Dr. Hunt warns of structural inflation, fiscal vulnerability, and the end of Keynesian policy as interest costs rise.
Summary
Dr. Lacy Hunt argues the global economy is shifting from globalization to reshoring, creating persistent inflationary pressures. He contends that the Federal Reserve has failed to control inflation due to a false belief in mean reversion, with money supply growth outpacing potential growth. Hunt predicts interest expenses will consume 20% of the budget deficit within seven years, signaling a fiscal crisis akin to historical sovereign debt defaults. He also notes that AI-driven GDP growth is being offset by trade deficits, while corporate profit momentum is slowing. Political intervention is expected if markets decline, potentially doubling the deficit.
Key takeaways
- 1 The path that we're on here by in seven years interest expense will be twenty percent of the budget deficit.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) · 0:00
Episode sections
- 0:00 – 3:48
Post-Globalization Shift and Inflationary Pressures
Dr. Hunt argues the world is shifting from globalization to reshoring and friendshoring, reversing economies of scale and creating inflationary pressures. He notes that interest expenses are projected to reach 20% of the budget deficit in seven years, signaling a move into the Keynesian endgame.
- 3:48 – 8:43
Monetary Policy, Velocity, and Inflation Persistence
The speaker contrasts current monetary conditions with the Volcker era, noting that while M2 growth is high (6.5%), velocity is rising, meaning the non-inflationary benchmark is lower than previously thought. He asserts that the Fed has operated under the false assumption that inflation would mean revert, resulting in 66 consecutive months of inflation above the 2% target.
- 8:43 – 13:41
The Keynesian Endgame and Fiscal Vulnerability
Hunt describes the inherent bias of the Keynesian system toward deficits, exacerbated by rising interest expenses. He argues that modern politicians have attractive alternatives to austerity, making a return to sound fiscal policy unlikely without a crisis.
- 13:41 – 22:03
Political Implications and the Reserve Currency Status
Hunt discusses the political implications of inflation and the potential erosion of the US reserve currency status due to fiscal irresponsibility.
- 22:03 – 27:12
Historical Parallels and Sovereign Debt Risks
The speaker warns that interest expenses will reach 20% of the budget deficit in seven years, drawing parallels to historical debt crises in Mesopotamia, Rome, and post-WWII Britain. He argues that unlike past eras, modern politicians have attractive alternatives to austerity, making a return to sound fiscal policy unlikely without a crisis.
- 27:12 – 31:30
Inflation Expectations and Wage Dynamics
Hunt highlights a dichotomy between anchored inflation expectations in futures markets (~2.25%) and higher expectations in consumer/business surveys (~4%). He argues that money supply growth drives prices, which then drive wages, and that waiting for wage acceleration means losing the battle against inflation.
- 31:30 – 32:44
Service Sector Inflation and Fed Inaction
The speaker notes that inflation is becoming entrenched in the service sector, with Q3 nominal services growth near 8% and service inflation around 4%. He criticizes the Federal Reserve for accelerating money supply and bank loans while waiting for other factors to change, assuming mean reversion that is not occurring.
- 32:44 – 35:00
AI Impact on GDP and Corporate Profits
Speaker 0 argues that while AI added ~1.33% to Q3 GDP, a ~0.9% trade deficit deterioration reduced the net contribution to only 0.3-0.4%. Corporate profit growth slowed significantly from Q2 ($390B rise) to Q3 (~$185B rise), suggesting vulnerabilities despite headline growth.
- 35:00 – 36:01
Political Response to Market Vulnerabilities
Speaker 1 suggests a negative wealth effect from an equity pullback could trigger political intervention. Speaker 0 agrees, noting that such stress would cause politicians to increase spending, potentially doubling the budget deficit from 2% to 4% of GDP.
- 36:01 – 37:05
Bond Market Behavior in Structural Inflation
Speaker 1 questions if bonds will behave traditionally during a downturn given embedded inflation. Speaker 0 predicts that while rates may fall, the historical inverse relationship between growth and yields will be a thing of the past.
- 37:05 – 38:02
Monetary Policy, Velocity, and Inflation Dynamics
Speaker 0 asserts that when money supply growth exceeds the declining potential growth rate, inflation accelerates. He cites recent 30-year yield declines as partly due to Treasury operations.
- 38:02 – 40:55
International Swaps and Domestic Money Supply
Speaker 0 explains that the US Treasury and Fed used swaps to stabilize the Japanese Yen earlier in the year, which inadvertently loosened US monetary conditions. This action prioritized preventing contagion over domestic inflation targets.
- 40:55 – 42:24
Evolution of Economic Theory and Fiscal Bias
Speaker 0 discusses how his views have evolved since 1969, noting the Keynesian system has an inherent bias toward deficits. He extends James Buchanan's work by incorporating rising interest expenses, which were previously trivial but are now a major fiscal drag.
- 42:24 – 47:05
Velocity of Money and Fiscal Multipliers
Speaker 0 outlines five historical periods of money velocity since 1900, noting it is currently rising again. He also rejects the traditional Keynesian multiplier of 4, citing evidence that it is likely negative (~0.3), implying fiscal stimulus may worsen economic outcomes.
Assets discussed
| Asset | Kind | Stance | Context |
|---|---|---|---|
| Gold | commodity | neutral | And with we then we hear people talking about real asset. assets and gold and all this other stuff. |
“Stance” is how the speakers talked about the asset, not a recommendation.
