Ewan Kirk and Campbell Harvey discuss trend following, systematic trading, and the limitations of traditional risk models.
Summary
Michael Covel interviews Ewan Kirk of Cantab Capital and Campbell Harvey about the realities of trend following and quantitative finance. Kirk explains that systematic trading requires rigorous scientific methods, acknowledges the inevitability of drawdowns, and critiques the use of the Sharpe ratio for capturing skew. Harvey discusses the distinction between skill and luck, the psychological traits of successful CEOs, and the dangers of assuming normal distributions in portfolio optimization. Both speakers emphasize the importance of understanding market randomness and avoiding overfitting in strategy development.
Episode sections
- 0:00 – 3:19
Introduction and Market Context
Michael Covel opens with a monologue about current market fundamentals, citing inflation and AI concerns, while emphasizing the need for a systematic trading approach to handle potential crises and large drawdowns.
- 3:19 – 5:12
Guest Introduction: Ewan Kirk of Cantab Capital
Covel introduces Ewan Kirk, head of Cantab Capital, highlighting his growth of assets from $30 million to over $5 billion and his background in mathematical physics and quantitative trading.
- 5:12 – 10:12
Career Origins and Goldman Sachs Culture
Kirk recounts his early days at Goldman Sachs, noting his lack of prior trading knowledge, the importance of programming skills, and the firm's tolerance for idiosyncrasy as long as performance was strong.
- 10:12 – 14:26
The Shift of Trend Following to London
Kirk speculates that London became a hub for trend following due to a more scientific, statistical approach compared to the US, which remained more conservative and traditional in its methods.
- 14:26 – 18:42
Inevitability of Losses and Drawdowns
Kirk explains that losses are statistically inevitable in trend following, using a Monte Carlo simulation to show that even a strategy with a 20% annual return can experience significant drawdowns and losing periods.
- 18:42 – 24:31
Discretionary vs. Systematic Trading
Kirk argues that discretionary macro trading is extremely difficult and often driven by reactive demand, whereas systematic trading relies on rigorous, tested models without human intervention.
- 24:31 – 30:07
The Scientific Method in Finance
Kirk advocates for a scientific mindset in finance, focusing on proving strategies wrong rather than right, acknowledging that randomness dominates markets and certainty is unattainable.
- 30:07 – 33:19
Social Utility of Quantitative Finance
Kirk addresses criticisms about the social value of quantitative trading, arguing that providing better risk-adjusted returns to institutional investors (who represent retail investors) is a valuable contribution.
- 33:19 – 34:10
Critique of Active Management and Systemic Nature of Trading
Speaker_3 criticizes active managers who track indices while charging high fees, arguing their approach lacks intellectual rigor. Speaker_1 and Speaker_3 discuss the zero-sum nature of trading profits, noting that gains for some imply losses for others, though long-term positive returns are possible through frequency of winning.
- 34:10 – 38:03
Business Philosophy and Client Transparency
Speaker_3 defends their firm's small business status, highlighting job creation in Cambridge and survival over eight to nine years. They emphasize understanding client utility functions and offering transparent communication about processes rather than hiding models, contrasting with industry norms of secrecy.
- 38:03 – 41:20
Product Offerings and Volatility Management
The firm offers two products: a high-volatility (20%) 'high octane' fund with 2/20 fees and a lower-volatility (10%) scalable fund with 1/10 fees. Speaker_3 notes that while investors can manually adjust volatility by allocating capital, psychological preferences often differ from mathematical realities.
- 41:20 – 49:15
Marginal Improvements and Industry Performance
Success is attributed to aggregation of marginal improvements, such as saving half a basis point daily, which compounds significantly. Speaker_3 acknowledges that trend following has underperformed for the last three years but is currently performing well, citing trends in bonds, agriculture, yen, and energy.
- 49:15 – 56:12
Skill vs. Luck and Survivorship Bias
Campbell Harvey discusses separating skill from luck in investment performance, using sports analogies and dice rolls to illustrate regression to the mean. He highlights survivorship bias, where only successful managers are visible, while skilled managers who suffered bad luck may have exited the industry.
- 56:12 – 1:31:31
Risk Tolerance and CEO Psychometrics
Harvey's research on CEOs finds they are ten times more risk-tolerant than the general population. He suggests this is due to a selection process where risk-tolerant individuals take more risks, get lucky, and rise to the top, while risk-averse individuals remain in the middle or drop out.
Assets discussed
| Asset | Kind | Stance | Context |
|---|---|---|---|
| S&P 500 | index | neutral | People effectively just being an index tracker, you know, doing non only things but just actually tracking the S and P index, but charging two and twenty for it. |
“Stance” is how the speakers talked about the asset, not a recommendation.
Claims worth verifying
Michael Covel has delivered 10+ million podcast listens since 2012.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·0:00
How to verify: Check the 'About' section of the Trend Following Radio website or podcast hosting platforms for cumulative download statistics. For recent events, verify 2026-08-15 through 2026-11-15. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Inflation is going up and AI is on edge.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·0:03
How to verify: Check recent US CPI/PCE inflation data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and Federal Reserve; review AI sector valuation metrics and earnings reports for 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-15 through 2026-11-15. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Covel's website is michael at covell.com.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·1:49
How to verify: Visit the URL provided in the transcript to verify the spelling and existence of the contact page. For recent events, verify 2026-08-15 through 2026-11-15. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Ewan Kirk is the head of Cantab Capital in Cambridge in the UK.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·3:19
How to verify: Check Cantab Capital's official website or LinkedIn profile for Ewan Kirk's title and location. For recent events, verify 2026-08-15 through 2026-11-15. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Cantab Capital grew assets under management from around $30 million to over $5 billion between 2006 and today.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·3:48
How to verify: Check Cantab Capital's public reports, SEC Form ADV (if registered in the US), or press releases for AUM history. For recent events, verify 2026-08-15 through 2026-11-15. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceEwan Kirk's net worth is half a billion plus.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·4:01
How to verify: Check Forbes Real-Time Billionaires List or similar wealth tracking databases for Ewan Kirk's net worth. For recent events, verify 2026-08-15 through 2026-11-15. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Trend following was considered 'dead' in September 2014.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·4:22
How to verify: Search news archives from September 2026 for articles titled 'Is Trend Following Dead?' or similar. For recent events, verify 2026-08-15 through 2026-11-15. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Goldman Sachs was a partnership with maybe 150 partners in the early days.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) ·8:27
How to verify: Check Goldman Sachs historical records or biographies of partners from the 1990s. For recent events, verify 2026-08-15 through 2026-11-15. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Bernard Madoff existed and was a fraud.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) ·14:43
How to verify: Check historical records of the Bernard Madoff Ponzi scheme and SEC enforcement actions. For recent events, verify 2026-08-15 through 2026-11-15. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceEwan Kirk has a PhD in mathematical physics.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·5:17
How to verify: Check Ewan Kirk's LinkedIn profile or academic publications for his educational background. For recent events, verify 2026-08-15 through 2026-11-15. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Active managers tracking the S&P index charge 'two and twenty' fees, which is described as a bad thing to do.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) ·33:19
How to verify: Check fee structures of major index funds vs. active funds via SEC filings (Form N-1A) or fund prospectuses. For recent events, verify 2026-08-15 through 2026-11-15. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceCantab Capital employs 50 people in Cambridge.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) ·35:09
How to verify: Check company website or LinkedIn employee count for Cantab Capital. For recent events, verify 2026-08-15 through 2026-11-15. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Cantab Capital was founded in 2006 by the speaker and Eric.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) ·35:49
How to verify: Check company history on Cantab Capital website or SEC filings for the firm. For recent events, verify 2026-08-15 through 2026-11-15. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceThe original quantitative fund has 20% volatility and 2/20 fees.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) ·38:03
How to verify: Check fund offering documents or fact sheets for Cantab Capital's 'Original Quantitative Fund'. For recent events, verify 2026-08-15 through 2026-11-15. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The lower volatility product has 10% volatility and 1/10 fees.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) ·38:34
How to verify: Check fund offering documents or fact sheets for Cantab Capital's lower volatility product. For recent events, verify 2026-08-15 through 2026-11-15. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Bill Miller beat the S&P for 14 years in a row.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·51:09
How to verify: Verify Bill Miller's performance record at Leg Mason against the S&P 500 index via financial data providers (Bloomberg, FactSet) or Leg Mason historical reports. For recent events, verify 2026-08-15 through 2026-11-15. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Jim Simons said he is a very lucky guy.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·53:33
How to verify: Search for interviews or public statements by Jim Simons regarding luck and skill. For recent events, verify 2026-08-15 through 2026-11-15. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Warren Buffett said he won the 'Ovarian lottery'.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·53:38
How to verify: Search for Warren Buffett's quote about the 'Ovarian lottery' in interviews or letters to shareholders. For recent events, verify 2026-08-15 through 2026-11-15. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Harry Markowitz published a pathbreaking paper in 1952 on portfolio optimization.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) ·1:03:08
How to verify: Verify publication date and title of Harry Markowitz's paper 'Portfolio Selection' in the Journal of Finance. For recent events, verify 2026-08-15 through 2026-11-15. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Harry Markowitz won a Nobel Prize in 1990.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) ·1:03:08
How to verify: Check Nobel Prize official website for the 1990 Economics prize recipient. For recent events, verify 2026-08-15 through 2026-11-15. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Harry Markowitz's 1952 paper is the foundation of modern finance, but the industry often ignores the assumptions required for its application.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·1:07:22
How to verify: Review Harry Markowitz's 2026 paper 'Portfolio Selection' and academic critiques regarding its assumptions (e.g., normal distribution, known parameters). For recent events, verify 2026-08-15 through 2026-11-15. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Man AHL manages approximately 15 billion dollars.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) ·1:09:27
How to verify: Check Man AHL's official website or recent SEC Form ADV filings for assets under management figures. For recent events, verify 2026-08-15 through 2026-11-15. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceA specific strategy presented at Man AHL had a 15% annualized return and 15% volatility from 2004 through 2014.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) ·1:10:07
How to verify: This is a specific anecdote; verification would require access to the internal Man AHL seminar materials or the speaker's published paper 'Evaluating Trading Strategies' if the data is reproduced there. For recent events, verify 2026-08-15 through 2026-11-15. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The Sharpe ratio is calculated as expected excess return divided by volatility.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) ·1:19:10
How to verify: Standard financial definition; verify via any academic finance textbook or CFA curriculum. For recent events, verify 2026-08-15 through 2026-11-15. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Markowitz's framework assumes exact knowledge of volatilities, correlations, and target returns with no uncertainty.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) ·1:23:59
How to verify: Review Harry Markowitz's 2026 paper 'Portfolio Selection' to confirm the mathematical assumptions regarding known parameters. For recent events, verify 2026-08-15 through 2026-11-15. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Do your own research
- Verify Cantab Capital's historical performance data and fee structure (2/20 vs 1/10) through their official website or SEC Form ADV.
