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Cameco's Q3 2026 Profit Collapses Amid Mill Outage and Westinghouse Headwinds

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Uranium MiningNuclear EnergyCamecoWestinghouseCommoditiesEquity ResearchCapital AllocationTax Disputes

Summary

Speakers detail Cameco's Q3 2026 operating profit drop to $18 million, driven by a Key Lake mill outage and lower Westinghouse earnings. The company trades at a 116x P/E with a 0.9% earnings yield, pricing in future nuclear demand rather than current cash flow. Long-term contract coverage exceeds annual guidance, indicating strong utility demand despite lumpy revenue recognition. The Westinghouse investment, funded by depleted cash reserves, faces accounting headwinds and delayed government partnership payouts. A decades-long tax dispute with the Canada Revenue Agency continues to tie up capital.

Key takeaways

  1. 1
    reported more than 28 million pounds of average annual uranium deliveries contracted over the following five years. Against 2026 production guidance of roughly 20 million pounds, that is a book that already absorbs more than a full year's mine output each year.

    Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) · 15:05

Episode sections

  1. 0:00 – 6:04

    Cameco's Q3 2026 Profit Collapse and Valuation

    Cameco filed for a $1 billion at-the-market share offering on November 5, 2026, shortly after reporting a Q3 operating profit collapse to $18 million on $442 million revenue. Despite a 30% stock drop, the company trades at a $32 billion market cap with a 0.9% earnings yield, reflecting a 116x P/E ratio that has persisted for five years.

  2. 6:04 – 12:14

    MacArthur River Suspension and Supply Strategy

    Cameco suspended its MacArthur River mine in 2017/2018 to preserve high-grade ore during a post-Fukushima glut, cutting dividends by 80% to protect its credit rating. The strategy avoided selling cheaply but resulted in years of operating losses and significant shareholder dilution/costs.

  3. 12:14 – 21:21

    Contract Book and Revenue Structure

    Revenue is driven by long-term contracts, mostly market-linked with floors/ceilings, rather than fixed prices. By Q3 2026, 28 million pounds were contracted for the next five years against 20 million pounds annual guidance, showing strong utility demand but lumpy revenue recognition.

  4. 21:21 – 24:10

    Production Decline and Strategic Choices

    The restart of MacArthur River and Key Lake in 2022-2024 allowed Cameco to hit record production in 2025, but 2026 saw a decline due to a Key Lake mill outage. The company now faces a strategic choice between maximizing output, prioritizing margins, or holding inventory.

  5. 24:10 – 26:36

    Nuclear Renaissance vs. Mill Outage

    Production fell from 15 million pounds in H1 2025 to 13.6 million in H1 2026 due to Key Lake maintenance. Cameco bought uranium at $60/lb in Q3 2026 to fill gaps, which squeezed margins as purchased uranium cost more than inventory.

  6. 26:36 – 32:39

    Westinghouse Investment and Accounting

    Cameco acquired a 49% stake in Westinghouse for $2.14 billion in Nov 2023, paying ~11-13x EV/EBITDA. While 2025 earnings were boosted by the Dukovny project, the speaker warns this was a one-off peak, and the investment is recorded as equity income, not consolidated revenue.

  7. 32:39 – 36:29

    Westinghouse Earnings and U.S. Government Partnership

    Cameco's share of Westinghouse's adjusted EBITDA fell from $569 million in 2025 to $427 million in the first nine months of 2026 due to the absence of large project-linked contributions. In late October 2025, Cameco and Brookfield announced a partnership with the U.S. government to facilitate financing for new Westinghouse AP1000 reactors, involving at least $80 billion in investment, in exchange for a 20% participation interest in cash distributions above $17.5 billion and potential IPO rights.

  8. 36:29 – 39:06

    Key Lake Mill Outage and Operational Performance

    Cameco's Key Lake mill underwent a planned maintenance shutdown in 2026 that ran longer than usual, causing third-quarter operating profit to fall 73% to $18 million and margins to shrink from 15% to 4%. Management attributed the weaker consolidated results to lower uranium sales volumes and higher unit costs from the outage, as well as the decline in Westinghouse earnings.

  9. 39:06 – 41:34

    Cash Flow, Capital Spending, and Currency Hedging

    From 2014 to 2025, Cameco generated $6.9 billion in cash from operations against $1.3 billion in net profit, a gap driven by depreciation, working capital swings, and equity investee distributions. In 2025, capital spending was $333 million with 2026 guidance of $490–$540 million, while currency hedging policies covered 35–100% of net exposure, resulting in derivative gains of C$95 million in 2025 after C$183 million in losses in 2024.

  10. 41:34 – 45:25

    Management, Compensation, and Governance

    CEO Tim Gitzel, who has led Cameco since 2011, received $10.96 million in total compensation for 2025, up from $7.93 million in 2024, with significant holdings in company shares. Management guidance has been mixed, with production outlooks cut and capital spending lowered due to the Key Lake outage, and the CFO role is transitioning from Heidi Schocke to Leah Hipperson in early 2027.

  11. 45:25 – 50:52

    Canada Revenue Agency Tax Dispute

    Cameco is engaged in a nearly two-decade-long tax dispute with the Canada Revenue Agency over transfer pricing structures from the late 1990s and 2000s. The CRA has adjusted taxable income by $3.3 billion for 2007–2013 and secured $559 million for 2014–2017, while Cameco has paid $346 million in cash taxes for 2024–2026 to date, citing reassessments that reduce tax pools.

  12. 50:52 – 1:06:25

    Valuation, Moat, and Investment Thesis

    Cameco trades at a $32 billion market cap, implying an earnings yield of 0.9% and a free cash flow yield of 0.7%. The company's moat is described as a cornered resource with scale and system advantages, but the valuation assumes significant future growth from uranium contracts and Westinghouse cash flows, leaving little room for operational errors or further guidance cuts.

Claims worth verifying

Cameco filed papers on November 5, 2026, allowing it to sell up to $1 billion of new shares via an at-the-market program.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·0:42

How to verify: SEC EDGAR filing (Form S-3 or 424B) for Cameco Corp (CCJ) dated Nov 5, 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

Cameco reported Q3 2026 consolidated operating profit of ~$18 million on ~$442 million revenue, an operating margin of ~4% vs ~15% in Q3 2025.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·1:14

How to verify: Cameco Q3 2026 Earnings Press Release and 10-Q filing on SEC EDGAR. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

Cameco shares traded at ~$70.63 on November 13, 2026, roughly a third below the 52-week high of ~$104.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·1:34

How to verify: Historical stock price data for CCJ from Yahoo Finance or Bloomberg for Nov 13, 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Cameco's median P/E ratio over five years was ~117x, and the stock offered a 0.9% earnings yield at the time of the transcript.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·1:46

How to verify: Calculated from Cameco's 10-K filings (2026-2026) and Nov 2026 stock price; verified via SEC EDGAR. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

Cameco holds a 49% stake in Westinghouse Electric, acquired in November 2023.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·3:19

How to verify: Cameco 2023 Annual Report (10-K) and Westinghouse acquisition press release. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

MacArthur River suspension removed ~18 million pounds of annual supply from the world market.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·7:00

How to verify: Cameco operational reports and World Nuclear Association production tables for 2018. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

In 2025, ~$2.2 billion of Cameco's $3.5 billion revenue came from market-linked contracts, with $1.3 billion from fixed-price contracts.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·14:15

How to verify: Cameco 2026 Annual Report (10-K) under 'Revenue' and 'Long-term Contracts' sections. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

By Q3 2026, Cameco had >28 million pounds of contracted deliveries over the next five years against 20 million pounds 2026 guidance.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·15:05

How to verify: Cameco Q3 2026 Earnings Release and Investor Presentation. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Cameco bought ~1.8 million pounds of uranium at an average price of ~$60/lb in Q3 2026, holding ~8.5 million pounds in inventory.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·18:21

How to verify: Cameco Q3 2026 Earnings Release, specifically the 'Purchased Uranium' and 'Inventory' sections. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Cameco acquired a 49% stake in Westinghouse for $2.14 billion, with total enterprise value of ~$8.2 billion, closing in Nov 2023.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·26:58

