PitchBook's Kenny Tang explains why private credit defaults remain low despite market stress, citing LMEs and cov-lite structures.
Summary
Kenny Tang of PitchBook discusses the structural differences between private credit and traditional banking, noting that post-GFC regulations drove borrowers to non-bank lenders. He argues that while market stress has increased due to AI scares and geopolitical events, formal defaults remain low because borrowers use Liability Management Exchanges (LMEs) and amend-and-extend transactions rather than filing for bankruptcy. Tang highlights that covenant-lite loans and PIK interest are often structural features rather than signs of immediate distress. The speakers also debate whether private credit firms possess the workout expertise of traditional banks and predict a rise in defaults over the next two years.
Key takeaways
- 1 PIK interest is not a sign of distress by default; it is often a structural feature agreed at inception to allow growth companies to preserve cash flow for reinvestment rather than debt service.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) · 19:02
Episode sections
- 0:00 – 3:27
Intro and Private Credit vs Private Equity
The host introduces guest Kenny Tang, head of U.S. credit research at PitchBook, to discuss private credit terminology and market dynamics. Tang defines private credit as non-bank lending to borrowers who may not access traditional bank loans or public bond markets, contrasting it with private equity which involves equity ownership.
- 3:27 – 8:06
Growth Drivers and Regulatory Impact
Tang explains that private credit grew significantly after the 2008 Global Financial Crisis due to increased bank regulation and leverage restrictions. This created an opportunity for non-bank lenders to fill the funding gap, offering flexibility and higher yields to borrowers in exchange for fees and interest.
- 8:06 – 11:45
Glossary: Direct Lending, BSL, CLO, BDC
The speakers define direct lending as non-bank lending, synonymous with private credit. They explain BSL (Broadly Syndicated Loans) as tradable loans often bought by CLOs and BDCs. CLOs are structured vehicles that tranching risk/return, while BDCs are SEC-registered investment companies focused on middle-market lending.
- 11:45 – 14:29
Fund Structures and Liquidity Gates
Tang distinguishes between interval funds, which have scheduled redemption windows, and evergreen funds, which offer ongoing liquidity subject to limits. The host notes that during early 2026 stress, some funds imposed gates (e.g., 5% quarterly redemption limits) to prevent runs on illiquid assets.
- 14:29 – 18:00
Covenant-Lite Loans and Governance
Covenant-lite (cov-lite) loans, which lack maintenance covenants, are now mainstream. Tang argues that without regular financial testing, lenders rely on incurrence covenants or springing governance on revolvers to trigger conversations with borrowers when performance deteriorates.
- 18:00 – 21:08
PIK and PIK Toggles
PIK (Paid-In-Kind) allows interest to accrue to the principal balance rather than being paid in cash, preserving borrower liquidity. A PIK toggle gives the borrower the discretion to switch between cash interest and PIK interest, a feature often used by growth-oriented software companies.
- 21:08 – 24:45
Amend and Extend vs. LMEs
An 'amend and extend' pushes out a loan's maturity date to avoid refinancing risk. An LME (Liability Management Exchange) allows a borrower to renegotiate terms with consenting lenders, potentially cramming down on non-consenting lenders in broadly syndicated loans without filing for bankruptcy.
- 24:45 – 28:10
Workout Dynamics
Workout occurs when a loan is at risk of default or bankruptcy. The host shares an anecdote about being transferred from a relationship banking role to a workout team, where the focus shifts from origination to maximizing recovery through strict oversight of collateral and cash flow.
- 28:10 – 31:05
Workout Capabilities and Private Credit Maturity
Speaker_0 recounts a past workout where lenders recovered 60-70 cents on the dollar while equity was wiped out, questioning if private credit firms possess the same workout muscle as traditional banks. The discussion highlights the rapid growth of private credit AUM post-GFC and post-COVID, noting its perception as a higher-yield, safer alternative to equity.
- 31:05 – 35:46
2026 Market Cracks: AI Scare and Geopolitics
Kenny Tang identifies rising PIK loan usage and declining spreads in late 2025 as early warning signs. He attributes the 2026 market stress to two main events: the February AI software disruption scare (Anthropic's Claude release) and the subsequent Middle Eastern war in March, which caused oil spikes and supply shocks.
- 35:46 – 39:46
BSL Market Dynamics and Equity Implications
Tang notes that BSL bid prices dropped from 94 to 87 cents following the AI scare. Speaker_0 explains that when debt trades below par, equity is effectively worthless. This liquidity in the BSL market provides real-time valuation signals unlike private equity, revealing stress even if formal defaults remain low.
- 39:46 – 43:28
Low Defaults vs. High Stress and LME Transactions
Despite 11-12% of loans trading below 90 cents and software being particularly distressed, default rates remain under 1%. Tang explains that traditional defaults are low because borrowers are increasingly using LME (Lender-Mandated Exit) transactions, which are easier and faster than bankruptcy filings, especially in cov-lite structures.
- 43:28 – 49:38
LP Due Diligence and Workout Preparedness
For LPs, Tang advises scrutinizing underlying investments for AI disruption sensitivity and geopolitical risks (e.g., raw material supply chains). He questions whether private credit firms have the necessary workout expertise compared to traditional banks, noting that modern restructuring processes are faster but involve complex majority vote structures rather than unanimous consent.
- 49:38 – 1:07:19
Fundamental Analysis and Zombie Companies
Drawing on his time at Fleet Bank and S&P, Tang emphasizes looking beyond revenue to volume metrics (e.g., subscriber counts) to detect price-driven growth. He warns about companies that are growing revenue through price increases rather than volume, which may indicate underlying weakness.
Claims worth verifying
Private credit has grown significantly over the last 10-15 years following the 2008 Global Financial Crisis.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·3:47
How to verify: PitchBook Private Credit Market Reports; S&P Global data on private credit AUM growth trends. For recent events, verify 2026-08-04 through 2026-11-04. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Post-GFC bank regulations, including leverage lending guidelines, restricted bank lending and drove borrowers to private credit.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·4:03
How to verify: Federal Reserve Bank Stress Test results (2026-2026); Dodd-Frank Act provisions; Basel III implementation timelines. For recent events, verify 2026-08-04 through 2026-11-04. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Broadly Syndicated Loans (BSL) are tradable, unlike most private credit loans.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·9:17
How to verify: Loan pricing data providers (e.g., Bloomberg, Markit) showing secondary trading volumes for BSLs vs. private credit. For recent events, verify 2026-08-04 through 2026-11-04. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceCLOs are structured securitization vehicles that tranching risk and return based on credit ratings.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·9:43
How to verify: S&P Global or Moody's CLO rating methodologies; SEC filings (Form N-SEC) for CLO issuers. For recent events, verify 2026-08-04 through 2026-11-04. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceBDCs are registered under the SEC and have existed for 15-20 years.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·10:51
How to verify: SEC Investment Company Act of 2026; historical BDC inception dates (e.g., American Capital Ltd. founded 2026). For recent events, verify 2026-08-04 through 2026-11-04. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceInterval funds and evergreen funds have liquidity limitations (e.g., 5% per quarter) to prevent runs.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·12:44
How to verify: Fund prospectuses for interval/evergreen private credit funds; SEC Form N-1A filings detailing redemption policies. For recent events, verify 2026-08-04 through 2026-11-04. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceCovenant-lite loans are now mainstream, with virtually all new loans lacking maintenance covenants.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·14:39
How to verify: LSTA (Loan Syndication and Trading Association) Covenant Survey data; S&P Global Market Intelligence loan covenant analysis. For recent events, verify 2026-08-04 through 2026-11-04. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
PIK (Paid-In-Kind) interest accrues to the balance rather than being paid in cash.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·18:01
How to verify: Sample private credit credit agreements; PIK toggle definitions in loan documentation. For recent events, verify 2026-08-04 through 2026-11-04. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
LMEs allow borrowers to renegotiate terms with consenting lenders, potentially cramming down on non-consenting lenders.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·22:36
How to verify: Legal analysis of LME provisions in loan agreements; case studies of LME transactions in 2026-2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-04 through 2026-11-04. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Workout teams focus on maximizing recovery by assessing collateral and company viability when default is likely.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·25:06
How to verify: Bank workout department job descriptions; S&P Global Recovery Research reports on loan recovery rates. For recent events, verify 2026-08-04 through 2026-11-04. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Lenders are not pushing out maturities on distressed assets but are trying to recover value, potentially extending loans with higher interest rates.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·55:41
How to verify: Review PitchBook research on lender behavior in distressed assets or analyze loan modification data from credit bureaus like Moody's or S&P for the period 2026-08-04 through 2026-11-04. For recent events, verify 2026-08-04 through 2026-11-04. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Double-digit increases in bankruptcy defaults are occurring for middle-market companies with liabilities between $100 million and $500 million.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·57:06
How to verify: Check PitchBook's published research on private credit defaults or SEC filings (e.g., 10-K/10-Q) of major BDCs for default rate data in the specified liability range during the verification window. For recent events, verify 2026-08-04 through 2026-11-04. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceNon-accrual status reporting is inconsistent among BDCs for the same loan.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·57:29
How to verify: Compare quarterly portfolio disclosures from multiple BDCs (e.g., Ares Capital, Blackstone Capital) via SEC EDGAR to identify discrepancies in non-accrual classifications for overlapping investments. For recent events, verify 2026-08-04 through 2026-11-04. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourcePrivate credit will not disappear and often co-exists with BSL loans and bonds in the same capital structure.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·59:02
How to verify: Analyze recent bond prospectuses or loan syndication reports (e.g., from Bloomberg or Refinitiv) to identify capital structures containing private credit, BSL, and public bonds. For recent events, verify 2026-08-04 through 2026-11-04. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourcePrivate credit structures prevent bank-run scenarios and protect retail investors in 401(k)s.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·1:00:46
How to verify: Review fund offering documents (PPMs) for private credit interval funds to verify liquidity gates and redemption restrictions compared to traditional bank deposits. For recent events, verify 2026-08-04 through 2026-11-04. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Distress ratios in the BSL segment are high.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·1:03:58
How to verify: Access PitchBook's BSL distress index data or S&P/LSTA High Yield Default Report for the period 2026-08-04 through 2026-11-04. For recent events, verify 2026-08-04 through 2026-11-04. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceDefaults in private credit will rise within the next two years.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·1:04:18
How to verify: Track actual default rates in private credit indices (e.g., PitchBook, S&P) from 2026-11-04 through 2026-11-04 to verify the prediction. For recent events, verify 2026-08-04 through 2026-11-04. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Cov-lite structures require worse underlying performance to trigger default, leading to more LME transactions.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·1:04:20
How to verify: Analyze loan agreements for cov-lite terms and compare default triggers against financial covenants, or review LME transaction volumes relative to covenant breaches in the verification window. For recent events, verify 2026-08-04 through 2026-11-04. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceDo your own research
- Review PitchBook's latest Private Credit Market Report for AUM growth and vintage year performance data.
