Martin Schmalz discusses equilibrium effects of indexing and family office governance
Summary
Martin Schmalz, a professor at Oxford, joins the podcast to discuss the theoretical equilibrium effects of index investing, arguing that while indexing reduces individual risk, it may lower expected returns for all investors by driving up stock prices. He distinguishes common ownership from indexing, suggesting that concentrated blockholders, rather than index funds, drive reduced competition. Later, Speaker 2 discusses delegated investment management as a commitment device to avoid volatility-driven selling, highlighting the significant compounding impact of costs on family office wealth. The discussion concludes with advice on governance structures and the challenges of diversification in private markets for smaller investors.
Key takeaways
- 1 A 2% annual cost reduces wealth growth from 16x to approximately 7x over 40 years on a 7.2% return, meaning costs eat half of total wealth, not just returns.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) · 1:03:58
Episode sections
- 0:03 – 2:35
Introduction and Indexing Growth
Ben Felix and Cameron Passmore introduce guest Martin Schmalz, a professor at Oxford, to discuss index investing. Schmalz explains that indexing's growth stems from its low cost and cooperative structure, which benefits individual investors by saving hundreds of billions in fees and increasing market participation.
- 2:35 – 5:55
Equilibrium Effects of Indexing
Schmalz introduces a theoretical paper questioning whether indexing is good for investors in equilibrium. He argues that while indexing reduces individual risk, it increases demand for stocks, driving up prices and lowering expected returns, potentially making all investors worse off in a static model.
- 5:55 – 15:58
Model Mechanics and Welfare
The speaker details a model where cheaper index funds shift investors from bonds to equities, raising stock prices and lowering returns. In this simplified view, every investor is worse off due to negative externalities, though variations allowing bond yields to rise can create winners among bond holders.
- 15:58 – 29:13
Common Ownership and Competition
Schmalz distinguishes between diversification and common ownership, arguing that centralization of voting control by asset managers like BlackRock, rather than indexing itself, drives common ownership. He notes that empirical evidence suggests common ownership correlates with higher product prices, possibly due to reduced competitive incentives rather than explicit collusion.
- 29:13 – 57:03
Common Ownership and Consumer Prices
Martin Schmalz discusses how common ownership might lead to higher product prices and margins, referencing a 1985 paper by Joe Farrell. He argues that while a
- 57:03 – 58:38
Delegated Investment Management as a Commitment Device
Speaker 2 discusses how investors may delegate money to managers who impose liquidity gates or delays, a concept Cliff Asness terms 'volatility laundering.' This structure helps investors avoid selling during high volatility, effectively paying for a commitment device that allows them to take on more risk than they could alone.
- 58:38 – 1:01:28
Family Offices: Sophistication, Fraud, and Sales Tactics
Speaker 2 notes that while some family offices are sophisticated, many are unsophisticated and prone to fraud or aggressive sales pitches. He describes presentations that acknowledge active underperformance but promise top-quintile returns, exploiting human instincts to beat the market.
- 1:01:28 – 1:03:00
Wealth Preservation vs. Impact Investing Goals
Speaker 2 argues that family offices must first define their goals, such as wealth preservation or impact investing, before designing strategies. He suggests a governance structure with separate buckets for financial and non-financial goals to prevent misalignment.
- 1:03:00 – 1:04:56
The Compounding Impact of Costs on Wealth
Speaker 2 illustrates that a 2% annual cost reduces wealth by more than half over 40 years (from 16x to ~7x growth on a 7.2% return). He highlights that costs include not just fees but also taxes, legal, and due diligence expenses, which can easily exceed 2% for smaller family offices.
- 1:04:56 – 1:06:39
Governance Structures and Consensus
Speaker 2 criticizes governance structures requiring unanimous consensus, as they give veto power to one individual. He proposes alternatives like giving decision-making power to a chairman or triggering an auction for shares to incentivize consensus.
- 1:06:39 – 1:08:35
Diversification Challenges in Private Markets
Speaker 2 advises that smaller family offices should likely just index, as private markets like real estate are hard to diversify. He notes that investors often overweight illiquid assets like real estate due to misconceptions about inflation hedging, leading to poor long-term performance.
- 1:08:35 – 1:13:25
Economic Thinking vs. Happiness
Speaker 2 argues that economic thinking (focusing on externalities, counterfactuals, and outcomes) can reduce happiness compared to philosophical approaches (focusing on process and presence). He cites mathematicians and musicians who value the process of their work over efficiency gains from AI.
- 1:13:25 – 1:20:31
Success and Value Creation
Speaker 2 defines success as creating value for society, citing his role as an audit regulator where small improvements in disclosure can impact trillions in market cap. He emphasizes the importance of contributing to welfare economics and future generations.
Claims worth verifying
Indexing has saved hundreds of billions of dollars in fees and pulled many people into the stock market.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·1:58
How to verify: Calculate cumulative fee savings of major index funds (e.g., Vanguard, iShares) against active funds using historical AUM and expense ratios from fund prospectuses or Morningstar data. For recent events, verify 2026-08-12 through 2026-11-12. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Vanguard index funds charged 76 basis points a year in 1976.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·6:35
How to verify: Check historical prospectuses or SEC filings for the Vanguard 500 Index Fund (or its predecessor) for the year 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-12 through 2026-11-12. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceThe 'Big Three' own well north of twenty percent, mostly approaching thirty percent, of stock in most large US publicly traded firms.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·22:11
How to verify: Review ownership data from S&P Capital IQ or Bloomberg for S&P 500 constituents to calculate the aggregate ownership percentage of BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street. For recent events, verify 2026-08-12 through 2026-11-12. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
BlackRock acquired Art Lay's Global Investors in 2009.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·24:32
How to verify: Search SEC EDGAR for BlackRock's Form 13F filings or press releases from 2009 confirming the acquisition of Art Lay's Global Investors. For recent events, verify 2026-08-12 through 2026-11-12. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourcePeter Drucker wrote a paper in the 1950s titled 'Pension Fund Socialism'.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·21:38
How to verify: Search academic databases or Peter Drucker's bibliography for the publication 'Pension Fund Socialism' and its publication date. For recent events, verify 2026-08-12 through 2026-11-12. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Common ownership correlates with higher product prices in the US airline industry.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·23:19
How to verify: Review the academic paper by Azar, Schmalz, and Tecu (2026) on airline ticket prices and common ownership, or replicate using route-level price data and ownership records. For recent events, verify 2026-08-12 through 2026-11-12. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Indexing increases asset prices and lowers expected returns.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·3:27
How to verify: Review academic literature on 'index inclusion effects' and 'equilibrium asset pricing' to find empirical studies measuring price impacts and subsequent return changes post-index inclusion. For recent events, verify 2026-08-12 through 2026-11-12. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The FTC and DOJ have started enforcing antitrust laws regarding interlocking directorates in the last few years.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·21:18
How to verify: Search FTC and DOJ press releases or enforcement actions from 2026-2026 regarding interlocking directorates or common ownership in corporate governance. For recent events, verify 2026-08-12 through 2026-11-12. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Larry Fink pointed out at Davos that voting could be delegated back to individual fund managers.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·19:42
How to verify: Search for Larry Fink's annual letters to investors or speeches at the World Economic Forum in Davos for mentions of voting delegation. For recent events, verify 2026-08-12 through 2026-11-12. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Wealth of Nations was published in 1776.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·27:39
How to verify: Historical fact check of Adam Smith's 'The Wealth of Nations' publication date. For recent events, verify 2026-08-12 through 2026-11-12. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Cliff Asness calls the practice of investing in private markets to avoid selling during volatility 'volatility laundering'.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·57:18
How to verify: Search for 'Cliff Asness volatility laundering' in academic publications or financial news archives. For recent events, verify 2026-08-12 through 2026-11-12. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Matt Levine on Bloomberg makes fun of brokers' phone lines not working during periods of high volatility.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·57:03
How to verify: Search Matt Levine's Bloomberg Column archives for mentions of broker phone lines and high volatility. For recent events, verify 2026-08-12 through 2026-11-12. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
After 40 years, a 7.2% return compounds wealth to 16 times the starting amount.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·1:03:25
How to verify: Calculate (1.072)^40. For recent events, verify 2026-08-12 through 2026-11-12. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
A 2% annual cost reduces the 40-year wealth outcome from 16x to less than half (7.something times).
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·1:03:52
How to verify: Calculate (1.052)^40 and compare to (1.072)^40. For recent events, verify 2026-08-12 through 2026-11-12. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
95% of active fund managers underperform the passive portfolio over 10-year horizons.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·1:00:21
How to verify: Check SPIVA (S&P Indices Versus Active) reports for 10-year performance data. For recent events, verify 2026-08-12 through 2026-11-12. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
One-third of music uploaded to iTunes is AI-generated.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·1:11:34
How to verify: Search for the Financial Times article referenced by the speaker regarding AI-generated music on iTunes. For recent events, verify 2026-08-12 through 2026-11-12. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The regulations written or considered during Speaker 2's time as chief economist affect $70 trillion of equity market cap.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·1:14:15
How to verify: Identify the specific regulatory body and audit standards referenced, then check the total market capitalization of the relevant equity markets at the time of the podcast. For recent events, verify 2026-08-12 through 2026-11-12. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Adam Smith wrote 'The Theory of Moral Sentiments'.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·1:12:44
How to verify: Check the publication details of Adam Smith's works. For recent events, verify 2026-08-12 through 2026-11-12. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Do your own research
- Review Martin Schmalz's academic papers on the equilibrium effects of indexing and common ownership for theoretical assumptions.
- Examine empirical studies on the correlation between common ownership and product prices to assess the competitive impact.
- Analyze the compounding impact of total costs (fees, taxes, legal, due diligence) on long-term wealth accumulation using historical return data.
- Evaluate family office governance structures for veto power risks and consensus mechanisms.
- Assess the diversification benefits of real estate versus its concentration risk relative to the total market.
- Review Cliff Asness's commentary on 'volatility laundering' and the behavioral finance rationale for illiquidity premiums.
- Check primary sources on the cooperative structure of Vanguard versus margin-maximizing corporations to verify fee advantages.
Full transcriptexpand
- 0:03
- Ben Felix: Welcome to episode 435 of the Raffle Reminder Podcast. I'm Ben Felix, Chief Investment Officer at PWL Capital.
- 0:10
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 0:10
- Cameron Passmore: I'm Cameron Passmore, Chief Executive Officer at PWL Capital. And today we are joined by Martin Schmaltz.
