:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): That confidence was not irrational. It was built on evidence. But it was also built on a set of institutions that had become so familiar, so woven into the fabric of daily life, that their assumptions had stopped being examined. The central institution was the
3:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Karetsu, the group. great corporate group.
3:40
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A
3:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Karetsu was a loose confederation of companies spanning different industries, all bound together by long term relationships and by their connection to a single main bank at the center.
3:54
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
3:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): bank did not lend to its member companies the way a Western bank lends to a client at arm's length, watching the interest payments arrive.
4:03
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It
4:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): knew those businesses intimately.
4:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Stakes in each other, and because the main bank held stakes in the companies it served, and the companies held stakes in the bank, the ownership structure of any major Japanese corporation was a tight, settled circle. This was called cross-share holding. It had risen from about
4:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): 39% of all listed shares in 1950 to about 67% by the 1980s.
4:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): 67%.
4:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Think carefully about what that means in practice. Two-thirds of all Japanese shares were held by friendly institutions that were never going to sell.
5:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Partners, allies, long-term holders who bought in the spirit of loyalty, not of profit. Only a very small fraction of any company's stock was ever actually available in the open market. And when the float is that thin, when so little is genuinely for sale on any
5:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): given day, a relatively modest amount of buying can move the price a very long way.
5:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): A coiled spring.
5:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Above all of this sat the Ministry of Finance.
5:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): It ran the financial system through what was politely called administrative guidance, a web of informal instructions, understood expectations, and telephone calls that shaped bank behavior without always requiring a written order.
5:57
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
5:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the organizing principle of the whole edifice was this no bank would ever be allowed to fail. The ministry would not permit it. The system held. The system always held.
6:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): For three decades it had.
6:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): By 1985, nobody in Tokyo had lived through a bank failure in their adult life. The idea that one was coming seemed simply not to belong to the world. they inhabited.
6:29
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
6:29
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): something had already quietly changed.
6:33
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
6:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the years before the big events, before the Plaza Hotel and the rate cuts and the land frenzy, a structural shift had already begun loading the system with pressure it did not know it was carrying.
6:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Deregulation had been creeping through Japanese finance since the late. 1970s. Bond markets had opened, capital controls had eased, companies could now raise money directly from investors, without borrowing from their main bank.
7:04
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
7:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the biggest manufacturers, the ones with the strongest credit ratings and the greatest appetites for capital, had noticed.
7:13
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
7:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Toyota did not.
7:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): bank anymore, not in the old way. Nippon Steel could issue bonds on its own terms. The best corporate borrowers, the ones who had always been the safe, steady core of the bank's loan portfolios, were quietly leaving. The banks were still there,
7:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): still enormous. Still gathering the deposits of a nation with one of the highest savings rates in the developed world.
7:44
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
7:44
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): money kept flowing in. The window guidance system, administered by the Bank of Japan, kept requiring the banks to push that money out as loans every quarter in rigid percentages.
7:58
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
7:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the customers who had once absorbed that money, who had needed it and used it.
8:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): productively, had moved on.
8:06
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
8:06
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the banks went looking for new borrowers.
8:10
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): They found property developers, non-bank finance companies, small and medium-sized manufacturers and traders who had never previously attracted much interest from a major lender. And in each case, when they extended a loan. they asked for collateral.
8:29
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
8:30
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): collateral they understood best, the one their entire lending culture had been built around, was land.
8:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Urban land prices in Tokyo were already moving in the early 1980s, rising 12.7% in the fiscal year of 1984, rising further. through 1985.
8:53
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): A branch manager who steered loans toward property developers was a branch manager whose book was growing,
9:00
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
9:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): a growing loan book was what the system measured and rewarded.
9:05
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
9:06
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): machine was already turning when the Plaza Accord was signed, already loaded when the rate cuts began. That matters enormously for other
9:14
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): people.
9:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): understanding what happened next, because it means this was not purely a story of one bad policy decision or one external shock.
9:25
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
9:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): conditions for the fire existed before anyone struck the match.
9:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): 1985, the Plaza Hotel New York, The finance ministers. and central bank governors of the group of five, the United States, Japan, West Germany, France, and the United Kingdom, sat down together and decided that the dollar was too strong.
9:53
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): American manufacturers were struggling. The trade deficit was vast and growing.
9:59
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
9:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): dollar, they agreed, had to come down. The other currency currencies, including the yen, had to go up, and they would intervene in the currency markets to make it happen.
10:10
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
10:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): effect on Japan was immediate and severe.
10:15
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
10:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): yen had been trading at around 237 to the dollar in September 1985.
10:24
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): By
10:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): December of that year, it was at 203. By August of 1986, it had reached 154. By the end of 1987, 128.
10:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Consider what that meant for a country that lived, fundamentally, by selling things abroad. A car that had cost an American buyer ten thousand dollars was now. in effect, costing far more. Japanese goods had not changed. The factories were the same.
10:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): The workers were the same. The engineering was the same.
11:04
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
11:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the price tag in every foreign shop had nearly doubled, through no fault of the product itself.
11:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Export orders slowed, factories cut ship. shifts, company profits dropped. The Japanese called it Ndaka, the recession of the strong yen, and it was a genuine industrial shock that moved through the real economy with speed and force.
11:29
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Unemployment crept upward. The mood among manufacturers who had driven the miracle for thirty years turned genuinely anxious.
11:39
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
11:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): government and the Bank of Japan responded as governments and central banks do when their economies contract. They stimulated.
11:49
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
11:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): bank cut its official discount rate five times in rapid succession. Each cut aimed at keeping credit cheap enough to offset the damage from the strong yen.
12:02
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On
12:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the 30th of January 1986, the rate fell from 5% to 4.5.
