Fairmount Funds founders detail shift from public biotech investing to building drug companies via iterative antibody engineering.
Summary
Peter Harwin and Tomas Kiselak, co-founders of Fairmount Funds, explain their transition from a public market hedge fund to a 'distributed pharma' model that builds its own drug companies. They argue that investing at the inflection point where clinical uncertainty is reduced allows for identifying future revenue-generating monopolies. The firm focuses on engineering 'better' versions of existing standard-of-care antibodies to fix formulation or efficacy flaws, citing a 20x multiple on invested capital and an IRR in the high 30s. They discuss specific cases like Apogee's $11 billion sale to AbbVie and the development of Qualis, while noting that AI's role in biotech is currently limited by the 'lag variable' of physical experimentation.
Episode sections
- 0:00 – 3:45
Podcast Intro and Sponsor Reads
The episode begins with sponsor reads for Portrait research platform and 8Sleep smart mattress. Hosts Rick Berman and Paul Buzer introduce guests Peter Harwin and Tomas Kiselak, co-founders of Fairmount Funds, noting this is their first interview.
- 3:45 – 7:23
Fairmount's Evolution and Track Record
Hosts highlight Fairmount's founding at age 30 and its evolution from a public biotech hedge fund to a company that builds its own drug firms. They cite a 20x multiple on invested capital, an IRR in the high 30s, and a portfolio where 95% consists of Fairmount-founded companies.
- 7:23 – 11:15
Meeting and Shared Philosophy
Peter Harwin recounts meeting Tomas Kiselak at the 2011 American Society of Nephrology conference. They bonded over a shared disdain for short-selling and a desire to focus on long-term business building rather than trading momentum around clinical trial readouts.
- 11:15 – 14:44
The Core Investment Thesis
Harwin explains their thesis: while drug development success rates are low (14-17%), there is a specific point in the timeline where uncertainty is reduced enough to identify a future revenue-generating monopoly. They aim to invest systematically at this inflection point.
- 14:44 – 20:20
Founding Impulse and Risk Aversion
Harwin discusses the fear of becoming too risk-averse if he stayed employed, prompting him to start Fairmount at age 30. Kiselak adds that he sought authenticity and creative freedom, finding a rare partner in Harwin who shared similar values and ambitions.
- 20:20 – 23:37
From Public Investing to Building Pharma
The hosts discuss Fairmount's shift from a public market fund to building a 'distributed pharma' company. Harwin explains that they initially tried to license a drug (NS Pharma's JAK2 inhibitor) but were rejected due to lack of operational experience, leading them to build companies from scratch.
- 23:37 – 29:53
Hosts' Due Diligence and Initial Investment
Berman describes his journey to understand biotech after his son's medical challenges, leading to a meeting with Fairmount in 2019. He was impressed by their humility and distinct framework, eventually investing his endowment's capital with them.
- 29:53 – 31:59
Early Career and Education Background
Kiselak begins sharing his background, born in former Czechoslovakia, attending boarding schools abroad on scholarship, and attending the Red Cross Nordic United World College, which shaped his adaptability and global perspective.
- 31:59 – 40:17
Personal Backgrounds and Entry into Biotech
Tomas Kiselak describes his educational path from a Norwegian leadership program to Amherst College, where he switched from economics to neuroscience before discovering venture capital at Ari Capital. Peter Harwin explains his entry into biotech was influenced by his oncologist father and his mother's battle with breast cancer, leading him to combine finance and healthcare interests via an internship at Boxer Capital.
- 40:17 – 48:35
The Biotech Industry History and Capital Cycles
Kiselak traces the industry from Genentech's 1976 founding to the 1990s boom, the 2002-2012 'nuclear winter,' and the post-2011 rise of crossover funds that bridged private venture capital with public markets. He notes the number of US-listed biotech companies grew from under 200 in 2012 to over 1,000 by 2021, followed by a valuation contraction in 2022 and a recovery in early 2026.
- 48:35 – 1:03:41
Drug Development Process and Regulatory Framework
Kiselak outlines the FDA's role in ensuring safety and efficacy, detailing the progression from preclinical toxicology studies to Phase 1 (safety in healthy volunteers), Phase 2 (efficacy in patients), and Phase 3 (registrational trials). He emphasizes that the complexity arises from non-overlapping skill sets required for manufacturing, clinical operations, and physician education.
- 1:03:41 – 1:09:22
Fairmount's Strategy: Building Better Antibodies
Harwin explains that Fairmount shifted from licensing to building companies to solve analytical problems they identified as investors. Their strategy involves engineering 'better' versions of existing standard-of-care antibodies to fix flaws, rather than pursuing novel targets, thereby reducing risk and aiming for revenue-generating monopolies.
- 1:09:22 – 1:13:06
Improving existing biologics: The Qualis/Hereditary Angioedema case
Speakers describe how observing high injection pain rates in a Phase 3 drug for hereditary angioedema led to the founding of Qualis. They identified that antibody aggregation and formulation issues caused the pain, and sought to engineer a more stable molecule with improved persistence to reduce dosing frequency.
- 1:13:06 – 2:17:13
From seed funding to clinical success: The $500k experiment
Peter Harwin recounts pitching Perceptive Advisors with a $500,000 seed check to engineer a better antibody. Despite initial setbacks including all mice dying in early immunization experiments, they developed an antibody now in Phase 3 trials with Licrist Pharmaceuticals, demonstrating the viability of their iterative approach.
Claims worth verifying
Tomas Kiselak attended a program in Norway with 200 kids from 86 countries, with the nearest settlement being 3,000 people away.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) ·31:59
How to verify: Biographical details on Fairmount Funds website or Kiselak's LinkedIn profile; verify program details via educational records. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Kiselak attended Amherst College on a full scholarship.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) ·33:39
How to verify: Amherst College alumni records or Kiselak's LinkedIn profile. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Peter Harwin’s father was an oncologist and his mother had a 10-year journey with breast cancer.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) ·35:58
How to verify: Biographical details on Fairmount Funds website or Harwin's LinkedIn profile; verify breast cancer treatment timelines via medical literature. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Genentech was founded in 1976.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) ·40:40
How to verify: Genentech corporate history page or SEC filings for Roche (Genentech's parent company). For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceGenentech sold the first recombinant insulin to Eli Lilly, which still markets it.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) ·41:25
How to verify: Eli Lilly product history or FDA approval records for Humulin (recombinant insulin). For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The biotech 'nuclear winter' lasted from 2002 to 2012.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) ·42:45
How to verify: Historical biotech IPO data from Biotech Index or Crunchbase; verify capital formation trends via industry reports. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
By 2021, there were over 1,000 US-listed public biotech companies, up from fewer than 200 in 2012.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·45:11
How to verify: Biotech IPO data from Biotech Index or Crunchbase; verify public company counts via SEC EDGAR. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceFive-year annualized returns for XBI or ARKK are close to zero.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) ·47:51
How to verify: Calculate total return for XBI and ARKK from 2026 to 2026 using Bloomberg, Yahoo Finance, or ETF provider data. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Apogee was bought by AbbVie for close to $11 billion.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) ·1:05:31
How to verify: AbbVie press release or SEC filing (8-K) regarding the acquisition of Apogee. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceLoxo was an early passive investment by Harwin and Kiselak.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) ·1:08:46
How to verify: Fairmount Funds portfolio disclosures or SEC filings (13F) if applicable; verify Loxo's TRK inhibitor development via clinical trial registries. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceA drug administered every two weeks for hereditary angioedema showed a 52% rate of injection-side reactions, compared to a typical 5-10% range for subcutaneous antibodies.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) ·1:10:21
How to verify: Check the Phase 3 clinical trial data for Lanadelomab (e.g., in the New England Journal of Medicine or FDA review documents) for adverse event rates related to injection site reactions. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Alexion's Ultomiris was engineered from Solaris to allow for eight-week dosing intervals instead of every two weeks.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) ·1:12:19
How to verify: Review Alexion's (now part of Takeda) press releases or FDA approvals for Ultomiris regarding dosing regimen and mechanism of action. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Harwin and Kiselak received a $500,000 seed check from Perceptive Advisors.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) ·1:13:06
How to verify: Check SEC Form D filings for Fairmount or related SPVs for investment amounts from Perceptive Advisors. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceThe antibody developed from the $500k seed is in Phase 3 studies with Licrist Pharmaceuticals.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·1:14:47
How to verify: Search ClinicalTrials.gov for trials sponsored by Licrist Pharmaceuticals involving hereditary angioedema and the specific antibody. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Fairmount's portfolio shifted from 0% to 95% in companies they founded.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·1:17:12
How to verify: Review Fairmount's investor presentations or SEC Form PF filings detailing portfolio composition. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceFairmount manages approximately $7-8 billion in AUM, entirely composed of gains with net negative capital contributions.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·1:25:54
How to verify: Check Fairmount's Form PF filings or investor reports for AUM and capital contribution/redemption data. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceCogent and Viridian were taken public in 2020.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) ·1:18:40
How to verify: Check SEC filings (S-1, 8-K) for Cogent and Viridian regarding their IPO dates. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceViridian had a drug approved a few months prior to the interview.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) ·1:19:00
How to verify: Check FDA approval announcements or press releases from Viridian for drug approvals in the relevant timeframe. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Fairmount has built 15-20 companies with only one shutdown.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·1:32:59
How to verify: Review Fairmount's portfolio list or press releases regarding company launches and terminations. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The founders aim to put out roughly three companies every year.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·1:42:55
How to verify: Check Fairmount's strategic updates or investor presentations for stated company formation targets. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Fairmount was started by Peter Harwin and Tomas Kiselak at age 30.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·1:43:15
How to verify: Fairmount Funds website or SEC filings for the firm's formation date and founders. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary source14 to 17% of drugs that enter the clinic succeed.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·1:43:15
How to verify: Clinical trial success rate studies, such as those by BIO or Nature Reviews Drug Discovery. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Close to 95% of Fairmount’s portfolio sits in companies they’ve founded.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·1:43:15
How to verify: Fairmount Funds portfolio disclosure or investor presentations. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Paragon is a permanent home for a discovery team that licenses IP to new entities.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) ·1:43:56
How to verify: Fairmount Funds corporate structure documentation or press releases describing Paragon. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Apogee pursued two parallel lead programs: APG0808 to improve Dupixent and APG777 to improve Librilezumab.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) ·1:57:42
How to verify: Apogee or AbbVie clinical trial registries (ClinicalTrials.gov) for APG0808 and APG777 indications. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Do your own research
- Verify Fairmount Funds' audited performance reports for the stated 20x MOIC and high 30s IRR figures.
- Review the FDA approval history and clinical trial data for Apogee's APG0808 to confirm the AbbVie acquisition terms and efficacy claims.
- Check the current clinical trial status and trial design for Qualis's hereditary angioedema candidate.
- Analyze the XBI and ARKK index performance data for the 2022-2026 period to validate the speakers' claims about sector valuation contraction and recovery.
- Research the operational structure of Paragon to understand how it licenses IP to clinical-stage entities and retains institutional knowledge.
- Compare the efficacy and safety profiles of Fairmount-engineered antibodies against the referenced standard-of-care molecules (e.g., Dupixent, Librilezumab).
- Assess the competitive landscape for antibody engineering firms to evaluate Fairmount's claim of reducing risk by targeting 'better' rather than 'novel' molecules.
Full transcriptexpand
0:00Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Alright, friends, today's episode is brought to you by Portrait, the AI research platform built by fundamental investors for fundamental investors.
0:07Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): For
0:07Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): founding Portrait, David Plon spent a decade as a buy-side analyst at some of the world's leading investment firms, including our friends at Slate Path Capital and the Bowpost Group.
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0:16Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): even as some of the best resource firms in the world, David kept bumping into a reality that may resonate with many of you, never having enough time to research all the compelling ideas that crossed cross his desk. This tension inspired him to build Portrait, the research platform that delivers the equivalent of an army of capable analysts ready to help you focus on the most actionable ideas with unprecedented speed and depth. Portrait isn't about replacing judgment, it's about giving you back time for the work you actually love, developing novel ideas and building conviction through deep, creative, value value-added added research. Portrait assesses the same qualitative attributes we value as investors to identify businesses that fit your specific mental models. It generates comprehensive primers and lays out bull bear cases in minutes rather than days or weeks. The system is trained to help you process pressing research questions, delivering final outputs at the caliber you would expect from a member of your team. So,
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1:23Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On
1:23Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): this show, we talk about the joys of compounding, not just as an investment phenomenon, but as a principle for your life. Now we're convinced that sleep is actually one of those high leverage, repeatable decisions that has the power to improve your physical, emotional, and psychological well well-being. being. So if you care about trying to be the best version of yourself every day, how you're approaching your nights matters a
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1:44Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): now you know we're huge fans of A-Sleep. We've had the company's founder Mateo on the pod, and we and our families have been obsessed with their products for years. They just released the sixth generation of the pod, a smart mattress cover that fits on any existing bed. The hub, which is the piece of hardware that runs the temperature system, is 50%. smaller than the previous version and now fits under most bed frames. The thermal engine is 20% faster
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2:57Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Hello and welcome to Joys of Compounding.
2:59Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): We're still on the same mission to study greatness in order to help you find and compound your life's work as fast as possible for as long as possible.
3:07Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I'm
3:07Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Paul Buzer
3:09Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
3:09Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I'm Rick Berman.
3:10Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): We're your hosts, and each session, our teachers will be some of the world's most compelling people. from across the vast range of human achievement.