- Check SEC Form N-PORT filings for BDCs to compare non-accrual reporting consistency and loan loss reserves.
- Analyze recent LME transaction announcements in the BSL market to assess the volume of debt restructuring versus formal defaults.
- Examine portfolio company financials for high PIK interest usage and incurrence-only covenants to evaluate covenant quality.
- Verify the liquidity terms (gates, redemption limits) of specific interval or evergreen private credit funds held in 401(k) or IRA accounts.
- Research the operational metrics (subscriber counts, volume) of AI-exposed portfolio companies to distinguish price-driven growth from volume growth.
- Compare current BSL bid prices (cents on the dollar) against historical averages to gauge market-implied stress levels.
- Investigate the workout team backgrounds of private credit managers to assess their restructuring experience compared to traditional bank workout divisions.
Full transcriptexpand
- 0:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Working out's good, right? It's good for the heart, it's good for the mind. Um, but you don't want to be in workout if you're in a private credit or private equity. They had made, you know, thousands and thousands of loans over decades. Private credit, obviously smart people, but they haven't had a time like this. Are they equipped, in your opinion, to get these companies into and
- 0:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): through a workout?
- 0:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah. That's a great question, Devin.
- 0:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Now the private equity fund cast is about to begin. So give it up for your host.
- 0:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Devin and Jim.
- 0:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Welcome back to the Funcast, everybody. Uh we are going to school today. Uh we're gonna talk about private credit. We're gonna talk about uh all the things and terminology you need to know to understand uh the asset class, because there's a lot of lingo in private credit. We're going to talk about what happened in 2026. Things seem to crack
- 0:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): after many years of peace and calm. And then we're going to talk about where the private credit industry is going today. And we've got a friend of the funcast and a soon-to-be good friend of mine, uh Kenny Tang, who's a senior director and the head of U.S. credit research
- 1:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): at Pitchbook. He knows all the data. He's been on both sides of the table, even did some workouts uh for some period of time, which may come in handy. So they might call him back in, uh, given the way private credits going these days. Uh but Kenny, live from New York, it's Kenny Tang. Thanks for being on the pod.
- 1:34
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Thank you,
- 1:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Devin. Really, really appreciate being on your call.
- 1:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Great. So uh listen. let's do this. I want to talk uh about uh high, high level. We've got a lot of sophisticated listeners who are in the private equity, private credit industry, um, but some also uh who this lingo is pretty confusing. So I want to go through um just literally the glossary of private
- 1:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): credit and you kind of explain what it is and kind of why it uh it makes sense. Uh
- 2:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): today. So private credit versus private equity. We'll start there. Uh these all kind of get thrown in private capital or alternatives bucket. But like what's the basic difference between private credit and private equity?
- 2:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Okay. Yeah. So private credit is really a loan, right? Uh where a fund is focused in on lending money to borrowers. who may or may not be able to get it from a bank, for example. Or maybe for a larger company, uh it could be a an
- 2:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): alternative to reaching out to the larger uh credit markets, such as the broadly syndicated market, for one, or even the bond market as well. So that that's that would be where I private credit is. You know, it the level the of interest in fees are what drives
- 2:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): revenues for the for the investors. On the other hand, for private equity sponsors, you're looking at investing into companies from an equity perspective. So you're basically the owner of the company, whereby a portion of that company likely is going to be financed with debt. So it does come hand in hand, actually. Private
- 3:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): equity and private credit. Or if you're a larger company, it could be a a a bond piece or or even on a on a larger scale, the syndicated loan market.
- 3:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And let's uh maybe as we talk through this glossary, I'm going to ask you some questions around kind of the history of this as well, uh given your background. So uh why the run-up in private credit, right? There was always uh banks you could get a loan from, but it does seem like after the GFC, the global financial crisis in twenty uh two thousand and eight, two thousand
- 3:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): nine, a lot of these loans started to move out of banks and into more private equity like uh structures, uh though on the credit side. Maybe you'd talk a little bit about that run-up and why private credit has become such a big asset class over the last ten or fifteen years.
- 4:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, that's a that's a great question. And uh, you know, it it does come from the great financial crisis where there was a little bit more scrutiny on the banks in terms of how much leverage are you taking, how much risk are you taking with these loans? So regulatory issues come up. You know, you have your lending uh uh leverage
- 4:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): lending guidelines for for one, where there are some restrictions about what you can or cannot lend, um which also means for the borrowers, there's only a limitation about what you can do uh before you need to maybe tap into equity for f one more so than you you would
- 4:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): want.
- 4:43
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 4:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I I think fr starting from there is when when investors or or lenders, alternate lenders, are looking at this and saying, you know what, we have an opportunity here to fund this market. You know, we can provide this loan. We don't have to go um by by all these regulatory uh
- 5:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): concerns here or compliance. So we can provide you with this loan. I think that's probably where it started off. And, you know, it's um it's built up over the over the last ten, ten years, uh maybe even more than that,
- 5:19
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): to
- 5:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): a point where it's a, you know, it's a normal part of business these days on the on the credit market side. Aaron
- 5:24
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Powell
- 5:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): For people old like us, and you go back to like Timothy Geithner doing stress tests of banks, right? And saying, like, what is the health of these banks? And there was some concern in those stress tests that maybe they had too much risk on their books and were encouraged with kind of, you know, liquidity levels and other types of, you know, tests they were doing, that maybe these loans should be somewhere
- 5:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): else. And water finds its own level, right? And uh, you know, products get created around that. There was interest in making these loans,
- 5:52
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): um,
- 5:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): from other types of investors, endowments, foundations, pension funds, whatever. And then private credit started to grow inside the large asset gatherers gathers like a Blackstone and KKR. Apollo, and others, and then independent shops. Um, so I would say a lot of our as we look uh to put leverage on a company, certainly the banks are in it. Um, and
- 6:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we talk to a lot of banks who like software, uh, but maybe not at the levels uh they were before. Uh and then there are a lot of these independent shops who will loan you capital uh that feels like a bank. They're just not, you know, uh using deposits, they're using LP capital to make these loans. Um and water finds its own level, like I said. So like is
- 6:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): there's more interest in this and the biote industry grew, the private credit industry grew alongside. Is that fair?
- 6:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, yeah, definitely. Definitely and and also, you know, one of the things as you were talking, I was thinking about was banks also look at returns differently too. So they have deposit relationships that if you really think about it, that would usually be the go-to place to go get your financing. But you know, if there are
- 6:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): restrictions or if it doesn't fit the the credit um target type of a borrower, then you know there's only so much you can do. That's where the opportunity, the opportunity comes up for these funds to say, you know what, we can do it. We can maybe charge a little bit more interest
- 7:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): or charge a little bit more in fees. And if they're even more sophisticated, take a piece of equity as well. So it creates this new, complex, and maybe innovative type of an opportunity for lenders.