- 0:17
- Ben Felix: Martin is a German economist and professor of finance, economics, and real estate at the University of Oxford's Saeed Said Business School. His research spans asset management and asset pricing, and investor behavior. He is best known for his work on common ownership, which is when one set of shareholders owns competing companies as index fund investors do.
- 0:38
- Cameron Passmore: We talk about whether index funds, for all their benefits, carry hidden costs for investors and the broader economy. From there, we turn to investor behavior and why wealthy investors often avoid the cheap, diversified portfolios that research supports. We finish on a personal note with why thinking like an economist can make you unhappy.
- 0:58
- Ben Felix: Well, we'll share our thoughts at the end of the episode, but for now, let's go to our conversation with Martin.
- 1:07
- Ben Felix: Martin Schmaltz, welcome to the Rational Reminder Podcast.
- 1:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Thanks very much for having me.
- 1:12
- Ben Felix: We're very excited to be talking to you. Martin. why has index investing grown to its current scale?
- 1:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Mostly because it's an incredibly valuable product offered at a very low price. Economists have these theories of how when things are cheap, people buy a lot of it. So I think that must be the main reason. So thanks to Jack Bogle. I think the genius of it was not just the product itself, but also how you set up the fern, basically making it a cooperative, a
- 1:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): customer-owned
- 1:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): corporation, which I just conjecture without evidence might be behind them offering the product at cost, as opposed to trying to extract the highest margin out of the value they create. I think we all have to thank him for that.
- 1:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): How do you think about how good a deal indexing really is for the individual investor?
- 1:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): I think your audience is used to that statement, but I mean it's hundreds of billions of dollars of fees saved. And not just that, it also just pulled in people into the stock market that otherwise wouldn't have any exposure. If we know anything about the drivers of wealth inequality on Earth these days, a lot of it is driven by stock market participation. One would
- 2:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): think that it's been an unbelievably good deal for
- 2:21
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
- 2:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): average individual investor. Aaron
- 2:23
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Powell
- 2:23
- Ben Felix: We're asking about a paper that you have that asks an interesting question. about index funds. If index funds are good for each individual investor, why is it worth asking whether they're good overall?
- 2:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): That's where the heresy starts. Yeah. So you're referring to a paper that started with Bill Zame at UCLA, and it's titled something like whether indexing is good for investors. And that's like a strange question to ask, given what I just said about how. wonderful it is.
- 2:52
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
- 2:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): the question is whether it's good in equilibrium. So it might be good for every individual, but it might have equilibrium effects that are not actually good for each individual investor. We might all be better off without them. That's a theoretical possibility relay out here. Let me be clear about this. But of course, one could also ask about externalities that indexing
- 3:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): could have on other stakeholders. so non-investors, such as consumers. That raises a whole host of issues that traditional finance has just ignored for the last hundred years.
- 3:23
- Cameron Passmore: How does indexing affect asset prices?
- 3:27
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 3:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): I think there's quite a bit of evidence and simple theory as well that indexing increases asset prices. The simple model goes you have a certain amount of supply of equities out there, certain number of companies. with a certain number of outstanding stock. And if you make holding that stock more attractive, for example, by making
- 3:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): it cheaper to hold a diversified portfolio, that's the whole point of indexing.
- 3:50
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 3:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): you hold supply constant, you increase demand, what happens to price? That's just eco 101, that the price will go up in financial economics terms, just the risk premium. in the market will just go down when you make it cheaper to diversify because the individual investors hold less risk. So it stands to reason,
- 4:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): and there's a whole bunch of evidence from index inclusion effects and so forth that companies that are captured by the index have lower costs of capital. That's
- 4:20
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
- 4:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): good side from the corporate finance side. But of course it means for the investor that it has lower expected returns as well. The fun intellectual question that arises is this. So through indexing, you have less risk than if you held individual stocks and were exposed to idymcratic risk. That's a good thing for investor welfare, of course.
- 4:39
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
- 4:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): you also have lower expected returns, which is kind of like a bad thing for investors.
- 4:45
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And the
- 4:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): question is which effect of these then dominates an equilibrium? And this is where
- 4:50
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): at least
- 4:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): my intuition runs out. And that's why one needs a model to figure out the answer to that. That's what I've been trying to do with Bill Zane.
- 4:58
- Ben Felix: I do want to ask about the model. You mentioned this being heretical. What kind of feedback have you gotten from people when they see this paper?
- 5:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): They're they're honestly upset at the question one asks
- 5:09
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): about
- 5:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): whether indexing is good for investors. Again, because I mean, look, we've trained ourselves for a few decades now.
- 5:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): into believing, and for good reason, that indexing is good for individuals. I'm also not challenging that notion. Everybody who listens and everybody who should talk to, nothing has changed about the fact that if
- 5:28
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
- 5:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): run across someone who holds a bunch of individual stocks not knowing about index funds, then it's a good thing for that person to instead hold an index fund and get cheaper diversification. Just nobody has asked the question. what the equilibrium effects of that might be and what the welfare effects are. So I think lots of it is really just misunderstanding the question we ask and that there's actually a bit more thought
- 5:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): and not really anything that overturns conventional wisdom, but really just expands on it.
- 5:53
- Ben Felix: Tell us how the model is set up.
- 5:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): So there's a few models because we were You're trying to understand how robust the results are. In the simplest version of it, you just think that you have a fixed number of firms that have a fixed number of stock outstanding, they have a fixed profit generating process or pay dividends, whatever it might be. All of that is held fixed. So that's the supply of
- 6:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): stocks part. And then there is a continuum of investors. So some are more risk averse than others, some might be richer than others. Doesn't really matter. And then the key exogenous parameter. is just how expensive indexing is. Computers were expensive in 1980. So it was kind of hard to run an index fund.
- 6:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): And I think if I r remember right from memory, Vengar index funds went for 76 basis points a year or so.
- 6:42
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We
- 6:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): all know that computers got cheap and that then we get this stuff for free now. Effectively for free, anyways. So the question is, then what happens to stock market participation of these investors? And whether they hold individual stocks or the index fund instead, what happens to the asset prices? Just to simplify things, we say, look, these investors,
- 7:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): they can only hold a small amount of individual stocks. So what that would do is just force them to take on idiosyncratic risk if they wanted any equity exposure at all, unless they hold the index fund, which gets rid of all the idiosyncratic risk. It's an idealized index fund, like in the textbook, not necessarily like in the real world.
- 7:21
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But of
- 7:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): course they could also hold bonds. So the more risk-averse ones are going to hold a higher fraction of their portfolio in bonds or call that a savings account
- 7:29
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): or
- 7:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): a CD, whatever it might be. And the less risk-averse ones are going to hold a higher fraction in equities. And now as you introduce index funds or just make them cheaper, more people are going to hold an index fund instead of individual equities because the trade-off goes, well, for just a small fee, I get a gigantic risk reduction.
- 7:49
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 7:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): others are going to shift more of their bond holdings into equities. The logic being for a small fee, I get a much higher expected return at not that much more. of a risk because the idiosyncratic risk is taken out. None of what I'm saying right now should be surprising to anyone who's thought about these
- 8:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): issues. This effect that I just described of people taking allocations out of their bond fund or their savings account into the equity market, that's a demand increase. Again, if you by assumption, hold the supply of stocks fixed and increase the demand. It's gotta got to be true that the stock price goes up. So that is just what happens in the model.
- 8:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): The riskiness of the portfolios goes down,
- 8:33
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): but
- 8:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): the stock price goes up and it reduces the rate of return. The fun result of this simplified model is actually every single one of the investors involved, every single one is worse off when you have an index fund
- 8:45
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): or
- 8:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): when the index fund gets even cheaper
- 8:48
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): than
- 8:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): if there was no index fund at all. So everybody likes it. that the index fund is there and buys it. They act optimally. But in equilibrium, it's bad for everyone. And the reason is that the risk reduction is precisely reflected in the increase in stock prices.
- 9:03
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 9:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): there's an externality. The externality is Ben's acquisitions of stocks, they drive up my stock price. No. The more stocks he buys, the lower my expected rate of return is. As we all know, when
- 9:16
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): there's
- 9:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): an externality in a market equilibrium, people do too much of that stuff. So I'm being harmed by Ben's stock market purchases. And that's why it can be, again, I'll close this by saying it's a theoretical result. It's a possibility result that investors actually worse off
- 9:36
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): by
- 9:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): the existence of an index fund. And then one can do variations of the model and say, okay, how robust is that result?
- 9:43
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 9:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): what I just described, we held the rate of return on bonds constant. What if the supplier of bonds is constant? And actually, as you shift out
- 9:52
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): from
- 9:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): your bond portfolio, the bond prices fall and the yields go up. Results stay the same. And in variations, they do. I can get into that, but I've been talking for a while here. So
- 10:03
- Ben Felix: what is the relationship with the fee? Is it a linear relationship where the fee goes down a basis point, or is it a different shaped relationship?
- 10:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Good question. I wish I knew a better answer. No, so look for these interim results, we can actually solve that model analytically, but recalling the graphs, it looks kind of linear, but that's not a particularly great answer.
- 10:25
- Ben Felix: Okay, interesting. I was just wondering if it's like, you
- 10:27
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): know,
- 10:27
- Ben Felix: if a Vanguard index fund is three basis points today, does it matter if it goes to two, or are we basically at the limit of this effect now?
- 10:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): I think we're probably at the limit of that effect, but that's not a very confident statement. I should really go back to that and figure it out.
- 10:41
- Ben Felix: It's really interesting. It's also interesting that the effect in the short term, obviously this is a theoretical, and who knows where we are in the sort of timeline of the effect playing out. It would appear as if, assuming this theory is a good lens of reality, it would appear that we're at a point where asset prices have gone up, expected returns have gone down. But from the
- 11:01
- Ben Felix: perspective of everyone participating in the market, unless they're thinking about expected returns, I guess, everyone's like, wow, this is great. Returns are really high.
- 11:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Indeed, indeed. And the co-author team, Bill Zame Zaym and I discussed discuss that quite a bit. He's been around for a few decades longer than I have. We have lived that reality ourselves. Now that's actually something the model can't really speak to because it's a static model, which would be the first critique one could levy against it, because we live in a dynamic world. So it doesn't really inform these
- 11:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): effects across generations. And that's one of the expansions that we're working on to see whether these welfare effects affect different generations, different. differently and so forth. The comparison is between two alternative worlds, one in which index hunt exists and one in which they didn't, it does not actually speak to the motivation of the fee coming down over
- 11:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): the last 40 years and who benefited and who lost. But I mean the intuition I certainly share that this was pretty great for those at bought earth. It's just not that great for the people that are on the streets these days and vote for socialism.
