Scott Wilson details WashU's concentrated endowment strategy, high SpaceX allocation, and skepticism on AI valuations
Summary
Scott Wilson, head of investments at Washington University in St. Louis, explains how he restructured the $8 billion endowment into a concentrated portfolio with over 20% in SpaceX. He argues that artificial concentration limits in venture funds inhibit returns and that mega-funds struggle to generate high multiples. Wilson expresses skepticism about current private market valuations, particularly in AI, citing Cerebras' public performance as evidence of a disconnect. He also discusses the importance of direct investing, liquidity constraints driving public/private splits, and opportunities in European and Chinese markets.
Episode sections
- 0:00 – 4:42
Introduction and Portfolio Overview
Scott Wilson describes WashU's concentrated portfolio strategy, noting that over 20% of the portfolio was once in SpaceX and half is in the top 50 look-through positions. He explains that they sold hedge funds to focus on direct company meetings, which consume 80-90% of their time.
- 4:42 – 8:20
Grinnell Experience and WashU Restructuring
Wilson discusses his time at Grinnell, where he learned a concentrated strategy of co-investments and external partners. Upon joining WashU with an $8 billion endowment, he executed a rapid restructuring, selling over half the portfolio in the first week and turning over more than 75% through secondary sales over 18 months to improve performance.
- 8:20 – 11:09
Public vs. Private Allocation and Liquidity
Wilson states WashU targets a 50/50 split between public and private markets, driven by liquidity constraints rather than asset class preference. He notes that without the 5% annual payout requirement, they would target 70-80% in private markets to access less efficient markets and generate alpha.
- 11:09 – 13:31
Direct Investing Strategy and Team Structure
WashU has no separate direct team; all generalists spend 80-90% of their time meeting individual companies. Wilson claims that without direct/co-investments, their performance would be average, but with them, they are in the top of their peer group. They source deals through existing fund partners rather than cold sourcing.
- 13:31 – 15:01
Concentration Limits and SpaceX Position
SpaceX reached over 20% of the portfolio, requiring board approval for positions over 2-4% at cost. Wilson argues that artificial concentration limits in venture funds inhibit returns, noting that a 50% position in a fund representing 1-2% of the endowment is only a 100 basis point exposure to the endowment.
- 15:01 – 19:40
Investment Mistakes and Scaling Challenges
Wilson identifies his biggest mistake as not adding capital to winners early due to arbitrary size limits. He cites failed investments in automated and additive manufacturing companies. He believes the direct model scales better than the fund-of-funds model, allowing maintained concentration even as AUM grows.
- 19:40 – 25:35
Mega Funds and Venture Returns
Wilson maintains that mega funds are hard to generate multiples with because doubling fund size requires either larger checks at higher valuations or more investments with lower hit rates. He avoids funds over $10 billion, preferring smaller funds where they can lead rounds and build conviction early.
- 25:35 – 31:34
Private Market Valuations and AI Risks
Wilson observes a valuation premium in private markets, citing Cerebras' poor public market performance and SpaceX trading near IPO price. He predicts half of current AI companies may not exist in 10 years due to commoditization of models and lack of defensible moats, though he holds Anthropic exposure through partners.
- 31:34 – 32:38
Post-IPO Position Management and SpaceX Strategy
WashU hedges or sells down positions like SpaceX pre-distribution if valuations are frothing, aiming to be 'not stupid' rather than clever. For large positions with long-term upside, they take some chips off the table to manage risk but hold the rest for 5-10 years.
- 32:38 – 34:33
Exiting Sequoia Capital and LP Dynamics
WashU suggested Sequoia abandon its Evergreen fund structure as it did not fit their co-investment model, a move discussed with their board. Although controversial and potentially detrimental to some LPs, WashU did not follow Sequoia closely after the structural change.
- 34:33 – 38:12
Valuation Discipline and Fund Churning
The dominant reason WashU churns venture managers is discipline around valuation, such as turning down deals at 100x revenue. They prefer smaller funds that deploy capital efficiently over large mega-funds that may lack focus.
- 38:12 – 43:30
Cerebras AI Valuation and Performance Concerns
WashU took chips off the table on Cerebras at IPO and added hedges, noting that current KPIs do not justify valuations of $25-30 billion based on recent performance. They remain holders due to confidence in the team but acknowledge the company has a lot to prove.
- 43:30 – 46:03
Endowment Mistakes: Adding to Winners and Secondary Market Timing
Scott Wilson identifies his biggest mistake as not adding to winners like Nubank when they grew, costing billions. Another major error was holding secondary market assets through the 2021 bubble instead of selling at 80-90 cents on the dollar.
- 46:03 – 58:03
European and Chinese Investment Opportunities
WashU invests in Europe and China, finding better value due to lower multiples compared to the US. They maintain an office in Shanghai and invest through local partners, viewing geopolitical risks as manageable compared to historical tax confiscations in developed markets.
Assets discussed
| Asset | Kind | Stance | Context |
|---|---|---|---|
| OpenAI | private company | neutral | YOU SEE THRIVE absolutely CRUSH IT WITH OpenAI OpenAI, and Cursor and positions in inside. |
| SpaceX | private company | neutral | seen with SpaceX. |
| Anthropic | private company | neutral | Do you think we're seeing a massive sell-off now to make capacity for Anthropic? |
“Stance” is how the speakers talked about the asset, not a recommendation.
Claims worth verifying
SpaceX was north of 20% of the WashU portfolio at one point.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·0:00
How to verify: Review WashU Endowment’s public disclosures or filings regarding major holdings if available, or verify via third-party reports on WashU’s investment performance and composition during the relevant period. For recent events, verify 2026-08-07 through 2026-11-07. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceHalf of the WashU portfolio is in the top 50 look-through positions.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·0:19
How to verify: Verify via WashU Endowment’s annual reports or public disclosures detailing portfolio concentration metrics. For recent events, verify 2026-08-07 through 2026-11-07. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
WashU endowment was just under $8 billion when Scott Wilson started and is just under $20 billion today.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·7:44
How to verify: Check WashU Endowment’s annual financial statements or public reports for the year Wilson started and the most recent reporting period. For recent events, verify 2026-08-07 through 2026-11-07. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceWashU sold over half the portfolio in the first week and turned over more than 75% through secondary sales over 18 months.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·6:15
How to verify: Review WashU Endowment’s transaction records or annual reports from the period immediately following Wilson’s start date. For recent events, verify 2026-08-07 through 2026-11-07. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
WashU has a 5% net outflow payout requirement smoothed over a rolling five-year average.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·9:19
How to verify: Check WashU Endowment’s governing documents or public financial disclosures regarding payout policies and distribution rates. For recent events, verify 2026-08-07 through 2026-11-07. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
WashU had 36-37 hedge funds in the portfolio before selling them all.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·7:18
How to verify: Review historical portfolio composition data from WashU Endowment reports prior to the restructuring period. For recent events, verify 2026-08-07 through 2026-11-07. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Cerebras stock has traded poorly since its IPO.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·27:17
How to verify: Check public market stock performance data for Cerebras AI (ticker: CERS) from its IPO date to the present. For recent events, verify 2026-08-07 through 2026-11-07. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceSpaceX is trading close to its IPO price.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·27:17
How to verify: Check secondary market valuation data for SpaceX shares or public market performance if listed, comparing current valuation to IPO valuation. For recent events, verify 2026-08-07 through 2026-11-07. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceWashU owns NewBank, which went public five years ago and is in their 13F.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·31:15
How to verify: Review SEC Form 13F filings by WashU Endowment to identify holdings in NewBank (ticker: NWBI) and verify holding duration. For recent events, verify 2026-08-07 through 2026-11-07. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceThere is $14 trillion globally in private markets.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·28:20
How to verify: Check global private market size estimates from industry reports such as Preqin, Cambridge Associates, or McKinsey Global Private Markets Review. For recent events, verify 2026-08-07 through 2026-11-07. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
WashU's endowment grew from $8BN to $19BN under Scott Wilson's leadership.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·31:34