- 7:32
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
- 7:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): kind of like squeezing a balloon. If it wasn't in the banks, it has to go somewhere. So that air has gone to these private credits. credit institutions. So yeah, you're going to pay a little bit more
- 7:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): on sofa plus something. So you're probably paying a little more on that plus something than you would with a traditional bank. But you might be able to get more flexibility, more total leverage,
- 7:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): more terms and other things, and you're kind of paying uh for that risk. All right, let's keep going through our little glossary here. So if that's private credit versus private equity, like don't direct lending.
- 8:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): A lot of times in our industry, like the same thing has a bunch of different names. So what's direct lending?
- 8:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, I you know, I've always that's a great question because I've always thought lending is lending. Yeah, all my life. It's like lending is lending. Why do we have to put a name to it? I mean, if a bank lends directly to, you know, the local supermarket, for example. that's a direct loan. You know, do we should should that be construed as a
- 8:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): direct loan? Probably, yes.
- 8:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): But you you also can look at it from a fund perspective and say, you know, okay, so this is what it is really these days, is direct lending is when a non-bank Bank lends you money. That would be the the new definition.
- 8:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So private credit and direct lending synonymous, just like an LBO, a buyout, and private equity could all kind of mean about the same thing. So nothing special. If somebody says direct lending, they're probably talking about private credit or a non-bank loan of some sort.
- 9:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Correct.
- 9:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): BSL, What's BSL and the difference between so define it? Uh, What does BSL stand for and kind of where does it stand? sit in the private credit world?
- 9:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah. Broadly syndicated loan is what the BSL stands for. It basically represents the credit market where loans that are procured are tradable. And uh the typical buyer of these loans are CLO funds, for example, BDC's funds as well to some degree, and also banks, too.
- 9:37
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It's
- 9:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): tradable company. That makes it more liquid.
- 9:40
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): All
- 9:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): right. So what's a CLO and what's a BDC?
- 9:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): So a CLO is a collateralized loan obligation. So it's a structured securitization vehicle which really um buys into loans, uh a portfolio of loans, and it can be in different uh allocations in different concentrations of sectors where it optimizes
- 10:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the returns from that. And along with it, on the lending side, the amount of risk is um tranched out by uh the credit risk that's being taken. So the first tranche, for example, can be the first tranche out. So they get paid first. And that may be, you know, in
- 10:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): many cases construed as the triple A tranche. right? So it's uh reflecting the credit rating, credit risk for that tranche, all the way to an equity tranche as well.
- 10:35
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 10:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): each of those tranches, there's a little more risk as you go down, uh, but there's a little more return to be compensated for that risk.
- 10:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yep, exactly. Yeah.
- 10:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Is that fair? And this is what got us in trouble in 2008. But we'll get to that later. Uh
- 10:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): BDC. What's a BDC?
- 10:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): A BDC uh is a business development company.
- 10:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And it's um registered under the SECs and it's usually traded. In some cases you can trade non-trade it. Um but it's actually been around for quite a long time. I can re probably remember it back in 15, 20 years ago and hearing about these BDC loans for the middle market uh uh
- 11:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): sector. And um
- 11:18
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
- 11:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): know but back then the size of the funds, if I remember right, were anywhere from fifty to two hundred million.
- 11:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): American capital being a a good example. In the early two thousands, American capital was a BDC, right? Publicly
- 11:34
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): traded, um,
- 11:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): but a lender to private equity.
- 11:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yep, exactly.
- 11:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Okay. So about what about interval fund, evergreen, semi-liquid? What are the
- 11:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): as you hear of these things?
- 11:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, these are more on the fund, higher level fund side, where you know investors can put money into certain types of funds where they may have some flexibility about redeeming if and when they need it. So like um an interval fund.
- 12:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): basically, you know, at a certain point, you're allowed to take your money out or it's scheduled in. Versus an evergreen, at a certain point, you can redeem a certain level of your capital back. But there are limitations because the asset class is basically a longer-term Term type and it's not really equity
- 12:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): per se. Trevor
- 12:24
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Burrus
- 12:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So this is like what we heard a lot about in February. and March, where they're putting the gates up, and we're going to get to that, what the gate is. The gate meaning, hey, you you invested in this fund and they had a 5% per quarter limitation on liquidity. So they can only, you know, uh provide liquidity up to 5% per quarter.
- 12:44
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um
- 12:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): meaning it would take 20 twenty quarters for you to get all your money out if they followed that, right? Um so the reason to do that is they've got a long-dated loan, maybe a you know, three, five, seven-year loan with somebody, and you can ask for liquidity. So you can't there can't be a run on the fund, um, given that it's illiquid, largely illiquid. Aaron
- 13:04
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Powell
- 13:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): That's that's the proper way to to uh phrase it as well. It was kind of sort of a mini run back uh early in I if I remember right, it was Q one.
- 13:13
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Aaron Powell Yeah.
- 13:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): We heard a lot about Cliffwater and B-Cred and all these things, that they were getting these massive requests for for redemptions. But so they put the gates up. It's like, well, no, no, they didn't put the gate up. They just said, no, we have a five percent limit, and you signed up for that. We can't give you 15 percent. Now, maybe they got creative to kind of calm people down,
- 13:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): but you know, these are the things. An interval fund or a semi-liquid fund means there
- 13:38
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): is a
- 13:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): schedule. and a and a percentage at which you can ask for some liquidity.
- 13:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yep. Yep. And then
- 13:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): what's about Evergreen is Evergreen the outer.
- 13:46
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Oh yeah,
- 13:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that's right. Evergreen is really just not really having a a whole period, right? So you are essentially you can invest in it and it just continues on an ongoing basis.
- 13:59
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It's
- 13:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): like a ten 10-year year fund like a typical private equity fund.
- 14:01
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It just
- 14:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): goes on and on and on and there's you know liquidity along the way and mark-to-markets and you can kind of get paid out um part or in whole along the way through other liquidity mechanisms.
- 14:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Right. And that helps, you know, especially if you're looking at long dated type assets and you know you're continuing with it. And it you know if so long as it's making you good returns,
- 14:23
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you know,
- 14:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it it doesn't put you on the hold to sell it if it's not necessary.
- 14:28
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): All right.
- 14:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): What about Cov Light? Which is uh which is uh the shortening of Covenant Light. So we hear a lot about Cov Light loans.
- 14:37
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): What does Cov
- 14:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Light mean?
- 14:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): That is mainstream number one. So basically virtually all loans these days are Covenant Light, but there are some. There's still some with Covenants in in place.
- 14:50
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You know,
- 14:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I I'm a covenant person. I've always drafted up, you know, structured covenants. So I I do miss them a lot, number one. But essentially what you're seeing today is credit agreements on loans, especially on the broadly syndicated BSL market, you don't see covenants. And those measures or or
- 15:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): metrics are really for for the lenders to monitor a company's performance. right? To make sure they don't deviate to a or deteriorate to a certain point where there's no underlying collateral value or value to the company. So those things are very important.
- 15:25
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 15:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): if you went back to your old days, right? So you've been on both sides of the table here, what would be in a list of a c typical covenant package and then what would remain, like what would be the few things that we remain in CovLite, Cove Lite, a CovLite Cov Light loan?
- 15:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, so
- 15:41
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you know,
- 15:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): these days what you see is is uh springing type governance, especially on revolvers. And that's kind of sort of your stop gap on a liquidity basis, just to, you know, make sure you have some level of a pull on a on a borrower. But if if I had my drrothers druthers and I'm looking at a particular new deal,
- 16:02
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you know.
- 16:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): as it is, I would have a leverage covenant for sure, secured in a total leverage. And um I would have a debt service coverage ratio in there at the minimum.
- 16:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 16:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): what else? And those are just the maintenance covenants.
- 16:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Exactly.
- 16:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): So
- 16:20
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): we
- 16:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): can talk about it later, but there are other covenants that are just as important. And those are you know incurrence type covenants and and uh voting rights type covenants.
- 16:30
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
- 16:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): so it's covenant is a way for the lender to have some say if things go haywire, right? You can't do this without our permission. Or if this happens, now you need to come and we need to have a talk. Uh
- 16:42
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): which
- 16:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): could be the lawyers could get involved, the workout team get involved or whatever. That covenant is basically you tripped this. So no you can no longer do business as usual. You have liquidity is too low. Or uh again, you your EBITDA covenant has been tripped. You said we give you five times trailing EBITDA. Now you're at five
- 17:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and a half times. So now we need to kind of get this loan back into compliance.
- 17:07
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um
- 17:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): and it's a great way to bring the the parties, meaning the borrower and the lenders back to
- 17:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the city.