How to verify: Cameco 2026 Annual Report (10-K) and Westinghouse acquisition press release dated Nov 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

Cameco's share of Westinghouse's adjusted EBITDA was about $427 million in the first nine months of 2026, compared with about $569 million in the same period of 2025.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·32:39

How to verify: Cameco Q3 2026 Earnings Release or 10-Q filing; Westinghouse financial disclosures if public or via Cameco's equity method accounting notes. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

In late October 2025, Cameco and Brookfield announced a partnership with the United States government for at least $80 billion of investment in Westinghouse reactors.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·34:18

How to verify: Press release from Cameco or Brookfield dated late October 2026; U.S. Department of Energy announcements. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The government would receive a participation interest entitling it to 20% of Westinghouse cash distributions above $17.5 billion.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·34:27

How to verify: Terms of the partnership agreement disclosed in Cameco's Q3 2026 earnings call transcript or press release. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Management described a pipeline of 91 potential AP1000 units around the world on the Q3 2026 call.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·35:26

How to verify: Transcript of Cameco Q3 2026 earnings call. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Cameco's Q3 2026 operating profit fell about 73% to roughly $18 million, with operating margins shrinking to around 4% from 15% a year earlier.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·37:05

How to verify: Cameco Q3 2026 Financial Statements (Income Statement). For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

From 2014 to 2025, Cameco generated about $6.9 billion of cash from operations against only about $1.3 billion of cumulative net profit.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·39:10

How to verify: Cameco Annual Reports (10-K) for years 2026–2026; Sum of Cash from Operations vs. Net Income. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

Cameco spent about $333 million on property, plant, and equipment in 2025, with 2026 guidance of $490–$540 million.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·40:11

How to verify: Cameco 2025 Annual Report (Capital Expenditures); Q3 2026 Earnings Release (Guidance update). For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

At the end of 2025, Cameco had about US $2.2 billion of US dollar hedges in place, covering about two-thirds of 2026 exposure.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·40:52

How to verify: Cameco 2025 Annual Report (Note on Derivatives and Hedging Activities). For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

CRA's remaining adjustment to Cameco's taxable income for 2007–2013 was about $3.3 billion after reducing claims by $1.8 billion.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·46:15

How to verify: Cameco Annual Report (Note on Income Taxes and Tax Disputes); CRA reassessment notices if public. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Cameco paid about $346 million of cash tax for 2024 through 2026 to date due to reassessments reducing tax pools.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·46:43

How to verify: Cameco Q3 2026 Earnings Release or 10-Q; Cash Flow Statement (Income Taxes Paid). For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

Do your own research

  • Verify Cameco's Q3 2026 10-Q filing for exact operating profit, revenue, and Key Lake outage details.
  • Check Cameco's 10-K for the status of the Canada Revenue Agency tax dispute and reassessments.
  • Review Cameco's equity method accounting for Westinghouse to understand EBITDA to net earnings conversion.
  • Confirm the $80 billion U.S. government partnership terms and vesting conditions for Cameco's 20% interest.
  • Analyze Cameco's cash flow statement to reconcile the $6.9 billion operating cash flow against $1.3 billion net profit (2014-2025).
  • Check uranium spot prices and long-term contract pricing formulas to assess margin impact.
  • Verify the $1 billion ATM offering details and dilution impact on existing shareholders.
  • Review management compensation disclosures for CEO Tim Gitzel and CFO transition plans.
Full transcriptexpand

0:00Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): This podcast is brought to you by mPor.top, the stories of top companies. Disclaimer, this AI-generated content is for informational purposes only and should not be considered as investment advice.

0:12Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): If

0:12Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you like our podcasts, please subscribe on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, or your favorite podcast player. And don't forget to follow us on X at mport.top. MPOR.top. Find thousands of stories of top companies on our website, mPor.top. MPOR.top is brought to you by Hayfin.co. Finn is a personalized junior AI research assistant for equity portfolio managers. Check it out at heyfin.co. Camacau, the mine that waited for its market.

0:42Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On

0:42Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): November 5th, 2026, a uranium company in Saskatoon did something investors usually expect from a young biotech, not a decades old. resource producer. It filed papers allowing it to sell up to one billion dollars of new shares into the market, a few at a time, whenever its agents saw fit.

1:01Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

1:01Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): mechanism is called an at-the-market program, and it works like a tap rather than a bucket. Nothing in the filing says the tap will be opened all the way, or opened at all. It says the company now has the right to turn

1:13Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it.

1:14Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): The timing made the filing hard to ignore. A week earlier, Camico had reported a third quarter in which its consolidated operating profit had collapsed to about eighteen million dollars, on roughly four hundred forty two million dollars of revenue, an operating margin of about four percent against about fifteen percent in the same quarter a year before.

1:34Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

1:34Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): shares had already fallen hard. On november 13, thirteenth, twenty 2026, twenty six, they traded at about seventy dollars and sixty three cents, roughly a third below their fifty-two-week high of about one hundred four dollars.

1:46Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And

1:46Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): yet, even after that fall, the market still valued Camico at about thirty-two billion dollars. For every dollar of earnings Camico reported over the previous twelve months, an investor paid about one hundred sixteen dollars. Turn that around and the picture becomes stark. The shares offered an earnings yield of about zero point nine percent, less than an investor could have earned from a government bill. Strangely, that multiple was not unusual for Camico. Its median price to earnings ratio over five years sat at almost exactly the same level, about 117 times. The market has been paying a premium for this company's future for half a decade. That contrast is the place to begin.

2:27Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A

2:27Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): business priced at more than a hundred times its earnings is supposed to be one that can fund its own growth. Instead, at the very moment its operations stumbled, Camico reached for the ability to raise more equity.

2:39Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): That

2:39Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): does not prove the company needs the money. The program could be prudence, opportunism, or insurance. But it does show that the people running Camico think their shares are a currency worth having on. hand. And it reminds investors that a valuation built on the future can also be spent in the present. What the market is actually buying. To understand what that US thirty two billion dollars buys, it helps to be precise about what Camico is. At its core, it digs uranium out of the ground in northern Saskatchewan through mines it operates in the and joint ventures it shares. And it holds a stake in a large uranium operation in Kazakhstan. It then turns uranium into forms a reactor can use through refining, conversion, and fuel fabrication plants in Ontario. And since November 2023, it has is owned 49% forty-nine percent of Westinghouse Electric, the American company whose reactor designs and fuel and maintenance services sit inside a large share of the world's nuclear fleet. That last piece is easy to misread. Camico does not consolidate Westinghouse. It records its share of Westinghouse's profit as a single line, the way an investor records a stake in a company it does not control.

3:59Westinghouse's sales do not appear in Camico's Camiko's revenue and Westinghouse. Westinghouse's tens of thousands of workers do not appear in Camiko's headcount, which was about thirty one hundred people at the end of 2025. When investors talk about Camico as a nuclear platform, they are adding together a uranium miner's revenue and a minority stake in a reactor company. Both matter, they are not the same kind of money.

4:24Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

4:24Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): bull story is simple to tell.

4:27Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

4:27Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): world wants more electricity that does not burn carbon, from data centers, electrified industry, and governments worried about energy security. Nuclear power can supply that around the clock. Every reactor needs fuel for decades, and qualified uranium supply is concentrated in a handful of places, with Camico's Canadian mines among the richest anywhere. Add Westinghouse, and Camico participates in the fuel and the machinery at the same time.

4:55Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

4:55Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): skeptic story is just as easy to tell. Camico has been a scarce asset story before, and for most of the past decade, that scarcity produced thin or negative operating profits. Its revenue grew only about two percent a year in Canadian dollars over the ten years to 2025. twenty twenty five.

5:13Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Its

5:14Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): third quarter of the

5:14Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): remote.

5:15Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): twenty twenty six show that even in a strong market, a maintenance outage and shipment timing can erase most of a quarter's operating profit.

5:24Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And

5:24Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the Westinghouse earnings that flattered twenty twenty five included large one off project contributions that are already fading in twenty twenty six. So the episode carries four questions.

5:36Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Did

5:36Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Camiko's Camico's decision to shut its best mind? mines during the uranium bust preserve a scarce advantage or expose a business that cannot reliably deliver? Does long-term contracting capture the uranium upswing without giving too much of it away to utility buyers?

