Eddie Perkin discusses cognitive biases, decision-making frameworks, and the importance of process over performance in investing.
Summary
Eddie Perkin and host Bogumil Baranowski explore how cognitive biases like conformity and the endowment effect distort investment decisions. Perkin advocates for zero-based portfolio rebuilds, using AI as a devil's advocate, and writing down decisions to combat hindsight bias. The discussion covers the limitations of passive investing efficiency, the dangers of groupthink in investment teams, and the necessity of disciplined exit strategies. Perkin shares a personal mistake involving NVIDIA to illustrate the risks of heuristic bias and emphasizes that success lies in the rigor of the process rather than just the outcome.
Key takeaways
- 1 Using starter positions allows investors to act on incomplete information while retaining the flexibility to adjust or exit quickly, reducing the opportunity cost of waiting for 100% certainty.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) · 26:27
Episode sections
- 0:00 – 3:59
Conformity and Cognitive Bias
Speaker_0 uses a 'Face the Rear' candid camera sketch to illustrate how humans naturally conform to social cues, even when it is illogical. He argues that investors must acknowledge these inherent biases to overcome them, noting that mental shortcuts can be beneficial but costly if applied incorrectly.
- 3:59 – 12:40
Career Origins and Compounding
Speaker_0 recounts opening a $50 Bank of America passbook savings account in the late 1970s that yielded 4% interest, sparking his interest in compounding. He later re-engaged with investing after reading about Warren Buffett and Berkshire Hathaway, leading to his career at Goldman Sachs Asset Management.
- 12:40 – 17:06
Morningstar's 'Mind the Gap' Study
Speaker_0 cites Morningstar's annual 'Mind the Gap' study, which shows a performance gap between reported fund returns and actual investor returns due to behavioral biases like buying high and selling low. He notes this gap exists across asset classes but is particularly pronounced in growth funds.
- 17:06 – 22:09
Zero-Based Portfolio Rebuild
Speaker_0 defines the endowment effect as overvaluing existing holdings and recommends a 'zero-based portfolio rebuild' as a remedy. This involves treating the portfolio as 100% cash and rebuilding it from scratch based on current guidelines, rather than tweaking existing positions, to avoid anchoring bias.
- 22:09 – 24:36
AI as a Devil's Advocate
Speaker_0 describes using AI to challenge his investment theses by prompting it to act as a critic. He applied this to Nike, where AI provided arguments against the stock that led him to trim his position, although he notes the stock has performed poorly since.
- 24:36 – 30:20
Decision-Making with 70% Information
Speaker_0 references Jeff Bezos's 2016 Amazon shareholder letter, advocating for decisions with 70% of desired information to avoid analysis paralysis. He suggests using starter positions in liquid markets to mitigate the risk of acting on incomplete data.
- 30:20 – 32:15
Desert Island Exercise and Quality Investing
Speaker_0 describes using a 'desert island' thought experiment during the 2008 financial crisis to shift focus from valuation to long-term quality, moats, and balance sheets. This exercise helped the team identify companies that would be stronger and healthier after a seven-year hold, setting aside near-term noise.
- 32:15 – 37:14
Texas Roadhouse CEO and Shareholder Pressure
Speaker_1 introduces a story about Texas Roadhouse's CEO refusing to cut costs by using frozen chicken, prioritizing customer experience over short-term margins. Speaker_0 contrasts this with Procter & Gamble and Pepsi, arguing that companies often degrade products to meet short-term shareholder expectations, whereas Amazon reinvests for long-term gains.
- 37:14 – 41:03
Mountaineering Metaphor and Exit Discipline
Speaker_1 references Ed Viesturs' book, noting that 'getting to the top is optional, getting down is mandatory.' Speaker_0 applies this to investing, criticizing the lack of process around selling stocks compared to buying. He advocates for Benjamin Graham's time rule (2-3 years) as a disciplined exit strategy if an idea fails to materialize.
- 41:03 – 42:12
Leaders and Laggards Report
Speaker_0 details a weekly 'Leaders and Laggards report' used to force conversations about portfolio performance. By tracking top and bottom performers over 3, 6, and 12 months, the team was compelled to evaluate whether to hold, add to, or sell positions based on thesis integrity rather than rigid rules.
- 42:12 – 44:53
Passive Investing and Market Efficiency
Speaker_1 observes that stocks can remain neglected for long periods before correcting sharply, attributing this to passive investing. Speaker_0 expresses skepticism that passive assets lead to market efficiency, citing Joel Stern's 'lead steer' theory: a few active managers set prices, while others follow, meaning markets can still be inefficient in neglected stocks.
- 44:53 – 51:12
Connect 4 and Groupthink
Speaker_0 recounts watching a team game of Connect 4 where one team lost because all four players shared a blind spot, illustrating groupthink. He argues that investment teams need diversity of thought and perspective to avoid collective errors, as relying on teammates to catch mistakes can lead to missed obvious opportunities.
- 51:12 – 56:16
Anonymous Voting and Hierarchy
Speaker_1 notes that open voting at Eaton Vance rarely showed objections, but anonymous voting revealed dissent. Speaker_0 explains that anonymous voting (writing yes/no on paper) encouraged genuine disagreement, which he viewed as a sign of thorough analysis, whereas open voting led to conformity and 'yes-man' behavior.
- 56:16 – 1:08:15
Observer Effect in Investment Meetings
Speaker_0 describes excluding salespeople from investment meetings to prevent the 'observer effect,' where analysts perform for an audience rather than engaging in rigorous debate. He argues that larger groups dilute the quality of discussion, as participants become nervous or pull punches, turning meetings into shows rather than critical evaluations.
Assets discussed
| Asset | Kind | Stance | Context |
|---|---|---|---|
| BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INCBRK-B | equity | bullish | And there was a very dramatic stock chart in the newspaper showing how well he had done at the helm of uh Berkshire Hathaway. |
| AmazonAMZN | equity | neutral | And if they were, think about Amazon. We talked about Amazon earlier. There are plenty of times uh over the years where Amazon has not allowed profits to drop to the bottom line because they reinvested in the business or undertook some new initiative. And maybe initially the investor base didn't like it. But eventually investors figured out and Amazon got the investor base they deserve, which is long term oriented people who want to see the company reinvest in its business. |
| NVIDIANVDA | equity | neutral | Well, the company I'm talking about is NVIDIA, and it's up 35-fold since the day I reached that conclusion not to buy the stock. |
“Stance” is how the speakers talked about the asset, not a recommendation.
Claims worth verifying
Speaker_0 opened a Bank of America passbook savings account in the late 1970s with $50, earning 4% interest.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·5:54
How to verify: Speaker biography or autobiography; verify 4% interest rates for US savings accounts in the late 1970s via Federal Reserve historical data. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
An independent study found much of Speaker_0's outperformance at Goldman Sachs came from knowing when to sell.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·4:18
How to verify: Search for independent performance attribution studies of Goldman Sachs Asset Management funds managed by Eddie Perkin during his tenure (1990s-2000s) via fund fact sheets or third-party research archives. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Morningstar publishes an annual study called 'Mind the Gap' showing the difference between fund returns and investor returns.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·12:40
How to verify: Search Morningstar's website for 'Mind the Gap' annual reports; verify the methodology and data in their published research. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Jeff Bezos stated in the 2016 Amazon shareholder letter that most decisions should be made with around 70% of the information.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·24:36
How to verify: Access the 2026 Amazon Shareholder Letter on Amazon's Investor Relations page; verify the specific quote regarding decision-making and 70% information. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Speaker_0 trimmed his Nike position after using AI to identify arguments against the stock.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·23:31
How to verify: Speaker_0's LinkedIn posts or blog entries from 2026-2026 discussing his Nike investment and AI usage; verify Nike's stock performance post-trim via market data. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Speaker_0 was CIO of Equity at Eaton Vance overseeing $75 billion.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·3:59
How to verify: Eaton Vance (now part of T. Rowe Price) press releases or SEC Form ADV filings listing Eddie Perkin as CIO of Equity and assets under management. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceSpeaker_0 mentors students at the Babson College Fund.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·4:38
How to verify: Babson College website or Babson College Fund annual reports listing Eddie Perkin as a mentor or advisor. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Speaker_0's book 'Running Against the Herd' covers 15 cognitive biases.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·4:38
How to verify: Purchase or review the table of contents and index of 'Running Against the Herd' by Eddie Perkin. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Speaker_0 read an article about Warren Buffett and Berkshire Hathaway at age 24 that reconnected him with investing.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·7:21
How to verify: Speaker biography or interview archives; verify age timeline against birth year if available. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Speaker_0 used AI to critique his Nike thesis and received 5-6 bullet points, some of which were hallucinations or consensus views.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·23:11
How to verify: Speaker_0's social media posts or blog posts detailing the specific AI prompt and output regarding Nike. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Lehman Brothers went under in the summer of 2008, triggering the global financial crisis.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·30:20
How to verify: SEC EDGAR filings (e.g., 8-K) from Lehman Brothers or historical news archives from September 2008. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceTexas Roadhouse CEO refused to use frozen chicken instead of fresh chicken to cut costs.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·32:35
How to verify: Texas Roadhouse investor relations materials, annual reports, or reputable news articles covering the company's operational decisions. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Procter & Gamble could reformulate Tide's chemical composition to save on raw materials.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·35:09
How to verify: Procter & Gamble SEC filings (10-K, 10-Q) or press releases regarding product formulation changes. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourcePepsi reduces the number of potato chips in bags instead of raising prices.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·35:57
How to verify: PepsiCo SEC filings or consumer reports/analyses on snack food portion sizes. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceEd Viesturs wrote a book stating 'getting to the top is optional, getting down is mandatory.'
