Ann Pettifor warns AI debt bubble mirrors 2008 crisis, citing shadow banking risks and calling for monetary reform.
Summary
Economist Ann Pettifor argues that the current AI investment boom poses a greater financial threat than public debt, comparing it to the 1873 railroad crisis and the 2008 financial collapse. She attributes this risk to the unregulated shadow banking system and central bank failures to control credit expansion. Pettifor contends that speculation in financial markets has displaced productive investment, leading to rent-seeking and global trade imbalances that fuel political unrest. She rejects crypto and gold as monetary foundations, defining money as a social construct dependent on institutional trust. Finally, she predicts another major crisis before meaningful international monetary reform can occur.
Episode sections
- 0:00 – 1:46
AI Debt and Creditor Risk
Pettifor identifies debt accumulated by AI companies and their lenders as the biggest current financial threat, arguing creditors face greater risk than public finances due to high spending and delayed income.
- 1:46 – 3:27
Historical Parallels: 1873 and 2008
She compares the AI boom to the 1873 railroad crisis and 2008 financial crisis, noting that while overinvestment patterns are similar, the scale of debt and shadow banking are unprecedented.
- 3:27 – 5:43
Regulatory Failure and Shadow Banking
Pettifor criticizes central banks for failing to regulate the shadow banking system and repo markets, allowing massive easy credit creation that fuels speculation.
- 5:43 – 17:05
Public vs. Private Debt and Historical Context
She argues public debt is less risky than private debt due to tax backing, citing post-WWII Britain’s debt reduction through growth, and contrasts Anglo-American credit expansion with Europe’s conservative approach.
- 17:05 – 21:50
Speculation vs. Investment and Rent-Seeking
Pettifor describes the economy as a 'global casino' where easy money drives speculation on interest rates and commodities, leading to rent-seeking behaviors like high student housing rents instead of productive investment.
- 21:50 – 24:26
Trade Imbalances and Geopolitics
She highlights trade imbalances, specifically China's surplus and the US deficit, as sources of political tension, arguing China is following free-trade rules which is destroying European car industries.
- 24:26 – 27:22
Inequality and Political Unrest
Pettifor links economic inequality to political instability, citing the rise of Donald Trump and unrest in China as reactions to the global system's failure to manage incomes and protect domestic industries.
- 27:22 – 35:52
Proposed Solutions: Capital Controls and Bretton Woods II
She proposes managing cross-border capital flows and international coordination, referencing the post-1945 Bretton Woods framework as a successful model currently lacking due to US isolationism.
- 35:52 – 37:06
The Social Construct of Money
Pettifor argues money is a social construct and institutional achievement, citing the BIS to explain its reliance on central banks, tax systems, and contract enforcement rather than scarcity.
- 37:06 – 38:09
Critique of Crypto and Gold
She rejects crypto and gold as viable monetary bases, describing crypto as lacking trust and gold as a 'barren asset,' contrasting them with credit-based money.
- 38:09 – 39:09
Political Leadership and Crisis Cycles
Pettifor expresses skepticism about returning to a Bretton Woods-style system due to a lack of political leadership, predicting the system will 'hurtle into another crisis' before reform emerges.
- 39:09 – 40:36
System Change and Resources
She concludes that system change is possible because the current system is human-made, citing David Graeber, and directs listeners to her Substack and book 'The Global Casino'.
Assets discussed
| Asset | Kind | Stance | Context |
|---|---|---|---|
| Gold | commodity | neutral | We've got to stop thinking about money as a commodity, as something finite, as something uh scarce like gold or cigarettes or whatever it is that you want to call money. |
“Stance” is how the speakers talked about the asset, not a recommendation.
Claims worth verifying
The biggest threat to the financial system is the debt accumulated by AI companies and their lenders, not public finances.
Unidentified speaker ·0:00
How to verify: Review financial reports of major AI infrastructure companies (e.g., NVIDIA, Microsoft, Amazon) and their debt levels; analyze credit default swap spreads for lenders in the tech sector.
The 2008 financial crisis originated in the repo markets of the shadow banking system.
Unidentified speaker ·3:01
How to verify: Consult Federal Reserve reports or academic papers on the 2008 crisis detailing the role of repo markets and money market funds.
The shadow banking sector holds close to 50% of the world's financial assets, comparable to high street banks.
Unidentified speaker ·17:05
How to verify: Check data from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) or IMF Global Financial Stability Reports on the size of the shadow banking sector relative to traditional banking assets.
In 2007, low-income countries had approximately $300-500 billion in debt relative to their GDPs.
Unidentified speaker ·7:00
How to verify: Review World Bank or IMF data on external debt stocks for low-income countries in 2007.
Britain's public debt was 250% of GDP after WWII and fell to 20% by the 1970s.
Unidentified speaker ·11:17
How to verify: Check UK Office for National Statistics (ONS) or Bank of England historical data on government debt-to-GDP ratios from 1945 to 1970.
China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2000.
Unidentified speaker ·24:01
How to verify: Verify WTO accession records for the People's Republic of China.
Binance had $6.3 billion stolen from them.
Unidentified speaker ·35:02
How to verify: Search for news reports or official statements from Binance regarding a $6.3 billion hack or theft incident.
The OBR (Office for Budget Responsibility) and Resolution Foundation reported that UK living standards are in decline and have hardly grown since 2007-9.
Unidentified speaker ·34:04
How to verify: Search for recent reports from the UK OBR and Resolution Foundation on living standards and wage growth post-2008.
The 'golden age' of economics was from 1945 to 1971, characterized by high stability and prosperity.
Unidentified speaker ·30:40
How to verify: Review economic history literature or OECD data on GDP growth and stability during the 1945-1971 period.
The Bretton Woods system collapsed in 1971 due to actions by President Nixon.
Unidentified speaker ·6:11
How to verify: Verify historical records of the 'Nixon Shock' and the end of the gold standard in August 1971.
The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) explains that money is a social construct and an institutional achievement.
Unidentified speaker ·36:08
How to verify: Search BIS publications or official website for statements defining money as a social construct or institutional achievement.