12:09
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On
12:10
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the 10th of March to 4%, a cut made simultaneously with the American Federal Reserve and the German Bundesbank.
12:19
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On
12:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the 21st of April to 3.5%, three and a half, again alongside the Federal Reserve.
12:25
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On
12:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the 1st first of November, to three percent. And then, on the twenty third of February 1987, the day after the major economies signed the Louvre Agreement in Paris to stabilize exchange rates, the rate fell one final time.
12:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): To two and a half percent.
12:46
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
12:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): lowest it had ever been. Money was almost free.
12:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Alongside the rate cuts, the government launched three fiscal stimulus packages in October of 1985, in December of that year at 3.12 trillion yen, and in September of 1986 at 3.63 trillion yen. And in April of
13:10
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): 1986, the Miyakawa Report, produced by a commission. chaired by a former Bank of Japan governor, Haruo Mayakawa, told Japan formally and publicly to change course. Stop relying on exports, start consuming at home, spend more, build more,
13:30
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): borrow more.
13:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): The policy made sense as far as it went.
13:35
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
13:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Endaka recession was real, and the stimulus was evident. aimed at a real problem. What nobody in the spring of 1987 had fully reckoned with was where all that cheap money was going to go. In a system where the banks had lending quotas, the best corporate borrowers had left, and the
13:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): collateral sitting underneath everything was land that had already been rising for years.
14:03
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): By
14:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the summer of nineteen eighty seven, some people inside the Bank of Japan had begun to feel uneasy. Asset prices were rising faster than the economy could explain.
14:15
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
14:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): share market was climbing steeply, land prices in the cities were accelerating. The bank signaled, in terms that were public enough to be noticed, that it was considerable. considering raising rates.
14:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Then, on the 19th of October, 1987, the stock market in New York fell 23% in a single day. Black Monday.
14:43
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
14:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): shock moved instantly Constantly across every connected market in the world. Dealing rooms from Frankfurt to Hong Kong. watched their screens in something close to disbelief. The question everywhere was,
14:57
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): how
14:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): bad will it get? Is this the beginning of something larger?
15:03
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
15:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that climate of genuine global uncertainty, the Bank of Japan set aside its plans. Tightening could wait. International financial stability had to be come first. The rate stayed at two and a half percent.
15:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): It would stay there for twenty-seven months in total. Pause on that for a moment, because it is the hinge of the entire story.
15:30
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
15:30
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Bank of Japan's own analysts could see asset prices moving in ways that worried
15:36
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): them.
15:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Senior officials had said so. in public. The institution had reached, or nearly reached, a decision. And then an event 4,000 miles away in New York shelved it for two more years.
15:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Those two years were when the bubble truly inflated. Not cautiously, not gradually, violently.
16:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): To understand why the banks kept lending through all of this, why the money kept flowing regardless of whether anyone genuinely needed it, you have to understand the mechanism called window guidance.
16:14
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It
16:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): is not a colourful phrase, but what it describes was, in practice, extraordinary.
16:22
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
16:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Bank of Japan did not merely set the price of money through the interest rate.
16:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Every quarter it also told commercial banks how much they had to lend. Not suggested, required. Each major bank received a target, a percentage by which its loan book was expected to grow in the coming quarter. Banks that fell short were noticed.
16:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Banks that exceeded their targets were recognized.
16:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): The system was administered with the kind of quiet, relentless pressure that institutions that have operated in a certain way for a long time learn to apply without anyone having to raise their voice. Toshihiko Fukui, who ran the Bank of Japan's banking department during the
17:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): critical years from nineteen 1986 eighty six to nineteen 1989 eighty nine,
17:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): oversaw the administration of these quarterly quotas.
17:19
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
17:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): banks received their targets and they met them. That was how the system worked.
17:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Manager in Tokyo in 1987 could not simply call up Toyota and offer them money they had already raised more cheaply elsewhere.
17:43
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He
17:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): had to find other borrowers. He had to go looking.
17:47
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
17:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): so the banks looked. Property developers who wanted to expand their land holdings. Non-bank finance companies that would lend the money on in turn against more property. Small manufacturers and traders. who had modest balance sheets and real operations, but no particular
18:07
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): appetite for debt. These were the borrowers who remained, and the branch managers found them.
18:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Documented as having been recognized and rewarded within his institution for finding ways to, as he described it, stimulate demand for loans among businesses that had not come asking for them, creating the demand, manufacturing the appetite for credit that the quota required.
18:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And on the other side of those conversations, there were business owners like Kenichi Shigata, who ran a small metal plating factory.
18:50
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Shigeta
18:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Shigetta left
18:50
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
18:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): later described being pressed by bank managers to take loans his factory had no genuine use for.
19:12
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): By 1989, corporate and household borrowing across Japan was growing at close to fourteen percent a year. The system was doing what it had been designed to do. The money was moving. The question of whether it was moving toward genuinely productive purposes had stopped being
19:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): asked.
19:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Most of it was moving toward land.
19:37
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
19:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): land myth. the banking system's deep institutional conviction that urban land in Japan's major cities could not fall in value, was not a superstition born of ignorance. It was a conclusion drawn from forty years of unbroken experience. Since the reconstruction,
19:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): since the first years of the miracle, land in Tokyo and Osaka. and the other great cities had never declined. Not in one year out of all the years since the war. The data was clear, prices went up, they always had.
20:15
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
20:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): so the banks lent against land freely, up to a hundred percent of the appraised value of whatever parcel of land was being offered as collateral.
20:25
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Because
20:26
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): if land had not been never fallen, and there was no historical reason to believe it would, what was the risk?
