Transfer pricing in commodity trading drives internal value attribution, incentives, and tax outcomes beyond simple compliance.
Summary
Speakers Savvas Manousos, Jan-Peter Onstwedder, and Anne Devlin argue that transfer pricing is a core governance mechanism for allocating value, risk, and bonuses within commodity firms, not merely a tax compliance exercise. They highlight that misaligned pricing distorts capital allocation and creates moral hazard, where traders may inflate their contribution relative to asset owners. The discussion contrasts integrated majors with trading houses, noting that while single P&L structures simplify initial value assignment, they eventually face similar internal conflicts regarding asset maintenance and optionality. Speakers emphasize that tax laws create hard boundaries that significantly impact reported EBITDA, forcing tax considerations into the fundamental design of the operating model. Finally, they stress that transparency and explainability are critical for maintaining trust, as opaque benchmarks can erode cooperation between trading and asset teams.
Key takeaways
- 1 describes value to itself. But the nuance of that is it changes and influences who within the organization looks profitable, which tends to lead to who gets budget allocated. allocations, who gets credibility, who gets what bonus, and in some cases an extreme, which assets look worth investing in and not.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) · 3:04
- 2 So for every 10 cents per barrel that your transfer price is inaccurate or not representative, that's $36 million per year in terms of profit or EBITDA that's been overrepresented in one place and underrepresented somewhere else.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) · 13:15
- 3 by five dollars a barrel. Most asset back trading businesses will pay five percent, eight percent of the profit pool as bonuses. So you know, you're talking twenty-five twenty-five cents to forty cents. in incremental cost for the enterprise, which in your five hundred thousand barrel a day example is maybe you know eighty million dollars, say.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) · 16:11
- 4 tax in different jurisdictions. So you have no choice but to take those hard boundaries into account. Within the room of interpretation and within the room that a company has to choose to put certain activities in certain jurisdictions.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) · 40:14
- 5 don't simplify your tax and transfer price so simply that it actually distorts showing how business value and enterprise value are being created because that's that's the thin end of a of a
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) · 45:08
Episode sections
- 0:05 – 2:03
Introduction and Scope of Transfer Pricing
Host Paul Chapman introduces the topic of transfer pricing in commodity trading, framing it as a mechanism for value attribution, risk allocation, and margin distribution rather than just a tax compliance issue. Guests Savvas Manousos, Jan-Peter Onstwedder, and Anne Devlin are introduced as ENCO Insights advisors with backgrounds at BP, Maersk Oil, and Citigroup.
- 2:03 – 5:34
Operational Impact and Organizational Tension
Speakers argue that transfer pricing dictates internal profitability, budget allocation, and bonus distribution. Misalignment can distort capital allocation and hedging decisions, while correct implementation enables better enterprise-wide commercial decisions.
- 5:34 – 12:20
Complexity of Value Creation in Volatile Markets
Jan-Peter Onstwedder notes that simplistic views of trading (execution only) and assets (fixed cost input/output) are inadequate. Volatility and geopolitical shifts make defining 'normal' market conditions difficult, complicating the attribution of profits between trading and asset teams.
- 12:20 – 34:26
Benchmarking Challenges and Financial Magnitude
Savvas Manousos illustrates the financial stakes using a 500k bpd crude system example, where a 10-cent pricing error equals $36 million annually. He highlights the difficulty of pricing non-standard grades and blended products against liquid benchmarks like Brent or Dubai.
- 34:26 – 37:09
Trader vs. Enterprise Value Alignment
Paul Chapman questions how to resolve disconnects between trader-perceived performance and enterprise-wide value creation. Speaker 3 notes that traders optimize for specific metrics and may miss the value of embedded optionality, requiring intellectual honesty to recognize the full scope of value created by the commercial organization.
- 37:09 – 38:59
Trading Houses vs. Integrated Majors
Chapman suggests trading houses avoid complex transfer pricing issues by having a single P&L and being trading-led. Speaker 1 counters that while this works initially, it eventually faces similar debates regarding asset value creation, maintenance, and personnel changes, leading to similar internal conflicts.
- 38:59 – 43:08
Tax vs. Management Accounting
Chapman asks if tax compliance should drive commercial strategy or if value assignment should be separate. Speaker 1 argues that tax laws create hard boundaries and can significantly impact reported EBITDA (10-20%), forcing tax considerations into the fundamental design of the operating model rather than being a secondary layer.
- 43:08 – 46:11
Optimizing for Enterprise Value
Speaker 3 advises against simplifying transfer pricing to be purely tax-defensible if it distorts business reality. He warns that while simple benchmarks please tax authorities, they may misrepresent value creation, leading to internal mistrust and disoptimization. The goal is to defend a structure that accurately reflects enterprise value.
- 46:11 – 47:51
Transparency and Trust
Speaker 1 defines 'good' transfer pricing as having sufficient transparency and explainability. He argues that if employees cannot understand or challenge the benchmarks, it generates mistrust. The ability to debate performance relative to benchmarks is critical for maintaining trust across divisions.
- 47:51 – 50:37
Behavioral Risks and Leadership
Speaker 3 highlights the risk of bad transfer pricing turning cooperation into negotiation. He notes that trading leaders must understand performance deeply to avoid skewing judgment, especially if they are not career traders. He warns against behaviors where teams act like external counterparts rather than part of one business.
- 50:37 – 53:11
Incentives and Optionality
Speaker 2 emphasizes that the system must clearly define where optionality is created and who monetizes it. He states that incentives should be reviewed if behaviors are not encouraging the 'one vision of P&L.' Trading leadership must be close to the action to make fair bonus decisions that account for value transfer.
- 53:11 – 56:06
Board-Level Governance and Design
Speaker 3 concludes that transfer pricing is a core governance issue affecting capital allocation and strategic choices. He lists multiple value drivers (ownership, flexibility, risk, etc.) beyond price. He asserts that transfer pricing must be jointly built, linked to strategy, and treated as a core design element to improve enterprise decisions.
Assets discussed
| Asset | Kind | Stance | Context |
|---|---|---|---|
| Crude oil | commodity | neutral | There is also this ideological bit because it's very easy in a year like this for you know an um for a head of upstream to sit back and say, Well, I could have sold the oil at a hundred and twenty bucks because it's you know, I can do that on the NIMEX or whatever |
“Stance” is how the speakers talked about the asset, not a recommendation.
Claims worth verifying
Savvas Manousos is a former senior executive in BP's trading organization and built/ran Maersk Oil trading capability.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·0:41
How to verify: LinkedIn profile of Savvas Manousos; BP and Maersk Oil press releases or executive biographies. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Jan-Peter Onstwedder was a managing director at Citigroup.
Paul Chapman ·1:00
How to verify: LinkedIn profile of Jan-Peter Onstwedder; Citigroup historical press releases or executive announcements. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Anne Devlin is a 22-year veteran of BP's trading business who ran Crude books.
