UTI's US-64 crisis exposed accounting flaws, leading to government bailout and SEBI regulatory reform.
Summary
Speakers Deepak and Shray detail the UTI Unit Scheme 64 crisis, where trend pricing and cost-based accounting masked massive unrealized losses as equity exposure grew. The Deepak Parekh committee recommended NAV pricing, but UTI's refusal led to a 2001 redemption run and government bailout. The episode highlights how this event ended UTI's monopoly, forced SEBI regulation, and established modern mutual fund safety rules like segregated portfolios and direct plans.
Episode sections
- 0:41 – 2:55
Introduction and UTI's Legislative Origin
Speaker 2 introduces the episode's focus on the UTI and US-64 crisis as a formative event for India's mutual fund industry. Deepak explains that UTI was created by an Act of Parliament, similar to LIC, and was the only mutual fund allowed until 1987 when SBI and Canara Bank were permitted to start their own funds.
- 2:55 – 4:56
US-64 Structure and Trend Pricing
Deepak describes Unit Scheme 64 (US-64) as a tax-free dividend vehicle initially backed by government bonds. Due to a lack of electronic infrastructure in the 1960s, UTI used 'trend pricing,' announcing a single sale and repurchase price once a year rather than marking assets to market daily.
- 4:56 – 12:15
Shift to Equity and Accounting Issues
Over time, US-64's portfolio shifted from debt to nearly 70% equity by the late 1990s, despite markets being flat from 1992-1998. Investments were carried at cost rather than market value, hiding unrealized losses. UTI paid high dividends (17-18%) partly by drawing down reserves, which turned negative by 1998.
- 12:15 – 21:01
Deepak Parekh Committee Recommendations and Government Bailout
The Deepak Parekh committee recommended NAV-based pricing and reduced equity exposure. The government provided a bailout, buying overvalued PSU shares from UTI at cost (3,300 crore) and arranging a 500 crore injection from LIC, SBI, PNB, and Bank of Baroda, but UTI refused to adopt NAV pricing.
- 21:01 – 26:33
2001 Market Crises and Redemption Run
A series of events in early 2001 triggered a crisis: the Anandharati Rathi BSE scandal, the Ketan Parekh/Calcutta Stock Exchange payment crisis, NIT profit warnings, and the Tehelka political scandal. These caused a 30% market fall and led to a redemption run on US-64 by 2 crore unit holders.
- 26:33 – 27:48
Suspension of Redemptions and Market Volatility
Deepak describes how massive redemptions in early 2001 forced UTI to suspend repurchases in July 2001, locking investors in. He notes the Sensex fell 30%, rose 25% by June, then fell another 30% by September, while UTI continued to use pretend NAV pricing.
- 27:48 – 32:47
Parliamentary Inquiry and Government Bailout Structure
A 541-page joint parliamentary committee report revealed UTI had 20% NPAs and bad debt practices. The government executed a bailout and takeover, offering investors a guaranteed exit price starting at 10 rupees per unit, increasing to 12 rupees over 20 months, in exchange for taking ownership of UTI's shares.
- 32:47 – 37:23
Government Profit from ITC Holdings and Regulatory Reform
The government acquired shares in companies like ITC, L&T, and Axis Bank through the bailout. These shares appreciated significantly, allowing the government to recover more than the 14,000 crore bailout cost. UTI was split, with the new AMC brought under SEBI regulation, ending the UTI Act.
- 37:23 – 48:53
Lessons on Concentration, Taxation, and 'Pretend and Extend'
Deepak highlights lessons learned: avoiding single-player dominance (UTI was 72% of AUM in 2001), not granting selective tax-free dividends, and avoiding 'pretend and extend' accounting. He contrasts UTI's hidden losses with modern SEBI segregated portfolio rules used in cases like Vodafone and Yes Bank.
- 48:53 – 50:23
Regulatory Reforms and Industry Crises
Deepak lists several Indian mutual fund crises and regulatory changes, including the 2013 liquid fund NAV negative event, the 2016 JP Morgan fund default, the 2018 ILFS crisis, and the 2019 Bharti Airtel promoter group crisis. He notes that SEBI reduced entry loads to zero in 2009 and introduced direct plans in 2013 to address high upfront costs for investors.
- 50:23 – 51:47
Marketing Allowances and Trail Commissions
The speaker discusses the 2018 recategorization and marketing expense allowances, citing an NFO that collected Rs 5,000 crore with Rs 300 crore allocated for marketing. He explains that regulators initially allowed spreading this 6% hit over five years but later prohibited 'pretend and extend' accounting. He also mentions the shift from high upfront commissions to trail commissions.
- 51:47 – 53:27
Evolution of Mutual Fund Safety and Rules
The speakers reflect on how decades of crises have shaped the safety of mutual funds, noting that features like single schemes per category (since 2018) and direct plans are relatively recent developments. Deepak emphasizes that regulations like OTPs for redemptions exist because of past incidents, such as an uncle losing Rs 25 lakhs due to credential theft.
- 53:27 – 54:07
Podcast Conclusion and Call to Action
The hosts conclude the episode, thanking listeners and inviting them to subscribe on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, or YouTube. They direct listeners to capitalmind.in, capitalmindwealth.com, or capitalmindmf.com for more products and services.
Claims worth verifying
UTI was created by an Act of Parliament, similar to LIC, and was the only mutual fund allowed until 1987.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·2:34
How to verify: Check the Unit Trust of India (Transfer of Undertaking and Reorganisation) Act, 2026 or historical SEBI mutual fund regulations for the timeline of non-UTI fund approvals. For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceThe first two non-UTI mutual funds were SBI and Canara Bank, allowed in 1987.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·2:34
How to verify: Review SEBI's historical records or the annual reports of SBI Mutual Fund and Canara Bank Mutual Fund for their establishment dates. For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceUS-64 paid dividends of 17-18% which were tax-free.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·7:55
How to verify: Check historical income tax laws regarding mutual fund dividends and UTI's annual reports for US-64 dividend declarations in the 1990s. For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
By 1998, US-64's reserves had gone negative.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·10:26
How to verify: Review the Joint Parliamentary Committee report on UTI or UTI's audited financial statements for the year ending 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The Deepak Parekh committee recommended NAV-based pricing for UTI.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·12:27
How to verify: Access the report of the Committee on UTI constituted by the Government of India, chaired by Deepak Parekh. For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceThe government bought 3,300 crore worth of PSU shares from UTI at cost, despite a market value of 1,500 crore.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·16:41
How to verify: Check the Union Budget documents or government press releases from 2026-2026 regarding the UTI bailout and asset transfer. For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceLIC, SBI, PNB, and Bank of Baroda contributed 500 crore to US-64.
Deepak ·17:05
How to verify: Review the financial statements of these institutions for capital injections into UTI/US-64 around 2026-2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The BSE board was sacked by SEBI following the Anandharati Rathi scandal.
Deepak ·22:08
How to verify: Check SEBI's enforcement actions or news archives from 2026 regarding the BSE board dismissal. For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The stock market fell 30% in early 2001.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·24:23
How to verify: Calculate the percentage decline in the BSE Sensex or Nifty between February 2026 and April 2026 using historical index data. For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
There were 2 crore unit holders of US-64.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·26:24
How to verify: Check UTI's annual reports for the year 2026 or SEBI's mutual fund industry statistics for that period. For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
UTI suspended every repurchase and sale of units in July 2001, locking investors in.
Deepak ·27:39
How to verify: Historical news archives from July 2026 regarding UTI's suspension of redemptions for US-64. For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceA joint parliamentary committee produced a 541-page report detailing five crises, including UTI and Ramesh Gelli scandals.
Deepak ·28:09
How to verify: Search for the 'Joint Parliamentary Committee on UTI' report from 2026-2026, specifically looking for page count and contents. For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceUTI had 20% NPAs at one point, including debt from defaulted companies.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·28:18
How to verify: Review the Joint Parliamentary Committee report or UTI's financial disclosures from the early 2000s regarding asset quality. For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceThe Sensex fell 30% in two months, rose 25% by June 2001, then fell another 30% by September 2001.
Deepak ·29:53
How to verify: Check historical Sensex data for the period April 2026 to September 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The actual NAV of US-64 in December 2001 was about 6 rupees or less, despite being announced at 14.13.
Deepak ·31:31
How to verify: Review the government's bailout valuation reports or the final NAV calculation submitted to SEBI post-bailout. For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceThe government bailout cost was 14,000 crores.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·32:33
How to verify: Check Union Budget documents or Ministry of Finance records from 2026-2026 for the UTI rescue package amount. For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The government still owns 26,000 crores worth of ITC shares.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·33:39
How to verify: Check the latest Department of Investment and Public Asset Management (DIPAM) reports or ITC's shareholding pattern for government stake. For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
In 2001, UTI represented 72% of the mutual fund industry's AUM.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·38:55
How to verify: Review AMFI (Association of Mutual Funds in India) historical AUM data for the year 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceTotal mutual fund AUM in 2001 was about 90,000 crores.