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·37:29
How to verify: Publication of Ed Viesturs' book 'Never Give an Inch' or verified interviews/quotes from the author. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Benjamin Graham had a rule to hold stocks for two to three years before admitting error.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·40:41
How to verify: Benjamin Graham's book 'The Intelligent Investor' or 'Security Analysis' for discussions on holding periods and error recognition. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Joel Stern was a professor at Columbia Business School.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·44:06
How to verify: Columbia Business School faculty directory or alumni records. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Connect 4 is a solved game where the first player can force a win by starting in the center column.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·45:49
How to verify: Mathematical proofs or computer science databases on solved games (e.g., G4WIN project results for Connect Four). For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Speaker_0 recommends against screening for short-term or three-year performance in investment consulting.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·1:01:00
How to verify: This is a subjective recommendation/opinion. It can be verified by checking the transcript text for the speaker's stated preference for process over performance metrics. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Speaker_0 claims NVIDIA stock was up 35-fold since March 2018 when he decided not to buy it.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·1:03:44
How to verify: Verify NVIDIA (NVDA) stock price in March 2026 versus its price on the verification date (2026-11-16) or the date of the podcast recording. Calculate the ratio of the later price to the earlier price. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceSpeaker_0 states he dismissed NVIDIA in March 2018 due to its new glass headquarters and a bright green neon Formula One race car in the lobby.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·1:02:57
How to verify: Verify NVIDIA's corporate history for a new headquarters built around 2026. Search for internal NVIDIA newsletters or news reports from 2026-2026 mentioning a neon F1 car in the lobby to confirm the anecdote's details. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceSpeaker_0 mentions NVIDIA was exposed to video games and crypto mining.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·1:03:44
How to verify: Check NVIDIA's SEC filings (e.g., 10-K) from 2026-2026 for revenue breakdowns by segment, specifically looking for 'Gaming' and 'Data Center' (which includes crypto mining hardware) revenues. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceSpeaker_1 references a Morningstar research study regarding retail investor behavior.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·1:01:41
How to verify: Search Morningstar's research database or publications for studies on retail investor performance, specifically those discussing chasing top-performing funds or momentum effects. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Speaker_0 states he holds public confessions of mistakes every January with his team.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·1:02:18
How to verify: This is a personal practice claim. It can be verified by checking Eddie Perkin's LinkedIn profile, Babson College Fund activities, or previous interviews where he discusses his team's culture and annual rituals. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Speaker_0 claims the human mind suffers from hindsight bias and outcome bias when relying on memory for decision review.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·1:05:25
How to verify: This is a psychological assertion. It can be verified by referencing academic literature on cognitive biases, such as works by Daniel Kahneman or Thomas Gilovich, which document hindsight and outcome bias in human memory. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Do your own research
- Verify Morningstar's 'Mind the Gap' study data on investor vs fund returns across different asset classes.
- Review Jeff Bezos's 2016 Amazon shareholder letter for the '70% information' decision-making framework.
- Check Joel Stern's 'lead steer' theory on market efficiency and active manager influence.
- Examine Texas Roadhouse's (TXRH) financial reports and investor communications regarding cost-cutting vs brand equity decisions.
- Analyze NVIDIA's (NVDA) stock performance and corporate spending history around March 2018 to assess heuristic bias risks.
- Review Benjamin Graham's writings on holding periods and exit discipline for the 2-3 year rule.
- Investigate the use of anonymous voting in investment committees to identify potential groupthink dynamics.
- Read Ed Viesturs' books on mountaineering for the 'getting down is mandatory' philosophy applied to risk management.
Full transcriptexpand
- 0:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): You're making me think of an old uh candid camera episode. Uh you can find it on YouTube. It's called Face the Rear. That show, for those who don't remember, was a a hidden camera and it was it was a comedy show. So you they they trick people, they'd prank people. And in this one from
- 0:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 0:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): think it was early sixties, they would have actors who were working with the uh candid camera team enter an office elevator and face in the wrong direction, away from the door. And then uh an unsuspecting uh target of theirs would inevitably enter the elevator, see these people standing in the wrong direction, have a look of confusion on
- 0:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): their face, and then eventually turn and face the wrong direction themselves. And you watch that and you think, I would never do that. That that's ridiculous. Um, there's an obvious way you should face in an elevator, and why would you do that? And I think a lot of people have that feeling that I would never do this. And you you see all these different social experiments and the the uh behavioral
- 0:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): bias experiments that have been done over the years, and you and you think to yourself, I would never do that. But I think the reality is we would, most of us would. You're almost obstinate at that point, you're antisocial if you're gonna you know be that independent uh in the way you think. Um, we are social beings, we want to get along, so conformity and uh those sorts of things are natural.
- 1:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): They help us uh have relationships with other people. So I think the yeah, the point of that is you gotta acknowledge it to yourself. But once you do, then you can start to look for ways to overcome it. And I think one of the themes, themes of running against the herd is there are positives and negatives, there's a yin and a yang uh that comes from each of these mental shortcuts. They serve
- 1:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): as well in many cases, but used or applied in the wrong situation. they can get you into a lot of trouble. And for investors, it can cost you a lot of money if you allow these mental shortcuts or heuristics to dictate how you make your decisions.
- 1:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Welcome to Talking Billions. We talk about big ideas. big inspirations, big topics. We take on the hardest topic of all money. How to make it, save it, keep it. But our conversations lead us to an even bigger question what it means to live a rich life beyond money. My guests share their practices,
- 2:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): principles, and evergreen wisdom. I'm your host, Bogomil Varanowski, author, TEDx speaker, and investor. investment advisor to wealth creators with patient capital and an infinite investment horizon. I work with families and individuals who aspire to grow wealth over a lifetime and generations through disciplined,
- 2:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): thoughtful investments in durable quality businesses, while giving money, meaning. Join me on this quest to unearth and share the wisdom of the ages. Let me share with you the podcast. program disclosure statement. Blue Infinites Capital LSC is a registered investment advisor, and the opinions expressed by the firm's employees and podcast
- 2:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): guests on the show are their own and do not reflect the opinions of Blue Infinites Capital. All the statements and opinions expressed are based upon information considered reliable, although it should not be relied upon as such. Any statements or opinions are subject to change without notice. The information presented is for educational purposes only and does not intend to
- 3:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): make an offer or solicitation for the sale or purchase of any specific securities, investments, or investment strategies. Investments involve risk and unless otherwise stated, are not guaranteed. The information expressed does not take into account your specific situation or objectives and is not intended as recommendations appropriate for any individual.
- 3:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Listeners are encouraged to seek advice from a qualified tax, legal, or investment advisor to determine whether any information presented may be suitable for their specific situation. Past performance is not indicative of future performance. None of what you're about to hear is investment advice. My guest today is
- 3:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Eddie Perkin. He believes that Investor's Edge is a known isn't knowing more than everyone else, but deciding better with what you already know. And that starts with admitting we're all unbiased. He was CIO of equity at Eton Benz, overseeing $75 billion in client assets, and before that, CIO for
- 4:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): International and Emerging Markets Equity at Goldman Sachs Asset Management, where an independent study found that much of his funds' outperformance. came from knowing when to sell. Today he mentors students at the Babson College Fund, and his new book, Running Against the Herd, turns 15 cognitive biases and the problem of group
- 4:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): thing into practical tools any team can use. Eddie, how are you? So nice to see you.
- 4:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I'm great. Thanks for having me on.
- 4:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I really enjoyed your book. It's a very humbling read.
- 4:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Where after investing money for wealthy families for the last 20 years, I'm still poking holes in how I think. And reading your book made me realize there's room for improvement. There are certain things that I still do. Before I asked you about the book, which I really enjoyed, I want to ask you about the early days, childhood upbringing, Bringing and how you think that time
- 5:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): shaped you.
- 5:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I was interested in investing in business from an unusually early age. My parents are British. They emigrated to the U.S. when I was seven years old. We settled initially in Houston, Texas. And I can remember sitting in the backseat of the family station wagon, this big, ugly, brunt
- 5:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): used brown Gran Torino station wagon with my father in the driver's seat. This is in the late 1950s. 1970s, so inflation was very much in the news. And I can remember asking my father as a young child, what is inflation? What are interest rates? What's going on with the economy? Not your normal questions for a seven or eight-year-old child.