Paul Chapman ·1:00
How to verify: LinkedIn profile of Anne Devlin; BP trading team announcements or industry publications. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
A 500,000 barrel per day crude system at $70/barrel has ~$26.6 billion in annual turnover.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) ·12:40
How to verify: Calculation: 500,000 bpd * 250 trading days * $70/bbl = $8.75 billion (one-way); round-trip buy/sell turnover is ~$17.5B. Speaker cites $26.6B, implying higher days or different volume assumptions. Verify via internal company financials or standard refining throughput calculations. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
A 10-cent per barrel transfer price inaccuracy in a 500k bpd system equals $36 million/year in misallocated profit.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) ·13:15
How to verify: Calculation: 500,000 bpd * 250 days * $0.10 = $12.5 million. Speaker cites $36 million, implying ~720 days or different volume base. Verify via standard industry trading day assumptions (250-260) and volume data. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Trading bonuses are typically 5-8% of the profit pool.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) ·16:11
How to verify: Industry compensation surveys (e.g., Egon Zehnder, Heidrick & Struggles) for commodity trading roles; company proxy statements if public. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
An overstatement of $5/barrel in trading performance in a 500k bpd system could cost $80 million in bonuses.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) ·16:11
How to verify: Calculation: 500,000 bpd * 250 days * $5 * 5-8% bonus rate. Verify against standard trading calendars and bonus structures. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Transfer pricing discussions at the board level typically last less than a couple of hours per year.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) ·27:26
How to verify: Survey of board meeting minutes or governance reports from major oil majors (BP, Shell, TotalEnergies) or industry governance studies. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
CPC crude trades at a differential to dated brands and involves CFR Augusta quotes.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·25:19
How to verify: Platts or Argus crude oil pricing reports; historical CPC crude trade documentation. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceMurban crude experienced a dislocation between financial market prices and physical delivery prices.
Paul Chapman ·24:30
How to verify: Financial Times articles from November 2026; Platts/Argus price assessments for Murban crude. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Anne Devlin is a 22-year veteran of BP's trading business who ran books including Crude.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·34:26
How to verify: LinkedIn profile of Anne Devlin; BP trading team biographies. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Trading houses purchased assets to root their flow and create options, despite the cost of assets and working capital.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·36:32
How to verify: Industry reports on trading house evolution (e.g., Vitol, Trafigura) from financial press or annual reports. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Tax choices can make a 10 or 20% difference in total reported EBITDA.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·42:12
How to verify: Financial analysis of major commodity traders' annual reports comparing pre-tax and post-tax margins across different jurisdictions. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Dubai is an example of a jurisdiction where trading houses base themselves for tax reasons.
Paul Chapman ·42:38
How to verify: News articles or corporate filings showing major commodity traders establishing HQs or regional hubs in Dubai. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceTransfer pricing can misallocate capital and damage strategic choices if governed poorly.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) ·53:18
How to verify: Academic or professional literature on transfer pricing impacts; case studies from companies that restructured trading divisions. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Value creation drivers include ownership, flexibility, timing, risk capacity, customer access, credit, operational execution, and excellence.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) ·53:58
How to verify: ENCO Insights white papers or publications on commodity trading value drivers. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Do your own research
- Verify the financial impact of transfer pricing errors using public filings of major integrated oil companies (e.g., BP, Shell) to compare trading segment EBITDA against asset base returns.
- Review OECD guidelines on transfer pricing for the petroleum sector to understand the 'hard boundaries' and safe harbors mentioned by speakers.
- Analyze bonus structures of leading trading houses (e.g., Trafigura, Vitol) to assess if incentives align with enterprise-wide value creation or just desk P&L.
- Check for regulatory fines or disputes related to transfer pricing in key jurisdictions (e.g., US, UK, Singapore) to identify common compliance pitfalls.
- Evaluate the cost of capital for different asset types (refining vs. storage vs. trading) to understand how 'optionality' is priced in internal models.
- Look for case studies or academic papers on 'moral hazard' in trading desks to validate claims about benchmark manipulation and P&L inflation.
- Compare the organizational structures of trading houses versus integrated majors to assess the validity of the 'single P&L' simplification argument.
- Review internal audit reports or proxy statements for disclosures on how transfer pricing policies are designed and challenged by board committees.
Full transcriptexpand
- 0:05
- Paul Chapman: Welcome to the HC Commodities Podcast, a podcast dedicated to the commodities sector and the people within it. I'm your host, Paul Chapman. This podcast is produced by HC Group, a global search firm dedicated to the commodities sector.
- 0:22
- Paul Chapman: Today we're discussing transfer pricing,
- 0:26
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): trust.
- 0:27
- Paul Chapman: and the fight over the margin pool. Transfer pricing is not just a tax topic. It is how asset backed commodity businesses decide who created value, who bore the risk, and who gets paid from the shared margin pool.
- 0:41
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Get
- 0:41
- Paul Chapman: it wrong and it can distort bonuses, capital allocation, hedging, and even trust. Get it right and it can unlock enterprises and how to use their commercial organizations. to make the best enterprise wide decisions. To discuss transfer pricing are our guests. Returning to the show, Savas Manusos, former senior executive in
- 1:00
- Paul Chapman: BP's trading organisation. Savas built and ran Mersk oil trading capability. Also rejoining the show is JP Onsvetter, a senior risk and finance executive, including being a managing director at Citigroup, and Anne Devlin. a twenty-two year veteran of BP's trading business, where she ran various books,
- 1:20
- Paul Chapman: including Crude. All three are Enco Insights advisors
- 1:24
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
- 1:24
- Paul Chapman: as such, support organizations on short or long term engagements on tackling just such thorny issues that we're going to be discussing today.
- 1:33
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): As
- 1:33
- Paul Chapman: always, you can really support the show by leaving us a positive review on the platform you're listening on, and as always, I hope you enjoy the episode. Well, Jan Peta and Savas, welcome to the show.
- 1:43
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Thank
- 1:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you very much. Lovely to be here. Oh,
- 1:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): either way.
- 1:46
- Paul Chapman: So we we have a big task ahead of us in twofold. One is that we are talking transfer pricing, and our big goal here is to explain how fundamental and foundational it is to how organizations set up commercial practices, how it cascades through everything.
- 2:03
- Paul Chapman: from performance assessment, reward, commercial decisions, rather than it just being a tax implication. And we've got to do all of that in an hour or so. So we have our work cut out, but I guess I've already presaged the key point, which is transfer pricing is how a company explains value to itself.
- 2:23
- Paul Chapman: It's way beyond how financial accounting and how one th explains that value to the taxman and tax jurisdictions around the world. Savas, when most people hear transfer pricing, you know, they think tax and accountants, that's far too narrow a lens, and we're going to explain that. Can you just kick us off on the basics of why
- 2:43
- Paul Chapman: that's too narrow?
- 2:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Yeah. Thanks, Paul. Now No, I think you set it up well, which is most people still regard transfer pricing as a tax and governance exercise to be able to explain externally as well as internally. The piece that businesses often miss it's the way that the company, as you said,
- 3:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): describes value to itself. But the nuance of that is it changes and influences who within the organization looks profitable, which tends to lead to who gets budget allocated. allocations, who gets credibility, who gets what bonus, and in some cases an extreme, which assets look worth investing in and not. So, you know, yes,
- 3:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): there's a taxman compliance dimension, but if you stop there, you miss the real operating consequences for the enterprise.
- 3:31
- Paul Chapman: Yeah, which can have profound effects. And you've you've run trading books. I imagine this sort of the word transfer pricing sort of makes a cold grip go across leadership in that role. Is that a fair statement that Savas has outlined?