- Check Campbell Harvey's research on CEO risk tolerance and its applicability to current market leadership.
- Review the mathematical limitations of the Sharpe ratio regarding skewness and kurtosis in asset returns.
- Analyze the impact of fixed-lot sizing versus risk-weighted sizing on portfolio volatility using historical futures data.
- Assess the survivorship bias in active management by comparing visible fund performance against broader market indices.
- Examine the assumptions underlying Markowitz portfolio optimization and their validity in non-normal market environments.
- Look for evidence of overfitting in backtested strategies by testing them against out-of-sample data or random null hypotheses.
- Consider the psychological difficulty of maintaining discipline during drawdowns when evaluating systematic trading strategies.
Full transcriptexpand
- 0:00
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 0:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you know, I look at the fundamentals right now.
- 0:02
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I'm not
- 0:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): a fundamental guy, but I'm human, so I see the fundamentals. Jensen Wang can't keep his pants zipped up. Inflation is going up. AI is on edge.
- 0:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 0:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): everyone knows deep in their gut that something is wrong. Now that doesn't mean you hear me say that and make bearish bets. No.
- 0:26
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You
- 0:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): need a system. You need an approach. Yes, we can walk and chew gum at the same time. We can see
- 0:34
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that
- 0:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): shit is hitting the fan, but you need a system in a crisis moment. Just sitting there waiting
- 0:44
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): to
- 0:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): get punched in the gut, which is what literally billions of people are doing.
- 0:51
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well,
- 0:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): don't be surprised when it happens. What's it? It is losing 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, even potentially 80% of your net worth
- 1:01
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): if
- 1:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it's all in something like equities.
- 1:03
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You
- 1:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): don't think that can happen?
- 1:05
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 1:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): have no idea if it can happen. Has it happened before? Of course it's happened before. Could it happen right now? Absolutely. Why not? Given everything that we've seen in the last 15 years, bubbles on top of bubbles with children that have bubbles. It's a crazy time to be alive.
- 1:23
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Even
- 1:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): though it's a crazy time to be alive, you don't want to be crazy when it comes to your investing or your trading. You want a systematic approach. To that end, and this is coming just what, less than two weeks before Black Friday. But if you want to be ready for this kind of moment that hits cultures
- 1:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and societies quite regularly,
- 1:46
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
- 1:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Black Swan, as they say, hit me
- 1:49
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): up.
- 1:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I'm easy to reach. I'll put you on the list, michael at covell.com. Again, Michael at Covell.com. I will keep you posted on what's coming on Black Friday.
- 2:02
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A
- 2:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): mindset, a teaching, a writing, an education that can put you in the right headspace to protect yourself and make money. There's no guarantees, but at least I'm telling you that. At least I'm telling you there's no guarantees. I can't promise you that I'm going to save you. I can't
- 2:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): promise you that I'm going to make you a ton of money,
- 2:25
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): but
- 2:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I can show you how. it has happened if you apply certain rules and certain mindsets.
- 2:33
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So,
- 2:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): in advance of Black Friday coming up, let me reach back and give you two classic trend following episodes. Timeless,
- 2:42
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): not
- 2:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): recorded yesterday, but it doesn't matter.
- 2:45
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): If
- 2:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you listen to my podcast, you know how I record. I don't record things to be toxeless. topical to whatever is blazing on social media for that day. It's about the principle, the philosophy. Without any further delay, let's jump right in and enjoy.
- 3:03
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 3:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I'll see you on Black Friday.
- 3:19
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In the
- 3:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): show I have Ewan Kirk. He's the head of Contab Capital in Cambridge in the UK. Ewan brings very clear and strong opinions. I'm sure there's probably a few things that he says in this interview that will be enlightening and perhaps a few people. will feel like
- 3:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): their feathers are ruffled.
- 3:41
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
- 3:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): nonetheless, I love it. What a great story. From 2006 to today.
- 3:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Growing his assets under management from around 30 million to over 5 billion.
- 3:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Inspiration as well. Ewan has seen his net worth climb from
- 4:01
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): not
- 4:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): super high to super. high. I think super high, a half billion plus would be quite inspirational.
- 4:09
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A
- 4:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): trend following trader plus other strategies, but clearly a trend following foundation.
- 4:17
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): One
- 4:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): thing to keep in mind also: September of 2014.
- 4:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): For all of the last couple years, where you'd read these articles, is trend following. dead, is trend following dead, trend following's over.
- 4:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): September 2014 comes along and boom.
- 4:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): It's not about consistent profits. Consistent profits, predictable profits,
- 4:44
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): are
- 4:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): the holy grail. You're never gonna going to get there. Better to have a strategy that takes those small losses.
- 4:51
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
- 4:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): then finds those big months, those big periods
- 4:55
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): where
- 4:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): the world changes, where profits come unexpectedly. That's trend following.
- 5:03
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 5:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): hope you enjoy this conversation.
- 5:12
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And if
- 5:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): you'll
- 5:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): indulge me for a moment, I would love to be go back in time a little bit.
- 5:17
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 5:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I want, I'd love for you to paint the picture because we're going to break apart your trading strategy, your management strategy. I want to break all that apart. But before that, you know, a guy with a PhD in mathematical physics going to Goldman Sachs, you weren't the guy that was living and breathing trading when you got there, were you?
- 5:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Not at all. No. When I turned up for my first interview. with Goldman Sachs in nineteen ninety two, I didn't actually know who Goldman Sachs were. I thought that they were a bank, but apart from that I wasn't entirely sure. So no, I didn't I didn't live or breathe trading, I didn't even live or breathe quantitative finance. Probably couldn't have discounted the cash flow.
- 5:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): So they were looking for a certain type of thinker, a certain type of thinking.
- 6:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Yes, they were they they were looking for somebody who had, you know, some sort of m you know mathematical background. And uh computer programming is also important. You know, I say this to just about everybody that we interview, that it's it's sort of useless being a mathematician, being a statistician without being able to computer program
- 6:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): or without being able to program a computer rather. Because y it's like being a novelist who can't write. The way that you express your views or express your ideas is through programming computers. And so I was a reasonably good computer programmer, I had a background in quant, and Goldman
- 6:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): very kindly took a punt on me.
- 6:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I saw that your co co-founder founder Eric, he he called programming, he said it's today's literacy. You have to have it.
- 6:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): It's today's literacy. And that that strand runs through a lot of my career, but also runs through what we do at Cantab, everyday programs. I I myself have just spent the last two or three weeks programming up a piece of our infrastructure. There's no rest for the wicked, as they say.
- 7:10
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
- 7:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): as I lay that foundation, as you talk about your background, it's gonna look going to to the audience. out there that there's this kind of this perfect physics-mathematical background. But you're also a guy that you go to work at Goldman Sachs, and I've seen this mentioned in the press. You allowed yourself to turn up at a black-tied dinner wearing a kilt.
- 7:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Yeah, that's true.
- 7:29
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
- 7:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I'm curious though, you I mean, you're not a
- 7:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): cavalier guy. I Obviously, you're very grounded. You're very
- 7:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): uh,
- 7:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you know, you think in terms of risk.
- 7:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So,
- 7:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): but what was your thinking? there? What what is your thought process that you allow yourself to to stand out like that?
- 7:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Truth is of course that for somebody who like myself originally came from Scotland, the traditional black tie dress is a is a kilt and all of the attendants are bits and pieces with that. So it's not it's not like I I turned up in a clown costume.
- 8:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I hope you did not uh infer that. that's what I was saying.
- 8:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): No, no, I'm I I'm smiling as I'm saying that
- 8:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): but I I I do think that uh one one thing that Goldman Sachs was very good at doing, and presumably still is, is it's tolerant to some degree of idiosyncrasy. Certainly in the early days, you know, Goldman was a partnership. with
- 8:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): maybe a hundred and fifty partners running their small businesses. That made it very much a meritocracy, very much a what have you done for me today kind of thing. Me turning up in a kilt is not the strangest thing that I've I've seen, but it is it's a place where were
- 8:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): really
- 8:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): much more so than other banks, certainly in the nineties. It was a place where all Goldman was interested in was was you were you good at your job? Within certain limits, obviously turning up at a clown c w in a clown costume at a client meeting would probably be a very quick way of getting fine.
- 9:05
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 9:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): mean I took it as a complete outsider reading about it in a press account. Count. I just took it as you say, saying,
- 9:11
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you know,
- 9:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): look, I'm not gonna I'm gonna march to some some music that is standard, but I'm gonna think outside the box. I'm not gonna just be the guy that's clocking in. I mean that that's as an outsider reading it, that's how one takes it.
- 9:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): That's I I probably couldn't violently disagree with that view. No. Um I think I think yes, there's certainly there's certainly some of that in me is you know to to not just be the guy. Although, you know, to to put this in context, Goldman Sachs to take that as an example. Well, Goldman Sachs is a very
- 9:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): serious, very successful US corporate. And there is there's a limit to how outside the box you can think in a bank, and quite rightly too.
- 9:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Banks are responsible for a lot of risk for their customers, they're responsible for fiduciary duty and lots of. in cases.
- 10:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Yes, you can be a little bit idiosyncratic sometimes, but at the end of the day, it is a big US corporate.