- 5:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And uh
- 5:54
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it
- 5:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): was around that time I opened my first uh savings account. I had about $50, fifty dollars my life savings at the time, and I opened a Bank of America pay. Passbook savings account. The interest rate, the yield on the account was four percent. And I got quarterly statements in the mail. And I remember that first quarterly statement being excited to receive a piece of mail and opening it up and
- 6:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): seeing that my account balance was now fifty dollars and fifty cents. I'd earned about fifty cents of interest and just thinking that was the coolest thing uh that my money without me doing anything, my money had earned money on my behalf. And I knew that next time I got a statement, not only would the 50, the original $50 principal be earning money, but I'd now be earning
- 6:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): a little bit of interest on the on the interest. And so that concept of compounding really clicked with me early
- 6:41
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): on. Um,
- 6:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I also I I remember as a teenager watching Wall Street Week with Lewis Ruchaiser uh with my father. It was on Friday nights on PBS. I enjoyed that. And uh my friend down the street had a new TV service uh where he could watch movies in his home. And uh we didn't have it at my house, but I went over there a lot and uh I told my dad I want to buy
- 7:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): HBO stock uh because uh it seemed like uh a good uh a good service. Um I went to uh UC Santa Barbara, studied economics, was in the investment club there, but when I graduated, I didn't really know what I wanted to do for a career. I went to work initially for the family business. Uh, and it wasn't until I was about 24
- 7:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): years old that I read an article about Warren Buffett and Berkshire Hathaway. And there was a very dramatic stock chart in the newspaper showing how well he had done at the helm of uh Berkshire Hathaway. And that got me reconnected with investing and made me realize this isn't just a passing interest, but it can be a career. So I I got very focused. at that time and uh
- 7:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): eventually moved to New York to go to business school and then joined Goldman Sachs Asset Management on the value equity team to start my career in asset management.
- 7:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): So many fascinating observations. Once you notice that you can make money with money, it's something you cannot unsee. A lot of guests
- 7:57
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): on this the
- 7:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): podcast point out to me that moment at different points of their life, usually as kids with some parents' guidance, once they discover they can make money with money. Something happens and you don't look at the world the same way.
- 8:09
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It's like
- 8:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): ma it's like magic.
- 8:11
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It's
- 8:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): like magic. And you brought up the big word inflation. I feel like so many of us have forgotten that such a phenomenon exists. You have a memory of it from the 70s. seventies. I was born in Poland. I remember hyperinflation in the nineties in Poland and being sent to a store by my parents to buy some groceries and seeing how from
- 8:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): week to week the prices would go up.
- 8:35
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I had a
- 8:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): lot of questions about it and it was a very confusing time. But it made me respect
- 8:41
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
- 8:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): purchasing power of money and preserving the purchasing power over a long period of time, which is harder than many people think. Eddie
- 8:50
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
- 8:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): see sorry, go ahead.
- 8:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): You see when you visit other countries like Poland, uh for me, Albania, parts of South America, you see homes that are partially constructed. And I think a lot of that has to do with inflation and just wanting to not own the currency, own the uh you know, own something physical, a physical asset, even if it's uh a partially built home.
- 9:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Very much so. Real estate, but also back in the day it was the dollar that was considered gold, at least in the part of the world where I grew up. These days some people think of gold as the place to put the money just in case things go really bad. But um to me, owning businesses that do something useful, it's a good place to preserve.
- 9:32
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): As
- 9:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): long as you got the rule of law working on your side.
- 9:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Very much so. Not everywhere since you've been investing in emerging markets, I think you've seen. a thing or two that I'll ask you about throughout this conversation. I want to start with what you write about in the book that we're all biased. And reading your book, I
- 9:49
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it
- 9:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): made me it reminded me how biased we can all be. But then you say once the admission has been made, liberation follows. And I'm curious about the their choice of words. Tell me about that liberation that follows once we realize what's what's going on.
- 10:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): You're making me think of an old uh candid camera episode. Uh you can find it on YouTube. It's called Face the Rear. Uh that show, for those who don't remember, uh, was a hidden camera and it was it was a comedy show. So you they they trick people, they'd prank people. Um and in this one from I think it was early 60s, um, they would have
- 10:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): actors who were working with the uh candid camera team. uh enter an office elevator and face in the wrong direction away from the door. And then an unsuspecting uh target of theirs would uh inevitably enter the elevator, see these people standing in the wrong direction, have a look of confusion on their face, and then eventually turn and
- 10:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): face the wrong direction themselves. And you watch that and you think, I would never do that. That that's ridiculous. Um there's an obvious way you should face an elevator, and why would you do that? And I think a lot of people have that feeling that I would never do this. And you you see all these different social experiments and the the uh behavioral uh bias uh
- 11:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): experiments that have been done over the years, and you and you think to yourself, I would never do that. But I think the reality is we would. Uh most of us would. It's the rare person is uh you're almost obstinate at that point, you're antisocial. if you're gonna um you know be that independent uh in the way you think. Um we are social beings, we want to get along, so conformity
- 11:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and uh those sorts of things are natural, they help us uh have relationships with other people and so
- 11:28
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): on.
- 11:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So I think the yeah, the point of that is
- 11:32
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
- 11:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): gotta got acknowledge to it to yourself. But once you do, then you can start to look for ways to overcome it. And I think one of the themes themes of running. against the herd is there are positives and negatives. There's a yin and a yang uh that comes from each of these mental shortcuts. They serve as well in many cases, but um used or applied in the wrong situation, they can get
- 11:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you into a lot of trouble. And for investors, it can cost you a lot of money if you allow these mental shortcuts or heuristics to dictate how you make your decisions.
- 12:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): It's fascinating because it happens in everyday life, not just in investing, where where we have some of the biases that we'll talk about today. And I think the audience could will relate to it even more so. You bring up a a study in early in the book about retail investors that trail the very funds they own. And I remember Peter Lynch in one of his
- 12:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): books he mentioned how an average investor in his you know that legendary fund did not have the returns that you would see on the cover page. What's happening here and why we can't participate? We get in our own way. What's going on?
- 12:40
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 12:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): study you're referencing comes from Morningstar. It's called Mind the Gap. It's an annual study they put out each year and they have a a chart right at the front. The gap that they're referring to in the title is uh the gap of returns between the actual investor experience in various mutual funds and the reported returns of those funds. Uh and there's a get
- 13:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): there's a graph, a chart showing that that gap. It tends to be worse in growth funds, I believe, and and and not so bad in in uh in value funds and and so on. But um there's a there's a gap in pretty much every asset class. And it's you know it's it's we're all told buy low,
- 13:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): sell high, and yet somehow we all, or at least most of us, tend to do the opposite. Um and it it goes it it it's all these various biases that we talk about in the book and that have been well documented, they uh get in the way of good decision making. We tend to overreact to bad news, uh we tend not to stick to
- 13:39
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
- 13:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you know portfolio targets. Uh we all know about diversification, but then we end up, you know, with one stock dominating the portfolio or or whatever it is, there's um things that get in the way of these um of the of better decision making. I think the idea of just you know be aware of your biases being enough, I don't
- 13:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): think it is. I think it's too abstract a con a con. concept. I think you have to be purposeful and intentional about combating the biases. So once you know once you've admitted to yourself that you have them, then you've got to go about finding ways to overcome them.
- 14:16
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Aaron Ross Powell
- 14:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): To share something with you. And I've had over 200 guests coming up and 250 guests on this the show, and many people that I've talked to in between and remain very private and haven't recorded with me. I'm looking forward to it as well. And they shared with me that they bought the right stocks at the right time, even at the right price. But the confession that they have, and I I would
- 14:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): sign up on that list too,
- 14:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): is holding on to those
- 14:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): long enough is a whole different story. And I think a lot of the attention is about what's your best idea. And I think more. attention could be, and maybe after reading your book I even think more more about it, is how can I not get in my own way and hold on to those ideas? Or in this case we're talking about a fun, you know, holding on to it long enough for it
- 15:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): to matter. But we'll come back to it. But it's something I keep thinking about. It's not what's your best idea, but how do you hold on to that idea long enough for that to matter? Eddie, many academic economists take this insight to the extreme and argue that the market cannot be beaten. And I'm curious, we're
- 15:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): in a way discovering this new edge with you today, the biases. Once we discover them, is this an edge that's here to last or they will be competed away after everybody reads your book?
- 15:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): One
- 15:34
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): can
- 15:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): only hope.
- 15:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I think uh
- 15:39
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
- 15:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): academics have it mostly right most of the time. I think markets are certainly in the US largely efficient, but that doesn't mean they get every stock right all of the time. And so our job as active investors is to look for those dislocations and opportunities that pr present themselves within an otherwise mostly efficiently priced market. Um
- 16:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I think
- 16:02
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 16:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): think these biases are so fundamental to who we are as human beings that um it would take a very broad based, rigorous, intentional effort uh to overcome them and combat them and put processes in place to uh address them that I'm not worried about that um
- 16:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): being competed away in in uh the near future for sure.