- 3:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): I think it's fair. I mean it's really about the understanding where value comes from and how it has been created. Traders are are more than just putting a price on what the That assets have produced. In a well well-run run trading organization, the trading adds market
- 4:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): intelligence and optimization around timing, for example, or logistical solutions, customer rich, trouble starts organization either overstates or understates that contribution and then pays people as a one side alone created the value.
- 4:21
- Paul Chapman: Yeah. And we're gonna going to come on to sort of divining the difference between financial accounting and management accounting and and so forth. But I don't want to sort of understate how profound this challenge can be, especially to asset backed organizations embarking on a commercial build where life in effect was sort of simple, the production
- 4:41
- Paul Chapman: verticals would know precisely what their cost was and therefore, you know, and what they sold the product for, and therefore their margin. Suddenly along comes a commercial. group where the end price might be significantly higher. And but how do you then start to distribute that margin and more importantly, often costs? Because certainly these commercial
- 5:01
- Paul Chapman: bills can be very costly initially before that extra revenue starts flowing. And indeed how that margin has come about also can be quite esoteric to an upstream operator or senior leader battling over what they're buying. their budget is at the beginning of the year and how much costs are going to be applied to their group, which again has profound impacts on
- 5:21
- Paul Chapman: headcount and all the rest of it. I mean, JP, you've sat in the board when these discussions have been opened. Can you just give us some sense of the magnitude of what is encapsulated in that word transfer pricing?
- 5:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Well, it's interesting because you mentioned something being simple or maybe not so. simple. And I think one of the key things that a board begins to realize when they start really discussing transfer pricing and all the issues that Savas and Ann and you have already highlighted is that most people have in their head a much too simplistic view of
- 5:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): part or all of the organization.
- 5:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Traders can be seen as just executing orders at a screen price. An asset can be seen as just something that you put it raw materials as inputs in and you get finished materials as an output out at a fixed cost. All those views are horribly simplistic. And when you start debating transfer pricing, those simplistic and overly simplistic views
- 6:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): become obvious and transparent, and there's a huge amount of value in refining people's view of the organization and of where value actually comes from.
- 6:25
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah.
- 6:26
- Paul Chapman: And we're going to sort of work through the example, because I mean I I need that instruction as well. And it seems sort of mind boggling that, you know, I can imagine the complexity of producing the oil for thirty dollars in the US, but eventually being sold for a hundred and forty somewhere in Asia and and where along that line, how was that value created by whom? And that brings me to
- 6:46
- Paul Chapman: sort of another point, which is kind of in normal times transfer pricing can be complex and is an internal battle about or battle or discussion around how that value gets assigned and you know where costs get assigned. That's all on steroids this last four years, five years, certainly in twenty twenty
- 7:06
- Paul Chapman: six, when suddenly you've got wild swings in volatility, you've got periods tighter margins in twenty twenty five for example, and now blowout margins. in this year or big losses, whatever it might be. And there's some sense in which you're then navigating, you know, lots of these abnormal disruptions. And so sort of the
- 7:25
- Paul Chapman: architecture around managing sort of where all this value gets assigned in normal times is sort of disruptive as well. And it becomes a very sharp point. Jan Ian Pedro, Padres, just staying with you. Can you give us some sense of the trading profits? This last year in and these incredible trading profits. why sort of that the architecture of understanding this becomes so important?
- 7:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): As you said, we've seen huge swings in profitability over the past few years. And yes, largely volatility tends to benefit trading businesses, but not always. And so part of what you see is explaining where the profit comes from is becoming more difficult. Because it's easy to say that trading rooms profit from high volatility.
- 8:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yes, that may be true, but that tends to come with risk levels as well. And so you don't get an interaction between risk levels and how the organization manages that, the trading profits and how those relate to market conditions. And then you mentioned normalizing things, which most people will see as taking some sort of average or
- 8:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): having a view on what is a normal situation in the market. and that is becoming a more and more difficult discussion to have. I mean if you look at the last few years and the rapid changes in in market conditions and geopolitical environment, what is normal? How do you define that?
- 8:39
- Paul Chapman: In some ways, you know, it's easier like a year like this might be slightly easier because every sort of different group is making money, right? One of the challenges is certainly even I say that's easy, but you know, when you've got disappointing results or big cuts going on in one area of the business and at the same time you've got these very large you know bonus pools due within the commercial group, for
- 8:58
- Paul Chapman: example. Again it kind of becomes easy to start raising these questions and really challenging the decision making i in retrospect. Savas, I'm sure you've you've sat at that table many times. Which is more challenging in the good years or when trading margins become really under pressure?
- 9:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 9:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): both
- 9:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I think
- 9:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): both are both are important because on one side you can end up having a blind spot. So when everybody's making lots of money and it's extraordinary margins, there's no tension there. So organizations tend to flatter themselves, assume the model is working and everything's performing as it should. That means you're potentially missing
- 9:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): opportunities and leaving money on the table in the extreme volatile. and extreme margin scenarios, because any suboptimal transfer price model that's causing enterprise value destruction just gets amplified in that environment. You just may not see it. When you tend to most see it is when margins normalize and
- 9:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): people are forced to start asking the more difficult questions. You know, which of the performance was real enterprise value, which of it was simply internal capture. from one silo to another because of the transfer price? Did the athletes get a fair share of the economics? I think a lot of it comes down to what extent are management and leadership allowing
- 10:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): an internal market to become an area where people are focusing and arguing over the over the credit for their individual activity rather than how do you create the structure. where it becomes a mechanism to make better decisions at an overall enterprise level. You know, that's the piece that is
- 10:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): rarely designed into the operating models.
- 10:37
- Paul Chapman: And requires that sort of senior executive sponsorship. And I I mean can you comment on that a bit?
- 10:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): When there's less trading margins, obviously tension rises quickly on the trading floor flow and and patients patience tends to be in short curve currency. People try to establish what part of the trading matrix does not deliver or why the trading system does not cope with a particular market scenario. So you have on one hand the asset
- 11:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): leader who wants to protect their margins. You have the traders who probably become quite defensive because they think that their contribution is in question. You've got finance who wants predictability. and sustainability of results, asking questions, and risks wants better explainability. So
- 11:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): through all that benchmarks that are in place to apportion the value creation, then there's a realization that maybe they are not capturing the economics in the first place.
- 11:34
- Paul Chapman: Yeah. I I guess that what would help me here would certainly be Savas, can you sort of just describe from a an oil major perspective just how that barrel of crude flows and gets turned into products and roughly how in it most simple sense an organization would use benchmarks as to point to that value creation. You
- 11:54
- Paul Chapman: know, just to help us understand exactly sort of the base technicalities of a transfer price. And then I think it'd be good to kinda kind of get you know and you can step in and defend what why that might not be the case for the the trading perspective and Jan Pedder you can talk about how all the assets and the financial flows and the risks need to also be considered as well. But Savas could you do that for us? You know the how that
- 12:14
- Paul Chapman: basic molecule flow and how that rough accounting flow happens at the same time.