5:52Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Can

5:52Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Westinghouse earn back the price Camico paid for

5:55Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it? And

5:56Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): can the current management team turn a nuclear renaissance into cash without diluting shareholders or tripping over another? operating problem?

6:04Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

6:04Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): answers begin with a mine that went quiet. In November 2017, Camco told its workers, its customers, and its shareholders that MacArthur River would stop. This was not a marginal pit. MacArthur River, together with the Key Lake Mill, some 80 eighty kilometers to the south where its ore was processed, was the largest high grade uranium. operation in the world. Its ore was so rich that in parts of the deposit, uranium made up a meaningful fraction of the rock itself, rather than the tiny fractions typical of mines elsewhere. Miners there used remote equipment and freezing techniques to control water and radiation. It was, in every engineering sense, a crown jewel.

6:48Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And

6:49Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Kanco CANCO chose to turn it off. Production was suspended from early 2018, initially for ten months, and about five hundred twenty site employees faced temporary layoffs.

6:59Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On

7:00Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): a one hundred percent basis, the shutdown took roughly 18 million pounds a year out of world supply. Camco's own share of production from the complex fell from about eleven 11.2 point two million pounds in 2017 to almost nothing in 2018.

7:15Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In

7:15Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): July 2018, the suspension became indefinite. To understand why a company would idle its best asset, the clock has to go back to March 2011, the year Camco's current chief executive took

7:27Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): over.

7:28Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): The earthquake and tsunami that struck Japan and disabled the Fukushima Daiichi plant did not just take Japanese reactors offline, it froze a large part of the global appetite for new. nuclear power and left utilities sitting on inventory they no longer needed. Uranium is not traded like oil, where refiners buy cargoes every week. Utilities buy most of their fuel through long-term contracts, signed years before the pounds are needed.

7:53Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): When

7:54Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): those buyers stopped signing, producers like Camco discovered that a mine is only as valuable as the contracts behind

8:00Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it. The

8:01Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): mechanics of the glut were simple. and brutal. Utilities had signed contracts before twenty eleven for pounds they expected to burn in reactors that were now idle, especially in Japan. Those pounds piled up in inventories or were resold into the market, which meant every new buyer could find uranium without signing a long term deal with a miner. Meanwhile, producers kept mining, partly because mines are expensive to stop and restart. partly because some producers, including state controlled ones, had reasons to keep output high. The result was a market in which spot prices sagged for years and long-term contracting, the lifeblood of Camiko's model, dried to a trickle. Shutting the lesser assets first. Camico's response came in stages, and the order of those stages reveals the logic.

8:50Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): First,

8:50Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it cut the operations that cost the most to run. Rabbit Lake, an older Saskatchewan mine, was suspended in 2016, and production at Camiko's U.S. in- situy operations in Wyoming and Nebraska was curtailed.

9:04Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In

9:04Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): December 2016, the company announced preliminary 2016 results that included large write downs and a further set of operational changes for 2017, twenty seventeen, including workforce reductions. and cost cuts. Rabbit Lake and the Kintyre Project in Western Australia were among the assets whose book values were written down in this period. Money tied up in

9:33Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it.

9:34Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Camico recorded operating losses in twenty 2016 sixteen and twenty 2017, seventeen and again. in 2020 and 2021, years in which a supposedly irreplaceable portfolio of uranium assets could not cover its own costs. Then came the big one. Shutting MacArthur River was qualitatively different from closing Rabbit Lake. Rabbit Lake was old and expensive. MacArthur River was Camico's best. Management's argument. was that if it could not sell pounds at prices that paid for them, it would rather leave them in the ground, where they would keep, than mine them into a glutted market and sell them cheaply. The cost of discipline. The price of that discipline was paid by people as well as shareholders. Hundreds of northern Saskatchewan workers, many from indigenous communities whose economies depended on the mines, lost their jobs or went on temporary layoff. Shareholders paid too. Alongside the suspension,

10:44Camico cut its annual dividend from 40 forty cents a share to eight cents, a drop of eighty percent. explicitly to protect its investment grade credit rating. Any confident in a quick recovery does not slash its payout by four fifths. Camico was saying, in effect, that it could not see when term contracting would return, and that it would rather preserve the balance sheet than reward shareholders through a downturn of unknown length.

11:24Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It

11:25Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): was the right call for a cyclical business.

11:27Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It

11:27Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): is also evidence that the cycle, not the geology, set the terms. What did management promise in return?

11:35Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Its

11:35Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): message, repeated through the downturn, was that MacArthur River would come back. when Camiko had acceptable long-term contract homes for the pounds. It is also a strategy of waiting for customers. Camiko could control its own costs and its own supply. It could not control when utilities would decide that the uranium they had stockpiled after Fukushima was running down and that it was time to sign again. That is the honest verdict on the shutdown. It was costly but coherent. It preserved high-grade pounds for a better market, and spared Camiko from selling its best resource at a loss.

12:14Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But

12:14Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the impairments, the layoffs, the dividend cut, and the long wait also show the limit of the scarce asset thesis. Rock in the ground does not generate returns on its own.

12:26Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Some

12:26Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Someone has to agree to pay for it years in advance. Which leads to the second half of the business, the half that never shows up in a picture of a head frame, the contract book. Picture a utility executive somewhere in the United States, Europe, or Asia. Her company runs reactors that will need fresh fuel in four or five years. Between the uranium in the ground and a fuel assembly loaded into a reactor, sit a mine, a mill, a refinery, a conversion plant, an enrichment plant, and a fabricator, each with its own lead time.

13:00Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): If

13:00Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): any link fails, a reactor that powers a city cannot run. So she does not wait until next year to buy. She signs contracts today for pounds that will be delivered years from now.

13:12Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On

13:12Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the other side of the table sits Camico with a its own dilemma. It can commit future production now at today's terms, it can sell from inventory, or it can wait, betting that prices or terms will improve. Every pound it commits early is a pound it cannot sell later at a higher price. Every pound it holds back is a pound that might not find a buyer if the market turns. That negotiation, repeated across dozens of utilities and users. years of deliveries, is the second half of the mine. Some set a fixed base price that escalates each year with inflation. Others are market related, meaning the price is set near the time of delivery by reference to published market prices, often with a floor beneath and a ceiling above. Many blend the two.

14:02Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A

14:03Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): floor protects Camico if prices crash, a ceiling protects the utility if prices spike. The design is a negotiated sharing of risk, not a guarantee for either side.

14:14Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In

14:15Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): twenty twenty five, about two point two billion dollars of Camiko's three point five billion dollars of revenue came from market market-related related contracts, and about one $1.3 point three billion dollars from fixed price contracts. That split matters because it answers a question investors often get wrong. Long-term contracting does not mean Camico is insulated from uranium prices. Most of its revenue still moves with the market, just with a lag and within bands. The fixed price book provides ballast.

14:45Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): At

14:45Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the end of 2025, fixed price contracts with remaining deliveries represented about $7.5%. $7.3 billion of expected future revenue, a figure that excludes the much larger stream of future market price deliveries. Volume coverage is where the contract book looks strongest. By the third quarter of 2026, Camico reported more than 28 million pounds of average annual uranium deliveries contracted over the following five years. Against 2026 production guidance of roughly 20 million pounds, that is a book that already absorbs more than a full year's mine output each year.

15:21Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It

15:21Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): is evidence that utilities are once again willing to sign and that Camico is a supplier they want on their list.

15:27Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): There

15:28Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): is a catch in how this shows up in reported results. Because utilities take delivery when their own fuel schedules require, Camico chemico sales arrive in lumps. Management says the time timing of customer requirements drives quarterly revenue and cash flow, and that a week quarter can simply mean pounds scheduled for a later one. That is true. And it is also a reason investors should not annualize any single quarter, good or bad. Where the pounds come from.

15:54Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It

15:55Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): helps to picture the fuel chain as a series of workshops a uranium atom must pass through. Mind ore is crushed and leached into a yellow. powder called uranium concentrate. A refinery purifies it. A conversion plant turns it into uranium hexafluoride, a compound that becomes a gas at modest temperatures.

16:13Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): An

16:13Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): enrichment plant spins that gas in centrifuges to raise the concentration of the fissile isotope.

16:18Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A

16:19Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): fabricator then presses the enriched uranium into ceramic pellets and stacks them into the long metal rods of a fuel assembly.