Deepak ·39:05
How to verify: Check AMFI historical data for total industry AUM in 2001. For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceMutual fund AUM has grown 100x to 80 lakh crores since 2001.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·39:15
How to verify: Check current AMFI data for total industry AUM and compare with 2026 figures. For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceIn 2013, liquid fund NAVs went negative for a 15-day period, which is unusual as they typically have positive returns daily.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·49:06
How to verify: Search for '2026 Indian liquid fund NAV negative' in financial news archives or SEBI reports on mutual fund liquidity risks. For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
JP Morgan had a mutual fund default in 2016, creating a mini crisis, and has since sold its mutual fund business.
Deepak ·49:13
How to verify: Check SEBI mutual fund investor alerts from 2016 regarding JP Morgan Asset Management and search for press releases on JP Morgan Asset Management's sale of its Indian mutual fund business. For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
In 2009, SEBI reduced entry loads to zero; previously, investors paid 2.25% entry load, receiving only ~97,000 for a 1 lakh investment.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·49:49
How to verify: Review SEBI circulars from 2026 on mutual fund entry loads and compare with historical prospectuses showing 2.25% loads. For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Direct plans were introduced in 2013 to offer a lower-cost option compared to regular plans.
Deepak ·50:10
How to verify: Search for SEBI circulars introducing 'Direct Plans' in 2013 and compare expense ratios of direct vs regular plans in fund fact sheets from that period. For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
In 2018, an NFO collected Rs 5,000 crore, with Rs 300 crore (6%) allocated for marketing commissions, which regulators initially allowed to be amortized over five years.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·50:23
How to verify: Search for SEBI circulars on 'marketing expense allowance' for NFOs in 2026 and identify the specific NFO with Rs 5,000 crore collection. For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Do your own research
- Verify UTI's legislative history and SEBI's jurisdictional timeline via SEBI archives or Ministry of Finance records.
- Check the Deepak Parekh Committee report for specific recommendations on NAV pricing and equity exposure limits.
- Review the 2001 Joint Parliamentary Committee report (541 pages) for details on UTI's 20% NPA claims and bailout structure.
- Compare US-64's announced NAV vs. actual market value of underlying assets using historical Sensex data and UTI annual reports from 1998-2001.
- Examine SEBI's segregated portfolio rules and their application in recent crises like ILFS or Yes Bank via SEBI circulars.
- Analyze mutual fund expense ratios and trail commissions post-2018 recategorization using AMFI data and fund fact sheets.
- Look for conflicts of interest in historical dividend policies by reviewing UTI's financial statements and auditor reports from the 1990s.
- Verify the government's profit/loss on the bailout by tracking the market value of acquired shares (ITC, L&T, Axis) from 2002-2007.
Full transcriptexpand
- 0:10
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Hello
- 0:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and welcome to the Capital Mind Podcast.
- 0:13
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- 0:13
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- 0:17
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- 0:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you'd like us to help you manage your wealth, visit capitalmindwealth.com.
- 0:22
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 0:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): if you'd like to invest in our mutual funds, visit capitalmindmf.com.
- 0:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): This podcast is for informational purposes only and should not be relied upon as the basis for investment decisions. Clients of Capital Mind may maintain positions in the securities discussed in this podcast.
- 0:41
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Hi
- 0:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): everyone, and welcome to a new episode of the Capital Mind Podcast.
- 0:45
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Today,
- 0:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): mutual fund Sahih CIA seems to have been the way things always were. For decades now, people have invested in mutual funds and saved up for their life goals, their retirements, and become fairly wealthy. I think only now there's been a bit of a wobble with SIPs not doing something for two years, and that itself feels like such an anomaly. But the fact of the matter is that Mutual Fund Sahih was something that had to be
- 1:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): created because mutual funds didn't always enjoy the reputation they do today. In today's episode, we're going to dive into one of the formative episodes in the mutual fund. history or the history of mutual funds in India. We're going to talk about UTI and US 64, a crisis that happened a couple of times and how it changed the industry today. So it's a deep dive into history. We're bringing
- 1:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): in Deepak, who was actually alive at this time. Well, actually, so was I. But okay, okay. But we're looking at we're bringing in Deepak to talk through what happened during this episode, how rules were changed in uh uh in response to it. and how all of that has contributed to making mutual funds safer today and how they've influenced our regulations. So with that, Deepak, welcome
- 1:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): on board. And let's dive right in. What is US sixty four? Who was UTI? Are they the same as the UTI today? And why don't any of us talk about well both I thought certainly US sixty four and not even that much about UTI to some extent?
- 1:59
- Deepak: Yeah, I think you know, Shrey, firstly, thanks. I think this is uh uh an important lesson in history, and I written it in my book, and I think it was one of the most boring chapters in the book, and you know, not not very um exciting to hear about. But when you think about it from the fact that now we run a mutual fund, a lot of the regulations start to make sense about why
- 2:19
- Deepak: uh certain things are done in a certain way. US 64 is a is Unit Scheme 64 started by Unit Trust of India, Unit Trust of India was created by an Act of Parliament. Okay. So it's like, oh, uh, you know, uh you you not many mutual funds are created by an act of parliament.
- 2:34
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): This is like
- 2:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): LIC, right?
- 2:35
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Created by a Act
- 2:36
- Deepak: of Parliament. So it's it is like it was blessed by the act to say you can run a fund. Uh it was only in 1987 that non-UTI mutual funds were even allowed. The first two were SBI and Canra Bank. And uh in 1993 or something. that's when the first actual private mutual fund came to existence. So from US 64 units
- 2:55
- Deepak: unit scheme 64 was a very interesting scheme. It was basically a point where
- 3:05
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): people
- 3:05
- Deepak: wanted to invest. Every investment that you made, whether you bought government bonds or you bought anything else, they were taxed on their interest payments. US 64 is created with a tax-free dividend. So whatever dividends they would announce would be completely tax-free in the hands of uh the
- 3:22
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): holders,
- 3:22
- Deepak: the unit holders. Which is great because instead of investing in a fixed deposit within a bank where I will get taxed, I will invest in US 64 and they will give me a dividend, and that dividend is tax-free. And in the initial years, they started off saying, listen, we will invest only in government bonds.
- 3:38
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 3:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): it would be a conduit for you. You can't invest in government bonds directly, either because it'll be too cumbersome, there's obviously the tax disadvantage. And so we are a wrapper around that, uh a fund around that to begin with.
- 3:48
- Deepak: To begin with. You know, you think about 1964 thing, there was no electronic anything. So it was literally, you know, paper stuff. So how do you decide what the NAV of this this fund is? And they called it, oh, you know what? If We're you're buying government bonds, right? So we're in there the very little. fear of default. So you buy something for five years. I'm just going to like
- 4:06
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): look at the
- 4:06
- Deepak: trend and say, oh, this is the trend pricing. Kind of straightlining, but in the sense they they kind of determine it using a different philosophy. Once a year, they would announce a price.
- 4:16
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): They
- 4:17
- Deepak: would say, We will sell units to you at that at some price called a sale price, and a repurchase price was what you could sell it back to us at. So typically, two too, in India now you think of the NAV as both the sell and the repurchase price. But you could have a different sell price and a different repurchase price that time because you know the the of
- 4:36
- Deepak: the of the different costs, these things involved. And what would happen is it would kind of uh be a once-a-year phenomenon, very slow-running slow running for the longest time, gave good dividends slowly over a long time. period of time, it had started to buy equity stock, equity shares as part of its positioning.
- 4:56
- Deepak: Now think of it as it's not revealing its portfolio. It's telling you what the NAV is. It's not like mark-to-market prices because what they bought was not necessarily liquid in the market. This is 1960s, 1970s. So they also bought uh shares. Now increasingly, uh as shares are traded, you get a market price,
- 5:16
- Deepak: but they still decided to continue with this trend pricing thing. The NAV is uh not really reflective of the underlying stocks or whatever, because in the 70s and 80s you had big bull runs and big bear you know markets, and they just kept the trends up because now people were used to
- 5:36
- Deepak: prices only going up.
- 5:38
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Uh
- 5:38
- Deepak: in 1916. 1990, there were about 33% equity. Only 30%, one one-third of it was equity. But think of it as you know, I bought government bonds, uh, I used a l used it a little to buy shares. The shares went up faster than my government bond portfolio. I never sold the equity. I kept keep the equity kept becoming a bigger and bigger part of my portfolio. So I ended
- 5:58
- Deepak: up with 33% equity. Now the crisis started to happen in the 90s, late 90s. And by that time, they were now nearly 70% equity, 69% equity. And this was in a decade when markets did nothing. 1992 to 98, I think markets were flat.
- 6:18
- Deepak: They still increased their equity positions.
- 6:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): So I think let me jump in. This is where things went wrong, right?
- 6:23
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Because basically
- 6:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): they got the public and themselves used to say saying trend pricing. things drift up over time. And I'm guessing that even though in good years they would perhaps drift it up by less than it did, eventually this caught up with them and they were their NAVs were higher than what perhaps the real value was. Is this really the core of the crisis? That's one. And second, this seems like the spiritual predecessor to like hybrid funds, right? At some level.