20:33
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): What
20:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): followed was a loop, a very tight, very powerful, self reinforcing loop. Rising land prices increased the appraised value of existing collateral. A higher collateral value supported a larger loan. A larger loan could buy more. more land. More land
20:53
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): purchases pushed prices higher still.
20:56
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
20:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): higher prices increased the collateral value further.
21:00
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
21:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): larger collateral supported a larger loan, and around again and again, each turn of the wheel lifting the floor a little higher.
21:10
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
21:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the tax system made the loop even more powerful.
21:26
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And yet land was assessed for tax purposes at roughly half its market value, while debt was counted at full face value. which created a calculation that any accountant could see. If you borrowed heavily and bought land, the debt on your balance sheet reduced your taxable
21:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): estate pound for pound, while the land beneath you was valued at only half of what it would fetch on the market.
21:54
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
21:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): rational strategy to protect your heirs from an enormous tax bill was to borrow as much as possible and buy as much land as possible.
22:04
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
22:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): government had built, without quite intending to, an incentive machine that rewarded individuals for inflating the bubble, and rational people, responding to rational incentives, inflated it.
22:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Called land pinball. A bank would finance a developer buying a parcel of land for 50 million yen. Another bank would then finance a second developer buying that same parcel from the first at 60 million yen.
22:38
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A
22:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): month later, a third developer would buy it again, at 65 million yen, financed by yet another bank.
22:47
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
22:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): land was not being built on, it was not being improved.
22:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it was simply passing from hand to hand each transaction generating fees for the banks involved and setting a new price benchmark that made the next transaction a little easier to justify. The benchmark was the thing. Because every new transaction at a new
23:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): high price became the comparable that the next appraiser looked at when valuing the next piece of land for the next loan. The prices fed forward into the appraisals, and the appraisals fed forward into the loans, and the loans funded the next round of purchases at still higher prices.
23:32
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It
23:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): was during this period that someone did the mathematics on the most famous piece of land in Japan.
23:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): The Imperial Palace, sitting on 1.15 square kilometres in the heart of central Tokyo.
23:47
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): If
23:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you took the prevailing price per square meter in the city and multiplied it across the palace grounds, you arrived at a number that exceeded the estimated total value of all real estate in the state of California.
24:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): One irregular patch of central Tokyo, all the land in California, the same theoretical number.
24:10
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It
24:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): needs saying plainly, the palace was not for sale. Nothing of that kind was for sale, and nothing of that kind could ever have been transacted. It was a mathematical extrapolation, not a market price.
24:25
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You were
24:26
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): multiplied. multiplying an extreme per meter figure across a large area and arriving at an abstraction. But that the abstraction was possible, that you could write that sentence at all, tells you something very precise about where prices had gone.
24:44
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): While the land market did its work below, something strange was happening in the offices of Japan. Japan's great industrial corporations.
24:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Japanese companies in the late 1980s had superb credit ratings. The deregulation of the bond markets had given them access to international capital at very low cost. They could issue convertible bonds, bonds that could be exchanged for shares at a preset price, at almost
25:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): no net interest cost.
25:17
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): They
25:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): could issue bonds with share warrants attached, giving buyers the right to purchase stock at a future price, on similarly favorable terms.
25:28
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
25:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): money came in cheaply, and the companies had it to deploy.
25:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): The question was what to do with
25:35
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it. In
25:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): many boardrooms, the answer was to hand it to a securities broker and let them manage it actively. These arrangements were called token, specified money trust accounts, run by the brokerages that were handling the company's securities business.
25:55
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
25:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): broker would trade in equities and property on the company's behalf.
26:00
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
26:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): gains would flow back to the company as
26:02
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a
26:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): non-operating income, sitting alongside the revenue from making steel or chemicals or electronic components.
26:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): This practice had a name, Zitec, Financial Engineering, and it spread through corporate Japan with a speed that reflected how attractive the returns appeared to be.
26:24
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A
26:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): steel trading company called Honhua became famous and eventually notorious as the clearest example of where this could lead. Hanwa's financial trading income grew so large, and its actual steel trading business contributed so comparatively little that the company
26:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): had effectively become a leveraged investment fund that happened to have a steel operation attached. attached. Its president, Shigerito Okita, would eventually be forced to resign when the market turned, and the losses became undeniable.
27:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): But the deeper problem with Zitec was one that almost nobody was saying aloud.
27:08
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
27:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): profits that justified the share prices were being earned by buying shares.
27:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): A company's earnings looked strong, partly because its token account had made money in the stock market. But the stock market was rising, partly because companies' token accounts were buying into it.
27:28
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
27:29
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): whole thing was a circle. Remove any part of it, and the logic collapsed. Nobody at the time wanted to look directly at that.
27:41
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): By
27:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the late nineteen eighties, the texture of daily life in Tokyo had changed in ways that people who lived through it struggled later to explain to those who had not.
27:54
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
27:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Ginsa at midnight, businessmen Men on company expense accounts stood in the rain waving ten thousand yen notes to make taxes. taxis stop.
28:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Not because there were no taxis, because competition for a taxi in Ginsa after eleven at night was fierce, and waving money was how you announced, without having to say anything, that you were prepared to pay more than the person standing next to
28:20
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you.
28:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Gold Leaf had appeared on sushi, not as a rare indulgence, but as a standard. offering at the kind of restaurant where business was conducted. Coffee in certain establishments in the right parts of the city cost sums that would have been absurd anywhere else. The word for all of this
28:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): corporate entertaining was seti, and the sums spent on it were not marginal. They were enormous. Golf club memberships had been transformed into financial instruments. They traded on open exchanges like shares, with published prices that moved from day to
29:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): day.
29:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Companies bought them to entertain clients and carried them on their balance sheets as assets, as things of lasting and perhaps appreciating value, which at the time they appeared to
29:21
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): be.
29:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And then the trophy purchases, the acquisitions that became the image of the era in the international press.
29:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): In nineteen eighty seven, Yasuda Fire and Marine Insurance paid nearly forty million dollars. at auction for Vincent Van Gogh's sunflowers.
29:43
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
29:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): painting had never been sold for anything approaching that sum before. The purchase was widely noted in Japan as a sign of a rival, of a nation wealthy enough to buy the masterworks of Western civilization on its own terms.
30:01
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
30:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): October of nineteen. 1989, Mitsubishi Estate purchased a controlling stake in the Rockefeller Group in New York, including the Rockefeller Center itself, for something approaching $850 million.
30:17
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
30:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Rockefeller Center was not just a building. It was, to many Americans, a kind of civic monument, a symbol of American. ambition and grandeur in the heart of Manhattan.
30:31
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): At
30:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): almost the same moment, Sony purchased Columbia Pictures for approximately three point four billion dollars, plus the assumption of considerable additional debt. Columbia was Hollywood. It was American culture in a very particular and visible form.
30:51
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
30:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): American reaction was loud and in certain quarters genuinely frightened.
30:57
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
30:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): tenor of much of the commentary was that Japan had bought the soul of America, that the country was acquiring not just buildings and studios, but identity, that something fundamental was at stake.
31:11
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
31:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): hindsight, that reaction was overdone.
31:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): But it is also worth noting what it reveals. The alarm was only possible because people on both sides of the Pacific believed the Japanese ascent was permanent. Nobody was treating these purchases as the extravagances of a bubble that was about to burst. First. They were being treated
31:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): as the opening moves of an era.
31:40
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): In September of 1990, a Japanese developer named Minoru Esutani paid $841 million for Pebble Beach, the most famous golf course in America. Seventeen miles of California coastline, the site of the United States Open, one
32:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): of the most recognizable patches of turf in the world. sporting world.
32:05
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
32:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): prices paid for these things would later tell a different story. Esutani would sell Pebble Beach in February of 1992 for roughly $500 million,
32:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): a loss of more than $340 million dollars in under 18 months. Mitsubishi would walk away from the rock of Rockefeller Center in September of 1995, after the properties filed for bankruptcy protection, having absorbed losses reported at around six hundred
32:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): million dollars. Sony would write off two point seven billion dollars on Columbia Pictures in 1994.
32:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Sony Pictures, unlike the others, endured.
32:51
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It
32:52
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): remains part of the company today, and that is worth a sentence, because not every trophy was a pure disaster. But the overall picture of those years, of Japanese institutions pouring money into trophy assets at peak prices, is a picture of confidence that had crossed the line into
33:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): something else.
33:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Of all the stories this era produced, none captures what the bubble felt like from the inside quite as precisely as the story of Nui Onoue.
33:25
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): She
33:26
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): ran a restaurant in Osaka. She had come up through the hospitality world, had worked as a hostess before building her own establishment.
33:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): By the late 1980s, she was a woman in her sixties, small and quiet in manner, with a restaurant that had become, in financial circles, something more than a restaurant.
33:50
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
33:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): a back room of the establishment, she kept a ceramic toad, about a meter high, green, heavy, very still, and late at night, after the restaurant had closed and the regular customers had gone home, certain visitors would arrive.
34:08
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): They
34:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): came from Nomura Securities,
34:11
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): they
34:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): came from Yamichi Securities. They came most significantly from the Industrial Bank of Japan, which was then the most prestigious lending institution in the country. The industrial bank had been established by specifically to finance Japan's post war industrial
34:30
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): reconstruction. It did not take retail deposits, it lent to the great corporations of the nation. It was, in the vocabulary of Japanese finance, serious.
34:44
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
34:44
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): yet the senior executives of the Industrial Bank of Japan, alongside their counterparts from the country's leading brokerages, came to Nui Onoe's restaurant. They sat before the ceramic toad. They laid their hands on the toad's head while she chanted. And then they took her stock tips
35:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and went home and acted on
35:07
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): them.
35:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): This is not folklore. It is what was reported at the time and corroborated extensively during the investigations that followed. It was a real practice. It happened.
35:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Were good. In a world where equities went up every year, and the Nikkei was approaching. 39,000, a source of stock tips that had been consistently right was a source worth cultivating, regardless of the method.
35:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): The sums involved were, even by the standards of 1989 Tokyo, staggering.
35:57
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
35:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): loans that Nui Onoe had assembled, using a network of arrangements that had become increasingly elaborate, amounted at their peak to something in the region of $20 billion in total exposure. She was, reportedly, the largest individual shareholder in the industrial bank
36:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): of Japan itself.
36:19
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
36:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): most prestigious lender in the country was, in some notional sense, partly owned by an Osaka restaurateur.
36:28
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
36:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): source of the money was this. Branch managers at a small credit institution called Toyo Shinkin had been issuing forged certificates of deposit. Onaue used those certificates as collateral to borrow from other institutions. Those loans funded her positions
36:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): in Tokyo equities. The positions made money, which funded more borrowing, which funded more positions. It was a system that worked for as long as the market rose.
37:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): By 1991, the Industrial Bank of Japan alone had lent her 240 two hundred and forty billion yen. Twenty-nine Twenty nine other institutions had extended more than two thousand eight hundred billion yen between
37:19
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): them.
37:20
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): The total exposure across the whole network was close to two point seven seven trillion yen.
37:27
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): She
37:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): was arrested on the thirteenth of august nineteen ninety one. She was eventually sentenced to twelve years in prison. Toyo Shinkin was destroyed the industrial bank of Japan was badly damaged, its reputation for impeccable judgment among the first casualties of a crisis that would
37:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): take many more.
37:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): The serious point, the one to hold beyond the strangeness of the toad and the chanting, is this. The most respected bankers in Japan attended those ceremonies and took those tips because, for years,
38:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the returns were real.
38:05
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
38:06
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): bubble did not make people irrational, it made irrational seeming behavior produce rational outcomes. And that is a different thing entirely.
38:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): There was also a political dimension to the mania that mattered more than it might appear at first.
38:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): In 1988, investigators began looking into a company called Recruit.
38:33
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
38:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Recruit Group was a large media and services conglomerate, and its subsidiary, Recruit Cosmos, was preparing to float its shares publicly.
38:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Before the flotation, shares in Recruit Cosmos had been distributed at heavily discounted prices to people. politicians, cabinet ministers, and senior government bureaucrats.
38:56
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
38:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): recipients would make money automatically when the shares listed at their market price.
39:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): It was, in effect, a payment dressed as an investment opportunity, a reward Award for access and goodwill, structured so that no cash had to change hands directly.
39:16
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Finance Minister Kaiichi Miyasawa resigned on the 9th of December 1988.
39:23
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
39:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): scandal eventually brought down Prime Minister Noboru Takashita as well.
39:29
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
39:29
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): point to carry forward is not the mechanics of the scandal itself,
39:34
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it
39:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): is what it reveals about the people who were supposed to be watching the boom.
39:39
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
39:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): officials whose job it was to regulate the financial system, to notice when asset prices had detached from reality, to make the calls that cool an overheating economy had been personally invited inside the boom. Their financial interests and the continuation of the mania were,
40:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): for a period, the same interests.
40:03
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
40:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): regulator and the regulated were in the same trade.
40:09
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On
40:10
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the 1st of April 1989, a 3% national consumption tax came into force.
40:17
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It
40:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): was politically difficult and widely resented, but it was also, in retrospect, an acknowledgement by the government that it was a aware something needed to change.
40:32
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On
40:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the 22nd of December, 1989, the government passed the land basic law, formally establishing the principle that land was a social resource, and that speculation in it should be restrained. It was the right principle. It came very late.
40:52
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): December 1989. A new governor arrived at the Bank of Japan.
40:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yasushi Miyeno had been deputy governor since 1984. He had sat in the building throughout the entire inflation. He had watched the window guidance quotas push money into the market quarter by quarter.
41:13
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He had
41:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): been in the room when the tightening was. debated and shelved after Black Monday, and now he was in charge.
41:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Was necessary.
41:35
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He
41:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): had already been governor for less than three weeks when, on the twenty fifth of december nineteen eighty nine, the bank raised its official discount rate from three and three quarters to four and a quarter per cent. Four days later, on the twenty ninth, the Nikkei printed its all-time high.
41:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): That sequence is worth holding in mind.
41:59
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
42:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): rate was already rising when the market peaked. Mieno had not waited for the peak to act. He had begun before
42:08
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it.
42:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): What nobody yet knew was that the peak had just been made.
42:13
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
42:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): rate rises had actually begun under his predecessor.
42:20
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On
42:20
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the 30th of May 1989, the bank had lifted the rate from two and a half to three and a half. quarter percent, the first increase in nine years.
42:31
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On
42:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the eleventh of October to three and three quarters. Then Mieno's Christmas rise to four and a quarter.
42:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Then on the twentieth of March 1990, to five and a quarter per cent. And on the thirtieth of August 1990, nineteen ninety, with the government. Gulf crisis already unsettling markets worldwide, to six per cent.
42:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Five rises, two and a half percent to six percent in fifteen months.
43:03
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
43:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it was not the rate rises alone that broke the land market. Something more direct was needed for that.
43:13
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On
43:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the 27th of March 1990, the Ministry of Finance issued what was formerly known as the Total Lending Amount Regulation, an administrative order requiring banks to ensure that the growth of their property loans did not exceed the growth of their total loan portfolio.
43:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): In other words, if your total lending was growing at 8%, your property
43:38
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): is not a good thing.
43:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): lending could not grow faster than 8%.
43:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): The land market's oxygen supply was being cut.
43:47
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A
43:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): ministry official named Yoshimasa Nishimura later described the effect of the combined measures in an image that stayed with those who heard
43:57
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it.
43:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): It was, he said, like the lead car in a convoy, breaking high. hard at 90 miles an hour, with everything behind it piling in.
44:10
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Then, in July 1991, the Bank of Japan formally abolished Window Guidance, the quarterly lending quota system that had been forcing credit into the economy for decades.
44:22
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
44:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): mechanism that had loaded the gun was dismantled.
44:26
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Both Mieno and the ministry were celebrated at the time for the courage of the decision. The bubble had to come down. That much was clear to almost everyone. What was less clear was what the price of bringing it down would be.
44:43
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): There
44:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): is a harder reading of Mieno's choices, and it has only grown more prominent in the years since.
45:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Act on top of the ministry's hard cap on property lending, was the right calibration for deflating what needed deflating, or whether the combination was so severe it transformed a necessary correction into a 15 year crisis, is a question that has never been settled.
45:28
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
45:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Bank of Japan published its own careful retrospective on those years in 2001, written by three of its economists.
45:37
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It is
45:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): an institution examining its own decisions.
45:42
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It
45:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): is worth reading with that in mind.
45:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): It would not end the year anywhere near that number.
46:01
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
46:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): selling began in January, quietly at first, then gathering pace.
46:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Institutional investors who had built large equity positions were now facing a different calculation. Higher interest rates meant that the future earnings of companies, discounted back to their present value, were worth less than they had been, and the earnings themselves.
46:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): were under pressure. Companies that had been generating much of their profit through Zitech, through token accounts trading in a rising market, were watching those gains evaporate as the market fell. The profits that had justified the prices were disappearing along with the prices.
46:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Through the spring, the market continued largely. lower. Through the summer, as Mieno raised rates again to five and a quarter percent, the losses mounted.
47:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): By December of 1990, the NICKE
47:04
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): had
47:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): reached 21,900, a fall of more than 40% inside a single calendar year. Land held on a little longer.
47:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Prices peaked somewhere between 1990 and the middle of 1991, the exact timing varying by location and by type of property.
47:26
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
47:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the ministry's lending cap meant that the fuel for further rises had been cut off. Developers who needed to refinance found the banks could not help them. Sellers who needed buyers found the buyers could not get loans.
47:43
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
47:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): market did not crash overnight. It settled, and then it began a long, slow, heavy descent.
47:52
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
47:52
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): collapse was officially acknowledged in early 1992.
47:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): That year, Tokyo residential land fell 19% nineteen percent in twelve months. Commercial land in the city fell 13%.
48:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Prices had moved back to where they had been in 1987. Years of apparent gains collapsed within months of official recognition.
48:21
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): By
48:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the nineteenth of August, nineteen 1992, ninety-two, the Nikkei stood at 14,700. 14,338, from 38,915 to 14,338, a fall of nearly two-thirds from the peak.
48:40
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): As the market fell, a different kind of accounting began.
48:45
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
48:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): what it uncovered was uncomfortable in a way that went beyond the simple reality of falling. prices.
48:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Between nineteen ninety one and nineteen ninety three, investigations into the major securities houses revealed that the four biggest brokerages in Japan, Nomura, Yamichi, Nikko, and Daiwa, had for years been secretly compensating their most important corporate clients
49:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): When the market fell and a major client's portfolio lost money, funds were transferred quietly into their accounts to cover the damage.
49:27
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
49:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): arrangement was not written in contracts that anyone would show a regulator. But it was understood. It was within the industry a known practice.
49:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Ordinary retail investors had taken their losses in full. They had had no such arrangement. Nobody had offered to protect them. Nobody had told them that the protection existed for others.
49:53
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
49:53
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): total amounts involved in the documented compensation grew, as investigations continued, towards something approaching two billion dollars across the four firms. Hiroyasu Ishihara, a vice president at Yamichi, later acknowledged publicly that deregulation had
50:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): intensified competition so fiercely that the firm had engaged in the practice to hold on to its biggest clients.
50:22
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He
50:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): framed it as something the pressure of the market had made difficult to avoid.
50:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): The point to hold is not simply that the law was broken, though it was.
50:33
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
50:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): point is that there had been two markets operating simultaneously: one for the corporate clients who were protected from the downside, one for everyone else, and for as long as the boom lasted, the difference between the two had been invisible.
50:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Other things were surfacing at the same time.
50:55
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): At
50:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Dai Ichi Kangyo Bank, investigators found that the institution had extended hundreds of millions of yen in loans to a professional corporate racketeer named Ryuichi Koike. Koik's Koike's business was the Sokaya, Sokaia, the practice of threatening to disrupt a company's.
51:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): shareholder meeting unless paid to stay quiet. Several bank executives were arrested in connection with the loans.
51:23
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
51:24
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): former chairman of Dai Ichi Kangyo died in 1997. These events deserve to be stated plainly and without embellishment.
51:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): The question that defines the following decade is not why the bubble burst. Bubbles always burst when the mechanism that inflates them loses pressure. The real question, the harder one, is why Japan could not recover.
51:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): The answer begins with the JUCEN.
51:55
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
51:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Juicen were specialist housing loan companies, established in the 1970s by the major commercial banks.
52:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Their original purpose had been to handle residential mortgages, freeing the banks to concentrate on corporate lending.
52:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Market. They needed somewhere else to go. They found property developers. and they lent, without the regulatory constraints that applied to the banks themselves, against land that was rising every year, and would, everyone believed, keep rising.
52:45
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Their
52:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): loan books consisted almost entirely of loans secured against assets that were
52:50
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): not.
52:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): now worth a fraction of the money lent against them.
52:54
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
52:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): borrowers could not repay.
53:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Seven of the largest Juicen were wound up between 1995 and 1996.
53:09
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
53:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): government committed 680 billion yen of public money to assist in the liquidation. That 680 billion was the taxpayers' share of a much larger whole. The visible portion of total Juicen losses that ran far higher. But
53:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): 680 billion yen was what went into the budget, and the public knew
53:34
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it.
53:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): The political reaction was fierce. It was the first time Japanese citizens had been asked directly to pay for failures in the financial system. There were protests, there was sustained opposition in the legislature. The word that described the mood was fury, and the fury was not
53:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): irrational. People who had never borrowed recklessly, who had saved carefully and built modest lives were being told that their taxes would cover losses run up by institutions lending to speculators.
54:10
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
54:10
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that fury produced a consequence that would cost Japan far, far more than the Juice themselves had.
54:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Because the politicians who had absorbed the public's reaction to the Juice Juicen and bailout did not want to face it again, and the banking system needed a far larger rescue than anything the Juicen had required.
54:32
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
54:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): balance sheets of the major commercial banks were full of bad loans, loans extended against land that was now worth half or a third of what the loans had been written for, loans to developers who could not sell, to companies that could not generate enough revenue to service the debt.
54:52
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
54:52
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): true scale of the bank's losses was already, by the mid-1990s, becoming visible to anyone who looked carefully.
55:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): But looking carefully was politically difficult, and acting on what you saw was, given the public's reaction to the juice, JuiceN politically nearly impossible.
55:14
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
55:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the full reckoning was delayed for years, and the delay is why the lost decade lasted a decade.
55:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): What filled those years in place of recovery was zombie lending.
