Economy & Finance

South Korea's defense industry rose from scratch via state incentives, tech transfer, and civilian-military integration.

29 min Listen to the original Episode page
Defense IndustrySouth KoreaGeopoliticsIndustrial PolicyMilitary ExportsEconomic Development

Summary

The speaker details how South Korea built a world-class defense industry starting in the late 1960s after the US shifted from aid to paid sales. Government incentives under President Park Chung-hee supported firms like Hyundai and Samsung through subsidies and tax exemptions. The strategy relied on 'learning by doing,' offset agreements for technology transfer, and integrating defense with civilian heavy industries to achieve economies of scope. Persistent North Korean threats ensured steady demand, allowing firms to lower unit costs through economies of scale. Recent successes in exporting systems like the K-9 howitzer and K-2 tank demonstrate the industry's global competitiveness.

Episode sections

  1. 0:00 – 2:24

    Introduction and Research Methodology

    The speaker introduces key Korean defense exports like the K-9 howitzer and K-2 tank, noting South Korea's rise despite lacking an industrial base 70 years prior. To understand this transformation, the speaker secured sponsorship from Arirang TV to gain access to industry insiders, government agencies like DAPA, and experts, bypassing standard open-source research limitations.

  2. 2:24 – 4:24

    Historical Context and Government Incentives

    South Korea's defense industry was spurred by the US reducing troop presence and shifting from free aid to paid sales under President Nixon in 1969. This created three incentives for self-reliance: conserving foreign currency, ensuring supply chain security against regional threats, and accessing technology restricted by the US. President Park Chung-hee supported local firms like Hyundai and Samsung with tax exemptions and subsidies.

  3. 4:24 – 6:22

    Comparative Failure of Other Nations' Defense Programs

    The speaker contrasts South Korea's success with the failures of India, Egypt, Brazil, and Argentina, which spent billions on domestic defense but failed to achieve self-sufficiency or international competitiveness. These nations struggled with cost overruns, delays, and reliance on foreign parts, whereas South Korea achieved significant independence.

  4. 6:22 – 9:55

    Learning by Doing and DAPA Procurement Rules

    South Korea avoided the pitfalls of other nations by adopting a 'learning by doing' strategy, starting with simpler technologies like light artillery and trainer aircraft before advancing to tanks and jets. The Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) follows a rule of thumb: if local industry is within two years of foreign competition, they procure domestically; otherwise, they import to facilitate technology transfer.

  5. 9:55 – 12:34

    Offset Agreements and Technology Transfer

    Offset agreements are crucial for South Korea's progress, where import deals include requirements for technology transfers, investments, or purchases. Unlike Canada's request for offsetting investments in critical minerals, South Korea prioritized technology transfers, such as licensed production of F-16s by Samsung Aerospace, which built foundational know-how for future indigenous jets.

  6. 12:34 – 15:59

    Economies of Scope and Civilian-Military Integration

    South Korea succeeded by leveraging economies of scope, integrating defense production with broader civilian heavy industries. Companies like Hyundai Rotem and Hanwha Aerospace produce both military and civilian goods (e.g., gas tankers, Boeing parts), allowing shared production lines, efficient mass production, and financial stability against defense downturns.

  7. 15:59 – 20:43

    Economies of Scale and the North Korean Threat

    The persistent threat from North Korea ensured South Korea maintained high defense spending (~2.5% of GDP), providing economies of scale through steady, high-volume orders. This allowed Korean firms like Hyundai Rotem to lower unit costs compared to European competitors like Germany's KDS, who scaled back production after the Cold War.

  8. 20:43 – 29:11

    Geopolitics in Defense Exports and Recent Successes

    Technical superiority does not guarantee export wins; geopolitical factors like offset offers, alliance value, and supply chain security often decide tenders. South Korea lost tenders in Norway, Australia, and the UAE due to diplomatic disadvantages. However, leveraging its reputation as a reliable democratic partner and offering generous offsets, South Korea recently secured missile defense contracts with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Iraq.