Claims worth verifying
Interest expense will be 20% of the budget deficit in seven years.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·0:00
How to verify: Calculate projected federal interest payments using CBO long-term budget outlooks and compare to projected deficits; verify current interest expense as a percentage of the budget using Treasury Department data. For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The US is shifting from globalization to reshoring and friendshoring, reversing economies of scale.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·2:23
How to verify: Analyze trade data (US Census Bureau) for changes in import sources and manufacturing investment trends (BEA data) indicating a shift from global supply chains to domestic or allied sourcing. For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Labor force growth has declined from 1.5% per annum (1929-2020s) to negative/flat due to aging, falling birth rates, and halted immigration.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·4:49
How to verify: Check US Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) labor force participation rates and Census Bureau population projections for trends in working-age population and immigration flows. For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
M2 money supply growth is at 6.5% annually, while the non-inflationary benchmark is 3% (2% productivity + 1% velocity rise).
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·6:13
How to verify: Retrieve M2 data from Federal Reserve H.6 release; calculate potential GDP growth using BLS productivity and labor force data; estimate velocity trends using nominal GDP/M2 ratios. For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Paul Volcker faced an 8.5% M2 growth rate against a 3.5% potential growth rate and 2% inflation target in 1979, with stable velocity.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·6:21
How to verify: Review historical Federal Reserve data (H.6) for M2 growth in 2026; check historical GDP growth and inflation rates from BEA; verify velocity stability using historical nominal GDP/M2 ratios. For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Inflation has been above the Fed's 2% target for 66 consecutive months.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·7:39
How to verify: Count the number of months where the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Core PCE or CPI inflation rate exceeded 2% from the start of the podcast's referenced period to the present. For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The budget deficit for fiscal year 2026 (ended Sept 2026) is $2 trillion, or 6.3% of GDP.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·12:03
How to verify: Check the US Treasury Department's Monthly Treasury Statement or CBO budget data for FY2026 actuals or estimates for total outlays, receipts, and deficit. For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Interest expense is 14% of the federal budget and 7.5% of GDP, up from 7% and 1-3% respectively ten years ago.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·10:43
How to verify: Compare current federal interest payments (Treasury data) to total budget outlays and GDP (BEA) against data from ten years prior (2026-2026). For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
30% of US debt is held by the foreign sector.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·10:54
How to verify: Check the US Treasury Department's International Capital Asset (TIC) data for the percentage of total public debt held by foreign investors. For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Consumer and small business inflation expectations are around 4%, contrasting with ~2.25% in futures markets.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·27:33
How to verify: Review University of Michigan Surveys of Consumers and Conference Board Consumer Confidence Index for inflation expectations; compare to CME FedWatch or Treasury futures-implied inflation rates. For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
AI added about 1.33% to Q3 GDP out of a total 3.3-3.4% growth, but a 0.9% trade deficit deterioration reduced the net contribution to 0.3-0.4%.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·33:04
How to verify: Check BEA GDP reports for Q3 2026 (released Nov 2026) for total GDP and trade balance components; compare with Q2 2026 data. For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Q2 corporate profits rose by ~$390 billion, while Q3 rose by ~$185 billion.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·34:08
How to verify: Check BEA National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) Table 1.1.5 for Corporate Profits after Tax for Q2 and Q3 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The US Treasury increased buying of longer coupon Treasury securities and funded them by selling more bills.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·38:02
How to verify: Check US Treasury Daily Treasury Statement (DTS) for Q3 2026 auction results and settlement data. For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The US opened the Fed's balance sheet through swaps to help stabilize the Japanese Yen earlier in 2026.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·38:46
How to verify: Check Federal Reserve H.4.1 reports for Foreign and International Securities held by Federal Reserve Banks for Q3 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Money velocity has been rising again after declining until the pandemic.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·43:14
How to verify: Calculate M2 velocity (Nominal GDP / M2) using BEA data for 2026 and compare with historical trends from St. Louis Fed FRED database. For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The Keynesian multiplier is likely around 0.3 with a negative sign.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·43:36
How to verify: Review academic literature on fiscal multipliers (e.g., Auerbach & Gorodnichenko) and recent IMF/BEA empirical studies on fiscal policy impact in 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Speaker 0 earned his PhD in January 1969.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·41:16
How to verify: Check Dr. Lacy Hunt's professional biography or CV from his employer (Association for Monetary Economics and Macrostructure) or university alumni records. For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Do your own research
- Verify the current trajectory of US federal interest expenses relative to the budget deficit using Treasury Department data or CBO reports.
- Check the latest GDP components for AI-related contributions and trade deficit impacts via BEA releases.
- Review Federal Reserve balance sheet data for changes in M2 growth and velocity of money.
- Analyze corporate earnings reports for profit margin trends and growth rates across sectors.
- Examine historical sovereign debt crises (e.g., post-WWII Britain, Rome) for parallels to current fiscal metrics.
- Assess the validity of the Keynesian multiplier estimate by reviewing recent fiscal stimulus outcomes.
- Monitor inflation expectations surveys (e.g., Michigan, NY Fed) versus TIPS breakeven rates for divergence.
- Check for any new international swap agreements or Fed interventions affecting domestic liquidity.
Full transcriptexpand
- 0:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): The world is shifting into the post globalization era. The path that we're on here by in seven years interest expense will be twenty percent of the budget deficit. Now that that's a calculation that I made and it's pa it's fraught with error potentialities, but we're moving higher, steadily higher. Well the the the
- 0:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): fact of the matter is that we've we're beginning to see dema dem uh globally at least, episodes of what I call the Keynesian End game.
- 0:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): This week, a returning guest, it's Dr. Lacey Hunt. He needs no introduction. I recently got an update from Lacey on his views on a whole range of issues. The most significant argument emerging from Lacey's interview is that economic relationships investors became accustomed to during the disinflationary era may be changing. His
- 0:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): thesis combines five propositions. Firstly, the global supply environment is becoming less favorable. Demographic aging, slower labor force growth, reshoring, and declining gains from international specialization may constrain potential economic growth. Secondly, monetary growth may be excessive
- 1:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): relative to the economy's productive capacity. Hunt argues that a renewed increase in monetary velocity. makes this problem more serious than it would have been during the preceding period of declining velocity. Thirdly, persistent government deficits and rising debt service costs may reduce the ability of fiscal policy to respond
- 1:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): effectively to recessions.