55:28
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A
55:29
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): bank that cannot afford to admit the true state of its balance sheet faces a terrible choice. If it recognizes its bad loans as bad, its capital ratios fall. Regulators may intervene. Shareholders will panic. Depositors in the worst case might lose
55:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): confidence.
55:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): The alternative is to not recognize the losses, to roll the loans over.
55:56
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): When
55:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): a borrower cannot make a payment, the bank extends the loan for another year, renegotiates the
56:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): terms, agrees to accept less, does whatever is needed to keep the loan technically current rather than formally in default.
56:13
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
56:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): borrower, who cannot in truth repay, remains technically alive.
56:19
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
56:20
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): bank's books, inspected at a distance, appear less damaged than they are.
56:26
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): This approach has a cost that does not show up on a balance sheet. Every yen tied up in a rolled-over loan to a company that cannot repay it is a yen that cannot go to a different borrower, a new business trying to get started, a healthy manufacturer that needs to upgrade its equipment,
56:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): an entrepreneur who has a genuine idea and a real plan.
56:52
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Those borrowers went to the banks and were turned away, not because they were bad risks, but because the bank's capacity was silently consumed by the losses they had refused to acknowledge. The healthy parts of the economy, the parts that might have generated growth and employment and recovery, were
57:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): being starved of capital by the dead weight of the bubble. bubble's unpaid debts.
57:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Deflation set in, not explosive or catastrophic, but persistent, year after year of mildly falling prices, mildly rising real debt burdens, marginally reduced incentive to invest or hire or build.
57:35
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A
57:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): low low-grade grade illness that the body of the economy could not shake because the treatment required more political courage than the moment could produce.
57:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): November 1997. Three weeks that made everything else worse.
57:53
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): By
57:53
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): then it was seven years since the peak. The NICKE UK
57:57
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): had
57:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): not recovered. Land values were still sliding. The banking system had been nursing. its hidden losses for the better part of a decade. And in three weeks in November, the weight became too much to carry.
58:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): When it went down, it defaulted on its obligations in the interbank call market, the short term lending market, where financial institutions lend money to each other overnight to manage their daily cash needs. It is the circulatory system of any banking sector. Without it
58:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): everything ceases.
58:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Sanyo's default was the first in that market since the end of the war.
58:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Not since nineteen forty five. had a Japanese institution failed to return money borrowed overnight in the interbank market.
58:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): The institutions that had lent to Sanyo did not get their money back, and in the days that followed, the most dangerous thing possible in a banking system happened, quietly and invisibly.
59:11
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
59:12
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): banks began to look at each other differently, If Sanyo could default on an overnight loan, who else might? The trust that allows institutions to lend to each other routinely, without extensive collateral or negotiation, that trust began to thin.
59:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Fourteen days later, on the 17th seventeenth of November, Hokido Takushoku Bank collapsed. Hokido Takushoku was one of Japan's major city banks. It was one of the institutions that the entire post-war architecture had been built to protect.
59:50
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
59:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Ministry of Finance's core promise that no bank would be allowed to fail had held for forty years. Hokido Takushoku had bad property loans it could no longer conceal. and the government did not step in.
1:00:06
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
1:00:06
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): bank failed.
1:00:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): The guarantee was gone. The floor had opened. And then, on the twenty 24th fourth of November, Yamichi securities. announced that it was shutting down.
1:00:30
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yamichi was a hundred years old. It was one of the four largest brokerages in the country. For generations, it had been as much a part of Japanese financial life as the exchange itself. And now something had been found in its accounts. More than 260 billion
1:00:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): yen of losses had been moved off the balance sheet into arrangements designed to make them invisible.
1:00:57
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
1:00:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): practice of hiding losses this way was called tobashi. The total debts that came to light were reported at around $26 billion.
1:01:08
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
1:01:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): numbers were large. But what stayed in Japan's memory was not the numbers.
1:01:15
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): At
1:01:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the press conference on the day of the announcement, Yamichi's president, Shohei Nozawa, wept.
1:01:23
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He
1:01:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): stood at the microphones in front of the cameras, and he wept.
1:01:28
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He
1:01:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): said his employees had done nothing wrong. He asked the public not to blame them. A man in a dark suit in front of a bank of microphones.
1:01:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): in tears, asking not to blame the people who worked for
1:01:43
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): him.
1:01:44
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Those images were broadcast across Japan. They were shown again and again, and they became the photograph of the crisis.
1:01:54
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Of
1:01:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): a century-old institution ending not with anger or defiance, but with grief and apology. Of a system that had believed itself unbreakable discovering in public that it was not.
1:02:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yamichi's creditors would hold their final meeting in 2005, eight years after the firm had closed its doors.
1:02:18
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
1:02:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the international money markets, something called the Japan Premium had appeared. Banks in New York and London.
1:02:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): were charging Japanese institutions a surcharge to borrow overnight, because nobody in the international market believed the published balance sheets of Japanese banks anymore. If the accounts were unreliable, the risk of lending had to be priced accordingly. Japan, which had been a
1:02:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): byword for financial solidity for decades, was paying. a premium for its own opacity.
1:02:54
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It
1:02:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): should be said that these events were not happening in isolation. Japan's banking failures in November 1997 were unfolding at the same time as the broader East Asian financial crisis, which was sweeping through Thailand, South Korea, and Indonesia that year, and the two crises.
1:03:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): fed each other in ways that made both worse.
1:03:20
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): The rescue, when it finally came at sufficient scale, was enormous.
1:03:27
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
1:03:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): October of 1998, the Financial Revitalization Law was passed. Two major institutions, the Long Term Credit Bank of Japan and Nippon. Credit Bank, were declared insolvent and placed under government receivership. Nationalized, the government
1:03:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): injected 1.815 trillion yen of public capital into the banking system in 1998.