- 12:03
- Ben Felix: Right.
- 12:03
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You
- 12:03
- Ben Felix: mentioned the welfare goes down for everyone. Are there any winners when the index fund enters the market?
- 12:09
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah.
- 12:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): So in this first simplified model, they're not. Just every single investor is worse off. But that result is changed once you allow the bond prices to change as well. So what happens is again, the more risk-averse parts of the population, which also tend to be the less affluent. they have a larger share in a bond portfolio. Now, if you
- 12:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): compare a world in which
- 12:31
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
- 12:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): bond prices are high versus low, meaning the yields are low versus high, as people shift more wealth into equities, the yields go up. Now, who benefits from that?
- 12:41
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well,
- 12:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): it's those people who get to buy the bonds for cheap. And those are the highly risk-averse ones. So it turns out
- 12:47
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that
- 12:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): in this variation of the model, there are a few winners from cheaper index funds, which is the people who hold the bonds, but they don't benefit because they hold a lot of index funds. They benefit because they make a killing on increased bond returns. I don't think anybody should interpret this in terms of the time series of returns that we saw. It is really just to point out: my
- 13:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): conclusion of this paper is just, hey, we know a lot less than we thought. This thought process that we just went through is not really something that people think about when we try to evaluate. the welfare effect of index funds. And that starts to become important when one thinks of regulation of that or existing laws and antitrust laws that we're going to talk about in a moment. What is the
- 13:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): optimal regulation of this sector? For that, one should really kind of understand what the welfare effects are, even in such simple models. And we don't. And that's why we wrote that paper.
- 13:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Why is this a the tragedy of the commons?
- 13:37
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 13:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): the tragedy of the commons really goes back to the point that if Ben buys more index funds, that imposes a negative externality on me because it drives down
- 13:47
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): my
- 13:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): returns. It drives up the price at which I have to buy the stocks. So it's really quite similar to the usual tragedy of the commons example.
- 13:55
- Ben Felix: So interesting. It's good for each person in isolation, but when everybody does it, it's bad for everyone.
- 14:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Exactly.
- 14:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): That's right. That's exactly what it is.
- 14:04
- Ben Felix: So interesting. Do you have a sense of when does this start to matter? Because if index funds are small, it's probably not a big deal.
- 14:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): You're again pushing me to think about this more quantitatively, as with your question about whether the effects are linear or not. And I mean, I honestly can't. I mean, this model is so stylized that it really just aims to point out there's this mechanism we don't properly understand.
- 14:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): We just qualitatively state in the introduction of the paper, well, this probably didn't matter in 1976, but seems like a good time to think about it now.
- 14:36
- Ben Felix: Right.
- 14:37
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It
- 14:37
- Ben Felix: does seem that way. I mean, in index funds are big, no longer small.
- 14:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): No longer small. At that point, it's just time to think about equilibrium effects. Especially again, I'll go back to when people start thinking about regulating the sector,
- 14:50
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): then
- 14:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): you're regulating a gigantic part of the market. If you do that, there's going to be equilibrium effects of the regulation. And how are you going to make predictions about the effects of your regulation if you don't even have a model about such equilibrium effects? So we just think that is a terribly understudied question that we are just
- 15:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): trying to give a bit of a push to so that people start thinking about it more seriously.
- 15:15
- Ben Felix: Seems like it'd be a tough thing to regulate too when everyone recognizes the benefits, but the costs are so hard to see or to quantify.
- 15:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Yes. So I spent two years as a regulator in DC, as a chief economist of the audit regulator until a year and a half ago or so. There's a political economy or the reality of regulation, which has some political motivations as well. Let's say this carefully. And it doesn't exactly follow the eco 501 idea that if
- 15:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): there's a market failure, the benevolent dictator comes in and fixes it. But I do like to think that it's a nice benchmark to have, to know what the right thing to do is. Even before taking the political economy constraints into account, it's a really tough cookie to figure out what to do about it.
- 15:58
- Ben Felix: How does indexing create common ownership of competing firms?
- 16:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): There's an old idea. From late 70s, people started talking about this. And in the early 80s, people started writing papers about it. Rubinstein and Yari in 1983 and Julio Rotenberg in 1984 started writing papers that basically said hey, this diversification thing that the finance people
- 16:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): talk about, capital asset pricing model, and Markovitz portfolio three. or theory, all that stuff. When you think about it, that's not really consistent with having competitive product markets. And the theory goes like this. So clearly, again, if Martin owns all the firms in the economy or in a given
- 16:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): sector, then Martin is just a monopolist. He might be running a multi-brand strategy, but if he you holds hold 100% of the shares, it's the same.
- 16:49
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): If
- 16:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Ben and Martin each own 50% of all the firms,
- 16:53
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): then
- 16:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): it doesn't really change anything. It's neither in Ben's nor in Martin's interest that the firms compete.
- 17:00
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 17:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): why would they? We're gonna find ways of making sure the managers don't or that they do what we want. But of course, if you take that to a theoretical extreme, nothing changes. When there's 10 people that own all the firms and the firms still don't have an incentive to compete, maybe have you a million people that each own one millionth of each firm, that's called
- 17:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): diversification. Then why would the firms compete? So that theory has been around for a while, for more than 40 years. So we can see that in theory, just diversification will cause common ownership of competitors. And again, in theory, threaten to reduce competition. Now in practice,
- 17:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): that's not really what happens. I tried to go out of my way for the last 10 years scraping together all the SSE ownership records and constructing ownership structures of all US publicly traded firms with it. And what you'll see is that a lot of common ownership in practice is not driven by indexing at all. It's
- 17:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): driven by Bill Gates family office owning a gigantic stake in one waste management company in America and also in another.
- 18:07
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Right?
- 18:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Or there's Berkshire Hathaway owning 10%, 15% in a whole bunch of banks, or occasionally in a bunch of airlines, or insurance companies, and so forth. And these entities would be way more diversified if they held shares in different industries as opposed to gigantic stakes and industry competitors.
- 18:25
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 18:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): that's a much bigger driver. And even to the extent that it's our usual index fund providers, it's not the funds that create the common ownership. It's the centralization of all the funds votes in one centralized corporate governance office that then effectively executes all the votes with one voice
- 18:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): until recently, anyways. It's really the centralization of control, of corporate control. that drives common ownership. It's not the indexing per se. I've been trying to get this message out for 10 years because people, I think, wrongly create indexing with common ownership. So it's kind of dear to my heart to clean that up.
- 19:05
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I was
- 19:05
- Ben Felix: thinking about this earlier. Do you think that because
- 19:08
- Ben Felix: the big winners in indexing, like Vanguard and BlackRock, have these massive funds that are hard to compete with? because costs are so low. Does that itself drive concentration within those big asset managers?
- 19:21
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 19:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): short answer is yes.
- 19:22
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 19:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): think Vanguard is a particularly good example for that. There are scale effects. Again, if they want to offer that stuff for cheap for the benefit of me and you individually, if not an equilibrium, then of course they gotta be large. But again, BlackRock is not an index fund. Black BlackRock is a collection of all kinds of funds,
- 19:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): some of which are textbook type index funds and many others aren't. So a lot of the centralization of corporate control one could also get rid of, and Larry Fink himself pointed this out in Davos a few years ago, by just delegating back voting to the individual fund managers. I'm not sure if that's a good idea.
- 20:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): There's also scale effects in governing portfolio firms.
- 20:06
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 20:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): depending on what one's precise theory is of why that might be a bad thing for governance or for competition, that may or may not be a good idea to make active ownership less attractive to the large so-called index funds, which are not index funds. Aaron
- 20:22
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Powell
- 20:23
- Ben Felix: So it's really the concentration among large asset managers. who oversee how funds vote the shares that they own. That's what causes these potential competition issues.
- 20:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Those in addition to the active stakes that I mentioned, there's also a whole bunch of activists, well not a bunch. There exists activist hedge funds that just buy shares and competitors Start
- 20:46
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): are
- 20:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): talking to them about hey, why don't you merge and why don't we replace a few directors? They've gotten in trouble for that occasionally. Or of course, in private markets, depending on who you talk to, private active firms will tell you, oh, but that's our business model. We call it industry specialization or a roll up or whatever it might be. That is not necessarily a bad
- 21:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): thing because maybe
- 21:08
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): my
- 21:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): dentist does become more efficient and offers greater, better services
- 21:13
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): with
- 21:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): less pain and lower cost. costs. If they have a more professionally run back office,
- 21:18
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): of
- 21:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): course, it might also hamper competition if the same person sits on boards of competitors, and that's what the FTC and the DOJ started enforcing really just in the last few years. It's a very old law. People knew that this problem existed since almost a century ago. They just never really bothered about enforcing it. The management scholar,
- 21:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Peter. Drucker, that guy, he wrote a paper in the 1950s with the title of Pension Fund Socialism, made a slightly different argument, but the notion that concentrating huge pools of capital that are controlled by a handful of people, that this might threaten the capitalist system, that is not
- 21:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): really a new idea. Just a the particular manifestation thereof and the empirical reality, that is kind of new or really popped up in the last two decades.
- 22:07
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 22:07
- Cameron Passmore: interesting. So how concentrated is firm ownership today?
- 22:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): In most firms, the most large US publicly traded firms, so the big three own well north of twenty percent, mostly approaching thirty 30% percent of a whole bunch of the stock is large in REITs in particular. is less big elsewhere. Obviously, there's exceptions. There exist publicly
- 22:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): traded firms that have very large blocks of insiders that sometimes are called Elon Musk or Mark Zuckerberg, or might even be controlled by individuals who don't own shares in their direct competitors.
- 22:45
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 22:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): common ownership is really driven by the absence of such large blockholders. The variation in common ownership across industries or firms is mostly driven by whether or not you have such a large non-diversified block holder at the top of the shareholder register or not. But this is more of the exception to the rule. You get
- 23:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): that in a few industries and then just in one or two firms per For industry, the but not in others.