16:26Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Chemical

16:26Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Camico runs. the first four workshops, sells fabrication through its own plants and westing houses, and has no stake in commercial enrichment today. Behind the contract book sit the physical assets. Camico operates MacArthur River and Key Lake, and it owns a majority stake in and operates Cigar Lake, another of the world's richest uranium mines.

16:47Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It

16:47Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): holds a forty 40% percent interest in the Inkai joint venture in Kazakhstan. alongside the state producer. It also owns refining and conversion capacity in Ontario at Blind River and Port Hope, and fuel manufacturing facilities.

17:00Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

17:00Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): distinction between total joint venture output and Camico's share is critical.

17:05Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): When

17:05Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Camico reports producing 21.0 million pounds in 2025, that is its share, not the full output of the mines it operates. Its partners own the rest.

17:15Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A

17:15Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): great deal of loose talk about Camico producing a given volume confuses the two.

17:21Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On

17:21Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the global stage, Camico is one of a handful of producers that matter.

17:25Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

17:25Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): World Nuclear Association's production table for 2024 put Kazakhstan's state company, Kazatomprom, at about 21% of world mine production, Camico at about 17%, France's Orano at about 11%, and China's. China General Nuclear at about 10%. MacArthur River slash Key Lake and Cigar Lake ranked among the largest producing mines in the world. Four suppliers produce well over half of the world's mined uranium, and two of the largest are directly controlled by governments. Production share is not the same as market share in contracted deliveries, though. Camico also buys uranium from others and sells it under its contracts, and it holds in inventory.

18:03Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A

18:04Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): buyer cares about who signs and delivers the contract, not whose mine the specific atoms came

18:09Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): from. That

18:10Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): is part of the commercial edge. Camico can meet commitments from a mix of sources. It is also part of the risk because pounds bought on the market do not carry the cost advantage of pounds mined from a Tier 1 deposit.

18:21Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

18:21Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): third quarter of 2026 shows how the mix works. During the quarter, Camico Camiko bought about 1.8%. million pounds of uranium at an average price of about $60 per pound, and it ended the period holding about 8.5 million pounds in inventory. Those purchases were not a sign of distress, they are how an integrated supplier smooths the gap between when a mine produces and when a customer wants delivery.

18:46Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But

18:46Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): each purchased pound carries a cost. Realized prices depend on which content. contracts deliver in a given period at what fixed or market linked terms. Costs depend on mine performance, on the price of purchased pounds, on transport and conversion. When production falls short, Camico can still deliver by buying, but it earns less on those deliveries.

19:07Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): That

19:07Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): is why a quarter with roughly flat revenue can produce a collapse in margin. Where the moat could break.

19:15Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

19:15Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): contract book also concentrates risk. Camico's customers are utilities, and a small number of them buy very large volumes.

19:23Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In

19:23Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): 2025, three customers accounted for about 20% of uranium and fuel services revenue, down from about 34% in 2024. Camico does not name them, and its annual report does not disclose its top five or top ten share.

19:38Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): That is

19:38Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): not unusual. in the industry, but it means the reader cannot see how much leverage any single utility holds.

19:45Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

19:45Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): credit record is clean.

19:47Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): At

19:47Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the end of 2025, almost all of Camico's trade receivables were current. Just over $1 million was more than 30 days past due on a book of about $338 million, and every customer accounting for more than 10% of receivables carried an investment grade rating. Utilities pay their bills. The risk is not that a buyer defaults, it is that a buyer negotiates hard, sources from someone else, or delays signing, as utilities did for years after Fukushima. In 2026, Camiko signed a long-term uranium supply agreement with India for nearly 22 million pounds over nine years on market-related terms. At the reference price used in the announcement, the deal was worth about $2.6 billion. It is a concrete commercial win with one of the world's fastest growing nuclear programs, and it demonstrates that Camico can win long-dated government business. It also tests the moat. Government buyers are the most demanding counterparties in the world. They can diversify suppliers by policy,

20:47demand domestic content, and set terms to suit national strategies. strategy rather than commercial logic. The India contract is market related, which means its eventual value will depend on uranium prices during delivery, not on a price locked at signing.

21:01Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It

21:01Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): is a meaningful volume, about two point four million pounds a year on average, but it is not a fixed price windfall. So, the contract book works as a bridge between geology and cash. It reduces the risk of having nowhere to sell. it does not remove commodity risk, and it rewards a supplier that delivers on time. That raises the operational question that the shutdown left hanging. When the contracts came back, could Camico actually produce the pounds at the cost it needed? For more than four years, MacArthur River sat on care and maintenance. The pumps and freeze systems that keep water out of a mine and saturated sandstone had to keep running. and the equipment had to be maintained, but no ore came out. Then, in 2022, with utilities finally returning to the term market, Camiko began bringing MacArthur River and Key Lake back. By 2024, the complex produced a record volume of packaged uranium. That restart is the moment the shutdown story acquires a happy ending, and it is the version most often told. Camiko Camico is held its nerve, refused to sell cheaply, and was rewarded when the market came back. There is truth in it. The question is whether the record supports the stronger claim that Camiko's discipline created a durable commercial advantage, or only the weaker one, that it survived a bad cycle intelligently.

22:20Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

22:20Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): revenue record helps answer that. Over the ten 10 years to 2025, Camico's revenue grew only about two. 2.4% a year in Canadian dollars. Over the five years from 2020 to 2025, growth was about 14% a year. And from 2022 to 2025, it was about 23% a year. Reported revenue reached about $3.5 billion in 2025, up from about $2.6 billion dollars in 2023. The acceleration looks impressive, but each period tells a different story. The 10-year figure includes the long downturn, so it compares a recovered business with a weakened one. The shorter periods begin near the trough, when revenue had fallen for several years in a row, so they show recovery from a low base. And from November 2023, Camico's net results also include its share of Westinghouse earnings, which do not appear in revenue but do appear in profit. Recent growth is real. It is not a clean measure. of a new trend line. Profitability tells the same story more sharply. Operating margin moved from losses in 2020 and 2021 to about 17% in 2025.

23:25Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): That

23:26Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): is a large swing, and it reflects both higher realized prices and production returning. But a 17% operating margin is still modest for a company often described as owning the world's best uranium assets.

23:39Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And

23:39Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the third quarter collapse showed how quickly that margin can vanish. Did the restart deliver? In 2025, Camico produced 21.0 million pounds of uranium, its share, which beat its revised guidance. That revision matters. Camico had cut its outlook earlier in the year and then delivered slightly more than the lower number. Beating a reduced target is a sign of operational. recovery, but it is not the same as meeting the original plan.

24:07Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

24:07Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): 2026 record so far is weaker.

24:10Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In

24:10Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the first nine months of 2026, Camico's share of production was about 13.6 million pounds, down from about 15.0 million a year earlier. Management narrowed its four-year Year guidance to between 19.5 and 20.5 million pounds.

24:25Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

24:25Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Key Lake Mill the processing plant for MacArthur River Ore, had run through an extended maintenance shutdown that included new infrastructure and major repairs. None of this is a disaster. A mine that produces about 20 million pounds instead of twenty one is still a large, productive operation. But it is a reminder that restarted assets are still old assets in harsh conditions. Key Lake has been processing ore for decades. The work it needs is the price of its age. When production lags, Camico fills the gap by buying.

24:56Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In

24:56Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the third quarter of twenty twenty six, its average purchase cost was above its average inventory cost, meaning each purchased pound was more expensive than the pounds already on the shelf.

25:06Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): That

25:06Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): is the hidden cost of a production shortfall.

25:09Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

25:09Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): contract book still has to be served, and a rising market makes it more expensive to serve it from other people's pounds. And restart, therefore, leave Camico at a strategic fork. It can push for maximum output from its best assets, accepting higher capital spending and operating risk. It can prioritize margins, selling only what it produces at good terms and buying sparingly. Or it can preserve optionality, keeping some pounds uncommitted in the hope that prices rise further.

25:56Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It

25:56Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): cannot maximize all three at once. The record narrows the claim about discipline rather than rejecting it. Camico's supply restraint helped it survive and positioned it to benefit when contracting returned, but its recovery has not been a straight line, and its ability to meet production targets has been tested twice in two years.

26:16Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

26:16Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): confirming evidence would be several consecutive years of production at or above guidance, with unit costs stable. The falsifying evidence would be another narrowed outlook. While its mines and mills were struggling back to full speed, though, Camico made its largest bet in a generation on a company that had itself been through bankruptcy.