How to verify: WashU Annual Report or SEC Form 990-PF for fiscal years 2026-2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-07 through 2026-11-07. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceSpaceX made up over 20% of WashU's AUM at one point.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·31:34
How to verify: WashU Annual Report or SEC Form 990-PF for fiscal years 2026-2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-07 through 2026-11-07. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceWashU generated $17 billion of profits on an original $8 billion investment over nine years.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·42:10
How to verify: WashU Annual Report or SEC Form 990-PF for fiscal years 2026-2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-07 through 2026-11-07. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceWashU paid out roughly $5 billion to the university.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·42:10
How to verify: WashU Annual Report or SEC Form 990-PF for fiscal years 2026-2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-07 through 2026-11-07. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceWashU was 70% in private markets at the end of its fiscal year.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·41:17
How to verify: WashU Annual Report or SEC Form 990-PF for fiscal years 2026-2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-07 through 2026-11-07. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceWashU invested in a fintech company in Spain.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·46:12
How to verify: WashU Annual Report or SEC Form 990-PF for fiscal years 2026-2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-07 through 2026-11-07. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceWashU has an office in Shanghai with two permanent staff members.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·48:17
How to verify: WashU Annual Report or SEC Form 990-PF for fiscal years 2026-2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-07 through 2026-11-07. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceWashU invested in Cerebras through a fund called Eclipse.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·51:30
How to verify: WashU Annual Report or SEC Form 990-PF for fiscal years 2026-2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-07 through 2026-11-07. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceWashU turned down a deal at 100 times revenue.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·35:49
How to verify: WashU Annual Report or SEC Form 990-PF for fiscal years 2026-2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-07 through 2026-11-07. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceWashU was up 65% in 2021 before writing back down in subsequent years.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·45:25
How to verify: WashU Annual Report or SEC Form 990-PF for fiscal years 2026-2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-07 through 2026-11-07. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceDo your own research
- Verify WashU Endowment's actual public filings (Form 990-PF) for current asset allocation and top holdings.
- Check Cerebras' latest public financial statements and revenue growth metrics against its $25-30 billion valuation claims.
- Review SpaceX's latest secondary transaction prices and IPO pricing history to assess valuation premiums.
- Analyze performance data of venture funds over $10 billion versus smaller funds to validate the 'mega fund' return hypothesis.
- Examine WashU's historical performance relative to peer endowments to assess the impact of the concentrated strategy.
- Investigate geopolitical risk assessments for Chinese and European tech investments, including recent regulatory changes.
- Review Nubank's historical stock performance and capital raise history to understand the opportunity cost of size limits.
- Check Sequoia Capital's structural changes from Evergreen to traditional fund models and subsequent LP reactions.
Full transcriptexpand
- 0:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): We had 36, 37 hedge funds in the portfolio, and when we got rid of them all, you know, 80, 90% of our time is just out meeting individual companies. And that's very different than probably how most of your LPs spend their time. You know, at one point, north of 20% of the portfolio is in SpaceX. Half of our portfolio is in our top 50
- 0:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): look-through positions. Our model doesn't really work with the mega funds. They don't need our capital. We hardly ever talk about, like, fund performance. We only really talk about the underlying exposures in the portfolio. Price is what you pay, value is what you get.
- 0:34
- Harry Stebbings: This is 20VC with me, Harry Stebbings. Now, how often do you hear one of the biggest allocators in the world reveal how they make incredible investment decisions? Very rare. This CIO today has taken their institution from $8 billion to close to $20 billion today. I'm so excited to welcome an OG of the endowment fund space,
- 0:54
- Harry Stebbings: Scott Wilson at WashU. Now, the incredible fact about this institution is that at one point SpaceX was over 20% of their portfolio. It has done incredibly well for them. And today we discuss the journey from $8 billion to 20B $20 billion in AUM, the biggest lessons, what they did that they wish they hadn't done, and what they didn't do
- 1:14
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- 1:54
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- 2:14
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- 2:33
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- 4:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): You have now arrived at your destination.
- 4:35
- Harry Stebbings: Scott, I'm so excited for this. One of the most respected in the industry. Thank you so much for joining me today.
- 4:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah, well, thanks for having me.
- 4:42
- Harry Stebbings: Not at all, but I'd love to start with a couple of lessons from the past. You obviously had roots with Grinnell, spent several years there building out an incredible book. What are some lessons for you from Grinnell that really stuck with you and you took with you to WashU and impacted how you think about building out your book with WashU?
- 4:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah, I think we ran a similar strategy at Grinnell. So I was fortunate to work for this guy, David Clay, who hired me at Grinnell. Grinnell had a long history of kind of a mix of direct co-investments and external partners that manage managed the portfolio. It was a pretty concentrated portfolio. Thank I think you. it was super concentrated relative to the peer group.
- 5:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And we do a lot of the same things, but David was a great guy to learn from because when I first landed at Grinnell, I really had no idea what an endowment actually did, you know, on a day-to-day basis. And I think our strategies evolved over time, but we still fundamentally do We the exact same things we were doing at Grinnell here at WashU.
- 5:36
- Harry Stebbings: Which is concentrated managers, concentrated positions in diarise as well.
- 5:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah. I mean, if you really want to dumb it down, there's nothing particularly clever about it. We try and find really good external partners. When they find something that we think is really unique, we try and double, triple, quadruple down on it, and then hopefully let that compound over long periods of time. That's it.
- 5:57
- Harry Stebbings: If we go forward to WashU, I heard, and this was, I can't remember who told me, but they said that the first week in the job, most people have a bit of time, get used to the new environment. Nope, Scott did a fire sale, sold 75% plus of the WashU portfolio.
- 6:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah, I saw that stat. I'm not sure that it was 75%, but we put in redemptions for over half the portfolio in the first week. But I also had the portfolio for a couple months before I actually landed in the seat. so there was a lot of preliminary work that went into those decisions it wasn't uh wasn't a complete like we're just fire sailing everything were
- 6:34
- Harry Stebbings: you worried about doing too much too soon that is a very large shift
- 6:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): yeah I mean it was a mix there was this kind of obvious tension that performance hadn't been great for for quite some time and the board you know wanted to see results quickly and and they had kind of given me and the team three years to really make performance show some real performance improvements and to do that you know
- 6:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we had to really restructure the portfolio relatively quickly you know and changing around an endowment portfolio is more like turning around an aircraft carrier than a speed bro so we knew that was going to take a decent amount of time and then the private side luckily the private side was in better shape i think than the public side of the PORTFOLIO BUT WE UH WE HAD 36 37
- 7:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): HEDGE FUNDS IN THE PORTFOLIO AND WHEN WE GOT RID OF THEM ALL SO WE CERTAINLY WEREN'T POPULAR IN CERTAIN PARTS OF MANHATTAN ULTIMATELY WE TURNED OVER MORE THAN 75 PERCENT OF THE PORTFOLIO THROUGH SECONDARY SALES ON THE PRIVATE SIDE
- 7:30
- Harry Stebbings: THAT IS A FIRE SALE THAT WOULD CONSTITUTE YEAH I'LL TAKE
- 7:34
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Fire THAT sale
- 7:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): OVER 18 MONTHS
- 7:36
- Harry Stebbings: Ah, FINE AND JUST DON'T GO TO MANHATTAN FOR A WHILE You won't be the most popular dude on Wall Street. Okay, and the endowment then is $8 billion?