- 23:10
- Ben Felix: You've done a lot of work on this. What does the evidence show about the effect of concentration? concentrated ownership on competition and then ultimately on consumers? Aaron
- 23:18
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Powell
- 23:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): The Broadstrokes answer is that there is quite a bit of evidence that product prices go up when the same investors own more of the competitors. And this is not a time series statement or a statement across different industries, which would be difficult to identify. It's a
- 23:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): statement that started with a paper on the US airlines industry. So what we showed there is that you look at route level prices. How much does it cost to fly from New York to San Francisco?
- 23:51
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 23:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): how much does it cost to fly from New York to Boston? Those are two different markets. It's a different product.
- 23:56
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 23:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): there's different markets. And the airlines that fly that route are different airlines and they have different owners. So they have different degrees. of common ownership. And what we see is that
- 24:05
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in
- 24:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): those markets where common ownership goes up, ticket prices go up in those markets where common ownership goes down, for example, because a large undiversified investor buys a huge stake in one of the competitors. That's why the prices go down.
- 24:18
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): If
- 24:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): you're an empirical finance, empirical corporate finance scholar, this description triggers a mechanism thinking about what all the endogeneity. problems are and reasons why this might not be causal, but just a correlation.
- 24:31
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 24:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): what we did in that paper is using BlackRock's acquisition of Art Lay's global investors in 2009, which presumably didn't happen because of US airline ticket prices in New York to Boston and San Francisco. That would be absurd.
- 24:48
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
- 24:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): of course, it actually did change the ownership. structure of US Airlines as a side effect.
- 24:54
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 24:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): what we do is
- 24:55
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): we
- 24:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): look at these portfolios the year before the merger or the acquisition
- 25:00
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
- 25:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): say, if hypothetically you combine these portfolios, how would the ownership structure of US airlines change? And then we use this hypothetical increase, which is correlated with the true A change in ownership, as a shock to ownership, you know, as if you gave a black pill versus a white pill to different US airline routes. It turns out you can predict years into the
- 25:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): future
- 25:21
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in
- 25:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): which US airline routes prices increase more than in others based on that acquisition. It's a bit wild, as one famous economist said, seeing these results, but of course it perfectly corresponds with the theory. So that's one piece of evidence that And people have replicated. this in other industries with different methods and
- 25:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): so forth. But really, the interesting question is whether this happens due to the 1980s style theory that the investors basically act like monopolists and they just extract higher margins, which might explain why the capital share went up in the macroeconomy, why the
- 26:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): labor share went down and all these kinds
- 26:02
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): of things.
- 26:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): good things that we see in the macro data. Or whether it might be for a completely different and much more boring story.
- 26:09
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 26:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): that boring story goes like this. So I'll call them index funds, although they're not. The index funds are really just lazy owners. Yes, they have these corporate governance teams, but really, I mean, honestly, compared to an activist, they don't really do anything.
- 26:23
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 26:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): what happens is that
- 26:25
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it
- 26:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): just weakens monitoring of the management team. Now, when Richard Branson shows up at whoever ran Virgin America, there's a very direct link. And Richard Branson talks about, oh, you're gonna buy new airplanes, extract market shares, he puts a bit on lipstick, shows up as a flight attendant. You really try to steal market share from competitors.
- 26:45
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Now
- 26:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): I've never seen Warren Buffett or Larry Fink put on lipstick
- 26:50
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
- 26:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): try to help Delta win market share from United.
- 26:53
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 26:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): the next day show up at United and try to help them steal market share from Malta.
- 26:58
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 26:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): mean, that would be absurd for many reasons. One reason it's kind of absurd to think of Warren Buffett with lipstick, but the other one is it's absurd to think that you would help two of your portfolio companies find ways of stealing market share of each other. And that is an important point. The important point is this theory here is. not about increased incentives to collude. The theory
- 27:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): is not Warren Buffett calls up the alliance and tells them to collude. The theory is, by contrast, to a large undiversified owner, he does not have incentives to push the firms to compete particularly aggressively. Whoever is has read Adam Smith, happy 250th anniversary. Anyways, wealth of nations.
- 27:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): and all that good stuff, the whole theory of capitalism relies on the idea that the baker on one side of the street sees the prices and the bread on the baker on the other side of the street and tries to either outcompete him on quality or price for entirely selfish motives.
- 27:55
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 27:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): the result of all these selfish motives leads to the wealth of nations. That's the whole idea of capitalism. So the point is just that if the two bakers on the two sides of the street own 50% of each other's bakery, then the competitive incentives they just go away. It's about the absence of incentives to compete as opposed to an incentive to
- 28:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): collude. So that's a very different theory of reductions in competition that calls for different evidence. It also calls for different policies. If the problem is that they don't really do anything in corporate governance to make managers to reduce costs or increase innovation, you might come up with very, very different
- 28:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): policy implications. And when your main worry is that they call up competitors and tell them to collude.
- 28:40
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 28:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): that's why it's important. That's where really much of the recent literature has gone to try to distinguish between these different theories of why prices are higher when there's more common ownership around.
- 28:51
- Ben Felix: It was 1776 that Wealth of Nations came out. It is 250 years. There's like an anti-competitive cost imposed on consumers from common ownership. Does any of that cost come back as a benefit to the air quotes index investors slash lazy investors through the ownership of those companies?
- 29:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): At least in the theory that
- 29:13
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): common
- 29:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): ownership comes with high higher product prices because it comes with higher margins.
- 29:17
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You
- 29:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): might say, hey, look, the whole thing is a wash. The three of us are the only investors in the airlines. We're also the only customers.
- 29:25
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It's
- 29:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): a right pocket, left pocket kind of thing. Turns out Joe Farrell, Berkeley professor, wrote a paper about this in 1985 at Bell Labs. It has the most beautiful abstract in all of economics, according to me. Nobody seems to share that view. The abstract goes like this:
- 29:41
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): if
- 29:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): each household owns the same fraction of a firm as its share of consumption,
- 29:47
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): then
- 29:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): shareholders unanimously want marginal cost pricing. It's exactly the intuition that: look, we don't really care. All we want is that the firm prices effectively
- 29:56
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): we
- 29:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): maximize social welfare as an Eco 101. one one. Second sentence of the abstract. Otherwise, profits are overemphasized relative to consumer surplus. So in other words, if you have inequality and some people do all the owning and other people do the consuming,
- 30:12
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): well
- 30:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): then the owners are gonna overemphasize profits relative to consumption. In theory, yes. If we lived in a world without inequality, but given the world we live in, which is really kind of consumers versus capitalists, that's not a political statement, that's an empirical statement.
- 30:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): This is really about extracting rents from one part of society and redistributing it elsewhere. So I think for all practical matters,
- 30:35
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
- 30:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): answer is no. The poor people like you and me, relatively poor compared to
- 30:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): very rich people, we actually probably pay way more in increased product prices than we get back through our index portfolios. from such reductions in competition. Just because the wealth distribution is super unbelievably skewed.
- 30:57
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
- 30:57
- Ben Felix: that's really interesting. You gave the example of the dentist being rolled up by private equity. I guess we could apply similar thinking there.
- 31:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Yes.
- 31:05
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We
- 31:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): just don't have a lot of data on it. So the reason one does this research in public markets is that's where the data is. If there was a place I would be concerned about common ownership and product markets, it would probably be first in private markets rather than in public ones. Which is one more reason not to confound common ownership and
- 31:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): indexing.
- 31:26
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): They
- 31:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): can leave our index funds alone for quite a while. There's lower hanging fruits.
- 31:31
- Ben Felix: We went from the kind of equilibrium effects of index funds to the effect on common ownership, which we established is not necessarily an index funding. fund issue. But I just want to come back to the equilibrium effects. Can you talk about how your model differs from reality?
- 31:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): That's actually a great way of closing the circle here.
- 31:50
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): When
- 31:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): you asked me about how the model was set up, one of the things I said is the firms have a fixed profit or dividend process. So in other words, the ownership of the firms in that model does not affect how efficiently they run, how they set product prices and all that stuff. So in that model we previously discussed,
- 32:07
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): these
- 32:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): empirical effects are just described. They're not present there at all.
- 32:12
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Okay,
- 32:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): so that's one way it differs from reality. There's all kinds of other deviations from reality. There's no other funds, there's no active funds, there's all kinds of simplifications. Again, just to illustrate the point that we know less than we think. But
- 32:25
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
- 32:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): other point it illustrates. which we didn't talk about, is this. It might just be that the effects a model predicts, the 1980s style industrial organization model predicts, is precisely the opposite
- 32:39
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): of
- 32:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): what a model predicts that has asset prices included. So let it try to explain this.
- 32:43
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 32:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): the 1980s style models, common ownership or diversification is a good thing for investors because the well-known reasons. reduces risks and all that good stuff. And distributes rents from consumers to investors. So it's a good thing for investors, but it's a bad thing for consumers. Shift back to the equilibrium indexing model we discussed. There,
- 33:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): indexing is bad for investors. And it might be good for consumers. And here's why. Remember the lower rates of return, the lower expected returns for investors. That just means lower. cost of capital for the firms. But if the corporates have lower cost of capital, that means they have a lower cost of production.
- 33:21
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): If
- 33:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): they have a lower cost of production, they're going to produce more output. Somebody's going to eat all that output. That's a consumers. The fun trara moment is you realize once you endogenize the asset prices into these models, you might get that indexing is bad for investors and good for consumers.
- 33:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): which is exactly the opposite of the intuition that comes out of these models from the 1980s and that a lot of the policy discussion is based on. And I cannot emphasize enough. Nobody should believe that model that we wrote down. The point is just freedom a lot less than we think. And if you think about regulating the entire industry by
- 33:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): really making market-changing market changing ways. to regulation or even prohibit certain types of ownership structures or disincentivize them, you're going to change an equilibrium. And changing an equilibrium without having an equilibrium model
- 34:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): is
- 34:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): a bit of a gutsy thing to do. Again, from the practitioner policy maker standpoint, I mean, people do that all the time. People make regulations without understanding the equilibrium effects all the time. But this is just a bit of a word of caution to say.
- 34:27
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
- 34:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): really want to think about this carefully before you
- 34:30
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): pull
- 34:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): out the sledgehammer here.
- 34:32
- Cameron Passmore: And how concerned do you think index investors should be about your findings?
- 34:37
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 34:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): think mostly not. So at some point, BlackRock disclosed in their investor filings that the policy debate based on this paper is a risk to their business, which triggered a bit of an unpleasant period in my life.
- 34:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): But I've emphasized a few times here. I don't think that we know that these anti-competitive effects have much to do with indexing per se at all.