In parts of Africa lacking independent central banks, tax collection systems, and functioning criminal justice systems, there is no money.
Unidentified speaker ·36:36
How to verify: Cross-reference with economic literature on currency usage in fragile states or reports from the IMF/World Bank regarding monetary systems in Africa.
Gold is a barren asset.
Unidentified speaker ·37:13
How to verify: Verify the definition of 'barren asset' in economic literature; gold typically yields no interest or dividends, unlike productive assets.
Money is credit and a promise to pay.
Unidentified speaker ·37:18
How to verify: Consult modern monetary theory (MMT) or central banking textbooks that define fiat money as a liability/credit instrument.
The current monetary system has operated on the same principles since 1873.
Unidentified speaker ·38:30
How to verify: Research the history of the gold standard and monetary regimes; 1873 marks the start of the 'Great Depression' of prices and the widespread adoption of the gold standard by major powers.
David Graeber famously said the ultimate truth of the world is that it is a system we have created and can remake.
Unidentified speaker ·39:17
How to verify: Search for quotes by anthropologist David Graeber, particularly in his book 'Debt: The First 5,000 Years' or 'The Dawn of Everything,' regarding the social construction of systems.
Ann Pettifor has published a book titled 'The Global Casino'.
Unidentified speaker ·39:50
How to verify: Check book databases (e.g., Amazon, Goodreads) for a book by Ann Pettifor with this title.
Ann Pettifor plans to write a book about the system 20 years after the crisis (referring to the Lehman Brothers collapse).
Unidentified speaker ·39:56
How to verify: Check Ann Pettifor’s Substack or official website for announcements regarding a new book project timed for the 20th anniversary of 2008.
Do your own research
- Verify the current size of the shadow banking sector relative to traditional banking assets using data from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) or Federal Reserve Z.1 reports.
- Review the debt-to-income ratios and cash flow projections of major AI infrastructure companies and their lenders to assess the 'delayed income' claim.
- Check the regulatory status of repo markets and non-bank financial intermediaries in the US, UK, EU, and Japan to confirm the extent of oversight gaps.
- Analyze historical data on UK public debt from 1945-1950 to verify the claim that growth alone reduced debt from 250% to 20% of GDP without austerity.
- Examine trade balance data between China, the US, and the EU to assess the impact of Chinese exports on European automotive and US manufacturing sectors.
- Research the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) publications on the definition and architecture of modern money to evaluate the 'social construct' argument.
- Investigate the regulatory and trust frameworks surrounding major crypto exchanges like Binance to assess the validity of the 'trustworthiness' critique.
- Review Ann Pettifor’s book 'The Global Casino' and her Substack 'System Change' for detailed policy proposals on capital controls and Bretton Woods II.
Full transcriptexpand
- 0:00
- Unidentified speaker: Biggest threat is the debt that's been accumulated by the AI companies and by those people who have lent to the AI companies and to the infrastructure backing up AI of data centers and so on and all the companies involved in that.
- 0:18
- Unidentified speaker: And those lenders are in a very risky position at the moment because then the AI is not generating the income that was expected and not in time, but it's massively spending.
- 0:31
- Unidentified speaker: So I think creditors to the AI companies are the ones at the moment that have most to fear much more uh threat, much greater threat than there is to the public finances.
- 0:51
- Unidentified speaker: Hey everyone, my name is Anthony Fatsies, and welcome to another episode of the What the Finance podcasts.
- 0:56
- Unidentified speaker: On this podcast, I have the pleasure of welcoming onto the podcast, Anne Petifor.
- 1:00
- Unidentified speaker: So Anne is director of policy research and macroeconomics, and she's also the author of the book The Coming First World Debt Crisis, which predicted the 2008 financial crisis.
- 1:10
- Unidentified speaker: Her new book that was released this year, The Global Casino, argues the financial system has been built on speculation rather than investment.
- 1:16
- Unidentified speaker: So Anne, thank you so much for coming on the podcast today.
- 1:18
- Unidentified speaker: Thank you, Anthony.
- 1:20
- Unidentified speaker: Lovely to be here.
- 1:21
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah, really looking forward to the conversation because it definitely seems like we're at a sort of similar point to where we were potentially in 2006.
- 1:27
- Unidentified speaker: You know, you predicted the crisis then, uh, and it seems like we're looking at everything similarly at the moment.
- 1:33
- Unidentified speaker: The bond yields are at multi-decade highs, the Fed is hiking into an oil shock.
- 1:37
- Unidentified speaker: Uh, you know, obviously AI is sucking up massive amounts of debt.
- 1:41
- Unidentified speaker: So be really interested in seeing sort of how you're currently seeing the debt landscape.
- 1:46
- Unidentified speaker: So, you know, you're right, it's the same old story.
- 1:50
- Unidentified speaker: And I was I read recently um Liaquat Ahmed's wonderful book, uh 1873, The First Ever Global Financial Crisis.
- 2:01
- Unidentified speaker: And this was a crisis that was a result of a boom in investment in railroads.
- 2:06
- Unidentified speaker: And, you know, we just repeated the story over and over again.
- 2:11
- Unidentified speaker: Uh, only this time the overinvestment is in AI, of course.
- 2:16
- Unidentified speaker: So um, you know, it's kind of painful because the I wrote the book uh in 2005 and published in 2006, and I couldn't get the timing right of the of you know when the thing would blow up.
- 2:31
- Unidentified speaker: I believed that by the time the book was published it would all be over.
- 2:34
- Unidentified speaker: And I was terribly worried the publisher had fixed the title wrongly, calling it the coming first book debt crisis, when actually it it was already there.
- 2:43
- Unidentified speaker: I was wrong, of course, because it didn't begin to break until August 2007.
- 2:49
- Unidentified speaker: And I feel similarly about today, that uh the difference between 2007-9 and today is the scale, the scale of the uh of the debt essentially.
- 3:01
- Unidentified speaker: Um and and the other big difference, I mean, the the 2007-9 crisis was also a crisis that originated in the repo markets in the shadow banking system, if you like.
- 3:12
- Unidentified speaker: But the shadow banking system has grown hugely since then.