- 7:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah, it was just under $8 billion when I started.
- 7:46
- Harry Stebbings: Okay, and today is how much?
- 7:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): The total managed pool is probably just under $20 billion today. I hope
- 7:52
- Harry Stebbings: you have a 20% take rate, personally.
- 7:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): No, unfortunately, that's not the way it works. it works.
- 7:59
- Harry Stebbings: Unfortunately not. That would be a $2.4 billion take. So, well done. So, you have that restructuring of the portfolio, and you then have the freedom to bluntly reallocate and start a little bit more afresh. How did you approach it then, going, okay, this is how much I want publics, privates? What did the portfolio construction look like when you had that
- 8:19
- Harry Stebbings: flexibility?
- 8:20
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 8:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): mean, I always say we're pretty much indifferent between publics and privates. And I would tell my board, like, you know, the only difference between those two asset classes is how often they're marked to market. If you have a 10, 20-year timeframe, should you really care that something is marked every day or something is marked once a quarter? Within that, we have obvious liquidity
- 8:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): constraints. Our big, broad target, I would say, is half publics, half privates. We're definitely out Well, with over the our skis greatest of and respects, privates, I get you but on that's the markets. reversing quickly.
- 8:51
- Harry Stebbings: The biggest difference is, as you said, liquidity, no? I mean, the extended period that funds are now, in terms of being 12 to 15-year funds, and the time it takes to get cash back, the fundamental difference is available liquid, no?
- 9:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah, I mean, we obviously have liquidity constraints, and that drives that ratio between public and Privates. private. But it's not like, if Stripe goes public tomorrow, it should be in a different asset class.
- 9:14
- Harry Stebbings: In terms of the... capital requirements, you have net outflows a year of like 5%?
- 9:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Roughly 5%. It's smoothed out over kind of rolling five-year average.
- 9:23
- Harry Stebbings: If you didn't have the required net outflows, would you do anything differently in terms of capital allocation?
- 9:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Oh, for sure. We would probably have 70, 80% targeted privates.
- 9:34
- Harry Stebbings: Wow. Can you walk me through that thinking and just like, I'm the board. Rationalize that for me, Scott.
- 9:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah, well, your payout is a function of your liquid assets, right? Because you can't always convert your private portfolio and the payout is not guaranteed, right? In theory, like, you know, some percentage of your private portfolio should become liquid every year, but you can never count on it when you actually need it. So if you have a 5% NETS, NETS, NETS, payout NETS, on NETS, and half your portfolio is
- 9:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): liquid, that's 10% of your liquid portfolio that you're paying out every year.
- 10:21
- Harry Stebbings: VALUE DRIVER OF A PORTFOLIO
- 10:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): No,
- 10:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): but I do think the markets are less efficient.
- 10:26
- Harry Stebbings: What do you mean by that?
- 10:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I mean, you can get access to investments that are less picked over. There's always
- 10:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): natural buyers and sellers, and I think it's much harder to create alpha in public markets than it is private markets. And I think this is well documented over the course of time.
- 10:43
- Harry Stebbings: So if we take the 70% to 80% NETS, NETS, NETS, that NETS, could NETS, be in privates, how do we think about structuring in the privates book today, obviously privates.
- 11:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): We manage investments and direct investments. So we manage it the same way we manage the public portfolio. So we, you know, find good partners. And to the extent we can, when they find something that's really interesting, we try and co-invest or add capital directly to that single name.
- 11:23
- Harry Stebbings: Do you have a separate direct team?
- 11:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): No, no, everybody on my team is a generalist.
- 11:27
- Harry Stebbings: What would you advise another CI? I, you know, obviously I'm a manager. I have many LPs and they all say to me, you know, oh, we'd really like to do more directs, but we don't feel like we're equipped to do so. we don't have the time to really do the work. What would you say to them and how would you advise the CIO who doesn't really do directs today, but maybe should and could?
- 11:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah, you kind of have to build that muscle. You have to have that internal skill set on the team. So if you look at how my team allocates their time, and we still meet with a lot of external partners, but upwards of you know, 80, 90% of our time is just out meeting individual companies. and and that's very different than probably how most of your LPs spend their time.
- 12:06
- Harry Stebbings: Very different. Most of them spend 70 to 90% of their time with managers, and then 10% of their time with directs, I'd say.
- 12:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): But if you look at our performance over the last decade, if we didn't have any direct or co-investments, we would have been right at the average of our peer group, you know, as it is, I think, for we're at the top, if not the very top of our peer group over the last decade.
- 12:26
- Harry Stebbings: So are you just better company pickers then? Because what you just told me is that actually you'd be average if it were just funds only. And if that were the case, you must just be better company pickers than everyone else.
- 12:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah, it's not us, though. Like, we're not doing what you're doing. You know, I think you have to be humble. Like, I think, you know, we're trying to identify what we think is a really unique thesis a or really unique company. but we're not sourcing that from scratch, and so I think we're starting on second or third base because we're already invested with
- 12:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Harry, and we think Harry's a really smart guy, and he really likes this investment, and we'll do our own work to kind of independently verify the thesis, and sometimes we don't agree with the thesis, and we have certain partners a that mutual we friend think in is Mr. Lee Fixall, who high signal I happen to think and is wonderful. lower signal, he told me but that that's I where had to we ask start about our concentration process. limits. How do you think about concentration on a per company basis?
- 13:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Well, I would separate cost versus, you know, NAB and Lee and the board and Adam should get a lot of credit for, for the big win in SpaceX. space.
- 13:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I think that became such a large position for the portfolio. At one point, north of 20% of the portfolio is in SpaceX. And at that point, we had conviction as a team, and we had many chances to take lots of liquidity in that name, but we advocated for holding it and letting that compound. And we did several kind of continuation vehicles
- 14:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that allowed us to hold on onto to that stock up and through the IPO. But you can't do that without the right government structure. So at cost, you know, if we were going to put more than 2% or 3% of the portfolio in a single name, we would need to notify the board. I think it's 4%. We need their approval. But we have a lot of leeway to concentrate the portfolio quite a bit.
- 14:19
- Harry Stebbings: You've also worked with some of the best funds, and we have capital concentration limits on a per company basis. Do you think those are inhibitors of great venture returns?
- 14:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I do. They're mostly artificial. If you think over the course of, say, you're going to do five funds, that's X amount of capital, and to have a 10% concentration limit in any individual fund, I don't think it makes sense. I think we have lots of funds, actually, where we have a mandate where it's two or three stocks, and we certainly wouldn't have a problem with...
- 14:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): If you think about it, if you're 1% of our portfolio, or 2% of our portfolio and you have a 50% position, that's only 100 basis points for us.
- 14:56
- Harry Stebbings: Have you had a position with a lot of capital concentration that hasn't worked out?
- 15:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Oh yeah, for sure.
- 15:02
- Harry Stebbings: What did you learn from it?
- 15:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Well,
- 15:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): a lot. There's a couple that come to mind where we, you know, we had super high conviction going in. One was an automated manufacturing company and another was an additive manufacturing company. Maybe we're just poor at underwriting manufacturing companies where we have substantial investments. I don't think the story's completely been written on either company, but certainly it's painful.
- 15:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): It's painful when those don't work out.
- 15:27
- Harry Stebbings: Do you think 50% of your private book being in direct is the right allocation?
- 15:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I would take it to 80%. you know, When we started, it was it was just a tiny fraction.
- 15:37
- Harry Stebbings: Could you have it as 80% given that you are fed by the managers you back?