- 10:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): You know, I want to break apart some of your strategy ideas and how your firm operates, but I wonder if you would be willing to paint a picture for me. I'm curious when I can look at the success of the London CTAs, the London quants, those many. that have trend following backgrounds, why did the switch happen? Why did
- 10:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): London become the spot? You know, for example, so many of the the longstanding early pioneer trend following CTAs were from the US. What what was the switch flip?
- 10:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): That's a that's a good question. It's it's not one I immediately have an answer for, but I can speculate. I think in you know if we think about the very early trend following the the history of the industry is you know, the very early trend following the Turtles, we're talking mid eighties there, maybe early
- 11:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): nineties. The kickoff for the London, or maybe better to call it the European scene, probably not happened in the mid to late nineties with AHL, obviously, you know, the granddaddy of us all, and then you know Winton and Blue Trend and Aspect and ourselves
- 11:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): and and a whole plethora of really great films at firms in Europe. I think partly the reason why
- 11:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): we uh you know maybe managed to become m more successful or girl grural was more. of the scientific approach to investment and statistics. You know, I I look back at some of these things that you know I see in the old tattered books about
- 11:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): average true range and breakouts and and it seems like the dark ages. You know, we you know we are thinking in a much more statistical sense, uh much more
- 12:07
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
- 12:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): scientific, I think. And it's not just enough that it happens to have worked. Possibly that's you know, maybe we can thank you David Harding and the rest of the team at AHL for building that into the consciousness and then and then it just takes off. Why so so the question there is so
- 12:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): why don't the or why didn't the CTAs in the US follow that lead? Uh you know, I would I would clearly believe that a more scientific approach to investing a a rigorous statistical approach to it, uh I clearly believe that that's better than just a a rule that happens to have worked in the past.
- 12:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): But it's not clear to me why
- 12:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): that would be that would then not be transplanted back. I remember even though we started in 2006-2007, you know, I I do remember people asking me, again, particularly in the States, you know, why do you weight your positions by risk?
- 13:08
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You know,
- 13:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): why don't you just take a constant lot quantity? You know, you know, one lot of this or ten lots. of this and ten lots of that and ten lots of the next thing. And obviously that's
- 13:19
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): m
- 13:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): well, I mean there's no other way that that that's just madness in a world where you have a contract like the wheat con contract, which is maybe I don't know, twenty thousand dollars and the nickel contract, which is two hundred and fifty thousand dollars. I mean it's just a it's just a a a an insane way of doing it. But it was the tradition and our
- 13:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): industry is quite conservative. You know, the the idea that's th there's there's a small subset of investors who uh you know, want the new thing, you know, believe maybe that there's some fabulous technique out there that's just going to predict what the S SP P is going to be tomorrow. But there are also people who
- 14:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): want it to be the way it was. And anything that's that steps outside that is maybe a little bit different.
- 14:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Fair enough. Let me jump into some issues that are near and dear to you, central to how you look at markets, your trading strategies. You're talking to clients and you have to tell the new client, and this could be a very experienced client, perhaps they're not experienced Experience with your strategy yet. And you ultimately have to bring up the conversation of, hey, look,
- 14:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): losses. are statistically inevitable. You can't get around that fact. There's still a significant number of people in the population out there, whether they're very astute about investing or not so astute, they still don't want to imagine losses as part of the game.
- 14:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Yep. People are desperate to invest in something which never loses money. And that is, of course, why Bernard Midoff existed. There's a great phrase by John Maynard Keynes where he said, In the field of fraud and deception, demand creates its own supply.
- 15:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Everyone is desperate. Everyone is desperate to invest in something that doesn't lose money. I'd like to invest in things that don't lose money. I'd like to come up with a strategy that never loses money. And of course, we all want that. But the reality of almost all invest. investing is that
- 15:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): if you're probably if you're really good and or really lucky and you've got a very long track record, maybe twenty, thirty years, and you've never changed your strategy over that period, which of course none of these these things are really true for NIV, maybe the best you can vote for is a shop shock ratio of point eight, point nine,
- 15:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): maybe one.
- 15:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): I know that there are some more liquid, say stat arb strategies which can outperform that for a long period of time, and then of course August 2007 happens. But broadly, you know, a a good investment strategy, an outstanding investment strategy, is something which over a long period of time has a shock sharp ratio of one. Investors should really
- 15:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): want that. So, you know, a twenty percent volatility. with an average gross twenty percent return, that would be great. But that does mean something with say a twenty percent volatility, every pff every two years it's going to have a drawdown of fifteen percent, statistically. Every four years it's going to have a drawdown of
- 16:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): twenty percent.
- 16:20
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You know,
- 16:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Yeah, th this is just what happens. Even if the the the system truly has that return profile, it's it's going to experience those kind of drawdowns and it's going to experience losses. I have a little spreadsheet that I sometimes show to clients when I'm discussing this, which and broadly we don't really use
- 16:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): spreadsheets, but it's a nice little tool, which sort of simulates five years of returns, daily returns, from something which is a twenty percent return, twenty percent volatility process. So you know effectively a Monte Carlo simulation, if you want to call it
- 16:57
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that.
- 16:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): And every time you press F9 on this spreadsheet, it draws another graph of another realization of this random but positive process.
- 17:08
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You
- 17:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): don't have to press F9 very often before you get a history which loses money in a straight line for five years, which has a forty percent drawdown.
- 17:17
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 17:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): remember, this is something which is guaranteed to make twenty percent per annum over a long enough period. So the the expectation of losses is something that everyone should build into their investment process at all times, and it's something that investors do. And you know the majority of our investors are institutions, they
- 17:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): they're are pension funds, they're insurance companies, they're uh sovereign wealth funds, they're endowments. To be very fair to these investors, they are really quite sophisticated and they understand that. And so I think you know if you're sometimes when you're speaking to maybe high net worth individuals or
- 17:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): smaller family offices, the desire there to protect capital is much stronger. You have to be extremely clear about the fact that there are things that will happen in the future which will be unpleasant. The other thing you have to do is explain to
- 18:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): investors when you're making money that it probably won't last.
- 18:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Do you see the demand for that discretionary macro trader hedge fund? that just says, trust me, I have the experience, I can call the direction, I can position these multiple futures contracts across all these all these different markets. Just trust my discretion. Do you see the demand
- 18:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): for that waning?
- 18:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Obviously, you know, by the time by the time somebody's sitting on the other side of a table from me, they're probably not going to be asking me that question. And I am, of course, very clear about the fact, particularly when people say, Well, do you take risk off? Do you put it on? You know, how about taking off your bond position or adding more of this? I'm very
- 19:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): clear about the fact that I cannot see into the future. I'm not psychic. So therefore, I don't have any skill in that. That my you know my skills lie elsewhere.
- 19:13
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): There
- 19:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): is an argument.
- 19:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): that at least in in terms of positioning longer term, maybe nobody has skills like that. Maybe it is just impossible. I I mean I I could certainly argue both sides of that. I think we're I think the demand for discretionary trading probably comes from the reactive
- 19:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): demand. It's extremely uh it's It's extremely extremely hard to write a model. Well, it's impossible to write a model that
- 19:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): can react to every last move in the market or react to a piece of information that's coming in. I don't know. September the 11th is probably a very good example of a piece of information that arrived, the world changed at two minutes past nine, and systematic models knew nothing about it, whereas discretionary trade. traders clearly did.
- 20:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): So, in in those kinds of events, it's quite possible that discretionary traders will outperform, and I can understand why people have that demand for it. But it it is an extremely difficult job to be a good macro trader, and you know, we all know of those people who have
- 20:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): great reputations in doing that, and it's maybe only a handful of people. Of course, the the interesting thing about macro trading is that everyone wants to be a macro trader. It's really it's really interesting when you when you hear uh stock pickers talk, discretionary equity long short people talk, very
- 20:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): often what they're talking about is macro things. You know, we think the market's going up, we think it's going down, we're doing this. and then therefore we're going to buy these stocks. And quite often macro decisions are wrapped up in um security analysis, which they probably shouldn't be. I really think trading trading macro
- 21:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): on a discretionary basis is one of the world's hardest jobs. And it's possible that the people who are successful at it may just be the lucky pennies. I don't know. I don't have hugely strong views on this, but I think it is a very hard job.
- 21:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): So the macro discretionary guys, when they hear, and I'm just kind of painting an illustration, could it could be the uh the investors that are hearing from you for the first time, but the macro discretionary guys, when they hear that everything you do is systematic from strategy selection, asset allocation, portfolio construction, position sizing, execution, and risk control. that
- 21:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): everything you do at your firm is systematic. That's gotta cause some people to just go, what the blank? How how does there's gotta be that that that aha moment of like, hold on, this is an approach that's different.
- 21:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): I don't think I don't think we are exceptional. I I think it's you know, obviously, you know, whilst I know the people who run my peers well in uh socially, I don't know what they do and how they sell themselves. But I would be I would be surprised if any of the large European CTAs are talking about how they
- 22:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): intervene in what they do and they make some decisions. The remember uh one way to think about this problem is that you know and there there is there is that little bit from people where well we have a model but we occasionally intervene.
- 22:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): My view of that is that that is not systematic trading. Systematic trading, I've used this phrase before, it's a little bit like being pregnant, you either are or you aren't. You can't just be a little bit systematic. You know, I often say to people who you know are maybe pitching me with systems that are a model that they then put a
- 22:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): discretionary overlay on. I say, Well, why don't you just run to two books? Run the model in one book and run your discretionary overlay as another book, and then just see which one makes money. Once you think about it that way, the the decisions are often this is uh a way for people to to
- 23:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): hide really quite complex decisions. Remember the the point, that what we're all trying to do is we're trying to say what's more likely to go up tomorrow and what's more likely to go down tomorrow.
- 23:19
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 23:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): that's the decision. Now what we have and many other people like us is we have lots of complex or sometimes simple models which have been tested statistically over many, many years and then they're weighted using very sophisticated weighting And algorithms and cost control measures and all of those other things, literally millions of lines of code.