3:17Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): This
3:17Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): show is brought to you by Pine Grove Studios in collaboration with Colossus. The hosts of the show, Rick Berman and Paul Buzer, are the co founders and co CEOs of Sata Grove Holdings and co CEOs Sata Grove Management Company. All opinions expressed by any of Rick, Paul, or their podcast guests are solely their own and do not reflect the opinion of either Sata Satar Grove Holdings or Sata Satar Grove Management Company. This podcast is intended for informational purposes only and should not be relied. upon as the basis for investment decisions. Satar Grove Holdings or clients of Satar Grove Management Company may maintain positions and securities discussed in this podcast.
3:45Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Our
3:45Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): teachers are Peter Harlan and Tomash Kiselak of Fairmount Funds, perhaps the greatest biotech investor in the world today, and yet you've likely never heard of them. That's because, for one, they're pretty new to the scene, only 10 years into the journey after founding Fairmount when they were both just 30 years old. And also because, well, they're not exactly guys who are looking for any of attention. You're not going to find them on X or CNBC, and in fact, this is literally their first ever interview of any kind.
4:09Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): By
4:10Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): my calculation, an investment in Fairmount since inception has yielded a multiple uninvested capital of well over 20 times, representing an IRR in the high 30s. Now, these returns sustained for that long are obviously outrageous. Whether you compare them to biotech indices, other biotech investors, or really almost any investor. I've ever come across. But as you'll hear on this episode, just how they've done it is even more wild and inspiring.
4:33Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): If
4:34Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you're a longtime listener of ours, you know Paul and I are kind of obsessed with the idea of enduring excellence. We're convinced that to be great and stay great requires constant evolution, a trait not commonly embraced in the investing industry.
4:47Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): When
4:47Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Fairmount began, it looked a lot like other institutional qualities. quality biotech hedge funds, investing mainly in public stocks and perhaps an occasional private crossover investment, but the dream was never really about picking stocks. It was always to build great businesses that build great drugs that ultimately improve the quality of life and standard of care for patients. Against all odds and little external support, they began to experiment, tinkering with licensing and drug development via SPVs until eventually. the distraction became the focus. Today, Fairmount has founded 17 companies with 15 already public, translating into a combined market cap of over $50 billion.
5:25Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): They
5:26Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): have developed an incredible 55 drugs with 27 already in the clinic and one receiving FDA approval. Companies like Cogent, Dianthus, Viridian, Aruca, Spire, and of course App. Apogee, which was recently acquired by Abvi for close to $11 billion.
5:43Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
5:43Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): in doing so, they have also accomplished something almost singular as investors, literally building their own opportunity set, with close to 95% of their portfolio today now invested in Fairmount founded companies.
5:55Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Now,
5:55Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): whether you're a biotech investor or not, there are so many valuable lessons in Peter and Tomasha's journey.
6:01Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
6:01Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I'm just so proud of these guys. for all they've already accomplished for the benefit of humanity and feel privileged to be aligned with them in business and in life. And perhaps what is most abundantly clear after spending the day with them recently is that they really are only just getting started. With that, please enjoy our conversation with biotech's new builders Peter Harwin and Tomash Kisilak of Fairmount.
6:26Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Paul
6:26Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and I have just been prepping for this, going back, reading all the letters from start to finish. And it's really, even to us who believed in you from the very beginning, it's mind-boggling what you've achieved and and the way that it's impacting humanity. And before asking about Fairmount, though, I want to ask just the two of you about your friendship. I was talking to Peter earlier today, and in The Four Loves, C.S. Lewis devotes. a whole chapter to friendship. And he talks about it as when two people are looking out at the world or looking out at a sector like biotech, or and they say, wait a second, you see what I see. I thought I was the only one who thought that way. And that that's really how friendship is nurtured, these common bonds, values, interests that ultimately tether. us together. I'd love to start there. Just tell us how you guys met and what you both kind of saw and agreed on that first brought you guys together like this.
7:23Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): That brings us back to this wonderful medical conference of the American Society of Nephrology, sometimes abbreviated Kidney Week, back in 2011, in I think it was November in Philadelphia. It was rather cold. It was not my favorite climate, not my favorite time of year. The industry was very different when we started. It was much smaller. There has certainly been a palpable deepening, both in terms of the number of firms that invest in the ecosystem and their respective size, not just in assets under management, but also in the number of people that are involved in making this industry function as well as it does today. But when we started, there were a dozen, two dozen firms, and we all sort of knew each other.
8:15Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): At least
8:15Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): recognized everybody.
8:16Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah.
8:17Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): It was in many ways inevitable that we would run into each other. And so we did at one of these conferences. And we we got to talk and realized. that we're at roughly the same stage of career, and there is probably something we will learn from each other along the way. And that was the beginning.
8:37Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Do you remember some of the early ideas that you discussed or the things that you felt, wait a second, this guy Peter, or wait a second, this guy Tomash, they kind of see things a little differently than the industry.
8:49Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): So back then. there was more of a trading mentality amongst at least our peers. So if you were socializing with different people and talking to different funds, you know, you would talk about the different trades on long and short. So if you gravitated to business building and a fascination with business building and shunning shorts and not understanding why that was such a focus and why people like talking about that, it stuck out. So that was definitely a big part of I'm
9:25Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): laughing because if you were gonna turn the mics on us and ask us what connected you, and I've thought about that, but of course nobody wants to interview us. It's that exact thing. It's when you start talking about a certain duration or ambitions that are somewhat unorthodox based on their time horizon. I'm picturing you guys at this kidney week talking not about what the readout is going to be and which stock is going to pop. It could be which kidney therapy is going to work the best 10 years from now. Or oftentimes an investor will have once they have experience, they boil down
10:01Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a
10:01Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): thesis to a couple
10:02Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): of
10:02Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): points. Early on, it was about around the same time, 09, when we started working together, the types
10:07Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): of
10:07Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): things we would look for seemed completely different than any of the other peers, in our case, in investing endowment land. And it made us stick out like a sore thong in a way. But then gradually you find those people who think the way you do.
10:22Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
10:22Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): don't know that we immediately saw what we were going to become. and how well we will work together. There was a basic kinship immediately, and we kept meeting at regular intervals in subsequent years. And as we were discussing not just the ideas that we were doing work on, but also how we were approaching it, as we were building our own individual philosophies and shaping them, there was a moment where you realize when I'm having these conversations with others in the industry, it is all about the next trait and how do I put together the next trait. And if I ever brought up this notion, which is certainly much more common in other industries, that there is such a thing as a buy and hold, and that's going to be somehow lucrative in biotech, I would get laughed out of the room.
11:15Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Let alone a build-in hold.
11:16Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): There's a very good reason why I would be laughed out of the room, right? Because if you look at the success rates in the industry in drug development overall, vast majority of drugs that are put in the clinic will fail. It's the nature of the trial and error exercise that is the human biology. And there is no alternative way to handle that. You just have to try. The success rates are in the teens, probably somewhere in the 14 to 17%, depending on what underlying data you look at. So naturally, if you then look at a biotech business that's pursuing a development of a single drug, you should, in fact, expect it to fail. But we had this thesis, and that was actual. actually the thesis that drew us together and ended up underpinning the hypothesis that became Fairmount, and it was a hypothesis at the time. And it was that there exists a point on the timeline of a drug development project where you know enough, where the uncertainty that remains has been reduced by enough that you actually
12:27have pretty good confidence that this drug is going to go on to become a revenue-generating monopoly. Not only did we believe that that point in time exists, we believed that it is readily identifiable and that we can develop a strategy that systematically looks for that point in time. And the core of the larger thesis was that if you made an investment after that moment has occurred, you could benefit from watching this previously small biotech business grow into something much more. Ideally, Really, over a period of many years, develop into a large and successful. biotech exercise.
13:16Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Having lived the life of looking at all these different ways of approaching biotech trading and the long and short side, it was extremely helpful to the conviction. It wasn't actually a bad thing. I would call it essential. Living the distraction makes you have conviction
13:36Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): that if you focus, you actually can win. and be ready at the moments Tomash is alluding to that don't come that many times a year when they're really surprising and truly, truly a different brand new standard of care where you actually have a moment. It's shorter than you'd think to put 10% of your fund, funds, you know, really concentrate into a position.
14:03Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
14:03Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): if you live at these funds, which we did,
14:06Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): where
14:07Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): you're doing a lot of different things, and some of them do them really well. You have these moments where that day comes and you don't have conviction. And you might recognize it to some extent. You probably did a little work on it historically. You probably touched it. Maybe you started to do work just before the event. You're not going to be able to concentrate. when you need it most. And doing that work
14:30Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): after the event is hard just from a human standpoint. And that's something we talked a lot about.
14:37Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So take us back to the founding moment. You both are about 30 years old. You're not much older than that.
14:44Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Ready. You
14:44Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): were
14:44Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): born ready, Peter.
14:45Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Kidding, kidding.
14:46Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): But you're at some great shops. You're presumably learning a lot. It feels a little early starting an investment firm at 30, at least optically. And then you start with a couple million dollars. It's not like the external world saying, yeah, these are the two guys, they're ready. Let's go. But what was the impulse there? What was your why? I'm sure it might have varied for each of you.
15:08Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We
15:08Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): were talking about this earlier briefly. I knew I wanted to give this a try. some version of this, the strategy that Tomas and I had aligned on or were aligning on over years. I also was just worried that risk aversion was gonna grow at some nonlinear rate. Really, I actually feared this that I was gonna wake up one day and not try. Just
15:35Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): feel like you missed
15:36Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it. And then just
15:36Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): yeah, for whatever reason I would just not be willing to do it. And I was terrified. This I remember actually more than most things that feeling of if I don't do this, what if next month I feel like I just can't, and I'm gonna just work for someone forever.
15:52Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): What
15:52Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): was the reason? I mean, in terms of was it starting something? Was it that you were tired of going to conferences and
15:57Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): I was enthusiastic to build something that Tomash and I had been talking about for years? It was more. the this is what I want to do. I don't want to think about anything else that happens at these firms that I actually think are counterproductive. And then there's someone that I view as the perfect partner will not find anyone close to there
16:19Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): was
16:20Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): not a oh, there's another person who really likes talking about this, but they're not quite Tomash.
16:25Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It
16:26Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): was, yeah. this is like a once in a lifetime chance. I hope he also wants to do this with me. It was those two things partner and running at a time. Gotta try. I want to try.
16:38Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
16:38Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): hypothesis was that this will in fact produce superior returns. And that sure it will take us a little while to get up and running. We're proving a concept. we're proving a hypothesis, but we can do it. And once we do it, we will have a thriving business, a simple premise. For me, there's always a underlying drive for authenticity. It's one of those points in time when you sort of look at the mirror and you ask, what is it that makes me effective Like how am I going to be the best version of myself? For better or worse, my personality drives me towards a level of creative engagement for which I benefit from a degree of creative freedom. And I know that when I have that freedom, I can focus my energies in a self-directed way. And that motivates me. There is a underlying current of hold my beer moments that drive me as a person. So this was a great challenge and a great opportunity that turned into a great work. And there is nothing more satisfying in life that I can envision.
17:57Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Just
17:57Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): to add a little bit, it was also more than just strategy. You know, we dated quote unquote for a while before. we decided to give it a go. And beyond strategy, there was so much alignment in other areas. Like, how do you want to treat other human beings? Do you care about that? Oh, you do? That's something we want to actually do. We want to relate to people and the outside world in such a similar way. That was really fun, right? To talk about along the way and realize do you want a shiny website or do you want anonymity? Oh, okay. You don't want quotes all over your website. You want to just do the work and build things and have people just see the product. If you're not aligned,
18:41Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I'd never go on a podcast, which because I looked it up recently, I told Peter I'd gone back through our entire group chat, group text chat, and then also just into individually. We launched Joys of Compound in what was initially R investing fall of 2023. I think it was like September, probably when we released our first episode. And it was late October when I first texted Peter only because I knew you weren't gonna go for it. I texted Peter only, hey, you gotta come tell your story. And at that time, I think part of it is the evolution that we'll get to in this conversation was how. happening and it was really speeding up. And I was just so energized by what I was seeing. It took a full three years to get you to this point. But let's talk a little bit about the original vision. So today's vision is to build great businesses that make great drugs. And that wasn't the original plan, at least articulated. There was always that interest in tinkering with drug development and company formation. But in your first letter, you described Fairmount as an investment manager dedicated to investing and promising new therapies pursued by publicly listed biotech and life sciences companies. One of the things that we were touching on earlier, the through line that has been consistent from the very beginning was in that same initial letter in the middle of 2017, you talked about ambitions of
20:00building, quote, a self-sustaining portfolio. of companies that resembled a distributed pharma company. We're going to come back to the evolution. We're going to come back to a lot focusing on what you're doing today and going forward. But just say a little bit about that initial push into the market, into the industry. What were some of the elements that led you to start in one place when you knew that if you were gonna have it your way, you were gonna be ending up somewhere quite different?