- 15:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah, there's a natural equilibrium there. And that'll ebb and flow over time. You know, as you do get some of these bigger positions become liquid, there's no kind of artificial limit on it. And it's somewhat of an organic process when you, you know, if you're right on the underlying thesis, and it can compound for a decade or more, and it massively outperforms the rest of the portfolio, like you
- 16:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): get natural high concentration in that portfolio
- 16:05
- Harry Stebbings: i think investment decision making processes are the product that we sell our lps i'm intrigued by your investment decision making process on the direct side what does that look like how do you decide on directs
- 16:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): yeah i mean we have to agree with the thesis and we also have to underwrite it so there's a ton of stuff that people bring to us that you know for whatever reason the team is not smart enough. We just don't have the right skill set or it's impossible for us to differentiate between this company and five of its competitors. And there we just don't play. So we have to be able to
- 16:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): independently verify the thesis, understand the thesis, have the ability to underwrite the company, ability to monitor it going forward. And we have to think it's our best marginal use of capital. So we we look at a lot of potential investments. and i would say we do it's probably more like 0.1 of those investments than one percent
- 16:57
- Harry Stebbings: is it challenging as you've scaled because now you're close to 20 billion dollars and just something that moves the needle i mean writing a 20 million dollar check into a growth round at 20 to 50 billion dollars even if it 20-axis, 20 x's it doesn't move the needle in any meaningful way
- 17:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): yeah and i think if i look back the biggest mistake that I've made since I've been at WashU is not adding capital to our winners just because they became a relatively sizable position early on. So we had lots of opportunity to add capital to some of the names you would know that have done extremely well. And we didn't do that when we could have,
- 17:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): just because they were already north of 1% or 2% of the portfolio. but I still think our model probably scales better than the traditional fund-to-funds model, because it's hard to scale with managers as well. And what you end up doing is you just have to add more managers, and then each manager means less and less. So we can maintain, I think, better concentration. Now, we're
- 17:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): still probably over-diversified, but we can hopefully maintain this concentration even as we double in size from here.
- 18:00
- Harry Stebbings: You say you're potentially over-diversified. over diversified. What's the right amount of managers to have in a book, do you think?
- 18:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Well, if you think about the underlying look through exposures, right, the quantitative benefits for diversification trail off really quickly when you get more than 20, 30 names in the portfolio. So if you have 20 or 30 investments, you know, Charlie Munger would say if you have three, you're fine. But there's really no quantitative benefits beyond 30 for 30
- 18:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): 30 underlying look through exposures and you know really the way we think about diversification is we want the top 30 names to have a be a significant driver of our performance and the way we target it we actually target like i would say half of our portfolio is in our top 50 look through positions and it's taken us a
- 18:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): long time to get there and that's probably a good target for us a realistic target but it's still very diversified. I mean, if you look at a diversified hedge fund, typically they have the bulk of their capital in their top 15, 20 names.
- 18:59
- Harry Stebbings: So just so I understand, we have 50% of privates in directs. In the venture funds allocation, how much do you allocate towards those 20 to 30 names?
- 19:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): At costs, cost, you know, I always tell if we don't have enough conviction to do 1% of the portfolio, then we probably don't have enough conviction to do it at all. But typically, we, you know, at this point, that's close to $200 million. And we just don't, we don't have capacity. So, you know, we have to continue to back the companies that we have high conviction in over time. So we
- 19:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): might start off with a $50 million check in a co investment, and then scale that out up over time.
- 19:35
- Harry Stebbings: With a fund investment, will you do a $20 million fund check if it's completely irrelevant from a returns perspective?
- 19:41
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You
- 19:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): know, it probably means it's a very small fund. And if it's a very small fund that's doing like really interesting things and we would have an opportunity to write a bigger check into one of the underlying companies, then we would do it. But we don't do many of them because it's just not scalable.
- 19:57
- Harry Stebbings: You have 20 to 30 funds. How many do you add a year?
- 20:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I think last year we added one. We have one that we're going to add. We know we're going to add next year. But if we add one or two funds, it's kind of one in, one out. It's not a hard line,
- 20:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): but we don't add partners very often.
- 20:14
- Harry Stebbings: You've said before about mega funds, that maybe instead of just growing, they should be more judicious about where they invest. I'm kind of paraphrasing you. And it seems like the world has moved in favor of megafunds. mega funds. Capital is a moat now for many startups. Compute and capex is a very real cost that maybe wasn't there before.
- 20:34
- Harry Stebbings: Have you reflected on that and changed your mind or not?
- 20:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): No.
- 20:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Our model doesn't really work with megafunds. They don't need our capital and they certainly don't really need RELATED us for TO co-investment THE WHOLE GROUP, BUT unless WE ARE it's ALSO some INVESTING massive round IN THE and SPACE some OF massive THOSE COMPANIES. company that we can probably go direct in anyway.
- 20:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I THINK THESE MEGAFUNDS ARE GOING TO BE VERY HARD TO GENERATE THE MULTIPLES OF INVESTED CAPITAL THAT THEY HAVE ON THOSE MUCH SMALLER FUNDS.
- 21:02
- Harry Stebbings: WITH RESPECT, I THINK THE SHOW IS PHENOMENALLY SUCCESSFUL BECAUSE I DO PUSH BACK. FORGIVE ME, YOU'RE AN OG AND I'M A PODCASTER, BUT you know, YOU SEE THRIVE absolutely CRUSH IT WITH OpenAI OpenAI, and Cursor and positions in inside. sizes of outcomes that are just previously never seen before. And we're seeing outcome expansion so real, as you've
- 21:22
- Harry Stebbings: seen with SpaceX. With respect, that would suggest that you could get venture returns on megafunds if in those outcomes.
- 21:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah, and certainly when you get these trillion-dollar-plus outcomes in private markets, even before the they're public, it's possible.
- 21:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I think if you just think about the dynamics, when you double your fund size, you either have to double your check size in every company at the same valuation, and we know that doesn't happen. It's a much bigger check, but it's a much higher valuation, so the multiple money is probably not going to be as good going forward as it has been historically, or you have to do twice as many
- 21:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): investments, and you know your 50 50-bets bets investment is not as good as your top 10 investments so you have to do way more investments double your check size and typically when they double the check size it comes with a valuation that's commensurate
- 22:13
- Harry Stebbings: i think they would say they double their check size but the companies need so much more capital ai is this exhaust of capital that venture FEDERAL COMPANY, needed FEDERAL finally COMPANY, FEDERAL we have COMPANY, an avenue FEDERAL COMPANY to deploy the billions of dollars that you very kindly give us
- 22:45
- Harry Stebbings: If you have to write $50 to $100 million, and you don't want to be more than 10% of the fund, you've got to be in billion-dollar-plus funds.
- 22:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): We're obviously in lots of funds that are north of a billion dollars. We're not in any that are north of $10 billion.
- 23:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): We would certainly have a strong bias. I wouldn't say never, but we would have a strong bias that that's probably not the best use of our capital. and We have no problem getting concentrated positions. you know if you look at our look through exposures you know we have lots of significant capital allocated to a small handful of names that we built up over
- 23:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): time in really great companies that we don't need trillion dollar outcomes to have you know SpaceX like outcomes yeah it's just a completely different strategy we would rather be at somebody who's small doing We're really interesting things in these companies early and we can partner closely enough with it that we know those companies We can develop conviction early on, and
- 23:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we can essentially lead some of those middle to late stage rounds.
- 23:46
- Harry Stebbings: When is it interesting for you to get involved? Company valuations are soaring so far so quickly today. How do you think about, like, when's the WashU insertion?