- 6:43
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah, at s
- 6:43
- Deepak: at some level
- 6:44
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): this
- 6:44
- Deepak: was this was like a hybrid fund that started off as a net debt fund and suddenly found itself uh getting equity, right? No. Now, you know, okay, let me go back. I think we should we should start with this. 1992 was the Harshid Meta crisis and the stock market fell, the stock market went up. In fact, 1992 to 1994, the stock market went up a lot. Even though there was a Harshid Meta
- 7:04
- Deepak: crisis, that year was a positive year. Uh 1994, uh they had they had so what would happen was the accounting-wise.
- 7:15
- Deepak: the investments were worth only uh what they showed as cost.
- 7:20
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 7:20
- Deepak: a lot of customer companies were valued at 10 rupees and so on. These were not valued at any way. So if you looked at their books of accounts, they might say I have 100 crores of LNT. But 100 crores is just the cost at which they bought LNT. L N T. Not that the market price of it was maybe 700 crores, but they never showed. you that, right? So
- 7:40
- Deepak: what would happen over time is sometimes they would sell shares and buy them again and so on. Whatever profits they kind of realized, they would go into something called reserves. So they were paying 17-18% dividend. It was not like it's a small amount. And 17-18% tax-free is like it's
- 7:55
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a damn. And
- 7:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): by by the
- 7:57
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): way,
- 7:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): I'm guessing back even back then companies generally didn't pay 17-18% 17, 18%
- 8:00
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): dividend. of it. In fact, uh
- 8:01
- Deepak: you would get fixed deposits and at maybe 10 to 12 percent uh or 13 percent. But you know, people unofficially, even if you looked at cash, everybody wanted two percent a month. Because you know, if you have UTI giving you a tax-free seven, eighteen percent, then if you're gonna give you taxable income, I'm taking a personal loan. They wanted twenty five, twenty-six.
- 8:19
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I can see why.
- 8:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): But at so at some level they were returning capital in the form of like income or dividend.
- 8:25
- Deepak: Interestingly, till then there was actually that. much being made.
- 8:27
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Oh,
- 8:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): but
- 8:28
- Deepak: so uh
- 8:29
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
- 8:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): profits, out of profits.
- 8:30
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Out of profits, yeah. So they were they
- 8:31
- Deepak: were earning a lot of
- 8:32
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): dividends.
- 8:32
- Deepak: And remember, this 10 to 17 percent was on the face value of 10 rupees per cent.
- 8:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Oh, I see.
- 8:38
- Deepak: So their their pricing had moved up to 13 or 14. So if you look at, you know, uh in into 1994, for instance, they sold units at 19 rupees per
- 8:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): unit,
- 8:49
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
- 8:49
- Deepak: they paid two 2 rupees 60 pesa, which sounds like 26% dividend.
- 8:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): On 10.
- 8:55
- Deepak: On 10,
- 8:55
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): but it's actually
- 8:56
- Deepak: 13% on 19, right? So it's like, okay, you're getting 13% if you kind of bought it at the 19 price. Now, 13% is not bad at all. Again, however, there was a problem because they were using, they had built about a thousand odd crores of reserves. You know, they had uh these reserves were built as
- 9:16
- Deepak: dividends that they hadn't paid out. So maybe they hadn't made 20%, but actually they paid out only 13% or 14%, the extra 7% or something. That's 1,000 plus crores of reserves. In 1994, they decided to pay 4,000 crores if effectively as a dividend. Now you can imagine if you have 30,000 crores uh in 1994, that's a lot
- 9:36
- Deepak: of money. You were actually paying 4,000 crores out of that 30,000 crores, but you made profits or income of only thir 3,150 crores.
- 9:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): So where did the gap of 850 slash 900 crores come from?
- 9:52
- Deepak: So that would essentially be taking out of reserves. Okay. Fair. So you can do that. A company can say I'll pay more of uh I'll pay more dividend this year than a profit I've made by dipping into the profits of pro past. years. But this was a bad idea because if you keep doing this, you will deplete your reserves. And once your reserves go
- 10:11
- Deepak: to zero, you are now forced to keep making uh payments because you've been telling people you're getting 12-13% tax-free. Now,
- 10:21
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): if
- 10:22
- Deepak: I make 13% payment this year and the markets are not doing very well,
- 10:26
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 10:26
- Deepak: might end. up with a situation where I start eating into unit capital. And on the accounting side, this is a bad thing. But uh essentially reserves did go negative in 1998. They wanted to pay dividends. And if they did pay that dividend, the reserves would go negative. So all hell break broke loose.
- 10:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): So let me get into that. So this is what you call the first of the uh crisis in this UTI US 60. 64 excavate. So, how bad a deal is it to get into this uh issue of negative reserves? Could you explain a little more what it means? I get it. You don't have enough now profit to make it up for it. But then how big a deal is this?
- 11:01
- Deepak: Yeah, so essentially, since UTI is a government controlled company, it's not considered good form to start eating into unit capital to pay dividends. Now, So uh, what that also means is their accountants have to be okay with this. You may you are essentially eating into not just past profits, which you're completely eaten into, you're eating into equity capital to pay dividends.
- 11:21
- Deepak: If I raise a hundred crores as equity and I use that hundred crores itself to pay dividends, you're almost like, why are you doing this? You know, so uh why would you raise a hundred crores and then pay out a hundred or ten crores out of that hundred crores as dividend if you don't have profits in the past? It's a little bit of a nightmare, but remember. also UTI was not regulated
- 11:41
- Deepak: by SEBI. UTI was a different act of parliament, SEBI was a different act of parliament. So UTI simply said we are not your
- 11:48
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): regulated by USIP in
- 11:49
- Deepak: that sense. There were 40 mutual fund houses at the time. So it's not like okay.
- 11:54
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): There's not
- 11:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): too many more today like
- 11:55
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): 55.
- 11:56
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 11:56
- Deepak: you're looking at like a growth of forty 40% percent over what, 30 28 years. That's
- 12:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): So less than one year. a I mean, yes.
- 12:03
- Deepak: Yeah. So essentially there was a lot of private mutual funds. They were
- 12:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): regulated by SEBI.
- 12:08
- Deepak: Yes. And SEBI had already told mutual funds that they have to use NAV based pricing.
- 12:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): And they were complying, I imagine.
- 12:16
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): They
- 12:16
- Deepak: were complying, yes. So every week they would mark their assets to market and send a NAV and saying you can buy and sell at this price. New T TI was not doing that. So there was a committee with uh Deepa. Deepak Parik heading it.
- 12:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): The same Deepak Parik of
- 12:29
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): HDFC.
- 12:30
- Deepak: In that committee, they decided, listen, let's go and fix UTI a little bit. Firstly, uh, they gave four or five suggestions, but the main ones were one move to NAV-based pricing. Why are you allowing people to redeem at an NAV, which could be higher? Remember now, why were they eating into reserves? They were paying out more dividends than they were making as profits.
- 12:50
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
- 12:50
- Deepak: all also at the same time, it was evident that UTI's net asset value was actually lower than their whatever they were publishing as their sale prices and pre-purchase prices. So if they were saying 14 rupees, it could actually be 10 or 9. And you know, they didn't want to reveal it. And you know, in the joint
- 13:10
- Deepak: parliamentary committee report that came out much later, it was the excuses were were on. almost hilarious because they said, Oh, if we announced uh lower NAV, people would be uh you know, would would would would be very disappointed and it would it's a difficult thing to do and all that. So Adipa Parak said, listen, let's do this, let's
- 13:30
- Deepak: go back to any go to NAV pricing. You guys are getting uh you know uh having a problem. Uh
- 13:36
- Deepak: why was there a problem? This negative. reserves and this NAV thing is not a problem if you are doing one thing. For instance, you are saying, Listen, every year I get let's say 100 crores or 200 crores. But people who are redeeming their units, maybe that's only 50 crores.
- 13:52
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 13:53
- Deepak: if I receive 200 crores and I have to pay out 50 crores, I can pay it at any NAV I want. Right? It's just that
- 14:01
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 14:01
- Deepak: don't have to actually sell anything. to re realize that. So if I'm I if I have 10 stocks and they are worth 1000 crores, my NAV, I pretend that it's worth 1300 crores. Right? And now you give me a hundred crores inflow and fifty crores outflow.
- 14:19
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 14:19
- Deepak: don't have to sell any of my shares Yes, to realize what I have to pay out. I just have to pay it out from fresh incoming.
- 14:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): You're just kind of hurting some of the the people who've come in because they're buying something at a you could argue artificially
- 14:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): is a artificially higher price. But yeah, you're not having to hurt any of the existing investors. That's fair.
- 14:35
- Deepak: Yes. And and essentially what you're doing is you're doing a pretend thing. And the pretend thing is working because you know you have more inflows and outflows. Till nineteen ninety-eight, people were actually buying more units into IT UTI than they were selling units to UTI. So that means the cash flow was fine. It was just that the NAV was wrong.
- 14:55
- Deepak: Now, there's also the fact that units of this US 64 were trading in secondary markets. People would there was this reach purchase price and a sell price. So it was maybe 13 rupees 20 pesa as the repurchase price and 13 rupees 80 pesa as the sale price.
- 15:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Some spread for the back then this made sense.
- 15:13
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yes, so
- 15:14
- Deepak: it's a you
- 15:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): know.