Claims worth verifying

Korea sold K-2 tanks to Poland, KM-SEM missile defense systems to Gulf Arab States, modern frigates to the Philippines, and FA fighter jets to the Philippines, Poland, and Malaysia.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·0:06

How to verify: Check public defense export contracts and news reports from 2026-2026 regarding Korean defense exports to these specific countries. For recent events, verify 2026-08-08 through 2026-11-08. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

70 years ago (circa 1956), South Korea was one of the poorest countries in the world with no significant industrial base.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·0:29

How to verify: Consult World Bank historical GDP per capita data or UN historical development reports for South Korea in the 1950s. For recent events, verify 2026-08-08 through 2026-11-08. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

US President Nixon told South Korea in 1969 that allies had to take more responsibility for their own defense, leading to reduced US troops and paid sales of weapons.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·2:52

How to verify: Review Nixon Doctrine speeches from 2026 and historical records of US troop reductions in South Korea during the early 1970s. For recent events, verify 2026-08-08 through 2026-11-08. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

President Park Chung-hee gave tax exemptions, state-sponsored loans, local monopoly licenses, and subsidies to Hyundai, Hanwha, Samsung, and Daewoo to set up defense production units.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·3:44

How to verify: Search Korean government archives or historical economic policy records from the Park Chung-hee era (1960s-1970s) for defense industry subsidies and corporate licenses. For recent events, verify 2026-08-08 through 2026-11-08. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

India, Egypt, Brazil, and Argentina spent billions subsidizing homegrown defense industries in the 1960s and 70s but failed to compete with South Korea; India and Brazil still depend on foreign countries for almost half their defense systems.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·4:24

How to verify: Check SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) reports on defense spending and self-sufficiency rates for India, Egypt, Brazil, and Argentina. For recent events, verify 2026-08-08 through 2026-11-08. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Egypt's 1960s rockets were not functional during the Six-Day War with Israel.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·6:42

How to verify: Review historical accounts and military analyses of the 2026 Six-Day War regarding Egyptian rocket performance. For recent events, verify 2026-08-08 through 2026-11-08. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

South Korea's K-1 battle tank was developed in the 1980s based on US technology.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·7:59

How to verify: Check defense industry histories or KAI/Hanwha Aerospace records regarding the K-1 tank development timeline and technology sourcing. For recent events, verify 2026-08-08 through 2026-11-08. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

It took 27 years from the K-1 to build the K-2 tank, exported to Poland in 2014.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·8:06

How to verify: Verify K-2 tank development start date and export contract dates with Poland via defense industry press releases or news archives. For recent events, verify 2026-08-08 through 2026-11-08. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

DAPA follows a rule of thumb: procure domestically if local industry is within two years of foreign competition; otherwise, import.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·9:35

How to verify: Review DAPA procurement guidelines or interviews with DAPA officials regarding their 'two-year rule' for domestic vs. foreign procurement. For recent events, verify 2026-08-08 through 2026-11-08. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

In 2022, South Korea's T-50 lost a trainer jet deal in the UAE to China's L-15.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·21:03

How to verify: Check UAE defense ministry announcements or major defense news outlets from 2026 regarding the trainer jet procurement decision. For recent events, verify 2026-08-08 through 2026-11-08. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Do your own research