20:31Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): A little overview of a few structural comments on biotech first, so you the contrast comes through a bit more effectively. From a structural point of view, the industry really isn't that unusual or that complicated. You have a few investment vehicles, pools of capital that focus on public investing. You have a handful of vehicles that focus on new company and venture formation. And a handful of vehicles that try to straddle the two and look for late stage privates and try to help them enter the public markets. And we loosely refer to those as crossover funds. The strategies that the public markets guys embrace the most generally focus around some form of momentum investing. There is some series of bets on conical trials, and if those conical trials go well, the stocks appreciate. If they don't go well, you know, they lose money and you hope to win more often than you lose on a position size adjusted basis. The framework that we try to build identify the point in time when the company is about to transition from being this early stage pre-commercial enterprise that's just burning cash and becoming, you know, having a clear line of sight on a revenue generating monopoly just doesn't really fit into
21:51much of this framework. When we try to explain it, the closest analogies that ended up being effective in our minds is okay, let's think of us
22:00Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): as
22:00Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): a holding company, where each of our holdings is intended to be an independent and a successful business. And we can talk about what it means to build a successful biotech business and how we define it and how we think about it. If you start doing it this way, you think through how the companies, how the holdings are different from one another, you start realizing that more and more you look like a pharma company instead of department, departments, you have individual companies. And if you need a new drug to add to your pipeline, a pharma company might go buy the business and we do the same thing. We invest in, you know, the public enlisted equity, buy the public listed equity of that business. If the department in pharma is not performing, you might sell it. And we do the same thing. We would sell a non-performing. holding and conceptually approach it as a large, unified, business-built exercise. So the holding company parallel became more effective. And the notion of a distributed pharma company just means you have entities where each of them are self-sufficient, self-contained. Self-contain, You can add them, you can remove them, but they function as you're looking for an appreciation of the value of that unified whole.
23:18Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): We first met in January 2019. I'm not sure how it's been since I've told this story, but I was focused on biotech. My first biological child, Theo, was born in 2016 with a ton of challenges. And I spent a lot of time in hospitals the first few years. And we, as I was sort of getting my wits back about me, say by 2018, we basically observed we had no investments in biotechnology across our entire endowment at the time. And I was just getting more and more interested in what was happening with everything in the industry from the drug side, but also beyond that.
23:51Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
23:51Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I asked if I could just kind of canvas the entire industry, which is a little bit unique for us because we were siloed by asset class, et cetera. But that process led me to meet with anybody. who would take a meeting with me from venture through public markets and every stage. And we were spending some time with Peter and Raj at RA Capital. And Andrew Carrion, one of our former colleagues who now runs his own investment firm and is just a total rock Rockstar star, was working with me on this project. So we're going all over the place, but spending a lot of time in Boston. And before one of the meetings, I'm just totally drawn into this one of these atlas maps that's up on the wall and just mesmerized by the level of detail. And for those out there, basically, RA Capital is known for the way in which that they map out, whether it's a disease area or a certain theme or of any kind, with the just excruciating detail and everything going on. Fast forward, we're meeting with Peter Rock. Raj, others, and I ask about the Atlas maps. How do these things come about?
24:55Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We
24:55Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): had this guy, Tomash, who used to be here, and I think we locked him in a closet for a week and came out with the first Atlas map.
25:02Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
25:02Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I'm like, oh, Tomash, okay, well, is his last name? You know, he's I think he's out there somewhere. I think he might actually be trying to raise a Of fund or something. That's interesting. Let me write that one down.
25:12Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
25:12Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Andrew and I go back to South Bend and track you. down via LinkedIn. And to be honest, I don't know if I ever told you this, but the initial call was probably more RA-centric. It was like, well, what could we learn about this firm? You know, it's obviously a great investment firm and established. But we all, Paul and I and Andrew, you know, we always had an interest in finding the emerging talent, the next Baker brothers, for example, whatever, but had no confidence in this space. And I remember our very first conference call was. with you, you know, it was obviously pre-COVID. And so it was really just audio.
25:42Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): You got that confidence.
25:44Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): We got 10 minutes to this. They were like, we knew you were young too. And it's like, these guys are just like, there's like a humble irreverence about you, you know, where it was so crystal clear that you had a different framework for how things should look and how investing should occur.
26:01Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It
26:01Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): was exactly what I think. you know, we needed to hear. Fast forward the medical conferences, you guys were great in hosting us at Ash that year, the American Society of Hematology in Orlando. And we're having dinner. Again, this is really 2019 and you're managing this kind of mainly public fund that hedges a little bit, et cetera. We're sitting over dinner and I've just gone to this day of this medical conferences and I didn't understand three words the entire day. But it was at one point, one of us asked you, like, So what do you really want to do? I just remember both of you just kind of sheepishly like, Well, we really want to build drug companies. My reaction was, Well, yeah, let's do that. That sounds really great. But you didn't do that initially. I mean, you started to experiment, et cetera. But same more
26:44Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): by the
26:44Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): way, we found the old investment memo. I think you withheld that from there because I'm not sure we would have done the investment. end up in there.
26:51Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Say more though about why that was maybe not even a possibility to start a firm day one and do what you all are now doing.
26:59Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): That's
26:59Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): easy. So in fairness, when Vitra and I were first thinking through the concept of the firm, we have as part of the wider exploration spent a few moments talking about well, should we be starting an investment vehicle or should we be starting an operating business? Because that is something that could also be a way to build. And we very quickly dismissed that idea because we were exactly 30 years old and we have never operated a business.
27:32Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We
27:33Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): also didn't think anyone would let us do that. Seriously.
27:36Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Maybe I'm fast forwarding here too much. but I'm sure we can take a little tangent.
27:41Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
27:41Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): we started Fairmount October twenty sixteen and we started it again as a public investment vehicle testing a very particular hypothesis. But the underlying entrepreneurial urge is very hard to suppress. So within six months, the two of us try tried to license a drug from a Japanese company called NS Pharma. It was a Jack 2 inhibitor for myelfibrosis. It's actually a really good idea. It was a great ended up being a wave of these other variants of Ruxolitinum from Insight, including companies like Sierra. Many years later, too bad no one would give us one. But we engaged in this, you know, licensing process. Again, two guys, 30 years old, no operational experience whatsoever. I think we had some single digit million under management at that point. And we did all the diligence, had all of the engagements, you know, ended up going to a lunch with a few people that flew from Japan. And it was painfully obvious to us that everyone in the room recognized that we had no operational experience whatsoever.
28:57Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): We were in a shared office space and like an off brand we work in
29:00Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Philadelphia in a shared office, not just two offices. So we didn't want to bring them there. So instead we went to the cheapest steakhouse that we could find in Center Central City, Philadelphia. It was now that we're proud of it. How did this not happen? Yeah, I wonder. We concluded pretty promptly thereafter that no one should license us a drug. It's a bad decision to license the two of us a drug. We needed to approach this in some very different way. We also didn't want to wait. So what if the fund wasn't successful? What if we had to go apply for a job at one of these other funds and we never got a chance? to try? So we were gonna try. We were not going to just sit there idle. I remember talking about this.
29:46Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Let's take another tangent, this time going way back. And
29:50Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): we
29:50Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): want to get into a bit of your formation.
29:53Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
29:53Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I'll set a little bit of the context, thinking we keep going back to our old jobs. And we like when Rick would come in in 2017, twenty seventeen, 2018, twenty eighteen, 2019. twenty nineteen with his biotech project, we all thought he was totally nuts. And then when he wanted to put all the eggs into the Fairmount basket, I'll withhold our reaction then. Very happy he did that. Conventional wisdom as we managed the public investing program at an endowment at Notre Dame was that generalists cannot touch biotech. Like you had to have grown up, you had to have become a PhD scientist or spent your entire life in it. And what we noticed was it became a very inefficient area in a good way for investing. It wasn't a lot of competition. You guys outlined part of that. Neither of you guys are PhD scientists. Tell us about the formation of how you got here.
30:43Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We
30:43Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): talked about Slovakia. We can talk about Amherst, Emery, any of the points along the way. I know we've talked a bit about your early career. but let's go prior to that because then we can jump forward into like biotech 101, because you guys had to learn biotech 101 yourselves somehow in that formation period.
30:59Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): I am going to try to keep this not too long, and you can signal if if it is getting too long. I was born in the former Czechoslovakia Yeah, while Soviet Union still existed. We were very much behind the iron card. Curtain. I was raised by my founder to leave and look for a better wife because he was convinced that was the only way for me to have a better wife. And that led me to regularly apply to schools, boarding schools abroad. And that was natural to me because that's you know something that my parents. recommended I do. And I applied to a few and went to the one that gave me a full scholarship because that was the only way I could actually have left. My family certainly didn't have the means to support me. I ended up at Red Cross Nordic United World College, which is one of the UWC schools. This one was based in Norway. And there was 200 kids from eighty-six countries stuck in the middle of the fjord with the nearest settlement of a grand total of 3,000 people, about a two-hour hike over the mountain
32:19away. You really get to know the 200 kids that you go to the program with. And there are so many moments and anecdotes, but my second year roommate was from Israel and he regularly received a visitor from Palestine and they would yell at each other in a language I do not understand. And the world just felt smaller all of a sudden, particularly to someone from middle of nowhere, Eastern Europe. You start seeing the patterns in people, you start seeing the way different cultures interact. It all sort of channels through into this little community and makes you feel like you kind of get it. You know, whether you actually do or not. That's a separate issue. The institution has a pretty queer clear mission. They are they're trying to generate the next generation of leaders. And many of the graduates go into,
33:19you know, politics, public service, NGOs, and the like. Maybe more importantly for me, majority of the graduates end up attending a school in the United States thereafter. And that's what I did. Again, And I applied to a few schools and I went to the one that gave me a full scholarship. That ended up being Amherst College. And I arrived there thinking I'm going to be an economics professor, because both of my parents were economics professors. And I will go into some facet of public administration, maybe a central bank or some such thing. Until my academic advisor insisted that I take a class that wasn't math or economics. which I just couldn't understand at the time, but I did so because I was required to do so. I was peripherally interested in behavioral economics, so I took an intro to neuroscience class, and I just fell in love with the discipline. The brain is an amazing construct at every step, the basic biology, the cellular mechanics, the overall system, the whole theory of consciousness, there is a lifetime or lifetimes of study that they can perform. And from that moment on, I thought I was going to be an academic scientist. Until
34:38as I was nearing graduation and increasingly realizing that the early stages of academic science involve involved moving very small volumes of liquid from container A to container B all day long. And I just did not have the personality for that. Naturally, I wanted to have some way to merge some of my interests in economics and science and networked and ended up by chance alone one at RA Ari Capital and where learn an majority of the actual theory of the business of this industry from that point on.
35:20Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Peter, what did Tomash miss about Tomash?
35:23Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): I think Tomas captured Tomash pretty well. What Tomash missed about Tomas is that he's not supposed to do his bio before mine because it's impossible Possible to follow.
35:35Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well
35:35Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): let's go right there. Tell us about young Peter.
35:38Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
35:38Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): actually keep mine pretty brief, but I had exposure to healthcare, right? So my dad was an oncologist, so and he really loved it. So talked about it a lot, got a lot of exposure that way. And then my mom was terminally ill with her two positive breast cancer. The 10 10-year year journey, six years terminal during a formidable time in my life. That's not why I went into biotech, but it'll have an effect on you. And one of the biggest things from that is breast cancer used to be a death sentence. It is still obviously not something you want, but with the advent of her septin initially, and now there's a bunch of drugs for the disease, once it was approved in the adjuvant setting, it actually took a patient that was diagnosed with early stage HER2 positive breast cancer. from a pretty likely chance of relapse to you're probably going to be cured. And my mom barely missed that. And that sucks. Again, not a reason for why I'm a biotech investor, but it definitely had an impact having exposure to a lot of oncology as I was growing up. And I gravitated to how do I combine healthcare and finance? I had an interest in finance, majored in finance, was pre-med for a very brief moment, but wanted to combine the two.
36:58It didn't know how. I had a first internship at J. It was not for me. Content was interesting, but didn't really like the job. And then my second and last internship during undergrad, I just got incredibly lucky and landed at Box. Boxer Capital. And the moment I was there, immediately I knew I didn't know if this was going to be it, but it was so incredibly exciting. It was also the start of the business. They were really early on in the business. And yeah, I can go into kind of why that was really my entry into this industry. A ton of luck and chance and just went with it.
37:39Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Paul's already mentioned it, but how should one make sense of neither of you having an MD or a PhD? What is it that is necessary, assuming that you don't have that kind of technical education? Because when you pull up any biotech fund website, there's going to be 20 PhDs and MDs. It does stand out, but it hasn't slowed you down. And I know, of course, across the team today, there's plenty of that. Early on, did it feel like a disadvantage? Did you feel like you were coming up the curve in a different way?
38:13Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): When we started, there were a variety of different phenotypes that were PMs at funds. It wasn't were the two guys, you know, without the advanced degrees. It was actually pretty mixed. The other thing is I I'd challenged challenge anyone to go toe-to-toe with Tomash with an advanced degree. I never
38:31Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): got his PhD, but we're gonna give him an honorary one at some point.
38:33Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Yeah, yeah, yeah. This concept of an autodidact is something that people really struggle with. It's doubly interesting in this industry because there actually isn't a structured instruction anywhere in academia that teaches drug development. That's not how you were in drug development you were. weren't drug development on the job. You do it typically in a pharma or a biotic company over a period of time. What does exist are programs that teach you the basic biology or medicine or related disciplines. And it turns out that majority of those programs utilize textbooks. that you can procure yourself. And they are taught by lectures that you can stream. And if you just put in the time, the basic building blocks of knowledge can be had, and you can pretty readily catch up to people that did, in fact, have that structured instructor somewhere in their in background.
39:39And then you still need to learn how to develop the drug. And that is an on-the-job learning experience.
39:47Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
39:48Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I've told Rick he should finally get to those videos so he knows what he's talking about. But in lieu of that, can you give us the Cliffs Notes version? Like what is biotech 101? One From discovery to different clinical phases to approval, or you can think about the different models. molecules, different ways that you go after solving getting to cure breast cancer earlier, or any number of indications or disease states out there. Just what's the couple minute version of what is biotechnology?