- 17:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): table and say, okay, what's going on? You you essentially have a default, a covenant default on the on the loan and you know what what's wrong and you know, identify what you need to do to rectify it, right? If it needs more money or whatever it is, you know, that's
- 17:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the time to talk about it. Aaron
- 17:36
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Powell And
- 17:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you may still be current on your interest and your amortization. It's just that the ratios are off, and that is their way to say, like, hey, sure, you're still paying us the money, but this isn't gone the way we thought it would go. We got to have a conversation. And then you're talking about me being amendment, you're talking about uh forbearance agreements, other kinds of things.
- 17:53
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): All
- 17:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): right. What about what's pick? We hear a lot about pick and pick toggles. So pick stands for what and and what's a pick toggle?
- 18:00
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Aaron Powell
- 18:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, that is the uh that is what I've been working on more recently. And uh no first of all, pick means paid in kind.
- 18:09
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You know,
- 18:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): essentially what what's happening in a pick loan is either a portion or all of the interest on the loan is is basically accrued and not paid out, but it's accrued to the balance. And then once that loan matures. that's when it's due along with the the remaining principal.
- 18:30
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 18:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): what does that do for many companies? It saves them the need to pay interest right up front.
- 18:36
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 18:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): there's two ways you can look at it. One is you can look at it from a distress basis. Companies don't have the cash flows, and therefore you need some breathing room until such time. Or you can see it as a uh an opportunity for a company to grow.
- 18:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): right? So you see that a lot more with software type loans, for example.
- 18:56
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah.
- 18:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So you're you're basically saying from the beginning
- 18:59
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): of
- 18:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the loan,
- 19:00
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): right?
- 19:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): When it's
- 19:02
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
- 19:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): exception of the loan. And there's lots of uh debates about, oh, this much this percentage of debt is picking. It's like, well, it was it was agreed to pick from the beginning. They didn't stop, start picking later on because they were in distress. A lot of these loans from the beginning were, hey, it's 10% interest, so far plus, you know, five and a half or something. But yeah, it's just going to
- 19:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): accrue. Just like a private equity investment, oftentimes, it's a principal plus an accrued dividend. You're not paying current interest on a on your on the preferred stock of a private equity Um investment. It just accrues over time. Some loans do the same thing. So it frees up your cash to make other investments in things that hopefully you're
- 19:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): generating more than an 8 or 10% return. Like if you basically never had to pay your mortgage interest, you just let it roll. And at the end of the mortgage, you just paid it all off at the same time. That's what picking is. And then what's a pick toggle?
- 19:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Ah, okay. Yeah. That's uh we're getting more complex now.
- 19:59
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah, I know. This is uh this is fun.
- 20:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah. So a pick toggle.
- 20:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): is when a borrower, you know, and the lender they agree that in case they need to pick a loan, like if X happens or not even, like if they choose if you know at a certain point that it's best for them to pick the interest, then they
- 20:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): have that selection and that they say, hey lender, um I'd like to just defer my interest at this time. So I I will toggle the loan.
- 20:32
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 20:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you have
- 20:32
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that it's like a toggle on
- 20:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and off, an on and off toggle. Like, hey, for the next six months we're gonna pick the interest. And that again was probably set up at the very inception of the loan at the borrower's discretion. Do you want to pay the interest or do you want to pick it?
- 20:46
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 20:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the risk the lender would take is if the business appears to be heading in distress.
- 20:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): having it pick is dangerous. They want the cash up front. So they're kind of taking that risk.
- 20:57
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): All
- 20:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): right. What would be
- 20:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): amend and extend, or what we like to call amend and pretend? So what what does amend and extend uh mean?
- 21:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, so an amend amended and extend extent is when a loan is coming due. So it's maturity date. Let's say it's due at the end of the year, December 31st. And what you want to do is you want to refinance your loan. And one of the easiest ways to do it is
- 21:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): just continue on the loan. And what you do by the amendment is you're amending the maturity date to a later date. So now no, that would be the easiest way to do it. And hopefully, as uh thinking of my work from a workout perspective now, just make sure you're uh renewing the lien as well.
- 21:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah. So basically, hey, I owe you, you know, we have a five million dollar loan. I owe it to you at the end of the year. I've been paying my interest in some amortization. I owe you five million dollars at the end of the year. I could refinance it with a new lender, maybe for whatever reason that's
- 22:01
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): um
- 22:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): not gonna happen every Everybody knows it'd be too hard. It's a tough market. The business maybe hasn't performed quite well. The lender and the borrower get together and say, hey, let's push this out a year.
- 22:11
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 22:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): so you amend the loan and then you extend it out one more year. And then you probably have to pay some fees and penalties and maybe interest goes up or some other things. It's you're not gonna get that for free, but there's gonna be some negotiation between the borrower and the lender around that. And there's lots of discussion around kind of pushing out this maturity wall. and other things right now, which we're going to get to in a few minutes. So a lot of talk about
- 22:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): LMEs right now. I'm not even sure I know what an LME is.
- 22:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I I can't really say it either, but it is a essentially liability management exchange is what it is. I usually go by L lia liability management transaction.
- 22:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Okay.
- 22:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And
- 22:47
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): yeah you know,
- 22:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the easy way to say it is really like when a company is going under certain distress, actually it doesn't even have to be distress. When a company at a certain point wants to renegotiate the terms of the of a loan,
- 23:02
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
- 23:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): know, they can do it out of court, meaning they don't have to file for bankruptcy for it. They can just say go to the lender and say, you know what, let's talk about whether we can do this or not. Now, if you have a broadly syndicated loan where there's more than one lender, let's say ten lenders or more, then not
- 23:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): everyone is gonna be in agreement with you.
- 23:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I'm not agreeing with your your proposal here.
- 23:31
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 23:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): don't want to participate, and then you have a few whom who may want to do
- 23:35
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it.
- 23:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): So
- 23:37
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): to
- 23:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the extent that all of the credit document compliance is is met, then there could be ways that uh companies can
- 23:47
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): do
- 23:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): an LME transaction and kind of cram down on on the non-consenting lenders.
- 23:53
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 23:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): then you have this whole change in the whole debt structure now that it basically,
- 23:58
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
- 23:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): know, in many of the more recent cases, lenders are actually losing. you know, taking a loss on it.
- 24:04
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah.
- 24:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): If you Google LME, you'll see lots of examples on the press this year about these things. Never good for the lender. Maybe reason not to um, you know, have cov light loans and maybe pay more attention to the documentation. But when things are blowing and going, the borrower often has a lot of leeway and uh authority in the negotiation and when and when
- 24:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): money was free, maybe there was some oversight on on on stopping or being able to block one of these LMEs. But creative borrowers, certainly gonna be hard to get a loan from that s those same group of lenders again if you pull this off or do this to them. But at the same time, it's uh something that they're they're capable of doing in a in a difficult situation
- 24:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): to try and give themselves himself some breathing room. All right, let's end with one more because you were on this side of the table in an earlier part of your career was like, what's a workout? If you've been told you've been you're in workout. I mean, working out's good, right? It's good for the heart, it's good for you know the the the the mind, uh, but you don't want to be in workout if you're in a private credit or private equity.
- 25:04
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 25:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): what's
- 25:05
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): work
- 25:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): out from your experience? Aaron
- 25:06
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Powell
- 25:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Workout is when a a a loan um is risky enough that you know the a full recovery is at risk or the likelihood of of a company surviving a bankruptcy or or going into bankruptcy is quite likely. And um so
- 25:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): what happens from a lender's perspective or or a bank where where I I used to work is you go from the relationship banker group and it gets moved to the workout group. which takes on a different tactic. And their tactic is really to say, okay, we have this loan. What can
- 25:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): we do to make sure we recover
- 25:49
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): all
- 25:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): of our investments on that? So, you know, all the things that we would look at as a as a workout person is to make sure we know what our rights are under the credit agreement. You know, what's our underlying collateral? What can we get back? And what's the prospects of this company uh remaining a viable business? And
- 26:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): those those things are key. And how you manage that you know is gonna highly determine what kind of recovery you're gonna get at the end of the day.
- 26:19
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Here's
- 26:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): my workout.
- 26:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah.
- 26:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So so this is just picture Kenny doing this to me in the early 2000s two thousands as I was.
- 26:27
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I wouldn't do that to you. We
- 26:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): were we were put in workout on a deal. So we were going to take a company public, not we. I mean, a lot uh many jobs ago and many companies ago. We were gonna take a company public in the dot com. It did not go public, the window closed. We found the business was had all kinds of adjusted EBA. I mean, more so than probably we understood. It was a big MA
- 26:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): roll-up deal. And uh yeah, we had we had too much debt and not enough EBA. Ibata. So we went from the coverage guy, the relationship lender, um, at the club of lenders we were with. And they wanted to play golf with you. They wanted to take you out to dinner, they wanted to come to maybe show up at a board meeting, you know, every once in a while and and shake your hand and talk about the next deal you were going to give them to loan
- 27:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): to loan.