26:36Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In

26:36Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): October 2022, Camico and Brookfield Renewable Partners announced that they would buy Westinghouse Electric Company from Brookfield Business Partners.

26:44Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

26:44Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): announced enterprise value was $7.875 seven point eight seven five billion, dollars, a number that included Westinghouse's debt. Brookfield Renewable and its institutional partners would own fifty-one percent, and Camico forty-nine percent.

26:58Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

26:58Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): deal closed in November 2023, with the final enterprise value adjusted to about eight point two billion dollars. Camico paid about two point one four billion for its stake.

27:09Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

27:09Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): name Westinghouse carries more than a century of American industrial history, and some of it is really. recent and painful. In 2017, its construction of two pairs of AP 1000 reactors in Georgia and South Carolina ran so far over budget and schedule that Westinghouse filed for bankruptcy protection, nearly dragging down its Japanese parent, Toshiba.

27:31Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In

27:31Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): January 2018, In Brookfield Business Partners agreed to buy the company out of bankruptcy for about $4.6 billion. Brookfield refocused it on the steady side of the business: fuel, maintenance, outage services, and parts for the reactors already operating around the world. Four and a half years later, the price for the whole company was about 70% higher.

27:53Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

27:53Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): comparison is tempting and dangerous.

27:56Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In

27:57Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): 2018, twenty eighteen, Westinghouse was a bankrupt business with uncertain liabilities, sold in distress. By twenty twenty two, it had been restructured. The world was rethinking energy security after Russia's invasion of Ukraine, and nuclear power was moving back into policy favor. Ownership, debt, investment levels, and market expectations had all changed.

28:17Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

28:17Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): twenty eighteen price is a historical reference point, not a comparable Terrible transaction.

28:22Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But

28:22Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it shows that Camiko Camico bought after the turnaround, not before. Westinghouse Westinghouse's was contribution to Camico remains a single line in earnings, with cash arriving only when Westinghouse pays distributions to its owners. Services business from owning a piece of the company that services so many reactors.

28:49Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

28:49Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): strategic fit is credible. Westinghouse designs reactors, manufactures fuel assemblies, and provides the services utilities need to keep reactors running for 60 or 80 years. Camico mines uranium and converts it. Together, the two cover much of the nuclear fuel cycle, with enrichment as the main missing link. A utility that buys fuel from Westinghouse and uranium from Camico is dealing with two kinds of companies that now share an owner. But fit is not the same as revenue.

29:19Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): There

29:20Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): is no public evidence that utilities award Camico more uranium contracts because it owns part of Westinghouse, and customers generally buy each stage of the fuel cycle separately. Synergy is the opening argument for the deal. It is not, on its own, a measurable return. How Camico Paid. Camico funded its share of the purchase with roughly US $1.5 billion of cash, $600 million of term loans, and the proceeds of an earlier share offering of about $34 million shares. That offering, sold in October 2022 to prefund the deal, diluted existing holders by roughly 8%.

29:56Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

29:56Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): cash came from a balance sheet that had been built up during the recovery. At the end of 2022, Camico held about U.S. one point eight billion dollars of cash in short term investments. A year later, after closing, it held about four hundred twenty million dollars.

30:11Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In

30:11Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): other words, Camico used most of its liquidity, borrowed, and issued shares. The acquisition did not over lever the company. But it did convert a large cash cushion into an illiquid minority stake, and it is worth remembering that sequence now that Camico has filed for the ability to issue another one billion dollars of shares.

30:37Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): For

30:37Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): twenty twenty four, the first full year of ownership, Camico guided that its share of Westinghouse's adjusted Ebit Da would be between about four hundred forty five and five hundred ten million dollars.

30:49Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): To

30:49Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): compare that with the price, Thomas. take Camiko's forty nine percent of the roughly US eight point two billion dollar enterprise value, which is about US four billion dollars, or around five point five billion dollars at the exchange rates of the time. Divide by the guided Ebitda range, and the implied entry multiple lands at roughly eleven to thirteen times enterprise value to Ebitda. Ebit Dah. That is a full price for a services heavy industrial business. but not an outlandish one. There is no clean, public, comparable transaction for a company like Westinghouse, which is why no honest analysis can declare it a bargain or an overpayment from the multiple alone. The test is whether Westinghouse grows earnings and distributions enough to earn a return on the cash, debt, and diluted equity Camico committed.

31:36Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

31:36Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): boom year. In twenty twenty five, Westinghouse looked like a jackpot. Camico's share of Westinghouse's adjusted Ebada rose by about two hundred ninety seven million dollars, helped by a large contribution linked to Westinghouse's role in the Dukovny New Build Project in the Czech Republic. Camico reported about two hundred sixteen million dollars of share of earnings from equity accounted investees in twenty 2025, twenty five, and it received about four $447 hundred forty seven million dollars in dividends. from those investees, which include Westinghouse and others. That dividend figure is easy to misread as a Westinghouse check. It is not. Camico's related party note records about $137 million of dividends from associates, the category Westinghouse sits in, in 2025. The larger balance came from its other equity equity-accounted accounted investments, chiefly the Incae Inkai Joint Venture in Kazakhstan. Westinghouse's distributions arrived in a year flush with Dukovny related cash, which is precisely why they should not be read as a steady annual yield on Camiko's

32:36investment.

32:37Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But

32:37Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the boom was not a run rate.

32:39Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In

32:39Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the first nine months of 2026, Camico's share of Westinghouse's adjusted EBITDA was about four $427 hundred twenty seven million dollars, compared with about five $569 hundred sixty nine million dollars in the same period of 2025. The difference is mostly the absence of the large project-linked contribution.

32:58Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A

32:58Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): reader who extrapolated 2025 into the future would have overstated Westinghouse's steady state earnings by a wide margin.

33:06Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): There

33:07Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): is a second gap worth understanding between Camico's share of Westinghouse's adjusted ebida EBITDA and the much smaller share of earnings that reaches its income statement.

33:16Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): When

33:16Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): a company buys another, accounting rules require it to revalue the acquired assets, including contracts, technology, and customer relationships, and then to depreciate those new values over time. Add Westinghouse's own interest costs and taxes, and a share of EBITDA measured in the hundreds of millions shrinks considerably by the time it becomes net earnings.

33:37Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

33:37Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): EBITA ebit figure of tells us that

33:38Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the

33:39Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): investors how the business is performing. The earnings figure tells them how much of the purchase price is being worked off, and the distribution figure tells them how much cash actually came home. Only the last one pays for anything. The project pattern matters because project revenue is the most volatile part of Westinghouse's business. Fuel and services revenue tends to recur because reactors keep running. Construction revenue arrives in bursts tied to milestones, and history, including Westinghouse's own bankruptcy, shows that construction contracts can also generate large losses. The most dramatic development came in late October 2025. Camico and Brookfield announced a partnership with the United States government, under which Washington would facilitate financing and approvals for new Westinghouse reactors, representing at least eighty $80 billion dollars of investment. In return, the government would receive a participation interest entitling it, once vested, to 20% of Westinghouse cash distributions above $17.5 billion, and, under certain conditions, the right to require an initial public offering of Westinghouse. Camico's shares rose sharply on the news.

34:46Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

34:46Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): AP 1000 one thousand is the design at the heart of that ambition, a large pressure. pressurized water reactor of roughly a gigawatt, built with passive safety systems that rely on gravity and natural circulation rather than pumps to cool the core in an emergency. Think of it as a reactor designed to keep itself safe with the power off. The engineering is not the hard part. The problem with the AP one hundred has never been whether it works. It has been whether anyone can build it on budget, which is why the financing promise mattered more than anything. any technical milestone.

35:16Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

35:16Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): announcement was a term sheet, not a construction contract. Vesting of the government's interest depends on final investment decisions and definitive agreements for the reactor projects.

35:26Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On

35:26Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the third quarter, twenty twenty six call, management described a pipeline of ninety one potential AP one thousand units around the world. That figure is a list of opportunities, not orders.

35:36Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

35:36Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): questions that decide the value are how many reactors. reach funded contracts, how many reach construction, and how much of the economics flows to Westinghouse's owners rather than to builders, governments, and lenders.