40:17Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): You can separate this into: hey, here is how the industry came to be, like here is a little bit of history, and then we can talk about how the industry. functions and operates today, which is a end result of a few decades of evolution. You know, when people say biotechnology, they typically go back to founding of Genentech back in, I think it was 1976.
40:42Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Exactly 50 years ago.
40:43Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Interesting. Yes, it is
40:44Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): exactly Exactly,
40:45Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): 50 years ago. One day I will be good at math. And you know, why was Genantech Genentech special? special? Well, there were obviously companies that made medicines for centuries prior to that, right? They either made chemicals that had some pharmaceutical properties or they extracted more complex molecules from plants or animals and used those as treatments. What Genantech Genantec did was for the first time create a method to at scale produce large amounts of a protein. And this protein was insulin. It was actually the first recumbent insulin molecule they sold to LI Lilly, and LI Lilly still markets this product to this day. Since then, the other methods for other more complex biologic molecules have been produced with antibodies product. probably the most important piece. You know, there were other seasonal molecules like erythropoietin alpha, which was epogen, that made Amgen into what Amgen is today. There were monoclonal antibodies comprising increasingly more prominent class of therapies out there. Even though the industry, you can trace the founding to whatever the 70s, it really didn't experience a meaningful boom
42:05until the nineties, where it really grew along the first tech bubble. And majority of the large biotech companies today actually trace their origins to that period of time, whether it's Amgen or Regeneron or Vertex or Gilead, all of these guys started in that window, including a few companies. that are often cited as case studies but have since been acquired, like Millennium Pharmaceuticals. So the industry is typically bucketed with other high-tech industries, tends to correlate with them as well, and people's interest sort of waxes and wanes in in similar ways. And it persisted up until 2002. And in 2002, the tech bubble burst and the interest in biotechnology declined in proportion as well. The period of time from 2002 until you know 2012 or so, the old guard in biotech refers to this as the nuclear winter because it was nearly impossible to find capital to fund companies. Very few companies were created, even fewer companies made it to the public publico listed entities and their business. models were very different than what they are today. This began to change 2011, 2012, 2013. Fortunately, you know, roughly around the times we were
43:25really starting our careers. What happened? Well, there were a number of monetary changes economy-wide that contributed to this, but there was also a major structural change. And that major structural change was the creation of the crossover fund. Why? Well, you had the public investment funds that invested in public companies, and the private companies were not in their investment universe, so they didn't even know what companies were there. You had the venture guys that were really good at spinning out new technologies from academia and reducing them to practice, but they had this major hurdle of then trying to list their companies in the public markets to access the capital they needed to progress. And there was no readily available bridge. QN the crossover funds that realized that they could participate in the last private financing for a private biotech company. They could indicate support to uh fund a portion of the IPO of this company that made the venture guys very happy because it increased the likelihood that their companies will in fact go public and therefore they will have their exit. It made the bankers very happy because it took the risk away from taking a company public and
44:44it created a mechanism by which the public guys now had a reason to know what's going on in the private markets. What do you think happened? Well, there was a dramatic expansion in the number of public listed biotech companies. You know, when we started doing this 2012, 2013, they were fewer than 200. By the peak year of 2021, there were over a thousand. Wow. Were over a thousand US listed public biotech companies. That's
45:11Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you know what's amazing about that too, is is at the same time, public markets in all developed economies and particularly United States, public markets were generally shrinking. So the percentage of companies that were listed and were biotech must have been accelerating at a pace.
45:33Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Crossover funds that led to this. S As everything came to a bit of a screeching halt. in 2021, there was actually nothing super special about 2021. It was sort of a very classic Hyman Minsky end of a business cycle moment. As you increase the amount of funding that flows into a given sector, and the rate of formation of new companies is roughly the same. Well, the first thing that happened is that the crossover funds that used to invest into late stage private companies now had to invest in companies that were earlier and earlier and earlier in their development lifecycle. And when you exhausted the early companies as well, your only other option is to move further down the quality curve. And after 90 or so, I think we're 80 and 89 IPOs in 2021, and after a few hundred new public biotech companies, vast majority of the listed public biotech companies were not in the clinic. They were very early in the process and often didn't have the requisite data and evidence to really foundationally prove that they have a product or are likely to have. a product.
46:51Yeah. Proximity to clinic and risk. The two things that people really want in the public markets. So a few of them fail and a few more of them fail. Then some of them don't get funded. Then a few of the transactions don't go well. The same public investors that previously believed that there is money to be made investing in these new IPOs and the new public companies now no longer believe that. And guess what happens? The available pool of capital decreases, the valuations decrease, and that entire reduction in size of the overall ecosystem really continued through majority of 2022. And it was in fact not until earlier in 2026 that we truly recovered to where we were in 2021. In fact, if you look at the five year returns of XPI or A BB and some of the in-the-season ETFs that people like to point to, the annualized returns close to zero. Like in theory, no one should have made money in the last five years. In fairness, there was the twenty 2025 twenty five tariff tantrum that cost a seven seventh sell of and that we have largely recovered from and recovered from very quickly. So if you look at just the last 12 months, biotech looks like a story of success because it recovered well from
48:11April 2025. But if you look further back in time, you will see this is the recovery that's just getting to what I think the two of us would consider a well-functioning industry.
48:23Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): All
48:23Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): right, take us to that second bucket of content. context setting around the industry. Like, how does an idea become a drug? Just kind of walk through, soup the nuts.
48:35Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): This industry and the medical field in general is characterized by a very large amount of information asymmetry. And it is also the field that gave rise to the concept of a snake oil salesman. It is therefore in everyone's interest for there to be a central authority that has the public's trust that evaluates the claims that a pharmaceutical business may make as they're Their marketing their therapies. And in the United States, that is the FDA. The FDA was founded in the 30s, but it didn't really have a forceful enough mandate until 1962. In 1962, that was the first time that a new medicine had to show conclusive evidence of safety and efficacy before it was permitted on the market. And that requirement then shaped, you know, the rest of what this industry is and how we approach it, chiefly through the mandate of making sure that people are safe. First and foremost, as a simplification, there are two points in time that the FDA really cares about.
49:55It's when you're selling something to people, you gotta prove that it is safe and effective, and then when you're taking something into clinical trials for the first time. And a lot of it is, you know, less so about prohibiting an activity and more so about making sure that you can provide informed consent. It's making sure that the healthy volunteer that's signing up for the first clinical trial of never before tested drug has some way to anticipate what might occur and that the company. is given the burden to at least frame a safety of a drug before it is first given to a human. Everything we do, the first rule here is the good old do no harm as much as possible. So when someone has an idea and they want to reduce it to practice, you know, they So might begin by identifying a disease that sometimes we refer to that as indication. They try to understand the biology, they formulate a hypothesis of how this biology might be altered, and we can talk about what that means and how that is done. And then they develop some tools, typically some chemical matters, some compounds or biologic molecules that can mediate some pharmacology that then hopefully
51:14helps the disease.
51:16Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A
51:16Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): lot of it starts with brute force. You generate thousands and thousands and thousands of molecules and you test them in a dish and you try to see what they do. And then you narrow down the thousands and thousands of molecules to some smaller number at every step until you're left with ideally one. And then you take this one molecule forward into what's called preclinical development, which again is relatively formulaic and relatively well developed as an arc of a regulatory science overseen by the FDA. You have to run a series of toxicology studies that evaluate the effect of that molecule on animals so that you have some sense whether this molecule at some dose is. safe enough to be then tested in humans. And when you have checked all of those boxes and you manufactured a clinical supply of appropriate quality, you go to the FDA, you give them all of the data, the FDA will look at it and they will either ask for some follow-up questions, or they'll say, You're good to go, you can start your clinical trial. When you start a clinical trial. you typically start it in healthy volunteers. In healthy volunteers, the job is to give them some amount of the drug and see what happens. Just make sure
52:35it's safe. And you give them dose A. And if it is safe, then maybe you increase the dose and you keep increasing the dose until either you get to see the pharmacology that you're looking for, or it is no longer safe to increase the dose. further. At that point, these typically are described as the phase one studies. At that point, you advance to the next phase of clinical development. You take this drug into patients, you typically test a few doses in some dosing regimen. Maybe the drug is given daily, maybe the drug is given more frequently, and there is typically a placebo arm. The participants in the study are typically masked. They don't know whether they're receiving a drug or what dose of the drug they're receiving or whether they're receiving placebo. And at the end of some period of time, the activity or the experience of these groups is compared using some sort of an endpoint. There is some metric that you're looking to test and modify. Ideally, in this fashion. phase of development, you find a dose and a dosing schedule for a drug that looks like it's accomplishes the pharmacological activity you're looking for, the patient's benefit, you can readily demonstrate it, and it is safe enough that it makes sense to continue to
53:54develop the drug further. You then initiate what's called the registrational clinical trial, sometimes referred to as the phase three study. And that's intended to serve as the data that you will then take to the FDA and prove you have generated the necessary evidence of safety and efficacy such that your drug can now be permitted on the market. And you run that trial. And again, it's a very similar logic. There is typically multiple groups. Some people receive the drug, some people receive uh placebo. They generally don't know whether they're receiving drug or placebo. They take it for some period of time. And at the end of this period of time, there is some sort of a measure referred to as endpoint that is used to evaluate whether the drug was active relative to placebo or not. You then take it to the FDA, you submit what's called a new. drug application or a biologic licensing application, depending on if it's a small molecule or a biologic molecule. The FDA looks at the totality of the evidence and determines that the risk benefit of this therapy makes sense for the patients that will take this therapy and also develops a
55:13document that the the package insert or the drugs label that guides the physician how they should prescribe this medicine and what they should expect from this medicine so that it can be administered safely. If all of those boxes are checked, you're then permitted to commercialize your product as a market to drug.
55:33Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So everything that Tomas Tomash just said is happening before, in most cases, before a company. has any revenues. And I think this is really kind of one of the most interesting elements of like what makes a biotech company different. So much of the life of the company itself is relates to raising, continuing to raise capital as this process is playing out in advance of much revenue, certainly any like cash flow profitability. And you layer onto that sort of this dimension. of more and more of these companies being publicly listed.
56:06Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
56:07Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): was going to ask you throughout the arc of your careers, do you think you've seen more generalist investors come into the market? And I mean that at the principal GP level, more capital investing directly in companies from generalists, as well as at that kind of allocator level too, because they both obviously need. to work in concert in order to grow the industry.
56:30Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): I think the generalist participation ebbs and flows. They have a relatively high hurdle for entering the sector precisely because, you know, they believe that it requires specific skill sets and knowledge. What we have seen, though, So certainly over the entire arc of our career, there is an increased interest in the allocator community, started, you know, 15 years ago. But that interest manifested itself as an expansion of the specialist biotech investor universe. There were simply more funds that were formed, and these funds became larger and larger than they used to be in the past. This wasn't a very effective expansion of the ecosystem of
57:14Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the world.
57:14Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): overall. It sustains more public companies, it sustains more drugs in development, and it sustains that development actually pretty completely. Like we can do things in 2026, fund projects and programs and clinical trials in 2026 that we would never be able to fund in 2012, 2013, 2014. There just wasn't the requisite depth in the capital markets to be able to do this. But we're able to do this now. So there is a very palpable expansion and maturation of the overall ecosystem. And it is largely a function of expanding capital inflows. Very likely accounts for why after what was an absolutely disastrous 2021 and 2022 for the sector, the sector did not enter some sort. of a nutter nuclear winter. It actually continued to function. Like companies got funded and they develop drugs. The number of drugs approved on an annual basis is stable or slightly increasing over the last five years. It's actually all functioning.
58:19Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): There's generalist investor in our ecosystem, generalist biotech
58:23Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): investors.
58:24Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): That definitely ebbs and flows. You feel it you read about it in research reports,
58:28Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): whether generalists are interested in the sector, we need more MA to get generalists into the sector. They don't entirely go away if they're not writing $100 million checks in the financing. It's noticeable. We're looking at that across financing. So is anyone else, whether generalists are involved or not. But on the LP side, I mean it's night and day from when we started. Like it used to be, I feel like it would be more often than not, you would hear no allocation or very limited allocation of biotech, whereas now it's pretty standard. It's not everybody, but it feels like it's very standard to have a few managers.
59:07Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
59:07Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): also read recently that commercializing a drug requires more people, time and capital than building a skyscraper. on average. But I mean, you know, when people talk about that process that you described, Tomash, roughly eight to ten years on average could be upwards of a billion dollars spent in order to get a drug to commercialization and all the man hours. Is it mainly that sort of regulatory apparatus that's required that we all need that puts such a heavy kind of burden on the activity of the sector, or are there other aspects that just make this so hard and take so long? And of course, we're going to talk about how you guys are doing it in a quite different way and you're moving faster and you're acting more efficiently and all of that. But just in general, any other drivers behind just the duration and the intensity that's needed in order to make a drug?