- 16:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): As long as humans are running the show, but even I think machines, as we are learning with AI, can have biases and start to emulate.
- 16:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): They train on human data and information and pick up all of the biases we have. In some ways, they exacerbate
- 16:42
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): them.
- 16:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Very much so. Let's take on some of those biases. You talk about the endowment effect, and you recommend uh a remedy. in a sense, a zero-based rebuild. And it's a it's an interesting concept of starting with literally blank all over again with an idea instead of just tweaking it. What's an endowment effect and how do
- 17:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): we go about addressing it?
- 17:06
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 17:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): endowment effect is the idea that once you have something in your possession, you put more value on it and you're less you're reluctant to let it go. Um and that that's so in this context. the um the the existing portfolio, you have an existing collection of holdings, uh, either for yourself or for your clients, that is your endowed, if you like,
- 17:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): portfolio. And that's what you own. And one mental reframe that I think is really useful is to imagine that you come in to work tomorrow and you have a blank sheet of paper. You've just got a new client that gives they've given you money. Um, there's no baggage. It doesn't matter what you owned last year or yesterday or what you just bought. It doesn't matter if you're up or down
- 17:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): on any of your positions. You've got a hundred uh percent cash and you need to put it to work against whatever the client guidelines and mandate are. That's the concept of a zero-based portfolio rebuild. I think the wrong way to do that is to take the existing portfolio.
- 18:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): grab a red marker, and then start marking it up because you'll anchor to the positions that are already there. It's a little bit like the government when they do a budget, they take last year's spending and then they add 5% to it, and maybe they tweak a couple things here or there, but for the most part, it's on cruise control. And so you want to really you're trying to
- 18:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): create a circuit breaker um for some of the biases that might have found their way into the portfolio. by starting completely fresh and rebuilding it from scratch. Not sorry, not rebuilding it from scratch, building it from scratch. Uh and um I think it's a useful exercise to go through and to do it. If you work as part of an investment team, do it independently of your colleagues. Each of you do
- 18:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it and then bring it to the table and see how you differ from one another. And then that should spark debate and some of those ideas may find their way into the existing portfolio.
- 19:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And
- 19:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it's almost like a friend. So
- 19:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah, I think uh what like one risk uh one thing I was always wary of was if an analyst got too close to a stock, you know, if they and you want them to go deep. You want them to know a lot about it and be able to have the context of what's happening at the company and and so on. But if you're if you're too close to the company, if you've invested too much of your time in it,
- 19:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you can, you know, to use an expression, get married to the stock, and that's not always a good thing.
- 19:31
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well,
- 19:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): speaking of analysts, uh, you bring up a story of a fidelity fund manager that once told you that
- 19:37
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
- 19:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): minute an analyst has a thesis and investment case, they should spend every waking moment trying to prove it wrong.
- 19:46
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It's a
- 19:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): big ask, but tell tell me more about that idea.
- 19:49
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Aaron Powell
- 19:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I think uh it's a great way to approach the job. It it's it's basically the scientific method, right? The scientific method says
- 19:57
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
- 19:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): know, observe your surroundings and environment and develop a hypothesis and
- 20:02
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): then
- 20:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): f define an experiment to test that hypothesis where you isolate the varia the variables and see if your hypothesis is correct and then test it again. And and and and when you finally you know draw the conclusion from your from your work, write it up and let others try to poke holes in it. And um I
- 20:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): think you know it's very hard to do that. It's very hard to seek disconfirming information, to invite dissent, to invite the contra opinion. It's human nature to want to be right. Uh it's human nature to want to hear others agree with you. Um, so it's difficult. But I do think as an analyst, to be successful, you've got to have an open mind
- 20:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): about your own ideas. And if you're just constantly trying to um prove yourself right rather than prove yourself wrong, uh you can uh you can end up falling into some of these traps and end up with a a bad investment. So having that fresh mindset of, okay, I own, I own this stock now, I recommended it, but
- 21:02
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): what
- 21:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): where could I be wrong? And you know, look searching out disconfirming information. I think one way to do that in a management meeting when you're interviewing the senior management of a company is to ask open open-ended ended questions. Um, because if you ask an open end open-ended question, you may get an unexpected answer. So I think that's one way to avoid confirmation bias.
- 21:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): It's fascinating. I have this approach that I I want to be the least wrong. You know, I don't go into investing thinking I'm gonna be right. And I've been doing it long enough to know how many things d go the wrong way, despite the research despite the effort. So it's very humbling to think. about what can go wrong. But I noticed how
- 21:43
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): with
- 21:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): and I want to bring up AI to this question because back in the day I remember how we would ask one of the analysts on the team to to poke holes in your own idea, which is easier for somebody else to do than yourself. But now you can ask AI, and it's something that I believe you've done. You ask for the best arguments that would prove you're wrong. Share share that experience with us. what AI has done
- 22:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): on that front for you.
- 22:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): You can w the way I would put it is prompt AI to be your biggest critic. And I wrote about this uh on LinkedIn in a in a blog, and I got a few comments, and and a few people I think made good arguments that what we just said a moment ago, aren't you just picking up the human bi. bias? Isn't using AI just another form
- 22:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): of confirmation bias? So I d I do think you have to go, you know, one thing to do is go into your settings and put the inst you know personalized instructions in there to say, hey, I want I don't want you to be agreeable. I want you to pick apart my ideas and uh you know suggest new ideas that I haven't thought of, that kind of thing. And then when you do the prompt, say, you know, give me your five best arguments against
- 22:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): this stock that I otherwise like. You might even
- 22:51
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): say,
- 22:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): here's my thesis, try to pick it apart. And, you know, you're gonna get answers. Some of those you I did this with Nike last year. I owned Nike and I liked it for various reasons. And I said I said, Here's my thesis, here's my reason for liking this stock. Tell me why I'm wrong. And it came up with, I think, five or six uh bullet points with,
- 23:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you know, kind of a paragraph each on the on the argument. There were a couple. where you're like, eh, you're kind of hallucinating. That's not really a good argument, that's not accurate. There were a couple that were kind of already known, like, yeah, that's part of the consensus, it's in the price. But there were there were one, maybe two arguments. I'm like, actually, you're making a good point there, and I hadn't thought of it,
- 23:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and I don't think it's in the price. And I did d I made a trim of the position. I wish I I'd sold the whole thing because it's been a terrible stock since, but uh uh at least in that case it um made you know it acted as a devil's advocate to my own ideas. And I think if you set it up properly, it can be very useful in that in that domain.
- 23:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Very good point. And it's uh easier than asking a colleague, a friend, the other analysts or
- 23:57
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah, it doesn't
- 23:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it's it doesn't worry about hurting your feelings. It um you know it exactly. It's uh it's it's gonna be more objective and more direct with
- 24:06
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you.
- 24:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): We we humans try to be nice to each other, so in grass pokeholes in ideas. Again,
- 24:12
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): most of the
- 24:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): time that's a good thing, but sometimes it gets you in trouble.
- 24:16
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 24:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): want to ask you about a quote from Jeff Bezos, the one that you bring up in the book. Most decisions should be probably made with somewhere around 70% of the information you wish you had. And I really like it because I've seen moments where it leads to a paralysis. You can always look up more, you can always set up another call, you can always do another store visit. Tell me about this
- 24:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): phenomenon, especially today when it feels like with the tools that we have, we could possibly get to a hundred.
- 24:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): But
- 24:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): in my in my experience leading investment teams and working with junior analysts, the big biggest struggle that analysts early in their career have is indecisiveness. And if you like the the nice way of putting it is analysis paralysis. Um they often we recruit into this industry people who are
- 25:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): quantitative, so they they're used to math and numbers, they're comfortable spreadsheets, Sheets they're are comfortable in that environment, and there's a certain precision that comes with all that. But picking stocks is not a as precise as we'd like it to be. And uh we're operating under conditions of uncertainty. So the question is, how much information and data do you really need before you make a decision? Because there's an
- 25:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): opportunity cost of waiting. And I like that Jeff Bezos quote. It comes from uh the 2016 Amazon shareholder letter where he's talking about how do we stay, you Yeah, know, he he distinguishes between a day one and day two. A startup mindset is day one. Day two is paralysis and indecisiveness and
- 25:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): bureaucracy. And so he wants Amazon to stay, you know, to act and operate like a startup company. So I don't know if 70% is the right number. It it you know, as a fiduciary, it doesn't sound like enough, but there's some level less than 100% a hundred percent where you know enough to act. And you, you know, the tip-off tip off for me for from my junior analysts uh
- 26:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): over the years was when they would say something like,
- 26:07
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
- 26:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): let's wait for the earnings call. We're gonna get earnings next week. We'll see, you know, that'll give me a chance to update my bottle and then we'll decide. Or, you know, the company's got a capital markets day next month. Let's wait for that. Well, you know what? Every other analyst is gonna be at that capital markets It's day too. two. And so you're you know, whatever edge you have today is gonna going to be gone by the time that meeting happens. So you've got to
- 26:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): sometimes be willing to stick your neck out and act, even though you don't have as much information as you'd like. One way to mitigate that is just to not make everything an all or nothing decision. With investing, you can buy, you know, define what a full position would be in a particular stock, buy half of it. Um, and then after whatever event you're waiting for, after you learn more
- 26:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): information, then fill out the rest of the position. And if you learn something. that makes you change your mind, that's okay too. And so I was I would make a point of saying, hey, we're we're buying a starter position, but if we learn something next week that we don't like, we're going to just sell it right back out. You know, that's the beauty of at least mid and large cap
- 27:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): US stocks. It doesn't the the frictional cost costs of getting in and out, these are very liquid markets. The frictional costs are not that high. And so you can you can do that kind of thing where you take a a starter position and then, you know, complete the decision at a later date.