- 23:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): running. And all we're trying to do is forecast whether or not something's going to go up or down tomorrow. Very often people intervene in their models by saying things like, Well, I think vol's going to come off tomorrow, or correlation's going to go up, or I don't think this model's going to work as well tomorrow. Now that's a very
- 23:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): complex statement. The amount of analysis you would have to do. to say that, for example, a trend following model isn't working very well and is unlikely to work tomorrow, it since it's it's so difficult to do that for something as simple as an asset, the idea that you can do it for something as complex as
- 24:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): a model which is running on 120 different assets with various risk weighting and control and cost control measures on top of it. seems to me to be unlikely.
- 24:31
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
- 24:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): fair point. Fair point. Why don't you talk about part of your process under the hood in the sense that you like the idea of proving a strategy? Prove a strategy is broken rather than it's right.
- 24:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Yeah. I
- 24:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): don't think I'm the first person to come up with that in that you know effectively that is the scientific method which has been working pretty well for humans since the Greeks came up with it. Science is about proving things wrong.
- 24:58
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Okay,
- 24:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): it's not about proving things right. What you're trying to do is break your strategy. You can never really prove that a strategy works or doesn't work. Finance uh f despite you know pundits and newspapers. and people on the television and maybe even people on um
- 25:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): podcasts filling filling what they say with certainty. You know, this is going to happen. This is the best way of doing things. This is our systems are better than somebody else's systems, our stock portfolio is better than somebody else, Also I know this, I know that. Finance is full of all of that. But in fact, in fact,
- 25:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): finance. is dominated by randomness. Randomness is everything. And so because randomness is everything, you need to be uncertain. You need to have a a lack of conviction and dogma in certain things because you want to be able to prove that things are wrong.
- 25:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): And so, you know, when we come up with a new strategy or a new idea or a new trading system, what we're trying to do is at least in you know when we're simulating it and running it through all of our systems, what we're trying to do is find out what's wrong with it. And then if you get what is literally literally months of
- 26:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): testing and retesting and rethinking about it and thinking about things in different environments and so on. If it gets through months of that, then maybe it's going to work in the future. And these are all very weak, uncertain statements. But to a great extent, our the philosophy of what we do is around
- 26:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): that uncertainty and conviction. There's certain things I've got conviction about, obviously, I've got conviction about the importance of technology, I've got the con conviction about the importance of risk. weighting or uh coherent portfolio design, all of those things I've got a lot of conviction about. But I don't have a conviction
- 26:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): about any particular technique. You just do what you think is best and what you think will be persistent.
- 27:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yes, I I love the uh the way of dealing with uncertainty because it seems like until the last handful of years in the financial fund management arena, so many people desire certainty. And so it's it's refreshing. And of course, as you say, you're not the only one. It's refreshing to
- 27:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): hear that I just don't know. I'm doing the best that I can, but I don't know, and I really don't think anyone else knows.
- 27:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Yeah, the uh there's a there's a little phrase that I sometimes use, which is that systematic trading is i it's what we are trying to do as scientists in finance, is a little bit like sort of dimly being able to forecast what the weather is going to be like
- 27:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): tomorrow. And it's like meteorology in that sense. It's full of uncertainty and you know technology helps and the models aren't perfect and they don't forecast better than you know, even the biggest computers in the world don't forecast the weather very well five days forward. But meteorologists are trying hard to improve
- 28:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): that, both on the technology side and better theories about atmospheric circulation. And you know, they're maybe not too bad at forecasting the weather tomorrow in certain places, probably not in the UK because it's so rainy, but you you you understand. where we are. In the past, a lot of investment has really been people looking at the sky and saying, look
- 28:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): at that cloud, it looks like a dog. Yeah, I think our our way uh or and people like us have our way of doing it, I think is it's what we do. I I think it probably captures the realism of of the world. Uh the other the other way of thinking. about this is when
- 28:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): very often and rightly
- 28:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): when something happens, either when you make money or lose money, or you know, when a model does something or whatever it might be, there's always a question that everyone asks whether or not it's internally, people at Cantab or are investors or journalists, generalists. you know. Why did this happen? But It's a great question. Why did
- 29:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): this happen? And what we try and do is approach the problem from the perspective of the reason why this happened was chance. Now prove that it wasn't chance.
- 29:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Very often that's quite hard. You know, you have a you know you you have a bad month or you have a great month. People say, Well, what happened? Say, well can I prove that it's any different from chance? The quite often the answer to that question is no.
- 29:46
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
- 29:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): it's just it's just a different mindset. And obviously you have to approach problems in lots of different ways. But approaching a problem from the mindset of I think this might just be a result of random noise. Let's see if we can prove that it isn't is it's intellectually satisfying, if nothing else. I think it's quite a powerful technique.
- 30:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Let me ask something I don't know, I really call it controversial, but I I saw this great article that was about you featured in the New York Times, and I kind of went through some of the comments, and I noticed some of the comments were highly negative, and the thrust of the comments were essentially
- 30:24
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that
- 30:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you don't bring value to the economy. And I thought to myself, because I know something about what you do and what your peers do, and I thought to myself, those comments misunderstand because there's so many of your investors, even if they're institutional investors, are representing the small guy. I mean, it's the small guy's retirement money that often makes it into the
- 30:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): big institutional account. And so I think it's it's unusual that maybe people don't see that you. know, yes, you might not be accepting ma and pa's retail account. That's not your position. But I think someone misses the point and misses the boat when they make that criticism. What's your feeling on that?
- 31:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): This is a hard question to answer. So the the question is, you know, are we doing something that is socially useful? Are we doing a good thing for the for the economy? That's a hard question to answer.
- 31:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Once you start going down that route, I mean, what is useful to the economy, you know, or useful to society? The world only needs one car manufacturer. It doesn't need hundreds of car manufacturers, it doesn't need hundreds of models. So every car manufacturer is kind of not doing something useful
- 31:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): for the economy. You know, no nobody really knows. needs an expensive meal at an expensive restaurant. So expensive meals and expensive restaurants aren't really doing anything useful to the economy. Nobody needs podcasts. You know, we can live without them. You know, there's there's all once once you get into that, then I think you're getting into sort of dangerous water.
- 31:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): We are, I believe,
- 31:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): over time, are providing something which is valuable. to our investors. I think we are doing that as well as we can. We are constantly trying to add little incremental improvements that make the returns better. We won't make money every month, and we will make money every year, and sometimes we'll lose money and sometimes
- 32:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): we'll make money. But we are doing the best we can to produce positive returns for our investors. And our investors are, as you say, a wide variety of people. They're pension funds, it's it's as you say, mum and dad, as we say here in the UK, who who are investing in this. And where I feel,
- 32:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): although
- 32:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): it this is not quite the same as finding a cure for cancer, and it's certainly not the same as landing a probe on a comet to use something recently without. which is which are all fantastic things to do. This is what we do, and we probably at the margin make the returns of our investors' portfolios
- 33:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): better in some way, either higher or lower risk or less correlated and so on. Where I think there's much more problem in people doing something which is not socially useful is when relatively simple. strategies are dressed up as something very complex.
- 33:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): People effectively just being an index tracker, you know, doing non only things but just actually tracking the S and P index, but charging two and twenty for it. That's a very bad thing to do, I think. At least I believe that what we do is something that is intellectually rigorous, it's probably a good thing.
- 33:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): The other the other thing to remember, of course, is that trendfall in systematic trading, the money comes from somewhere. If we make money for investors, somebody loses it.
- 33:49
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 33:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): if you lose it, someone's gaining it.
- 33:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Some someone's gaining it. We we would believe and hope that over time, you know, we will make money more often than we lose and that that will, you know over time get positive returns. But it doesn't mean that somebody is losing. And it's a very hard question to answer.
- 34:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): There's a game out there that everybody can play. Everyone can pony up to the table and they can develop a strategy and it is the ultimate game where everyone can try. And I'm not just being a homer trying to defend you from the comet, but I kind of look at it like okay, you know what? And I'm not asking you to say this, but I can draw my conclusions about those types of critics.
- 34:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And it's like, hey, if you don't like it, go try. Ultimately, the libertarian in me is like, hey, you know, I I think we've got a lot a lot of better things to do on this planet than draw those types of conclusions. And perhaps that if you look closely you can you can see those positive things, but of course we all know that some people will never see some positive things. So you you can't convince everybody, right?
- 34:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): That's probably true. Um I mean I I'm obviously always wary about talking about politics in in any public forum because it's not my job to do that. But you know, I I do believe that we do a relatively good thing. We provide if nothing else, you know, I provide employment for fifty 50 people
- 35:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): in Cambridge, which is the small business side of what we do as well. And it's important to remember that this little community that we have is an employer and it pays people money and does all of those things as well. So I think uh you know whether whether or not there is some great good out there that we we all have to aim aim for,
- 35:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): I do believe that you know we we run good small businesses, and that is a good thing. So so I'm I'm I'm very pleased about the fact. One of the things I'm very pleased about is that in two thousand and six Eric and I sat in a small office with uh two computers and a server that gave us electric shocks every time we touched
- 35:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): it. And from that we have built a business. It's a small business and it's a business that, like any small business, you know, can go through bad times and could potentially go bust. And all of the efforts associated with running small small or medium sized enterprises, we've we've
- 36:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): managed to survive for eight or nine years now. And I'm really pleased about that. It's if I'm proud of anything, I'm proud of that. Well
- 36:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that's inspirational. It's inspirational. I would love you to expand on the idea and I think I saw you say that you unlike maybe I'm not maybe peers or other firms out there, you like to ask clients what they like.
- 36:30
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You
- 36:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): know, what n not necessarily force things on clients. If you could expand on that, because clearly some clients are not gonna have the technical market know-how that you do. So there's gonna be some desire for guidance. So maybe I'm taking a little bit of that out of context, but could you expand on the idea of of seeking client feedback for
- 36:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): what they want?
- 36:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): That's maybe taken a little bit out of out of context. I think it is important to understand what your client's utility function is, to use that scientific phrase. What are they looking for? What do they expect from an investment? And that sort of informs it it informs the
- 37:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): way that you
- 37:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): explain things. to them. As you say, generally, although all of our clients are very knowledgeable and sophisticated in lots of different areas, and of course they have to cover all types of investments and all and all types of asset allocation, they're almost certainly less knowledgeable than us in the very area
- 37:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): that we do, systematic macro trading or systematic micro trading. So I'm I'm struggling to remember that particular quote, but I think the the point here is that you do have to understand your your clients' drivers. What is it that they are looking for in their portfolio? What do they expect?