- 1:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Become more vulnerable as investors reassess sovereign credit, inflation, and currency risks. And finally, these developments may undermine the traditional relationship between weak economic growth and falling long term government bond yields. So, what does all this mean? The combined outcome is the possibility of an extended period characterized by weaker
- 1:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): real growth, persistent inflation, and greater financial market volatility. So I often ask guests on the show for some reading suggestions and labor. Lacey didn't disappoint. Stay tuned till the end of the podcast where Lacey provides some very interesting recommendations. Okay, with that said, I hope you enjoy this
- 2:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): week's conversation with Dr. Lacey Hunt.
- 2:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): The world is shifting into the post-globalization era.
- 2:20
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We're
- 2:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we're now fragmenting.
- 2:23
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Uh
- 2:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we're shifting to home shoring and friendshoring. We're moving from just in time inventories to just in case. Uh the law of of Ricardo's law of comparative advantage is no longer the law of the day. The the fall of the iron and bamboo
- 2:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): curtain uh caused a major outward shift in the global aggregate supply curve. and resulted in a substantial economies of scale. And now those are being reversed probably more rapidly than we realize. And that's important, especially in the
- 3:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): United States case,
- 3:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): because at the time that the globalization process was clearly disinflationary. But so that we're that we're now in an inflation inflationary era.
- 3:17
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um
- 3:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): now people forget what what Frederick Bastiat told them
- 3:23
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a
- 3:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): long time ago. You may recall Bastiat a pre-Enlightenment philosopher, economist. And he said that it's important to take into consideration the seen and the unseen. And so we don't get monthly or quarterly indicators or annual indicators on economies of scale.
- 3:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): They're totally unseen, but we know they're important, don't we?
- 3:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Mm-hmm.
- 3:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And that is changing. And it's changing at a time when U.S. monetary growth has accelerated,
- 3:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): while our potential growth rate has been coming down.
- 4:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): If if you look you at the long-term trends in productivity, which we can go back to 1929, productivity grew about 2% per annum.
- 4:10
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We
- 4:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): had episodes when it was a little better and a little worse. There was obviously this was an in period of continuing technological innovation. Technological innovation's Invasions always with
- 4:22
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): us.
- 4:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And even when when we were getting s considerable spur. spurts, they didn't last very long. And then we would have a period of sub-2% increase in production. And at the same time, we had fairly steady rate of growth in the labor force, 1.5% per annum, going back to 1929.
- 4:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): 2% productivity, 1.5% And a half percent growth in labor force, your potential GDP is 3.5%. three and a half.
- 4:49
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
- 4:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): now our labor force is declining.
- 4:51
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It's
- 4:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): dropped since January. Not a great deal, but uh that means we no longer have the contribution from labor force growth. It's just not the immigration, the only element there. Our baby boomers have now all reached eligibility of Social Security and Medicare,
- 5:11
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
- 5:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): they're retiring. And we've had a falling birth rate. not as bad as the rest of the world, but we've had a falling birth rate. And so we have fewer entrants coming in on the front end. And then immigration has slowed dramatically, particularly illegal immigration, basically come to a halt.
- 5:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And so the potential growth rate Right now is two.
- 5:35
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 5:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Fed's inflation target is two. And if you were to use Friedman's original model,
- 5:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the M2 target should be four. But over the latest three quarters, velocity of money has risen more than one percent has risen more than one percent per annum. Over the latest four quarters, it's risen less than one percent per annum. am. But if you look at the trends there, we we hit we're entering an era in which velocity.
- 6:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): may rise at one percent per annum, which means that the money's non inflationary benchmark is actually at three.
- 6:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): But M two is at six and a half.
- 6:16
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Now
- 6:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): when Paul Volcker came in in nineteen seventy nine,
- 6:21
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): M
- 6:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): two growth was eight and a half percent. But the potential growth rate was three and a half. percent. The target was two percent then, or approximately two, just as it is today. But then velocity was stable. It had been stable for four almost four decades.
- 6:39
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I'm
- 6:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): sorry, three decades from nineteen fifty to nineteen eighty.
- 6:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And so velocity was not an issue. Well, Velocity I see is it'ssue an issue now, which means that money supply growth is has to be adjusted to take account of that. And so
- 6:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): when Volker came into office, he had a three and a half percentage point gap between money supply growth and the noninflationary benchmark, which is the same that we have today. And he had to take very stringent measures. Money was not mean reverting. It's one of the peo One of the main concepts that people don't understand.
- 7:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): But if you if you look at the situation under
- 7:19
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
- 7:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Powell Federal Reserve, after they accelerated money supply far beyond what was the mon non-inflationary benchmark for money,
- 7:27
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): they
- 7:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): operated uh for extensively under the assumption that money velocity would decline, or that that that inflation was not in and that inflation was in fact mean reverting.
- 7:39
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): They
- 7:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): gave it ample time to work. But did it work? No. Now we've had sixty-six consecutive months in which inflation has been above the target. And so we have a situation where the risk is that inflation moves further above the Fed's target in time. And I think that that's where we are in the United
- 7:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): States. And it's it's not a very healthy development.
- 8:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): because
- 8:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): inflation robs everyone, but it ma uh robs the modest and moderate income households the most.
- 8:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And it it's it's undermining the real per capita growth rate of the economy. Historically, we grew at 2.3% 3% real per capita turns.
- 8:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): The growth rate has come down, and we're only growing at about 1.5%. 1.2% per annum now.
- 8:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Can I ask about the growth rate, uh, Lacey? What is the biggest impediment to growth in your opinion? When we spoke previously, it was demographics, obviously, is non-productive use of capital, you could say. What are the main drive what drivers have I missed there?