35:47Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

35:47Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): partnership also reshapes the upside. If Westinghouse ever generates very large distributions, a fifth of the excess goes to the U.S. government. That is a reasonable price for policy support that could make reactors financeable, but it is a cost, and it trims the tail of outcomes that bowls often point to.

36:07Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

36:07Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): verdict on Westinghouse is provisional. It is a strategic acquisition with a plausible industrial fit, bought at a price roughly 70% above its distressed 2018 value, and at an implied multiple of about 11 to 13 times guided EBITDA. It's delivered economics in 2025. Whether it earns back its cost will depend on recurring earnings and distributions over many years, not on pipeline announcements. And it now competes for attention with the operating problems back home in Saskatchewan, which came to a head in the third quarter of 2026. The Key Lake Mill sits in the boreal forest of northern Saskatchewan. a long drive north of Saskatoon and a world away from data centers and policy summits. In twenty twenty six it underwent a planned maintenance shutdown, and when Camico reported its third quarter results, commissioning was still in progress.

37:05Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

37:05Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): mill ran longer offline than usual, and that one decision reshaped the year. Third quarter revenue was about US four hundred forty forty-two two million dollars. essentially flat against a year earlier. Operating profit, however, fell about 73% to roughly $18 million. The operating margin, about 15% a year earlier, shrank to around 4%. Westinghouse earnings also eased from the prior year's project boosted level.

37:34Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): To

37:34Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): read that quarter, it helps to separate Camco's Camico's three engines. Uranium is the largest by far, the segment where mine output, contract prices, and purchase costs combine to drive most of the company's earnings. Fuel services, which includes refining, conversion, and fuel manufacturing, is smaller but strategic, because conversion capacity in the Western world is scarce, and because it ties Camico to customers at another step of the fuel chain. Westinghouse is a third engine. that runs on its own clock, with earnings driven by service contracts and construction milestones that have nothing to do with Key Lake.

38:10Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In

38:10Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the third quarter, management attributed the weaker consolidated results to lower uranium sales volumes and higher unit costs, while the previously noted Westinghouse decline reduced net results. These effects come from different places. The operating margin collapse is a uranium segment. story, driven by fewer pounds sold and each pound costing more because the mill was down.

38:32Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

38:32Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Westinghouse decline affects net earnings below the operating line because it is an equity accounted result. Management framed the quarter as timing and transition. Lower output now, a more reliable mill later. That explanation is plausible, and the company gave a specific reason rather than a vague one.

38:50Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But

38:50Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): investors should judge it by what happens next. Maintenance that improves reliability should show up in steadier production and falling unit costs in 2027. If it does not, the explanation will look like an excuse. Over the 12 years from 2014 to 2025, Camico generated about $6.9 billion dollars of cash from operations, against only about $1.3 billion of cumulative. net profit.

39:16Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): That

39:16Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): fivefold gap is striking, and Bulls cited as proof that reported earnings understate the business.

39:22Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): There

39:22Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): is truth there, but it needs qualification. Much of the difference is depreciation, a non cash charge that reflects the wearing out of mines and mills that must eventually be replaced. Some reflects working capital swings as inventory is built and drawn down.

39:37Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Some

39:37Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): comes from unreported. unrealized derivative losses and impairments that hit profit without touching cash.

39:43Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And

39:43Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): in recent years, a growing share comes from distributions from equity accounted investees, Inkay and Westinghouse among

39:51Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): them. In

39:51Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): 2025 alone, operating cash flow of about $1.4 billion included about $447 million of such dividends. Cash generation is real, but it is not. the same as a recurring cash yield. Capital spending is rising. Camico spent about $333 million on property, plant, and equipment in 2025, and its 2026 guidance had called for between $490 and $540 million, including work at Key Lake, Cigar Lake, and MacArthur River, and on aging infrastructure.

40:23Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In

40:23Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the third quarter, management lowered its expected 2026. capital spending as some projects moved beyond year end. Spending slipping into the next year is not a sign of saving. It is a sign of delayed work. Currency adds another layer of noise. Camico sells mostly in US dollars and pays most of its costs in Canadian dollars, so it hedges under a policy that allows it to cover between 35% and 100% of expected net exposure up to five years after. out.

40:51Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): At

40:52Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the end of 2025, it had about US $2.2 billion of US dollar hedges in place, covering about two-thirds of 2026 exposure. Those contracts are marked to market each quarter, which is why Camiko swung from derivative losses of about C 183 million dollars in 2024 to gains of about C95 million dollars in 2025. Neither number

41:14Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): of the same thing.

41:15Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): says anything about how many pounds were mined or what they cost. A careful reader strips them out before judging the operating trend. Camico expected research and development, mostly for global laser enrichment, the laser based uranium enrichment technology it is developing with its partner Silex to rise to between $50 million and $55 million in 2026. That is a small sum relative to the company, and it buys an option on entering enrichment, the step of the fuel cycle Camico does not currently serve.

41:43Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It

41:43Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): is not yet revenue. The man at the top. Tim Gitzel has run Camico since July 2011. He was born and raised in Saskatchewan, studied law at the University of Saskatchewan, and spent years in the uranium business before joining Camico, including running the global mining business of the French nuclear group Areva from Paris. He returned home to join Camico in 2007 as chief operating officer, was named president in 2010, and became chief executive the following year.

42:10Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He

42:10Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): took the job months after the Fukushima disaster, and he has now led the company through the entire downturn and recovery.

42:17Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): That

42:17Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): tenure is the best evidence for judging him. He steered Camico through the shutdown and restart and made the Westinghouse bet. Few chief executives in any industry have had to manage. a single company through such a complete cycle. The record shows patience and balance sheet caution in the downturn. It shows ambition in the recovery. His pay has risen with the recovery. His total compensation awarded for 2025 was about 10.96 million dollars, up from about 7.93 million in 2024. Total pay for the named executive officers was

42:50Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a very good thing.

42:51Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): about 1.5% of adjusted EBITA. Gitzel also owns a lot of the company. At the end of 2025, he held 532,211 shares plus share units, with total holdings valued at about $88 million, well above the requirement for the chief executive to own five times his salary. His wealth is tied to the share price.

43:14Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

43:14Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): long-term awards are mainly performance share units that pay according to share price performance over three years. That aligns executives with shareholders, but it also rewards them for share price gains driven by uranium prices or policy announcements, rather than operational execution alone.

43:31Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

43:31Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): management bench has changed. Grant Isaac, long the chief financial officer, became president and chief operating officer in September 2020. 2025. Heidi Schocke became Chief Financial Officer and is due to retire at the end of March 2027, with Leah Hipperson slated to take over as CFO on January 1, 2027. These are orderly transitions, but they mean that the finance chair will have had two occupants in roughly two years. Judged by outcomes rather than self description, the record on guidance is mixed. Camico cut its 2025 production outlook, then beat the lower number. It narrowed its 2026 production outlook after the Key Lake outage and lowered expected capital spending as projects slipped. Those are not dramatic misses. They are a pattern of modest overpromising on operating plans, which matters more in a company priced as richly as this one. Owning Westinghouse also creates large flows between the two companies. In 2025, Camco bought about $462 million of products from associates, chiefly from Westinghouse, roughly 13% of Camco's revenue by comparison. Set against the dividends Westinghouse paid back to Camco that year, the purchases ran more than three times larger. These are purchases and distributions, not sales. Camco is a customer of Westinghouse.

44:51buying fuel products it then supplies onward. Such flows are normal in the industry, but they show how intertwined the two businesses have become. So the twenty twenty six update is a useful corrective to the platform narrative. Contracted demand and nuclear policy do not guarantee smooth quarterly earnings. Camco's execution, its production, its costs, and the timing of Westinghouse's project revenue remains central to the investment case. And behind all of it sits a legal fight with the Canadian Tax Authority that has been running for nearly two decades.

45:25Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

45:25Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): dispute began with a structure set up in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Camico sold uranium through a Swiss subsidiary under long-term long term contracts, and when uranium prices rose sharply in the mid-2000s, mid 2000s, much of the profit was earned in Switzerland rather than in Canada.

45:41Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

45:41Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Canada Revenue Agency argued that the arrangement was a transfer pricing scheme that shifted taxable income out of the country. Camico argued it was a legitimate commercial structure. For years, the two sides have fought over who earned what and where. Camico has won the most important rounds so far. Canadian courts rejected the CRA's position for the early tax years, and the Supreme Court of Canada declined to hear the government's appeal.