- 3:17
- Unidentified speaker: So it's it's the same old story, it's the same old story as the 1873 railroad story, but the scale is unbelievable.
- 3:27
- Unidentified speaker: And for me, um the real issue is the failure of our regulatory authorities, the Federal Reserve, the ECB, the Bank of England, the Bank of Japan, to manage the global financial system to prevent these, this first of all, the creation of easy money, if you like, easy credit, uh, masses of it, billions, trillions of dollars of this easy credit being managed, or we hope it's being managed in the in the shadow banking system, uh, in in repo markets, which you know we we might monitor but we don't regulate.
- 4:05
- Unidentified speaker: Uh when I say the authorities monitor but don't regulate, um, you know, it the scale is just extraordinary.
- 4:14
- Unidentified speaker: And and there's kind of irresponsibility at the heart of the system, the irresponsibility of those public authorities that ought to be managing a monetary system that is based on old-fashioned trust.
- 4:29
- Unidentified speaker: It's a social, as this wonderful paper by um Inyaki Alvasoro of the Bank for International Settlements, Money in the Architecture of Trust.
- 4:41
- Unidentified speaker: Money is based on a social construct, which is trust.
- 4:46
- Unidentified speaker: And how do you manage trust at a global level beyond the reach of the regulatory boundaries of states, including even the most powerful, the United States?
- 4:58
- Unidentified speaker: Um of course we can manage that, and we have done so in the past.
- 5:03
- Unidentified speaker: You know, we've had global easy money creation back in the day, uh, with all the booms and busts that we know of.
- 5:12
- Unidentified speaker: And the authorities do know how to deal with it, but they come deeply reluctant to do so.
- 5:19
- Unidentified speaker: Instead, they prefer to prevail over crises and very, very costly bailouts, costly for taxpayers, that is.
- 5:28
- Unidentified speaker: So, you know, for me, it's just the same old story, the same old blues.
- 5:33
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah, yeah, it definitely seems to be the case.
- 5:34
- Unidentified speaker: So if we maybe go back to before the 2008 financial crisis, what are what were the key things that you saw that really worried you at the time and that you're seeing today as well?
- 5:43
- Unidentified speaker: Well, I was working on low-income countries' debts.
- 5:48
- Unidentified speaker: Um, and it was clear to me that um these countries had been persuaded to accept easy money, mainly dollar bills, um, partly as a result of the inflation of the 1970s, and again of the deregulation of credit uh with the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1971.
- 6:11
- Unidentified speaker: Not the collapse with the kind of destruction of the Bretton Wood system by uh President Nixon in 1971.
- 6:19
- Unidentified speaker: And after that, there was this period of rampant deregulation, loads of money created uh by central banks and pumped into the system.
- 6:31
- Unidentified speaker: Um, and that naturally led, as both Hayek and Keynes would have explained, to inflation.
- 6:37
- Unidentified speaker: Too much money chasing too few goods and services.
- 6:40
- Unidentified speaker: Subsequently, Paul Folker arrives on the scene in 1979, 1980, I think it is, and he smashes the whole thing up by putting very high rates of interest on that money, um, on that debt.
- 6:54
- Unidentified speaker: And so what I could see back in 2007, because I was worrying about low-income countries and because their debts amounted to, I don't know, at the time, 25 years ago, something like, I don't know, 300 billion, four, five hundred billion dollars, relative to their incomes and to their GDPs, that was still a very large amount for them, especially for individual countries.
- 7:19
- Unidentified speaker: Um, and when I looked up at the Anglo-American debt, which I hadn't focused on at all because I was so busily focused on these smaller countries, it was just shocking to me that there was this extraordinarily high ratio between the level of debts owed and the expected income that was supposed to deal with those debts.
- 7:43
- Unidentified speaker: And it was so obvious that relative to GDP, the debt was completely out of sync with annual uh income from these uh these Anglo-American economies.
- 7:53
- Unidentified speaker: And it was very much the Anglo-American economies.
- 7:56
- Unidentified speaker: It was Britain, the United States, Australia.
- 7:58
- Unidentified speaker: It wasn't, it wasn't Europe.
- 8:00
- Unidentified speaker: Europe was being very conservative about credit creation, actually.
- 8:05
- Unidentified speaker: You know, it was really interesting to me at the time, just to reflect, that um by 2000 we were using credit cards like crazy.
- 8:15
- Unidentified speaker: I remember my sons going to university uh and having no income whatsoever, and in some cases, no prospects.
- 8:23
- Unidentified speaker: Uh, in one case, no prospects, and um and yet being absolutely overwhelmed by credit cards because you know the banks believed that they're because they were at university, they were going to be able to get jobs afterwards.
- 8:38
- Unidentified speaker: And the case of one son, that did not happen.
- 8:40
- Unidentified speaker: On the other, it did.
- 8:42
- Unidentified speaker: Um, so you know, but in France it was really hard to get a credit card.
- 8:47
- Unidentified speaker: People were still using bank loans and that sort of thing.
- 8:50
- Unidentified speaker: It was people didn't weren't familiar with credit cards.
- 8:53
- Unidentified speaker: We were crazy about easy money in the Anglo-American economies, and that became very clear to me that if I I was worrying about these poor countries, actually, the rich countries had a much bigger problem.
- 9:05
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah, really interesting.
- 9:06
- Unidentified speaker: Are you seeing similarities to today?
- 9:08
- Unidentified speaker: Do you think because it's interesting, I feel like the government's the the area of the economy that is much more indebted.
- 9:14
- Unidentified speaker: Whereas I guess, you know, if you look back to that period, it was definitely the individual person, potentially companies as well that was holding the debt.
- 9:20
- Unidentified speaker: Yes.
- 9:21
- Unidentified speaker: So I mean, public debt is less of a problem for the big states than it is for and then private debt.
- 9:30
- Unidentified speaker: Um and that's because you know, the amount of collateral, if you like, the amount of guaranteed income in the form of tax revenues makes public debt a very different matter than for private corporations who do not have guaranteed flows of future income.
- 9:51
- Unidentified speaker: Banks, uh, central banks have guaranteed flows of future income because whether you like it by or not, by law, um we in Britain are obliged to pay taxes, and we can get into trouble if we don't pay our taxes every year.