- 8:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Well, the the the fact of the matter is that we've we're beginning to see demand- dem uh globally at least. episodes of what I call the Keynesian endgame. There was a very great economist of an earlier generation, slightly earlier. He's active in the early part of my career, James Buchanan, Nobel
- 9:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): laureate. And and basically what he said was that
- 9:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the the Keynesian approach would veer off the the runway because the in recessions
- 9:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): when conditions are bad people can advocate programs, you know, to cut taxes or increase various governmental benefits. Those benefits are very real.
- 9:29
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 9:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): so it's easy to run budget deficits and in recent times increasingly larger budget deficits.
- 9:38
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But he
- 9:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): said that there are the incentives to contain the budget and have surpluses in the boom times that would offset the deficits. The incentives don't work that way.
- 9:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Let's give a cheer for the fact that we can ensure a longer term future by raising taxes or cutting are benefits. Or we would make the inflation rate lower and help everybody else. out longer term. People don't see those benefits, do they? And so we Buchanan said that we
- 10:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): would get into a situation where the deficits during the bad times would greatly overpower any surpluses in the boom times. And now we have another problem that's becoming evident that Buchanan did not raise. what what that I raised. And that is that the interest expense is rising
- 10:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): very dramatically. Ten years ago, the interest expense as a percentage of the federal budget was roughly seven percent. It's doubled that now. It's fourteen percent.
- 10:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): It's seven and a half percent of GDP. Up from one to two to three. We've been steadily escalating higher. Now in our our case, and and this is true really for everyone,
- 10:54
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
- 10:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): thirty percent of our debt is held by the foreign sector.
- 10:58
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 10:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that doesn't recycle to the US, does
- 11:00
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it?
- 11:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Benefits people outside. But if you look at the saving rate by quintile in the United States, um
- 11:10
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): all
- 11:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): of the saving is done by the top quintile, which means that the what doesn't go to the foreign sector, the interest goes to the high income sector. And so the interest expense doesn't recyc recirculate. It does recirculate,
- 11:27
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): but
- 11:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it doesn't recirculate for the benefit of the domestic economy. And so the
- 11:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): let's let's say
- 11:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that AI is a big deal and the bubble is easing, which some people have begun to assert just in recent time.
- 11:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And let's say that the effect is big enough to cause a mild recession. A mild recession, based on historical comparisons, tell us the budget deficit could increase two trillion dollars.
- 11:57
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well,
- 11:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the budget deficit is already two $2 trillion. It's it's six 6.3% point three percent of GDP.
- 12:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): for the fiscal uh year 2026, which has just ended
- 12:08
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
- 12:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): end of September.
- 12:10
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 12:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): a recession gives you your corporate profits will go down significantly, income will fall, stabilizers will s set in. Moreover, the politicians will come to the rush, right? And so suddenly you have a you have a twelve trillion dollar, four trillion dollar
- 12:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): deficit, twelve percent of GDP.
- 12:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Well, national net national saving, which is saving of the household sector, the corporate sector, the foreign sector, and the government sector, is just barely positive.
- 12:43
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 12:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): so net national saving is going to go negative.
- 12:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): But but to have f real physical investment, you have to have savings.
- 12:52
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You
- 12:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): can't cover that by printing money.
- 12:55
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Now
- 12:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the Fed may print money to try to solve the gap, but that will be inflationary.
- 13:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And so
- 13:02
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
- 13:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I think that what we're already seeing, we're we're beg we have begun to see episodes of the Keynesian Endgame. Certainly in France. But I think we saw an episode or two uh in the UK.
- 13:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): they managed to deal with
- 13:17
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it
- 13:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): temporarily.
- 13:19
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well
- 13:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): what's very interesting, Alan, is that if if you look at the gross government debt in France and the UK, which clearly has problems, and if you look at their interest expense as a percent of their GDP or their the interest expense expenses is a part as a portion of their budget, it's considerably less. than it is in
- 13:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the United States.
- 13:41
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 13:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): United States fiscal house is in much worse order. But we still have uh what Barry Eichengrane, the great professor at the University of California, calls an exorbitant privilege.
- 13:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I've I'm very familiar with that uh That's Frey's um exorbitant privilege, yeah.
- 14:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So what he said is that we're the world's reserve currency.
- 14:06
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 14:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): people are more willing to hold the dollars because of that. But the the fact of the matter is that some of the considerations that that gave rise to the U.S. being the reserve currency are fading away way and reversing.
- 14:22
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 14:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): federal budget, federal interest expense, terms in of the economy. economy,
- 14:28
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
- 14:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): in terms of the federal budget. And so
- 14:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): when if if if the AI is big enough to cause a recession, even when money supply growth is accelerating, you're going to have hard times
- 14:44
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): for
- 14:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the UN.
- 14:46
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Can
- 14:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I ask you, Lacey, I mean, I was watching an interview you gave about ten years ago. on RealVision and you were you were flagging this ten years ago. I mean you you were saying this is unsustainable and we're just frog marching right into this current scenario that we are in now.
- 15:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): You mentioned endgame, but how does
- 15:09
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 15:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I said the cane can episodes of the caney Kane V and end game. gang.
- 15:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, the cane
- 15:13
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): say
- 15:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): endgame was
- 15:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Okay, interesting. But how does this play out then? I mean if and correct me if I'm wrong, from what I'm taking, this is like um stagflationary, the worst type of environment where growth is obviously suppressed by excessive debt. But in typic in a typical scenario, So that should lead to deflation. But
- 15:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): we've got this structural inflation now. So we've got the worst states of
- 15:39
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the state
- 15:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): of
- 15:40
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the state. And you also
- 15:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): abetted by a money money growth that's too fast.
- 15:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Mm-hmm.
- 15:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Too fast currently.