46:06Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): That

46:06Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): should have ended the matter. It did not.

46:08Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

46:09Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): CRA continued to reassess later years, using different arguments. What is still at stake?

46:15Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): For

46:15Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the years 2007 to 2013, after reducing its claims by about $1.8 billion, the CRA's remaining adjustment to Camico's taxable income was about $3.3 billion. Camico is appealing and seeking the return of security it has posted.

46:31Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): For

46:31Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): 2014 to 2017, Camico remitted about $209 million in cash and provided about $350 million of letters of credit, a combined $559 million of security.

46:43Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It

46:43Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): has also paid about $346 million of cash tax for 2024 through 2026 to date, because the reassessment reassessments reduce the tax pools it could otherwise use. Further reassessments relate to 2018 and 2019.

46:57Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It

46:57Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): is important to read those numbers correctly.

46:59Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A

47:00Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): $3.3 billion adjustment to taxable income is not a $3.3 billion tax bill. It is a disputed amount of income on which tax might be owed if Camico loses.

47:10Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

47:10Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): cash Camico has paid or secured is real and has already left the company or retired. tied up its credit lines.

47:16Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

47:16Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): ultimate cost depends on the courts, and Camiko's past record in this fight is strong.

47:21Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But

47:21Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the dispute has already affected cash taxes and liquidity, so it is not a theoretical footnote.

47:27Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): At

47:27Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the end of September 2026, Camico held about C eight hundred sixty million dollars of cash and carried about one point zero billion dollars of debt, with its one point. zero billion revolving credit facility undrawn.

47:45Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): That

47:46Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): is a comfortable position for a company of its size. But the history councils humility. During the last downturn, Camico cut its dividend by eighty percent to protect its credit rating. Today it faces rising capital spending, potential Westinghouse funding needs. tax security and cash tax payments, and the ATM program. The tax case competes with the mines, Westinghouse, and shareholders for capital. It is one more reason the ATM program exists as insurance. Camico's current issuer ratings are BBB from Morningstar DBRS, BAA2 BAA two from Moody's, and BBB from S. SP Global, with stable trends from DBRS and Moody's and a positive outlook from SP. DBRS confirmed its rating in June 2026. Those are solid investment grade ratings, a notch or two above the lowest investment grade tier, consistent with a cyclical commodity producer with a strong balance sheet.

48:47Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

48:47Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): auditor's opinion on the 2025 financial statements was unqualified.

48:51Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

48:52Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): critical audit matter the auditor highlighted was the recoverability of about $666 million of deferred tax assets, whose value depends on Camico generating enough future taxable income in Canada to use

49:05Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): them.

49:06Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): That is a judgment call, and it ties back to the tax dispute and the earnings outlook. Camico is widely held with no controlling shareholder. Canadian law, reflecting the strategic nature of uranium, caps any single shareholder or group at 25% of the votes for directors. The largest disclosed holder in mid 2026 was BlackRock, which reported owning about 5% of the shares in a July 2026 filing.

49:32Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): At

49:32Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the 2026 annual meeting, the advisory vote on executive pay received about 97% support before it was. a statutory adjustment. These facts show a governance structure without a dominant owner and shareholders broadly comfortable with pay. They do not, on their own, prove anything about operating quality. Two features of the dispute deserve emphasis for long-term holders. The first is duration.

49:56Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A

49:56Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): fight that began over tax years in the mid-2000s mid 2000s is still generating reassessments for years near the end of the last decade. and each new round requires fresh cash or letters of credit while the appeal runs.

50:08Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Even

50:08Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): when Camico wins, money can be locked up for years before it comes back.

50:13Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

50:13Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): second is accounting. Because Camico says it believes it will ultimately prevail, it does not book the full disputed amounts as liabilities. It treats much of the cash it has remitted as recoverable. That is a reasonable judgment given its court record, but it is not. a judgment, and it sits alongside the deferred tax assets, whose recoverability the auditor flagged. If the courts were to rule against Camico on the later years, both the balance sheet and the income statement would feel

50:39Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it.

50:40Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): The tax case is therefore best understood as a drag on liquidity rather than an existential threat. It has already absorbed hundreds of millions in cash and security, and future outcomes could release or use. absorb more.

50:52Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): With

50:52Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that weight acknowledged, the full case can be assessed. Put the three businesses on the table side by side.

50:59Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A

50:59Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): uranium mine in northern Saskatchewan, producing pounds that will be delivered under contracts signed years ago,

51:06Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a

51:06Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): conversion plant in Ontario, turning uranium into the gas that enrichment plants need,

51:12Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and

51:12Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): a minority stake in Westinghouse, whose project pipeline stretches from Poland to the Carolinas. Three ways to participate in nuclear demand, each with a different path from opportunity to cash.

51:25Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

51:26Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): market values all of it at about $32 billion, or about 116 times trailing earnings, 53 times EBITDA, and 13 times sales.

51:36Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

51:36Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): free cash flow yield is about 0.7%.

51:40Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): For

51:40Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): 2026, the company expects to produce between 19.5 and 20.5 million pounds of uranium, its share. Those numbers frame the debate. The question is not whether Camico is a good company, it is whether its future cash can justify a price that already assumes Consumes a great deal of

51:58Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it.

51:58Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Start with buyers. Utilities are concentrated and sophisticated. Their procurement teams negotiate contracts that stretch for a decade. They want security of supply, which gives qualified suppliers bargaining power, but they also diversify among suppliers deliberately. Buyer power is meaningful. Suppliers to Camico matter less. The key inputs are labor, contractors, reagents, and energy in remote locations. Purchased uranium is a

52:26Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): very important thing.

52:27Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): more supplier relationship, and when Camico must buy pounds to meet contracts, it pays market prices. Rivals are few, with production concentrated among a handful of producers.

52:38Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): That

52:38Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): concentration helps price discipline, but state producers may act for national rather than commercial reasons, and Kazakhstan's output decisions can move the market.

52:48Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): New

52:48Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): entrants face long timelines. Developing a new uranium mine takes many years of exploration, licensing, and construction, especially in jurisdictions with strict nuclear regulation. Several developers in Saskatchewan's Athabasca Basin are advancing projects, but none is likely to match MacArthur River's scale soon. Substitutes for uranium in a reactor do not exist. Substitutes for nuclear power do, gas, renewables with storage. and efficiency. Nuclear's case rests on reliability and carbon free output. If other technologies close that gap, demand growth would slow.

53:24Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In

53:25Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Hamilton Helmer's language, Camico's strongest claim is a cornered resource, high grade Canadian deposits that cannot be replicated.

53:33Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

53:33Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): evidence supports that claim, but the shutdown years narrow it. A cornered resource is only powerful. when buyers will pay for its output, and for several years they would not. Scale economies are real but limited. Large, high-grade mines have lower unit costs than small or low-grade ones, but Camiko's 2026 quarter shows that scale does not protect against operational disruptions. Switching costs are moderate. Utilities must qualify suppliers and fuel which creates friction. They can and do diversify over time. Process power, the accumulated know-how to mine in frozen, radioactive, waterlogged conditions, is a genuine advantage. It was earned over decades at MacArthur River and Cigar Lake.

54:17Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): There

54:18Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): are no network effects. Counterpositioning and branding are weak. Or Taken together, Camico's advantage is a scale and system advantage, a combination of high grade reserves, existing mines, conversion capacity, customer relationships, and Westinghouse ownership that is difficult to assemble quickly. It is not a monopoly.

54:36Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

54:36Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): case for the pounds. Long term contracting has restarted, and Camico has visible commercial proof. The company reported more than 28 twenty eight million pounds of average annual deliveries contracted over five years, along with the India Agreement. Its assets are large and operating, global production is concentrated, and Western utilities have reasons to prefer Canadian supply over state-controlled alternatives. Westinghouse gives Camico exposure to reactor services and fuel fabrication, and the U.S. government partnership could, if it advances to definitive agreements, create a construction pipeline that the industry has not seen in decades. The case against the price. The case can break in several ways. Mine and mill outages, as at Key Lake in 2026, raise unit costs and force purchases at market prices. Customer concentration gives utilities leverage. Uranium prices remain cyclical, and the market-related market related contracts that give Camico Chemico upside also transmit downside. Westinghouse's earnings are lumpy, and its construction history includes a bankruptcy.