1:00:02Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): The need to produce data that supports a safety efficacy of a drug, it's not just a regulatory requirement. You know, I'll be the first one to say that the FDA is one of the best functioning organizations out there, and I have nothing but good things to say about what they do. The physicians need to make a decision to prescribe a drug, and the patient needs to make a decision to take a drug. If there are multiple options out there, they need to know whether one option works better than the other, and whether there are some patients and characteristics of the patients that make one drug better suited than another drug to be used in that population. So the need to generate evidence that drives all of these trials, that drives all of these costs. is actually a net benefit for the field overall. It helps knowing who the drug should be given to. And I'd argue it helps the revenues as a result, right? Like you can establish a clearly winning profile and dominate a market and an indication precisely because you can demonstrate that you have the superiority
1:01:11over the other options out there. The conclusion that people often make that less regulation is better, you know, for a number of reasons. This probably isn't the industry where you want to practice that. But even if you had no regulation, you'd still compete on the basis of having enough information to win over physicians to prescribe your drug. The complexity of a drug development project is extremely high because many different groups of humans with non-overlapping skill sets are involved at one point or another at the development process. The pre-clinical team that's running toxicology and developing assays to make sure that you can measure the potency of a drug, the manufacturing team that is making sure that you know your bioreactors and your synthesis pathways are all clearly laid out. They're all non-overlapping skill set. Then you take the drug into the clinic, and then you have a group of physicians that needs to design the appropriate experiment. Again, a non-overlapping set of humans. And then you have this sprawling clinical trial operation. You can have hundreds of clinical sites involved in a clinical trial across the entire planet. Someone has to set the contracts, interface with the humans, translate the
1:02:31materials to the local language, make sure that people's questions are answered if they have any, and actually take care of the patients, get all the data in into some centralized system, analyze it, and then make sense out of it. These are all non-overlapping skill sets. It's a giant, giant project to develop a drug. Oh, and by the way, once you get your drug approved, someone needs to go out there and tell the physicians that it exists. It turns out that they don't actually just like spontaneously read up on all of the new molecules out there. So a sales rep needs to show up in their office and say, Hey doc, I got this new thing. Would you like to know more about it? So there is an entire element of education. that needs to take place anytime a new drug launches. It is extremely, extremely complex.
1:03:21Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): This is the perfect segue. Why the heck, even just one year into building Fairmount, did you say we want to experiment and try building a company? Let alone the I think 17 companies from scratch, 15 public companies you've built now. It's been a long road the last eight or nine years. But given what you just said, all that complexity was there.
1:03:43Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Why
1:03:44Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): did you do that? Was it a particular situation where you thought there was a unique opportunity, or were you again frustrated with
1:03:50Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
1:03:50Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): couldn't find enough stocks to invest in, so you needed to create one yourself?
1:03:54Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): I think this is best understood as the analytical problem from the other direction. You wear this investor hat, you run around conferences, you look at all of these posts. posters and you read about all of these clinical trials, and you find all these interesting drugs and then you make sense out of them. What do you think is the likelihood that at some point you will come to a conclusion that wait, someone could be doing this thing differently? Is anyone doing that? And in our past lives, we would then troll the entire planet to try to find that one company. you know, that was making this one tweak that would have been the absolutely best way to develop a molecule going forward. And sometimes we found it. And most of the time, we would not. Before we were what we are, we would just stop. It's like, well, no one's doing it. So I guess we're done. You know, let's go look at another project. It's not a logical leap to then take that one additional step. and ask, wait, so can we do it? How could we do it? How could we try to do it? The analytical problem came first. The figuring out how to do it. We obviously understood the basic building blocks and the basic steps that are required. At the other end of this process,
1:05:11you have a revenue-generating revenue generating monopoly. That's a pretty appealing business. That's the other side of the coin. We were also talking about this before we even started Fairmount. This concept of wait, why don't we just make a better version of something? It wasn't something that, you know, happened one year later and hey, let's give this a shot. It was always something that we wanted to do, just weren't sure we could.
1:05:39Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Take us through the first examples. You had done Quellis was the first one, then Diantis, Coge and Viridian, and then some of these are very large public companies now, just not that long ago when they were started as new codes by you guys. What were some of the early mistakes or learnings or successes that you had?
1:05:58Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): First, with the answer to the question earlier, we did try to license something. first. Thankfully, we quickly realized that we should stop. And then we said, Well, we'd never get a chance if we don't try to make something ourselves. So let's do that. We did look at a variety of different technologies, and you know, we had a bunch of different ideas, and it came down to in part one simple question: how do we not have this? blow up? And that got us focused a lot more on let's try to make an antibody to a target where there's an antibody that already exists. And that antibody is likely to become standard of care or is standard of care, but it's got a flaw that we feel we can fix and just try to make. this as much of an engineering problem as we possibly could. How do we reduce the risk as much as humanly possible? And then
1:07:01at the same time have a dramatic impact and clear standard of care if we get it right.
1:07:07Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): What does that mean? Maybe you can use an example, like specifically, why would that opportunity even exist? I'm even thinking like IP. patents. Why can you just take something, an antibody that's working out there, engineer it slightly differently, and then create a company around it?
1:07:23Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): It's useful to remember that when a drug goes into the clinic, its profile is locked. It will not change anymore.
1:07:32Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): You can vary the dose. You're not changing the chemical composition. The drug is the drug.
1:07:37Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
1:07:38Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): trial trials still take years.
1:07:40Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
1:07:40Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): then years down the road, you'll learn that a set of properties of a given drug are not entirely perfect. Then you have the decision that you can absolutely make. Go back, rewind, you know, five, seven, eight, ten 10 years, and make a better molecule and restart the process. Majority of the companies will not do that. They don't engage in that exercise. They will move on to some other project that they have put a higher NPV value on rather than revisit and improve their molecule.
1:08:17Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): And when we would see this in the public markets, even it would be remarkable. Someone trying to beat themselves. It was wow.
1:08:27Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Wow. Those guys are really doing something unique. I mean, Loxo, one of our early investments, passive investments, had a track inhibitor, and they had a second track inhibitor that was developed for the resistance that would come about when you gave patients the first track inhibitor. Generally, even now, you know, a company developed. develops a drug and they go on and hopefully get to sell that drug. And if it's successful, another company will try to iterate on that drug, not themselves.
1:09:02Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
1:09:02Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): mean, we can just use a concrete example. Everything we ever do is because we have seen a recent clinical trial that have on one hand demonstrated that a drug has a pharmacology that just works. Like the biology works. But it has also left something on the table that perhaps wasn't particularly perfect. And everyone looks for this grade next innovation. Sometimes that makes sense. And at other times, you know, things can get much more simple and still produce very appealing product concepts. In the case of Qualas, Qualys, which was our first company, it was observed. observing the phase three results of a drug called Lanadoema for the treatment of hereditary angioedema. Two profiles were tested. A drug was administered every two weeks, or it was administered every four weeks. And the drug that was administered, the group that received the drug every two weeks had great benefit, you know, something that came as close to what would be a functional cure in the disease as one can envision. And the group that received the drug every four weeks also had derived the benefit, but it was less so because they had received the drug less often, they have received less total amount of drug. The one thing that really caught our attention at that point was the safety table, because the safety
1:10:21table showed that a 52% of patients that were in injected with this drug experienced an injection-side reaction. It hurt to administer the drug. We looked at it and we thought, well, that's a very unusually high number. So what happens with other subcutaneously administered antibodies? Do they produce this high a rate of pain? And the answer is no. The typically see a range of 5 to 10%, like we've opted. optimized the delivery of these therapeutics. It is highly unusual
1:10:54Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): for
1:10:54Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): it to hurt quite so much.
1:10:56Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): As
1:10:56Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): we dug deep, we started to see that this is not the most stable antibody. This is not the most well behaved antibody. If you weave it in an unmodified solution, it aggregates. So we have to introduce a variety of excipients and play with the formulation properties so that. you prevent the antibody from clumping up into just one giant aggregate, which you cannot inject. And that was both unusual and it resulted in an introduction of excipients that were uncomfortable. They were actually promoting this sense of pain.
1:11:30Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
1:11:30Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): we thought to ourselves, well, can we fix
1:11:32Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that?
1:11:33Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Okay, even if we fix that, can we do something more? Like how can we make this into a better molecule? And we looked at an old lesson from a company called Alexion. Alexion developed the first therapeutic for another rare disease, peroxis monoctrinal hemoglobinuria, or PNH, and it was a hugely successful, sold billions of dollars. The drug was called Solaris. It was administered IV every two weeks. Years down the road, they launched a follow-on molecule called Ultomeris, fascinating choice of names, that behaved just like Solaris, but was given not every two weeks. It was instead given every eight weeks, less frequently. And this, you know, patients obviously would prefer to sit in a chair in an infusion clinic less often rather than every two weeks.
1:12:26Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
1:12:27Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): we saw that everyone in the industry was aware of this case study. And we asked, okay, how did they accomplish this? How did they manage to take an every two weeks product and turn it into an every eight weeks product? And it turns out they have engineered a portion of the antibody that became Ultomeris, still very much built from Solaris itself. And that engineering improvement. improvement improved the persistence of the antibody in the body. If it lasts longer, you need to give it less frequently. That was the observation. These were the observations that God has started. So we formulated a pitch, and we went to the guys at Perceptive Advisors and we pitched them on this crazy idea. And they said, This is great. Here is $500,000. So the two of us, in our infinite wisdom, in a pizza shop called 24, great pizza, by the way, but unfortunately did not survive COVID. Designed a plan for how to tackle this. We ordered some mice. We signed a contract with a collective contract research organization for some
1:13:40experiments, you know, an immunization that would have resulted in the production of antibodies
1:13:45Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): on
1:13:46Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): this $500,000 budget, not really expecting much to come out of it.
1:13:51Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): A couple other anecdotes. They the election enhancement of persistence in the body, it was four amino acids were changed in this antibody. It was basically barely anything that led to Ultimirus from Soleris. We generated the first antibodies, de novo. So it wasn't the same,
1:14:12Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it
1:14:12Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): wasn't quite as simple. But the engineering that goes into making it persist is actually relatively simple. And at the time we could license rights to make those mutations from this company's N-Core NCOR in the same way. Alexion did, which was part of our pitch for the big $500,000 check from Perceptive.
1:14:33Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): We did not expect much to come out of this, improbably, through, I'm not entirely sure how, on this $500,000 seed, we managed to get an antibody out of that process.
1:14:47Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): That
1:14:47Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): antibody is actually, you know, fast forward to today. it's in the clinic. It's called the Bandibart for the treatment of hereditary androidema. It's in phase three studies pursued by Licrist pharmaceuticals. And if you believe the phase two data, it does exactly what we designed it to do, which is tremendously rewarding looking at it now. It felt very different when you're doing all of this in your spare time on the weekend. on no budget for the first time. Certainly did not foresee the outcome. But it was the most fun we've ever had.
1:15:22Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Yeah, it was a blast. And there was a ton of learning. That sounded more like a straight line. We ordered the mice, we sent them to the CRO, we injected the mice with the immunogen to produce an immune response to collect the initial set of antibodies to filter from. Every single mouse died. I thought it was over.
1:15:40Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It
1:15:40Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): wasn't over. We tried a new immunization schedule and then it went from there. But there was a lot of that along the way. Not so simple. And it was the beginning of this journey of learning how to do this. How can we optimize this? How can we avoid that setback? And again, as Tamash Tomash said, it was just a blast. And it's been a blast since.
1:16:03Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah.
1:16:03Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Speaking of the learnings, I was talking to our mutual friend Andre Perold earlier this week, the legendary Harvard business school professor and co-founder of High Vista, who always has the right questions, as Paul and I have learned, going back to our business school days. But he brought this up as one of the more fascinating case studies of evolution he's ever seen, as well, just how you've evolved in the last, particularly the last seven. eight years. One of the questions that he had was just what you learned early on that was synergistic, that fed back into your main thing at the time. I think it's important to mention that even going to 2019, you don't have any of Fairmount built companies in your portfolio. They're being done by SPVs because the original sort of construction of the fund was typical. It was a cap on, you know, 10%, I think, was the cap on privates, even. And then it was like, if you were going to actually build something, well, that seemed so wild that that would have to be an SPV. We surely couldn't use fund capital for that. At some point, you go from 0% of the portfolio in fair amount companies to 95%, Ninety five percent, which is what I think it is today.
1:17:12Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): From what, 30 thirty million to well over 7 billion. seven now.
1:17:15Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): To me, the for a good chunk of that time though, you're kind of doing both. And what did you learn
1:17:21Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): by
1:17:22Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): going kind of behind the curtain that then maybe fed back into you being even better investors in other people's companies over the coming years? I think most investors are afraid to take that plunge into operating businesses or form helping to form businesses and chairboards and do the sort of the blocking and tackling of company building, it is different. It is quite different. It does require a different set of skills, even changes to maybe team constructs, et cetera. But I'm sure early on, as Dianthus is coming out, and then I think 2020, you've got Cogin and Beridian are both hitting. What are you learning from all of that activity?
1:18:00Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): I think there were stages to our development and each came with its own set of lessons, right? I think there was a period of time from 2017 until 2020 or so that was all about how is it that you get a drug into the clinic? What are the pitfalls? Where do things go awry? Where do you need redundancy? What are the types of setbacks? and how do you protect from them? How do you formulate a philosophy of what it means to develop a drug? That was largely built up the lessons of Quellis and Dianthus, which we founded in 2019, and partially on, you know, Cogent, Viridian, and Xenus, which we founded in 2020. There was a second period of time that started in 2020. In 2020, we founded Viridian. and Cogent, and we took them public in the same year. To this day, Peter chairs the board of Cogent, and I chair the board of Viridian. And then they're very different businesses now. Viridian had their drug approved just a few months ago. When we founded them and when we took them public, they were the very definition of an under under-resourced, resourced, understaffed, public-o-listed public enlisted startup. skeletal crews trying to operate this business and that's perpetually
1:19:19sort of spiraling out of control. And that was when the two of us first learned how to build a business, how to build about a company. What are the job descriptions you need? What does an org chart look like? You know, things that we can do in our sleep now were new to us at that time.