- 27:08
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Uh
- 27:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): pretty soon I got you know to get handed over to workout. The guy at workout wears a mouth guard at night because he grinds his teeth. Uh so uh he would come in, I'd fly down there every every month uh to meet with a workout guy and the CFO, because our CEO, you know, claimed he had heart heart uh murmur and quit because this business was not going to work out
- 27:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): too well and he was too stressed out through all the layoffs and other things we had to do to right size the business.
- 27:33
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um
- 27:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): this guy Scott would scream at me every month from across the table and there's like little a veins. vein in his in his forehead that would just like bulge, because how could you do this? You guys are idiots, this business isn't doing well, you can't pay your interest, like what the hell? Um, and every w every month I would take the keys to the front door of our office and I would slide
- 27:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): them across the table to him and say, Hey Scott, I'm working for you right now. The equity is cooked here.
- 27:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah.
- 27:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So, like y me and the CFO are working for you.
- 28:03
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 28:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): if you want to take this over and you want to run it, please do. And then he would say, Hey, hey, hey, let's let's not do that.
- 28:09
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 28:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): then I would continue for one more month and I'd run the business for him. And we wound up recouping maybe sixty or seventy cents on the dollar for the lenders, zero for the equity holders.
- 28:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Right.
- 28:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Um, but you know, it was a very different tenor, a very different level of scrutiny and a different devot level of expectation when you go from you know, a performing loan to a non performing loan, you get put in the workout group. Question I'll have for you as we get deeper into this is do private credit firms have that workout muscle the way that traditional bank
- 28:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): lenders did, right? 'Cause this is relatively new to private credit that we're in kind of a downturn on the credit side. And do they have the the um capabilities to like really drive work out the way the banks used to? So all right, that was a great 101. Great introduction, Kenny. Good way to get us warmed up and also to teach the listeners all the
- 28:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): lingo uh that lives in private credit. So let's do this. So you're the head of credit research at Pitchbook. You see all the data. You guys have bought lots of credit data, bought companies that have access to a lot of this stuff. So you've got everything. We had this huge run-up start. since the GFC in private credit that seemed to
- 29:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): accelerate post-COVID, you know. So from hundreds of billions to maybe, are we in the trillions of private credit in terms of total AUM? It just grew very, very fast. And as private credit equity grew, private credit grew alongside it. But it is a massive amount of capital in private credit. Often, hey, this is
- 29:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): safer than equity.
- 29:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Uh it has a nice yield, more so than you know a bank loan.
- 29:44
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Uh,
- 29:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and these are professionals, these are solid businesses. It performs like you know typical um you know good quality credit, uh other loans, just with more yield. Whether that was totally true or not, who knows? But certainly, you know, hey, these are professional investors. The default rates are relatively low and the
- 30:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): interest is is relatively high comparatively. Something cracked earlier this year, 2026, the bloom kind of fell off the private credit rose. Lots of headlines in Q1, certainly coming out of CESPOCLIPS given the concentration of private equity in software, and many of these very large loans with a lot of take privates and other
- 30:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): things, and at very aggressive
- 30:26
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): means.
- 30:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): multiples given software businesses' um ability to cash flow and potentially pay off the loan in a down cycle given their cash flow dynamics. People got very comfortable loaning to software businesses. So from where you sit, what happened in 2026
- 30:44
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): up
- 30:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): till now, walk us through kind of the timeline of of what you saw um happening in private credit. What were the arguments, you know, pro and con? What was actually happening? What are you seeing in the data? So let's do that and then the next segment we'll talk about where we're headed from here, but really focus on that run-up and then kind of the cracks in the armor.
- 31:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah. So so Devin, I I on that,
- 31:09
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 31:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): think the private credit market was actually seeing some signs at that the latter part of twenty twenty five, as a matter of fact, where it kinda led into it where
- 31:21
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): at
- 31:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): a certain point and and I'll get into this a little bit further later, is the the software announcements in February kind of exacerbated it exponentially. I think
- 31:33
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
- 31:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it was or but it was already happening from what you see.
- 31:35
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It
- 31:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): was already happening. Yeah.
- 31:36
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Walk us
- 31:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): through that. What were you seeing and what
- 31:38
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): does
- 31:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that mean?
- 31:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): We were seeing a a rising level of pick loans, number one. Right. We we can't exactly tell whether these are for uh from an opportunity opportunistic basis or on a distress basis, right? So we you know that but we did see that the level was rising.
- 31:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Meaning
- 31:57
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): people had
- 31:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): picked pick toggles and they were choosing to toggle to pick
- 32:01
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): up. to
- 32:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): toggle, right.
- 32:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Okay.
- 32:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Right. And we've seen that grow and it was like, okay, this is interesting. You know, it's getting to a a a a level. And um at the same time,
- 32:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
- 32:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): second half of twenty twenty five is when you saw spreads come down. So actually there was There's some level of in opportunities for the credit markets, right? For borrowers to refinance out if they haven't already. Um, especially in light of the the Fed raising rates in 22, where
- 32:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you know companies were still struggling through. Now was an opportune time for them to refinance or or tak take care of that MA act uh transaction while they can, right? So that was, you know, that was what happened. through 25. And the expectation, even at that time,
- 32:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): was we should be anticipating MA activity to pick
- 32:58
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): up
- 32:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): in 26. Right?
- 33:01
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 33:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): two things actually hit uh impacted the private credit market, I think. One is the This the software AI disruption issue, right, in February when Enthrop Anthropic
- 33:15
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): had
- 33:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): mentioned, you know, they released Claude, the new version of Claude, and it was just,
- 33:21
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
- 33:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): know, impacting the whole market across the board. Across the board. And then the second one was really the Middle Eastern War.
- 33:32
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): When
- 33:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): did that so? March, I think.
- 33:35
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So we
- 33:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): had this like uh we had Claude Co Claude Coworking. Cowork comes out in February, meaning everybody non-programmer has access to this machine that's like, oh my goodness. The w the lenders
- 33:46
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): are
- 33:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): like they care about existential risk.
- 33:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Right.
- 33:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Right? Like they can do fine in a in a windown
- 33:53
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): if
- 33:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the business can cash flow. And that's been the argument around software is hey, we could just cut sales and marketing RD and have sixty 60% percent cash flow margins, and we could pay off this loan, even in a really bad scenario. What happened in February was oh, these things might actually just go out of business. They might, you know, be obliterated by that. Largely overdone, but you know, that certainly was a reaction. So
- 34:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): a lot of scrutiny on software all of a sudden. And also, you know, uh a lot of the software loans underperforming on the big s the big end. And then, yeah, then we have the Halo trade, uh, hard assets. low obsolescence. So people cycle into this hard assets, low obsolescence trade coming out of the AI
- 34:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): scare right into
- 34:35
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
- 34:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Gulf War, you know, the the the new version of the Gulf War with Iran here. So then you have oil spikes and you know demand you know supply shocks and things like that. So yeah, it got really hairy there in in in March. So
- 34:50
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): but did
- 34:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): just because the headlines were bad, was the underlying data getting worse?
- 34:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): It actually was. It was getting worse. Um and you know, let me just you pull back the other part that
- 35:06
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): we
- 35:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): were anticipating was interest rates were Are gonna go down as well.
- 35:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And you know, obviously that's not happening. And as we know, this week
- 35:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): is a good thing.
- 35:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): we'll find out soon.
- 35:16
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You
- 35:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): know, will interest rates go up? Will the the Fed raise rates? So that'll put a little bit more
- 35:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): pressure across the board for everyone.
- 35:27
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 35:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): we'll see what what happens there. But yeah, absolutely, I think you're right. In
- 35:31
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): when
- 35:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Anthropic made their announcements, there was a probably I my my
- 35:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): thought process. or
- 35:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): how I viewed the market
- 35:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): reaction was basically
- 35:46
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): was
- 35:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): like, what do we do now? You know, this came across a little bit sooner than we anticipated, and now we have to deal with it. What do we do now? And that's when you saw the market just go down. Right? Looking at the BSL market, bid prices went down from 94 ninety-four to 87. eighty-seven, like straight down.
- 36:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So explain
- 36:05
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): to
- 36:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): people what that means. Like so we know like you know, a stock price goes down or uh uh the valuation of a company goes down, but what does that mean in in credit terms?
- 36:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): So on the BSL market, the the loans are traded and there there's a mark on it. Um there's a valuation on the on the loans um
- 36:24
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): for
- 36:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): all of the loans in the BSL market, whether it's like li liquid meaning traded widely or if it's just narrowly held, then you know that doesn't trade that much, but there's still some level of value to it.
- 36:36
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You
- 36:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): could buy a dollar of credit for
- 36:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): eighty four cents.
- 36:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, exactly. So it's looked at from eighty you know, eighty cents on on the cents basis. Yep. Right. So it's eighty seven cents or eighty seven
- 36:55
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah, and
- 36:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): unlike private equity, that you can't see it every day.