- 27:23
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 27:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you're teaching them a lesson about portfolio management as well, right? Just not having an idea, but how big of an idea it can be. Does it have to be a full position right away and how you can build it over time? As I was listening to you, I have this image of me going to Berkshire. Hathaway meeting, and you meet people that have owned the shares of Berkshire. No
- 27:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): endorsement on this in this recording of any kind, just as a phenomenon in business case study. Anyways, you meet two, at least two extremes, people that know absolutely everything about this company. Incredible researchers, they know anecdotes, stories, managers of all the privately held businesses, and on and on and on. And then you meet, and usually it's a
- 28:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): couple from somewhere in the middle of the country that has nothing to do. You're smiling, you know where I'm going with. They have no background. They probably have very limited understanding of accounting. If you start throwing at them ratios and margins and cash flows, you'll lose them very quickly. But they've held the shares of that company for 30
- 28:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): years. And that's that's the moment when we're we talking about the 70%. How much did they actually know? And what did they know that allowed them to hold those shares for so long? And they clearly haven't done more research other than just showing up and listening to the the two individuals, you know, Charlie and Warren, all those years.
- 28:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): What are your thoughts about that?
- 28:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Um
- 28:47
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 28:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): think sometimes simple is better. You know, they probably had a good sense of what the company was about and the, you know, Warren Buffett, and they had the good sense to stick with it. Um,
- 29:00
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
- 29:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): know, hyperactivity can be your worst enemy. Uh I would, you know, I admit in the book to um action bias probably being my biggest Achilles heel. Uh I, you know, all this, all these ideas we're talking about, like a zero-based portfolio rebuilt, rebuild, they're all oriented to poking and prodding and and sort of retesting all the time. But sometimes a
- 29:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): little bit of extra activity comes out of that. And some and and you know, in the example you gave of the couple who held Berkshire Hathaway stock for 30 years, less activity, not looking at their portfolio every day, um, not overreacting to recent news, uh, obviously served them well.
- 29:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Well speaking of lack of activity, in 2008 in London you asked your team to imagine being marooned like Robinson Crusoe for five to seven years holding one stock with no way to trade.
- 29:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Valuations aside, it made them think in a maybe sharper way.
- 29:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): What happened? What came out of that experiment?
- 30:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): There's a that comes from the the idea of that comes from uh a radio show that's been on, I think since the nineteen forties in in the UK, uh on BBC four called Desert Island Discs. So if you were uh marooned on a desert island like Robinson Crusoe, which eight I think it's eight albums or
- 30:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): records would you take with you uh if you had to listen to them for the rest of your life? Well, in two 2008, thousand eight, in the summer of 2008, the global financial crisis was unfolding, Lehman Brothers went under, and everything was, you know, every stock in the world just about was was uh dropping in value. And um, the team
- 30:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that I worked with was a it was a new team to me. I'd been in New York, but uh now I was in London uh leading the European equity team. They had a strong valuation uh point of view in their process, which it is good. I'm a value investor. But at that time, if you screened on valuation alone, you were led to heavily leveraged mining companies,
- 31:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): banks that were maybe gonna survive or maybe go under or be diluted if they had to raise capital. And so valuate, I didn't believe valuation was serving as well uh as the main constraint on idea flow. And so I said, let's forget about
- 31:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): valuation for a second.
- 31:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Not
- 31:18
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): we're
- 31:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): not gonna dismiss
- 31:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it. We're gonna care at the end, but let's start with in a very difficult global macro environment, which are the companies that have moats, that have good balance sheets, that have good management teams that uh can be play offense in this otherwise difficult environment? These which are the companies that
- 31:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): if you were Robinson Crusoe and you were on a desert island, you can't trade the portfolio, you're going to be stuck with whatever you pick for the next seven years. What stock, what one comp not even a stock, what company do you want to own, knowing that when you're rescued, uh it will the company will be bigger, stronger, healthier, have a deeper moat than
- 31:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it had when you started. And so it was a good way of just getting everyone. focused on these quality compounders and setting aside some of the near-term noise, setting aside the um valuation as a primary constraint, and just identifying these long-term winners.
- 32:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): It's such a fun thought experiment when you take away the ability to sell an idea, Yeah, you're thinking twice as hard about what you're going gonna to buy. I I'm very intrigued about the this dynamic between the companies, the executives, and the shareholders. And you have a story in your book, Eddie, about a Texas Roadhouse CEO who told you we could
- 32:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): use frozen chicken instead of fresh chicken, but we won't do it.
- 32:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And you point out that
- 32:43
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
- 32:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you get the investor base that you deserve.
- 32:47
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Talk
- 32:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): about that.
- 32:47
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You do.
- 32:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): You do. And I yeah, I may go, I may end up going on a little bit of a rant here because I think I see this
- 32:54
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
- 32:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): lack of thinking about the customer across the economy. And I think it's a shortcoming of uh of what of the pressure from shareholders on company management teams and and the negative consequences that I'll get into that in a minute. But the so the story is I
- 33:11
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): think
- 33:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it was two 2005 thousand and five that I was covering. small cap consumer staples for Goldman Sachs. Uh, and uh we included uh restaurants uh in that industry group. Some people classify them as discretionary, we had them as staples. So
- 33:28
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): there are
- 33:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): a lot of little public or not so little, but um well known public uh restaurant chains. And the problem was the that there've there have been so many new restaurants built. you know, think of Applebee's, Chili's, these casual dining chains, uh, that they were having the market was having trouble absorbing uh all this new supply and demand
- 33:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): was a little soft. The general rule of thumb with uh I think any retail business is you need about two percent same-store sales comp just to hold margins steady, um, because that'll that'll cover inflation and so forth.
- 34:01
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um,
- 34:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): so I had a meeting at a investment conference with the CEO of Texas Roadhouse, which was one of these casual dining chains.
- 34:09
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 34:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I asked the qu I am embarrassed by this now, but I asked the question that every analyst at the time was asking, which is, is there anything you can do given that comps are weak to cut costs and maintain your profit margins?
- 34:23
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 34:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): he looked me in the eye and he said, Eddie, there's a lot of things we could do. We could use frozen chicken instead of fresh chicken. We could take a few French fries off your plate. I could take one of the servers out of the restaurant.
- 34:36
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 34:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you know what? You probably wouldn't even notice. Um, but six months later, you'd be there or or you'd be talking to one of your friends and you'd say, you know, I used to love Texas Roadhouse. It's just not the same anymore. And it was eye-opening for me. I'm like, wow, this is guy willing to let his margins go down. Uh instead of doing the short-term thing, uh, he's gonna
- 34:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): um think about the customer and the customer experience and protect the brand. Um, and that leads me to my soapbox rant because I remember I can remember around the same time meeting with a
- 35:09
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): sell
- 35:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Cell side analyst from a large brokerage firm talking about large cap consumer staples and Procter and Gamble in particular. And she said, you know, there's um one of the great things about Procter Gamble is how much flexibility they have around margins. For example, they own Tide and they could, you know, reformulate the, you know, the
- 35:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): chemical composition of what goes into into Tide and change the ingredients a little bit and then save money on raw materials. And I said, well, what would happen if they did that? Like, w would it work as well? It's like, oh, your shirts might be a little grayer when you wash them. I'm like, Are you kidding me? Like, you want them to do that? Another
- 35:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): one, people used to always talk about Pepsi, which on Fritolet, and they would say, you know, they they don't want to push through a price increase to their consumers. So they're gonna take
- 35:57
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a couple
- 35:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): of potato chips out of the bag. And before long, you have a giant bag that's half air. and the customer the customer eventually figures that out. And so I
- 36:07
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): think a
- 36:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): lot of companies could be much wiser and longer term oriented. And if they were, think about Amazon. We talked about Amazon earlier. There are plenty of times uh over the years where Amazon has not allowed profits to drop to the bottom line because they reinvested in the business or undertook some new initiative. And maybe initially the investor base didn't like it. But eventually
- 36:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): investors figured out and Amazon got the investor base they deserve, which is long term oriented people who want to see the company reinvest in its business.