- 10:06
- Unidentified speaker: People dodge taxes, of course, and there's lots of tax evasion, that sort of thing.
- 10:10
- Unidentified speaker: But on the whole, this is a steady stream of income, and it's a steady stream of income depict depict expected into the future.
- 10:20
- Unidentified speaker: Um, you know, there was a time in the 19th century when we issued a hundred-year consoles, you know, to perpetual debt, if you like, on the basis that, you know, the state wasn't going to go away.
- 10:34
- Unidentified speaker: And that applies, of course, to Britain and the United States.
- 10:37
- Unidentified speaker: It may not apply to Zimbabwe, but it's not even Zimbabwe goes away.
- 10:42
- Unidentified speaker: Zimbabwe is still there.
- 10:44
- Unidentified speaker: It's not like a private company that can be bankrupted.
- 10:48
- Unidentified speaker: Um, it survives, um, it defaults and it has economic crises.
- 10:55
- Unidentified speaker: But so, in that sense, you know, public debt is less of a problem than private debt.
- 11:02
- Unidentified speaker: And I think at the moment, for example, that the United States, debts of the United States aren't really a problem.
- 11:08
- Unidentified speaker: When you think about where we were in 1945 here in Britain, uh debt was public debt was 250% of GDP.
- 11:17
- Unidentified speaker: That was because we'd had six years of economic destruction, if you like, where we had exported our young men, working men, and had them killed essentially.
- 11:30
- Unidentified speaker: And at home we were unable to produce, we were unable to manufacture, or we, of course, we did continue, and we were, you know, the British people were extraordinary during the war.
- 11:42
- Unidentified speaker: But what you had was the case of the government pouring money into the economy in order to generate food for the people and weapons for the soldiers, but there was not income coming back in in the form of tax revenues because there were people were not employed in that sense.
- 12:00
- Unidentified speaker: So um post-war, we've got 250% of GDP debt to income.
- 12:08
- Unidentified speaker: And immediately the Labour government began spending.
- 12:11
- Unidentified speaker: It spent on the National Health Service, it nationalized the health service, nationalized the education system, nationalized housing to a large extent, nationalized the coal mines, for God's sake, and spent all that money, and that generated employment, and employment generated income.
- 12:28
- Unidentified speaker: And with time, quite quickly, the debt went down from 250% to about 20% of GDP, and it stayed at 20% of GDP until the 1970s, I'm afraid, until Mrs.
- 12:40
- Unidentified speaker: Thatcher came onto the scene when the public debt began to rise relative to income.
- 12:47
- Unidentified speaker: So that's not the biggest problem.
- 12:49
- Unidentified speaker: It is a problem that has to be solved, and we do have to have, if not balanced budgets, we can't believe we can't have massively imbalanced budgets.
- 12:59
- Unidentified speaker: That's not sustainable either.
- 13:01
- Unidentified speaker: But in the case of the United States, you know, that economy is so big and so powerful and so um at the moment booming basically.
- 13:11
- Unidentified speaker: I I was reading the Wall Street Journal this morning telling me how much business investment there is in the United States, how uh everything is going well except perhaps the housing market.
- 13:24
- Unidentified speaker: Um and as a result, there are revenues pouring into the Treasury.
- 13:30
- Unidentified speaker: Um, I think those revenues are unstable.
- 13:33
- Unidentified speaker: I think the, you know, that this boom is unstable.
- 13:37
- Unidentified speaker: So there is a threat um to the to the public finances.
- 13:42
- Unidentified speaker: Um, but on the whole, that's not the biggest threat.
- 13:45
- Unidentified speaker: The biggest threat is the debt that's been accumulated by the AI companies and by those people who have lent to the AI's companies and to the infrastructure backing up AI and data centers and so on, and all the companies involved in that.
- 14:03
- Unidentified speaker: Um, and those lenders are in a very risky position at the moment because then the AI is not generating the income that was expected and not in time, but it's massively spending.
- 14:16
- Unidentified speaker: So, so I think creditors to the AI companies are the ones at the moment that have m most to fear, much more uh threat, much greater threat than there is to the public finances.
- 14:31
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah, really interesting.
- 14:32
- Unidentified speaker: So much drawing back there.
- 14:33
- Unidentified speaker: And I think an interesting take, maybe after World War II, is there was quite high inflation as well.
- 14:37
- Unidentified speaker: So really the bondholders were the ones that were uh were impacted the most.
- 14:42
- Unidentified speaker: Uh I'd imagine a lot of it was devalued.
- 14:45
- Unidentified speaker: Well, the inflation didn't appear until you know for a while, um, because there was such low levels of economic activity after the war.
- 14:55
- Unidentified speaker: It took a long time to sort of gear up the economy once again.
- 14:59
- Unidentified speaker: But sure, you know, there was inflation.
- 15:02
- Unidentified speaker: Um, and that was also, and this is again very similar to today, and what annoys me about the Bank of England using interest rates to tackle inflation is that this is external, you know.
- 15:13
- Unidentified speaker: But we were obliged to import essential foodstuffs after the war.
- 15:18
- Unidentified speaker: We were obliged to import, you know, what we needed to get the engine of the system going again.
- 15:26
- Unidentified speaker: Um, and those were higher prices in economies that those were bought at higher prices and so on, and just as today we're buying oil and diesel at much higher prices than we can afford, and that's causing inflation.
- 15:40
- Unidentified speaker: So we need to distinguish between the kinds of inflation that we get and and what that means for the economy.
- 15:46
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah, definitely.
- 15:46
- Unidentified speaker: But and and it seems like you sort of link with the Bretton, you know, going off Bretton Woods and going off the gold standard as a major driver of, I guess, you know, the neoliberalist world that we've lived over the last 50 years and uh and and the high inflation that we saw then and potentially we're seeing now.
- 16:01
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah.
- 16:02
- Unidentified speaker: Well, that it happened straight away.
- 16:04
- Unidentified speaker: And you know, as I say, both Hayek and Keynes would have agreed that if you you print too much money chasing too few goods and services, you get inflation really.