- 37:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): And it isn't a question of us sort of sitting on one side of the table saying, you know, what do you want? We've got it. You know, you just ask, we'll give you that.
- 38:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): But understanding what drives the decision making process, you know, who their stakeholders are. What's you know, there's we for example have you know we have uh we have two products. We have uh original quantitative fund, which is higher volatility, it's twenty percent, it's higher high octane, it's two and twenty
- 38:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): fees, so it's it's very much in that mode. mold of high octane,
- 38:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): very diversified systematic macro and micro trading.
- 38:33
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 38:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): we also have another product which is lower volatility. It's 10% volatility, it's it's much more scalable, it's got you know maybe just basic more basic trend and more basic value strategies in there, and it's available to investors at a half and ten. Now understanding your investor
- 38:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): means that you can understand what their internal desires are. What do they need? You know, if maybe they want a low-cost, very functional, but they want a low-cost system where it's lower volatility and therefore the headline Line numbers are smaller. You know, we we all know that investing if
- 39:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): investing in a twenty percent volatility product is is too risky, then all you have to do is invest half your money in the twenty percent volatility product and keep half of it in your pocket, and you've got a ten percent volatility investment. But somehow that doesn't feel the same as a ten percent volatility investment. For reasons that I d I really
- 39:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): don't get. I mean the the the pure mathematician in me says that's nuts. But nonetheless, it it is it is true and uh and and I you know I'm I I'm human too, obviously, and I feel that. So so I think it is important to understand your investor, who their stakeholders are, and by understanding that and
- 39:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): communicating with investors uh at the right level for for an investor, nobody none of our investors needs to know or cares about
- 40:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): the deep statistical details which might be embedded in some nonlinear Bayesian regression portfolio algorithm. And that sounds great but they kind of don't care. And they shouldn't care about that. But they should care about things like culture, technology, people, research processes. And these are all things that we can explain
- 40:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): and want to explain in great detail. And if you cannot if you can understand what your investor needs and wants, then maybe you can explain those things better. I always feel that I'm not really in that camp of
- 40:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): and and our industry is quite bad at this. The the industry of well, you know, if I told you about my models I'd have to shoot
- 40:44
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you.
- 40:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): That that's quite common, that sort of m you know, I'd I have to be massively secret, can't tell you about it. thing.
- 40:51
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 40:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): think I think that's wrong. You know, we we as an industry are managing money for people and it's their money, and they have the right um to know and we have the obligation to tell them what it is we're doing with.
- 41:05
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
- 41:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): fair point, fair point. And I I think that probably has been one of the reasons that you guys have have gone from zero to significant
- 41:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): and fairly short order in a very competitive space.
- 41:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Yes, uh we we have. It's it's be we we were, you know, I'll refer you to my previous thing about randomness. Some of that is of course luck. You know, we we had a good run. Um we didn't have such a good year last year. We're having a good year this year. These these things, some of this is randomness, but actually we're I think I mean,
- 41:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): apart from being open and transparent and supportive of investors and all those things that you have to be. I think the the other strand that runs through everything we do is that sort of s aggregation of marginal improvements. Little small marginal improvements that really
- 42:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): in of themselves maybe just don't make much of a difference. You know, you know, let's say I don't know we we work out some way of saving ourselves half a basis point in costs a day. That doesn't seem like very much. Half a basis point, that's that's a tiny amount of money. But it adds up to nearly a percent and a half
- 42:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): over the course of a year. That's great, right? We'll have that. And lots of those little marginal improvements are probably
- 42:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): what distinguishes good funds from less good funds.
- 42:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Ewan, where can we send people? People can go find uh more about you and your firm Contab Capital online. That's easy enough. And if I'm not mistaken, I think I saw you somewhere on Twitter as well, yes?
- 42:46
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I think
- 42:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): uh you know I I don't really tweet anything about uh about finance at all. Not you know uh I don't think it's the the format of a hundred and forty characters is not really ideal for extensive thought and and analysis of things. But uh our website's a great place to to find out a lot more about the firm. You know, all the
- 43:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): contact details are there. And you know that That's that really it it I actually quite like our website, you know, I think it it gives a very good impression. of the firm and how we work and our culture and the products that we have. So yeah, the website's a really good place to find out about Cantab. And obviously, if any of your
- 43:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): listeners are in Cambridge, you're more than happy to just drop in and see us.
- 43:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Ewan, hey, my pleasure. Thanks for coming on today. I hope some of my questions were not too far out from uh left field, right field. I hope you you seem to to handle everything with a plum and and very smooth and diplomatically. So uh uh the the one the the one though about the the guy that was the critic, it he he actually annoyed me more than anything because I just I was like, oh I just want
- 43:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): to strangle him. But uh
- 43:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): the one one of the things you have to remember in life is that not everybody's going to think that you're great.
- 43:57
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah.
- 43:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): And and there are valid criticisms, you know I'm quite phlegmatic about these things. There's valid criticisms about systematic trading, there's valid criticisms about uh about the finance industry. And just you know, getting annoyed about it doesn't help. You've you know you've got to take those criticisms on board, understand
- 44:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): why they've happened. There's been a lot of as we know and lots of stuff in the press about bad things that have happened in finance. People are right to criticize. You know. I'm I'm not gonna get annoyed about it because maybe some of the criticisms are valid. You know, we don't have a we certainly don't have a monopoly on the truth.
- 44:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): No, but as somebody who's watched this particular space for a long time and going back many, many decades, I think there is something noble about the systematic guys that have done this for a long time. I I I think there's something as you talk about the bad things in the finance space. the made offs of the world, or a particular strategy that blew up that wasn't so great.
- 44:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): There is something generally consistent that you can kind of hang on to in this systematic space. Like you said though, maybe things break and it all falls apart at some point in time. But knock on wood for several decades or more, it's it's done pretty well.
- 45:10
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 45:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): think I I think you we probably summarize summarise it as yeah I I think people in the systematic space we try harder. To to use that to use that old Avis ad. We we do try. I know I know just about everyone in the European space. I know that everyone is completely
- 45:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): focused on just doing the best thing they can. And I think that's great. You know, There's there's very few there's few well I've certainly never met any sort of shock charlatans or people that are just knocking together any old rubbish just so that they can raise some assets. People try really hard and sometimes we fail, but on average I think the industry succeeds.
- 45:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): And the industry's been in the doldrums for two or three years. You know, there's been trend Tran following in particular hasn't performed very well for probably the last three years. It's performed performing very well in the last three months.
- 46:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): That's how it goes though, right? It's you know you don't it's not necessarily consistency. It can just come boom and you all of a sudden have a September of two thousand and fourteen and everyone goes, Where'd that come from? Hold on, that's trend following.
- 46:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): That's the way it works. That's an interesting thing for for people. You know, I I I'd explain you here know, when people say trend following hasn't worked for three years. if you take a simple trend following model and just run it across a hundred assets, when trend following is working really well, it's maybe working on
- 46:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): sixty assets and not working on forty. And when it's not working, it's it's working on forty-five assets and not working on fifty-five 55 assets. So there's never really been a period in history where trends trend following hasn't worked on something. It just hasn't worked on enough. And now, of course, we're in
- 46:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): a situation where, and I I've got to be careful always to say, you know, we're not a trend follower alone. We do lots of other stuff. But you know, trends in in bonds, trends in ags, trends in the yen, trends in energy. I mean, this is all working out really well, and we are in one of those golden periods where. trends are working on quite a
- 47:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): lot of different things. That too won't won't last. Over time, you know, there'll be that will be ups and downs. But over a long enough period of time, trend following and more generally systematic macro trading is has done incredibly well. And presumably, and this is the little scientist and uncertainty in me coming out, and
- 47:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): presumably with a reasonable degree of probability.
- 47:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): it will continue to work in the future.
- 47:42
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Hey,
- 47:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): look, if you if if anyone out there looks at a systematic quant track record and it's all black ink, then then you've got trouble.
- 47:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): I refer you to my previous answer about Bernard Madoff.
- 47:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, yeah, yeah. Hey, Ewan, it was a pleasure having you on today. Thank you for providing some some great insights and experience to my audience.
- 48:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): It was my pleasure, Michael. Thank you very much.
- 48:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Thank you. Take care.
- 48:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Suspicion
- 48:22
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that
- 48:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): a lot of you are going to really like this particular conversation.
- 48:27
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): My
- 48:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): guest today is Campbell Harvey, Canadian
- 48:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): economist known for his work on asset allocation with changing risk and risk premiums and emerging markets finance.
- 48:38
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He's
- 48:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): a professor at Duke University as well as a research associate with the National Bureau of Economic Research in Massachusetts.
- 48:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): For those of you that love
- 48:50
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
- 48:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): conversation of the bell curve and skew and risk and volatility,
- 48:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Campbell is extremely proficient at really good explanations.
- 49:05
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 49:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): hope you enjoy this conversation with Campbell Hart.
- 49:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So listen, let me break this apart with you. I you've got this interesting paper that I've come to be aware of called Evaluating Trading Strategies. And I want to kind
- 49:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): of unpack how that how that started. And before we get into the trading aspect of that, I wonder if you could use the example that goes into football first and just kind of like let the audience slowly come into this thinking. Right.
- 49:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): So there are plenty of sports examples here, too, and and maybe football is one of them, where
- 49:46
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh like
- 49:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): a team could have uh many wins in a row or a quarterback, many passes in a row. And and the issue is is that due to skill or is it luck or is it a combination? It's it's also the case.
- 50:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): That doesn't necessarily mean that the quarterback lacks skill. It could just be bad luck. Again, if you're evaluating uh in real time whether the pole, the athlete or not, this needs to be taken into account. It is the same. thing with investment managers, where you can you
- 50:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): can outperform the market many, many years in a row. It's not clear that that's a result of skill or a result of just good luck. And it is a vexing problem in finance. How do we separate uh the skill from the luck?