- 15:47
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 15:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Fed really the PAL Fed as it was leaving office began a a broad acceleration of quantitative easing. And it basically lit up the bank the commercial bank balance sheet to both the assets and the liabilities. And since December M2's grown at a 6.5% annual rate, it's too fast. And
- 16:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): ODL, which is your diagnostic variable, other deposit liabilities, which is the bank component, it's growing at a almost 8% annual rate.
- 16:18
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 16:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): if I if I was to pose to you that the result of all this is monetary debasement, it's, you know. over time bonds don't do what they used to do. And I know you've reevaluated your long your call on longer term bonds because people will say, well, fixed income will give you a
- 16:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): fixed income, but it won't give you, you know, a fixed purchasing power. So your purchasing power is going to be eroded over time. And with we then we hear people talking about real asset. assets and gold and all this other stuff. But that is much more inherently volatile and more speculative, you
- 16:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): could say. So are we just in a new regime now where
- 17:03
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We
- 17:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): are in a new regime. The the one thing in in these is other episodes of of what what you aptly described, the the Treasury bills will will hold you even. with the inflation rate. They will they will go one for one over time. And so you can hold the bills and you don't avoid
- 17:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the capital loss and you reprice, but it doesn't generate the capital gains. But it but at least it it maintains your purchasing power.
- 17:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): That's all it will do, but it avoids the losses, the capital losses.
- 17:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And I think that
- 17:41
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
- 17:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we have to think in terms of the Fisher equation.
- 17:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Fisher said that the nominal treasury bond yield is equal to the real rate plus expected inflation plus the risk premium. The risk premium historically was not an issue for us or for the other major industrialized countries.
- 18:01
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
- 18:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the interest expense now. is becoming so burdensome and such a major component
- 18:08
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): of
- 18:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the budget, 15, as I said, 15% in the U.S.
- 18:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that that p investors now
- 18:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): cannot accept the notion that the budget deficit problem can be solved. It's unsolvable. There's no way out now. The options are too difficult.
- 18:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And so we we have to live with an ever increasing budget deficit. Which means that the deficit goes up and the Fed is allowing money supply growth to try to address the insufficient growth.
- 18:43
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 18:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): so that but that stimulates inflation. So you get higher inflation but without improved real economic growth. Nominal growth goes up.
- 18:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And
- 18:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): another byproduct of all this, I think, has been some of the political malaise that we're seeing globally. I mean, because people, the populace, are feeling poorer. They followed the rules. You mentioned earlier that inflation affects the lowest moderate income the worst. Um So you see
- 19:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): a kind of a uh we saw in Germany D F party, extreme extreme right party, we see Marie Le Pen in France, Brexit in Britain, but uh Trump in in the United States. So there does seem to be this correlation between this new economic regime and a lack a complete lack of
- 19:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): trust in politics and s perhaps even society.
- 19:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I think that that's definitely happening. and I think that we're seeing a revolving door pat pattern in the political parties, not only in the United States and overseas. President Trump was elected to fix the economy,
- 19:50
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): but
- 19:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): he failed to do so. And so he's lost his popularity. So he came in to fix the economy. I mean, He couldn't do it. He made a major effort there to try, uh Um and he was showing some expenditure of growth reduction, but then he entered the situation in the Middle East. And so the slight
- 20:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): slowdown in government spending that occurred there for about three or f three or four quarters has been reversed.
- 20:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And and so he wasn't able to fix the problem. He's now no longer popular. But the fact of the matter is
- 20:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): there's no solution being advocated by the Democrats that can fix the problem because what they're talking about is increasing government programs even further. A lot of the Democrats are actually, admittedly, of the socialist viewpoint. In other words, they want to move the
- 20:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): economy into command more heavily into command and control.
- 20:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): But we we know that result. Higher command and control just reduces the likelihood that you can get the productivity gains that you would in in a when when the private sector is becoming a a larger share, not when the private sector is being diminished at the expense of
- 21:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): government. And so neither political party has an answer because the problem is now just simply too intractable. And
- 21:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we we're being sheltered from this because we still have this
- 21:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): exorbitant privilege working for
- 21:30
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): us.
- 21:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): But I think that it it will become at risk as
- 21:34
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): As
- 21:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): time goes by.
- 21:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): How does that play out? Is that like a credit credibility issue where,
- 21:41
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
- 21:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): know, people just actually begin to doubt the ability of uh US government to, you know I mean, if we're talking about the sustainability of interest payments and if inflation is structurally higher for longer,
- 21:57
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
- 21:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): we as we go through business cycles, that burden becomes just too heavy.
- 22:03
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well
- 22:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you're you're gonna go you're gonna you're g uh the way the path that we're on here by in seven years, interest expense will be twenty percent of the budget deficit. Now that that's a calculation that I made and it's pa it's fraught with error potentialities, but we're moving higher, steadily higher.
- 22:21
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yes. Whether
- 22:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it's twenty percent in seven years or less than that or longer than that, by a little bit, I don't know. know. But but this this becomes an increasingly uh burdensome area and we have to we have to make the interest payment.
- 22:37
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 22:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): if we don't then you've got uh a catastrophe of a far worse kind. But in this in this environment, month, just
- 22:46
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
- 22:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): spending more on the interest expense makes the dudge budget. the deficit more and more difficult to contain. Th there's no pathway to fix it, which is exactly what Buchanan said. And you may remember the name Herb Stein, very influential economist,
- 23:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): chairman of the Council of Economic Advisor. Uh and he said if a if a if a if a thing can can't go on forever it won't.
- 23:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): And
- 23:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and you know, we we have records of of what have happened to these highly indebted governments.
- 23:22
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You know,
- 23:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we don't like to think about 'em and they they occurred long ago, but you know, the Mesopotamian Empire sunk in debt, the Roman Empire. the let's not forget the Bourbons of France. Their situation ended in a very violent situation. Louis XV and his queen, upper
- 23:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): tier of the French royalty,
- 23:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): most of them.