- 16:14
- Unidentified speaker: But you also get inflation if you know the Straits of Hormuz are blocked and you can't get you can't ship out diesel or or if Russian refineries are blown up by the Ukrainians.
- 16:26
- Unidentified speaker: So so there's a multiple causes of inflation.
- 16:30
- Unidentified speaker: Um, but uh easy money is another cause of inflation.
- 16:34
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah, definitely.
- 16:35
- Unidentified speaker: And you and you sort of mentioned there, I guess, the shadow banking and and how it's massively grown since since 2008 financial crisis.
- 16:42
- Unidentified speaker: And it seems like it was something that sort of jumped into the place of what the banks were doing when they were being massively regulated.
- 16:48
- Unidentified speaker: So almost, you know, seems like the regulators regulated the banks, but they sort of just allowed this beast to grow in the sideline.
- 16:55
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah, yeah.
- 16:55
- Unidentified speaker: So high street banks that now are well, they still they still hold something like 50% of the world's financial assets.
- 17:05
- Unidentified speaker: But the shadow banking sector is is catching up and is also, if I'm not mistaken, close to 50% of the world's financial assets.
- 17:14
- Unidentified speaker: Um and these are not overseen.
- 17:17
- Unidentified speaker: So, you know, put post-2007-9, we clamped down on the high street banks, and they finding it hard to lend crazy money.
- 17:27
- Unidentified speaker: Um, and instead we we kept the we allowed the shadow banking system to continue in its form, in the form that had created the crisis in the first place.
- 17:36
- Unidentified speaker: And the problem with that is that this kind of massive surplus of money creation uh means that it is possible to make money from money.
- 17:49
- Unidentified speaker: And that brings me to the global casino, to the fact that all you need is collateral.
- 17:55
- Unidentified speaker: Um, and using a tiny bit of collateral, say 10 million pounds, you can leverage an additional billion pounds in that system.
- 18:06
- Unidentified speaker: And that is why, you know, why on earth would I want to invest, for example, in building wind farms or solar panels or electric cars, when actually I can make loads of money just from betting, um, just from borrowing easy money and then betting that interest rates are going to rise or fall, or that diesel prices are gonna rise and fall by 5% or 2% or 1%, and make you know, effortlessly make loads of money.
- 18:36
- Unidentified speaker: Um, and so for me, speculation is dangerous.
- 18:39
- Unidentified speaker: Hedging, of course, is a socially necessary thing to do, but I think most institutions that call themselves hedge funds should really call themselves speculation funds because they're not hedging, they're mainly speculating.
- 18:53
- Unidentified speaker: And speculation is such a kind of socially unacceptable activity because it's about the extraction of wealth effortlessly from those who have wealth and in whatever form.
- 19:07
- Unidentified speaker: And um, you know, and it's it leads to a degradation of the economy.
- 19:15
- Unidentified speaker: I I'm I have young people around me just about going to university, and they're having to pay thousands, thousands of pounds a year, 10,000 pounds a year, to pay rent on their digs at university.
- 19:32
- Unidentified speaker: Now, in the old days, when we went to youth, our digs were pretty rough and horrible.
- 19:37
- Unidentified speaker: We didn't have washing machines and dishwashers on hand, but we didn't have to pay huge sums in rent.
- 19:44
- Unidentified speaker: Universities have turned into rent-seeking institutions, into real estate managers, if you like, not into um castles, you know, institutions of learning.
- 19:56
- Unidentified speaker: Um, so you know, if you try and do a master's degree at the London School of Economics, it costs an awful lot of money, and you get very little learning in return for it, because hiring lecturers is expensive.
- 20:11
- Unidentified speaker: Renting out students' digs is lucrative.
- 20:16
- Unidentified speaker: And so we have this kind of distortion of the economy by those who would prefer to invest in a bit of collateral building with fancy students' accommodation and just sit on their butts and collect the rent from that rather than investing in hiring professors and economists and experts who are going to expand our understanding of the universe.
- 20:41
- Unidentified speaker: So, so you know, this kind of distortion to our economic lives and to our social and political lives is what's causing political unrest and also generating massive imbalances, ultimately, the kind of imbalances we see in the AI sector now.
- 21:00
- Unidentified speaker: Everyone, sorry for interrupting, but just want to say thank you so much for listening, and I hope you're getting amazing value out of this conversation.
- 21:06
- Unidentified speaker: If you are, we really appreciate it if you could like, share, and subscribe.
- 21:08
- Unidentified speaker: It really helps the channel and means we can continue to get amazing guests like this one.
- 21:12
- Unidentified speaker: Thanks again, and let's get back to the show.
- 21:14
- Unidentified speaker: It does seem like the Western economies post-2008 have really pushed towards that rent-seeking um aspect.
- 21:21
- Unidentified speaker: As you said, there's not as much capital investment.
- 21:23
- Unidentified speaker: Maybe in the US there is, but in at least Europe there isn't as much, in Australia, there isn't as much.
- 21:27
- Unidentified speaker: It's really been focused on rent-seeking, and that's how the sort of economies have grown, which is which is unsustainable, as you say.
- 21:35
- Unidentified speaker: And it's a and that's why my book is called a global casino.
- 21:40
- Unidentified speaker: And the and the problem with the casino is that it creates imbalances, and the imbalances are not just financial imbalances.
- 21:50
- Unidentified speaker: One of the most frightening imbalances, in my view, is our trade imbalances.
- 21:56
- Unidentified speaker: Um, you know, we are now in a situation where China has a massive surplus, and the United States a massive trade deficit, and other countries have deficits and surpluses, and that creates political tensions.
- 22:09
- Unidentified speaker: Um, China is not deliberately dumping electric cars, if you're she's not even dumping electric cars on Europe because there is a manage, there is some management of those trade flows.
- 22:21
- Unidentified speaker: But the fact of the matter is that the European car industry is going to be wiped out by the fact that China invested very, in my view, very presciently in electric cars, encouraged investment in those companies, you know, provided the backup, the credit, if you like, the state credit needed to get those industries going.