55:43Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

55:44Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): CRA dispute ties up cash,

55:46Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and

55:46Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): at today's price, even ordinary disappointments can matter a great deal. An activist looking at Camico would ask a pointed question: Does this management team deploy capital well?

55:57Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

55:57Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): record is mixed.

55:59Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

55:59Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): earlier impairments and MacArthur River shutdown were defensible responses. to a downturn, and the later restart validated the patients.

56:06Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But

56:07Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): they show that management has had to abandon or idle assets when the cycle turned.

56:11Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

56:11Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Westinghouse deal is the next large test. Its value rests on future earnings that have so far been inflated by one project.

56:19Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

56:19Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): activist would also ask why a company that generated about 6.9 six point nine billion of operating cash over 12 twelve years and now trades at a lofty. valuation needs authority to issue another US one billion dollars of shares?

56:31Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

56:32Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): answer may be prudent preparation for Westinghouse capital calls, mine investment, or tax outcomes. It may also be opportunism, selling shares at a high multiple. Either way, the burden falls on management to show the money earns more than the dilution costs.

56:48Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

56:48Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): same activist would push on disclosure. Camico does not name its largest customers or publish its top five revenue share, so outsiders cannot judge how dependent the contract book is on a few utilities. In services profit from project milestones without waiting for management to explain the difference.

57:14Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And

57:14Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the company's preferred measure of Westinghouse, adjusted EBITDA, sits several steps away from the cash that actually arrives in Saskatoon.

57:23Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): None

57:23Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): of this is unusual for a minority stake, but in a company whose valuation leans so heavily on Westinghouse's future, opacity carries a cost. At this valuation, a shareholder is entitled to ask for a clearer view of what the second engine earns in a normal year. Finally, the activist would question the incentive plan. Performance share units that pay on three-year share price performance reward management when uranium prices or policy headlines lift the stock, whether or not the mills run on time.

57:53Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A

57:53Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): scorecard that tied a larger share of pay to production against guidance, unit costs, and cash distributions received would align executives more tightly with the measures. that decide the investment case. Are strategically relevant. They are not orders or recurring revenue. The history of the nuclear industry, including Westinghouse's own past, shows that milestones, designs, and memoranda of understanding often take many years to become cash, and some never do. Investors should track signed projects, committed capital, and Camico's actual share of cash distributions rather than pipeline counts. Camico's Camiko's PE is close to its own five-year five year median. That might sound like a reassuring, but it means only that the market has consistently paid a high multiple. A normal historical multiple is not cheap if the earnings underneath it are low relative

59:01to what the price requires.

59:03Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): At

59:03Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the November 13 price, the shares offered a.9% earnings yield and a.7% percent free cash flow yield. Kazotumprom, Kazatimprom, the largest producer, trades at a fraction of Camiko's Camico's multiple. multiples on vendor data, though the comparison is imperfect because the two differ in geography, structure, and Camico's Westinghouse and Fuel Services exposure.

59:24Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

59:24Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): gap shows how much of a premium investors place on Camico's jurisdiction, assets, and nuclear platform story. Three measures will tell the story. First, Camico's share of uranium production against guidance. 2026 Guidance is 19%. 19.5 to 20.5 million pounds, and nine-month output was below the prior year's pace. Second, realized uranium price and unit cost on delivered pounds, which reveal whether contracts and operations are converting into margin. Third, cash received from Westinghouse, separated into recurring operations and project-link project linked distributions. Its share of EBITDA Ebita has fallen from the 2025 peak.

1:00:02Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

1:00:03Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Verdict Camico holds a credible position in a concentrated capital intensive supply chain, but its moat is conditional on execution and contract economics.

1:00:12Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): At

1:00:13Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): today's valuation, sustained production, margin, and cash conversion matter more than broad nuclear demand forecasts.

1:00:20Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

1:00:20Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): lessons of its story extend beyond uranium. Go back to the winter of 2018, twenty eighteen, when the lights were. went out at MacArthur River and the dividend was cut by four fifths.

1:00:31Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Then

1:00:31Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): fast forward to late 2023, when Camico wrote one of the largest checks in its history to buy a stake in a reactor company. Those two decisions, years apart, bracket almost everything Camico teaches.

1:00:44Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

1:00:45Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): first lesson is that a mine is only an advantage when the contract pays for the pounds. MacArthur Rivers geology did not change while it sat idle. What changed was whether utilities would sign. Camico's supply discipline preserved value through the downturn, but the losses and layoffs showed how sharply returns fall when buyers walk away. For investors in any scarce resource business, the question is not whether the resource is rare, it is whether someone is willing to commit to buying it on terms that cover its cost.

1:01:15Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

1:01:16Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): second lesson is that a good asset can still produce a bad annual result.

1:01:21Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

1:01:21Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): third quarter 2026 outage at Key Lake showed how quickly operating results can move, even when revenue is flat. Delivery timing, purchased pounds, and production costs move the numbers around even when the underlying resource remains scarce. Resource quality sets the long run potential. Operations decide each year's results. Investors who confuse the two will overreact to good quarters and bad ones alike.

1:01:46Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

1:01:46Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): third lesson is that strategic fit is the opening argument, not the verdict. Westinghouse connects Camico to the global reactor fleet, and the logic of owning fuel and machinery together is easy to tell. But the results to date have been lumpy, and only recurring earnings and cash distribution. distributions can validate the price Camico paid. Founders and investors should treat every platform acquisition this way. The story earns a hearing, and the cash earns the verdict. Camico cut its dividend and held output back to protect its credit rating. It survived because it cannot be. kept its balance sheet intact. Now, with capital spending rising, tax security outstanding, Westinghouse ambitions growing, and a one billion dollar share sale program in place, capital discipline is relevant again. The best time to protect a cyclical company's balance sheet is before the cycle turns. Tonight, Camico stands at the intersection of a recovering mine and a booming narrative, and evaluation that leaves little room for error. Its 2026 production guidance remains the immediate benchmark. Its contract book

1:03:00is substantial, and its ATM authority is in place.

1:03:04Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

1:03:04Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): next production update will come as Key Lake finishes commissioning its new infrastructure. If the mill returns to steady output and unit costs fall in 2027, managed management's explanation for the 2026 disruption will hold, and the claim that Camico can align Tier I output with delivery commitments will strengthen. If production slips again or another guidance cut follows, the market's patience could shorten quickly.

1:03:30Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

1:03:30Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): second signal is the contract book. Camico's Camiko's realized uranium price and contract mix measured against the pounds it actually delivers will be. reveal whether the company is capturing the upswing or giving too much of it to utilities through ceilings and fixed price terms.

1:03:46Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): New

1:03:46Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): market-related contracts and the first deliveries under the India Agreement will show whether the commercial momentum is real.

1:03:53Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

1:03:53Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): third is Westinghouse. Each quarter's share of adjusted EBITDA EBITA and cash distributions separated into recurring services and construction project payments will be show whether the 2025 surge was a peak or a preview. Any definitive agreements under the U.S. government partnership and any new AP 1000 orders will matter more than pipeline totals.

1:04:14Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And

1:04:14Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the fourth is the ATM.

1:04:16Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): How

1:04:16Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): much Camico sells, at what price, and for what purpose will show how management balances uranium capital spending, Westinghouse investment, tax security, and shareholder return. returns. Material dilution at a high valuation could be smart if the proceeds earn more than they cost. It could also signal that the cash needs of the nuclear renaissance are larger than investors assumed. The thesis will be decided by pounds delivered at acceptable costs, by the quality of the contracts behind them, and by Westinghouse cash earned beyond exceptional project milestones. The tension that remains is between a market already paying for that future and a company still working to deliver it. Eight years later, the Key Lake Mill is restarting after another long shutdown, this time not for lack of buyers, but for repairs, while Camico owns a large piece of the company that services reactors around the world. That is the image that captures Camico. It owns scarce assets across the nuclear

1:05:28chain, from rock in the ground to reactors on the grid. But scarcity becomes shareholder value only when contracts, operating execution, and capital discipline are meet.

1:05:40Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

1:05:40Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): fuel and the machinery may become more valuable together. Only delivered pounds and collected cash can prove it. This podcast is brought to you by EMPore.top, the stories of top companies. Disclaimer, this AI generated content is for informational purposes only and should not be considered as investment advice.

1:06:00Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): If

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