- 36:59
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A
- 36:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): lot of
- 36:59
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): these
- 36:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): loans in the BSL, broadly syndicated loan market, have a price that's public.
- 37:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, exactly. Yeah. So and that's what makes that market liquid and you know and and also popular too, is because you can trade in and out of it. Um but you know obviously the trading price
- 37:18
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): can
- 37:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): be affected quite quickly, especially with a big sell-off like that.
- 37:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And understand, like if the loan is worth less than a dollar,
- 37:26
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
- 37:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): equity is worth zero. The only time the the loan is worth less than a dollar, right, is if you can't pay back all of the loan.
- 37:34
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): If
- 37:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you can't pay back all the loan, you can't pay any of the equity. Right?
- 37:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Right. Yeah. Yeah.
- 37:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So this basically means in a business that's trade where the debt is trading below par,
- 37:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the equity,
- 37:48
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it
- 37:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): would, you'd expect the equity to be wiped out. Whether private equity investors were right, had those assets down held at zero, that's a whole other story. We could have a a podcast about. Don't know. Um, But you could see, hey, I this loan on this company. is trading at 80 cents at 80. Um, so that would mean the equity's got to be worthless.
- 38:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, exactly. Exactly.
- 38:10
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): All right.
- 38:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So you're seeing all this held out. And like 71% of lenders in your survey, you guys did a survey of lenders at Pitchbook, said uh software was the least favorable place to put
- 38:20
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): cred
- 38:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you know credit
- 38:21
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in
- 38:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that this is just too hard. We we don't know. And we've seen that in our world. We live at a smaller end. of the world, but very large software deals. You've seen a lot fewer take privates this year than in prior years, because if you do a two billion dollar take private, the expectation is probably getting a billion of that in debt and it's just not available for software right
- 38:40
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): now.
- 38:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So you have to over equitize these things, which is going to put pressure on the returns
- 38:45
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um,
- 38:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): because you can't get the loans. You may not be able
- 38:48
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): to
- 38:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): get any of it, or you maybe get it at a much lower level. or you may have a lot of covenants you may not necessarily want to agree agree to. So it's just not attractive enough. So this is what you're seeing play out in the spring as all this is happening.
- 39:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, yeah. And the unfortunate part is that it hit across the software sector, right? It wasn't like, okay, these software loans are good over here, or you know, we can disregard it, they're okay, let's focus on the on the bad. ones. But no, it kind of hit across the board. And even with the with the good software
- 39:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): borrowers,
- 39:21
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): their
- 39:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): pricing when if and when they needed refinancing or needed to finance anything, they're still paying the extra premium for
- 39:30
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it.
- 39:31
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 39:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): here's we were joking in in our prior conversations about this, that nobody defaults anymore, though, right? So you would think with all this stress and these loans trading at discounts, there'd be big defaults. So I think, you know, almost 12% of loans,
- 39:46
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you know,
- 39:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): given your research, trade below ninety. And software is half of that, whether that's true today or you know it's you know broadly true this year.
- 39:55
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
- 39:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the defaults rates are still under one percent
- 40:00
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah.
- 40:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah. So even if there were defaults, they've you know more of them are becoming LME transactions, which we kind of defined earlier on. And those are more more pr predominant Dominant these days and much easier to get done than to do that traditional bankruptcy filing. Yeah, that's for
- 40:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): sure. Even though
- 40:30
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): like
- 40:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): default rates right now are low, and that's reflecting the BSL market, by the way, not the private credit market. So that point eight seven percent uh default rate for traditional type defaults, um, i it it it is low. The I think the average is like 10-year ten year average is about close to
- 40:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): one and a half percent, which is also low, by the
- 40:54
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): way.
- 40:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Um
- 40:56
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it's
- 40:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): been a
- 40:56
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): great ten
- 40:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): years.
- 40:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, for ten years.
- 40:59
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It's
- 40:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): probably the wrong ten years to like get the average, but you know, totally understood.
- 41:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): That's
- 41:04
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): true.
- 41:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): That's true.
- 41:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): That's probably about to change a little
- 41:07
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): bit.
- 41:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Um but n here's another ninety-two percent of this market, again, I'm just citing your research back to you, ninety two percent.
- 41:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So if you can't trip a covenant, does default even mean anything anymore, right?
- 41:24
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): If
- 41:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you have so few covenants.
- 41:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah. Yeah, that's exactly right. So you have that as well. Um where because you can't call it default or a covenant default, and moreover, when it even comes to that point where they do need to come back to the table, they meaning the borrower, is they want to come and say, okay, well let's
- 41:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): renegotiate. Yeah. And at that point, there's a likelihood, especially if it's Carved Light and given the particulars,
- 41:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): they have a there's a likelihood that they could do an LME transaction. And guess what? If you're not w one of those negotiating early with them, then you could be left out of that deal. And you know, it may not be to your advantage. Yeah. So those that's what's happening on that
- 42:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): front. But one thing you did mention, Devin, that uh that 11% distress ratio or stress ratio, anything greater than less than 90 cents on a dollar.
- 42:25
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well,
- 42:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that's 11%.
- 42:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): 80 cents on a dollar and below is about 6.5%, which is actually a pretty high number, close to what it was in 2022 when the Fed funds uh rates were increased significantly. So the stress is there. And maybe the question is whether it's going to come in the next
- 42:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): three to six months, right?
- 42:49
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Is it
- 42:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): going to come to fruition that these distressed credits are eventually going to move into that default or LME type default?
- 42:59
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 42:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): if you're an LP in a credit fund,
- 43:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): um, what are you and you've been on you know on all sides of the table over your career in this, what are you looking for now? Like are there canaries in the coal man? Are there data points that you want to really pay attention to? to as the quarterly reports come in or as you're checking the the pricing on some of these loans? Like w what are the things
- 43:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that you're on your checklist of I should be worried here or I should be really worried?
- 43:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah. So if you have access to the financials, which I presume you do as an LP, then you know it may make sense to just take a look
- 43:37
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): at
- 43:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): um
- 43:38
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
- 43:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): underlying investments of the companies and see how they're doing and how and also on top of that is to really have a gauge of how much software sensitivity they have. Are they sensitive to any AI disruption and are they doing anything about
- 43:56
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it?
- 43:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Right? Are they proactively investing in the company to make sure they're competitive? That's one, right? And the other one is how sensitive are they to geopolitical change, inflation, and also global trade too. If you're if you are in need of certain raw materials from
- 44:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): overseas and that spigot shuts,
- 44:20
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): are
- 44:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you gonna survive? Do you have an alternative? Right? I mean, those things would go in my mind to say, okay, is this portfolio how much stress or sensitivity does this portfolio have that could put this into a distress situation?
- 44:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): One thing we learned in the GFC, loved your opinion on this, is that
- 44:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): some lenders moved real fast and things were ugly and you know, cents on the dollar. Some lenders in other situations, maybe even bigger situations where there was more. at risk, actually kind of played ball. Say, listen, the private equity firm has an incentive to make this work. We don't want to come in and take the keys and move too fast. Let's
- 45:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): amend the credit agreement, cut some deals, maybe swat some debt for equity, but let's let the owner run this and drive this thing. And generally, like the defaults coming out of GFC for the people who are patient. I don't have the data. I'm going back on kind of anecdotal stuff, weren't as bad as everybody thought in the fall of
- 45:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): 2008 into 2009. The things kind of worked itself out, and if you just sat tight, it wasn't a great outcome, but it wasn't maybe as bad. What are you seeing today? Um are lenders moving in fast? Should they move be moving in faster and kind of dictating the plays here a little bit? Obviously they're in some pretty Cov Late situations, so maybe they
- 45:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): don't have the power to do that. But what are some things a LP, a credit LP can do
- 45:47
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): to
- 45:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): get ahead of some of this stuff?
- 45:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, you can take not really uh about the GFC period, but really about the 2022 period when interest rates went up significantly, and what happened there with the COVID cobblike deals?
- 46:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Essentially we saw a huge plot of pile of LM transactions coming in to do exactly that. It's like, okay, you know, the sponsors are coming in, the creditors are also coming in and discussing, okay, what can we do about this? Um do you want the keys or do you want to try to
- 46:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): work something out?
- 46:24
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You know,
- 46:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I I think that was a good rep representation of what what could transpire as we look at the next potential recession or or uh trough period.
- 46:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So we talked a little bit about this. Uh commercial lending to private equity deals um was much more prevalent uh before the GFC, heading into the GFC and during the dot dot-com, com. So late nineties and early two 2000s, thousands,
- 46:50
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
- 46:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and then then you know heading up into the GFC. Um
- 46:54
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): they
- 46:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): they knew the workout playbook. They had been around for a long time. They had made you know thousands and thousands of loans over decades. Private credit, obviously smart people, the right incentives, all with you know credit backgrounds and things, but they haven't had a time like this
- 47:10
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in
- 47:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): a meaningful way, maybe other that bad blip in 2022. twenty twenty two. Did they are they equipped, in your opinion,
- 47:17
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): um,
- 47:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): to to get these companies into and through a workout?