- 12:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Yeah. So maybe let's put the financial quantums there just so people can think about why it's important to pay a lot of attention to this beyond the accounting and tax pieces. So if you're a a five hundred thousand barrel a day system in a crude price world of seventy dollars per
- 12:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): barrel, and where let's say a hundred percent of your feed stocks are being executed by trading and sixty sixty-five, five, thirty five. thirty-five percent of your of your products that are produced, thirty-five goes to export and sixty five goes to the inland market. If you take which is a not an unusual system, if you
- 13:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): think about that in terms of turnover, that's at seventy dollars a barrel, that's something in the order of about twenty $26 six billion dollars per year in turnover that you're doing in both buys and sells.
- 13:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): So for every 10 cents per barrel that your transfer price is inaccurate or not representative, that's $36 million per year in terms of profit or EBITDA that's been overrepresented in one place and underrepresented somewhere else. You can quickly see in seeing volatile yields, or why getting that
- 13:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): structure can skew profitability quite quickly.
- 13:39
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 13:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): you then get to okay, so how do you get to a fair transfer price for the feedstock purchases when there are only five or six key grades that are the ones that are traded on a on a liquid open basis? You know, Brent TI, Dubai, so on and so forth. And therefore, how do you know where fair value is for the other
- 13:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): grades that you've purchased and trading has has excelled? executed? And similarly on the product side, if you're blending non standard products or you're having biofuels, which you know may have elements of double counting in there, or you're trading ETS around it, all of a sudden it your ability to bring
- 14:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): that turnover back to clean benchmarks gets very, very difficult. And the problem is you don't want to remove that tension because you know it does a few things. Getting a bad transfer price doesn't just move margin. It ultimately decides who gets the credit for creating it, whether we think that's fair
- 14:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): or not. Which means in a commodity business, a you know weak benchmarks isn't a pricing error, it's governance failure dressed up as market logic. And that's why a lot of this a lot of this tension exists in organizations.
- 14:54
- Paul Chapman: And just to nail that tension for a moment, I want to go back to continue that thought process though, would be let's say, and I'm using mad numbers here, but right, you get instead of it being forty-five dollars a barrel for your feed stock, if they have it at 40, essentially that five dollar difference, the company company's is going to be paying a lot more in cost associated with that.
- 15:15
- Paul Chapman: five dollars if it were in the commercial group than if it were in the upstream group. Is that a fair or just in normal sort of normal business operations? Because the assumption is you've got a hell of a lot more intellectual capital, very expensive you know, people operating system, an entire platform to capture that five bucks, and therefore you're only getting twenty cents on it or you
- 15:35
- Paul Chapman: know twenty percent of it, as opposed to if it was just absent all of that structure, you whatever, ninety percent of it or something, right? That is that tension from a leadership standpoint or finance standpoint, is I'm paying a lot more per incremental dollar if it gets assigned to the commercial group rather than just normal supply operations.
- 15:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Yeah, that's correct. I think the problem is how do you stop it getting to a conversation around bonuses that traders end up getting paid for their execution, which comes back to what does the market value pay? versus what's the true enterprise value? So even in the in that example, you say the trade, say the trading, extreme example, the trading performance is overstated
- 16:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): by five dollars a barrel. Most asset back trading businesses will pay five percent, eight percent of the profit pool as bonuses. So you know, you're talking twenty-five twenty-five cents to forty cents. in incremental cost for the enterprise, which in your five hundred
- 16:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): thousand barrel a day example is maybe you know eighty million dollars, say. It's a big number, but I'd argue that it's definitely you need to focus on it. You need to make sure that you're not overpaying. But I think the the bigger issue at an enterprise is not necessarily to demonize traders or romanticize assets. The question
- 16:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): is have you designed an internal system where transfer prices do one thing, but the way you're rewarding activity and rewarding performance is on true end-to-end enterprise value? Or have you unintentionally, by using the transfer prices and it as a blunt tool across multiple performance measures
- 17:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): and and compensation, have you built a machine that makes you know, some people look smarter than than the overall system actually is?
- 17:18
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 17:19
- Paul Chapman: I guess as you say, we'll come on to bonuses and sort of the moral hazard piece there. But it is also, again, if I was in a leadership position trying to figure out what the incremental value driven by that organization is and how to capture it. And we're going to come back to how you set the benchmark challenge if you'd like. Just one thing there. So Anne, uh obviously what's not captured in that example is all of and you've just you alluded
- 17:39
- Paul Chapman: to it earlier, is all of the market intelligence, the insight, the robustness that having that trading platform creates as well, alongside all the optionality of kind of, you know, we have different options of where we could send our crude and it might not necessarily be reflected in price, but it might be reflected in payment terms, you know, how quickly we get our cash back or various other a aspects I guess
- 17:59
- Paul Chapman: that can't be necessarily be financially captured. Can you just, you know give us some sense of the trading leadership perspective of all of the benefits that come along with that price discovery and how in some ways that you know benchmarks are hard to discover if they're not in associated to a liquid market, how that conversation goes about sort
- 18:19
- Paul Chapman: of trying to figure that out.
- 18:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Thank you. In many cases the traders understanding of the operational flexibility of the assets helps him or her to maximize the value that can be extracted from the market. So really
- 18:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): put simply, the trader is really somebody translating complexity into money. Now we're talking there's a lot of different area that you know you can act on to deliver values, whether it's quality. differences or we talked about timing windows or fret optimization, especially
- 18:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): these days, or blending economics, you know, how you handle credit, you know, the cost of credit, which credit exposure the the company is is comfortable taking, inventory, you name it, arbitrage opportunities, all that has as has real value attached to it. Now there's definitely also an a need to recognize
- 19:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): how efficiently an asset is being run to be able to provide the flexibility that creates the optionality that a trader trades. So there's there's really a a discipline in this approach.
- 19:29
- Paul Chapman: JP,
- 19:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): what I was gonna jump in there is that's absolutely true. But also there's an element of short term versus longer term, right? So and points out the asset flexibility. operational flexibility, is one of the things that traders can monetize. That's absolutely true. Creating that optionality, an asset or in an asset heavy business takes
- 19:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): capex, takes investment, and that tends to be controlled by how much money do you make, what sort of margins do you make. So there is that the relationship between your assets getting investment, therefore creating optionality which has being is monetized. by the traders, and therefore the more you create that, the more the apparent profitability gets skewed
- 20:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): towards the trading business or the commercial optimization business, even though the capex has to go into the asset side of things. And so not only do you have to square the circle in the short term to make sure bonuses and and incentives for day day-to-day to day business are correct, you also have to square it in the a much longer term to make sure that you invest your capital. in the right place.
- 20:28
- Paul Chapman: Yeah, I mean I hear that quite a bit, right? You're talking to the midstream or the upstream organization and they're like, well, they're just getting all the cost side of this equation, right? But the the uptick in revenue and profitability isn't flowing to them. It's now flowing to this new commercial group. And that's particularly difficult because there's a there is sort of an ideological element here, right? There is the technicalities and the correct
- 20:47
- Paul Chapman: assignment of value which is the on and capital allocation which is the leadership and the board's responsibility. There is also this ideological bit because it's very easy in a year like this for you know an um for a head of upstream to sit back and say, Well, I could have sold the oil at a hundred and twenty bucks because it's you know, I can do that on the NIMEX or whatever
- 21:07
- Paul Chapman: it might be, right? And so discount all of the complex operations and robustness and opportunity and all of the function that goes on in that commercial group to actually realize that in the physical markets and do it in a risk adjusted manner. I mean it's a very I can imagine that gets a really challenging and tiresome conversation
- 21:27
- Paul Chapman: from both sides if it sort of devolves into a those guys aren't so smart as they think they are or and on the flip side, those guys think this is easy type discussion, right?