- 22:48
- Unidentified speaker: And now we're in a situation where, but thanks to the system, the way the actual global system works, China is dumping cars on Europe and destroying the European car industry in its practice.
- 23:00
- Unidentified speaker: Now, that's going to have political consequences.
- 23:02
- Unidentified speaker: We see them played out in Germany and in France.
- 23:07
- Unidentified speaker: Um, and so really uh, you know, until central bankers take a political economy perspective on this, we're not, you know, to sit in a powerful central bank and pontificate about interest rates and inflation while you have a political crisis brewing, which is going to destroy, you know, quite a lot of economic infrastructure if we're not careful.
- 23:32
- Unidentified speaker: We may end up going to war, is irresponsible, in my view, profoundly irresponsible.
- 23:39
- Unidentified speaker: So it's not just financial imbalances, Anthony, is what I want to argue.
- 23:43
- Unidentified speaker: There are also trade imbalances.
- 23:46
- Unidentified speaker: And I don't blame China.
- 23:48
- Unidentified speaker: China is doing what China is told to do in a globalized financial system, in a system in which borders are meant to be frictionless, in which trade is meant to be free trade, right?
- 24:01
- Unidentified speaker: We persuaded China when she joined the World Trade Organization in 2000 that that was the way to run the world.
- 24:09
- Unidentified speaker: And so she's obediently done the deed and um has these thriving industries, export sectors, which are based in fact on inequality.
- 24:21
- Unidentified speaker: And another imbalance, a great imbalance, which is also politically dangerous, is inequality at home.
- 24:26
- Unidentified speaker: China has massive inequality at home.
- 24:28
- Unidentified speaker: It's almost as bad as it is in the United States, because those sectors working on, if you like, the coastal areas, the export sectors, are doing very, very well out of the global economy.
- 24:42
- Unidentified speaker: Back home, back in the hinterland, rural areas where there is not actually a fully developed welfare state, are suffering from low incomes and high levels of savings because of their insecurity.
- 24:54
- Unidentified speaker: That inequality is dangerous for China and for the Communist Party of China, but it's also dangerous for the United States.
- 25:01
- Unidentified speaker: It's why we're seeing the kind of reaction we're seeing in the midterm elections right now.
- 25:07
- Unidentified speaker: Um, and why we've got Donald Trump, in my view.
- 25:10
- Unidentified speaker: We've got Donald Trump for a very good reason.
- 25:13
- Unidentified speaker: People wanted a strong man or woman, but in the United States case, a strong man to protect them from global markets that were destroying what we now call it the rust belt, where there were jobs before, decent, well-paid jobs, and middle class families could afford a home and so on.
- 25:32
- Unidentified speaker: That's no longer possible.
- 25:34
- Unidentified speaker: Trump comes to power promising that he's going to fix it all, and then turns out to be one of the world's greatest grifters of all time.
- 25:42
- Unidentified speaker: And so they're chucking him out.
- 25:44
- Unidentified speaker: But I'm not sure that the new administration, uh, or the new Congress, if you like, is going to have a developed alternative plan for managing incomes and so on, and ending inequality.
- 25:58
- Unidentified speaker: I'm I'm I'm heartened by the news of the California tax, uh windfall tax uh issue that is about to be voted on next Tuesday as well, because that shows there is a beginning to be an attempt at managing this massive imbalance of inequality, which is dangerous for America, as dangerous for America as it is for China or any other African country or European country.
- 26:25
- Unidentified speaker: Um, but these are very tentative steps, and they're not dealing with the whole systemic issue that you know taxing wealth is all very well, but it doesn't deal with the system.
- 26:38
- Unidentified speaker: And it's the it's the system that needs to be changed, in my view.
- 26:42
- Unidentified speaker: And what actions could be changed, could could be made to sort of change that?
- 26:45
- Unidentified speaker: Because I think a risk that we're seeing, you know, in China, it's unsustainable for every country to do that.
- 26:51
- Unidentified speaker: So it's one of those things they can only do what they're doing because there's sort of um demand in or there's uh yeah, demand in sort of the West to be able to absorb that.
- 27:00
- Unidentified speaker: If every country was doing this, there'd be there wouldn't be enough demand, it'd be impossible, basically.
- 27:05
- Unidentified speaker: Sure.
- 27:05
- Unidentified speaker: So it's impossible for yes, exactly, because you know, the system, the global system, has to balance out, you know, in the end.
- 27:14
- Unidentified speaker: You can't have more surpluses and then you have deficits.
- 27:17
- Unidentified speaker: It's got to, it's got to be worked out.
- 27:20
- Unidentified speaker: Um, what should be done?
- 27:22
- Unidentified speaker: Well, I have a radical proposal, which is that we've got to begin to manage cross-border capital flows.
- 27:28
- Unidentified speaker: And I use the word manage rather than control, because it's just common sense that we should be able to manage our economies so that some of the most important levers in the economy, for example, the setting of the rate of interest, can be determined in ways that suit the domestic economy, not an economy that operates elsewhere.
- 27:52
- Unidentified speaker: You know, so the rate of interest for Britain is different from the rate of interest that would be required for Australia, for example.
- 27:59
- Unidentified speaker: And why should our rate of interest be determined by a market that's also considering Australia?
- 28:06
- Unidentified speaker: So, you know, for me, the management of cross-border flows is what central bankers call the macro-prudential tools we need to stabilize those flows, is the first step.
- 28:21
- Unidentified speaker: And for that to work requires international coordination and cooperation.
- 28:26
- Unidentified speaker: Now, currently, that is not possible under this disastrous American administration, which is determined to make enemies of absolutely every one of their allies and have no idea of international diplomacy or of the need for international cooperation to deal with, for example, the biggest threat we all face, and that is a climate on the one hand, but also the financial system on the other, because the financial system is like climate.
- 28:58
- Unidentified speaker: It's a big one kind of single system, and it you know, for us to manage that system requires for us all to cooperate.
- 29:08
- Unidentified speaker: So, as you say, China can't just do what she's doing, or everybody can't just imitate China.