- 47:22
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um
- 47:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): uh 'cause it's been a while before the industry since the industry's really had
- 47:27
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): to
- 47:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): exercise those muscles?
- 47:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, that's a that's a great question, Devin. Um and I also wonder about that too. I mean, is just having a regular credit acumen, is that sufficient to get transactions done, whether there's got hair on it or not, right? Um so it does cross my mind that's like
- 47:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): what what can what can firms do, what can funds do to restructure these deals, these types of restructures, do they have the bells and whistles to actually last through the next phase of this company? the re-emergence of this company, whether you actually went into bankruptcy or
- 48:06
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): not.
- 48:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Right?
- 48:08
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You know,
- 48:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I I think it's a good question. I I I don't know if I have the full answer to
- 48:13
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it.
- 48:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): But you know, certainly the way of restructuring deals are quite a bit different from back then.
- 48:19
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah.
- 48:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): When,
- 48:20
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you know,
- 48:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): if a payment default happened, then it's 100%. vote. All lenders are involved.
- 48:26
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Now
- 48:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it's like, you know, if payment default you
- 48:29
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
- 48:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): occurs, then you're at this point where is it just a majority vote? Do I even have a say in this? It's uh, you know, it does make it a little bit difficult, but it moves quick. It does move quick. That's the only um offset.
- 48:46
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well,
- 48:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): hey, if Scott from PWC's workout group is still around and hasn't ground all its time. his teeth to dust, uh, he was pretty effective twenty-five years ago screaming at me. Uh so maybe they gotta hire Scott to come in and yell at some people. All right, so let's do this. Transport yourself back, Kenny, to Fleet Bank and BNY Mellon. Remember when BNY Mellon
- 49:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): was still a thing? Sitting across the table from a borrower.
- 49:11
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Uh
- 49:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): so what did that teach you about what's going on now and where things are headed? So obviously you're on the research side with Pitchbook telling us what's going on and looking at this, but kind of go back to that part of your career when you were across the table from
- 49:26
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
- 49:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): from a borrower. Um what have you learned? And we're going to talk about where we headed from here. Like what what what's your research showing and what's your own experience of what happens in times like these over the next you know twelve, 12, twenty-four 24 months?
- 49:38
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
- 49:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that's a great question. I uh you're bringing back memories here. Some are good.
- 49:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Some are, you know, uh questionable. But um yeah, so bringing back to Fleet Bank was when I really started my c career in commercial banking. Now I was a uh an underwriter, Writer, analyst, slash portfolio manager, working in the middle market space. And uh this was in in Fairfield County,
- 50:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Connecticut. I don't know if you're familiar. Yeah. You know, Southwestern Connecticut slash also Westchester. We had some market there too. And we catered to middle market companies. Um sometimes they're the the local tire shop, the local supermarkets, and some are actually large companies, you know, that
- 50:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): eventually became syndicated deals. And it was a really good experience for me. Things I learned really was really about fundamental credit analysis, making sure you understand leverage, you understand liquidity, um, when deterioration happens, like if there's an inventory
- 50:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): build, you question that, right? It's like why is it growing? Is it because of business is growing or is it just not selling?
- 50:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): You know, cash flows. Some one of the things I still keep in my mind to this day is even if you look at revenues as a number, which is great. You look at revenues, if it's growing, great. But even further below that, you should be looking at the volume of business being done. I think
- 51:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that's been missing more recently. How many subscribers are there?
- 51:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Was it just price increases and maybe uh pass through of you know additional costs? There's actually the units going up, the number of customers going up, those things. Is that what you're talking about?
- 51:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, exactly. So if you're a software company and you have 10,000 subscribers this month, then next month you have 9,000 but your revenue stays the same,
- 51:35
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
- 51:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): gotta question what happens to the other thousand subscribers.
- 51:39
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Are
- 51:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): they was it because of the price increase that you lost a thousand subscribers?
- 51:43
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
- 51:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): things like that I think is important for us to remember to analyze those things. And obviously liquidity is a key driver of, you know, how a company's gonna do and if you're seeing deteriorating liquidity, then there's a likelihood that at some point whether a business is growing or
- 52:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): not growing, it's going to be an issue.
- 52:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah. And then you know you ran debt recoveries at S P. So what did you see in your S P days
- 52:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that you still draw on as you're looking at this research and trying to predict what happens in the future?
- 52:21
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah.
- 52:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): At SP, I was uh I was
- 52:25
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 52:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): was working on rec debt recovery ratings. So we assigned ratings to um company companies uh debt facilities. And along with that is we look at the probability of default, and then we also look at what's the likelihood of a recovery uh on that
- 52:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): debt in the case of a default. So the type of kind of recovery we get. is gonna either get it notched up or notched down. So if it's 100% recovery, even in the default case, then you would notch that rating up. So it binds with your credit credit rating.
- 53:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): So one of the things I learned there is that
- 53:09
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
- 53:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the kind of debt structure, the kind of leverage,
- 53:12
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
- 53:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the underlying cash flow that drives valuations is going to determine what your re ultimate recovery is.
- 53:19
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
- 53:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): those are you know the the key ones there. Of of course, the there's other factors, but in general, those three or four actually drive most of the recovery.
- 53:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah. So one thing people who follow uh the private credit market have predicted what would happened happen is happening is that the maturity walls are getting pushed out. So 28, 29, 30 were going to be big uh maturities. That appears to be getting pushed out to 2031, 2032, maybe like a half a trillion
- 53:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): dollars in sponsor debt getting pushed out, the maturity wall getting pushed
- 53:54
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): out. Is
- 53:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that a good thing that people are just like being rational and saying, hey, let's not, you know, let's give these companies some time to execute? Does that make you nervous? Like uh is the researcher working on and unpacking, you know, what's in there? Uh, you know, what's your view on on this?
- 54:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, what you're making me think about is one of the pieces that our one of our teams had written about, and it was a I forget the name now, but it's about z zombie companies. Yeah.
- 54:23
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 54:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): focused on P PE P E companies and how there's about thirteen thousand companies out there that's really waiting to be who are very close to their exit period and
- 54:35
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you know,
- 54:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): nothing's been done yet and it's about time to do it. What do you do in those situations? I think in those cases, along with levered type companies, those are the ones that you we need to be concerned about, right? And and along with that is the maturity. If if pushing out the
- 54:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): debt to th 2031 or 2032 is the way to do it, just to kick the can down the road, that's great so long as they can continue to generate the cash flows that they need to service it. But not all of the companies are in that situation. And that's where it doesn't matter, right? So you know in some cases it's
- 55:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): great, but in some other cases, you know, it it's inevitable that
- 55:20
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that
- 55:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): company, that type of company would be even further distressed.
- 55:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah, if you're cash flowing, your current on your AM, or your current on your debt service interest, and your Are uh generally in compliance with the covenants, as light as they might be,
- 55:38
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): um
- 55:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and or maybe you've reset the covenants or things.
- 55:41
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah.
- 55:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I
- 55:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): can understand a lender kind of sitting tight. I don't think there are a lot of lenders who are pushing out maturities on uh distressed assets. I think the lenders are jumping in and trying to recover as much as
- 55:52
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): they
- 55:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): possibly can at this point, trying to figure out a way, a way home. So maybe on these like uh good not great cases, it's like listen, we're not gonna try and refinance the debt with another. lender at this point. Like this is per a performing loan, maybe not performing great for the equity. Um, but what's another extra year or two of
- 56:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): interest here at pretty good interest rates? And maybe there's a default interest rate, you know, increase or something. Um so all right, let how does this end? With a bang, with a whimper? Um, you know, five years from now?
- 56:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Uh you know, what are you writing about? as you look back at this period?
- 56:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, that's a good question. What I envision is neither a bang nor a whimper, but in my mind it's like a huge glacier that's melting and you can't do anything about it and it's just sliding down.
- 56:45
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You
- 56:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): can't hold it back, you can't refreeze it. It's just coming your way. Yeah. And we we think back as I what could we have done to
- 56:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): protect ourselves or change the course of direction? And um, that's what I would be thinking about. Things I'm working on now is looking at
- 57:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): defaults on the private credit space, where we do see some increase in the middle market side. So companies that have liabilities between 100 to 500 million, we are seeing double-digit increases and defaults. Bankruptcy defaults, not LMEs.
- 57:21
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Okay.
- 57:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Bankruptcy defaults. And you know,
- 57:24
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): double
- 57:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): digit
- 57:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): increases in the amount
- 57:27
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): of data. Increases, right.
- 57:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Not the rate. Not the rate.
- 57:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yep.