- 23:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And the British Empire
- 23:50
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): at
- 23:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the end of World War Two couldn't refinance its debt. It survived after ten years of rationing, because the British have a stiff o uh stiff upper lift and they had the steady influence of Churchill
- 24:05
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): but
- 24:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): they had to jettison their empire. They could no longer hold their empire, which was a very expensive proposition, and carry on government. But it it's it expecting the the modern industrialized countries to to go through ten years of rationing to do what UK did at the end of World War
- 24:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Two II isn't very likely.
- 24:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Not since the politicians on both sides have very attractive alternatives that would provide benefits to people that we couldn't afford.
- 24:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): How concerned would you be about national capitalism? We know that the Europeans own an awful lot of U.S. equities, the Japanese own an awful lot of U.S. treasuries.
- 24:50
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): All of a
- 24:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): sudden Japanese interest rates are becoming a bit more attractive for domestic Japanese pension funds, insurance companies. What if the US and I should have said from the very start, none of this is investment advice, this is all just for education purposes, this conversation. But I just wonder, Lacey, how how does
- 25:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that play out when all of a sudden these large conglomerates have alternatives to US treasuries?
- 25:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Well, that that that remains a serious problem, but but the problem the the problem here is
- 25:26
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that our
- 25:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): trade deficit is gonna continue to rise. And and you know very well you're a damn good economist
- 25:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that as the trade deficit goes up, the capital surplus also goes up. They're the inverts. So, in other words, if people want to sell us more than we have, then they have to take our IOUs. And so the Japanese may not want to hold them, but someone else may. But in that process of settling
- 25:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the matter, it's going to be done in an environment in which the difficulties in one country pass to other countries. and then vice versa, transfer back. In other words, there may be episodes of international contagion. Because because there is there is no one that is pr
- 26:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): is is practicing sound policies.
- 26:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah. If we if we look at what's happening with yields globally and we talk about why are yields rising, and some people
- 26:26
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): point
- 26:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): towards inflation expectations, people point towards concerns about the ability of let's say France to service its fiscal issues. The French incredibly you have a retirement age of 62, and there was chaos when it when it was put to them that it would be extended to 64. I think that's a fundamental issue. But other people
- 26:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): are pointing to growth lacey then Dennis, as in terms of painting a very positive. picture that the real yield is is what's baked into this is an assumption that actually no, the US economy is doing really, really well. And the bond market is saying telling us uh a good story about
- 27:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the economy. Wha do you what do you think about that when you hear that?
- 27:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Well, first of all, if if you look at the futures markets, inflationary expectations appear to be anchored. However,
- 27:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we have other information
- 27:23
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): on
- 27:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): inflationary expectations. For example, we we have the extensive polling
- 27:30
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): by
- 27:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the University of Michigan in the conference board.
- 27:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And And also for small businesses through the National Federation of Independent Business. Businesses. And there,
- 27:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): even though the in inflation expectations in the futures markets are, you know, around two and a quarter, give or take, wherever they're trading. But the the consumers and the house b uh business small businesses are telling us that the inflation expectations are around four. And that
- 28:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): major dichotomy is going to be resolved. One of them is going to be right and one is going to be wrong. But in the current environment with money supply growth accelerating, I think that the the the consumer and business surveys are more accurate. Alan, one thing that people need to understand that
- 28:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): inflation
- 28:24
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in
- 28:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the sense that I gave it to you when money supply is accelerating the potential growth rate plus the the Fed central bank target is is a a money price wage spiral. Monetary growth comes first, then prices, then wages. The wages have
- 28:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): are the caboose, and people will point to the fact that they have stayed docile. There was a little bit of acceleration between the second and third quarter in terms of employment cost,
- 28:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): but it was mainly in the benefit side, Finiscule. But that that that's not surprising to
- 29:04
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): me
- 29:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): because wages are at the tail end. If you wait for the wages to start accelerating, usually at that point in time you've lost the war. against anchoring inflationary expectations.
- 29:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And so we have a situation here where, with the labor force not growing, gains in employment of 60 or 70,000 actually tighten the labor market
- 29:33
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): at
- 29:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): a time when the Fed is accelerating monetary growth. And that means that the inflationary process gets out of control. You know, one of the things that I think I'd like to emphasize is
- 29:45
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that
- 29:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): if you look back at at Martin, the Martin Fed there in the latter stages of his term and the Burns term,
- 29:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the term of G. William Miller, all of them basically made excuses for the rising inflation.
- 30:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Martin tried to do something, but uh Johnson basically hammered him and sort of impeded his ability to do what was right during the Vietnam War. He wanted to do more and made him may have,
- 30:22
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): but
- 30:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Johnson was such an a overpowering influence that Martin was
- 30:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): not able to work through that. Then Burns cooperated with Nixon during 1972. He found excuses for the rise in inflation.
- 30:41
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): When
- 30:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the airboil embargo hit in early seventy four, accelerated money supply growth because he thought that would hurt the domestic economy.
- 30:51
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 30:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): so what that did is that facilitated the passing through of the oil prices through the arable embargo and allowing the inflation to become more entrenched.
- 31:02
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 31:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): then of course G. William Miller did it repeatedly. And then the and eventually it it created such an intenable situation that President Carter had to replace him with Paul Volker,
- 31:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): who
- 31:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): did the job, but it took him four years of significant effort
- 31:19
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): to
- 31:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): get the job done. So
- 31:22
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
- 31:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the Federal Reserve has this prolonged period with the inflation rate moving above target.