  • Verify South Korea's current defense spending as a percentage of GDP via the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) or South Korea's Ministry of National Defense budget reports.
  • Check recent export contracts for K-9 howitzers and K-2 tanks through official announcements from Hanwha Aerospace or Hyundai Rotem.
  • Review DAPA (Defense Acquisition Program Administration) procurement guidelines to understand the 'two-year rule' for domestic vs. foreign procurement.
  • Analyze offset agreements in recent defense deals with Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Iraq to assess technology transfer components.
  • Compare unit costs of Korean defense exports against European competitors like Germany's KMW or France's Nexter using public tender data.
  • Assess geopolitical risks affecting defense exports by reviewing diplomatic relations between South Korea and key buyer nations.
  • Investigate the financial health and civilian-military revenue split of major contractors like Hanwha Aerospace and Hyundai Rotem via their annual reports.
  • Look for counter-arguments regarding the sustainability of South Korea's defense growth amid potential shifts in US alliance commitments or regional security dynamics.
Full transcriptexpand
0:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): This is the K-9 howitzer.
0:05
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
0:06
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): together with the K-2 tanks sold to Poland, the KM SEM missile defense system sold to the Gulf Arab States, and modern frigates sold to the Philippines, and the FA fighter jets delivered to the Philippines, Poland, and Malaysia. These advanced systems are the
0:24
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): ultimate symbol of how Korean the defense. industry is taking over the world.
0:29
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And in a hyper-advanced industry dominated by legacy players like France, Russia, and the US, Korea's rise is truly remarkable. Especially given that just 70 years ago, South Korea was one of the poorest countries in the world with no significant industrial base. So, how did
0:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): South Korea develop a world-class defense industry from scratch? And in today's even more dangerous global order, can other countries copy the Korean strategy to break into the notoriously complicated and secretive defense industry? Honestly, because the industry is so secretive, dominated by
1:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): big corporations, and governments determined to hide their methods, these questions were simply impossible. for me to answer, at least using my normal research process, relying on professional reports, open data, and academic research. Therefore, when Ari Rung TV contacted me to say that they wanted to sponsor a video about
1:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): a South Korean industry of my choice and that they would help me get in touch with industry insiders as well as the Korean government itself, and very important, that I would still have full editorial control apart from a single review for factual accuracy. I jumped on the opportunity and hopped on a plane.
1:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): To South Korea to interview experts from Korea's biggest companies, the Aerospace Association, Korea's biggest defense magazine, and I even got inside access to DAPA Korea's procurement agency. which also supports defense exports. It was really only thanks to their insights on government purchasing
2:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): rules of thumb, the strategic use of so-called offset, and the surprising role of North Korea that I believe I got the full picture of
2:19
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): how
2:20
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Korea built a state-of-the-art defense industry from scratch.
2:24
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): This is the border between North and South Korea. and of course, this plays a massive role in the rise of Korea's defense industry.
2:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): You see, while in the 1950s, the US had fully supported South Korea against the threat of a northern invasion, it had done so simply by giving the army all the weapons and systems that it needed. However, as the country developed, US President Nixon told South Korea in 1969 that. allies like South
2:52
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Korea had to take far more responsibility for their own defense. And in the years that followed, US troops were reduced and free weapons gave way to paid sales of the US weapon systems that South Korea literally depended on for its very survival. So, just like for nations that are under mortal threat today, this
3:12
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): retreat of the US gave Korea three strong incentives to start building its own defense industry. The first incentive is that importing expensive weapon systems costs valuable foreign currency, which countries would much rather use to develop their industries. The second incentive
3:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): is that Korea is literally surrounded by countries that have at one point or another invaded the country. Therefore, foreign weapons imports could easily be cut off in case of conflict with any of them.
3:44
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
3:44
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): then finally, while the US has historically been a very generous ally, it still restricted its most state-of-the-art defense tech. Therefore, under President Park Cheng-hee, South Korea set out to become largely self-reliant by encouraging local companies like Hyundai, Hanhua. then known as Korea Explosives,
4:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Samsung, and Dae Wu to set up defense production units by giving them tax exemptions, state-sponsored loans, local monopoly licenses, and subsidies. However, as anyone studying history will tell you, a government saying that they want something and a government that's actually doing it are two
4:24
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): very different things. For example, in the 1960s and 70s, India, Egypt, Brazil, and Argentina also spent billions of dollars subsidizing a homegrown defense industry. Yet, despite these billions, today they could never hope to compete with South Korea in international tenders like the Polish
4:44
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): tank contract. More importantly, while South Korea is now largely self-sufficient, India and Brazil still depend on. foreign countries for almost half their defense systems. And perhaps even worse, despite high-profile spending programs, Egypt and Argentina have now largely given up and almost completely depend on foreign
5:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): powers for their security. So why did these billion-dollar programs fail while South Korea's was a massive success? In other words, why is it so hard to build a world-class defense industry? As an economist, I've of course been trained to think about these problems first through the
5:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): idealized picture of the mighty free market. Okay, if people are willing to pay a lot of money for certain products, in this case, tanks, jets, and ships, Steps, then companies should, in theory, quickly pop up to supply them. Sure, it takes a while. to produce a good rifle, but if enough money is involved, there are
5:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): always smart entrepreneurs who will find a way to make it happen. Of course, the defense market is a bit special because for most products the only customer is, of course, the government. But actually, in this case, that could be an advantage. After all, the government wants to become street.
6:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): strategically independent, so it can just ask local companies to supply tanks, jets, and ships, and they will figure out how to do it. Right? No, sadly not. Because there are three factors that are actively preventing this. And the first is that
6:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): technologies like jets, missiles, and submarines are so difficult to make. that local companies may never actually figure it out. For example, when Egypt tried this approach in the 1960s, it started really promising. Thanks to how much money was involved, the Egyptians could simply hire experienced German engineers who
6:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): in no time came up with impressive rockets that President Nasser gleefully showed off at military parades. However, when Egypt actually needed the rockets to work during the Six-Day War with Israel, these rockets were not actually functional, proving to be simply a money pit. Similarly, Indian fighter jet
7:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): programs from the 1960s onwards were plagued by delays and massive cost overruns. And sure, while they are airborne today, they still rely heavily on crucial foreign parts, such as engines. So, how did Korea avoid this fate? That is the million-dollar question. Producing both
7:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): missiles and fighter jets that have been deemed reliable enough for countries to spend billions on them? The answer can be seen in this infographic from the museum at the War Memorial of Korea. While Egypt and India set their sights on advanced defense tech in the 1960s and 70s.
7:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Korea mostly started by making light artillery, Coast Guard boats, small arms, and propeller driven trainer aircraft. Only after mastering these technologies did the Koreans attempt to build their own tank. And even there, they started with upgrading and maintaining American patent tanks in Korea. Only then, with
7:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): experienced engineers that had worked on these tanks, was Sam. South Korea able to develop the K1 in the 1980s. This
8:06
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): here behind me is Korea's K-1 battle tank, their first self-made battle tank, but crucially it was still based on US technology.
8:16
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): After that, it still took them 27 years until 2014 to build their own tank, the K2, that was recently exported successfully to Poland. And this is what economists call learning by doing. You start simple, you learn by making, and then you slowly work your way up the value chain. Learning by
8:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): doing is the first factor that helps explain why so few countries were able to build a defense industry from scratch. You see, a thriving industry needs lots of engineers with knowledge that cannot be learned in school. If you want organizations that can build ultra-advanced military machines, you cannot just promise them money.
8:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): They will tell you they can do it, yes, but only they will deliver expensive inferior products plagued by cost overruns. So, when should governments ask their own industry to learn how to make something versus when is it better to just import instead? Of course, there is no single
9:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): right answer to that question. But when I visited South Korea's Defense Acquisition Program Administration, DAPA for short, they told me that they actually follow a very simple rule of thumb. If local industry is approximately two years or less behind foreign competition, they procure a product from
9:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): domestic industry. But if Korean industry is further behind, they are still with, for example, a fifth generation fighter jet like the US F-35, then Korea's government will import instead. Okay, learning by doing. That can explain the entire thing, right? So walking
9:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): out of that interview, I thought I had figured it all out. But the next day when I talked to Mr. Sangwan, Sang Ok Huang from the Korea Aerospace Industries Association, I realized that I was actually still missing something crucial. And that something turned out to be the concept of offset. That is, whenever you negotiate a
10:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): major defense import order, you do not just try to get the best product for the lowest price. You also try to get the highest offset. Where offset is a technical term that is used to describe something that a country does in return for you to offset your payment to them.
10:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Offset is typically a percentage of the dollar value of your import order. So, for example, when Canada recently requested new submarines.
10:43
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
10:44
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Canadian government today asked for 100% offset.
10:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): But okay, what does that mean? What is offset? typically? Okay, three things. It can either be offsetting purchases, offsetting investments, or offsetting technology transfers. So, for example, in the case of Canadian submarines, where Germany's TKMS was named preferred supplier in July
11:07
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): 2026, it reportedly meant two things. First, Germany would train and equip Canadian shipyards to maintain the submarines. And second, the Germans promised to invest heavily in strategic sectors such as critical minerals and AI.