- 35:01
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 35:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): don't think index investors should spend too much time staying awake at night thinking about these effects. Policymakers should. But index investors, I'm not sure that they have much to worry about or the other.
- 35:14
- Ben Felix: Was it the competition paper or the equilibrium paper that caused an unpleasant period in your life?
- 35:19
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Oh,
- 35:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): the competition paper.
- 35:21
- Ben Felix: Okay.
- 35:21
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 35:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): equilibrium paper that is newer. It was a competition paper. There was a Harvard law school professor called Einar Elhaig who wrote a paper about our paper, the Airlines paper, and explained which existing antitrust laws might be applicable to that situation. Not a policy discussion about what we should change,
- 35:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): just what the existing law really says about this. And so one short summary of that is that one thing are filing obligations. There's this Hard Scott Rodino Act.
- 35:51
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): If
- 35:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): you buy shares and competitors and you don't notify the antitrust authorities,
- 35:54
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that
- 35:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): can get very expensive very quickly. That happened to one of these active hedge funds that bought shares and competitors and did notify the authorities.
- 36:02
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A
- 36:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): second one is the Sherman Antitrust Act that prohibits us to fix prices. Collusion. But we just spent half an hour talking about that. This is not what this is about.
- 36:11
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 36:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): let's forget about this one. But there's also the Clayton Antitrust Act. That has a section eight that says you can't sit on the boards of two competitors. And that's the one that the authorities started to enforce in the past few years.
- 36:25
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And there's
- 36:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): a section seven which says you cannot acquire an asset
- 36:31
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): or
- 36:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): a part thereof, for example, a share of a company. If the effect of the acquisition was to substantially lessen competition.
- 36:38
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 36:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): interesting thing is that the sentence ends there, it doesn't say how you bring about the lessening of competition, whether you do it by whispering bring to the CEO or by voting your shares or whatever it might be. There's nuances to that in footnotes. I'm not a lawyer, I should also say that, but the thrust of the argument is you buy an asset, it affects competition, the acquisition is illegal. Remember how
- 36:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): we use BlackRock's acquisition of BGI as a shock? So you can see how that would make some people a bit defensive about
- 37:07
- Ben Felix: Yeah, I can see how that would get uncomfortable.
- 37:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Yeah.
- 37:11
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You
- 37:11
- Ben Felix: mentioned policy. What kind of policies could be looked at for either one of these issues, either the equilibrium effects or competition?
- 37:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Enforcing existing policy would basically go market by market. Find yourself a market in which there are measurable effects of common ownership on prices and your undo acquisitions or ask for divestitures Messagers and so forth. And the trust ROS authorities have been doing that. They've been starting to measure ownership in
- 37:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): MA transactions to see whether that changes the analysis and so forth. That is just going about their business as usual. But if you want to think of system-wide changes, then it gets more interesting. The two classes of proposals people have made, there are more in fairness, but two that I'll speak about here is
- 38:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): one is you basically prohibit common ownership. You say you can only hold one firm per industry, at least holding more than a percent.
- 38:07
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 38:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): the other idea is: well, you can hold as many competitors as you want, but then you can't vote your shares. You just take voting rights away from index funds mostly. And the argument goes like, look, they don't really want them, anyways. They really only vote them because the FCC told them to 20 years ago
- 38:22
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
- 38:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): told them that this is part of their fiduciary duty.
- 38:25
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 38:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): for the longest time, I thought that. this is a really dumb idea. Because if you take the voting rights away from the largest shareholders of companies, then you're creating an unbelievable agency problem.
- 38:37
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 38:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): if the 73rd largest shareholder suddenly effectively controls a firm, that shareholder is going to get very funny ideas. So my funny idea would be I'm going gonna to become an art painter and sell my art painter. to the company that I control. That's called tunneling. I mean it's just a classical principal agency conflicts I do create with
- 38:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): that. Here's why my thinking is wrong. My thinking is wrong because the ownership structure would change. Because once you become the largest and the controlling shareholder by being the seventy third largest,
- 39:09
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
- 39:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): two of you would also get funny ideas and start buying more shares in these firms to gain more influence.
- 39:15
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 39:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): the entire equilibrium ownership structure of the economy would change once you impose rules like that. And precisely how? And the answer is we have absolutely not the faintest idea. Nothing, absolutely nothing in the literature. Because in these pretty finance models we have, Markovitz and so forth, we assume
- 39:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): away any problems with competition. And Markovitz, Markovits, the returns they fall from the sky.
- 39:40
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Then
- 39:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): he says, go form a portfolio. Then you do your diversification thing, and that's it. It's just assumed a way that the ownership structure would affect the way the firms compete and how high the profits are, and therefore high high the stock prices would be.
- 39:53
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You
- 39:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): can see that in reality, of course, there's a gigantic amount of feedback going on. We have no models that inform that. And that is basically what I spent the last few years of my life trying to. develop and will spend the next few years trying to work out that we have even a faint idea of what would happen if we implemented some of these policy changes.
- 40:13
- Ben Felix: Sounds like the main takeaway is we probably know less than we think. And people who currently investing in index funds probably shouldn't worry. But people at the policy level should maybe think a little harder.
- 40:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Indeed, indeed. Which you should not take these models seriously I discussed so far. But if you did, you'd say, oh wait, but there's nothing to fix, because remember, indexing is bad for investors and good for consumers. So to the extent you want to fix consumer welfare, everything is fine. Again, you should not believe that. But the point is just the
- 40:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): intellectual provocation that this is an easily thinkable model that one could live in in order to figure out what the optimal interventions are. You really want to have better models than the ones we wrote down so far already.
- 40:59
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 40:59
- Ben Felix: guess one implication for index investors: it's not like you should not invest in index funds, which I don't think is the takeaway at all. One practical consideration could be to incorporate lower expected returns.
- 41:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Yes.
- 41:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 41:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): don't usually make predictions, but that seems a sensible thing to do, irrespective of the entire theory that we just laid out for high PE ratios and other stuff that you've discussed in earlier podcasts.
- 41:26
- Ben Felix: True. You don't even need your model to expect lower returns right now, I guess.
- 41:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Exactly.
- 41:32
- Ben Felix: That was all super interesting. I want to move on to the broad theme of the next set of questions is why don't wealthy people just invest in index funds?
- 41:41
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 41:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): reason I chuckle is because a few months ago I sat in an airplane next to a wealth manager of a very well-known private bank who told me this verbatim. He was like, I don't understand why my clients don't just
- 41:54
- Ben Felix: open a brokerage account and buy
- 41:56
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a
- 41:56
- Ben Felix: bunch of
- 41:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): ETFs.
- 41:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Now, let's start first with a factual observation. which is that they don't. There's not great data, but some data that many families, dynasties, lose gigantic amounts of capital within a generation or two.
- 42:15
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 42:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): at the same time, you and I know,
- 42:18
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
- 42:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): the listeners of this podcast know that if you costlessly held a diversified portfolio, you could not possibly lose money over the last few decades or even centuries, although it was hard to do it costlessly then. So what I conclude from that is that those people who lost their money did not
- 42:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): costlessly hold a diversified portfolio. I know that's not particularly advanced logic, but I think it's
- 42:44
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): kind
- 42:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): of
- 42:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): It's useful because it tells you that what these people must have done is either not diversify. or they had way too high costs of running their portfolio.
- 42:54
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 42:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): that's what I'm when I teach I call the cookie monsters of wealth destruction.
- 42:58
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 42:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): you say why don't people just index? We can talk about this, but the first observation is that clearly they don't. Otherwise they couldn't be losing all that wealth.
- 43:06
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You
- 43:07
- Ben Felix: mentioned the cookie monsters of wealth destruction. I think you have three. What are they?
- 43:11
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): All
- 43:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): right. So I talk about the third one. So the third one is just behavioral misfortunes. mistakes. You've talked about this without us before. People tend to trade way too much, which costs trading costs. They trade at the wrong times. They trade when volatility goes up and then buy back the stock when the volatility is down and the prices are up again. So they
- 43:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): sell low and buy high, and that turns out not to be a wealth creation strategy. Lots of behavioral mistakes might be the third cooperation. cookie monster. I see maybe there's a fourth, which is fraud. There's a whole bunch of large family offices that lost a chunk of their wealth to fraudsters. I say that's just half one because
- 43:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): if they were diversified, it wouldn't matter. It turns out I was a shareholder in Wirecard.
- 43:56
- Ben Felix: Oh wow.
- 43:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): I think. Because I hold index funds. So presumably you were too, but we didn't notice. So my point is fraud is not really a problem in a diversified portfolio. It's just a problem if you invested half of your wealth with a fraudster and then it disappears. So that's why I don't really think of that as a separate cookie monster, but in reality it is one.
- 44:15
- Cameron Passmore: How much does volatility matter to long-term wealth?
- 44:18
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Also,
- 44:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): here I don't have anything new to invent. There's this thing called volatility Utility drag. To recover from a 50% loss, you need a 100% gain and all this good stuff.
- 44:26
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 44:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): that's why it's so important to diversify. I sometimes feel like when I look at my MBA students, they think that this diversification concept we preach is some hobby of finance professors, but it's not. No, it just that's what you need to create long-term wealth and to compound.
- 44:41
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 44:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): I think we need to explain that better. So that's one reason to diversify the wealth. The other one being the skewness part, right? So you had Henrik Wessenbender on the right skew. of stocks drives
- 44:53
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
- 44:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): entire equity risk premium. Jack Bogle said that as well. Don't look for the needle in a haystack, just buy the haystack thing. I don't recall if that came up on this pod before, but can't be emphasized enough. So there's lots of reasons to want to diversify broadly. One question for finance professors that look for research topics would be:
- 45:13
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): is
- 45:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): that also true in private markets?
- 45:15
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 45:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): would guess that it's much more important in private markets. The right skew. But the reason that matters is because it's really hard to hold a diversified private asset portfolio.
- 45:26
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 45:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): if diversification is important because of the needle in the haystack problem, then that would point to that it's even more important in private markets to hold a diversified portfolio. But that's just conjecture and hypothesis. that somebody should work out. Aaron
- 45:40
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Powell
- 45:40
- Ben Felix: I think that's right. I mean, Bessembender has also the paper on mutual fund skewness and finds kind of the same thing that mutual fund returns are skewed. And I think venture capital returns are even more skewed. I'm not sure where private equity buyouts fit. It would seem sensible to infer that skewness in at least the venture capital market is even more extreme than in
- 46:00
- Ben Felix: public markets.