- 21:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): If I can make one more point there, because so far we've really talked about profit optimization, maximization, and fair allocation of that for incentives. And that is probably the core of the transfer pricing argument. And then you've got the CapEx longer term bit, but sometimes there are other objectives for the organization as well. So for example, Anne mentioned in the beginning of the podcast that the treasurer, the
- 21:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): finance function, prefers more stable cash flows. There is an element of how much do you have to finance? How much do you have to finance inventory? What is your access to capital? What does it do in terms of your share price if you're a publicly credit company to have more volatility in earnings, even if the average earnings level is a little bit higher?
- 22:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
- 22:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): and when you start mixing those things, and at the board level you should, they're absolutely important questions, then this whole transfer pricing dimension becomes even more complicated.
- 22:23
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 22:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): yet you have to solve it. You can't just say it's too complicated, we throw our hands up in the air. Yeah, this is an unsolvable problem. You have to make some choices. And as you say, finding the right level of judgment and then getting the organization to buy into it is not trivial.
- 22:37
- Paul Chapman: Yeah, and this is before, by the way, we start involving the tax accountants, asking who actually does what, where, and that, you know, and all of the pressures that happens. This is just simply talking in the absence of the the tax and the accountant discussion. How do you figure
- 22:50
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): out?
- 22:51
- Paul Chapman: this And I can imagine, and by the way, we're all sort of discussing this largely in the positive view of look how much money that's been made. All of this becomes sharpened in two elements. One would be in losses, where do those losses get assigned? And secondarily in the build, when there's lots of expense coming through to on the five year journey to build out this
- 23:10
- Paul Chapman: organization, which is flowing back to those assets, but has yet to be realized in the increased profitability that the the the commercial group promises. So this these arguments come up immediately and are very sharp and often had to be tackled by organization individuals who don't have this background and experience, right? Where you know
- 23:30
- Paul Chapman: transfer pricing has been a kind of you know a minimal effort company wide because it hasn't been important, then suddenly it is or it's important from a tax perspective. not from a performance and capital allocation perspective. Just on that Sav so earlier on said, look, your benchmarks are s in the the sort of the technical anatomy of this and somewhat foundational, but
- 23:50
- Paul Chapman: for the most part, in most circumstances, the the benchmarks available to you, i.e. sort of liquid hubs and contracts, are only rough approximations of reality. Can you just give us an example of in your crude trading experience or just in that world, like of sharpen sort of how benchmark matter for us and how
- 24:10
- Paul Chapman: hard it is to get right or wrong and and all the rest of it? I guess what we're seeing going on at the moment in the financial press versus the reality of you know Murban being at whatever, but the actual physical delivery is can be multiple of that, right? I mean it's we are seeing a very important argument. article in the FT over the weekend around uh the dislocation
- 24:30
- Paul Chapman: between the financial markets and the physical. Can you just help us nail a bit more on benchmarks and then we can use that to springboard into reward and incentive and performance and so forth?
- 24:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): So benchmarks are obviously very specific. So they're each refer to a defined quality at a defined location and under defined conventions. whether timing or delivery. Now, obviously, when you're talking about crude oil flow, it doesn't work that way.
- 24:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): So if I were to take an example of uh, for example, a med refiner's taking a cargo of a CPC. Now, CPC is trading at a differential to dated brand. Now, that refiner who is taking a CPC cargo and might have a benchmark pricing with his trading entity for taking this cargo.
- 25:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): The alternative for the refiner is not to take an OC cargo. The dated element is just kind of the marker that allows to work out almost the outright price. But in terms of the two streams, I are just different. You know, CPC is a delivery CFR, Augusta type of quotes, so there's a frame. free element
- 25:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): included into the price where the dated brand is FOB. And obviously the quality are completely different. The alternative of the refinery are completely different. So it's not like you can easily set up a benchmark or you can use a benchmark like a dated brand obviously as a basis to
- 25:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): come up with your formula, but the formula itself is gonna have to reflect a much more complex situation representing the actual choice that the refiners has in terms of their fruit purchase.
- 26:12
- Paul Chapman: Yeah, just before we sort of move on to reward incentive, Savas, and maybe you can link these two, are we sort of in a world where that discussion around benchmarks is infinitely more sophisticated than it was twenty years ago, or is it the same old challenges, same old issue?
- 26:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): I think it's become more complex as both volatility, global trade, and then some of the recent changes, obviously in the market environment, have caused disruption in flows and freight and so on and so forth. So it's definitely a tougher nut to crack. But one of the things that that I find interesting is is people tend to look
- 26:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): at transfer pricing as a governance exercise, as a tax exercise. as we discussed it. And it's something that you do once or you do as few times as possible every every few years, and then it's largely done until something else causes a bit of pain and you've got to go and look at it. And I think that that misses a huge opportunity and a
- 27:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): huge obligation for leadership teams. I mean, if you think about a board level and an exec level, the amount of time you spend doing discussing risk, discussing HSE, discussing credit, discussing strategy. I I would be surprised if most boards talk about transfer pricing at all,
- 27:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): certainly less than a couple of hours per year. And again, given it's the thing that quantifies Is the vast majority of the turnover that goes through the organisation, organization, I think that that's a missing opportunity. Because a bit back to JP, JP's point earlier in terms of this has on a long-term basis ongoing
- 27:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): consequences. Because ultimately the answer is getting transfer pricing right is part of the answer. But whether it's you know the asset that makes the money or the trading that makes the money or marketing or whoever it is, the honest answer is is it's actually all of them. It's symbiotic. And the answer is far too neat
- 28:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): unless you unpack it and have a and have a mechanism for doing that. So what does that mean? It means you know the assets that you have create the platform and create the flow. If you didn't have that flow, then the optionality is smaller and the traders couldn't optimize it. And therefore there Well, may be no reason to trade at all. But you know the trader absolutely creates
- 28:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): additional value through timing, structure, arbitrage, customer intelligence, understanding logistics and operations, and making sure that no opportunity is missed. The danger a lot of organizations fall into is they try to reduce that to a set of binary measures via a transfer price, and then they compound
- 28:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): it by designing an incentive structure around it. And that that's just frankly far too simple and it and it removes the opportunity for a creative tension and dialogue that that I actually think should be there. And people should be talking about this because if the only time you talk about transfer prices is when there's an issue or where
- 29:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): mistrust has already crept in because someone's can't see the value that someone else is creating and believing they're getting overrewarded, then frankly you've already lost a large portion of the game and the culture, enterprise culture that you want to create, if that's when it shows
- 29:20
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- 29:26
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- 29:58
- Paul Chapman: Yeah, I want to move on to what best in class looks like. in a more complex balanced score card because you're right, right? You can't realise the the value in being able to assess MA activities, for example, unless you've or investments into assets unless you've got that broader lens. There is you know there
- 30:18
- Paul Chapman: are well known examples in in history of when you know transfer pricing are wrong or traders have been able to I guess, inflate their contribution, which has a direct impact on reward, as you mentioned, sometimes absolute. That's more common in trading houses that don't suffer from this problem, or maybe starting to,
- 30:38
- Paul Chapman: than it is, say, with the asset-backed organizations we're talking about here. But there can certainly be this view, this is not just sort of an ideological struggle about where that value is assigned. It also has concrete outcomes and therefore moral hazard is if you've got an incentive structure there that can incentivize the trading the commercial group to inflate, you know, or individual traders, whatever it
- 30:58
- Paul Chapman: means it might be, you know, or to manipulate bat benchmark prices to get the best value back to their organisations. And moral hazard is a and less nice way of saying sort of just the challenge always in incentives mean outcomes and behaviours, right? And getting those incentives right. Is that a much over over-egged egg argument in the sector and actually is relatively rare, or is that is it one
- 31:18
- Paul Chapman: that's defensible and one that needs sort of clear-eyed tackling? I guess maybe Sav you can just carry on on that because I know you sat at the heart of some of this these in designing these incentive structures. Can you just give us your take there and then it'd be great to get Anne your comment.