1:03:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Then, in March of 1999, a further 7.6% 7.659 trillion yen.
1:04:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Zero interest rates followed, as the Bank of Japan pushed the cost of money as low as it could go in an effort to encourage lending and spending.
1:04:15
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
1:04:16
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): strategy had a certain circularity to it. The ultra-low rates that had inflated the bubble were now being deployed in a different context and for different reasons. to clean up after it.
1:04:29
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
1:04:30
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): cleanup of the bad loan portfolios ground on through the early 2000s. A body called the Resolution and Collection Corporation bought and liquidated the toxic assets.
1:04:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): By 2004, prime commercial land in central Tokyo had fallen. more than 90% from its peak. That figure is specific. It refers to the most expensive land in the most expensive district of the city, and it should be understood as such.
1:05:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Nationwide average land prices had fallen far more modestly.
1:05:09
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
1:05:10
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): bubble had concentrated its excesses in the most visible, most expensive.
1:05:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): places, and those places paid the most extreme price.
1:05:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): What is harder to put into a number and more important to name is what happened to a generation of people.
1:05:29
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): From roughly the early 1990s through the mid-2000s, 2000s, young people left schools and universities into a job market. that had simply closed. Companies managing their way through the long aftermath were not hiring for permanent positions. The lifetime employment
1:05:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): system, which had been one of the defining features of post-war Japanese working life, was contracting sharply and would not return to what it had been. Temporary contracts and part-time arrangements were
1:06:02
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): not.
1:06:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the employment that remained, if anything was available at all.
1:06:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): These years produced what Japan came to call the employment ice age generation. Young people who should have begun careers in those years and built working lives. Many of them never obtained a permanent contract. The savings never accumulated. the families were not
1:06:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): formed, because the financial security that forms the foundation of those decisions never arrived. The effects on Japan's birth rate, on the distribution of income across generations, on the lifetime earnings of a specific cohort of the population are still being counted.
1:06:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): A generation is a long time to pay for something. that happened before it had any say in the matter.
1:06:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Nationwide land prices did not rise year on year again until 2018.
1:07:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Twenty-seven years of decline or stagnation in the asset that had been held as unshakable institutional conviction to be the safest thing in the country.
1:07:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And then, on the 22nd of February, 2024, after three decades of trading, falling, recovering slowly, trading again below the level, the NICKE closed at 39,098.68, above 38,915.87 Nine hundred and fifteen point eight
1:07:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): seven for the first time in 34 thirty-four years.
1:07:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): A whole working life, from the last trading day of nineteen eighty-nine to the twenty-second of February, twenty twenty four, an entire generation of working years had passed.
1:07:53
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): There is a popular account of how this happened. America forced the yen upward at the Plaza Hotel. Japan cut rates to cushion its export. exporters. The cheap money went into land and shares. The bubble inflated, and then it burst.
1:08:11
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): That
1:08:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): account is not wrong. But it is incomplete, and the incompleteness matters.
1:08:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Tokyo land had already been rising sharply before the Plaza Accord was signed. Residential land in the
1:08:37
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
1:08:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Endaka recession was real, but the mania had already started before the yen began to move.
1:08:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Richard Werner, who studied the period closely, argued that the real engine of the bubble was not the exchange rate, and not even the discount rate. It was the Bank of Japan's own window guidance, the quarterly credit quota system that ordered banks to lend specific volumes of money
1:09:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): regardless of whether productive uses for that money existed. On that reading, the external agreements at the Plaza Hotel and the Louvre were. context. The mechanism was domestic. The Bank of Japan had built and operated the machine that inflated the bubble, and then it had turned it off very
1:09:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): hard.
1:09:26
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Adam Posen, approaching the same evidence from a different angle, argued that the Plaza Accord was neither necessary nor sufficient to explain what followed.
1:09:38
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
1:09:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): bubble had its own domestic logic, its own self reinforcing structure that would have found a way to inflate under similar conditions, regardless of the precise path of the Yen.
1:09:52
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Both readings contain something true, and neither settles the question entirely.
1:09:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): What is certain is this. Every individual decision in this story was rational, rational given the incentives the system had built.
1:10:16
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
1:10:16
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): corporate treasurer had cheap money from a warrant bond issue, and shareholders expecting returns. The family facing an inheritance tax bill. had a tax code that made heavy borrowing against land the mathematically sound strategy for protecting their children.
1:10:35
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
1:10:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): property developer had a bank on the telephone offering a loan at 100% of the land's appraised value, and a land market that had not fallen in living memory.
1:10:46
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
1:10:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): securities broker had token accounts to manage and a client base that expected.
1:10:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): gains.
1:10:52
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
1:10:52
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): senior banker attending late night ceremonies in Osaka had seen the portfolio behind those ceremonies produce real returns year after year for as long as the market had been rising.
1:11:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Each decision, taken alone, made sense. Each person was responding to the incentives placed in front of them by the system. they inhabited. Together, those decisions produced the largest asset bubble in the history of the world.
1:11:24
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Whether that makes what happened inevitable, whether it makes the individuals blameless, whether it means that a system of incentives can bear a moral weight that no single actor can be held solely responsible for. is something we will let you be the judge of that.
1:11:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Leave your thoughts in the comments. Join us next week for another story from the dark side of the markets, and sleep well tonight.
This page was produced automatically: the audio was transcribed with nvidia/parakeet-tdt-0.6b-v3+sortformer-v2.1 and interpreted by Qwen3.6-35B-A3B-UD-IQ3_S.gguf. Transcription and interpretation can contain errors; always confirm against the original episode. Nothing here is investment advice.
All insights