- 46:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Indeed, indeed, yes.
- 46:03
- Ben Felix: You talked about the private wealth guy on the airplane who wasn't sure why his clients don't just invest in index funds. We kind of talked a little bit about the fact that they don't, but why do you think? I mean, you talk to people, you talk to wealthy people. Why are wealthy asset owners reluctant to just buy index funds?
- 46:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): The main reason is probably because that's not how they created it. And they have that unexamined intuition that the methods and intuitions that created the wealth are also suitable to preserve it. The anecdote I like to tell with some trepidation of why that's a silly idea is if
- 46:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): you run across a lottery winner who became rich by buying a lottery ticket, I think everybody understands that continuing to buy lottery tickets is not a great way of preserving the wealth, although it was absolutely a way of maximizing. the probability of becoming rich.
- 46:53
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 46:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): I'm saying this with trepidation because obviously there's more than luck that contributes to entrepreneurial success. So I don't want to minimize all the other skills that entrepreneurs have in creating wealth. But it just drives home the logical point that wealth creation and preservation are different disciplines.
- 47:10
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
- 47:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): then, right? So I just think that entrepreneurs have personality traits that make them successful. as entrepreneurs that quite systematically kill them as investors.
- 47:21
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 47:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): I should preface that this is not hard science here. This is really just me making casual observations about the world. But an entrepreneur makes handshake agreements, trusts a counterparty. That's great. In finance, you better read the contract of the product you bought
- 47:37
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): or run
- 47:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): a due. diligence on your private market counterparty. Trust is not a great way of of running governance or courage or confidence, maybe even overconfidence is a great trade for an entrepreneur.
- 47:50
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): As
- 47:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): an investor, you probably want to be well calibrated and not underestimate risks, but property assessment, run risk management strategies and so forth. You probably don't want to make your investment decisions based on intuition. You would probably want to do it based on analysis, completely antithetical to not all, but many entrepreneurial
- 48:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): success stories or an intuition that you want to actively manage assets and have control over them. Great trade for an entrepreneur. They cannot possibly lean back and buy an index fund and participate in the success and effort of others. Or just the ambition to create wealth is kind of bad. I mean, if you think
- 48:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): that you have to create alpha to run a family office or preserve your wealth, well then you take on the risk of having quite negative alpha in effect because of someone on the other side of the trade. So even just the ambition to create wealth as opposed to participate in the overall wealth creation, I think, is just antithetic.
- 48:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): antithetical to the personalities of the people who created the wealth.
- 48:54
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 48:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): that is very hard to shake off. Sometimes it just gets shaken off from generation to generation, really.
- 48:59
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
- 48:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): yeah, I guess another reason is, and perhaps paradoxically, people just are really bad at stomaching volatility.
- 49:07
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 49:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): say that's a bit paradoxical because entrepreneurs took on this unbelievable amount of idiosyncratic risk that
- 49:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): is
- 49:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): more. risky than holding all your wealth in Tesla or whatever the particular individual stock is. And at the same time, when an ETF goes down 20% and a line wiggles on a chart, they scream sell, make all these trading mistakes.
- 49:31
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 49:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): don't find this funny. It's like super painful to me to watch that stuff.
- 49:36
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
- 49:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): I think it's just a reality that people get scared. when volatility goes up. The intuition part comes in, unbridled governance, the patriarch makes investment decisions the same way they did in the business, react very quickly.
- 49:50
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 49:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): that's exactly what then kills them as an investor. And a lot of the wealth gets destroyed that they spent many years creating.
- 49:59
- Cameron Passmore: What is horizon-dependent risk aversion?
- 50:02
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Oh
- 50:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): la la. So that is a while ago. So almost 20 years ago in grad school, my co-author Thomas Eisenbach and I came up with this term because we were wondering about how to describe the behavior of an investor who's more risk-averse to short-term risks and to long-term risks.
- 50:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Let's reflect and step back a bit.
- 50:26
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 50:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): all the little econ models you find in textbooks, you might have time separable utility functions, you know, the utility that evaluates today's risk and tomorrow's risk and next month's risk. But all these little utility functions, they have the same shape. There's the same risk aversion. That seems like a restrictive assumption. So if you read the
- 50:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): psychology literature, you'll find quite a bit of evidence that people just get scared of stuff. And to make this slightly more intuitive, you might think that going bungee jumping is a great idea because, you know, it seems like a good life experience to have, or something to brag about it with your friends. But once you stand on the brink and you're supposed to jump, then you feel
- 51:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): much less of an inclination to jump. People chicken out from stuff. So the closer, the more proximate the resolution comes, the more scared people get. I mean, take stage fright. I don't know if the two of you are musicians.
- 51:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): No.
- 51:19
- Ben Felix: No.
- 51:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): No. Stage fright is a thing. Musicians take beta blockers or some people take alcohol. There's this scene in Beautiful Mind of John Nash standing in a D-bar in Princeton and drinking a few beers to have more courage to talk to members of the opposite gender. Obviously, it's very intuitive to
- 51:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): people that of course people
- 51:41
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): get
- 51:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): scared of stuff, they chicken out, and they're kind of aware of it to an extent that they even start coming up with devices to change their future selves risk aversion. They start playing games against their future selves.
- 51:53
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So,
- 51:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): anyways, we had lots of fun in grad school thinking about how agents might behave and how assets might be priced, in fact, when people have horizon. horizon-dependent risk aversion rather than these normal utility functionals that
- 52:07
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): were
- 52:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): learned in grad school.
- 52:08
- Ben Felix: How does that concept, horizon-dependent risk aversion, explain that phenomenon of investors selling assets when volatility shows up?
- 52:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): When you think of an increase in volatility just as a risk that becomes more imminent, people knew it was going to come at some point, but when it's there in front of your face and you open
- 52:27
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): your
- 52:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Bloomberg or FT and the screen is red, that triggers this feeling of, we call it anxiety in one of our papers. Then they just behave in a more risk-averse way. So you shift out of your equity into a bond allocation. And once the risk ebbs a bit and the anxiety is gone,
- 52:45
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you go
- 52:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): like, oh no, but wait, I read that equities activities have higher expected returns, and let me shift back. That seems very intuitive, and that's kind of the point. It's not that people make these rational decisions in these periods of stress. They just trade out. It is actually quite a direct explanation for that phenomenon.
- 53:02
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Have
- 53:02
- Ben Felix: you guys ever gone bungee jumping?
- 53:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): I have not.
- 53:06
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Have
- 53:07
- Ben Felix: you, Cameron?
- 53:07
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): No.
- 53:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): But I watch watched lots of videos of people going bungee jumping for research purposes. One fun one involves a guy standing on the edge of the cliff with his girlfriend and pushing her down because she refuses to jump, which raises very, very interesting questions about paternalism and whether that's a good thing or not.
- 53:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): You can hear that woman scream at him.
- 53:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): I'm going to dump you at
- 53:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): the point that she's over the cliff and hang hanging on the rope. But of course, we don't know whether she will. Maybe she'll be grateful for it after the fact. So it raises all these interesting questions about, including about whether governance should encourage their citizens to take on risks that they would otherwise be unprepared to take.
- 53:52
- Ben Felix: That's interesting.
- 53:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Think about sovereign wealth funds and stuff. I'm still kind of puzzled about countries like Norway at the same time taxing their citizens. and saving for them. It's kind of interesting.
- 54:05
- Ben Felix: I've done bungee jumping once and it was exactly as you described. Seemed like a good idea. And then you're standing on the edge of this platform,
- 54:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
- 54:14
- Ben Felix: they actually tell you or they ask you, this place didn't force you to jump, but they ask if you would like to pre commit to jumping, where they're gonna count down from three, and if you don't jump, they're going to push
- 54:24
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you.
- 54:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Really? This is so interesting.
- 54:28
- Ben Felix: It was interesting. I agreed to that pre-commitment. I did jump in the end. I didn't need to be pushed. It is terrifying though.
- 54:34
- Cameron Passmore: Wow.
- 54:35
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 54:35
- Ben Felix: will never do it again. Once was enough. That
- 54:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): is so much fun to hear. I didn't know that existed. That must certainly depend on the legal system you're in, whether that's a thing that they can even do it.
- 54:45
- Ben Felix: Yeah.
- 54:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): There's more examples of that. In the 1950s and 60s, if I recall, there used to be a vending machines at airports right next to the gate
- 54:55
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): at
- 54:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): which you could buy life insurance for the case that he died on this particular flight.
- 55:01
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Wow.
- 55:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): And of course, the premia were like
- 55:04
- Ben Felix: I was gonna say. Yeah.
- 55:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Were super high margin products. And
- 55:08
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 55:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): think this originated in Japan, but I don't piece these things together well anymore. At some point that got prohibited because there's some regular regulation that makes you need to have a salesman present to sell insurance or whatever it might be. The need for humans to want to insure at the supermarket casher, you buy yourself new speakers, a new TV,
- 55:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): whatever.
- 55:29
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): All
- 55:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): these insurance products when people make it very palpable at the rental car checkout counter, all these super high margin insurance, they tend to be sold in situations.
- 55:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): where people stand on the brink before jumping.
- 55:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Metaphorically speaking.
- 55:45
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 55:46
- Cameron Passmore: what does horizon-dependent risk aversion imply about paying for delegated investment management?
- 55:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): It's kind of the same as in Ben's bungee jumping experience for sophisticated investors. By sophisticated, that's a technical term to say.
- 56:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): you know how you'll behave in the future, as opposed to being surprised by your chickening out, might have a demand for commitment. As there's a demand for commitment, someone is going to supply the commitment. What it implies to that is there should be a market for people who take a risk on behalf of others, investment risk in particular. So you say you have this
- 56:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): entrepreneur who is great at taking on idiosyncratic risk. in completely illiquid markets, but just cannot, for the life of him or herself, hold a diversified ETF through a market cycle. So that person should have demand for commitment to delegate holding that risk through the market cycle by someone else.
- 56:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): And for a small fee, I would be perfectly willing to do that. Even if I have absolutely no skill at beating the market, or even if I have negative skill, I might be producing negative alpha, anyways, after fees, but that's still better than not holding any equities at all. The investor might just say, look, let's be honest, I'm not going to be able to hold the
- 57:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): equity,
- 57:03
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): but
- 57:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): I might delegate it to someone else who will just not give the money back to me when I call them. Matt Levine on Bloomberg makes fun of brokers' phone lines not working during periods. of high volatility, which is a great service to investors.