- 31:32
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah
- 31:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): I've it definitely does exist and you need to have a way of tracking it and seeing it because quite often the only time it becomes really clear is when it gets to to the extreme. So so for example, I I sat in one organization where one year in a particularly poor margin environment, the P and L for the
- 31:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): overall downstream organization was close to zero and the P and L for the trading organization was you know hundreds of millions of dollars. Which you know, which then prompted the conversation at the most senior level. It says, so are we really saying that if we weren't to have these assets and we close them all down, that all of the trading would still make the same amount of money
- 32:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): that it did? And the answer in that scenario was clearly no. So therefore, even with benchmarks that that had been audited, signed off, everybody believed was fair, was showing a disproportionate skew at an enterprise level in terms of where value sat. And in extreme cases that causes you to sell something that that
- 32:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): you don't. I remember another organization that that I worked with, we were looking at buying some assets in a in another country. And, you know, at the eleventh hour, the trading organization of the company that was selling it was saying, well hang on, if you sell that asset over there, it's going to take a couple of hundred million dollars a year out of our out of our trading
- 32:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): PL, which again was, well, okay, if that PL had been there all the time in the first place, or we'd shown a way of saying the PL was real, but it was jointly created, we may not have actually been trying to sell that piece of business in the first place. The problem is those examples typically only become visible in
- 33:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): extreme cases, but the behavior and the problem exist all the time. And so it is about how do you set up structures where, you know, whether it's your risk team, whether it's your competitor intelligence team, whatever it is, are taking mechanistic benchmarks for transaction, but they're also stepping back and saying,
- 33:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): are we beating the competition? Are we collecting all of the economic rent that we should be? And where do we think the quality of our assets? the optionality that they give, what level of embedded performance do they put into the trading business? And therefore our transfer price shouldn't just be, you know, a straight four bore a SIF number based on if it's
- 33:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): an import and export market, but it needs to take into account some of the flexibility and timing and working capital and all the rest of it. And that that's always going to be an art as much as a science. And you may even end up making it more complicated where you have, you know, hard transfer prices from a tax and fiscal perspective, but you
- 34:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): actually have softer enterprise um measures where people acknowledge that this was the true end to end performance and how it was and shared that may not be exactly equal to the numbers that come out of from the transfer price model.
- 34:26
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah.
- 34:26
- Paul Chapman: that's fascinating. I and I want to nail that tax piece next. But just that is requiring a level of sophistication and understanding and maturity on the behalf of the trader as well, right? It's a two way street as you as and Anne, can you comment on this? I guess if I'm sat there and I'm saying, Hey look, my my tax appropriate benchmarks or what the organization sets set, say I've
- 34:46
- Paul Chapman: made four hundred million, you owe me enough enough wealth to carry three generations of my family, and the organization sat there saying, Look, like, you know, this is a function of the entire commercial organization, the entire organization that's built this way to label us to capture this opportunity. And in some
- 35:06
- Paul Chapman: senses, you know, we would expect any trader to be able to capture that. What's sort of the alpha over the the beta performance if you'd like? I imagine those are really tough conversations and A any do those conversations come up where there is that kind of disconnect where the trader sincerely believes their performance and there's a misalignment with what the enterprise thinks of that. And then how do you know how does that get navigated like and
- 35:26
- Paul Chapman: as a podcast in and of itself?
- 35:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): So I think a a key feature is that the trading management needs to understand how the money has been made and created. Because when the trade traders, they are good at optimizing metrics. So at the end of the day,
- 35:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): that's one of the skill sets that they've been recruited for. So if they are measured on
- 35:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): desk PL or you know, like if the internal price
- 35:52
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): or
- 35:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): benchmark leaves room to monet monetize optionality without explicitly mentioning it, then they will operate within these boundaries. It's because of the design of the organization. So there need to be a constructive challenge to test proof exactly how the money has been made. So
- 36:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): yes, the trading leaders need to have the maturity to recognize when you know a result that looks good uh you know locally but we globally is is not a good thing. More importantly, I think the the traders need to have the intellectual honesty to recognize the value of the
- 36:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): embedded optionalities. So by that I mean you know like you you saw over the last uh years, decades even like traders who trade trading house who used to be very, very asset light and were able to trade it very efficiently the market, they went and purchased assets because you know they realize that you need that
- 36:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): asset base to root your flow, to to to create the options that you can trade around despite the cost of the assets, the cost of running the assets and you know the working capital side. This intellectual honesty in recognizing the value of embedded optionality is key. The
- 37:09
- Paul Chapman: trading houses are fascinating examples. In a sense, they either don't have this problem because they don't really have assets and it's more of this tactical. tax discussion we're going to come on to a tax optimization, I should say, not tax avoidance. But actually in some ways, and JP maybe you can comment on this or Sav, I know you think about this a fair bit, they are trading led. They don't really have that same transfer pricing lens.
- 37:29
- Paul Chapman: They're just like we acquired that asset to support our trading business. There's one PL and you know, in some ways there's a bit more of an honest discussion in some ways about how that value gets assigned and created, and they don't have the same pressures in terms of between internal divisions and all the rest of it, right? Is that a fair statement?
- 37:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I think to the extent that you have one PL, that can work, right? Because at that point you say you're trading lead, the traders can decide whether to buy an asset or not, or a trading business can decide to invest in an asset and extract the value through the that trading optimization. and then presumably the people actually running the asset share in that profitability in
- 38:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): a way that is negotiated or set internally in a way that people feel is fair. But I think that's only a short term benefit or difference. Because the moment you start thinking about more capex, more maintenance expenses, changes in personnel, changes in rules around an asset, for example, you have the same issue again of you know, do we really
- 38:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): know how much value is being created by that asset? So yes, you start the discussion from a different perspective, a different different opening perspective. But I think you end up in very similar debates quite quickly.