- 23:55
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 23:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): mean, we come across at all stages. It's more driven by like our opportunity set at the time than, than any specific. strategy we're targeting this stage of company. But I'd say we're not good super early stage investors. That's a really tough skill set that I would say we don't have. So if we can't talk to customers, understand the
- 24:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): product, understand what we think unit economics look like, that's something that's going to be hard for us to build conviction in. So it tends not to be a lot of C or series A.
- 24:25
- Harry Stebbings: Does it become difficult as more and more of these funds have IR teams? And so, the distance between you and the manager becomes more real and your ability to get information, get deals becomes more buffered?
- 24:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah, well, I don't think many of our funds that we're real close to, I even have IR teams, but some of them have somebody that functions like our I guess guests. But the way we typically do it is more much more proactive. like we're not waiting for them to bring us a deal you know we're going out and saying harry like who are the five companies in your portfolio that you're most
- 24:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): excited about and then we'll just go out and meet those five companies and if you know if we find one that we think is really interesting we'd be like hey we would love to get involved with this company if there's a chance for us to help lead the next round
- 25:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): We've led employee tender offers, we've gotten direct on the cap table, we've done lots of things that help us get exposure, but that is more offensive than we're waiting for your IR person to call us and say, hey, we're doing an SPV in this fund. And I actually think there's a huge negative selection bias if you're just waiting for
- 25:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): someone to give you a call and say, hey, we have you know, $500 million of OpenAI that we're syndicating out.
- 25:37
- Harry Stebbings: Can I ask you, when you review the venture book that you've built in terms of managers, what do you know now that you wish you'd known back when you were at $8 billion, when you were doing the fire sale?
- 25:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): We've definitely learned some hard lessons. I think maybe the biggest takeaway is like, you know, we've done much better on this like offensive strategy than defensive strategies, strategy. So we do way fewer of co-investment opportunities than we do outbound. That's probably the biggest takeaway.
- 26:04
- Harry Stebbings: Are you concerned by where we are in the cycle? You're a very realist investor that, to me, really likes fundamentals. Today, a lot is detached from fundamentals, it would seem, especially from the privates world, where you've got incredible exuberant pricing, real frothiness, juxtaposed by this I very real
- 26:23
- Harry Stebbings: public markets reality. think How do you think about that?
- 26:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the markets have short memories. If you look at the lessons from the original tech bubble in the 2000s and the GFC in 2021,
- 26:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): from the crypto bubble, we're seeing the same kind of stupidity that we saw in all those other cycles. And it's like every five years, particularly in private markets, you know, where I think the investors tend to be just. less sophisticated. But it's clear to me that there's a valuation premium in the private markets. I don't know where
- 26:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Anthropix is going to go public. But it's clear to me they could have raised capital in the private markets if they stayed in the private markets at north of $2 trillion if they wanted to. I'm not convinced that the public market's going to give them that same valuation, maybe. Same with OPEN OpenAI. AI, Aura YOU KNOW, tried to go out. SARABRAS Cerebras tried to go. OR HAS TRADED REALLY POORLY SINCE THE
- 27:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): IPO, SPACEX IS BASICALLY BACK TO REALLY CLOSE TO ITS IPO PRICE, THERE'S JUST TOO MUCH CAPITAL CHASING THESE KIND OF LATE STAGE CHAMPIONS IN THE PRIVATE MARKETS, AND THE VALUATIONS ARE, I THINK THAT'S WHY THERE'S NO DPI, IT'S NOT BECAUSE THE PUBLIC MARKETS AREN'T OPEN, THE PUBLIC MARKETS ARE PRETTY CLOSE TO ALL-TIME HIGHS, IT'S JUST YOU CAN'T GO OUT
- 27:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): PUBLIC AT THE VALUATION THAT THE PRIVATE markets will give.
- 27:39
- Harry Stebbings: Why would you go public? Is this a permanent transition in the financing landscape? Where, to your point there, you could raise and stay private. The Collisons have proven that staying private and having a great business is very beneficial. You're still able to do amazing tender offers to your employees. You're able to do M&A and buy OpenRooter RUDA for $8 billion. $8B. How, Scott? Why are we going to go
- 27:59
- Harry Stebbings: public?
- 28:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): There's a lot of rationale to stay private. better I think day. ultimately, the public markets are obviously much deeper capital markets. I think when SpaceX raised $85B or whatever in the IPO, that's pretty tough to do. The sovereign wealth funds and the big pension funds and SoftBank, they can only write so many of those checks. And I think most of those capital
- 28:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): sources have I've been exhausted. And the public markets are still on multiple the size of the private markets. I think there's $14T 14 trillion or something globally in private markets.
- 28:28
- Harry Stebbings: Do you think we're seeing a massive sell-off now to make capacity for Anthropic?
- 28:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Could be. Obviously, we'd be a lot of the same potential buyers, but I think that's tough to beta test.
- 28:40
- Harry Stebbings: You said about stupidity within private markets. What did you mean by stupidity? What are you pointing to? Is it valuations? Is it deployment speeds? speed?
- 28:47
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah, it's
- 28:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): just valuations. I'm sure that half of these kind of, you know, I guess superintelligence is the correct term now, but these AI-related companies, like probably half of these companies don't exist 10 years from now. And it's not clear how many have like a defensible mode around their business. It's not clear to me what the ultimate profit pools look like for these companies. I
- 29:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): think it's a super strange dichotomy. If you take the top five kind of large language models and they all had the same user interface. for 99% of problems or tasks, like you probably couldn't tell the difference, right? You wouldn't know which model you're using. Like I can't describe another industry like that that has a big kind of deep profit pool.
- 29:27
- Harry Stebbings: Do you have much exposure to OpenAI or Anthropic, the model providers?
- 29:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): We have pretty decent exposures to Anthropic through a few of our partners.
- 29:35
- Harry Stebbings: With the greatest of respects, as you said that the ability and willingness to switch, the commoditization, do you ascribe little value then to that model provider layer?
- 29:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): The way the business models are currently constructed, yeah. When there's a free alternative, customer willingness to pay drops very, very quickly. And I think everybody starts with the frontier model, and this is definitely true when I talk TEL to our companies IN and our portfolio. You know, everybody starts with the frontier model because if you're trying to implement AI, YOU'RE STARTING AT
- 30:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): SPENDING AT ZERO AND YOU ALLOCATE SOME BUDGET TO IT. SO I THINK EVERYBODY STARTS WITH THE MOST EXPENSIVE MODELS AND THEY USE IT, THEY FIND IT USEFUL, THEY RAMP UP SPEND, AND AT SOME POINT THEY SAY, YOU KNOW WHAT, FOR MOST OF OUR TASKS, AND CERTAINLY THIS IS TRUE ON MY TEAM, WE DON'T REALLY NEED A FRONTIER MODEL, WE'RE NOT SOLVING MILLENNIAL PRICE PROBLEMS.
- 30:25
- Harry Stebbings: Why have you not sold then? We've had very liquid secondary markets. I completely hear and agree with you on everything. But then why hold a position that could be sold?
- 30:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah, for us, it's relationship driven. These aren't held in SPVs where we could easily sell. It's one exposure and a fund of 40 other investments. So we wouldn't be selling just one thing in isolation. Those particular partners, like, they're great partners for us. So we're happy to hold it. And you know, if it goes public, we have the ability to hedge if we think the price is right.
- 30:54
- Harry Stebbings: How do you think about the stock distribution lens? We've seen several managers say, actually, we think we can manage your position once public, and so we're going to create vehicles to do that. Others say we're going to distribute straight to you in stock. How do you think about what is the right way? And then what do you do once distributed
- 31:14
- Harry Stebbings: with the stock?