- 15:15
- Deepak: if I want to buy, I'll pay the 1380. If I want to sell, I'll get the 1320. So the market in the stock market, this would trade, but this would trade somewhere in between these two numbers, right? So that's the difference. There's a bunch of things that they the joint parliamentary committee said. They were also said, listen, you need to move your decision-making decision making into a separate
- 15:34
- Deepak: asset management company that's regulated by SEBI so that it's uh goes. through the governance rules. You have to do a bunch of things. You have to reduce your equity exposure. You have gone to 69% equity, you have started off as a debt product. Can we please reduce the amount of equity exposure? Because markets are very volatile and you guys are we're not bringing your NAV up and down on the same
- 15:54
- Deepak: volatility. Then buy products that are less Or volatile by definition, right? So go to debt. So these were the suggestions made by the committee.
- 16:03
- Deepak: And the interesting thing happened. Now they said, Listen, we still don't have money, we have to pay all these dividends. Please uh help
- 16:08
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): us. Help us
- 16:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): out.
- 16:09
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 16:09
- Deepak: the government said, Listen, okay, fine. If you're pretending, we'll also do some pretend. Uh see, remember I told you that the investments were marked at cost.
- 16:18
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 16:18
- Deepak: they had three thousand three hundred crores worth of PSU bank, PSU shares, not
- 16:23
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): just
- 16:23
- Deepak: banks, but everything, BH, bunch of other others. things.
- 16:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): ITC I believe was one of them.
- 16:26
- Deepak: ITC, no, this is the
- 16:27
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): same thing. That came later. That came later. Okay.
- 16:29
- Deepak: But there was a bunch of uh public sector unit uh you know uh shares that would have been uh that were owned by UTI. Government said, listen, anyway, you're not supposed to be owning these shares, it's a government company, so we will buy them from you.
- 16:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): At the cost, even though the market value is low.
- 16:42
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
- 16:43
- Deepak: the market value was 1500 crores.
- 16:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): And okay.
- 16:45
- Deepak: So they paid 3300 crores for what was the market value of 5500 thousand five hundred crores because you pretended, I pretend, we'll kind of. save you. So I we give you 3300 crores. But in addition, the four big institutions: uh LIC, SBI, PNB, and uh Banco Broader, these guys put in together
- 17:05
- Deepak: 500 crores into US 64. Said, okay, we will also support this and we will now uh add this money into uh UTI. Now we you UTI was supposed to move the US 64 to be managed by an AMC, an asset management company. US 64 was just one of their funds. Okay.
- 17:23
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): They
- 17:23
- Deepak: had a bunch of other funds. So
- 17:24
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): this was the
- 17:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): biggest, I imagine.
- 17:25
- Deepak: This was the biggest, and it was the UTI was huge. It was some 60 odd percent of the industry or something. It was just massive. So
- 17:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): problem solved, right, Deepak? I mean, uh I know things get worse, but the fact of the matter is at this stage you would argue the problem is solved. Uh meaningful capital injection has been run. So no one can uh fault the government for being too timid on this one. And uh the Deepakari committee, I assume, has done everything quite uh uh c carefully and has given the recommendations. So uh uh I've bailed you out and
- 17:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): cello, don't come back again, right?
- 17:54
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
- 17:54
- Deepak: but uh so uh you you you know you would think this is the end of the story, but this this is the beginning of the story.
- 17:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Oh dear.
- 17:59
- Deepak: Because now UTI decides that uh oh, this was a recommendation.
- 18:03
- Deepak: We are not going to adopt any pricing. Because if I tell you my NAV is like 40% lower than it actually is, you guys are going to lose trust. Mutual funds.
- 18:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So it was never
- 18:15
- Deepak: at that time, at you know, for for multiple purposes. But it was basically they refused to adopt any V price pricing, making it even more difficult to say mutual funds say yeah because mutual funds galat is the
- 18:25
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): was
- 18:25
- Deepak: was is is is the assumption. the job the committee has noted this and I'm saying I'm going to be continuing to be galath because if I tell you the say thing you will panic. Uh scheme was about 27,000 crores. 75%
- 18:40
- Deepak: uh
- 18:41
- Deepak: has and no sorry, see they were 69% in equity. They keep buying equity instead of being
- 18:46
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): told
- 18:47
- Deepak: to sell equity, right?
- 18:48
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): They
- 18:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): were told, yeah.
- 18:49
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): They were
- 18:49
- Deepak: told to sell, they they they were they were told.
- 18:50
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): were
- 18:50
- Deepak: told to sell instead of selling, they were actually started buying more equity. And you know, this is a time. And if you read the parliamentary committee report, it's kind of I can't even go through those details because I look at this and say, what kind of wretched world was this? They were like, oh, if we uh sell these shares in the market, it will cause a panic. So we will sell
- 19:10
- Deepak: it to one of our other schemes and do an inter-scheme transfer. And then we'll buy it. back after the next month because that need that scheme needed money today. So I'll I'll I'll
- 19:20
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I'll
- 19:20
- Deepak: I'll kind of buy its shares and tomorrow I'll sell it back its shares and all this drama. So I'm like, really? You can't do all this stuff right now. And there's a good reason why, because of this stuff. At that time, these were, you know, people government appointed officials who were routinely taking these decisions and saying, and you know, the chairman of uh UTI
- 19:40
- Deepak: or the management CEO of UTI, you know, who whoever that this thing was, was routinely making investment decisions. As a CEO, they don't I'm not allowed to do any of this
- 19:50
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): stuff.
- 19:50
- Deepak: At best, I can I can you know uh inform or tell. Uh but you
- 19:55
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): can give an opinion. I can I
- 19:56
- Deepak: can't give an order. But routinely, the it was the chairman who would say, Oh, I could be persuaded to buy this share and let's go back. buy it, and then somebody would go buy it. It was it was wild west in terms of organization in that sense, right? So market falls in 1998. This is roughly when uh we had the
- 20:16
- Deepak: I think the Pokran nuclear tests,
- 20:19
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): right?
- 20:19
- Deepak: The market's fallen and then we start to recover. 1999, the government becomes stable, and then you get a big rally, both in India. and the US at the time, the dot com rally. Markets went up like crazy and then crashed.
- 20:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): In 2001, right?
- 20:34
- Deepak: In 2000, the crash started.
- 20:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Okay.
- 20:36
- Deepak: Um, it was started in the US and then it kind of petered down into India. A lot of Indian IT stocks fell.
- 20:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Oh, yeah, of course. Yeah, same dot com boom.
- 20:44
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Same dot
- 20:44
- Deepak: com boom. But also um we we keep rolling over till Feb 2001. Feb 2001 is actually interesting because this is where the nifty is at 1400. It's a 22,000 today odd.
- 20:58
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It
- 20:58
- Deepak: was a 1400 at that
- 21:00
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): time.
- 21:01
- Deepak: Literally, some five or six things happen. So
- 21:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): is it the the the worst possible year happens?
- 21:06
- Deepak: Literally, like in in two months, like the whole disastrous thing happens one after the other. The Anand Anandrati Rati scandal in the BSC breaks out because during the fall. This
- 21:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): is the same Anandrati that's uh massive to the public, also, I think.
- 21:18
- Deepak: Yes, they're they're they're the wealth company's public. But Anandi is the president of the BSC at the time.
- 21:23
- Deepak: And apparently, because BSC was owned by brokers, uh Anandra makes a call apparently to his technical team to say, Can you open the database and tell me what positions FIS are short on? Or some people, some should give me the literature. details of the short positions on these stocks.
- 21:41
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 21:41
- Deepak: don't know what it was, but when you're a broker who is trading his own prop book also into the market, finding out somebody else's positions is an act of insider
- 21:52
- Deepak: unsavory uh mechanisms. This kind of leaks. This insider info-based info base thing is by the president of the BAC. BSE. SEBI gets. furious. It's a securities and exchange board of India. So BSE is
- 22:07
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a good idea.
- 22:08
- Deepak: So say SEBI comes in and says we fire the entire board, you guys are off.
- 22:13
- Deepak: So the brokers uh are told to get off the board and they uh they it things move on, right? So
- 22:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): this
- 22:19
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): is the first
- 22:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): interesting
- 22:20
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): thing in 2001.
- 22:21
- Deepak: And second part comes uh there's a Kaitan Parak Parek crisis that alongside a bunch of other stuff, he is a big bull. He has to pay for a lot of stock this Badla happening and all that stuff, and Badla is you know kind of on its way out at this time, or it's starting to do something. There is a uh a payments
- 22:41
- Deepak: crisis that happens on the Calcutta Stock Exchange. He would basically borrow money against some shares and then use that funds to bet more. The Calcutta Stock Exchange has. had a massive problem and there was a bunch of DSQ software shares that were held by Kethan and he needed the money to get money out. Um it turns out somehow
- 23:01
- Deepak: UTI was involved in all of this. Remember it's the UTI was
- 23:04
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the biggest participant
- 23:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): almost, right?
- 23:05
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yes.
- 23:05
- Deepak: So it's a big story, right? So if you wanted somebody to buy shares, you go to UTI because he has all the money. And people were routinely uh at some point apparently even asking UTI to please buy these shares at inflated values so that if uh whatever money you give us we can use to tide over this payments crisis. Today stocks
- 23:25
- Deepak: stock markets settle everything every day.