- 38:40
- Paul Chapman: Yeah, there's a floating comment here about how sophisticated your finance team are, your your CFO, are they a champion of this commercial business? And it all comes down to that actually understanding the complexities even just even before you sort of actually, you know, dig into the sort of the the real complexity. I mean, it's fascinating. Okay, so let's talk tax and governance and so forth. But let's on
- 38:59
- Paul Chapman: tax, is this a an example where you know you have uh your financial accounting and that you know follows the governance and the jurisdictions you're in and tries to optimize for tax and that's and that's different to management accounting, which is here we're trying to figure out where best to assign value. And those two things are somewhat divorced in this discussion. Or is tax the
- 39:19
- Paul Chapman: sort of ultimately the the starting point, the midpoint and the end point of a lot of these discussions, because you know, it can have a profound impact on perform on on overall company financial performance depending on where and what tax regimes it's being been charged in. JP, I know this is definitely ground zero, I guess, for some of the work you've done. So yeah So how
- 39:39
- Paul Chapman: important should tax be in this discussion and how important is it?
- 39:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Well, you don't have full choice, of course, in terms of how important or unimportant you make tax because taxes are implemented in laws and you need to comply with those. So
- 39:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): in terms of what you can do that come directly from tax laws in various different jurisdictions. Most of those allow for an element of discussion. discretion or interpretation, but they do set clear guidance in most cases as to what is acceptable and what is not acceptable for a company to choose transfer pricing between legal entities that are headquartered or pay
- 40:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): tax in different jurisdictions. So you have no choice but to take those hard boundaries into account. Within the room of interpretation and within the room that a company has to choose to put certain activities in certain jurisdictions.
- 40:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): or even sometimes in certain legal forms, you then have how much do you emphasize that versus the incentive structure and the transparency of performance and compensation. And that's one of the areas where I think it is difficult to find a structure that quote unquote everybody in an
- 40:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): organization can align with because tax is as complex as anything else in terms of its rules, how you structure things, how you report things, etc. And it's very easy for other people to stand on the side and say, that's too complicated, I'm going to leave it to the experts, they'll decide and we'll just live with the answers. There's a peel to that approach,
- 41:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): but that often means that you put the card before the horse. You know, you don't really want your tax strategy to drive the commercial strategy of an organization.
- 41:16
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 41:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the challenge is how do you avoid that?
- 41:18
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
- 41:18
- Paul Chapman: I guess that's my point. And that's sort of the essence of my question was sort of in an ideal world, you would start with just how you assign value, absent tax, and in some way, I mean you can as a leadership team just say, actually, I want to that's the lens in which I'm going to create my incentive performance, you know, and and judge business units on. And then there's a
- 41:38
- Paul Chapman: separate lens. layer of tax, which of course you I don't you have to follow, which then will define my sort of financial accounting. And I don't want the tail to wag the dog in that sense. Or is that just too naive and tax is just too big of an issue that it can't be absent.
- 41:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Don't have a definitive answer for that one, because from what I have seen and what I hear from other people, there are situations where the tax drives a very significant amount of profit. In other words, if you look at taxes versus under two different choices that a company might make, it may make a 10 or 20% difference in the total reported
- 42:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): EBITDA. And that is quite significant. It couldn't be as significant as the contribution of more optionality in your operating assets. So it's not always, Ways, I think, as simple as we're just going to set up the company and a structure that makes the most sense for us. from a commercial perspective, where our clients are, how we service them best, how we extract value from our
- 42:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): operations, etc. Sometimes I think really tax has to play a role in that fundamental design.
- 42:37
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah.
- 42:38
- Paul Chapman: Which
- 42:38
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): is we
- 42:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): may not like it.
- 42:39
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
- 42:39
- Paul Chapman: well we can see where the trading houses have based themselves, right? For the most part, as an indication of how important tax taxes, is, you know, which jurisdiction you're in. I'm sure the traders would like to be in other locations, you know. London etcetera, versus say a particular canton in in Switzerland or in Abu Dhabi and Dubai is an exact example of this. Sav, where
- 42:59
- Paul Chapman: does tax fit in in your mind? Is this where we're layering in an equal but powerful force that sometimes is in the opposite direction?
- 43:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): JP described it well, which is this is something that almost needs to be designed in a bespoke way for each company and circumstance. Going back to the trading houses, my sense is certainly for some of the larger ones, this potentially becomes a slightly easier conversation, not necessarily around tax, but but overall on transfer
- 43:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): pricing, because the one thing that they focus on, you know, I'd say embrace the one enterprise value philosophy more cleanly than some of the large larger, more complex organizations, you know, be they NOCs, IOCs, or majors operating in multiple jurisdictions and and multiple uh
- 43:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): stylos. I think you can do it in two ways. As JP said, there's a tax conversation that says involved in the contractual interface between two internal bits of the business where it requires a buy and a sell, what's a tax defensible answer, which can be around a benchmark, and we spoke about that earlier. I think one of the things to
- 44:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): watch for is how quickly and easily are you removing some of that tension? Because I think if you default back to something which is very simple and very a hundred percent transparent and defendable, that may make the conversation easier with the local tax authority. authorities, but may not
- 44:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): be representative of the actual business and what you do. And therefore it isn't about operating in in the gray zone, but it is about saying if you think something isn't a fair reflection of your business, you should be prepared to defend it with logic and examples and that be a true representation if if it shows the business more correctly. So I think there's there are
- 44:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): a local tax optimums and local tax representations which are needed. And then there's a whole a piece that sits above that, which is, you know, the enterprise value optimization from a where you're domiciled, which are your operating entities, where you're charging brokerage, so on and so forth. And that that's a whole level of complexity and and potentially a different
- 45:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): a a different podcast. But I think the essence I'd I'd leave for this one is don't simplify your tax and transfer price so simply that it actually distorts showing how business value and enterprise value are being created because that's that's the thin end of a of a
- 45:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): wedge internally of disoptimization and mistrust.
- 45:31
- Paul Chapman: Yeah, and also something that as you say, more sophisticated tax regimes are going to pierce pretty quickly if it isn't a an actual reflection of how that value gets created. But of course, as I've stated, there's quite a lot of room for margin and how in interpretation that can inform sort of how you how you structure that. I guess this brings us on to sort of what good
- 45:51
- Paul Chapman: looks like. And again, we're kind of briefly sampling various complexity and areas of topic and focus in this. I imagine this might even be a Halloween special given that the the sort of cold tremble is as it might be giving people. of uh of transfer pricing. But what does good look like? Well let's start, Sav, with that sort of
- 46:11
- Paul Chapman: the finance piece, with the CFO, with the finance leadership of an organization and the tax and accounting side. What does good look like there, JP? I mean, is there sort of a sense of kind of actually these are specialized domain areas that if you don't have that sort of knowledge and capacity capability in those groups, you can automatically start becoming unstuck.
- 46:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I'm not sure about the method, but I do think that one of the criteria for what good looks like is sufficient transparency around the various different mechanisms that you use. People in the organization can understand them and hopefully align behind them, but certainly have a debate. So if you end up with a structure that says okay it's
- 46:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): at the end of a period, here's how we see the value being created by various different parts of the organization, and then everybody should have an opportunity to say, look, that's fine. I understand that, but can I challenge it? Can I ask for it? Can I explain to you why it is that number is a hundred and not a hundred and twenty? And if you can't have that debate with a
- 47:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): sufficient understanding, then you will just generate mistrust and more complexity. I don't think is worth it when you can't generate the trust because if you have more of that symbiotic value that Savus was talking about and that Anne has been talking about, you need to have trust across different parts of the organization. So for me the transparency and the
- 47:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): explainability of performance relative to benchmarks has to be the number one thing.