- 36:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): It's such an important point on so many levels. You know, long term thinking, treating this as a business you want to keep customers that you want to see again. And then eventually deciding that the right share shareholders will stay. And the ones that came here just for a few months, they will leave, and you can't be
- 36:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): changing the course of the business just to accommodate some short term interest. It's a lofty goal. I see how companies do give in, but I see sometimes that the CEOs are really long term focused and they ignore all that noise, which is uh something I admire.
- 37:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Eddie
- 37:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): uh
- 37:15
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
- 37:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): share another story that really made me think. You say how most investors tend to cut their winners and let their losers run, and you borrow from the
- 37:24
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
- 37:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): mountaineer at I'm probably gonna butcher his last name, Visters.
- 37:29
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 37:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): think that's right.
- 37:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And getting to the top is optional, he said, and getting down is mandatory.
- 37:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Tell me about that. Why do we keep winners? Sorry, losers. Why do we get rid of winners? What's going on?
- 37:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I had a colleague who was a mountain climber at Goldman Sachs. Um, not a he was a mountain climber before he went to Goldman Sachs, and then uh it became more of a hobby after that, I think. But uh he had climbed Mount Everest, Everson and his hero is Ed Vistards, who'd written this book, his basically his autobiography, and uh I read it. And yeah, that his whole thing
- 38:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that when you read this book, you realize, I mean, it is an incredibly dangerous vocation or hobby to have, uh, to climb mountains because so many things can go wrong that are outside your control. And what happens is people get what's known as summit fever, where they are so focused on getting Not to the top of the mountain that they don't think hard enough about their plan to get down.
- 38:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And uh he was very good. Ed Vinciers was about uh defining his escape route or his you know his his plan so that if he didn't get to the summit, that was okay as long as he got down safely.
- 38:40
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um
- 38:41
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
- 38:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I think you applying that idea to investing, we all yeah, we all put a lot of time into id you know trying to find the stocks we want to own. We build screen. screens, we build models, we fly out and visit companies and do due diligence trips and channel checks and customer surveys and all these things. We make elaborate presentations to our colleagues,
- 39:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and then we buy the stock. And when we sell the stock, when it comes time to sell the stock, w there's a m considerably less process in place. Maybe we have a price target, it hits the price target, so we sell. or maybe we listen to an earnings call and we don't like what we hear, so we sell. But there's not much process around it. And I um
- 39:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I think it it's a shortcoming of the of the professional institutional investment industry is that we put so much effort into the buy decision and so little effort into the exit or sell decision.
- 39:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Very much so. We might be selling the wrong ideas.
- 39:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): and holding on to the ones we should sell. Eddie, you write that as a value investor, you have never liked the stop loss rules. And you described Benjamin Graham's two to three holding rule with real respect. How much do we need rigid rules and how much we can have pure discretion? Kind of tying back to what you just
- 39:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): shared.
- 40:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): In the book, I intentionally avoid being prescriptive about that because I think the answer is different for everyone. I think stop loss limits can work. Um, they can be a hard rule that you include in your process. I did not. I wanted I felt like my, you know, with all the other processes I had in place, I had enough
- 40:20
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
- 40:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): enough scaffolding around how I did things that um I could use my judgment to make those. decisions and that it would be value added to do so, especially as a value investor where you often want to buy things that are going down rather than dump them. And you referenced Benjamin Graham, he his rule was if it was not a stop loss rule, it
- 40:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): was a time rule. So if two to three years go by and whatever your idea is is not working, time to let it go. Just admit you got it wrong. Didn't play out the way you thought it would. and uh, and let it go and move on to something else.
- 40:54
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um,
- 40:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): so there's lots of different approaches. My main point is have some kind of process around it. Have have uh
- 41:03
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
- 41:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): know, have some rules or framework uh on how you do that. Um for me, a lot of it was as I said earlier, probing and testing. We had, for example, one report. we had in our weekly investment pack, the investment team would meet on a weekly basis. And we had a standard deck of materials. And in that deck was a report which we refer to as the
- 41:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Leaders and Laggards report. And we would look at the holdings in the portfolio and anything we we put the top 10 leaders, meaning relative performers, on a list uh over the trailing three, six, and twelve months. And then we put the topics. top ten or bottom ten, if you like, laggards. Uh, and then we'd put a
- 41:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): little asterisk next to anything that was new to the list. So it forced us to confront, okay, what's working in the portfolio and what's not working. And it might be right to stick with something that's working, or it might be right to let it go. And likewise it might be right to stick with what's not working or even add to it or to let it go. if the thesis is
- 42:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): unraveling. So it was just a way, it was a tool for forcing a conversation rather than a hard and fast trading rule.
- 42:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Maybe it's a bit anecdotal, but I want to bring it up. It came up in a few conversations, and I I would say that my experience has been similar that in the last two decades that I've been participating as a professional in this endeavor, there's something that has shifted in the market, many things. but one of them I notice, and I'm trying to work my way backwards. Maybe you can help me. I
- 42:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): see how some stocks, it looks like nobody's paying attention. And suddenly they correct in either direction very quickly. And I remember having opportunities to buy a stock, but they they wouldn't last too long. They That people would recognize the value. And nowadays, I can see six months and nobody's paying
- 42:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): attention. And suddenly there are two, three big updates, you know, a few weeks apart, and the stock is up 50, 60, 70%. It's as if no matter how good the business is doing, nobody was looking. And it makes me think why? And if I was to make an argument here, I would say that the passive participation in
- 43:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the market maybe plays a role in it. People buy it because it's in an index, and fewer of us are doing the work that you are describing today, which is looking at the businesses we own. Do you have some thoughts about it? It's just an anecdote. I don't know if there's a study that proves me wrong, but I see it every
- 43:25
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): day.
- 43:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah, I I accept your anecdote. I um, you know, it does feel like a very concentrated market um where people are mostly focused on a handful of stocks and the rest of the market's kind of doing its own thing. I I'm a little skeptical. I I wouldn't go as far, and I'm not saying you are suggesting this, but I wouldn't go as far as to say passive, you know, the
- 43:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): um increase in passive assets is leading to market efficiency. I know people make that argument, but I think there's this concept, it goes back to Joel Joel Stern, who actually was one of my professors at Columbia Business School. He had this idea of leading. lead steers. So his idea was uh in a
- 44:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): herd of running bulls, not every bull in the herd needs to know where it's going. Uh you need a few in front that are dictating the direction, and then uh everyone else can follow. And that idea I think applies to markets in the sense that you you don't need a lot of active money to set
- 44:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): prices relative. relatively efficiently. But I accept the notion that there are stocks that get neg neglected from time to time.
- 44:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): It's good to hear that we need the active managers to participate in the market in the market won't work if everybody is just buying things because they're in an index, but that's that's a whole separate topic. I want to ask about collaboration. You know, investment firms are organized around committees, they're There are analysts and and teams and you've had a lot of experience managing teams, but you also
- 44:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): share a story that you watched eight people play a giant game of Connect 4 in two teams of four. And you had some assumptions going in. There were some learnings that came out of it. And you write in the book I was wrong. What happened? What can we learn about collaboration?
- 45:09
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So Connect 4,
- 45:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I probably most of your listeners know Connect 4, but it's a it's a game, a simple board game where uh it you have this uh yellow board and uh the two players have different colored uh chips or tiles that you drop into the um into the slots there and it's uh I think it's a seven by six grid. And if you can get four of your color in
- 45:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): a row, kind of a more advanced version of tic tac toe, I suppose. If you can get four in a row, then you you win the game. And there's a my comment. concept of Connect Four is that it's what's known as a loser's game. So the game is more often decided by someone making a mistake than by someone making a brilliant move. I've since learned that it's actually a solved
- 45:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): game where if you really know what you're doing and you go first, there's an optimal way to play and you can force a win every time. You have to start by going in the center uh column. Uh and that if you don't go in the center column, the person going second can force at least a draw out of it. So uh there is it is a solved game. So in that sense, it's a winner's game if you know what you're
- 46:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): doing. But for most people, I think it's a loser's game where you make mistakes. And the mistakes are typically those of uh not paying enough attention or that kind of thing, and you d you don't notice that your uh opponent is uh about to win. Um and so the story I told in the book, uh is from my time in London. Uh it was a nice
- 46:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): summer day, and there was a uh kind of a team building event late in the day, nice summer evening in London, and people were having a drink and walking around this lawn, and there was a large lawn-sized version of Connect Four, and there were two two teams of four. Uh, and I went over to watch the game.