11:22
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On
11:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the other hand, Korea typically chose a technology transfer offset instead. That is, whenever they imported hardware from the US, they often asked for a substantial offset in technology transfers to local companies. For example, when Korea bought US FC F-C-16 16. fighters in the 1990s, the deal included
11:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): licensed production in Korea by Samsung Aerospace, a predecessor of today's Korea Aerospace Industries, which built aircraft know-how
11:52
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): with
11:52
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): these engineers that the company later used to make its own jets. So ironically, it may be an advantage to your own industry if you further. first import a lot because it can allow you to obtain foreign technologies much faster through offset, essentially turbocharging, learning by
12:12
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): doing. But if that was the whole story, then that would be good news for countries in the Middle East today who import a lot and also want to get more independent. Could they just copy Korea's slow and steady approach? supercharged with offset technology transfers? When I asked the experts in
12:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): South Korea, they told me that
12:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Middle Eastern countries, especially Saudi Arabia and UAE, Arab America,
12:40
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): those countries were heavily invested upon their indigenous defense industries, especially the Arab R UAE. But the problem is.
12:52
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): they couldn't build other industries industry sector which supports defense industry.
12:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): As an economist, I immediately recognized these arguments as basically saying that to build a defense industry from scratch, you need economies of scope. So besides learning by doing, the second factor that made Korea's path so successful is developing economies of scope. You see, while of course you could try to build a defense
13:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): industry through learning by doing over hundreds of years, Korea's 60 year trajectory was aided a lot by their rapid broad based rise as a global manufacturing power in general. And the reason is simply that defense companies can produce complicated defense tech like tanks or jets much more efficiently if they
13:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): either make related products themselves or are close to other heavy industry. For example, the K2 battle tank producer, Hyundai Rotum, well they are not just making tanks. In the beginning, Hyundai Rotum was actually founded
13:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): as a tank factory. But governments always thought, yeah, they cannot, well,
14:01
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): they
14:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): cannot maintain as a company.
14:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): only by making tanks because tanks are still very small compared to civilian economy.
14:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Similarly, the K9 Houser is made by Hanwa Aerospace, which also makes engines, while the KSS3 submarines are built by shipbuilders like Hanwa Ocean, which also build specialized civilian ships like gas tankers. And finally the T 50 T-50 trainer. Jet and FA50 Fighters are
14:29
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): produced by Karina Aerospace Industries, a giant conglomerate that also makes helicopters, satellites, and produces plane parts for Boeing and Airbus. This is, of course, no coincidence. Not only does building civilian products protect major military conglomerates from downturns, it also
14:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): teaches companies how to do mass production efficiently, and they can often share production lines for many parts that are used in both civilian and military products. So, in hindsight, it was also no coincidence that President Park kickstarted both his defense learning by doing program and his broader industrial policy
15:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): around the same time. Yet I'd argue that the cases of Poland and Germany show us that. we need yet another third factor to get the full picture by themselves, learning by doing and economies of scope are not enough. You see, while Poland was able to attract a significant
15:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): manufacturing industry, it was not able to build anything close to the military manufacturing capabilities of Korea. So when Russia invaded Ukraine, Poland could not build the tanks themselves. And crucially, while their neighbor Germany is historically a tank manufacturing powerhouse, Germany's tank factories had actually shrunk
15:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): so much that they could not deliver such big orders quickly enough. So what happened? And what does this have to do with our third factor that can explain the rise of Korea's defense industry?
15:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Behind me you can see North Korea, a country that has pledged to conquer all of South Korea if a war breaks out.
16:06
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Well, as it turns out, the North Korean threat can actually help explain the third factor that Korea needed to become a defense giant. It's not economies of scope, but rather economies of scale. Okay, as you can see here, due to the threat of North Korea, South Korea has consistently spent around 2.5% two and a half percent of GDP
16:26
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): on defense. And therefore,
16:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we've always had the very stable demand in the Korean market. So as you know, we always have a very tense relationship with North Korea, and thus we always have the demand for modernization because of the potential threat always coming from North Korea.
16:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And because Korea's economy was growing so rapidly, this meant that its heavy industry could count on consistently rising orders for
16:50
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the equation.
16:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): tanks, howitzers, jets, ships, and the like. By contrast, the Polish government was only spending half of what Korea was spending just before Russia invaded Ukraine. And meanwhile, although the UK and Germany spent more than Korea in absolute terms, they were not spending on the types of heavy weapons that are the backbone of Korea's
17:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): current success, like tanks and howitzers, because they felt like the Cold War was over. But thanks to the massive North Korean army at their border.
17:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): South Korea decided, well, for us, Cold War is not over. So they kept on making tanks, kept on making more self-profit howitzers, or such things.
17:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And this was very important for the competitiveness of Korean industries because of factor number three. economies of scale, meaning that as you produce more, your costs per unit actually drop. For example, Korean K2 tanks are reportedly significantly cheaper to produce than their German counterparts, in part because steady Korean orders kept Hyundai
17:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Rotum's production lines running, while Europeans who make leopards scaled back their productions after the Cold War. And therefore, Hyundai Rotum can spread its fixed costs, such as marketing finance, and research and development, over a bigger, steadier stream of tanks than German companies like
18:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): KDS can. And therefore, when Korea participated in a Norwegian tender to buy battle tanks, trials reportedly found that the K2 was as capable as the legendary German leopard tank. but thanks to economies of scale, the K2 was significantly cheaper. So, my initial
18:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): conclusions from my entire Korean research trip was that to develop a world-class defense industry from scratch, it was not just enough that Korea had big ambitions and used government power to get companies to get good at making defense locally. No, instead they enabled
18:53
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): slow learning by doing by importing advanced technologies, while step-by-step ordering simpler technologies from local companies, and this was all supercharged by technology transfers from Offset.
19:07
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
19:07
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): this only worked because they were also supporting their manufacturing industry as a whole, creating economies of scale. And it only worked. because they continuously spent money on their military, creating economies of scale as well. Indeed, this is exactly the template that the other major rising defense exporter followed as well:
19:26
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Turkey. Turkey's industry started assembling F-16s, producing armored vehicles together with other nations, and building basic tactical radios. And from there, they moved. up the value chain into domestic modifications and subsystems, and eventually they started
19:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): building their own state-of-the-art weapon systems. Turkey also has a relatively advanced manufacturing industry, providing its defense industries with economies of scope, and it also kept spending quite significantly, although slightly less than Korea, on its military.
20:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): providing its industries also with third ingredient economies of scale as well. So, as a naive economist, always thinking about efficient markets, my initial instinct was that not only could these three factors explain why Korea became largely self-sufficient, they could also explain how Korea became a defense export
20:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): powerhouse. They just created good products. and then exports were the next logical conclusion. Boy, was I wrong. This brings me to the final piece of the puzzle. Because while Korea's industry rose to where it is today, thanks to factors 1, 2, and 3,
20:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Korea's defense community has learned a painful lesson in these last few years. That is, even if you have a world-class industry and a super competitive product, you may still actually miss out on the most valuable international tenders. For example, in 2022, South Korea's T-50 lost out
21:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): to China's L-15 in a big United Arab Emirates trainer jet deal. And Korea's legendary shipbuilders have missed out on big tenders in Australia and Canada. despite having a highly competitive product. And of course, as I mentioned, Hyundai Rotom and its super competitive tank in Norway,
21:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): well, they actually lost the tender. But why? Well, I'd argue it's because this is where the unique government buyer aspect of the defense market came back to haunt South Korea. Sure, having a lot of government power is really useful if you want to steer your own industry in
21:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): a certain direction, like becoming more independent. But on the international market, this means that now all of your clients, if you want to export, are other governments. And predictably, this means that it's not just about offering an economic product, a good product for a good price. Sure, when an Air
22:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Force, Navy, or Army issues an international request for proposals, the procurement matrix typically talks about things like technical specifications, lifecycle costs, and operational utility. However, in reality, having a competitive product merely helps you
22:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): to get your foot in the door. What matters for actually? then winning the tender between somewhat comparable products is number one, what offset you can offer the importing country, what other geopolitical advantages you offer them if they buy from you, and how likely it is that you or one of your allies,
22:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): which will become important later, will block replacement parts or upgrades to the product that they just bought. These three diplomatic factors can explain Korea's missed tenders. Norway chose the German leopard over the reportedly much cheaper K2 because the German government convinced it
23:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that it would gain an advantage by closer defense ties with Germany in the face of a Russian threat. Similarly, Australia supposedly picked up the Japanese ships. and the Canada the German submarines because they viewed these countries as the more useful military ally.
23:21
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On
23:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the other hand, the UAE ultimately chose Chinese airplanes as part of a push to diversify its suppliers. While the US, which had helped Korea develop the T-50 jet, held export approval rights over its technology to the UAE, which the U.S. UAE did not want. Importantly, the lesson that the
23:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Koreans took away from these massive disappointments was not that they could not compete in the highly political world of international defense, but rather that they had failed to communicate their countrywide story of NATO interoperability, reliable production, and generous offset. Therefore, what could explain Korea's
24:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): initial export performance? after 2022 is not just that it fostered a world-class industry, but also luck. It was essentially in the right place at the right time. That is, when Russia invaded Ukraine with tanks and artillery, Poland and the Baltics suddenly thought we really need heavy
24:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): weapons as fast as possible. And thanks to the threat of North Korea, South Korea was essentially one of the few. countries that had maintained its heavy defense factories and were then able to deliver these tanks and howitzers. So, does that mean that Korea's defense export boom is actually now over? Now that traditional Western suppliers,
24:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): especially Germany, are gearing up their factories again and they have all the diplomatic advantages? No, I don't think so, because when I talk talked to the Koreans about it, it became clear that they had learned their lesson. They told me that after having witnessed so many missed tenders, they have now set up a big network of diplomatic
25:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): personnel specialized in selling the K defense story of a reliable democratic partner that doesn't put many restrictions on its allies and can produce, very importantly, heavy weapons reliably.
25:13
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On
25:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): top of that, Korea now offers control. countries that want to replicate the Korean success story generous offset in the form of technology transfers, helping produce jets, tanks, howitzers, and even ships to make them locally if desired. So, in conclusion, Korea is one of the few countries that was able to develop a
25:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): class-leading Class leading defense industry because rather than expecting to become independent right away, they used a smart buying approach and offset to help their industries slowly but surely master the defense technology tree. And this was only possible because they simultaneously built other industries and kept local demand high and stable,
25:52
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): allowing Korean industries to benefit from economies of scope and economies of scale. However, on their own, these three factors were not enough to truly compete internationally.
26:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): As they discovered, the international defense export game is about convincing governments that you can offer them more than just a good product. Companies cannot be expected to do this on their own, of course, and therefore the Korean government had to get good at defense diplomacy as well. And so far it seems to be working. After losing the
26:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): UAE trainer jet deal to China Korea, then successful. successfully convinced three major Middle Eastern states: Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Iraq to buy its missile defense system over traditional Western or Chinese suppliers. So, with that, we have answered the question of how Korea built a
26:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): world-class defense industry from scratch. And given that the only other major broad success story, Turkey, followed a similar template, I think this is potentially a very attractive model indeed for other countries to follow in this new age of increased security threats. However, I do want to stress that it's not the
27:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): only option. The other major international defense success story, Israel at first followed the Korean Turkish And the model of learning by doing and doing everything, but after the costly Lavi fight. fighter jet program strained the Israeli budget, it was cancelled in 1987, and then the Israelis decided to pivot to
27:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): a specialized model instead, where they mainly developed high-tech systems rather than offering the full defense stack. And this means that for any country that wants to increase its security today, there are essentially three models, all of which could be. the right model, depending on country's circumstances and what
27:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): they actually want. Model 1: simply rely on foreign systems. This is maybe not so popular, but as we've seen with Egypt and India, sometimes it would have been better if they had just imported. And if you are in a relatively quiet neighborhood like much of Latin America, or if you have extremely strong allies like
28:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): small European countries, this could very well be the right model. Model 2, get really good at some defense products that align with your industrial strengths, like Israel or Sweden did, or Model 3, the South Korea-Turkey model, which I think makes the most sense if you are really surrounded by rivals, like
28:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Koreas. But as we have seen, Model 3 is extremely difficult to get right. You need to have insane patience and know how to develop your industries in general, one of the hardest economic tricks in the book. So, what do you think? Are there other countries which have the patience to facilitate decades-long learning by doing,
28:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the stability to give their industries economies of scale, and the competence to develop heavy industries in general for economies of scope? If so, which are these countries? Let me know in the comments below. And just to be clear, this video and my research trip to South Korea were sponsored by Arirang TV, whose mission it is to
29:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): showcase South Korea to a global audience. Yet they had no editorial control over this video, other than a single review for factual accuracy.
This page was produced automatically: the audio was transcribed with nvidia/parakeet-tdt-0.6b-v3+sortformer-v2.1 and interpreted by Qwen3.6-35B-A3B-UD-IQ3_S.gguf. Transcription and interpretation can contain errors; always confirm against the original episode. Nothing here is investment advice.

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