- 31:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah, I mean, it depends on the situation. We have stuff that we owned as private companies and it went public five years ago, like NewBank, it's in our 13F. We've owned that since it was a private company. It was distributed and we still own it almost five years later. Other companies that goes public and we have the ability to hedge exposures even
- 31:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): pre-distribution, we'll do that if we think the valuation is frothing. SO FOR US IT'S KIND OF VALUATION WE PROBABLY HAVE SOME INDEPENDENT VIEW ON WHAT WE THINK THE RIGHT VALUE FOR THE STOCK IS AND SO WE'LL PULTURALLY HEDGE OR FULLY HEDGE THE POSITION
- 31:50
- Harry Stebbings: SO YOU GET STOCK YOU DO A LIKE SCHEDULED SELL DOWN OVER AN 18 MONTH PERIOD IT'S TOTALLY AD HOC AND IT DEPENDS ON A PER NAME BASIS I AGREE I THINK Newbank's NEW BANK'S AMAZING AND DAVID IS A ROCK STAR I'M A HOLDER TOO But how do you do that?
- 32:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): For something like SpaceX or a really big position that we think still has like a ton of potential upside over the next five, 10 years, like we'll, you know, try and be as thoughtful as we can. And it's, you know, I always say it's better to be not stupid than clever. So it'd be stupid to not take We'll some chips off the table because we have a fiduciary obligation to the university and the mission
- 32:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): of the university. So we'll take some. chips. But if it were a much smaller position, we would just hold it for the next 10 years. So we're, to some extent, just risk managing that position. But we'll gradually sell out it over a multi-year period.
- 32:38
- Harry Stebbings: I believe you were the only allocator to suggest to Sequoia that maybe the Eternal and Evergreen funds were not optimal. How do you think about and reflect on that? And did you kind of sit back and go, wow, this is a bold move as you were doing it?
- 32:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I mean, it was controversial enough that we discussed it with the board. I mean, they're great investors, they're great people, and they've obviously made LPs a ton of money over long periods of time. It didn't fit super well into our kind of co-investment model, so they weren't great partners NURS for us at that point in time. And you it know was probably detrimental to some LPs when
- 33:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): they switched that structure and we really haven't followed the firm as closely since then but hey those guys will do great over long periods of time
- 33:21
- Harry Stebbings: Scott I'm so sorry to be so blunt you don't freaking turn down Sequoia like you just you just don't do it I really like you because you're blunt you're honest you're just a good dude but like what are you doing even even if they won one-ax X, the point is you're you're close to the green leaf and goodness comes from being close. It's
- 33:41
- Harry Stebbings: like the genie in the lantern, you know, in the cartoons. Maybe, don't rub it. Yeah,
- 33:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): no, I'm sure it was a mistake if you look at the returns that they've generated, but we've done just fine.
- 33:53
- Harry Stebbings: Did every LP just come to you and be like, wow, that was so bold?
- 33:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you know it was funny i there was a bunch of lps that they called and we expressed our view and I think everybody complained about it, but everybody did it at the end of the day.
- 34:09
- Harry Stebbings: I have so many LPs that call us up because we have a lot of data on the managers that we interview and they all say, I can't believe it. And they name a big mega platform. They make me do the India fund, the China fund, the bio fund, the crypto fund, the games fund. I can't believe it. I can't believe it. And I say, so did you do them? And they go, oh, yeah, of course we did it. Oh, yeah.
- 34:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah. And we just want to do that. We'll just, we'll find some other place to put capital.
- 34:33
- Harry Stebbings: Is it a big decision for you to churn? Do you agree with the three fund policy for fund commitments, which is traditional in venture, being LPs will commit to three to give managers enough time and room to NG, prove NG, themselves NG, NG, NG, or NG, NG, not? NG
- 34:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah. I mean, like we don't have a hard commitment. Like probably we're committing some.
- 35:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): If we think there's a big disconnect on, you know, between our view of the portfolio and a partner's view of the portfolio, then, you know, we won't stick around. But that's super rare. I mean, typically, we have some view before we invest.
- 35:21
- Harry Stebbings: When you review those decisions to not do a fund, what is the dominant reason? What's the number one most frequent reason why you will churn?
- 35:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Discipline around valuation.
- 35:31
- Harry Stebbings: Wow, that's bold. But it's bold because you don't know with the greatest of respects. And so the best companies often look expansive. expensive at the time, but very cheap in hindsight. And so for you to take a snapshot decision and say that company is overpriced is bold, close to it being done.
- 35:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah, I mean, it's typically, it's not just one example. Like, we had one partner that I'm not sure he found a hundred times revenue deal that he was willing to turn down. Like, it just didn't exist. and for something to trade at a 100 hundred times revenue. it has to be, you know, an exciting company. I get that. But for us, like, that's not what we want our capital to be used for.
- 36:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): We want discipline around valuation. You know, and you mentioned Lee Fixell, like, you know, I think he's super pragmatic. He'll obviously, you know, pay up and he's participated in some of these great companies that are huge winners. But he's also very pragmatic about, you know, when things get too frothy, stepping away.
- 36:26
- Harry Stebbings: Do you think we should give managers forgiveness, patience for deploying funds much faster than they said they would? Scott, me and you are both old enough to know that every manager says three years and every manager right now is coming back 12 to 18 months later saying, Scott, I'm so sorry. I'm so sorry. But it's the best time ever to be investing. It's the best time ever. New intelligence, intelligence.
- 36:46
- Harry Stebbings: Should we give them forgiveness?
- 36:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): You know, if we think that they're deploying capital at really high returns, we have no problem with really fast deployment. And if we think if they're deploying capital at poor returns or poor expected value, then we don't care how fast it's deployed, is what I would say. We have a bias for smaller funds. We'd much rather
- 37:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): have someone who raises, INC, NETS, NETS, NETS, you know, NETS, NETS a billion dollar fund when they could raise four billion and comes back every 18 months.
- 37:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Do
- 37:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): you look at it through the look through perspective,
- 37:36
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): being
- 37:36
- Harry Stebbings: if
- 37:36
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 37:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): have a billion
- 37:37
- Harry Stebbings: dollar fund, and I get 10% in every company that I invest in, and you say, well, we're $100 million check of your billion dollar fund, our look through, obviously, I'm just explaining it for everyone listening, you've got this already, is 1% in every underlying company. Is that how you think about it?
- 37:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): We don't ever talk about like fund of performance. We only really talk about the underlying exposures in the portfolio. So we aggregate everything up and we know that we have X dollars of SpaceX or Cerebras or Anthropic in the portfolio. And that's how we think about it.
- 38:12
- Harry Stebbings: Can I ask you on your like Cerebrus, how do you think about performance being challenged? And I'm not saying to comment on Cerebrus at all, but when you have a company that is hit by bad tailwinds in the public markets, how do you think about whether to the stick and hold or actually a fiduciary duty to just cash your chips in?
- 38:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah, I mean, Cerebras specifically, like for us, that was a really big position at the IPO. And so we took some chips off the table and put some hedges on even pre-distribution. But we like Andrew and the team, so we'll continue to hold some of that. And I think, you know, if you look at the current kind of KPIs of the business relative to expectations going out the next four or five years,
- 38:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): It's tough to justify the valuation, even at 25, 30 billion, wherever it's at today. Based on what they've done the last 12 months, you're betting on the come, so to speak. So that company has a lot to prove, but it's clearly a great company and we have lots of confidence in Andrew and his team to produce good results over the next decade.
- 39:08
- Harry Stebbings: Scott, if you could I would do anything without retribution from any stakeholders, students, board, team, what would you do? differently?