- 29:15
- Unidentified speaker: China has to uh reverse her her obsession with exports and begin to turn, as she is actually already starting to do, to turn inwards and to invest in her own people and in raising incomes at home rather than in flattening incomes around the rest of the world.
- 29:36
- Unidentified speaker: That that is a necessary process and is going to require discipline on the part of China.
- 29:42
- Unidentified speaker: But equally, countries like Britain have to start making things as well.
- 29:46
- Unidentified speaker: If we want to import AI, you know, uh fancy iPhones, we've got to be able to make something that could earn the money needed to import and to buy uh iPhones and that sort of thing.
- 29:58
- Unidentified speaker: So, so you know, these these imbalances will have to be corrected and they do require discipline from all the different parties.
- 30:07
- Unidentified speaker: And we know it can be done because we did it again in 1945.
- 30:11
- Unidentified speaker: You know, the world's, you know, we all went to Bretton Woods, all of our economists all gathered at Bretton Woods, and they came up with a framework, an architecture, if you like, which stabilized the global financial system and the global trading system and exchange rates.
- 30:28
- Unidentified speaker: And as a result, we got what every economist on the left and the right argues is the golden age of economics, 1945 to 1971, was the golden age.
- 30:40
- Unidentified speaker: There was the greatest economic stability across the world, um, and there was also, you know, high levels of prosperity.
- 30:48
- Unidentified speaker: That all changed when we deregulated and we broke up the total system.
- 30:53
- Unidentified speaker: So we know how to do it.
- 30:55
- Unidentified speaker: The question is, you know, what leadership is there in the world to to embark on, if you like, systemic monetary transformation in order to stabilize the international system.
- 31:09
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah, I feel like you need a repeat of the plaza record as well, potentially, for China to, as you said, normalize.
- 31:15
- Unidentified speaker: But unfortunately, I don't think they I don't think they want to do that.
- 31:18
- Unidentified speaker: I it seems like they're sort of doubling down, tripling down on their manufacturing strategy and trying to just export more and more to the world.
- 31:26
- Unidentified speaker: Yes, I mean they're desperate because the you know, the Communist Party, in order to keep the population, you know, they they don't have a democratic system, but the Communist Party is very aware that they have, you know, a billion citizens who can get very stroppy and difficult and make life very hard for the Communist Party.
- 31:45
- Unidentified speaker: So there is a responsiveness.
- 31:47
- Unidentified speaker: How do we keep this machine going?
- 31:49
- Unidentified speaker: How do we keep money flowing?
- 31:51
- Unidentified speaker: Um, how do we keep people satisfied?
- 31:54
- Unidentified speaker: Um that's a very big issue for them.
- 31:58
- Unidentified speaker: And um yeah, no, no, they're going to have to adapt and change.
- 32:02
- Unidentified speaker: But it will be easier for them to do that if others do the same.
- 32:06
- Unidentified speaker: It's not possible for them to do that when you know they're in this intense competition with the United States and where the United States is putting up barriers and so on, and doing it in a very arbitrary way with tariffs and so on.
- 32:22
- Unidentified speaker: Um, and all that that is doing is kind of by this individual uh reaction to these imbalances, you're just creating political tensions and you're making it very hard for people to cooperate.
- 32:35
- Unidentified speaker: You know, we should be cooperating now to stabilize the Middle East, yes, in our interests, because you know, we an awful lot comes out of the Middle East that is very valuable to the Western economies.
- 32:48
- Unidentified speaker: But we're not thinking about that.
- 32:49
- Unidentified speaker: We're thinking about how we could divide the world even more.
- 32:52
- Unidentified speaker: Um, when I say we, I mean, you know, the the leaders of the United States and in some cases even Europe.
- 33:00
- Unidentified speaker: Um, so so that is necessary.
- 33:04
- Unidentified speaker: And what are the conditions that would create that kind of leadership?
- 33:07
- Unidentified speaker: Well, I don't know.
- 33:09
- Unidentified speaker: What I fear is that the way we're going to get there is by another catastrophic world war, and we'll wake up the next day and say, oh God, we better stabilize the system, we better sit around a table and do what we did in 1945 and get the thing, the system fixed, instead of just, you know, putting plaster on our own particular wounds here at home.
- 33:31
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah, unfortunately, oftentimes that's what we need a crisis to Yeah, but God, crises are so destructive, Anthony, and so many innocent people suffer from them, you know.
- 33:41
- Unidentified speaker: You think of all the hundreds of families that lost their homes in 2007-9 and weren't compensated, they were just chucked out onto the street, essentially.
- 33:51
- Unidentified speaker: Um, and and and they've never and I mean the case of Britain, we've never fully recovered from the 2007-9 crisis.
- 33:58
- Unidentified speaker: You know, the crisis is ongoing as far as I'm concerned.
- 34:02
- Unidentified speaker: And and it was so interesting.
- 34:04
- Unidentified speaker: Yesterday, the OBR and the Resolution Foundation produced reports showing that living standards are actually in decline, you know, and they have been, they have hardly grown since 2007-9.
- 34:16
- Unidentified speaker: And then we wonder why the people are unhappy, and we wonder why they're kind of looking for alternative parties and looking, you know, to other politicians because they've lost all faith in our existing political class and in the ability of the current political class to address this issue.
- 34:34
- Unidentified speaker: What do we do?
- 34:35
- Unidentified speaker: Why haven't we recovered from the two?
- 34:37
- Unidentified speaker: Why is the system, the global system, still so unbalanced?
- 34:41
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah, it's really difficult.
- 34:42
- Unidentified speaker: So if we if we go to you know the financial system now, it sounds like you think this sort of next crash will be a lot larger and potentially a lot worse than what we've seen before.
- 34:51
- Unidentified speaker: So, yeah, how how do you think it will play out?
- 34:54
- Unidentified speaker: Well, I mean, the point is there are far more lenders, creditors kind of exposed by this crisis.
- 35:02
- Unidentified speaker: And it's I mean, look at look at Binance today, 6.3 billion dollars um stolen from them, and and they've had to compensate, and they've promised to compensate all their investors.
- 35:17
- Unidentified speaker: I don't know where they get that money from.