- 46:49
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And I
- 46:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): my first thought was. this is silly. Like, how can you possibly since it's a loser's game and it's gonna rely on someone making a mistake and missing something obvious? How can you play this as a team game? Because you got four people, someone's gonna spot it. Someone's gonna spot the move. But sure enough, someone, you know, one team won and the other team lost. And it was uh all four players on one team had the same
- 47:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): blind spot and missed the obvious move that was about to be made. And maybe that was because you know, everyone kind of relied on their teammates to be paying close attention. So they kind
- 47:19
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): of
- 47:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): relaxed. Or maybe that there was some kind of collective blind spot there. And I think it's a good metaphor for anytime you're working in a group, um, you want to make sure you've got diversity of thought, diversity of perspectives, people tackling the problem in different ways. Otherwise, you know, that's where groupthink can set in and you end up uh making bad collective
- 47:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): decisions.
- 47:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I like that story, and you know, we're all humans and we want to get along. We assume that somebody else did the thinking, and sometimes it's not the case. You share another story that takes us in a different direction and how a team could operate. You share a story of um a certain surgery facing a life or death decision about Gabby Guildford's surgery,
- 48:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Mark Kelly. turned to the most junior resident and said, I don't want you to tell me what your boss thinks. I want to know what you think. So I'm curious, you as a CIO
- 48:13
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in
- 48:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that role overseeing $75 billion, how hard was it for you to hold back your own opinion until everyone else had spoken?
- 48:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I uh it was difficult and not difficult at the same time. The idea is you want to, you know, you want one way of undermining the yes man effect where everyone tells the boss what they want to hear is to undermine hierarchy, as Mark Kelly did when he was considering the surgery choices for his
- 48:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): um wife Gabby. The
- 48:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I would I I think I was pretty good at it. I mean, I I'm definitely an opinionated opinion person. a especially on stocks. I would, you know, I'd go into the room and I'd have my opinions. But when someone when one of our analysts was presenting to the to the rest of the team, I would I would try to disguise how I felt about the stock. And I would even sometimes uh role play
- 49:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the counter argument. I'd take the devil's advocate position uh just to make sure that we weren't missing something. Um so I think that's what you've got to, you
- 49:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): know.
- 49:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): there look, there are times as a leader where you know what you want to do and you want everyone on board and you say, Hey, this is the way we're gonna do it. Follow me. And then there's times when you're not sure of the right way to go and you recognize that your subordinates have information that you don't have and that you'd like to hear their opinions and you'd you like to hear their
- 49:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): insights. And you don't want to step, you know, you don't want to um you don't want to step on that by letting them know on a preliminary basis which way you're leaning, because then you might get a different um level of disagreement or debate or insight. They might bite their tongue rather than tell you what you don't want to hear
- 49:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): or what they think you don't want to hear. So I think it's important if you value the insight that you not reveal your uh preference.
- 50:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): It's it's fascinating to me because I'm thinking how when you're an analyst, and I was an analyst early on in my career, you have a couple of roles. Yes, you want to pick ideas that work well, but also you don't want to get
- 50:16
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): on
- 50:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the wrong side of your your boss. So you're playing a double double. There are two goals that you're playing here. Yeah. And I think it's it's tricky, right? And I even had a conversation with somebody how, you know, some analysts eventually choose to recommend stocks that they know the boss would buy. And it's it's
- 50:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): to get to the bottom of it and find an idea that the analyst independently would like, no matter what the boss thinks.
- 50:43
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It's a
- 50:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): big ass.
- 50:45
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
- 50:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I I uh yeah, that sounds awful. I think there are times when the portfolio has a certain mandate, you know, you're uh a quality value manager or small cap growth manager. And so finding stocks that fit the broad remit of the portfolio or the client d
- 51:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I think that can be a good um North Star, but just to pick a stock because you think someone else is gonna like it is it's probably not the path to alpha.
- 51:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Not the way to go. It's At uh Eaton Eton Van. Vans, you found that when the votes were taken by an open show of hands, objections were rare, but with the cover of anonymity anonymity, one or two descents became common. So you allowed people to disagree. Tell me about that experience. I've been in rooms where we were all supposed to vote.
- 51:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): But And if we could just write down what we think instead of voting
- 51:36
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): out in
- 51:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the
- 51:36
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): world. Yeah, it makes a
- 51:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): big difference. We didn't ha I want to be clear, we didn't have a consensus driven decision making process. We, you know, we had lead portfolio managers who would make the final decision. But it was important to hear from everyone around the table on whether they supported the idea. We wanted the buy-in of the team, and if we didn't have it or if there were reservations, then we knew there was more
- 51:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): work to be done. So we would uh after a 30 30-minute minute uh in-depth discussion and presentation. on a stock, we would uh invite people to um express their opinions in in the form of a vote. We'd, you know, the proposal would be we're gonna buy two, we want to buy 200 basis points of this stock. Who votes yes and who votes
- 52:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): no? And when it's a show of hands, people don't want to, you know, be disagreeable. They uh they don't want to um they want to support their colleagues. So you get a lot of hands going up to support the idea when it's done openly like that. Um we eventually implemented a anonymous voting system. We uh it was
- 52:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): simple. You'd tear off a scrap of paper from uh your notepad and you would write yes or no. You would not assign your name to it so it was anonymous and we'd pass those in and then we'd tabulate the results. And I always preferred to have one or two no's Uh it told me that people were really thinking it through and that there was a little bit of controversy about the stock. If everyone liked
- 52:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it, uh, even after the anonymous uh vote, uh that would concern me. Uh maybe there's something we were missing, maybe we're being too easy on this idea. Uh maybe there's uh controversy, but we haven't found it. Uh so I always liked a couple of no's and I always thought doing it anonymously was a better approach than doing it. openly.
- 53:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I think I I have a contrarian bone in me because I remember presenting stocks and I really liked the discussions where a lot of people would disagree with me. And I felt like I found something. I might be still wrong, but I found something. And if everybody was just nodding along, I thought, I I think it's a well well-understood understood investment case. I don't think I found anything that would
- 53:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): stir up the pot, but anything it anyways, it's it's interesting how we react to ideas.
- 53:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): There's a lot of talk about cultural fit around the corporate world and in investing too. And you're not that comfortable with the idea of a cultural fit. It's somebody just like us. You're actually looking for independent thinking curiosity. I guess somebody that can stand out, somebody different. Tell me about that.
- 54:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I think culture is super important. and there are certain cultural elements about how a company operates, what it values that should be non-negotiable. But at Eden Vance we had uh part of our culture, we had several aspects to it, but part of it was people were very supportive
- 54:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): of one another, very nice, and uh uh that was all good. Um and I I often found when I saw that, you know, when we were interviewing someone, and then I would see the feedback from the interviewers, people would write down, oh, good cultural fit. And I after a while, I started, I was like, Yeah, we want someone to be a cultural fit, but which culture are we talking about? Are
- 54:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we are we just picking people who we like and who are like us? And you know, what we really want to do is find someone who has shares our values. values, but uh maybe thinks a little differently. And I think
- 54:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): being I think the two things I always look for when I'm interviewing uh particularly a junior analyst is are they an independent thinker and are they curious? And those can be hard to evaluate from It a resume, but those are the two attributes that I think lead to success as an investor. And, you know, it
- 55:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): also leads to a collection of individuals who maybe look at the world a little bit differently. They have unusual hobbies. They uh come at problems from a different perspective. And I think you get several of those kinds of people around the room. Uh, they could have a shared value system and a shared mission, but maybe a very different way of thinking about the world that is
- 55:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): additive to a group. decision-making process.
- 55:41
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You know,
- 55:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I'm thinking of a conversation that I had with um
- 55:45
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
- 55:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): my future business partner and mentor for many years. And I remember I was a young graduate and I spent the whole conversation asking him questions how to avoid losing money. And we were talking going case by case. Enron was in the news not long before that conversation. So and he said it was so refreshing because all the kids come to him and
- 56:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): ask, How can I make money? And I just wanted to figure out where I shouldn't go. Kind of Charlie Munger's idea, tell me where I'm gonna die and I won't go there. But
- 56:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): to me,
- 56:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it was
- 56:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): tell me what I what could go wrong. And I've if I figure it out, then I'll make it down the mountain. You bring up something in the book that made me really think, you talk about salespeople. and you kept them out of investment meetings, and you compare that phenomenon to the presence of the observer effect in quantum mechanics. Tell me what's going on once people start to
- 56:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): perform for an audience instead of doing strict investment work.
- 56:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): An investment meeting, a discussion of a stock where you're vetting the idea and you're really trying to probe it and ask tough questions of one another.