- 39:16
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You
- 39:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): know, I would probably, there's this natural tension between what, like, we're here to support the mission of the university and that's why we exist. But I also think like a 5% payout in certain market environments is tough long term, depending on gift flow. So I'd probably smooth I think that's the payout a natural tension. over I a don't longer think there's period of really time. much But I at WashU understand that if that it makes
- 39:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): tension sense for and, the stakeholders you know, it's and great for the team, to like grow we've the been able Adam. to accomplish everything we wanted to accomplish.
- 39:55
- Harry Stebbings: Scott, you've seen many cycles now. You're a pro. Does this have a shakeout or do we keep going on the meteoric wave that is super intense? And. intelligence AI?
- 40:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah, well, I think there will be a shakeout. I don't know what the timeline of that is. Like some of these industries that have just had massive runs, like historically they were not great businesses, you know, and that was for like three decades. They were businesses that probably barely returned their cost of capital. And at some point they'll go back to being In not great businesses but in the short
- 40:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): term you know if you used to sell a chip or memory for $3 and now you sell it for $30 and all that excess just falls to the bottom line. I mean, I think you see that in the multiples. Like, I think some of these industries, right, you buy them at very rich multiples and you sell them at low multiples because that's how companies work. But how long the cycle actually lasts, I think
- 40:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that's anybody's guess.
- 40:45
- Harry Stebbings: Can I ask you, given what we said earlier, you mentioned like Nubank, or say, I'm just choosing like an Uber, or an Nvidia of the world. These are comparatively very cheap companies based on a fundamentals basis, actually today. And then the privates are exorbitantly priced, if one looks at fundamentals. And then I look at your statement earlier of wanting to be
- 41:04
- Harry Stebbings: 70 to 80% in privates, and I just try and judge
- 41:08
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the- Yeah, for
- 41:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): us, we are deploying all of this stuff that we're generating liquid back into public markets right now. So, 70% or 80%,
- 41:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): if we didn't have any liquidity constraints, I think over time, privates would grow as a percent. I mean, at the end of our fiscal year, we were 70% in privates, but a bunch of that has become liquid, so we're redeploying that. And we think the opportunities set in publics, particularly like non-AI, AI infrastructure infrastructure-related related publics,
- 41:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it's is a really good time. to be investing in sectors completely that we think are relatively protected, if not immune from AI.
- 41:45
- Harry Stebbings: It's a bit of a blunt question, but you've had such a meteor, like $11 billion is an incredible capital accrual value appreciation for WashU, and it's an amazing journey. You could do anything now, Scott. You could have every trillionaire, billionaire in the world pay you an exorbitant amount of money to join you on
- 42:05
- Harry Stebbings: their superyard and run their family office. With respect, why...
- 42:09
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It's
- 42:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): actually a lot. So, in the nine years I've been here, we started with roughly, say, eight. We've generated $17 billion of profits on that original $8 billion, and we've paid out roughly $5 billion to the university. I,
- 42:21
- Harry Stebbings: I mean, that's just showing off, Scott. Okay. but But you you could. and obviously WashU is an incredible institution, amazing, but like humans are humans.
- 42:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah.
- 42:32
- Harry Stebbings: Why do you stay in?
- 42:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I'm super happy here. I've got a great board, a great administration, a great team, you know, and I make plenty, I'm well compensated. So it's a great place to be. And I, yeah, I obviously had opportunities to go elsewhere, but I'm, I'm very happy at WashU. If you spent time with my board and the chancellor of the
- 42:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): university, this is a great place to work. And I think
- 42:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): maybe more than half of your fulfillment and enjoyment coming to work every day is who you get to work with. And from that standpoint, I'm just super fortunate. And you've spent time with my team. It's a really great team.
- 43:10
- Harry Stebbings: I know I have. They're there. amazing. Listen, I think before we do a quick fire, you learn from sometimes mistakes. We've talked about the amazing successes. When you reflect back on the $11 billion that we've added, what did you not do in that journey that you wish you had done? Be it renewables, be it more in privates, be it you name it. What did you not do that you
- 43:29
- Harry Stebbings: wish you had done?
- 43:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah, I think our biggest mistake was not We are adding to our winners, just because whether you like get frame of reference by bias, us, so oh, we invested in this company. at 2 billion and now it's 5 billion. So we didn't add to it. And obviously, like, you know, the position was twice the size of that point. But, you know, we had times where we could have invested in stuff that I think was
- 43:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): still probably our highest conviction investment. And we didn't do it either because, you know, it had grown in the portfolio or the price had just gone up. And that was that was my mistake. And it's cost us billions of dollars. So that's probably the biggest learning over that timeframe.
- 44:05
- Harry Stebbings: What did you do that you wish you hadn't done on the flip side?
- 44:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Oh, well, I mean, there's a lot. There's a lot of individual funds I wish we hadn't done. Obviously, we've made tons of mistakes on the co-investment. It's an 80-20 rule where 20% of your investments have generated ITE. 80% plus of the profits. We concerned We're about that. not quite that bad, We're but not yeah, quite we've that made bad. tons of we mistakes. of mistakes. We've added capital to
- 44:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): companies that probably we should have let die, but we thought there was still a chance they could recover. We've made every investing mistake you can think of.
- 44:36
- Harry Stebbings: Is there one that really stands out?
- 44:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah. Our biggest mistake, we had put in mid 2020, we had put a huge
- 44:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): A huge packet of of kind LP interest into the secondary market. And the markets had this huge run at the end of 2020. going into 2021. And we decided to hold off because we knew that all those companies were going to have just massive write-ups in the December quarter. So we were waiting for the first quarter to basically, you know, maximize the value on the secondary sale of
- 45:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): those assets. And then, you know, that was a short-term bubble in venture markets. So like we were just essentially being greedy and we had the chance to sell at really good prices. and we didn't take it, you know, pretty much by the end, like, I think it was probably mid-2021, and so that 2021 period, we were up, I think, 65%,
- 45:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and obviously wrote a bunch of that back down over the subsequent years, but we had a chance to get out of a bunch of that stuff at really good prices, and we didn't do it.
- 45:33
- Harry Stebbings: And so you wish you'd done it.
- 45:34
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
- 45:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): for sure, yeah. I mean, we were probably taking, like, 80, 90 cents on the dollar, but we were pretty sure that the bubble wasn't going to last forever.
- 45:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And so we should take chips off the table.
- 45:45
- Harry Stebbings: One of my dearest friends, who's a very successful ambassador, told me you must be fearful when others are greedy and greedy when others are fearful. And it sounds so obvious, actually very difficult in hindsight. fight.
- 45:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah. I think we needed another three months or something. And it those are was the a big secondary secondaries. sale.
- 46:03
- Harry Stebbings: Do you care about Europe? I had David Moorhead on from Baylor. I mean, he laughed at me, in all honesty, when I said about Europe. Do you care?
- 46:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah, it's mostly idiosyncratic ideas, but we like Europe. And we found lots of interesting stuff to do in Europe. And it's a super interesting market now. We were recently investing in a fintech company in Spain.
- 46:25
- Harry Stebbings: So, wait, pause, Scott. Europeans don't invest in fintech companies in Spain. What's you doing investing in a fintech company in Spain? How does
- 46:35
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that happen? Well, it's by one of our
- 46:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): partners. And we invested in another, well, I mean, it's more of a global fintech company, but based in London and Singapore. But we've done it a lot out in Europe recently. I mean, the thing is, like, for the same quality of asset, and there are good companies over there, just because like, the market as a whole has struggled, we find that there are great companies, and certainly non-tech-related
- 46:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): companies. You know, if they were based in the US and had the same kind of KPIs, growth, and unit economics,
- 47:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): they would trade at huge revenue multiples, and in Europe, they trade at, you know, small earnings multiples.