- 31:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And the inflation appears to be Of settling in to a very significant degree in the service sector. The service is not influenced by these volatile, at least affected by the volatile food and fuel issues. There's some impact. But but in
- 31:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the third quarter, you had a nearly 8% rate of growth nominal services. The inflation,
- 31:59
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 31:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): inflation rate in the service sector was around four. Real was still still was also four.
- 32:06
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
- 32:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): but the fact that the in inflation is becoming entrenched in the service sector is an indication that your your biggest sector, which is non-cyclical, is beginning to reflect
- 32:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): this transition to higher inflation.
- 32:24
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 32:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): what is the Federal Reserve doing? They're saying they're committed to inflation, but money supply growth is still accelerating, and bank loans are exploding, and the Federal Reserve is waiting for something else to happen, you know, working on the assumption that you'll get mean
- 32:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): reversion. Now, I th I think that the the AI is a big deal. and it is clearly faltering, but I tried to sort out what was the impact of AI on the third quarter GDP. And if you look at the gross impact, I would
- 33:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): say it it added about one and a third percent to GDP out of the 3.3,
- 33:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): 3.4.
- 33:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): However,
- 33:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a lot
- 33:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): of a lot of what was being spent led to a surge in imports.
- 33:20
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 33:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): remember, GDP is C plus I plus G plus X minus M. And
- 33:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the deterioration in the trade deficit related to AI may have been
- 33:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): nine-tenths of a percent. So that the net contributions. contribution to GDP was only three or four-tenths.
- 33:43
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Now,
- 33:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I also tried to figure out the impact on corporate profits.
- 33:48
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Now,
- 33:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the third quarter GDP doesn't report profits. But if you make assumptions about capital consumption adjustment, the statistical discrepancy of foreign income and some other minor components in and assuming that they're unchanged from the second to the third quarter, the corporate profit
- 34:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): growth in the third quarter was a huge number. About 100, and by my calculation, doing what I just described, say of about 185 billion. However, in the second quarter, corporate profits rose by about $390 billion. So it it had a
- 34:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): tremendous impact on reducing the growth in profits. Profits are still moving up dramatically, but only half as fast as they were in the second quarter. I think there was some really glamorous accounting in there. I don't know for sure because that's not my job. But but there
- 34:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): there is a significant vulnerability to profit. profits, and maybe that means that the net drain in time is more than three or four tenths. But but still that leaves you with
- 35:00
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a
- 35:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): two percent, a two and a half percent rate of growth in GDP. At a time when the Fed is accelerating monetary growth.
- 35:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And can I can I ask you then, because you have mentioned the vulnerabilities of AI, which we start we're speaking uh on the thirtieth of October 2026.
- 35:17
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 35:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): presume what you're leaning into there, Lacey, is this negative wealth effect that we could see given the share of ownership that US
- 35:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): US uh citizens have to equities, you know, versus the eighties we've mentioned, the seventies, and eighties is a fraction. Like this if even if we get a double digit pullback, the negative wealth effect could create a cascading effect.
- 35:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): It's an element in the picture. Still an element in the picture. And and if it does, then as soon as that happens, the politicians will go to work along with the stable the stabilizing components of the budget, and suddenly the budget deficit is four, not two.
- 36:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): But i in that environment then, Lacey, if we play this out, fixed income bonds, we all assume that interest rates fall and the yields will fall, but maybe they won't. Is there a possibility, given the inflation is so structurally embedded, that we don't get bonds
- 36:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): behaving like they typically traditionally have?
- 36:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I think that there will be episodes. of which the rate when the rates will come down.
- 36:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): But I don't think that they will any cyclical downturn will have the typical historical impact.
- 36:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): But I I suspect that it will be a a mere shadow of his former form of clear impact. I think that that people need to understand that that the Federal Reserve has a maj plays a major role
- 36:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): in in the level of spendable money balances that everybody has. And
- 37:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we have a great deal of evidence, some of which is in my latest letter, our latest letter,
- 37:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): which shows that
- 37:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that
- 37:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): when when money supply growth
- 37:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): is faster than the potential growth rate, which in the U.S. is coming down.
- 37:25
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It's
- 37:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): coming down around the world. Labor force growth is shrinking everywhere. And when money supply growth is accelerating relative to potential growth rate plus the target,
- 37:38
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you're going
- 37:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): to get accelerating inflation. And when there's when there's a desire to sort of keep the system functioning, uh these transitory measures can have an impact. For example, I I would say maybe 15 or 20 basis points of the decline in the 30-year thirty year yields, which
- 37:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we've seen recently, are related to the fact
- 38:02
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that the
- 38:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): trend. Treasury started or increased their buying of uh longer coupon Treasury securities and funded them by selling more bills.
- 38:13
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well
- 38:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that that works over the short run, but it really doesn't alter the picture. And the when when the Fed does that, what they don't fund,
- 38:25
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
- 38:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): banks fund which then that actually contributes in a small way to further money growth. The Japanese yen got in big trouble earlier this year. And so what did what did the Treasury do in the US? Well, we did we opened up the Fed's balance sheet
- 38:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): through swaps. We did a big operation, did a bit bid the bid the did the Japanese quite a fail a fit favor.
- 38:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): But it but we did it because we wanted, we didn't want the this contagion in Japan to spread further into the bond market ahead of the election. But opening up the Fed's balance sheet to help the Japanese stabilize their currency also has a money supply impact. And so you you the Treasury doesn't. does
- 39:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): a twist operation. The Fed does an operation that people don't understand very well to help stabilize the yen by making money looser in the U.S. And the Fed sees a little bit of weakness, maybe a a lot of weakness in the AI sector,
- 39:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and so that becomes more of a priority to them than the fact that inflation is far above their target and appears to be coming more significantly entrenched in the US. That's the situation as I see it.