- 50:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Before we get into your paper and the example that you have in particular about a particular trading firm, their strategy, I was just thinking as you were talking about beating the market for many years in a row. I'm quite fond of him. He's uh like some of my work, I've had a chance to meet him several times. He had a fantastic run at Leg Mason, and that's Bill Miller. I think he beat the
- 51:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): SP S P for 14 years in a row, I believe. But then at the end of the 14-year stretch, there was a pretty significant drawdown in the 08 crisis. So I I think this as you make this point about skill versus luck, there's no doubt it's not an easy subject, is it?
- 51:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): No, and and look, it can be a combination. That's the thing. It it it's really interesting if you if you group the best performing hedge fund. funds or or mutual funds and and then hold those for the next period and just keep on doing that. So you just just buy the winners, like the extreme winners.
- 51:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): You just have that as a strategy. Then what you find is that that portfolio does poorly. Some of this is just luck, uh, that the people at the very top probably were blessed uh with. good luck.
- 52:04
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Uh
- 52:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): that doesn't mean that they're unskilled. They could still be skilled.
- 52:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): But they were skilled plus the luck that got them up there. And and and this is the way that I usually like to explain this. And suppose that you you just like uh grab a whole bunch of dice, like a large number, let's say 36 dice, and and you drop them on on the table.
- 52:27
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 52:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): then you go pick out all of the ones that show six.
- 52:33
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 52:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): let's say there's about seven of them, and take all the other dice away off the table. Then you drop the ones that all have six. And you're going to get a combination of one, two, three. Uh it's gonna an average of about three.
- 52:49
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 52:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): and think of that as uh the people that did really well. The sixes are the people that were at the very top that did the best.
- 52:58
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 52:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): then when you throw those dice again, just it's just natural that you're not gonna get seven sixes uh from those dice. So a lot of this has to do with regression to the mean and and and luck.
- 53:13
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You know,
- 53:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I was thinking of two. very famed investors, traders. Uh one very famous, one not so famous, but just as successful. Jim Simons at Renaissance Technologies. I mean, he's had math formulas named after him. He will come out loudly and clearly always say, Hey, I I'm a very lucky guy.
- 53:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): That Now that's not, as you just say, that's not taking away from his skill. And I can think of the most famous
- 53:38
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): US.
- 53:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): USA investor, the wealthiest USA investor. He also says, he starts from, he says, look, I won the Ovarian lottery. I mean, that's Warren Buffett. So there's there's clearly a a piece of luck at play. And I think as we start to talk about uh as we start to move into your paper, the the notion of
- 53:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): survivorship bias
- 54:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): really starts to become an interesting topic.
- 54:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): because,
- 54:04
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
- 54:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): know, if if we if we are to look at particular trading strategies or particular traders, I always say to myself, and not in any way to take anything away from Warren Buffett,
- 54:16
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): but
- 54:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): there's not a lot of other Warren Buffett's.
- 54:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): That that's true. And and I think that um Jim Simons, uh Warren Buffett are probably uh
- 54:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): uh They're
- 54:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): up there.
- 54:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): They they're they are up there, uh and they are saying, well, I was lucky. I d I really that that's a hard one to believe. I I know uh Jim Simons, uh I don't know Warren Buffett. They do very different things. What from what I know of Simon's operations, there there's a lot of skill there,
- 54:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): but uh as you say it again, it's a it can be a combination of having skill and and good luck.
- 54:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): You gotta have a strategy. You gotta have a strategy that's predicated, I'm thinking maybe for both of them, perhaps. You have a strategy that puts you in a position to benefit,
- 55:07
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): which
- 55:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I think is a skill to think this through, puts you in a position to benefit when the unexpected happens. If if one has a strategy that can operate like that, that starts to be
- 55:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): skill-like.
- 55:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Yes. No, definitely. And again, it might not always work. Sure.
- 55:26
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Process versus
- 55:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): outcome. You could have a great process, and
- 55:29
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it
- 55:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): doesn't necessarily mean that outcomes could be beautiful every time, right?
- 55:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): That is correct. And you mentioned survivorship bias, the the the people, the winners. are are the ones that uh survive. There is a a kind of reverse type of bias and and that is that uh some very skilled uh investment managers drop out because they've had bad luck. That's call
- 55:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): kind of a reverse uh survivorship bias. But d this is really Pretty important that this this this idea doesn't just apply to investment managers. Just let me discuss just for a minute another research paper I have that does uh a
- 56:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): psychometric survey of CEOs. What my paper finds is that CEOs are hugely more tolerant of risk than the lay population. Like by a factor of 10. It's extraordinary. And you can think of a
- 56:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): scenario where these people that are very tolerant of risk enter a firm as a junior employee. They take a lot of risk. And and and some of them
- 56:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): they they get lucky, it turns out. Others
- 56:49
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): they
- 56:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): don't get lucky. and they drop out of the firm. And then these people that are taking a lot of risk with enough luck will rise to the top and and be uh the CEO. Whereas the person that's risk-averse never takes that extra bit of risk, never experiences the good luck
- 57:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): and is stuck in the middle of the firm. So this explains why. the CEOs happen to be very tolerant of risk. The interplay of that plus uh plus luck, I think goes a long way to explain kind of uh the kind of
- 57:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): psychometric qualities of uh CEOs.
- 57:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): You know, I can think of two very famed investors, heads of investment banks, who I think. until the fall of 2008 were just for the vast population out there that understood what they did, they were viewed as uh Prince Charming. Nothing, nothing could go wrong. Maybe Ace Greenberg at Bear Stearns
- 57:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): and Dick Fold at Lehman Brothers. I mean, these were guys that I think would fit right into the to the outline that you were describing. But then on the backside of a an entire career. of taking more risk, waking up one day and
- 58:08
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
- 58:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): dice come up different, huh?
- 58:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Yeah, exactly. And of course, risk is two sided. So there's an upside and a downside. And this was obviously a negative realization. It's It's really hard uh because they were on a roll, so to speak. This could be bad luck or it could be lack of
- 58:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): skill.
- 58:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): You know, y as we were talking about the survivorship bias issue, and we're gonna probably talk about that multiple times today, but I was thinking you mentioned you said, well, it could have been very successful investors, and then they drop out after a long like the two I just mentioned, a long string of success, and then boom, they drop out because Cause of as I sometimes sometimes think
- 58:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): though that as another side of that coin, I often see that we'll talk about successful investors and then we'll say, Well, Survivorship Bias, there's they're the lucky ones left. What about all the other guys that failed? The implication being that everyone that failed was as skilled and had the same technique or same strategy as
- 59:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): those winners, which I think sometimes that's not I don't necessarily see that evidence all the time. I think sometimes we just assume they were equal, but they're not necessarily equal or taking the same steps or strategies. Just another another facet of this, right?
- 59:27
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
- 59:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): totally agree. And it could be a much different strategy. But like in the end, And uh that's what they choose. So you could think of every investor uh having a slightly different uh strategy. Some of them might be chasing
- 59:43
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
- 59:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): real risk premia. Some of them think that they're chasing real risk premia, but it turns out that it's not. Others are chasing uh mispricing in the market that might might be fleeting. Uh in indeed it it might turn the other way that once you start uh buying, all
- 1:00:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): of a sudden, instead of something being undervalued, it's it's overvalued. Uh so there's just a myriad of different strategies out there. And some of them will will turn out because they should turn out, like uh capturing um a long-term risk premia. And and some of them
- 1:00:21
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
- 1:00:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): will turn out just by luck.
- 1:00:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): You're just you're just excited in terms of your research. research was it random
- 1:00:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): that that's correct i so i think that we don't do a very good job at basically questioning the the performance and and and basically saying uh was this due to luck or was it due to skill on both sides so this is very important so
- 1:00:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): we look at these uh these investment manager stars and and think that uh they've got a huge amount of skill, and we don't we don't consider the other side, how much of that is luck? As I said, it goes both ways. Where and and you know how often this happens, where you hire an investment
- 1:01:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): manager, uh you look at the track record that's a it's wonderful track record, you're comfortable with the track record, you invest with the manager, and then they have like one or two years of subpar performance, and then you fire them. And as soon as you fire them, the next year they do great. Well,
- 1:01:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): what's the story there? Well, it's a simple story of uh just like I I mentioned with the dice, you have a couple of years of bad luck. Indeed, in the track record, there's probably a couple of years like that too. But you tend to ignore that. You fire the person at exactly the wrong time and you pay the price.
- 1:01:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): So investors just don't do a very good job of uh attempting to
- 1:01:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): weigh the balance of luck and skill.
- 1:02:02
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Okay,
- 1:02:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): before we get into your paper, I want you to put your professor hat on for a moment. And I think one of the reasons that perhaps so many people get confused is that our thinking, we want to think in terms of this nice normal distribution. Because it works great for weights and heights and all this kind of
- 1:02:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): stuff. And it's just fantastic. Everything's just normally distributed.
- 1:02:26
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But in the
- 1:02:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): real world of asset management and trading and investing, there's something called SKU. Why don't I let you run with it here for a few minutes as you're opening up to the class for the first time to try and unpack a little bit of this
- 1:02:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): wrong thinking about the normal distribution? And what SKU is exactly?