- 57:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Um that non-accruals are actually much higher than we think. So we just did a piece on non-accruals, and uh what we saw. s seeing is that especially in BDC funds, what you're seeing is that some companies have some BDCs have uh their investments in
- 57:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): non-accrual, but others actually don't on the same loan. And you know, so basically how do you see discern the distress of one one's view and then the other one is not in distress.
- 58:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah.
- 58:04
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah.
- 58:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Uh
- 58:05
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
- 58:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): before we get to the quick lightning round here, um how does the private credit industry kind of get its mojo back or and and kind of take control of the narrative given how difficult the narrative has been in 2026 um after years of, hey, let's pile into this great yield year, especially given, you know, Nas and I and your team have talked
- 58:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): a lot about um the high net worth and the retail clients, you know, um allocating to private credit given the yield attractiveness and the perceived safety of these.
- 58:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Any ideas if you're talking giving advice to the industry? What how do they get how do they get their proof back here?
- 58:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, first of all, private credit is not going away. It's such a such a meaningful part of the the credit markets that you know it just comes hand in hand.
- 58:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Even like now what you're seeing in debt structures, you see in many cases you see a BSL loan,
- 59:02
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
- 59:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): then you see a private credit loan, and potentially you could see a bond bond issuance at the same debt structure.
- 59:07
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 59:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it's not going away. I think it provides a healthy competition for the credit markets.
- 59:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um
- 59:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): is there credit risk? Yes, there is credit risk, and you can see some deterioration, as I mentioned.
- 59:22
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Pic
- 59:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): clones still prevalent in this in in the portfolio. Non-accruals are rising. Okay, so that's that's important to point out. Is it gonna go up and down? Maybe, but you know, you go through your troughs and peaks.
- 59:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): In terms of the retail investment or or interest from the retail side, looking here, I mean, it would make sense to at least have a sense of what this business is about. That this is lending, this is a long term asset, nothing that you can go in and out that easily. Right. So that's
- 59:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that's one of the things I think is important to understand that the these types of investments are longer term. And you know, sometimes you can write it out. I guess sometimes you may may not, right? Depends on the investment.
- 1:00:13
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah.
- 1:00:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And uh
- 1:00:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the head
- 1:00:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): of research at Pitchbook and I Nas, if you go back if you know several episodes into the June timeframe, we did an we did a piece on you know f private equity in your 401, 401k, which was mostly around private credit in your 401k. and kind of
- 1:00:28
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
- 1:00:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): ups the upside and downside of that, kind of how that's playing out uh and things. Now with this sitting in private credit, like with LPs and GPs and, you know, fund lives and things and gates, right? So uh kind of semi liquid interval fund type structures,
- 1:00:44
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): there
- 1:00:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): can't be a run on the bank.
- 1:00:46
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 1:00:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): mean there can, and they could say like, we don't have to give it to you. But back in the GFC, there could be a run on the bank.
- 1:00:53
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): There
- 1:00:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): was a run on Silicon Valley Bank a few years ago.
- 1:00:57
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Uh
- 1:00:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): so I think that forces people to kind of cool their heads prevail, work something out. Maybe the equity is worthless. Maybe there can be incentives for that management team and some of the equity holders to pay attention and drive a result for the lenders. Maybe the loan is you know, under par and distressed. But kind
- 1:01:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): of this idea of
- 1:01:20
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
- 1:01:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): like we had in two thousand eight, two thousand nine, that there could be an absolute run on the banks and banks had to be merged and, you know, all called to Washington and forced to sign a piece of paper and all these things. Like this is going to work itself out much more in a much Which uh maybe not to a good result for some of these loans during this time period, but it's not going to be uh, hey, everybody get
- 1:01:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): called to Washington.
- 1:01:42
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You
- 1:01:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): gotta sign a piece of paper. We're gonna force some of you to go under uh things. There may be some failed lenders for sure, but uh, I think given the structures and the where the money
- 1:01:51
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): has
- 1:01:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): um been put, you will have some very large institutions lose some money for sure. But you're not having, you know, grandma and grandpa's 401k wiped out because they put it all in a bank. that went under and there was a run in the bank with, you know, bad lend bad lending uh uh practices.
- 1:02:08
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 1:02:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): can't say that universally, but certainly you think of the brand name private credit firms. Um do you agree with that? Disagree with that.
- 1:02:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Please disagree. It will make it much more exciting.
- 1:02:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Well um
- 1:02:26
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in
- 1:02:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): many ways, yes, I I do agree uh with that. You know, I I think when you compare the periods, the uh it's just different. The the things that the circumstances that's that we're under today are quite quite a bit different from the the GFC period, although So inflation
- 1:02:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): rates were high at that time. Interest rates were high at that time as well. I I remember spreads being five five hundred bips, LIBO spreads.
- 1:03:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): But we're not exactly there yet. But does it have to be par par and par with that to be considered a recession or even get getting to that point? I don't think we're gonna see that type of a scenario this time. but other scenarios
- 1:03:16
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 1:03:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): think will come into play, whether it's energy related, whether it's um really global competition, global trade issues, maybe war, right? So we are in
- 1:03:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): at a sensitive time for war and that could you know change um the markets.
- 1:03:35
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah.
- 1:03:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Well hey, as they say, may you live in interesting times. So let's get to uh uh one question we ask everybody is uh you
- 1:03:43
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): know
- 1:03:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): give me a bet your bonus prediction.
- 1:03:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I yeah, that's a good question. What's my prediction? I I you know maybe I'll I'll do a soft one. That's
- 1:03:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): all right.
- 1:03:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Um
- 1:03:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I think there's gonna be some rise in defaults in the private credit space. Um as I mentioned before, distress ratios on the BSL side are also on the high side. So we're probably gonna see some defaults rise. This is just me thinking. Probably within the next two years we'll
- 1:04:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): we'll see that.
- 1:04:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah.
- 1:04:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Um and
- 1:04:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): given that we said a lot of these loans are Cov Lite.
- 1:04:23
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Are A
- 1:04:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Cov Lite, right?
- 1:04:25
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): To default
- 1:04:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): to default you. need to be in pretty the underlying performance of the assets has to be pretty bad.
- 1:04:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Right. Right. So in that regard, to the extent it's Cov Lite, then what could happen is we'll see a lot of uh a lot more LME transactions come into play. Even in the private credit space, we'll we'll see
- 1:04:44
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that. But
- 1:04:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): but you know, overall in terms of distress, we sh I my my gut tells me that it's probably gonna increase quite a bit
- 1:04:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): in
- 1:04:52
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
- 1:04:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): next year.
- 1:04:53
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well
- 1:04:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): soon after this airs, we're gonna have the head of restructuring from Hulan Loki on for a second time. So we'll uh we'll we'll then we'll
- 1:05:01
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): do
- 1:05:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): like a round table with me, you, and him uh at the beginning
- 1:05:03
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): of
- 1:05:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): next year and see how we did. All right, so final question. So I'm sure your parents, family members gave you advice as a as a kid, and maybe it still rattles around in your brain and maybe you you you hear yourself. saying it um despite your best efforts to not take any advice from your parents so what's some advice you got as a uh over during your
- 1:05:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): life that you give to other you pass it on to other people
- 1:05:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): well I this this advice I get pretty much still to this day and I try to fight it every time every time my mom calls my folks call and they tell, Kenny, have you done this yet? I was like, not yet. Well, do it. Do it. I was like, okay, I'll do it. I'll do it.
- 1:05:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And I still to this day, I still like try to try to uh you know push it off. But I find myself doing that with my kids now. And and uh thankfully so far they haven't pushed off that much. All right,
- 1:06:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): good. Kenny Tang, uh senior director and the head of US credit research at Pitchbook, thank you so much for spending the last hour with us and walking everybody through from the, you know, uh 101 to I think 401. We maybe even gotten into some graduate level coursework there along the way. Uh for more information on Pitchbook, a big partner of uh the
- 1:06:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Funcast and me and my team at Parker Gale, uh you can see the links in the show notes below. We'll link some of uh Kenny's research as well there. Uh and the only way other people find this
- 1:06:34
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
- 1:06:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and nerd out uh like Kenny and I like to do uh on private credit is if you subscribe
- 1:06:39
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
- 1:06:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): on YouTube, Spotify,
- 1:06:43
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): um
- 1:06:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Apple or wherever else you listen to podcasts. Um so I appreciate you spending time with us. Kenny,
- 1:06:49
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): great
- 1:06:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): to hang out with you. I'm sure we'll be talking again soon and uh we'll be tracking your predictions. Bye for now.
- 1:06:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Sounds good. Great. Thank you, Devin. Really appreciate it.
- 1:06:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Technology issues, the middle market PE back companies. They bicker with each other and they don't take themselves too seriously. It's not venture cap control,
- 1:07:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): it's private equity, it's the private equity.
- 1:07:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): funcast, pour yourself a drink and have a seat.
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