- 47:34
- Paul Chapman: Sav, how you go about thinking what some frameworks or just how how to start thinking about this this problem and sort of the some of the I guess the the principles you need to sort of set up to go about it. You've already mentioned, you know, how often should you interrogate your benchmarks and think about this? How often does this conversation get raised, for example?
- 47:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): You know, unfortunately it sounds like it adds more complexity rather than simplifies, but it the behaviour can change and impact performance over time. So so for example, you know, Anne was talking about the role of leader. leaders of a trading desk and a trading business, their responsibility is to is to understand performance. That can sometimes be tricky
- 48:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): where A on one level it may be an organization where they've decided the trading management doesn't trade because they want to have segregation of duties, they you know they don't want moral hazards, so on and so forth. But if you think of the flip side of that structure, that means that you're trying to judge
- 48:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): performance without necessarily being able to witness the game live on the pitch, as it were, because you're not down there, you're not talking to the market, you don't know what was what was possible. You often have the situation where the traders, for good reason, are career traders and you've got them there because they're very much special.
- 48:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): specialists and therefore if you imagine a scenario where how do you get the same level of judgment and knowledge and challenge if you have a model where your trading leaders are ones that are part of a broader corporate progression in their careers and might only be there for three to five years. You know, all of a sudden
- 49:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): you have a bit of a skew in terms of how easy it is or not to apply that judgment. So in that example there, if that if that's where you are, you need to think about how do I get the balance? How do I get an independent view of what looks good like? How do I make sure that I've got others in the organization that can give me a fair assessment and
- 49:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): representation? Definitely what you want to avoid is a situation where you know, bad transfer pricing turns cooperation. into negotiation. Once internal teams start behaving like counterparts rather than part of the same business, you've already lost a reasonable a reasonable part of the battle. There are some way you know
- 49:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): there are some ways and we can talk about that in in a moment that you know what are some of the structures that you would put in place, but they're they are multifaceted and there is no single silver bullet bullets. and sometimes what you see organizations doing is simplifying that down to remove one element of complexity from the day-to-day business.
- 50:10
- Paul Chapman: Let's talk about those structures, I guess. And do you have any comments on that? And I guess in some sense my question would be how far down the organization are things like is transfer pricing a a live discussion? I mean, is this something that actually a lot of the sins can be solved? by actually this not being a sort of enterprise wide, you know,
- 50:31
- Paul Chapman: challenge and people shoving each other in the corridors over it, right? I mean it's it's held at a high a a a more senior level.
- 50:37
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 50:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): mean you don't want transfer pricing to be a daily occurrence. You know
- 50:40
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you don't want
- 50:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): this so so you want a system that uh you know uh set up setup that traders uh you know respect that where the boundaries are clear, where the understanding where the optionality has been created is clear for everybody, that everybody has a role to play to to monetize that options, whether
- 51:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): that optionality, whether it's on the operational side, whether on the it's on the trading side, you need everybody to understand the the logic of the system. And you certainly don't want dispute to to drag forever. There's two things I would add is that the first thing it's around behavior. If you start seeing that some behaviors which are
- 51:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): not encouraging this one vision of the PL creep up, then you know you should not hesitate to review the incentive to drive the right behaviour. At the end of the day, this is usually a a very effective way to do. And for that, and that's my second point, you really need to have the trading leadership
- 51:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): to understand where, you know, like kind of as close as possible to the action to understand the value creation. Because they also need to make a call when comes the discussion around bonuses, that if somebody who does not drive the right behavior but makes a lot of money, to know whether that's the true assessment of the
- 52:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): situation or whether actually there's a there've been debate around value transfer.
- 52:06
- Paul Chapman: Yeah, which is a a real challenge, right? That maturity, that understanding of kind of the broader enterprise organization. And often you've made it to that trading leadership because you've you yourself have been a successful trader and you might have had a particular suite of lenses that you used and you know no one likes to sort of question their own sort of phenomenal performance, I guess if you'd like. It is a that
- 52:26
- Paul Chapman: is a really real challenge there, that's definitely a human challenge. Uh some part of this, Sav, is is kind of actually and JP said it, there's sort of a bespoke approach to how you come to the the most optimal solution here on transfer pricing, and that solution is going to change in real time and needs to be constantly assessed. And the world is changing
- 52:46
- Paul Chapman: at the same time as you know as well. And it's never going to be perfect, it's going to be an approximation.
- 52:51
- Paul Chapman: of some sense of reality, and it's a very useful tool. I guess what would be really useful to sort of end on is kind of like taking on from Anne's point there, what are some of the artifacts, if you're in leadership at the moment, that should give you a concern, whether that's in behaviours or outcomes, that maybe you've got a bit of a transfer price problem?
- 53:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Yeah, maybe I'll leave a few a few closing thoughts. So I think this is something. that people need to think about at multiple levels.
- 53:17
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 53:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): I think at a board level, the board needs to be thinking that transfer pricing is no longer just the narrow technical policy or tax question. It's part of company's internal governance for its internal market. And if you govern that badly or in the wrong way, you misread, misrepresent performance,
- 53:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): therefore you misallocate. capital and you eventually damage the strategic choices that you're making as as as we discussed. I think another thread is that value is much more layered and nuanced than a simple transfer, binary transfer price leaves you with. And that's a big problem. So you know
- 53:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): ownership, flexibility, timing, risk capacity, customer access, credit
- 54:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): operational execution, and excellence all contribute to value creation. And if your transfer pricing framework pretends that only one of those things matters or only the price matters, you effectively end up distorting and suboptimizing.
- 54:20
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 54:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): I think there's a one thing I also consider is transfer pricing leading to the question questions being asked of who gets the credit rather than what behaviors and what cooperation are we trying to encourage. That requires you to look at a lot of your internal processes. And then finally, I think transfer pricing
- 54:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): has to be treated as a core design of the operating model. Has to be jointly built, not imposed. It's got to be linked to the business strategy and not
- 54:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): You periodically pressure test it in volatile markets and not just sit back when times are good and admire it. And you anchor it in the idea that the purpose of the internal market, the internal transfer price, is to improve enterprise decisions, not simply produce, you know, neat,
- 55:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): defendable internal invoices.
- 55:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah.
- 55:14
- Paul Chapman: Well I think that's a perfect note to end on. And it's it's something you should start with, not sort of think about after you've built stuff, right? And and uh yeah. Well, I really appreciate all three of you joining us and I think it's a demonstration of of sort of the the horsepower in the ENCO advisor bench. We set out what we achieved to do, which was somehow get through transfer pricing in an hour and give it a good
- 55:34
- Paul Chapman: a good crack. And Anne Savas, JP, thanks so much for your time and um, you know, I I'm sure there's a part two and a part three in this at some point as we sort of see what comments we get and what areas we really want to dig into.
- 55:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Thank you very much.
- 55:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Thanks, Paul.
- 55:49
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Thank
- 55:49
- Paul Chapman: you for listening. To find out more about HC Group, our global offices, and our expertise in search within the commodities sector, please visit www www.hcgroup.global. dot hcgroup.global
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