- 57:18
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
- 57:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): of course, you could think more about this. Cliff Astness calls it volatility laundering when people just make private market investments, not because they believe that they produce alpha vis-a-vis the stock market, but because you can't sell them when volatility goes high. So you might just have a commitment to delegate.
- 57:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): delegated investment management. And maybe that theory provides an explanation for why people invest with asset managers that have gates or will just not give you your money back while you're nervous, but only three months later, at which point you probably don't want the money back. And that's great. Even if these investment
- 57:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): managers underperform the market. So that's what a horizon-independent horizon-dependent risk aversion conversion implies about. paying for delegated investment management.
- 58:05
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
- 58:05
- Ben Felix: it's interesting. So people are better off because they're able to take more risk, even though they're paying a fee. So even if we can look at it and say, well, you would have been better off without the fee,
- 58:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it's
- 58:15
- Ben Felix: like, well, no, you actually would have been worse off without the risk.
- 58:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Exactly. So right, it's
- 58:19
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
- 58:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): traditional economist way of comparing them to a benchmark off. of If you just had held the risk yourself, it would be you better off. But that might just not be a benchmark that human beings or some human beings can actually implement.
- 58:34
- Ben Felix: Yeah, the counterfactual is a different portfolio entirely.
- 58:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): That's exactly it. Yeah.
- 58:38
- Ben Felix: Do you think family offices are smart money?
- 58:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Okay, look.
- 58:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): That's a bit of a broad question.
- 58:48
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 58:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): there's there are some extremely sophisticated family offices out there. And they definitely qualify as smart money. But it's definitely true that there's a few unsophisticated ones out there as well. And what's also true is that they're not perceived by many market presidents as being smart money. And that's where the propensity
- 59:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): to fall victims to frauds comes in. Obviously, there's an entire industry out there
- 59:13
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that
- 59:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): makes a lot of money by convincing people that they're in a privileged position to be allowed to invest in their fund and all these good things. People just have to guard the human instincts of falling for these things. And yeah, so a certain amount of humility, I think, is what does well to investors by mostly
- 59:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): thinking that if someone offers them an investment opportunity, that's probably because nobody else. wanted to invest at the same tournament.
- 59:41
- Ben Felix: Do we even have to go as far as fraud, or do you think family offices get preyed upon by other whatever people selling financial products?
- 59:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Absolutely. We definitely don't have to go to the fraud. I sometimes go to family office conferences to experience what kind of information flow family offices are exposed Exposure. to. It's just the usual tricks of triggering people's worst instincts. For example,
- 1:00:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): one presentation I see is the fund manager effectively showing them statistics on how active fund managers underperform the index, or most of them do. How over longer time horizons, whatever it was, 10 years, 95% of them underperform form
- 1:00:21
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
- 1:00:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): passive portfolio. So far we all agree. Here comes
- 1:00:26
- Cameron Passmore: what? the
- 1:00:26
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): plus.
- 1:00:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): The plot twist. The plot twist goes, and if you pay close attention in the next 20 minutes, I'm going to show you how to be in the top five percent.
- 1:00:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): So this is just effectively just selling lottery tickets, no?
- 1:00:38
- Ben Felix: Yeah, that's funny.
- 1:00:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): People, you prime people to want to beat the market even if it's extremely improbable.
- 1:00:44
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 1:00:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): that's extremely appealing to human beings. And unless you think in terms of probability distributions and analytical mind, it's very hard to guard against it. I have the same bad instincts as the next guy. I just try not to act on them. You definitely don't have to go to fraud. That's just offering people what they want to hear. And what
- 1:01:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): most people want to hear is not actually good for them in terms of investment.
- 1:01:08
- Ben Felix: Forget about the base rates. I've got a product to sell you.
- 1:01:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): That's right. Don't ask about fees. In that presentation. by the way, there was not an inkling of evidence that they actually outperformed the index. That doesn't matter, no? There's just a bunch
- 1:01:21
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): of
- 1:01:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): station with Greek letters and all that.
- 1:01:23
- Ben Felix: That's too funny.
- 1:01:24
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 1:01:25
- Cameron Passmore: what do you think then is the best setup for large wealth owners?
- 1:01:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): I think that mostly just depends on the goals. I teach a class in Oxford that starts with the premise that surely at least power. part of your objective is to preserve the wealth of the next generation. So let's study what you have to do for that. How does diversification work? How do you reduce the costs of running your
- 1:01:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): portfolio? And so forth. And after a day of that, you see lots of bored faces, and they look at you in the eye and they say, but then that doesn't feel purposeful. And what's the point of it all and all this stuff? And
- 1:02:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): I think that's actually the most important thing family offices should do before they start designing investment strategies. They need to figure out what is actually the goal, what are the individuals' goals of this process? And the wealth preservation, that's great. Then you follow one strategy. And if the goal is impact
- 1:02:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): investing,
- 1:02:23
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): even
- 1:02:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): if we can't measure the impact, then that's what they should do. But I think there's often a huge misalignment between what the goals are
- 1:02:31
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
- 1:02:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): whatnot, right? So one popular strategy is just to have one bucket that's for the wealth preservation and another bucket that is for
- 1:02:38
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): all
- 1:02:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): the non-financial goals. And then putting a governance structure on top that makes sure that money doesn't flow between the buckets uncontrolledly. uncontrolled lane.
- 1:02:47
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A
- 1:02:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): good setup is one that fits the goals, and a bad setup is
- 1:02:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): one that doesn't. That sounds like a perfectly subjective thing, but I do think there's some objectively bad things out there. So
- 1:02:59
- Ben Felix: it makes sense.
- 1:03:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Let's take a small detour on costs. We started this whole segment by talking about
- 1:03:05
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): how
- 1:03:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): people don't full diversified portfolios at no cost. So let's talk about why that is important. We talked about why all that is important. Cost, I think, and people underestimate as well. So a few people in every seminar I know, about a percent, know that if you make a 7.2% return per year, your
- 1:03:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): wealth doubles in 10 years. That's just this rule of thumb for how exponential growth works. Half of those knows that that implies that after 40 years, that's called that a generation, your wealth is supposed to be 16 times what. you started with. So you start with a billion, after 40 years, you'd have 16 billion if you're compounded at
- 1:03:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): 7.2%.
- 1:03:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Now here's a question that one cannot quite as easily answer with the rule of thumb, which is
- 1:03:52
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): if
- 1:03:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): you have a 2% cost per year, since a 7.2% return, you make just 5.2%.
- 1:03:57
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): How
- 1:03:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): much do you now have after 40 years? And the that two of you probably have a good intuition about this. And the answer is it's less than half. You have 7.something instead of 16. So the point is a 2% cost per year eats half of your wealth in a generation, not half of your returns, half of your wealth. Now, what are these costs? I mean, there can be many things. Of course, they
- 1:04:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): can be asset management fees, custodian fees, God And knows what. But of course, they can also be withholding taxes, they It can be the cost of running your structure, the law. lawyers, the accountants, and God knows what, your due diligence for the private investments. Once you add these things up, you see that you're very, very quickly way above 2% a year
- 1:04:36
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): if
- 1:04:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): you don't pay attention, especially for smaller family offices. So, anyways, all of that was going to be the long answer to the question of what's a bad setup. I mean, a university universally bad setup is one that it just has way too high costs for no particular particularly good reason. And I think that's an area people underestimate a lot. There's
- 1:04:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): also some universally bad governance structures. My favorite one of those is probably the one where the patriarch goes and says, I want my kids to get along. Therefore, I shall impose that all decisions get made in consensus. That never works. The reason that never works is
- 1:05:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): you're giving 100% of the power to that kid that blocks all decisions. Even if in substance everyone agrees, I mean, I would start asking for an extra kickback if I also agree. There's always going to be a last person in the row. So you're creating a structure that only works when there's consensus, but you're disincentivizing consensus.
- 1:05:35
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): What
- 1:05:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): people should be doing is, of course, creating structures that also work when there's no consensus, but that incentivize consensus. No, and it's very simple. You just add to your charter or to your governance structure. You say the kids make decisions in consensus, but if they fail to reach consensus, then all the decision-making power for a year goes
- 1:05:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): to the chairman of the board, some external party,
- 1:05:58
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): or
- 1:05:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): the nuclear option, then everybody has the right to trigger an auction for the other one. one's shares or something. People will work very hard to prevent that outcome and losing control. So this way you incentivize consensus. So, anyways, there's a few universally bad ways of doing investments or structuring the asset allocation by not making it
- 1:06:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): commensurate to the size of the family office. And there's a few universally bad ways of structuring governance. It's just very personal, depends It on what the goal. goals are of the family.
- 1:06:28
- Ben Felix: What about four less wealthy families, I guess, who don't have enough wealth to set up and cover the infrastructure costs of a family office? What do you think is the best setup for them?
- 1:06:39
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): To
- 1:06:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): close the circle, probably just index. But that's just a recap a bit of why we come to that conclusion so quickly. We emphasize the importance of diversification. And I said it's kind of hard to diversify a property. private market portfolio. My favorite example of that is probably real estate. I teach real estate in Oxford. Every year, half of my class is for old people who don't
- 1:06:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): work in real estate, but who figure my grandma told me that
- 1:07:04
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): real
- 1:07:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): estate is a good inflation hedge. And therefore, in their private portfolio, after they bought their home own house, they buy a bunch of more houses to rent them out. That is sometimes a good idea, and sometimes it's not a good idea. But ex ante, it's almost certainly a bad idea because you're way overweight in the
- 1:07:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): language of asset managers. You're way overweight two assets that have a minuscule fraction of the overall market portfolio.
- 1:07:33
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It
- 1:07:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): would be very surprising if that portfolio over long horizons would perform nearly as well.
- 1:07:38
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): as
- 1:07:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): a diversified one. It's basically impossible. So family offices make the same mistakes as individual investors.
- 1:07:45
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): They
- 1:07:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): invest in asset classes that they have no business being in, and just because they can't diversify effectively in those.
- 1:07:51
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 1:07:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): real estate being one of them, lots of private markets being another one. We mentioned due And diligence for your private market investments. Well, that's a fixed cost.
- 1:08:00
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 1:08:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): that there has to spread over lots of capital. to make sense.