- 23:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): So
- 23:28
- Deepak: if you sell a shark,
- 23:30
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in
- 23:31
- Deepak: yeah. So I mean they're they they they continued, you know. That time settlement failures were common, cuh but this was a big crisis because they couldn't pay. And even though there was a 15-day cycle, or at that time the cycles had narrowed, but 2001, what happened was uh the Caltra Stock Exchange would have been shut if this payment
- 23:50
- Deepak: crisis wasn't resolved. And you know, there was a big problem in there. You first, this is the second problem. Caltra stock exchange crisis hits. A bank called GTB Bank also goes uh is is in trouble and it's part of this whole thing. UTI has to take over. UTI Bank has to take over the uh GTB bank. This
- 24:10
- Deepak: is also happening at the same time. UTI is of course a different institution for the US 64. UTI Bank is a different bank. UTI Bank is now Access Bank and UTI is UTI, and that's it's come about as part of this process.
- 24:23
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 24:23
- Deepak: what has happened is uh by Febru Feb to April 2005. 2001, the payments crisis was because stock prices were falling. Price stock markets fell 30%.
- 24:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): That's quite painful.
- 24:34
- Deepak: Imagine, I mean 30% is 22,000, 6,600 rupee uh points down, which is unimaginable. It would have been 15,000, and you know, that would be ridiculous for something to have happened in two months, but it was happening at that
- 24:47
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): time.
- 24:48
- Deepak: They tried to ban naked short selling. saying you want to stop the shots somehow. That doesn't work. Uh post.com, one of the big companies then it's called NIT. NIT is still listed.
- 25:02
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Used to do classes and all classes
- 25:04
- Deepak: and learning. But they had a tech arm. Now that tech arm has to be named to CoForge and a bunch of other things and all that, but it's been demerged and delisted and on and listed again as uh uh uh NIT technologies, which was called CoForge. But that time NIT was one company and it issued a profit warning. That also took the market down because people were
- 25:24
- Deepak: afraid that it's the end of that story. The last thing is there is this massive crisis that happens, which is political the Tehelka crisis.
- 25:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Uh, but that was all politics must uh sting operations. How does that impact the stock market?
- 25:36
- Deepak: Apparently they were funded by Shankar Sharma's company. Shankar Sharma was a famous stock broker.
- 25:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Still very famous.
- 25:42
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Still
- 25:42
- Deepak: famous, but he's in a lot on India, not anywhere in close
- 25:46
- Deepak: in terms of size of broker. But they went after him and because he was a famous short seller, they went after everybody else who was shot. So including Radha Krishna Dhamani, who was who's now the founder of Dmart and stuff like that. These people were famous for shorting markets during uh bad times, and you know, SEBI just went after them.
- 26:10
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So we're going after all
- 26:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): of you.
- 26:12
- Deepak: Yeah, so the stock markets kept falling. Because now if you're a stockbroker and you're normally if you're even if you're short, it is the pay players who are short who will have the money to buy when the market is down. But now they're so rattled, nobody's buying.
- 26:24
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 26:24
- Deepak: bear cart has been rated, there's not now two crore unit holders of US 64.
- 26:30
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Excellent
- 26:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): lot,
- 26:31
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): actually. Even but
- 26:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): even it would be a huge number even today.
- 26:33
- Deepak: Even today. Which were who are all expecting a very large dividend. And for the first time in March, May, April, May, June 2001, there are massive redemptions. I told you, it was all
- 26:50
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the same. Probably in response to the
- 26:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): stock market falling as well.
- 26:52
- Deepak: And and the fears were rising that uh the NAV is a pretend and exchange. They have not gone into NAV based pricing, they have got they continue to retain trend pricing. The prices of the stock market has fallen. This guy's NAV is the same. How is that even possible? Uh you are
- 27:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Nikal Jao.
- 27:07
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Nickel
- 27:07
- Deepak: Jau.
- 27:08
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 27:08
- Deepak: you the selling was happening, and the selling was actually even done by LIC and SBI, who are were one of the four entities who put in the
- 27:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): put money in the first place.
- 27:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Okay, okay.
- 27:16
- Deepak: So
- 27:17
- Deepak: in a couple of months, very quickly UTI realized that boss, this this is not because for the first time we were actually having to uh r pay more than we have received, which means I have to actually sell my shares, but my shares were at pretend mark. You're I'm paying on a mark that is much higher than what my shares are actually worth. Then I can't continue to do this. So
- 27:37
- Deepak: in July 2001, they say,
- 27:39
- Deepak: we'll suspend every single um uh repurchase and sale of any units. So you US 64 is closed. So
- 27:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): you're locked in.
- 27:49
- Deepak: You're locked in. We'll have to figure out what to do. There's a joint parliamentary committee, there's a bunch of people who go in. There's a very long, I don't know how many pages, we'll try and link it there. But it's a 541-page 541 page report. There are five crises in that. report, including all of the stuff that I mentioned the Ramesh Gelli, the UTI, the this thing. And the scandals
- 28:09
- Deepak: are so much that I mean I can't even start to tell you. But the minute I I look at this, I say, I can this can't be real. UTI had 20% NPAs at one point.
- 28:18
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Oh,
- 28:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): so even the debt was not doing right.
- 28:19
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It's not just the stocks. Yeah, it's not
- 28:21
- Deepak: just the stocks. They were buying into they were buying debt of companies that had already defaulted, or update
- 28:26
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a
- 28:26
- Deepak: of a debt company whose other group company had defaulted. So there were bad practices, and nobody was questioning the stuff. And the joint parliamentary committee is almost like, why did you do this? Oh, we decided to do this. That's why. So you know,
- 28:39
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): we had full
- 28:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): discretion, and
- 28:41
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): there
- 28:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): was no rule saying otherwise.
- 28:42
- Deepak: Imagine if this was a private player, somebody would have lost their entire I don't know, you know,
- 28:49
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): just lost a a blank. blank.
- 28:50
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): They
- 28:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): would have completely taken them to the cleaners. But you're saying here since
- 28:54
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I guess they're
- 28:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): thinking that they may
- 28:56
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): there
- 28:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): must have been a reason that uh uh UTI I guess it was just a very powerful entity at that time, which was dictating the fortunes of many r small investors, and at some level the government felt beholden to it as well because of that.
- 29:07
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Also
- 29:07
- Deepak: there's a whole IS cadder that used to run On this.
- 29:09
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So it's
- 29:10
- Deepak: not like
- 29:10
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So this
- 29:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): was people regulating their friends at some
- 29:12
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): point. Yeah. Or
- 29:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): their former colleagues or their whatever.
- 29:19
- Deepak: So
- 29:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): it's
- 29:19
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): careful about that.
- 29:20
- Deepak: They the past chairman, PS Subramanium, is named.
- 29:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): The current one is not named.
- 29:24
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The current one is not named.
- 29:25
- Deepak: The current chairman of UTI. I'm like, oh my god.
- 29:27
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I mean, exactly how
- 29:29
- Deepak: crazy is this, right? I mean, there was and
- 29:31
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): so
- 29:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): do markets continue to fall in this time or does they
- 29:33
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): have to be able to do that? The markets
- 29:34
- Deepak: so interestingly, in April 2001, uh the finance activity. secretary writes to the UTI chairman and says, Excuse me, what are you doing?
- 29:42
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 29:43
- Deepak: the chairman routinely says, you know what, the markets are going to recover 25% by the end of June.
- 29:48
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Then
- 29:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): that's a very uh time-bound prediction.
- 29:51
- Deepak: Interestingly, right?
- 29:53
- Deepak: This is the Sensex. He says Sensex will rise 25% by June. It does rise 25%
- 29:59
- Deepak: by June. So first it falls 30% in two months, then goes up 25%, then falls another 30% from June to September.
- 30:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): This was quite a year to be an investor.
- 30:14
- Deepak: It goes back, right? Now, all these people are trying to sell their units. UTI has stopped redemptions, market has fallen another 30% after they have stopped redemptions.
- 30:25
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 30:25
- Deepak: UT, this joint party. parliamentary committee gives a report, a bunch of things, and the report is very damning in a lot of ways. But
- 30:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): this is the second uh
- 30:35
- Deepak: the first one was not a joint, it was a Deepak Pari committee.
- 30:38
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Second one is a joint parliamentary. It's uh
- 30:39
- Deepak: it's a got ministers in it and all that. Now, given this,
- 30:44
- Deepak: since there was so much stuff happening, the UTI guys said, listen, we cannot. I know we I t announced the UTI NAV as 14 and 13, but it's actually much lower than nine also.
- 30:57
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We
- 30:57
- Deepak: don't even want to tell anybody. Can we rescue this somehow? So they'll say, you know what? Now what? What we're gonna do is we're still gonna pretend, but you guys no longer run the show.
- 31:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Okay. We'll come in and pretend for you.
- 31:09
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We'll
- 31:09
- Deepak: pretend for you. So we'll say, listen,
- 31:11
- Deepak: start with a we'll it's a bait out
- 31:13
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a bigger deal. thing.
- 31:13
- Deepak: It's a bailout that the government
- 31:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): is.