- 35:19
- Unidentified speaker: Um you know, I I I just think and you know, crypto is is kind of the very pinnacle of deregulation.
- 35:32
- Unidentified speaker: We believe that a criminal currency operated by criminals is something worth investing in, and then we get our fingers burned by this kind of thing.
- 35:42
- Unidentified speaker: I I think it takes an a change in in the way we think about money and a particular way we think about the monetary system.
- 35:52
- Unidentified speaker: We've got to stop thinking about money as a commodity, as something finite, as something uh scarce like gold or cigarettes or whatever it is that you want to call money.
- 36:05
- Unidentified speaker: Um, money is not like that.
- 36:08
- Unidentified speaker: As the Bank for International System Settlements explains, it's a social construct.
- 36:14
- Unidentified speaker: And it's a brilliant social construct.
- 36:16
- Unidentified speaker: I mean, it it's as they explained so carefully, it's uh an institutional achievement.
- 36:24
- Unidentified speaker: It's achieved by institutions, the central bank, the tax collection system, the accounting system, the criminal justice system for upholding contracts, um, and so on.
- 36:35
- Unidentified speaker: You've got to have these.
- 36:36
- Unidentified speaker: If you go to parts of Africa where they lack these institutions, they don't have an independent central bank, they don't have a tax collection system, and their criminal justice system is corrupted.
- 36:49
- Unidentified speaker: In those countries, there is no money, right?
- 36:52
- Unidentified speaker: So when the BISA says that this is a really interlocking specific architecture, they really should be listened to.
- 37:02
- Unidentified speaker: Um and we have to understand that's the way the system works.
- 37:06
- Unidentified speaker: We can't base it on something called crypto, which is some numbers punched into a computer.
- 37:12
- Unidentified speaker: This is ridiculous, really.
- 37:13
- Unidentified speaker: And nor can we rely on gold, because gold is a barren asset.
- 37:18
- Unidentified speaker: Money is not barren in that sense, um, because it's credit, it's a promise to pay.
- 37:24
- Unidentified speaker: But promises are social, they're things that you and I engage in transacting.
- 37:29
- Unidentified speaker: And am I trustworthy?
- 37:31
- Unidentified speaker: Are you trustworthy?
- 37:32
- Unidentified speaker: Well, look at Binance, you know, how many people around Binance are trustworthy?
- 37:36
- Unidentified speaker: Um, and um, and I think there's very few, frankly.
- 37:40
- Unidentified speaker: I would be really dead nervous if I was managing that that company.
- 37:45
- Unidentified speaker: But um, you know, once we if only we could understand that and get rid of the illusion that money is like a commodity, that money is like crypto or gold.
- 37:55
- Unidentified speaker: You know, that is such an ancient prehistoric illusion, delusion.
- 38:00
- Unidentified speaker: And the fact that it's still being discussed and traded and and and uh operated just is astonishing to me.
- 38:09
- Unidentified speaker: Okay, so it sounds like you don't think we'll go back to a Breton Woods system, which or do you think that would be the case?
- 38:14
- Unidentified speaker: No, I don't think easily because because it's so because there's such a lack of political leadership for this.
- 38:22
- Unidentified speaker: There is no one I can see on the horizon that has a grasp of the scale of what's needed.
- 38:30
- Unidentified speaker: Um, and so we're going to do what we've done since 1873.
- 38:35
- Unidentified speaker: We're gonna hurtle into another crisis and then come out of it thinking, oh dear, what should should what could we have done better?
- 38:43
- Unidentified speaker: And you know, from that might uh emerge some leadership.
- 38:46
- Unidentified speaker: But it would be so wonderful if we could have leadership just from reasoned understanding of the nature of money in the monetary system.
- 38:55
- Unidentified speaker: I feel I'm beginning to rant now, Anthony.
- 38:58
- Unidentified speaker: No, no, that's okay.
- 38:59
- Unidentified speaker: It's uh I think we've covered so so much.
- 39:01
- Unidentified speaker: But uh yeah, and thanks so much for your time.
- 39:04
- Unidentified speaker: So we have covered so much.
- 39:05
- Unidentified speaker: But my last question is what is one message you want people to take away from the conversation?
- 39:09
- Unidentified speaker: I think one message is that system change is entirely possible, you know.
- 39:17
- Unidentified speaker: David Graeber famous famously said the the ultimate truth of the world is that this is a system we have created, and we can remake it, we can start again.
- 39:32
- Unidentified speaker: And so let's not despair, you know, it's possible to do.
- 39:36
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah, such an important message.
- 39:37
- Unidentified speaker: So thank you so much.
- 39:38
- Unidentified speaker: If anyone wanted to find out more about your work and what you do, where would the best place for that?
- 39:41
- Unidentified speaker: So I have a Substack page which I'd be pleased if you would um look at.
- 39:46
- Unidentified speaker: Uh I call it System Change, it's on Substack.
- 39:50
- Unidentified speaker: I've just published this book, The Global Casino, and people are really happy to buy it.
- 39:56
- Unidentified speaker: Um, I'm also going to write a book about the system 20 years after the crisis, which I hope to publish in time for the 20th anniversary of layman's.
- 40:06
- Unidentified speaker: Okay, perfect.
- 40:07
- Unidentified speaker: I'll put that all in the description below so people can access access there.
- 40:09
- Unidentified speaker: But thanks again for your time.
- 40:11
- Unidentified speaker: Thank you.
- 40:12
- Unidentified speaker: Hey everyone, thank you so much for listening.
- 40:14
- Unidentified speaker: Really appreciate your support, and I hope you found amazing value out of this interview.
- 40:17
- Unidentified speaker: If you really enjoyed it, would appreciate if you liked and subscribe or share.
- 40:21
- Unidentified speaker: Uh, it really helps with the podcast.
- 40:22
- Unidentified speaker: We're still trying to expand, get to more people to help make sure that everyone understands and decode what's really happening in the world of finance, investing, macroeconomics, and geopolitics.
- 40:32
- Unidentified speaker: If you enjoyed this one, then you might enjoy this other interview as well.
- 40:34
- Unidentified speaker: So really appreciate it, and thank you.
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