- 56:54
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um,
- 56:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that's best done in a smaller group setting. It's I mean, you want a few different voices and independent views, as we said a moment ago, a handful of people. But it once you get above, I don't know what the number is, eight, nine, ten people in the room, uh, just the sure sheer number of people, you know, some people get nervous in front of larger groups, um, and uh
- 57:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): people, the the questioners of of whoever's advocating for an idea are likely to pull punches. I think that's particularly true if some of the people in the room are less well known, meaning they're come from another part of the organization. For example, salespeople would often ask, Hey, Eddie, can we uh come to your meeting? We'd like we hear all, you know, when you're presenting to clients, we
- 57:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): hear about your investment process and all these different interesting portfolio exercises. and the Romance of Crusoe and all these ideas. We'd love to like get a feel for that, a flavor for that. And it's totally understandable. And uh in a sense, as a
- 57:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): chief investment officer who wants the salespeople to be supporting the product, you uh you're inclined to agree to that and you like having the attention. And I I know the analysts and portfolio managers would love to have that kind of an audience, but I I just believe it's going to affect the quality of the debate. Uh people are going to start performing for the outside audience
- 58:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): rather than asking the tough questions they should be asking. It'll be more of a show than a proper investment discussion. And so we were quite strict about who we allowed in the room when we were talking stocks.
- 58:22
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Aaron Powell
- 58:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Very good point. The observer has an impact on the outcome. I'm curious at Babson and in your work as well, you argued that it's more important to evaluate the process, the inputs over the returns. It's tricky, it's hard, but I think we know at the end of the day it's the truth. We control the process, not exactly the outcome. Tell me about that
- 58:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): phenomenon, you know, focusing and rewarding the process.
- 58:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Particularly at Babson, because it's uh you know it's a two two-semester semester course where the students uh
- 58:52
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
- 58:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): do research on stocks and then present them to their uh to their colleagues. And you know, you get a few months worth of uh market feedback on whether the idea is good or not. So I think the quality of the work that the students do is is the way to evaluate their performance. But you do want to include a little bit of
- 59:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the market too, because it's an experiential learning. class and the performance of the stock in the market and ultimately, you know, you know, they're managing part of the school's endowment, you want that to matter too. But the longer time horizon you have, the more you can weight outcome, uh, you know, especially if you're doing if you have a a large sample
- 59:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): size, a portfolio over a decade or more, then you can draw conclusions about the scale skill of the portfolio manager and the analysts working with that portfolio manager. The shorter the time period and the fewer the number of stocks, the less you can rely on on the output. Because there's just too much noise and dumb luck and other
- 59:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): factors that that weigh in. So I think focusing on the process, trying to reward a good process and hard work and some of these subjective elements uh is important. But you know, there's always gonna be I mean, what attracted me to this business in the first place was the purity of it. I loved the idea. I th I
- 1:00:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): always thought it was like being a professional athlete in the sense that you have your you have your numbers. You know, if you're a pitcher in baseball or a batter, you know, you're you're batting average, you're your ERA, and now we've got more advanced uh metrics but than those, but those are um published and broadly available for everyone to see. Same way in
- 1:00:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): investing, you have a portfolio return, and that is public information. You can compare it to an index, and there's no hiding from that. And I like that. I like the accountability that comes with that. But uh over short time periods, and especially when it's an analyst rather than the portfolio manager who has control over the full. portfolio, it
- 1:00:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you you can draw the wrong conclusion. I I think personally, if I were, if I ran an investment consulting business, I would
- 1:01:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I would I would not screen on short-term performance or you know, even three-year performance. I wouldn't look at it. I would look at process and I would almost try to be, this is me being a contrarian investment consultant, if there ever were such a thing. I would take to my clients, my institutional clients, I'd say, We've got this great manager.
- 1:01:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): They're their uh three year performance is bottom decile, but they've stuck to their knitting. They're really good and um they're due and they're gonna, you know, they're they're they're where you should be putting your money. Don't chase the hot dot. Invest in the talented uh fund manager who's had a bad run
- 1:01:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): recently.
- 1:01:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): It makes me think going back to our earlier conversation that if you switch around because you're looking at the short term performance, you run the risk of following in the footsteps of the retail investors we talked about in the Morningstar research study, right? So you pick the best. I mean, even if you pick the best of the year of the quarter, maybe there
- 1:02:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): is a momentum and you'll be right for a quarter or two, but it will come back with vengeance, from what I've seen. And then if you can find somebody as you describe, they're sticking to the process and the style that they have is out of favor for a period of time. They will come back.
- 1:02:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Same same with individual stocks. Eddie, every January your team held public confessions. Two mistakes I made last year, and then I'm curious if you could share some of the maybe one confession that you made since you usually spoke before everybody else.
- 1:02:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I already confessed to my Nike mistake. Uh but
- 1:02:37
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): another one,
- 1:02:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): probably the biggest, most expensive mistake I made was in March of 2018. I was on a investment research trip with several colleagues. Uh we were in California. meeting with several companies, and uh the company we were uh about to meet with was one that had
- 1:02:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): uh built a brand new headquarters, uh big glass building, architecturally impressive.
- 1:03:04
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 1:03:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): as we walked across the parking lot, I thought to myself, this is not how I want companies to spend shareholder money. Um, this is ostentatious, uh it's excessive, and so on. We got into the building in the lobby. They had a Formula One race car. It was a bright green neon race car. And I
- 1:03:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): took a photo with it, and I used that photo in an internal uh newsletter that I wrote to colleagues saying this is the kind of company we don't invest in because look at how they're wasting all their funds. The company uh also was in a couple of volatile business areas. They were exposed to video games and
- 1:03:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): crypto mining. I didn't like that either. Well, the company I'm talking about is NVIDIA, and it's up 35-fold since the day I reached that conclusion not to buy the stock. And I think the lesson learned from that is you know, be wary of your mental shortcuts. and heuristics. I
- 1:04:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): uh I think, you know, favoring companies that spend shareholder money wisely is a good thing, but it's not a hard and fast rule. And I think having that strict, dismissive mindset prevented me from seeing what NVIDIA could become.
- 1:04:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Great story. Thank you for sharing it. Eddie, you closed the book with good judgment is not the absence of
- 1:04:26
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the city.
- 1:04:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): mistakes, it's the willingness to confront them. You dedicated your book to your children, Three Masters of Constructive Conflict at the beginning of the book.
- 1:04:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): For a listener who wants to start running against the herd this week at work, on a board, or at the kitchen table, what's the one practice you'd ask them to try first?
- 1:04:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Start writing things down. Start writing your decisions down. And when I say writing, I mean writing. like with a pen or pencil and paper, uh, a journal, a diary. There's something about seeing your own handwriting that uh reminds you that yeah, you did actually do that or think that or say that. And um just start every time you make a decision, even a
- 1:05:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): small one, just jot it down and then you know, put a date on it. Put the, if it's an investment, put the you know, some basic metrics like the stock price uh down. and then review it periodically, you know, six months later, a year later, go back and look at what what you wrote. And it make it it forces you to confront your
- 1:05:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): your ideas, your reasoning, your process in a way that if if you just rely on memory, uh there's a the the human mind has a way of remembering things differently, uh hindsight bias, outcome bias, uh you know, things like that that uh are I think handled better when you when you write it
- 1:05:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): down and force yourself to confront your own words and your own decisions. And then you can use that as a learning tool. Uh we don't practice enough. You know, professional athletes are practicing all the time. They're working on their games, whatever sport it is. They evaluate their data uh and then they they address any weaknesses they have. And we don't do that until enough as professional investors. And so this is a way
- 1:06:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): to sort of force yourself, look at your own numbers, look at your own decision-making process, and then make course corrections.
- 1:06:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): That's good advice. Writing it down. Something happens once you write it down and you look at it, especially the day a day after. Eddie, I have one last question. What's your definition of success? And you can take it in any direction you like.
- 1:06:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I it it's a bit of a cliche, but I think it's true. I think the journey is more important than the destination. So I'm always at my most fulfilled when I'm working on a challenging problem, particularly if I'm working with with others, um, you know, tackling a problem.
- 1:06:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And that's often more fulfilling than the final result itself. And the catch twenty to it of it all is if you don't have a goal, if you don't have a precise target or goal that you're going after, then the journey is kind of directionless. So you need you need that goal in place and you need to care about it. But the
- 1:07:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): real I think satisfaction, the success comes from working hard uh in pursuit of that goal.
- 1:07:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Love that.
- 1:07:16
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): What
- 1:07:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): a wonderful conversation. The book is running against the herd. So many biases that I wasn't aware of. And some ones, some of them that I was reminded of highly recommend to I think everybody, but especially investors and those that are trying to figure out how they can do better. Eddie, thank you so much for this hour. I really appreciate it.
- 1:07:34
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Thank you,
- 1:07:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Bogomil. Bogamila. I enjoyed the conversation.
- 1:07:37
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You
- 1:07:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): were listening to Talking Billions. We talk about big ideas, big inspirations, big topics. We take on the hardest
- 1:07:45
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): subject
- 1:07:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): of all:
- 1:07:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): money. But
- 1:07:46
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): our
- 1:07:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): conversations lead us
- 1:07:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): to an even
- 1:07:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): bigger question: what it means to live a rich life beyond money. If you enjoyed the show, please take a moment and follow, subscribe, rate, and share with friends and family. We rely on word of mouth to promote the show one place. click for you means the world to us.
- 1:08:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Thank you. Until next time, your host, Bogmel Baranoski.
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