- 31:15
- Deepak: said I will
- 31:16
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): bailout
- 31:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): plus takeover.
- 31:17
- Deepak: Plus take over. So the government said we'll take over the entire uh things. You own a bunch of shares, I understand. I will take over the shares. And um there is a six month suspension uh uh for for the while this thing is being worked
- 31:30
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): out.
- 31:31
- Deepak: By uh December twenty 20 eight twenty 2020 twenty two 2001. thousand one, uh the NAV was probably about six. rupees or less. Oof.
- 31:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Brutal.
- 31:40
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 31:40
- Deepak: it was brutal,
- 31:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): right?
- 31:42
- Deepak: And the government was said, listen, fine, don't think of six rupees. I will give you ten rupees.
- 31:47
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Okay. So
- 31:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): that's the first.
- 31:48
- Deepak: For up to three thousand units, they said three thousand units are ten rupees, thirty thousand rupees. But they said they increased it to five thousand later. So it was
- 31:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): So like get get the smaller people out first. Reduce
- 31:58
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the number of people
- 31:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): one by one. Yeah.
- 31:59
- Deepak: So and if you had more, you could then give uh uh you you there there was an increasing NAV at that point. Ten rupees would become ten rupees, ten pesa, ten rupees, twenty pesa from December to I think for twenty months. So for twenty months it would go from ten rupees to twelve rupees, and in the end we'll pay out everybody who was there at the
- 32:19
- Deepak: end of uh it at twelve rupees. There was a complex scheme. But
- 32:22
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): fair I mean at
- 32:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): least everyone now has a has has like a backup or a has a plan. I mean
- 32:27
- Deepak: yes, yes. And imagine that this this discount, this this uh premium, if you may,
- 32:33
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): was
- 32:33
- Deepak: a bailout of 14,000 crores.
- 32:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): It's in the year 2000. So did they have this much money?
- 32:38
- Deepak: The government said, well, we'll do it. Let's keep it. Get guess what they got in return? They got all the shares.
- 32:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Okay. I think this may have an unexpected ending. Yes.
- 32:47
- Deepak: Very uh weirdly interesting. And this
- 32:49
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): is
- 32:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): where ITC came in.
- 32:50
- Deepak: This is where ITC came in. ITCA Access Bank, uh uh LNT, the U UTI was a big owner of them. This was more all moved into something called the SU UTI. So
- 33:01
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the special
- 33:02
- Deepak: undertaking of the UTI.
- 33:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Elegantly named, of course.
- 33:06
- Deepak: It still exists.
- 33:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Oh,
- 33:07
- Deepak: it still exists after 20 years because the government hasn't sold all the shares because they got all these shares, right?
- 33:13
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So they had to,
- 33:13
- Deepak: but the guess what? In four years the shares were worth I think 100,000 crores or so.
- 33:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): In it that's uh pretty good return.
- 33:21
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Exactly.
- 33:21
- Deepak: So because the markets went up like crazy between two thousand.
- 33:24
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So this was that glorious time
- 33:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): 2002 to 7,
- 33:26
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): just before
- 33:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): the financial crisis hit again.
- 33:28
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The government did
- 33:28
- Deepak: sell much of these shares and they realized a lot more than the 14,000 crores that they had uh been out. They still continue to own 26,000 twenty-six thousand crores worth of ITC, even today.
- 33:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Even today, okay.
- 33:40
- Deepak: ITC. So ITC is not an in a public sector company, and people keep cribbing about oh, where were we going to the money to do this and to do that? Well, you
- 33:47
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): could just
- 33:48
- Deepak: 26,000 crores of ITC. So, but you know, and that's a different story there because British American Tobacco, uh, which is a non Indian firm, owns a significant portion of ITC, they did not want this company to uh get
- 34:02
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): into foreign trade. hands per se.
- 34:04
- Deepak: But you know the government has bigger better rules.
- 34:07
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It can just introduce like limits, right? So
- 34:09
- Deepak: you
- 34:09
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): can't own it, yeah.
- 34:10
- Deepak: So they decide to not have those rules. Instead, they have continued to own this. But still, I mean you're talking about
- 34:17
- Deepak: a
- 34:19
- Deepak: huge,
- 34:20
- Deepak: like a huge return for the government through the UTI crisis. People even now say, you know what, you should have given us. an option to maybe continue to have those units. But UTI was moved to a different AMC. It's a listed AMC today. And that listed AMC is uh owned,
- 34:40
- Deepak: interestingly, by four large companies, L S E, B, S B, I, P N B, and BOB, all of whom have their own mutual funds.
- 34:47
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 34:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): see. So this is how, despite owning one mutual fund, they they still have more than I can. guess uh 10% stake in another one.
- 34:52
- Deepak: Yeah, they have uh together, I think, nearly 40% or something like that. So
- 34:55
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): they can
- 34:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): start selling this.
- 34:57
- Deepak: They could, in fact, one of the rules that was uh Sebi had created was that promoters need to own 40% of a mutual fund to be a sponsor. And you couldn't have a mutual fund without a sponsor until recently, when a uh when a fund can actually say, Listen, I want to be sponsorless, so I will sell. The problem is UTIMC's UTI AMC's price is so depressed.
- 35:15
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Oh,
- 35:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): no one wants to
- 35:15
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): do it now.
- 35:16
- Deepak: They don't want to do it now.
- 35:19
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I mean,
- 35:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): uh yeah, it doesn't feel like it's the best time for Indian stock markets at the moment.
- 35:22
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): At
- 35:22
- Deepak: the moment, yeah. So but this has been on for a while. So the interesting part about this entire thing is that it's it resulted in the UTI AMC being created in 2001 or 2002 or whenever it was, and moved under SEBI. Finally, that UTI Act was no longer valid
- 35:42
- Deepak: and uh it was fused into SEBI, and you know, this that happened. UTI was one of the largest mutual funds at the time. Today it is probably the what seventh, eighth, tenth, ninth, tenth largest, and most of the largest ones are uh either public sector like SBI or HDFC ICICI just
- 36:01
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): just done in
- 36:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): like an incredible. time over the years.
- 36:03
- Deepak: Oh yes, in comparison. UTI had the it's it's a you know, if you look at that time, UTI has been the leader for like what since um the sixties to two thousand, so forty years. And suddenly it goes out of existence. It's the Nokia of the Indian ANC industry suddenly becomes, you know, uh it's there, Nokia still exists, but except it it's By
- 36:22
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
- 36:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): way, it's apparently having a bit of a rally because of some AI stuff. I I didn't read what, but
- 36:26
- Deepak: Yeah, I it's yeah, now
- 36:28
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you know now I
- 36:29
- Deepak: think Nokia if you rearrange the words AI somehow come out.
- 36:31
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Somehow,
- 36:32
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): there we go.
- 36:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): There we
- 36:33
- Deepak: go. So N
- 36:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): O KI.
- 36:36
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): NOK.
- 36:38
- Deepak: So uh well the uh let's go back to I think you No so
- 36:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): I get I get your point. So they came in, they did this bailout, people were given their exits, and I guess the exits followed the plan that was stated, right? At ten 10 rupees and so on and so so forth. it was a slow exit. almost like how the uh uh I mean Sabi has dealt with more recent mutual fund crises and so I think this brings me to, in a sense, in the I won't say concluding, but the final part of this podcast, which is
- 37:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): so what the crisis happened, you've described it in fairly vivid detail. What has been the fallout of this? I mean, you started to describe what happened to UTI, but uh this time, I mean, uh the industry has changed, not just UTI, but the industry. itself must have changed from this crisis, right? So what are some of the lessons learned and what are some of the things that now can't be done because well
- 37:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): in large part because of what happened then?
- 37:23
- Deepak: Yeah, th so one I think number one thing was you had a crisis of trust because people trusted UTI, it was run by the government. Felt like
- 37:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): quasi
- 37:30
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): government.
- 37:31
- Deepak: And then guess what happened? Uh even though they got an NAV of ten, 10, it was a big loss for people who had bought in the last three or four years.
- 37:38
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Oh yes. because they they bought at
- 37:39
- Deepak: higher prices, right? So they did lose 30-40% from when they were uh you know started off. They might have got some dividends, but uh after that they didn't get anything, they just got this 10 rupees.
- 37:50
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): They
- 37:50
- Deepak: were two crore investors. This is huge for uh uh for an India where,
- 37:57
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you know,
- 37:57
- Deepak: I think total mutual fund investors of the rest of them combined was probably less than one fifteen actors.
- 38:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Today, how many is it?
- 38:04
- Deepak: Today, um I think between 10 and 15 crore investors. I'm not
- 38:08
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): sure.
- 38:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): I see, but uh so this was even back then a very, very meaningful number.
- 38:12
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Very
- 38:12
- Deepak: meaningful number. And it took so many years of MF uh you know,
- 38:17
- Deepak: to get to move there. But imagine 40 years of uh trusting one organization
- 38:23
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in that
- 38:23
- Deepak: field. Then even the people in the corporate world had tried started to lose interest because uh the dividends were no longer tax free. So when the dividends had lost being tax free, remember dividends all got tax free later in 2005 again, but for everybody, not just for UTI. You learned one lesson is that don't make one player tax free.