1:19:39Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): What types of people do we hire for
1:19:41Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): all
1:19:41Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): these roles? How do we interact with the board? How do we want to run a board? How do you
1:19:46Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): if we get
1:19:46Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): to set it up?
1:19:47Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): How do you recognize a good chief medical officer? What are the characteristics? What is a good plan? What is a good message? How do you finance a company? It's all of these operational learnings that we just started accumulating at that time. You know, at the end of 2020, we were five companies in, you know, took two of them public at the time. And we had an idea for another company, and we sort of just looked at each other and we said, well, we can't order mice anymore. We just don't have the time. And that was the first realization and the impetus to formalize the support infrastructure around us that gave rise to Paragon, our Holy Own Incubature. That decision provided the necessary leverage to the new company formation strategy. In the absence of it, we wouldn't be able to do the majority of what came after. That came with its own set of lessons, as we were trying to make that organization productive over the many years. The period of COVID 2021, really until maybe two years ago, was still largely dominated about how do you run a public biotech company? When do you need to finance? How much do you need to finance? How do you pitch it? What do
1:21:07you say? So when I read a press release of a company now, oh, I understand the choice of words far better. than I ever did before. When I join a conference call for a data disclosure by another company, I know exactly why that script sounds the way it sounds, and I know how I would change it if things were different. There is a whole set of interfacing with the outside world Role and than creating an inspiring vision that is resilient to the answer. uncertainties that ultimately are part of this industry and just survives, just manages to survive and thrive at the other end.
1:21:47Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Just to categorize it a little bit more broadly, I mean, a big part of it was how do we more effectively make drugs? How do we make drugs ourselves? Operationalize that. And that learning, I think, continues today. It's not stopping. as we generate, we get into more complexity and different adjacencies to the chemical space that we're used to. Then there's how do you build these businesses? How do you effectively build businesses? And then how do we structure our businesses? Fair amounted Paragon to actually tackle those things. And we are still figuring that out.
1:22:22Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): One question here before we shift gears a little bit,
1:22:26Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
1:22:26Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): guys were were public market investors for a long time. And then now you're building public companies. One area you left out in the description was just the investor base. You knew what other, say, hedge funds, crossover funds were looking for. How did you corral the right funds early on in how do you use Was today to be on the cap tables when you go public on a pre-revenue pre revenue company?
1:22:50Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): How
1:22:50Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): has that become because you had that experience something you can do differently than other people?
1:22:56Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): This actually perhaps a simpler than it may initially seem. All we do is build the type of companies that we would want to invest in. And it turns out that as long as we do that, at least a few other people want to invest in them too.
1:23:13Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): We came from public investing. So if we're taking something public immediately and we need to want to buy it because we're leading the rounds, we generally have some sense of what they're gonna like and not like about it and have a sense for how to navigate that. Where we've evolved along the way is who do we want in there? Another area where we're still learning and evolving. It also changes over time. as you kind of learn how different funds act in different times of distress or not just good times, it also just changes over time depending on who's operating those funds and and you have a little bit more history with those funds. Also, you know, there's some funds that want to play, you know, most funds want to play an inning or two. You want some of that for a variety of different reasons, but you also want people that want to play inning one, inning two, inning three and really see the build beyond the company launch. And I think that's still an evolution for us to optimize that better and better as we go.
1:24:14Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah.
1:24:15Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And I think that was Andre's the thrust of his question was actually you only learn this after the In fact. Before you learn it, there's actually a lot of tension, right? Because you're trying to evolve and we'll get to this. I mean in some ways, you were evolving faster than your investor base wanted you to involve. Or then any, you know, most investor bases would want their manager to, wait a second, we hired you to do this thing over here. What are you doing experimenting with this? It's so clear once you got going that you could look back and see the reciprocity prosody of the learnings, how building was helping you be a better investor, and then how investing was actually feeding into. how you were thinking about building a little bit differently. I want to ask you about 2021. You probably don't remember the momentous occasion in Fairmount history of our summer 2021 meeting in Philadelphia. I think you still even had the kind of we work type office. And I think it's also important to note like your early returns were very good. It's not like you were trying to evolve away from something that wasn't working, but you know, I took
1:25:14Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a lot of people.
1:25:15Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): picture our whiteboard. I didn't realize we were going to be talking about it five years later. But one of the things that's on the whiteboard as a main theme is quote, distractions becoming the focus. And this gets to at the time, the things that you were most excited about that were making you most alive and that actually were starting to generate even better returns were coming from a practice. that some of your investors were looking at as more of a distraction. In fact, I think one of the most startling and underappreciated facts about your journey so far is that the entire whatever seven and a half billion or so of AUM you manage today is entirely gains you've generated. In other words, you've had net negative capital contributions because as you've completely crushed it performance performance-wise, wise, many of your LPs have redeemed to either risk manage their position. or to help with their challenge liquidity, which has plagued a lot of the endowments, or maybe just thought you were evolving too much too quickly. But maybe just talk about how you negotiated that evolution because it did require some finesse, it required some patience from you, probably required a little bit of compromising to think about by then you know what you want to be. And I think you deep down kind of knew it from the beginning, but now it was crystal clear. This was what you guys, one of the things you two were put on earth to do.
1:26:34What was really important about making it work, not having to kind of blow the whole thing up and oh, this is so different that we're just going to start another firm or whatever. Talk us through that part of the evolution.
1:26:45Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): We still had uncertainty. We knew what we wanted to do.
1:26:49Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
1:26:49Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): don't
1:26:50Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): think we really
1:26:50Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): tried. trusted ourselves until probably like 2023.
1:26:53Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah.
1:26:54Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): In
1:26:54Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): fairness.
1:26:55Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): 100%. We knew we could do this to some degree. We still had a ton to learn. What was the date? I
1:27:03Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): think
1:27:03Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it was sometime in July.
1:27:04Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): We had just launched a few months prior and put 10% of our entire company in you guys.
1:27:08Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It
1:27:09Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): would have been helpful to know do you didn't have confidence the way what you were doing it? at the Oh,
1:27:11Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): we
1:27:12Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): didn't tell you. The drugs were working. that we had made. We felt like we had learned how to make drugs, learned how to make biologics or at least antibodies. I would actually just to antibodies at that point. We felt pretty comfortable. We were actually decent at that. We could optimize it. We could prevent setbacks. We could ensure we were gonna get a drug that we wanted to get on a timeline that we wanted it. That actually felt pretty good. We had a lot to learn. We would still have setbacks, but we felt pretty comfortable with that. The business building side, though, I would say we were way less comfortable. Could we scale that? How many people did we have to start? 21. Fair amount. Five?
1:27:53Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Maybe seven.
1:27:54Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): You're right. So that's not enough. I don't know. Not
1:27:57Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): gonna build a
1:27:57Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): skyscraper with seven people.
1:27:59Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Yeah. And Paragon, we founded that year. So we had no developers. And then think about the companies that we had just taken public within the fund, Cogent and Viridian. They really probably shouldn't have been public at that time. I mean, Kojin, we took public with nobody in the company. And the company we merged with, there were a group of roughly 10 ten people that had experience that was relevant. and I tried to recruit them to stick it out and see what happens.
1:28:34Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
1:28:34Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): think it's pretty fair to say that we shouldn't have had complete confidence that we could do it.
1:28:39Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): The way we've approached us throughout there is a little bit of Nassim Tallips, Talip's stochastic tinkering. There is a little bit of Jim Collins. Let's try something small, but keep it small until you know that it's working. We just didn't want to blow up. I was like, the first rule of business is don't blow up. You might be on to the next best idea, but let's actually just prove the concept to ourselves and we're probably our harshest critics. As we were starting it, the evolution was initially parallel with the fund, then eventually became part of the fund when we were confident enough it's not going to blow up the fund. And the fact that it led us in this direction is a product of this strategy ended up being more successful than I think we have expected it to be. The engine that we've created has performed better, it has been more productive, and and it has shifted us very naturally, very organically in this direction. I think throughout our entire existence, we would always say, we will go where the returns
1:29:44Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): are.
1:29:45Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): We don't have some a priori set of biases as to these are the exact sand pits, you know, in which we have to be looking for our returns. No, we'll evaluate the world, we'll see where the returns are, and we'll go where the returns are. And over time it became very clear. that the returns were in this strategy, and we leaned into it slowly and steadily more and more.
1:30:10Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): There's a lot of complexity to what we do and this evolution. At the same time, there's a lot of simplicity to the way we look at the world and investing in something that was not created by us to something that was created by us. The frame framework, and it's how we've woken up every day for the last 10 years, is exactly the same. If we're going to buy something, we're going to buy something that has been through this event that has reduced the residual risk dramatically. And the company goes from biotech burning cash to you have a drug, you have a line of sight to a drug, cost of capital plummets. plummet. You can actually start a real build. And if you have the right team, the right optionality behind that initial drug, you can actually build a mid cap. If you fund it right, you can build a mid cap. We are just doing that one step removed from okay, there's that initial drug like Tomash talked about with the foundation of Quellas Quellus for hereditary angioedema. angiodema, We see it, but it can be improved and we can improve it while preserving the pharmacology that works and is effective and safe. So even though we're starting from scratch with that lead drug, we can remove a
1:31:29dramatic amount of the residual risk from the beginning, from day one. And if we put the right team in place, put the right optionality, something that's that I think we're getting better and better at in the company, fund it the right way, something that we've been pretty decent at, but I think continuing to get better at, then that company can become a mid cap. Obviously, bringing it to life from nothing, it takes a lot of work. But the way we view it is they're actually not that different.
1:31:57Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): One of the most interesting observations for me about just watching you as investors. is we're in this space of biotech that is traditionally considered very volatile and risky. Tomash, you hit on just this kind of risk aversion in some ways to not blow up. Traditionally, the way that that is prosecuted from investors, and I'm probably this is probably also at that sort of LP allocator level, too, two is
1:32:22Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): oh
1:32:23Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): yeah, and it's super inefficient. So let's short a bunch or let's hedge out the industry risk. You guys shed that skin like really quickly. And yet through it, and the returns, they really have been among the best we've ever seen inside of biotech, outside of biotech.
1:32:39Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
1:32:39Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it's never felt like you're taking wild risks. And now that you're building companies, we're in the high teens in terms of numbers of companies you've built, in terms of the drugs that you're either developing or licensing, or something like 49 or whatever. I mean, the hit rate in terms of what hasn't failed yet. I think you've had one, one company that you shut down of the 1819 that you've built. Just say a little bit about risk management, about how you have cultivated an approach that takes away the layers of risk that are intolerable to you, but doesn't remove it in a way where it removes the extraordinary upside that you all have captured so well.
1:33:19Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): The framework in which we operate is predicated on picking the right project to work on. We can talk about what passes for innovation and how we view innovation versus how others in the industry view innovation. But at its core. you know, what we're trying to create and identify are compelling product concepts. And a compelling product concept is something that is going to be commercially successful because physicians will prescribe it and patients will want to take it, and insurance companies will want to reimburse it. This will happen often enough that when you look at the resulting revenue, it's a compelling product. That's a very basic schema. We always begin by looking at something that already exists. As with the example of Wanadelima, the phase three study that inspired Qualis. This is true for all of our companies throughout the existence. There's always something that has provided evidence that a biology is real and created an opportunity for an improvement, for an iteration. So we begin by looking for these starting points. We call them reference molecules. And then we spend an
1:34:38inordinate amount of time trying to figure out how we could improve upon these reference molecules Molecule so that they become really cool new product concepts. That is a creative cerebral hard exercise that you go to and majority of the time you conclude, hey, there's not much we can do, or you know, what we can do isn't actually going to be cool enough to create, you know, a high value product at the other end. If we do in fact find this path to a great potential product, the next step is can we make it? And technical feasibility is not something that is always easy, right? Sometimes we come up with ideas and we realize we just don't have the expertise or just it cannot be done. But often enough, we just go on and we try to make it. When we're trying to make a new product, again, reminder, there is already a drug that exists out there that has confirmed that a biology in fact works the way it's supposed to work. What you can do is actually use that as your comparator in every single assay that you will ever do. What that allows you to do is to start by reproducing the pharmacology of a molecule that you actually already know has worked in the
1:35:58clinic. If you do a good job, not only can you reproduce the pharmacology, but you can begin to improve upon it in some way and form. But at every point you have this control in every one of your assay that you actually know already works, right? Like that is a very simple step. But it provides a tremendous amount of de-risking in this early process. So by the time we are launching a company, we have already done all of this. We've already convinced ourselves that in every way we could possibly test our molecule side by side with this thing that we already know works, we have something very cool. Because we go through all of the work up front, by the time the company is real and we're raising money for it and we're trying to take it public and we're trying to staff it with humans, we have so much comfort
1:36:50Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that
1:36:51Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): what we're taking forward has reproduced the pharmacology and improved upon it in commercially compelling ways.
1:37:00Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): If you look at the optionality that we engineer in the companies behind the lead asset or two that Tomas described, first off, what Tomas just described, we often want two versions of that because you can reduce the risk as much as you want. It's still drug development and something could happen. So one, we'll add in redundancy. But then after that, we like to add an optionality that doesn't have to be risky, but it can be because then you have the foundational asset or two that's driving the initial valuation for call it a few years. And if something dies behind it, it usually has no effect. Typically, these biotech. companies for years are valued largely on the first asset or two. So you can engineer an asymmetric risk behind that asset or two. If it's a really valuable asset as the third program or fourth program and it comes to light years later, it has dramatic potential. Maybe it's got more, you know, revenue potential than the first asset or two. It's going to get value. valued. If it dies, you actually usually don't see much of a loss. And that's just how we like to engineer the companies. The amount of effort that goes into setting up these companies, it is not small. It's actually rather simple,
1:38:19you know, exercise to some degree. How do we make sure this doesn't die?