- 1:02:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Sure. And this is an important component of my own research. There's a pathbreaking paper published in 1952 by Harry Markowitz on how to kind of optimize a portfolio. That paper led to a Nobel Prize for him in
- 1:03:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): 1990. And and basically what this paper does is it says, well, what we want is a portfolio with the best possible target return, but the lowest, the lowest volatility for that level of target return. Essentially,
- 1:03:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): this is the optimal trade off of expected return and risk. And I'd like to put risk in quotations because in this pathbreaking paper, there's a footnote that's buried at the end of the paper that basically says: this
- 1:03:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): only is appropriate if the asset returns are normal and investors have uh have no preference for SKU. skew. So let me explain. what that actually means. If if the asset returns are so-called
- 1:04:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): normally distributed, then there's no unusual tail behavior. That means that there's no severe downside, there's no severe upside. The upside and the downside are exactly symmetric. The usual measure of volatility, that's exactly what. happens. That,
- 1:04:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): for example, you could have a stock that is going up dramatically. Maybe it goes up like 300, 400%, and it's got uh a high level of volatility. And you can have another stock that goes down dramatically, maybe goes down 95%, and it's got the exact same level of volatility. Volatility
- 1:04:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): doesn't tell you anything about the direction. It's measuring the surprises in an absolute sense. So volatility is symmetric. It treats the upside and the downside the same. Skew, on the other hand, tells us the
- 1:05:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): balance between the upside and the downside. So you could have two portfolios that have the same target return, that have the same volatility, but they've got a different skew. So one has got an abnormally high probability of a
- 1:05:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): severe downside. The other has got an abnormally high probability of severe upside. So for any investor, it's obvious which one to choose. You choose the one that has got more upside than downside. I've been on a campaign for many years to try to change the way
- 1:05:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): that we think of risk, change the way that we actually do asset management or portfolio management, to take this asymmetry between the upside and the downside, to recognize. that it is rare that any asset return is
- 1:06:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): so-called normally distributed, and actually make that part of the portfolio management exercise and equally as important, make it part of the risk management uh exercise. I am tired about hearing uh about the these 20
- 1:06:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): standard deviation events, like what happened to the Swiss franc or uh and there's many other during the financial crisis, the Russian crisis, all this stuff. 20 standard deviation events, it's not 20 standard deviations, only 20 if you believe naively that these asset returns are
- 1:06:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): normally distributed. They're not.
- 1:06:49
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 1:06:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): don't even tell me this. It doesn't
- 1:06:51
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): make any sense. I've had
- 1:06:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Harry on my show. I had a chance to meet him before. He's a really he's a really neat guy. He's still sharp as a tack. I think he would make the argument, and I
- 1:07:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): think
- 1:07:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): he has, that, like, okay,
- 1:07:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): I I did
- 1:07:03
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): my
- 1:07:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): paper, and uh, this was I don't want to use the word exercise,
- 1:07:06
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): but that's
- 1:07:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): what's coming to my mind right now. I think
- 1:07:09
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): he was
- 1:07:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): surprised at how the industry took his work,
- 1:07:13
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
- 1:07:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): he really wasn't a
- 1:07:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): part of what.
- 1:07:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): happened, but
- 1:07:15
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): they
- 1:07:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): kind of
- 1:07:16
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): took
- 1:07:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): his
- 1:07:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): work and ran for it, ran with it. And that was essentially uh how uh uh
- 1:07:22
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): modern finance
- 1:07:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): got built off
- 1:07:23
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the back
- 1:07:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): of uh his work, isn't it? Is that that's a fair uh fair brief synopsis, isn't it?
- 1:07:29
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah, no, I I was at a
- 1:07:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): conference
- 1:07:31
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): with him um
- 1:07:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): three weeks
- 1:07:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): ago. It is that that 1952 paper is an amazing paper. I've I've only mentioned one. one thing that he foresaw. There's another important one also. Yeah, I think that this was uh like a simple framework uh that he proposed. It works under special assumptions. He was the one
- 1:07:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): that recognized what those assumptions were. But then you're right, the industry just goes with something and doesn't think about like when is it appropriate. to apply and when isn't it? When I teach uh finance at Duke University, as one of the main lessons for my students is okay, we've
- 1:08:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): got these these models. All these models are wrong.
- 1:08:15
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): That's
- 1:08:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): why they're called a model. You're simplifying reality. And the issue uh of applying your skill is
- 1:08:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): knowing when to apply a simplified financial. framework and when not to.
- 1:08:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): In certain situations, it's fine, other situations, no.
- 1:08:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): So I think that uh Harry is really the the father of modern uh finance, and that paper is is just an incredible uh piece of work given that he saw not just the not just the the usefulness of his simplified framework, but he saw basically how to take it to the next level and to
- 1:08:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): incorporate this idea of of SKU.
- 1:08:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Let's jump into, as I mentioned in the beginning of this
- 1:09:01
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
- 1:09:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): this episode, your paper, evaluating trading strategies. And it did catch my eye for one thing in particular, which is your early example. And I want you to explain how you selected this. And I want to make sure that
- 1:09:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I mean
- 1:09:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): I I assume that I knew the advisor that you were talking about, which was uh AHL, which is a a managed futures
- 1:09:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): trading operation owned by Mann out of London. That that was the the example, right?
- 1:09:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Yeah. So let me describe the example. And it's from it's from a seminar at Mann man AHL, uh, to as you say, is managed futures host a house that manages. about 15 billion uh dollars. So at AHL, they look at strategies all the time. They think very
- 1:09:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): deeply about this luck versus skill. This is uh a strategy that uh basically they showed a cumulative profit from 2004 through 2014. It's a graph and it's basically going straight up. It's an extraordinary
- 1:10:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): strategy where it uh it's got one year that has a very small negative return in 2004. It uh knocks the ball out of the park during the financial crisis. Uh it's got about a 15% annualized return, 15% volatility. so a
- 1:10:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): so-called sharp ratio of one, extremely consistent. Uh, we're looking at this uh at this strategy, and you can see uh people's head nodding. Yes, this is the sort of thing we want to put some some capital on. And then the very next slide is
- 1:10:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): really surprising. It adds to this growth. graph the other 199 purely random strategies. So all of a sudden, this graph that was just one line going straight up is uh is
- 1:11:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): added 199 things that basically are are centered around zero. The exercise was to simulate.
- 1:11:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): 200 random strategies with uh a target return of zero. So every single one has no skill, has purely generated numbers and a 15% uh volatility. And you see the very top one, the very best one, is the one that was
- 1:11:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): shown first.
- 1:11:36
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 1:11:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): then you see at the bottom there's a like a terrible one that earns 15% uh negative and and everything in between. And the idea is that just by pure random chance, and that's what the random number generator is doing, by random chance, you're gonna see
- 1:11:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): strategies that look great. You need to be very careful in a company if you're doing internal research, what you don't want is your researchers uh sifting through hundreds of strategies and just picking off the top one. Because when you put money on that top one in real
- 1:12:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): time, it's going to do poorly.
- 1:12:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): This was a this was AHL presenting this information. You were at an event.
- 1:12:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Yeah, because uh again, they're they're leading edge in terms. of uh thinking about uh luck versus skill and and this was this was part of an exercise on how to avoid uh overfitting uh of back tests so that that's why that exhibit is there because it is a great
- 1:12:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): example that you could easily be fooled easily be fooled um by uh random uh strategies
- 1:12:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): what is your perspective Just as a kind of little interjection here, what is your perspective, your thoughts about the work of Nasim Talib, the the black swan thinking?
- 1:13:00
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Oh,
- 1:13:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): well, that it fits in really well with my work on on skewness. He talks about uh so-called black swan On events. And and again, uh these events that are like uh negative. 20 standard deviation events, it doesn't make any sense um unless it's um a normal
- 1:13:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): distribution. Uh because in within the normal distribution, uh the probability of something like that happening is like one event in the life of the universe, which doesn't make any sense. So so he's talking about uh these things that are basically not
- 1:13:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): you don't necessarily see them in historical data, but then they happen. Uh a so-called negative y you could think of it as an extreme negative skew uh type of event. So that works in really well because uh his view of the world as my view of the world i is that it's not symmetrically
- 1:14:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): distributed, it's not normally distributed. So
- 1:14:03
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 1:14:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): think that that's uh important.
- 1:14:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Coming back to the point you were making a second ago, though, I I think when you you have researchers, you have someone uh a massive, I use a third-party example, a trade station software, and you start people start inventing strategies. Most of the top traders that I've talked to, and I was I was looking at AHL, I've had a chance to talk to the to the H
- 1:14:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): and the L. in AHL. But I was thinking that you really need to have an economic thought process as to why this particular strategy might work. So, for example, if we were talking managed futures, we've been talking SKU. Many of the managed futures trading strategies obviously are trend following in nature, and they're predicated on
- 1:14:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): not really knowing what's going to happen next. Uh, a lot of their uh risk premia comes. from hedging. I mean, other hedgers out there. I mean, people can make arguments about where their source of profits come from. But I mean, it's, it's, there's a, there's a thinking, a long standing thinking that goes behind this particular strategy. And I think you're making the point that hey, if you just sit
- 1:15:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): down at your computer and you really have not even philosophically thought through what the strategy is, and then you only want to trust
- 1:15:13
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): some
- 1:15:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): random system. systems that come up, and there's really not a thought process behind those systems, you can wake up in some trouble. Even if initially all your investors are sold on the idea of 15% returns and 15% volatility, and that sounds great, and you raise a billion dollars. But if there's not a sound economic thinking behind what the strategy is,
- 1:15:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): we all know what's going to happen.
- 1:15:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): That's correct. So this is the way. that it should work. And I do know from direct experience, this is the way that it does work at a firm like uh man AHL. And maybe it's no surprise that they've done so well with this. So basically, a researcher would come up with an idea,
- 1:15:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): but without looking at the data. So they come up with an economic uh framework. And then they actually pitch that framework uh in a uh
- 1:16:08
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in
- 1:16:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): a seminar. Uh I'll call it that. It's like an academic seminar. They will get feedback and then the senior people will actually decide whether the economic idea makes enough sense that they actually go to the data. Let's say it does make sense then uh the firm
- 1:16:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): will give the researcher uh what's known as a random partition of the history of the data. So they will give bits and pieces of the history
- 1:16:39
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): to
- 1:16:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): the researcher. The researcher will then test the economic idea, and this is the so-called in-sample testing,
- 1:16:49
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
- 1:16:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): then there'll be another seminar.
- 1:16:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): The results will be presented of this exercise. And then a decision will be made whether to give the rest of the data to tested in the so-called out-of-sample.
- 1:17:03
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 1:17:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): it might be killed or it might go ahead to the out-of-sample. So let's say it actually goes to the out-of-sample, other sample, and let's say it does well, then there's a further step. stage where uh it will be invested in, but only invested with internal money. So it's multiple stages that
- 1:17:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): you actually have to go through until that gets to client, because you really don't want to put anything uh to client trading that might be a result of luck, because you don't want to disappoint your clients, all the incentives. are running the right direction to do the best possible thing for your client.
- 1:17:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I want to go into a couple other issues as we wind down.