- 38:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): And give everyone else the yeah.
- 38:44
- Deepak: Yeah. And so that that sounded like a bad idea. So it i we have not done that in the past. Now No, either you change it for everybody or you change it for nobody. There was seventy-two percent of the MF industry in two thousand one. That was
- 38:55
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): an
- 38:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): unhealthy concentration. No again in any industry.
- 38:58
- Deepak: Yes. And it's still it's it's been there in insurance in India, but for the most part uh
- 39:02
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But they
- 39:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): they've been uh chipping away at that, haven't
- 39:04
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): they? They have they have
- 39:05
- Deepak: they have uh they've chipped away substantially at that. They were 40 mutual fund, there was about 90,000 crores in total mutual fund AUM in 2001.
- 39:15
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Today
- 39:15
- Deepak: we're at 80 lakh crores. That's a hundred X.
- 39:17
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah, 100X pretty much. Yeah. In
- 39:19
- Deepak: fact, the Nifty 50 ETF is like 2 lakh crores
- 39:21
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): itself. Itself.
- 39:23
- Deepak: So this is so I think PPFS is 1.5 lakh crores.
- 39:27
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In just
- 39:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): that one flexicap?
- 39:28
- Deepak: Uh 1.45 in that one flexicap.
- 39:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Wow.
- 39:31
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 39:31
- Deepak: uh
- 39:31
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a little
- 39:32
- Deepak: bit else.
- 39:32
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): That's a lot. Yes.
- 39:33
- Deepak: SBI has the Nifty NFT 50 ETF. ATF.
- 39:35
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Of course, that that's
- 39:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): gigantic.
- 39:37
- Deepak: Now, the other thing that we learned was don't do pretend and extend. So the issue with pretend and extend is a lot of uh concepts. I'll give you one example. First of all, the NAV not being correct. Now, what happens is if you get more redemptions than you get uh inflows, your redemptions have to come from units that you hold. We have seen
- 39:57
- Deepak: problems with this later, even in my other sources. I'll give you an example. There was a crisis in uh 2000 in January 2000 when Vodafone there was an adverse order against uh Vodafone in
- 40:08
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): 2000.
- 40:09
- Deepak: In 2000 to 2020, 2020, 2020. In 2020, Vodafone's got this uh adverse order that says you know your AGR dues are due.
- 40:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Oh yes, I remember this. Yeah.
- 40:19
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Uh
- 40:19
- Deepak: so suddenly uh they have to downgrade. Slaughse Slam Sebi has learned from all these lessons and created something called a segregated portfolio rules. That says if you've gone, you know, you have something in your portfolio which has become defaulting or defaulted, then you should segregate that into a different
- 40:39
- Deepak: portfolio. Remember, UTI had 20% debt in some in its and in its
- 40:43
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): NPS and its portfolio.
- 40:44
- Deepak: NPS and its portfolio, right? They they didn't tell you that those things were not worth anything, they just decided to market mark to whatever. to whatever market price they wanted. So Savi has now said, no, no, you can't just market to randomly prices. You have to market to something that is meaningful. Now, what happened was Vodafone had uh bonds outstanding. Some of those bonds were going to
- 41:04
- Deepak: come due in June of that year, 2020. This is even before COVID, you know, kind of hit us. So January they had to take a call. Listen, we own these units of uh the we own these uh date
- 41:16
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): of Vodafone
- 41:17
- Deepak: of Vodafone. And uh some of these mutual funds are like, what do we do? Because it's going to get downgraded. For some strange reason, the credit rating agencies didn't downgrade Vodafone that day. Downgrade so they vote voted to vote down uh to downgrade
- 41:31
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it
- 41:31
- Deepak: on Friday. So they know this news on a Monday, but they've decided to downgrade download it on Friday.
- 41:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Credit rating agencies have a fun history. as
- 41:39
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you know.
- 41:39
- Deepak: As we've seen. So now what does a mutual fund do if it owns Vodafone debt? Does it allow people to exit at the price that the Vodafone debt is marked at currently?
- 41:51
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 41:51
- Deepak: can't sell that Vodafone debt to anybody because once it's marked defaulted, nobody's going to buy
- 41:55
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it.
- 41:56
- Deepak: So it's worth zero to me, but it's worth the there's a market price, which was the last traded price, which means may have been 90 rupees to uh four
- 42:07
- Deepak: of 100 rupees, right?
- 42:08
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 42:08
- Deepak: if I market at 90, then my customers, my investors will exit saying, boss is at
- 42:13
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): least
- 42:13
- Deepak: giving me 90. Let me
- 42:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): quickly get
- 42:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): out. Yeah.
- 42:15
- Deepak: But if I uh what do I do? So many mutual funds decided that they will market at zero for the next four days. On the day of the downgrade, they will move it to a segregated.
- 42:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): I understand. Okay, that's sensible in some ways.
- 42:29
- Deepak: Uh we were
- 42:31
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): capital
- 42:31
- Deepak: mind, uh, we saw this and we said there are two things. First of all, if we buy
- 42:37
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): when
- 42:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): it's downgrade marked to zero.
- 42:39
- Deepak: Marked to zero,
- 42:40
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
- 42:40
- Deepak: Vodafone debt comes for free.
- 42:42
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
- 42:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): that's true. That
- 42:43
- Deepak: means But
- 42:44
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it may
- 42:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): not be worth very much.
- 42:46
- Deepak: Let's say we don't know if what it's worth.
- 42:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Okay.
- 42:48
- Deepak: But by and large, Vodafone does not have capital. cash flow problems. They have a profit and loss problem because of this uh ruling. They have 20 years to pay. So they could still choose to pay back their debt. So if I take a Vodafone debt today, you give it to me at zero rupees. Tomorrow, if they are pay
- 43:07
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): back
- 43:07
- Deepak: 100 rupees, I have just made a you
- 43:09
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): know. Well, a fairly nice
- 43:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): return. Yeah.
- 43:11
- Deepak: And Vodafone's debt was maybe I don't know, 10% or 6%. or 7% of some mutual fund.
- 43:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Okay. So non-trivial amount, right?
- 43:17
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Non-trivial
- 43:18
- Deepak: amount, right? So if I buy this mutual fund today, you give it to me at NAV of I don't know 14 rupees per unit. 6% of that 14 rupees per unit is actually uh Vodafone debt marked at zero.
- 43:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Yeah, so almost one rupee. I mean, and that's
- 43:33
- Deepak: yeah. So I'm actually going to pay 13 rupees. You've marked it down to zero. Uh one week later. I will get the segregated portfolio that contains only Vodafone debt. I can sell the remaining units or whatever else I own for the same 13 rupees because it's obviously not gone up or down. So I've made no profit or loss on the 13 rupees that
- 43:53
- Deepak: I've paid. That I got these units for free and I can wait for uh six months to
- 43:58
- Deepak: sell them, right?
- 44:00
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Uh
- 44:00
- Deepak: we did this
- 44:01
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): because we
- 44:01
- Deepak: said, you
- 44:02
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): know,
- 44:02
- Deepak: it's a simple risk to take. Fine. Other people want to sell it.
- 44:05
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It is a risk, but
- 44:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): it makes sense.
- 44:06
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I mean it makes
- 44:07
- Deepak: sense. So uh this pretend and extend you pretended in one direction. Something or the other you pretended you created an opportunity for the other side.
- 44:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So you
- 44:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): pretended here in the other way. By pretend by being more conservative you you set it zero rather than
- 44:18
- Deepak: zero.
- 44:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): So in a sense you do need someone to take a stand and say this is what I think it's worth.
- 44:22
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah
- 44:22
- Deepak: and and you know you should be marking to market more I mean and segregating immediately. not doing the mark to zero today and segregating tomorrow and giving advance notice to everybody that this is what's happening. People like me will look at this and say, This is a clean six percent return for one week of effort. Well,
- 44:40
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): yeah,
- 44:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): no fail.
- 44:41
- Deepak: And point
- 44:41
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): point. And the
- 44:42
- Deepak: fact that COVID happened at that time was uh was a bonus, right? So interesting as in was what a bonus, as in it with six percent looks great in six months when the whole market is down 35%.
- 44:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Correct. And the world is going to help. Of course, the rotator stocks still managed to do better in six months, but anyway,
- 44:55
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that's another story. That's
- 44:56
- Deepak: another story. Yeah. So interestingly, this pretend and extend uh
- 45:01
- Deepak: don't do it is a is a clear lesson from even the UTI crisis saying, What are you pretending? You're creating unnecessary um and people at that time didn't try to take advantage of it. There were still more purchases than sales at a time when NAV was pretending pretended to be. higher.
- 45:16
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Fair. So
- 45:16
- Deepak: now they've increased the transparency. So a lot of other things, for instance, in uh uh uh N NAVs have been marked down at different levels. Even today, uh recently I think there was an there was an issue with some funds
- 45:31
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): um
- 45:31
- Deepak: because of a ruling of Yes Bank 81 eighty one bonds.
- 45:36
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yes
- 45:36
- Deepak: Bank 81 eighty one bonds were written down on one. particular day. Uh they were interestingly not moved to segregated portfolios in certain funds. This is 2000 again. 2020 was 2020 was March was when this
- 45:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): This sounds like another year like that, 2001.