1:38:25Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
1:38:25Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it's fascinating. It really does feel like you flipped all of biotech on its head or like venture capital, where lots of zeros, taking risks, hoping for giant home run. You narrow that down. In doing so, you create an enormous asset internally in Fairmount. I think you call it the Fairmount way. It reminds me of like Danaher business systems. We talk to Mitch about this all the time. Danaher's Dan Herr's tagline, one of them is innovation at the speed of life. Dan Hur is as process-oriented as it gets. I think about that with you guys because you're not looking for the vanity new molecule that could change the world. And hopefully there are those out there. You're thinking about building an enduring institution, enduring company, enduring fund that can do this, get better at it. And I guess what's coming to mind for me is what are the roadblocks from here? I mean, you've compounded it a high through. thirties net for 10 years. You've managed seven or eight billion dollars. You've created fifteen or twenty companies. Very few others have ever done anything like that, let alone biotech create more than one company. What is the limit here? And what are the limiting factors to what maybe a year twenty we'd be talking about?
1:39:32Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): First off, we want to make the best version of a molecule that we saw is likely to change the world or add efficacy or convenience or safety to that molecule.
1:39:46Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): It's funny the reaction we have when people actually summarize it, because the two of us when we wake up in the morning and when we go through our days and when we I am each other in during meetings and when we talk with each other like on the way here, we're talking about all the things that we still want to do and that we still need to do. The reason the two of us started this business and why we were aligned is because we wanted to build a business that we can be proud of that will stand the test of time. And you know what? The job's not done. There are so many things, whether it's ideating. better, whether it's the capacity to make things that we cannot make today, whether it's a more efficient way to put together a company, whether it's a way to like train an incoming management team on our way of thinking, or
1:40:47build a more resilient program with more redundant. redundancy and more optionality so that the resulting company is better than it would have been had we not done that. To the way we run the portfolio with all of the little mechanisms that compensate for a potential setback over here, so that the portfolio overall grows in value at a compelling and convincing rate. Like there are thousands of improvements. large and small, across the spectrum of the business that we still very much feel like are missing. The numbers sound great. The expression of the two of us is this ongoing drive, let's just do it better. Let's just build. Build the best possible business we can build. And we are. The job's just not done. dumb.
1:41:36Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Obviously, by the number of companies, we're past proof of confidence. concept. The way we feel and talk every day is I feel we have proven the concept. We have something. It's unique. And these are real builds. But like Tomas just said, we can actually do this way better. We can put these boards together better. We can ensure alignment between us and the income. incoming teams. We can make engineering way better optionality into these companies. We're walking before we run, but I think we're getting into adjacent chemical spaces to what we learned from our drug discovery engine, going from biologics to complex biologics, logics going from antibodies to FC fusions to biospecifics to brain shuttle to ADCs to AC. ASO conjugates, but not gene therapy, but not CRISPR, but not small molecule. You know, let's do what we actually know how to do and add something on top. We do feel we have a lot to prove and a lot we can do better. And we'll see if we can do it. But the engine, the initial pieces to the engine, that's there. And it's a recent feeling and we have way, way more to do. But even two years ago, it didn't feel like we have
1:42:55this slide that our head of investor relations, Kara, made that shows putting out roughly three companies every year. And yeah, we're on a pace to do that, but it feels like an engine that we need to make better. I don't think it felt that way until very recently. And that's exciting to build off. of.
1:43:15Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Let's double-click on a couple of the key components of that company building engine, starting with the obvious paragon. I mean, you guys already said it. It was the unlock to enabling you to scale this company building and do it with excellence. From the outside, I think you called it a wholly owned incubator. It is just a fascinating entity. And I know itself has evolved a lot. You know, is it a lab? Is it a company? Why have you learned it's important for it to sort of stand on its own outside of the rest of Fairmount? But just take us through sort of the brief history and
1:43:50Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
1:43:51Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): so what around Paragon, because it's clearly one of the most unique things that you've built.
1:43:56Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): We found that Paragon to be the permanent home for a discovery team. A place where we can come to with all of the crazy ideas that we come up with on a daily basis, and we can have a conversation with a team that can help us navigate whether the reference molecule that we found can actually be improved upon, whether it is technically feasible, whether it can be done on a reasonable time frame. And we all engage in a conversation, we develop a discovery. plan, then we go and execute and we debate the data that come out of it. That was the original starting premise. It was to scale what we were already doing and make it more systematic. And throughout the entire lifetime of the entity, we run it as a department of Fairmount, right? It's me and Peter guiding the team, supplying ideas, deciding when something is cooked and ready to go and become a company.
1:44:56And when it is, in fact, ready to become a company, we create a new entity and we license the intellectual property from Paragon into the new entity, and we staff it with a completely different team that is then going to actually take it into the clinic. Paragon Aragon does all the work or has historically done all the work up until the point in time that something goes into the clinic. And thereafter, a clinical development team just needs to take it over and make it into a standalone business. This works really well because, you know, again, these are two different groups of people with two different skill sets. So it's a natural point of a handoff that that permits the formation. of the subsequent doctor company. It allows us to run a lot of things in parallel. There were a few programs at first, then there were a dozen programs, then there were 20 plus programs. So it allows you to iterate on what can and cannot be reproduced and produce more and test more and more concepts and produce more and more drugs that are ready to go into the clinic. The more drugs we can produce, the more companies we can assemble, or the larger the portfolio of the companies, of the individual companies becomes. This is important for redundancy. This is important
1:46:16for optionality. Things happen. It is good to have a backup plan. It is good to have a second and a third molecule. And guess what? Even if your lead program is successful, at some point it is fully valued, and everyone's asking you what's the next act for the company. So we need to continue to engineer optionality into your businesses so that they can continue to grow and evolve. That's a very simple premise. It was operational leverage. That's really what Paragon provided us. It allowed us to run through more ideas at a time, produce more drugs, take more of them into the clinic, and then produce more companies.
1:46:55Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): We also saw from the first companies that we started, Quellis or Astria and Dianthus, the discovery, the the people that worked on the discoveries, they aren't valued for that long. People want to talk about the lead asset or two within the company. That makes sense. It's not a bad thing. It's just is kind of what it is. The investor base is asking about the lead drug. The focus is on the lead drug. You're hiring for the lead drug, and you also don't get the chance to take the learnings from those people that probably are going to leave to their next thing and generate that institutional knowledge. So another byproduct we talked about from the beginning of having Paragon, this permanent entity, is the generation of institutional knowledge. across tens of programs. I mean, there's lessons on every program.
1:47:44Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): What about talent? Because you've already referenced it. There's so much more complexity in the kinds of people you need to hire. And when you're building these companies, it should be clear that obviously you're reaching for that upper echelon of excellence. You mentioned hiring Chris recently. I mean, it's a great example. There's been tons of other examples. with some of the teams that you've drawn into some of your either at the new co company level that you're spinning out or Paragon, what are you learning about identifying and retaining the best talent possible?
1:48:16Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Let me start by saying it's a lot easier to tell people that this is an interesting opportunity now than it was when we first started. In fact, I think the biggest challenge. change is that people pick up our phone calls, which that certainly did not used to be the case. There is a very large range of phenotypes of people that work and that you can assemble into an effective team. And a large part of the learning has been every management team needs something a little different. Every CEO needs something a little different. Like we change our approach. to a company and the team in such a way that we can provide whatever they need, whether it's more encouragement, whether it's more direction, whether it's a second pair of eyes, or sometimes just a frank, I don't think this is a good idea. You know, recognizing what needs to happen when has been certainly a part of our growth, such an integral part of our growth. When we think about attracting the right group of people to the business, we look for a certain phenotype that perhaps unsurprisingly resembles the two of us, right? We have done best with young, hungry, very motivated
1:49:31individuals that are very comfortable with uncertainty, that are very comfortable with something that is. extremely unstructured, and the task of providing structure to it, that are just fine going through a period of strain. And by the way, taking a company public with a skeletal team is not fun. It's not an enjoyable activity. It's extremely hard. Everything feels very precarious for a period of time. And you just have to trust. that you will get through it. And if you've never done it before, oh, that's nerve-wracking, right? Like for us, you know, we've done it a handful of times. I have a pretty good sense for what to expect. But the first few times, you know, back in 2021, it certainly didn't seem that easy. So there is a certain amount of resilience, not just comfort Comforts with uncertainty and lack of structure, but also just resilience and grit. Like you just got to get through it. It's also in an industry where you will have a setback. Every one of our companies has a setback. Very often, these setbacks are very public. And you need to be able to not just get through that as an individual, you have to get your team through it. And they are all looking up to you for guidance. And most of them are failing.
1:50:51feeling pretty bad. And it is up to you to then go through that negative experience which you are very much feeling, wiped out of your face, show up to the room and reinspire. All of that together is actually extremely challenging. There is a very small group of people that can do it. And we do our best to try to find them.
1:51:12Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): I think it's something we're getting better at. It's what Tomash just said. described come with humility. That's essential for people we want to spend time with. You know, you have to be humble enough to be transparent about what you're worried about, what your problems are when you need help, or else we can't really help. And it's just not fun. So if you find that whole package, it can just be an incredibly enjoyable experience and maybe unsurprising. unsurprisingly, those are the most productive experiences.
1:51:41Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well,
1:51:42Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and you mentioned being well past proof of concept. And that trust now, that trust factor for these executives, for example, to trust you all with critical parts of their career seems like it's getting easier. I mean, you just look at not that it's ever easy, but I think they can look back at your body of work and say, well, this could be an exciting project versus maybe those first couple of new codes.
1:52:05Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Oh, sure.
1:52:06Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): What about speed? We talked earlier about just how exhaustively long it takes to get a company through the channels it needs to.
1:52:15Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
1:52:15Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): think you're bringing companies public in less than a year, you're getting them into the clinic in less than two years. What are you doing to compress everything that needs to happen and then create such a huge advantage of being able to move more quickly?
1:52:30Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): One thing to add, you know, easier to tell people about the body of our work. The best people that a prospective CEO of a Fairmont company can talk to is the other Fairmont CEOs. That actually is what makes these conversations so much easier than they would have been before because they can just go and ask, What has the experience been working with us? And that I think has been tremendously helpful. There were so many lessons, particularly in the early stages. You know, speed is one way to put it, but I prefer to use the term execution. Like we are very much focused on executing. Why? Well, the sooner you get your drug approved, the more patent life is still left on it. The sooner you get your drug approved, the faster you are than the competition, the more likely are you to capture a larger market share than you otherwise would. There is real tangible dollar value associated with getting your drugs to market as quickly as practicable. A lot of the initial lessons were just observing that some things are done in series when they could be done in parallel and rearranging the way the drug is developed in such a way as to optimize the plan. The next step
1:53:49was just creating the right culture. And this goes a really, really, really long way. You can have a kind of a person that will look at an assignment and say, I'll take another day and that's okay. Or you can have a person that will look at an assignment and say, every day matters. And in fact, every day does matter. The little advantages of do a process a week faster here, a day faster here, a few weeks faster here, over a lifetime of a drug development project actually sums up to quarter. quarters and sometimes years. The right culture helps people engineer in these little improvements that add up over time. The other thing is creativity. If you have a team of people around the table that are constantly examining the timelines for improvement and they're engaged in a creative thought process, guess what? They're going to find ways. to do things faster, to shave time here, to make this more efficient, to not have this be gated by this other thing, but start a little bit earlier, perhaps at risk. And that all adds up to executing better. It's process, it's people, it's the
1:55:09right culture. It's the right way to motivate and focus a team.
1:55:13Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): And you have to have that culture. Like you can point out to a team that does not have that culture of, hey, this is how you could save time. You could actually request an end of phase two meeting with the FDA before the study reads out. We did it over here. If they're not open to that, and if they don't love that, it's actually pretty painful.
1:55:34Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Maybe we can quickly go through the case study of Apogee, which was one of the first companies. coming out of Paragon. And first one. And incredible outcome. 11 billion sold for to Abvi. Abvi's market cap went up multiples of that once this happened. We want to share that because you guys are too humble to talk about this incredible outcome. I'm as interested though on everything we just talked about. How do you learn from that experience so that you have more approaches? apogee's? How do you keep that team around? How you keep those learnings around. And there is this one nuance where we're sold to Av V versus you guys holding it much longer. Talk about that dynamic too. Like just in the whole ecosystem of what's possible with all these companies you're building, you don't have to hold all of them forever. You can sell them along the way. There's other exit points.
1:56:22Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): We just answered the question on team and why teams matter. I mean, I remember um Carl, the CMO of Apogee, was it the first board meeting? One of the first board meetings, there was this slide in a board deck about I think it was someone sleeping on a pillow, correct? And it was all about if you get an extra few minutes of sleep and you get an extra few minutes here and an extra few minutes there, it adds up. And it's all about operational excellence. And it was definitely one of our first experiences, not just that slide, obviously, but this team seeing operational excellence ourselves for the first time, at least in that way. And I remember we talked about this a lot. We're like, this is how we need all of the teams to be. Perhaps it's not surprising that it's the team that, you know, at least had a great outcome. We can talk about apogee, but maybe to get to the end first. I mean, they were fantastic, had this exit, and we're really proud that we actually just hired them on to take Paragon to a whole new level. So now a great group of people at Paragon combining with a great group of people that led Apogee and we'll see what happens next. But we're really, really excited about that. And again, really grateful that they want to take another go with us. So but do you wanna talk about apogee?