- 1:17:47
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 1:17:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): was giving a presentation in Singapore this spring, and I was speaking about
- 1:17:52
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
- 1:17:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): managed futures trading strategy of trend following. And at the end of the presentation, this young lady raised her hand and she just had this look that said she probably had been. at Duke in one of your classes and really, really was bright. You know, she just had that look that said, Oh man, here I I'm in trouble. She's gonna just she's gonna kill me, she's gonna
- 1:18:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): obliterate me, I'm dead. And she raises she raises her hand and she
- 1:18:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): immediately shot herself in the foot. And I I want you to kind of explain why.
- 1:18:24
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
- 1:18:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): she immediately was like, Okay, can you tell me about the sharp ratio of these strategies?
- 1:18:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And I could just, I could, I wanted to do a Vulcan mind meld and just say, hold on, let's not just immediately assume the Sharp ratio is the be all end all. Let's at least pick apart the pros and cons of the sharp ratio. But you could just see the the indoctrination as she asked the
- 1:18:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): question.
- 1:18:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Yeah, incredibly naive. But this is the way it is in industry. And like on both sides, buy side, sell side, that people will look at an investment, look at the sharp ratio, which is the expected excess return, um usually over some benchmark,
- 1:19:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): divided by the volatility. So they are only considering the volatility. risk. And let me tell you the type of trouble that gets you in into. If you do um like the sharp ratios of different investment styles or maybe even like hedge fund returns, you'll see a wide variation in the
- 1:19:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): average sharp ratios. You'll But see gigantic sharp ratios for things like um convertible arbitrage. but more modest sharp ratios for things like managed futures. And the reason is very clear once you expand the way you think about risk.
- 1:19:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Managed futures has got positive skew.
- 1:19:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): And it's almost by construction, because when things are going up, you're buying. That's the same as replicating a long call option. When things are going down, you're selling. That's like replicating a long put option. So effectively, you can think of managed futures as uh as
- 1:20:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): something with a long straddle-like uh performance, which has got positive SKU. skew. So they do really well in uh market meltdowns, and they do well when the market market's going up sharply. So that is something that is rewarded by investors. They actually like that. It
- 1:20:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): provides a hedge. Whereas these other sharp ratio, very high sharp ratio strategies, they can have severe negative skew.
- 1:20:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): So uh so for them, you need to have uh some extra return on average. because investors really don't like that severe downside. So you cannot compare two strategies based upon a sharp ratio if they have different SKU properties. The sharp ratio
- 1:21:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): does not take that into account. Indeed, it's very similar to what we were talking about earlier with the the simple Markowitz Markovitz framework where you look at expected uh target return divided by volatility. Volatility is not a sufficient uh metric for risk. It is part of the
- 1:21:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): story, it's not the entire story. If you make the mistake of just looking at volatility, then it's going to lead to a portfolio that will disappoint you. You
- 1:21:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): know, I was thinking back to that example I just mentioned with the young lady. And the moment I started to try to unpack
- 1:21:42
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
- 1:21:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): conversation, the Sharp ratio, and talking about upside volatility,
- 1:21:47
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it
- 1:21:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): there the blinders went on. It was just like don't say anything else. I I or I I don't I didn't know if it was I didn't want to listen or I don't understand or I've already got my mind made up. It was just the indoctrination just strikes me.
- 1:22:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Well, it's you know it's complicated because this sort of uh discussion is not even in the textbooks in in in finance. It's kind of surprising. So you can go through uh a top program.
- 1:22:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): That is a truest, truest statement. Anyone listening right now that doubts you, I I want them to go find where you're wrong. Yeah.
- 1:22:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): it's one of the reasons I don't use the textbook uh for what I teach. I I teach out of my own notes and my own research articles. But this is this is something that uh uh
- 1:22:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): you have to point a lot of fingers here, including uh pointing fingers at my own colleagues. So I just don't think that we do a good job of explaining risk. uh to our students. I I think in my classes about three classes we just sit down and and just think about what risk
- 1:22:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): actually is.
- 1:23:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): That's such a great that's you're making an absolutely fantastic point there. And I I'm thinking this as we're talking, it's like it's the put aside all the jargon Again, and to to to get people to conceptually wrap their arms around the idea of what's what skew is, and and and even getting rid of the word skew, so to speak, and getting people to sit
- 1:23:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): down and and and and look at it all and really just I I think
- 1:23:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): a freshman in high school with no math training, if properly explained what's going on, could understand this.
- 1:23:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Yeah, no, I I agree. Let let me give the other insights
- 1:23:39
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in
- 1:23:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Markowitz's uh article that is relevant for this discussion. And that is that his framework assumes that you exactly know all of the inputs, you exactly know the volatilities, you exactly know correlations between assets, and you exactly
- 1:23:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): know the target return. Exactly. There's no uncertainty in any of the inputs. Whereas in the practice of management, there is uncertainty. So another dimension of risk is that you think the correlation is let's say 0.5, but
- 1:24:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): you're not sure. Maybe it's 0.2, maybe it's 0.7,
- 1:24:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): but uh it's certainly not exactly. 0.5. The same for the volatility. You think it's 15, but you're uncertain. Maybe it's 12, maybe it's 17. This is another dimension of risk. So most people think, well, risk is just the volatility. Well, another way of
- 1:24:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): thinking about risk is well, what if you don't know what the volatility is? Well, even deeper, what if you don't?
- 1:24:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): know the distribution? So it's not normal. We kind of know that, but what is it? So, or the skew. We don't know
- 1:25:00
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): what
- 1:25:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): that downside tail actually is. We can maybe estimate it, but we're not sure. All of this is risk. And it's rarely taken into account at this level that there's a difference between risk and uncertainty. People usually group those together and it shows that they really haven't thought it through.
- 1:25:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): You know, I think one last point to kind of end on as we talk about the notion of estimates and so many of the decision makers out there that are in charge of institutional money or making allocations. I I mean we could it'd be a long story to to get to the point as to why many of them have a uh
- 1:25:38
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a uh
- 1:25:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): maybe um a faulty foundation. But the fact that so many decision makers that are in charge of other people's money think that somehow or another there is a perfect prediction for tomorrow and that estimates are a bad thing when estimates are basically all we got, it's really uh
- 1:25:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it's really crazy as you know what that we've got to a position. where there's so many people that think the world of investment management is supposed to be perfection. It's just an insane notion that we've we've got ourselves to these this day and age.
- 1:26:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Yeah, and and unfortunately, the actual investors kind of reinforce this because they will judge the manager based upon the past quarter or the past year. And that leads to a different type of behavior on part on the part of the manager. I would much prefer, as I said earlier,
- 1:26:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): uh take a look at the track record. You're comfortable with it, fine. And what I actually recommend that investors do, and the investment managers, is to educate the client as to what could happen.
- 1:26:49
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 1:26:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): one way of doing that, it's really simple. Let's say I've got a 20-year track record. What I can do is to create with the real data from those 20 years an alternative history by kind of randomly sampling years and putting them together. And then just keep on doing that. Then it gives
- 1:27:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): you a way to look at what things could look like given the trend. track record. So then when it actually happens, maybe you've got two years in a row of substandard performance, you can look at the history and say, well, gee, that's not unusual. That happens 25% of the time,
- 1:27:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): given the track record. So if you believe the actual track record and you actually analyze it in this way of creating uh alternative histories, then it really helps you avoid the mistake of of of firing a skilled manager basically
- 1:27:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): because they've had some bad luck.
- 1:27:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): If I see 1% a month, every month, every year,
- 1:27:55
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I'm
- 1:27:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): either thinking it's Bernie Madoff Jr. or another long-term capital management. You just can't make money every month. I mean, maybe there's somebody with a high frequency shop that's got some insane advantage that none of us else that no one else has, but just it just doesn't work that way.
- 1:28:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Yeah, d this is a a great example of actually one of my exam questions was almost exactly this. So you you've got somebody that is basically an S P 500 portfolio, but under on top of the S P 500, they're writing out-of-the-money put options and out-of-the-money call options.
- 1:28:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): If there's not that much volatility, you're collecting a premium. Month after month, given that premium that you're collecting, they beat the market.
- 1:28:42
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You
- 1:28:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): know, 1% here, 2%, 1%, 2%. It just keeps on going. It's a legitimate strategy. It is foolish to think that. that is beating the market or alpha or whatever you want to call it. That's called taking risk. Because if the market goes severely down, then you've got
- 1:29:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): these put options you have to pay off. It magnifies the downside of holding the SP 500. And on top of that, it cuts off the upside because if the market goes up some substantially, you need to pay out for the call options. So all that does is to take a portfolio, the SP
- 1:29:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): 500, and tilt it towards negative SKU. And that's the reason that you see a return pattern like this: that people are getting a little extra return because at some point there's going gonna to be uh a severe downside.
- 1:29:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): So I think that that uh is important to take into account.
- 1:29:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): It's cliche, but that free lunch thing really isn't so free. So hey Campbell, listen, I appreciate you coming on today and I hope you enjoyed the time. I I really think people are gonna like this episode. You are uh a pros pro in terms of uh interviewees. So I appreciate you coming on. Where can we send people to check you out, more of your work? Where
- 1:30:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): where's the best? place for them to go? I know you got a Wikipedia page up, which probably leads to everything, but you fire out the URL.
- 1:30:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): You could go at Cam Harvey uh on Twitter. That that would uh and and my blog is called Garden of Econ altogether.
- 1:30:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I hope you come on again. I'm gonna have to start checking out your papers. It's a difficult subject, but to break this down, and and maybe I'm too far in the clouds too these days, I don't know. but to break it down and try and get these subjects unfiltered and in to make sense is is is a challenge.
- 1:30:38
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 1:30:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): see a time when those awake will understand how to make money in up, down, and surprise Prize markets. Whether new trader or experienced, college student or financial advisor, protecting against a crash or just trying to make a lot of money, trend following offers
- 1:30:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): everyone an answer in uncertain times.
- 1:31:02
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): To
- 1:31:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): get started immediately, send me an email, michael at covell.com. I will send you the right trend following steps to take along with my free video.
- 1:31:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But if you
- 1:31:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): want to buy and hold, trust the government and trust Wall Street, this is absolutely not for you.