- 1:08:04
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 1:08:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): you still earn these excess returns that you're hoping to get in private markets. But then if you spread this over a huge amount of capital in this one investment, it's very hard to diversify again. So you have to be really, really rich in order to be able to diversify in a private portfolio. So for
- 1:08:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): investors who are not large enough for that, they'd be better off to. just holding liquid investments and leaving all this illiquid stuff to really, really large investors.
- 1:08:35
- Ben Felix: Makes sense. We've spent the last hour or so talking about how to think like an economist on various issues. Why does thinking like an economist cause unhappiness?
- 1:08:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): You're referring to this semi-serious blog post I wrote. I think it was during the pandemic, but a while ago.
- 1:08:54
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 1:08:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): I think I titled it something like Yoga for Economists or something like that. The argument there is that people who study economics end up applying that to life as well. I think that's probably a bad idea, both based on my self-observations, but also based on what not just yogis,
- 1:09:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): but a whole lot of Eastern philosophies have taught over a few centuries. Let's do a few examples of how thinking like an economist is basically opposite of what yogis teach us we should be doing to be happy. One of the things we learn in Eco 101, one is there's this thing called externalities. And if there's an unpriced externality, I
- 1:09:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): can pollute the river, then the profit or value maximizing. the utility maximizing thing to do is just to pollute the river. A yogi would look at this and say, wait, the first person you're harming is yourself because you'll just don't feel great about having harmed other people, which is basically the opposite of how our
- 1:09:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): economists think about the issue. So that doesn't make economic thinking wrong. It's just the right way to think about economics, but not about your personal happiness.
- 1:10:03
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Or
- 1:10:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): the other example is thinking counterfactuals. That's probably more important. People are happiest when they are in the moment. They focus on what they're doing right now, no matter what the thing is.
- 1:10:12
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): What
- 1:10:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): do economists say? It's like, no, no.
- 1:10:15
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Don't
- 1:10:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): be happy what you're doing. Think about what you could be doing instead. And what are the opportunity costs of playing basketball or playing the piano or hanging out with your friends right now. You could be doing work and making money.
- 1:10:31
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I mean,
- 1:10:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): I don't need to explain to any human being listening here that this is probably not a happiness-generating thought to have. Oh, but it is what we teach in econ classes. And again, let us make econ wrong. It just makes it not a recipe for happiness. Makes it a The recipe for maximizing whatever the econs teach you to happiness. happen, Maximize.
- 1:10:50
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And I
- 1:10:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): guess the more general point is that the focus on outcomes rather than on the process. So what yogis and Buddhists and so teach you to do is to focus on the process of being and breathing and all these good things, as opposed to whatever the paycheck is at the end of the month. I think that matters a lot, especially
- 1:11:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): in this day and age, when AI is taking a lot. of the process away. So we've all seen loud protests by mathematicians quitting their jobs because suddenly it became so efficient to do proofs. So that is, on the face of it, kind of puzzling. You say,
- 1:11:29
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): your
- 1:11:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): job got easier to do, you're way more productive doing it. What's not to like?
- 1:11:34
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): When
- 1:11:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): you listen to the mathematicians, the answer is what we don't like is we actually enjoyed the process. of doing proofs. That is take it away. And the same thing, I think that was last weekend the FT had an article about musicians. A third of music uploaded to iTunes, I think it was, is now 100% AI generated. And it's not that composers
- 1:11:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): don't like using technical tools to do their job. They've done so for decades. But they actually enjoy the process of creating music. To take that away, that makes people unhappy.
- 1:12:05
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 1:12:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): again, in terms of economics and social welfare or consumer welfare, these concepts in antitrust, all these innovations, they are great. They increase human welfare. But whether they also make people happier, that's a completely different page. So that's why I think people should be a little more
- 1:12:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): not just investors, they should be more. humble in what they know as they form their portfolios, but also economists about whether their teachings should really apply to people's private lives as well, or whether they should just limit themselves to economics, which is what these tools were made for. It's not a new idea again. There was this guy called Adam Smith that we talked about
- 1:12:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): earlier,
- 1:12:45
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): who
- 1:12:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): wrote a theory of moral sentiments, in which he basically describes
- 1:12:50
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that
- 1:12:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): people have. this thing called compassion of looking at poor people. The contrast to economic thinking could be greater, where our welfare criteria usually just care about pareto efficiency, but not about inequality per se. So I think there's a lot of stuff in philosophy that
- 1:13:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): economists for simplicity or convenience just brushed aside. But that are really necessary for us to understand the social challenges of our time and hence also really what the right way of regulating the economy is.
- 1:13:25
- Cameron Passmore: That response, Martin, might be the best ever set up for our traditional final question, which is how do you define success in your life?
- 1:13:33
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
- 1:13:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): that was a tough one. I had to ask my partner.
- 1:13:36
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): She
- 1:13:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): didn't really know the answer either of how I defined. define success in my life. There's a private dimension to it and a professional one.
- 1:13:43
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 1:13:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): think what both have in common is probably that
- 1:13:46
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 1:13:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): find it most meaningful to just create value for society and for others. I have expensive hobbies, so I don't mind if some of the value sticks with me as well. But for example, taking on the role of a regulator, the auto-regulator audit regulator that I spent two years serving as chief economist. in. You don't do that for the money, but you might do it because you think
- 1:14:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): that you can improve disclosure by point one percent and maybe reduce the risk prima by a small fraction.
- 1:14:15
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
- 1:14:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): then do that with a gigantic amount of leverage that regulators so these rules we wrote or the ones someone was tempted to write or and we decided not to write, they affect seventy $70 trillion dollars of equity market cap. And once you do 0.1% times 70 trillion, that's still 70 billion.
- 1:14:34
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 1:14:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): I just find it highly motivating to get out of bed in the morning when you think that you're contributing to such amount of wealth creation for society or for the fundamentals of capitalism and all that good stuff. The same thing about being an economist, what I enjoy is thinking. about providing economic thinking to make the world a
- 1:14:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): better place in future generations.
- 1:14:56
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): That
- 1:14:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): is both a statement about focusing on the process, but also about creating that thing we call welfare economics.
- 1:15:04
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): To
- 1:15:04
- Ben Felix: your answer. This has been a great conversation, Martin. We really appreciate you coming on the podcast.
- 1:15:08
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
- 1:15:09
- Cameron Passmore: great to meet you. Thanks, Martin.
- 1:15:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Thank you very much for having me. It was a lot of
- 1:15:12
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): fun.
- 1:15:17
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You
- 1:15:17
- Cameron Passmore: know, Ben, one of my sayings I say all the time is you have to think about the unintended consequences. Like so many things we've done over the years in business. It's been the unintended consequences that have dominated. This is something that we've talked about with guests in the past. Ken French talked about the
- 1:15:37
- Cameron Passmore: unintended return. returns, unexpected returns.
- 1:15:41
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 1:15:41
- Cameron Passmore: that's the part of this conversation I found so fascinating. You know, Martin just asked these questions, like, huh, that's a really good question.
- 1:15:47
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You know,
- 1:15:48
- Cameron Passmore: you think about each baker owning half of the bakery across the street and the unintended consequences of that. But that's effectively what's going on with the proliferation of index tax funds. Just so fascinating. Interesting that doesn't mean you change anything, but man, really cool. Make it and you think.
- 1:16:03
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
- 1:16:04
- Ben Felix: that's one of the important takeaways is that this stuff matters. That can be true while not having any implications for what index investors should actually do with their portfolios.
- 1:16:13
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): There
- 1:16:14
- Ben Felix: can be an aggregate market level effect that policymakers should be worried about, but I am restating the tragedy of the comments. commons. It's fine for each individual to do this, but hey, we may have a problem developing here. And increasingly so as index funds get larger and larger, but who's going to step in and do
- 1:16:34
- Ben Felix: something about that? And I mean, should they? As Martin said during the conversation, we need to have a model of what may be going on for us to even have that conversation or even start thinking about
- 1:16:44
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that. So
- 1:16:45
- Ben Felix: I think he's contributed to that in a couple different ways in terms of common ownership and in. index funds more specifically.
- 1:16:52
- Cameron Passmore: So many unanswered questions. It's going to be fascinating to see the research over the coming years and decades on this kind of stuff.
- 1:17:00
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 1:17:00
- Ben Felix: then the second part of the conversation where we're kind of talking about why don't wealthy people just index, that part's really interesting. He's teaching courses on this stuff. He's talking to wealthy folks. You can tell he's been to some conferences, he's talking to family offices. to get a feel for what's going on.
- 1:17:17
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And I
- 1:17:17
- Ben Felix: thought his comments there were fascinating.
- 1:17:19
- Cameron Passmore: But it's the same pitch, no matter how many zeros you have on your balance sheet.
- 1:17:23
- Ben Felix: It's true.
- 1:17:23
- Cameron Passmore: Pitch doesn't change.
- 1:17:25
- Ben Felix: No, it does not change. And yeah, just what is smart doesn't really change.
- 1:17:30
- Cameron Passmore: Markets work,
- 1:17:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): that basic belief that doesn't change depending on how many zeros you have.
- 1:17:34
- Ben Felix: Tough for people to accept, though. Especially, I mean, Martin talked about it when you have someone who has been very successful, being concentrated, having control.
- 1:17:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Having conviction.
- 1:17:44
- Ben Felix: Having conviction, being active, making quick decisions, all that stuff. It's very hard to step back and and shift your mindset to be a regular long term passive investor when that's not how the wealth was created. I love that part of the conversation.
- 1:18:00
- Cameron Passmore: Also the horizon horizon-dependent dependent risk aversion. bungee jump example. That was really good.
- 1:18:06
- Ben Felix: And how that relates to but it's basically like wealth management or at least asset management, delegated investment management as a sort of commitment device, like a pre-commitment to endure volatility in your portfolio makes the fee worthwhile because the counterfactual is that you just didn't take risk or didn't take as much risk. We know that's true. I
- 1:18:26
- Ben Felix: mean we've talked to lots of people who are in cash or in very conservative portfolios.
- 1:18:31
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 1:18:31
- Ben Felix: that's one of, not the only, but one of the reasons that they seek advice.
- 1:18:35
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 1:18:35
- Cameron Passmore: thought this was a great interview. I think the listeners loved it. And if you listen this far, we're very grateful for that. But this is great stuff. Great guest.
- 1:18:44
- Ben Felix: Super cool to talk Dr. to Martin. And we appreciate everyone listening and we appreciate Martin coming on the podcast.
- 1:18:49
- Cameron Passmore: You bet.
- 1:18:54
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