- 39:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Can I uh just finish up and really really uh huge thanks again, Lacey, for this it's always an in education. Um had a a massive response from listeners and viewers to your last episode, which I strongly recommend people go back and listen to. We spoke about demographics. You quoted the famous French
- 40:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Auguste Comte uh Demographics is Destiny. And we won't get into that now, but one last very quick question, if you if you'll allow me. A lot of younger viewers and followers of the show or have been introduced to your work now. in Europe and Ireland, and if you had to give them a book that they
- 40:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): should look at, or perhaps an author that they should follow, given this regime that we are currently in to understand this regime, who would you recommend?
- 40:42
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well,
- 40:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I'm gonna do w I'm gonna do a favor for you and your readers. I'm going to send you my recommended readings with my cliff notes.
- 40:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Brilliant.
- 40:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And
- 40:53
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 40:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): will share them with you.
- 40:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Well,
- 40:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): but it's
- 40:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I would say that the important thing is that you economics is a science.
- 41:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): We're social science, so we can't be exact physics and In chemistry. But we're influenced by the march forward of technology and knowledge.
- 41:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And so many of the things that I believed when I earned my PhD in January of 1969, I know
- 41:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): to be wrong today.
- 41:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And it's important to stay abreast
- 41:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and to learn how we're evolving.
- 41:34
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 41:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I've tried to contribute to that in in my own small way. And so I've just outlined for you a an extension and mod modification
- 41:45
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): of
- 41:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): what the Nobel laureate James Buchanan talked about. That there was an inherent bias in the Keynesian system so that the uh budget surplus in during the boom times would not offset
- 41:59
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
- 41:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): deficit so that we would have a cyclically balanced budget. which was what Keynes advocated. And uh I've now connected that to the problem of interest expense, which is entering the picture, which is something the Buchanan didn't take into consideration because then it was a trivial matter.
- 42:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And so
- 42:21
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): so
- 42:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): in my own way, I'm trying to contribute. Another thing
- 42:24
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that
- 42:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that when I left graduate school,
- 42:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): in in 69, I believed that
- 42:30
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
- 42:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): velocity of money was stable.
- 42:32
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 42:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that meant monetary policy was very powerful. And it was stable when I was in school and in and and all the way up into the early nineteen eighties.
- 42:43
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
- 42:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): what we've learned as And we as we we reconstructed the archives, we found that since nineteen hundred there have been really five periods of velocity. We had a slight decline from nineteen hundred, nineteen fifty-two, a lot of volatility in
- 42:59
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): there.
- 43:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): But on general, slight decline. Then you had a period of stable velocity from fifty-two to eighty-four,
- 43:07
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): then
- 43:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): a period of rising velocity to in nineteen ninety-seven, ninety seven, then declining velocity, which kept the inflation rate in the
- 43:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): middle.
- 43:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and disinflationary process going until the pandemic, and now velocity is turned back upward.
- 43:20
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 43:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): so you have to try to understand what what moves velocity. Professor Friedman assumed it was stable. Another thing which I believed was that that fiscal policy was powerful.
- 43:31
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): That
- 43:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the Keynesian multiplier was somewhere around four. Well
- 43:36
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): now
- 43:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the best evidence indicates that it's it's probably point three, but with a negative sign in front of
- 43:43
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it.
- 43:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Wow. Yeah.
- 43:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And and so
- 43:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you the you can do things and you can do a program,
- 43:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): but it ultimately may make things work off worse off than better off. And the other element that's in the picture here is that all of us are moving. further and further into command and control. And and I think that the work of von Heyck or The Road to Serfdom or
- 44:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Joseph Schumpeter's massive and outstanding work, Capitalism, Freedom, and Communism,
- 44:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): is very Afropol. Command and control economies do not work as well.
- 44:27
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in
- 44:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): spite of all the problems. But but there is a clear thrust here uh that is that we're now seeing because of the underperformance of the economy and it's giving rise to um to views of socialism which look very attractive on the surface,
- 44:44
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): but
- 44:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I don't think they understand the ultimate consequences.
- 44:50
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 44:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): if you if you I don't know if you'll remember this, but uh von Hayek in its introduction to a road of serfdom dedicated it to the socialist of all parties. And what I would say is that both of the major parties in the US have significant socialist elements in
- 45:07
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): them.
- 45:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): One is just starting to call itself that.
- 45:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I think you could do worse than read the works of
- 45:13
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Dr.
- 45:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Lacey Holt. Hunt though. Uh 'cause I remember and I'm this is I'm gonna close off here, watching and listening to Lacey give interviews ten years ago. You can go back on YouTube and watch them, pointing exactly to what how this was gonna play out. And it's an awful shame
- 45:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): somebody didn't listen to to him because we are now in this Kogmire, Kogmar, I think. and it doesn't have a happy ending, unfortunately. But with that said, Lacey, huge thanks again. I really appreciate it. Always enjoy talking with you. And
- 45:50
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I just
- 45:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Oh, you're so kind. I enjoyed being with you. I don't want you to remember that I just coined for you episodes of the Keynesian End gang
- 45:59
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
- 45:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the Keynesian End gang.
- 46:01
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I gave
- 46:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you two.
- 46:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Here we go, and we have the patent. Thanks, Lacy.
- 46:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Thanks you. Great fun. All the best to you, Alan.
- 46:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Thank you for listening to the most important thing. This podcast is for general information and educational purposes only. Nothing in this episode is financial, investment, tax, legal, or pension advice. And nothing said should be taken. as a recommendation to buy, sell, or hold any investment, asset, or security. Any assets, stocks,
- 46:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): or markets we discuss are for discussion and illustration only. The views expressed by our hosts and guests are their own, and they may hold positions in investments mentioned. Investing involves risk. to The value of investments can fall as well as rise, and you may get back less than you invest. Past process. performance is not a reliable guide to future performance.
- 46:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Before making any financial decision, please seek independent advice from a regulated financial advisor who understands your personal circumstances. Thanks again for listening, until next time.
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