- 45:54
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Which it was like this is my I was very much in
- 45:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): markets, so I I uh well yeah. A little overshadowed by other events, but point taken.
- 46:01
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well,
- 46:01
- Deepak: yeah. So m uh fair March 2020 was when Yes Bank had a problem and the bonds were marked to zero in April, in early in mid-April or something like that. Some mutual funds which owned it in their portfolios marked them to zero.
- 46:15
- Deepak: Recently, when the ruling came, six years later, when the ruling came by the Supreme Court that said, No, no, you have to we cannot allow you to write off those bonds. Those mutual funds have since subs suspended subscriptions. uh purchases, and uh from the mutual fund. That means people like me can't go in now and say I will buy uh more units of
- 46:35
- Deepak: this fund because we may take unnecessary advantage of this thing. Though I really don't think there's a big opportunity here because I think those Yes Bank eighty one bonds are still worth zero and will forever be worth zero to me.
- 46:46
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 46:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): think this deserves its own podcast
- 46:48
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): where people
- 46:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): it's almost like a a topic of religion. Are you right? or
- 46:51
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): am I right?
- 46:52
- Deepak: No, no, there's no there's no pricing there. But what I'm saying
- 46:54
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): is
- 46:54
- Deepak: the the the the reason these regulations have come is because of this past, right? And it's come into listen, we saw the gargantuan fourteen thousand rescue, crow rescue of this mutual fund, which required a joint parliamentary committee with a five hundred and forty one page report that they didn't have AI to write. And uh you know, and it you you created this this massive thing.
- 47:14
- Deepak: So please regulate things more. Don't guarantee returns. By the way, there were a bunch of guaranteed return funds which were removed at that time. And now you're not allowed to guarantee returns. Don't do distortion of tax-free versus taxed. Reveal your holdings every month so other people can verify that your NEV is actually your NEV. Uh, if
- 47:34
- Deepak: anything, the idea over here is that you. you will actually be able to see if the uh NAV is lower. Don't think that people will get afraid that your NAV is lower and therefore don't reveal it. So, as in, if don't hide things because you feel that it'll cause panic in the market. And that is the
- 47:54
- Deepak: reason for a lot of bad things. I think a lot of the road to hell is paved by good intentions.
- 47:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): I actually have a lot of sympathy for the people who try to create a product that would help, say, people in India living in the 60s, 70s, 80s start getting into the stock market in a low drip way without too much volatility and therefore using trend pricing to underappreciate in good years and overappreciate in bad years. So I have my sympathies, but yeah, you're right. The
- 48:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): world just changes and uh it's very hard to be cleverer than than everyone else all the time. Yeah,
- 48:25
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): yeah,
- 48:25
- Deepak: yeah. I think and and to to some extent we should not be, you know, we don't need this my bar patitude.
- 48:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Don't play God over it.
- 48:33
- Deepak: Yeah. I mean we we we'll we'll we'll deal with it.
- 48:36
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 48:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): guess so. Well certainly now we have to. All right. So that's it for the UTI uh and US 64. But since in to the extent other people get interested in this topic and we do a few more episodes on crises, Crisis. can you tell me what are some of the other like uh just the one-line version of other big crises that happened? If you could list them out and we'll see if we should do an episode on
- 48:52
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): one of these later.
- 48:53
- Deepak: I'll give you the example of uh 2013. We keep talking about today's LRS, uh, you know, this thing that's uh things like that. We'll talk about the 2013 crisis with respect to liquid fund NAVs going uh negative.
- 49:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Oh dear,
- 49:06
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
- 49:06
- Deepak: as in negative as in the go there was no uh usually liquid funds have a positive return every
- 49:12
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): day, pretty much, right? Yeah,
- 49:13
- Deepak: but this was a 15-day period in which liquid funds were negative and they took a big hit on one day. We talk about that. We can talk about 2016, a mini crisis created by a default in one of JP Morgan's funds. JP Morgan is no longer a mutual fund owner. They've sold their mutual fund. The ILFS crisis of 2018,
- 49:32
- Deepak: which was uh succeeded by the Z uh you know promoter group crisis in 2019.
- 49:39
- Deepak: The regulatory changes in the mutual fund regimes, which is in 2019, Bhawei come in, comes in and these the SEBI chairman comes in and reduces entry loads to zero.
- 49:49
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It
- 49:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): was 2009, right?
- 49:51
- Deepak: 2009. And 2009 was when uh people were routinely paying 2.25% to enter uh a mutual fund. So when you invested a lakh, you would actually get 97,000. something.
- 50:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): And this is probably why Ulips took off right after that, right? Because suddenly instead of selling mutual friends, we were
- 50:07
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): like,
- 50:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): well, crap, I have to go and sell something else
- 50:09
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that pays me so much.
- 50:10
- Deepak: Yes, so that was one. And in 2013, they introduced direct plans where they said, you know, you can't just do sell regular, let's also do direct. There was a massive uh set of regulations that have come since uh
- 50:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): 20 twenty the recategorization one.
- 50:23
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 50:23
- Deepak: recategorization 2018, there was a marketing expense. allowance for any NFO of up to six percent. That means there was there was a there was a certain and I won't name it, but there's an NFO of a mutual fund which collected 5,000 crores. In that 5,000 crores, they were allowed to allocate 300 crores as marketing commissions. Then you'd think 6%
- 50:43
- Deepak: is gone. That means my 10 rupees NAV should be 9 rupees 40 pesos on the day it listed. But no, they said pretend pretended and extend extent is allowed. So we will take that six percent hit over a period of five years. Every single day you will see a small hit.
- 50:58
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And the hope that it's
- 50:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): drowned out by market movement.
- 51:01
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): By
- 51:01
- Deepak: market movement. So and again, they said no pretended expense, no six percent. Take this expense on your own books if you want to, you can't charge the fund. So that was another thing. There was uh trail commissions. We there was a lot of upfront commissions being given in the first year. uh saying that listen, I'm gonna earn from this customer for five years, point five percent a year. That's about two point five percent. Why don't I
- 51:21
- Deepak: pay you two percent commissions up front? So that was one. I I
- 51:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): think you mostly covered it, right?
- 51:27
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
- 51:27
- Deepak: I think this is the this is the most part. I think there have been market crises like twenty twenty, which we have been talked
- 51:31
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): to death, which
- 51:32
- Deepak: is like you know the thing. But there was a Franklin crisis also where
- 51:35
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): they had to
- 51:36
- Deepak: stop there. We've done a uh
- 51:38
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): article like and
- 51:39
- Deepak: episode on that. But I think these are the episodes that have kind of these are the areas that have kind of shaped the mutual fund industry into what it is right now.
- 51:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): So in fact, as you're talking about this, even though I mean it seems like such a ubiquitous product, and it it very much is and is uh such a good product in many ways. A it sort of uh reassures me about just how, in some ways, how much work and decades of like learned experience has gone into making them safer. So that's obviously one. But the second is the reminder that many things that we take for granted today are not all that old. The crisis
- 52:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): you talked about is 25 years old. The fact that there's only one scheme per category, and the fa and these categories is only since 2018, so
- 52:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): less
- 52:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): than a decade old. The direct plans, which are now so much of new inflows, are only what, 10, 12 years old or so on. So the fact of the matter is that, yeah, even though it may be like forever, it's actually not all that long ago. And uh it looks like then it probably might evolve a bit more interestingly in the future as well.
- 52:29
- Deepak: Yeah, I think the best thing that the world can do is learn from the past crisis. Every historical incident gives you something. It may not help you understand why. I mean, it may not help you um appreciate the fact that our SEBI requires uh tells you that you have to give an OTP behind after every redemption, but there is probably a reason, and then that
- 52:49
- Deepak: reason will be evident because someone some uncle lost 25 lakhs because some other person used his uh credentials to redeem 25 lakhs from his portfolio. This actually happened.
- 53:01
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I know about enough stories.
- 53:03
- Deepak: Because of this, now everybody has to put an OTP. Of course, you could put limits, you could think of better ways to handle this. But yeah, I mean, at by and large, this is also why your AI can't buy mutual funds for you unless it also has access to all the OTP. OTPs on your phone. Uh, because they have all these rules and regulations sitting in place. And if SEBI finds out to let an AI buy mutual
- 53:22
- Deepak: funds, I'm sure SEBI is going to be not very happy
- 53:25
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): with this
- 53:25
- Deepak: set.
- 53:27
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): All right.
- 53:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): So Deepak, I think that's it for today. I mean, uh fascinating story. I mean, the biggest crisis uh of its time and how it shaped the industry since. And uh with that, let's call it a close. Thank you everyone for listening in. And if you find this one interesting, we'll dive into a couple more crises and see how they impacted mutual fund in the industry today. If you want to hear more of our episodes, then just subscribe on
- 53:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): whether wherever it is that you're listening to this: Apple Podcasts, Spotify, YouTube.
- 53:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Otherwise, till next time, visit us at capitalmind.in, capitalmindwealth.com, or capitalmindmf.com, Mf.com uh, and you can see all the different products and services we offer. Thank you so much.