- 47:08
- Harry Stebbings: My question to What's you your on, view like, some of these companies, Europe or Asia, is actually, everyone's everyone like, oh, the Europe discount or the Asia discount. Well, if there's always a discount, it's not a discount. It's just the price.
- 47:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Well, there's price and value. I think you've got to separate the two, right? If we think companies are like, you can buy it at $100, we think it's worth $300, and we think it's compounding PENDING value at a significant clip. like we think that's a much better investment than in buying something in the u U.S. THAT TRADES AT FIVE TIMES THE MULTIPLE THAT'S COMPOUNDING VALUE AT THE SAME RATE. DOES THAT MAKE SENSE?
- 47:43
- Harry Stebbings: It does. So, people understand, how do you determine the difference between price and value? Value is what it's worth, and price is what someone's willing to pay.
- 47:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Price is what you pay, value is what you get. And it's very subjective, and I think you have to be pragmatic about valuation, but for the same quality of assets, and you can think same growth rate. And, you know, over long periods of time, like what the core KPIs of the business will drive returns more than the original entry multiple so if you get a much cheaper multiple
- 48:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): on the entry price and you get the same growth over a decade you're going to do a lot better
- 48:16
- Harry Stebbings: do you have much in china
- 48:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we don't we don't have a ton in china we have an office in shanghai so we we cover that region really well we have two guys there permanently and we certainly look at a lot of stuff in China. We probably have more than our peers in China. And we've been active since Jamie Dimon said China's uninvestable. We've added a decent amount of capital. And I think China was one of those
- 48:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): markets. The geopolitical risk was always there. The fact that it was a little bit more visible. If you spend enough time in Asia, You know, you want to do stuff that you think is either under the radar or supported by the broader political parties. So I think you have to be rational there. But when you can find a good company that can actually return capital
- 48:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): to shareholders and, you know, has a pragmatic view on the world, we think China is a great place to invest.
- 49:04
- Harry Stebbings: Why does everyone else not then? I know, again, I so enjoy this show.
- 49:10
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): People often
- 49:10
- Harry Stebbings: ask me, like, why do you love doing the show? I'm like, because I have conversations like Dude, this. the world is saying, no, run. They kill education overnight. Whole sectors get taken over. Xi Jinping has, like, unlimited power and control. And everyone's like, get out. Respectfully, you know, you're not. What do you see that
- 49:30
- Harry Stebbings: others don't?
- 49:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Well, you see that, but like, you know, we've seen worse behavior on very developed markets, like in the UK, where there was like. offshore, like on the northern part of the UK, where they had the offshore oil and whatever energy assets. And they took the tax rate from 25% to 75%. I mean, that's basically confiscating half the company. I've never
- 49:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): seen that behavior in China. And they more or less did the same thing in Norway with certain types of assets. Like if they take the tax rate from 25% to 75%, that's the equivalent of confiscating half the company.
- 50:02
- Harry Stebbings: Do you mind that, and I bet you weren't expecting to go here, but my knowledge of investing in Chinese funds is actually surprisingly solid.
- 50:11
- Harry Stebbings: When you invest in a Chinese fund, there's a dollar denomination and there's like an RB denomination. And now the average is $1 to 9 RB. Do you mind that split? And if you're not allowed to invest in chips and some of the most exciting things, WITH THE DOLLAR DENOMINATED FUND, DOES THAT NOT TAKE OUT ALL THE ALPHA OF
- 50:30
- Harry Stebbings: INVESTING IN CHINA?
- 50:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah, I mean, I think there's a natural, like, some agency problems, but I think for the most part, the entrepreneurs prefer dollar and it's a way for them to get assets offshore if they're in the VIE structure. So you still get access to really good companies and that's a good market. And we don't have a ton of funds in China, but we're certainly not afraid of it. And we've done more kind of co-investments and one-off
- 50:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): stuff in China over the last five years. But yeah, it's a huge market, is what I would say. But you have to navigate it on the ground and be realistic.
- 51:00
- Harry Stebbings: Do you have to have a team on the ground to do China?
- 51:02
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 51:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): don't know if you have to have a team on the ground, but you certainly have to invest through local partners.
- 51:08
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Listen, dude, I want to do Let's a quick fire
- 51:09
- Harry Stebbings: round with you. So I say a short statement, you give me your immediate thoughts. What fund are you not in? that you wish you were in?
- 51:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Benchmark, probably.
- 51:18
- Harry Stebbings: You're not in Benchmark?
- 51:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): We're not, no. I mean, I wish we had like a bigger allocation to the early stage founders fund as well.
- 51:27
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): How did
- 51:27
- Harry Stebbings: you get, you got Cerebrus through Foundation?
- 51:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): We got Cerebrus through a fund called Eclipse.
- 51:33
- Harry Stebbings: Oh Lior, yeah,
- 51:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Leo.
- 51:34
- Harry Stebbings: you Yeah. can put all of your money in only one fund, which one do you choose?
- 51:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Private or public?
- 51:41
- Harry Stebbings: One each.
- 51:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I will say addition of our core partners. I think he's the best investor in our portfolio. He's just very pragmatic. He's disciplined around price, but will pay up for super high quality assets. And I think his underwriting process and just the way he dissects companies and business models and management teams is really impressive. And so of
- 52:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the people I've spent a lot of time with, I think he's the, he's probably the most talented investor in our portfolio.
- 52:08
- Harry Stebbings: Are you ready for a hard one? You have an amazing board. Who would you most like to have on your board who you don't have on your board today?
- 52:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Probably it would be somebody with real industry expertise,
- 52:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): like Elon Musk or Thomas Riordan. Somebody who I think has like real deep industry knowledge that we could use and could help us diligence a variety of investments. I mean, as it is, my board is really great at that.
- 52:35
- Harry Stebbings: Which other endowment fund do you most respect and why them?
- 52:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): There are several. You know, I think what Eric's accomplished in Michigan, what Robert's accomplished I've pushed at Virginia, Seth at MIT, Jane, now Josh at Brown, All like right, those, that was good. those teams have just done unbelievably well over the last 20 years. And I think that's, uh, you know, ultimately that's what you're judged on is the, you know, multi-decade performance of the
- 52:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): portfolio.
- 53:00
- Harry Stebbings: Do you have like a CIO dinner party, like all get together and shoot the shit?
- 53:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Well, I've been involved in like various little groups over time and a couple I, like I, I, one-off I, I, chat I, I, groups where I keep track with some of my peers.
- 53:33
- Harry Stebbings: Founders. Final one, when we think about the best advice that you've been given that sticks with you every day, what would the best advice you've been given be?
- 53:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): The best advice, I tell this to kids all the time, and I think it's very true, and it stems from, I don't know who first said it, but you should always try and be the best at things that require no talent. So showing up, being curious, working hard, being presentable, Entable, asking good Quetions, questions, being respectful, being kind, like all
- 54:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): those things that require no talent, I think contribute a lot to success over time.
- 54:05
- Harry Stebbings: Do you know, and I also think its appalling when today you are equipped with tools that allow you to be so good at those things so easily. You can go to chatgpt.com before an interview with Scott for a job and say, give me three things about Scott that will show that I've done my MOTOR work CO, and F, really ROPER impress TECHNOLOGIES him. And INC, it'll ROPER tell TECHNOLOGIES me about an incredible INC, ROPER TECHNOLOGIES investment INC, ROPER you did TECHNOLOGIES at Grinnell, a
- 54:25
- Harry Stebbings: quote that Adam said
- 54:45
- Harry Stebbings: Yeah,
- 54:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): well, thanks for having me. It was a lot of fun.
- 54:49
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- 55:09
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