1:57:42Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): The idea that became apogee, I think we first had it in I think it was 2018 or so. We just didn't necessarily have the comfort and the conviction that we can actually do it because it took on one of the largest I INI and I drugs out there, dupixent dupixcent or dupullum dupulumab out from. from Regeneron. It was a relatively straightforward premise. You know, we're going to try to engineer a better molecule. There was also a potentially competitive molecule being developed by LI Lilly, Labricism app, that also read out phase three data around the time we were starting Apogee. And not really knowing which one of the two is going to be better, we've elected to pursue both in parallel and let the data guide us rather than make that choice a priori. That sort of was the genesis of let's have two parallel lead programs because you don't actually always know which one's going to be better. The program that attempted to improve on dupecent was Apogee APUG808. 808. The program that attempted to improve on Labra. Labrukizma was Apogee777. And it is that program that ended up winning out with 808, even though it was a great molecule, it just wasn't
1:59:01as good. And that was not something we would have a priori foreseen. The next step to building the company was engineering in additional optionality. And the easiest way to do that was to, you know. think through the indication that Apo G777 was going to compete in, which was atopic dermatitis, and then look at what other mechanisms we could add into the mix to create the best atopic dermatitis company that we could conceive of at the time. When we engineered that layer, that obviously allows you to think about: well, what should the next layer? be? And you think about all of the diseases other than atopic dermatitis that could be addressed by this class of drugs, and you start expanding into uh respiratory diseases, into eosinophagesophagitis, and keep going that way. So, from a framework point of view, you start with this one, in this case, two programs that are intended to be the lead. programs, and then you add layers behind it that provide optionality to the company going forward, intended to grow the price, grow the value of the company. We've obviously took the molecule into the clinic, ran it through the phase one and phase two studies. The phase two studies
2:00:20read out and they demonstrated that the molecule in fact work the way we envisioned it to work, and it provided a much superior patient experience relative to what Labrachism app or Dupulum app could do. And that was the point where InterABV and they decided to make the company an offer that was too hard to ignore. And it was ultimately a good outcome for the company. It was a good outcome for Fairmount. It was clearly a good outcome for App. AB2, given the stock reaction that they had after they announced the acquisition. Just an overall win. Now, if the company remained independent, we had all of the other layers of options coming behind. One could argue, and rightfully so, not all of the layers were perhaps reflected in the valuation. the way we would have hoped that they would have come to materialize in the future. And that was the trade of making the transaction happen at this time versus waiting. But it was a good outcome.
2:01:27Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): One last area uh we wanted to dive into before we close it here. And I love that this is coming up at the end because I think in this world right now in twenty 2026, twenty six, everyone talks about AI at first. In the news, you often hear about the way that it can affect coding, about consumer uses, and then also healthcare, biotech. So maybe it's better tools to understand disease states, find targets, design drugs, predict what actually will work in humans. And maybe there's a layer of this without all the trials or without all the cost. Where do you guys stand on this? right now with the knowledge you have, everything you built, where do you think AI is gonna add the most value in drug development?
2:02:09Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): The unsatisfying answer is that it is still too soon to tell. There has been an immense amount of progress in gen AI across many fields. If you distill it to the basic components, you know, what do you need for more progress? You need computes, which people are building, and you need data. The data component in biology is a little tricky. There is a a whole world of textbook biology that sure you can feed into an LLM and you're going to teach it what the textbooks know. That said, most of what textbooks know, we have already reduced to practice. And we where the true innovation lies is generally that one step further, the one step beyond the frontier. And here things get a little tricky because you what you now need to do is create a mechanism. I guess technically Claude can already do it. There was an anthropic paper on this not too long ago, where you give it instructions, it goes on and it procures.
2:03:15some molecules, it goes on and finds a way to test those molecules, it gets the results and it learns from them. This is what the basic backpropagation neural nets gen AI is supposed to do. This is how it is built. Except for every cycle of this is weeks to months. This is not a light speed, just churn. through subject matter and teach it an entire new field of a self-contained fashion. This is experimental. And in order to conduct these experiments to actually learn the same recursive learning that is utilized elsewhere, there is this lag variable. And this lag variable is going to be very tricky to solve. Where I get excited is things like this. the closed loop labs, which the place to look at now is the work done by Roche that they described just a few weeks ago at their most recent RD day, where this is exactly what they're
2:04:15doing. They're creating a lab system that can more rapidly go from synthesis of text articles, testing of those test articles, updating the data. teaching the gen AI what is it that it needs to know to improve, and doing so more readily and more rapidly. And this has all just begun. You know, I kind of go back to the way Jeffrey Hinton describes progress in AI. It's going to be jagged. There are going to be some things that the AI can learn how to do really quickly. He argues that AI is already much better at general knowledge than any one of us. And I kind of have to agree, right? Like I can ask an LLM any question I want, and I'm going to get like a not so good expert, but still an expert answer, which in fields where I don't have expertise is far more knowledge than I will be able to master muster at any given time. He thinks the AI is already much better at math. You know, I see it solve a millennium problem, and I'm like, okay, I kind of have to give you that one. It's probably already better at math than majority of humans, if not all humans, right? Like it's been unsolved for decades. It solved it. Sorry, guys. But then I look at biology and I the textbook biology, outstanding knowledge, right? So like you
2:05:35can ask it basic questions limited to the knowledge of. today, and it will do a very good job summarizing an answer, getting you a direction, helping you reason. It is excellent for that. But to advance the field, we gotta experiment and finding a way to make experiments faster so that the recursive learning can hit the right speed and shorten that lag variable that we currently struggle with. It's just starting. You know, we've used machine learning and increasingly Gen AI at Paragon for years now. There is for any program that we start, there is always a set of in silica tools to generate diversity every single time. And it has gotten better over time. You see it getting better over time, but you still need to go ahead, synthesize those molecules and test them and validate them. And guess what? Even though we have had an in silico route in every one of our projects, none of those have yielded a molecule that's you know in the quinegate. That's just a chance alone. At some point, one of them is going to yield something that is really cool. It's all just to say it's still very early. It's not there yet. But the lag variable is unique to this industry.
2:06:55Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You know,
2:06:55Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we get close to wrapping up. I want to ask you a few forward-looking questions. And one of them was sparked by what you said about starting the firm in pursuit of this creative freedom.
2:07:06Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
2:07:06Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I think so many of us in our careers, we start with a certain kind of aspiration that might be idealistic, and then you start building up out an investment firm. and more people and layers and bureaucracy sets in. And and by the way, even when you have success like you've had, success brings its own challenges. How are you guys thinking about setting yourself up for the next 10 years around making sure that creative freedom remains, making sure that you're still gonna love this the way you have the last 10 years in a way that continues to likely perpetuate that success. What reflections do you have on that?
2:07:44Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): So much to say. If there was a period of time where we sort of cut our teeth on how you get a drug into the clinic. And then there was a period of time where we learn the nuts and balls of assembling a biotech company. taking many, many, many, many, many lessons and making sure that we can get them to execute and they don't step their toes and that there is redundancy for setbacks and that we can re-inspire the teams when things don't go well, and then truly capitalize on builds when they do go well. Those are discrete lessons that help us formulate a philosophy and a way of being. And I think it was in fairness last year when you know 2025, when we first probably looked at the methodology and we felt like we understand how to do this and we can do it again. And it feels a little bit more like an engine. The path forward is much more of an organizational design question. Now that we understand the work, we understand the what, we understand the why, let's optimize the how. It's building fair amount so that the two of us
2:09:04are running and optimizing what is already a semi autonomous system to be the best version of itself. There is a system and then there is an organization that helps run it. That's the next phase. That's gonna ensure that the two of us enter the machine at the interface points that we find we provide the most impact and that we also happen to enjoy the most. That's at the early ideation stage when we troll the universe for. what is the best possible next product concept that we can try to work on to then turn into a company. And that is at that, you know, last stage where we have this portfolio of really cool businesses that comprise this holding company that we try to refer to as this distributed pharma company. How do we make choices? both in terms of allocating capital, allocating time and attention span, and the team capabilities in such a way that this portfolio continues to appreciate in value? Avoid setbacks, engineering redundancy, grow in
2:10:19optionality, make sure that we build in the right culture, make sure that we inspire people in the right way. All of these, but now on an organizational level. That is a lifelong project. And it is so rewarding.
2:10:35Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): One thing on the cultural piece, our culture is remarkably strong. So you asked about how do we keep doing this and have fun, or I'm not sure exactly how you phrased it. One, the motivation's there. Maybe too much ties, but there's definitely plenty of motivation. And the culture is not for everyone, but we're very careful who we hire. We have a very strong culture of people that are dead serious about their work, dead serious about operational excellence, and not serious about self. We perpetuate that, but then the rest of the organization perpetuates that. And it's something where we want to spend our time. I want to spend time with them. And that can't change either.
2:11:18Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I'm
2:11:18Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): curious what you would say
2:11:20Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): if
2:11:20Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you had a couple of young people come to you today now, with all that you've learned, all that you've lived through the last decade about a desire to start an investment firm. It doesn't have to be biotech necessarily, but whether it's things that you would do differently or things that you would really lean into even more that you believed then, what kind of advice would you have for others that want to take that entrepreneurial path?
2:11:47Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): We should have leaned more into what we thought we should have leaned into earlier. Tomash mentioned the apogee idea came years before we actually did it. We didn't think people would give us money to do that. So we didn't do anything with it. But it was, you know, one of our best ideas. I remember early on when we were thinking about going really broad with a bunch of our ideas and believing that no way people will not let us give this a shot. But it would have been by far and away the value maximizing endeavor. There
2:12:25Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): are
2:12:25Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): two lessons. that we the two of us got early on, from Kevin actually, that stick with me and come to me to this day with some frequency. The first one was we were talking to him about Quellis, and we were sitting in his office and we were basically telling him, like, oh, it's nothing yet. And this guy who's worth, you know, hundreds of millions of dollars, probably billions at that point. who also authentically did something his own way and succeeded, is sitting there, you know, he leans back in his chair and he says, Everything starts as nothing. And I remember thinking that, wow, that's actually like way more profound than I think you intended it to make at the time. It's true. Every great vision, every great business, everything that you admire today started as actually nothing at some point. It may have been a napkin idea, it may have been a conversation that two people were having over a meal. It started as nothing. So the fact that something doesn't feel like it is glamorous right now, I can tell you our first few years were not glamorous. I gotta set that aside. And if you want to do it, just start.
2:13:43Just start. There is nothing else to it.
2:13:45Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): There's also a component, and it's something we still love as we start new businesses. I can talk about this until I'm blue in the face. Until you start something, it obviously has to start with some idea, but until you start, you can't see over the horizon. And that is by far and away the most. exciting part. Look at how we started. You can't see this. You can't plan for this. You can't. You can have a ball of energy, an initial idea, and a great partnership. And you obviously have to put the pieces together along the way. But to me, each business, each new company we launch, that's always the most exciting part, but you can't see it unless you just start. The
2:14:26Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): other thing. that was also a lesson from Kevin, which is pretty funny, but these
2:14:31Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): are the two things that I
2:14:32Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): come back to. This
2:14:32Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): is Kevin Tang, by the way. Yeah, Kevin
2:14:34Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Tang. He was having a conversation with you. This was might even have been before we started. And you know, it was an equivalent of like, How do you succeed in the investment business? And his answer was just persist.
2:14:49Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Yeah. Because
2:14:50Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): it turns out that markets appreciate, generally appreciate over time. It turns out that as long as you make it for a long enough period of time, you will benefit from what generally is an upward momentum. And that, you know, taking a zero or hero series of bets up front Strong doesn't need to be the solution to your business model. Sometimes you should just focus on. not blowing up. And as long as you make it over time, you will do just fine.
2:15:20Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): It's been a remarkable journey, guys. This is an example of me getting something right when I really didn't have any clue mostly what you guys were talking about. Even though I had those kind of high expectations around the two of you from the beginning, it's blown through anything I could have ever imagined. And I think about what you touched on, Peter, ultimately the impact of what is going to come about with all of these companies that are building drugs that are going to affect patients and their families. What a great example of leaning into something you're passionate about and creating a lot of value for yourself and for others. As Paul mentioned, you know, it was our largest investment day one. The returns have been great, but so much more important. has been the learnings that we've taken from watching you guys, talking to you guys, learning from you guys. And then of course, even more important than those learnings are the people because you guys are the lessons factory for us. I mean, it's going to keep going. The friendship, you know, we couldn't be more proud of you and frankly, just are really grateful you'd you spend three hours with us to talk about your story and to share. all these insights. I know they're gonna have an impact on others as well. So thanks again.
2:16:31Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Appreciate it.
2:16:32Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): We can tell you guys that we feel a tremendous amount of gratitude that you have taken on this project of mapping out biotech and pitched us in spite of what probably was your better wisdom because your partnership has been foundational to us becoming what we are, and your constant reinforcement that no, you should just be authentic to what you want to do over the years gave us the confidence to see this evolution through. So thank you. Job
2:17:05Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Santa, let's keep going.
2:17:06Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Let's
2:17:06Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): keep
2:17:06Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Snot down. Thank you.