North Korea's $6.3B Binance Hack Reveals DeFi Laundering and OpSec Failures
Summary
Guests Jonty and Pablo Sabatella detail how North Korean actors exploited a compromised developer laptop and EIP-7702 to drain $6.3 billion from Binance in 20 minutes. The episode analyzes the subsequent laundering efforts, including swaps on Thorchain and collateral exploitation on Aave, which triggered industry-wide freezes. Speakers argue that the attack highlights systemic operational security deficiencies in crypto firms and the centralization risks within protocols like Thorchain. They also discuss the organizational structure of North Korean cyber units and the role of third-party money laundering services in obscuring transaction trails.
Key takeaways
Episode sections
- 0:00 – 2:37
Introduction and Hack Overview
Laura Shin introduces the episode and a listener survey, then outlines the North Korea hack of Binance on October 29, 2026, where $6.3 billion was stolen in 20 minutes. She introduces guests Jonty and Pablo Sabatella to discuss the mechanics of the attack.
- 2:37 – 12:26
Attack Mechanics and EIP-7702
Jonty explains that the hack began with a compromised developer laptop, allowing attackers to sign transactions from hot wallets. He details how they used pre-signed transactions and EIP-7702 to upgrade a hot wallet to a smart account, enabling rapid asset drainage across multiple chains.
- 12:26 – 29:10
Security Posture and Operational Security
The guests discuss Binance's initial statement blaming a DevOps laptop. They argue that while the laptop was the entry point, the scale of the loss suggests deeper operational security failures or lateral movement within Binance's infrastructure, rather than a simple key leak.
- 29:10 – 33:34
Industry Response and Freezes
The conversation shifts to the industry's rapid response, with Circle, Tether, and the Arbitrum Security Council freezing approximately half of the stolen funds. Jonty notes that these freezes were driven by business incentives and relationships rather than altruism.
- 33:34 – 35:32
DeFi Laundering Mechanics and Liquidity Constraints
Speakers discuss how North Korean actors swapped stolen assets for BTC and ETH, noting that large swaps on low-liquidity DEXs resulted in up to 10% slippage losses. Approximately $50 million was generated by market makers and builders facilitating these swaps, with platforms like Thorchain involved.
- 35:32 – 40:41
Aave Exploit and Protocol Freezes
Laura Shin describes how actors laundered $60 million in frozen USDT by selling it to market makers and borrowing nearly 20,000 ETH against it on Aave. Aave froze its markets across all networks in response, halting new supply and borrowing positions to prevent further exploitation.
- 40:41 – 54:34
Thorchain Centralization and Governance Issues
Jonty clarifies that Arkham's report of funds depositing directly to Binance was a mischaracterization; funds were swapped on Thorchain, and Binance provided liquidity for arbitrageurs. He criticizes Thorchain for enabling North Korean laundering, noting that node operators act in a herd manner and that the protocol is effectively centralized due to controlled node access and admin keys.
- 54:34 – 1:02:30
Regulatory Pressure and Tornado Cash Comparison
The FBI, Secret Service, and IRS specifically named Thorchain operators in a request to block transactions linked to the hack. Jonty contrasts Thorchain with Tornado Cash, arguing Tornado Cash is immutable and non-profit while Thorchain is centralized, profit-driven, and capable of being influenced by its community.
- 1:02:30 – 1:05:25
Laundering Tactics and AI Speculation
Laura Shin asks if the complex, machine-driven transaction patterns indicate AI use. Jonty explains that the messy transaction graph is likely caused by third-party Chinese money laundering organizations using automation to evade on-chain analysis tools like Chainalysis and TRM Labs by breaking taint attribution.
- 1:05:25 – 1:06:03
AI in Cyber Operations
Speaker_0 suggests AI is making scripting for cyberattacks easier and quicker, forming part of the kill chain. Speaker_0 speculates that DPRK likely uses AI for basic scripting tasks.
- 1:06:03 – 1:08:32
North Korean Cyber Organizational Structure
Laura Shin asks about the distinction between Lazarus, Trader Traitor, and other groups. Speaker_0 explains these are sub-departments of North Korea's Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB), analogous to military units with different specializations like espionage, propaganda, and cyber operations.
- 1:08:32 – 1:13:58
Trader Traitor Tactics and Attribution
Speaker_3 identifies Trader Traitor as the most prolific group, responsible for hacks at Binance, BitGet, LairZero, and Bybit. They use social engineering via fake job interviews and coding tests to trick developers into downloading malware, originally Trojanized trading apps.
- 1:13:58 – 1:15:05
Industry Security Deficiencies
Laura Shin cites Chainalysis data showing DPRK-linked hacks account for 89% of crypto hack losses in 2026, up from 15% in 2021. Jonty argues 90% of crypto organizations lack operational security expertise, relying instead on smart contract security.
- 1:15:05 – 1:20:36
Recommendations for EDR and Industry Action
Jonty recommends all organizations implement Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) tools like CrowdStrike ($150/year) to protect against malware. Speaker_3 urges the industry to self-regulate by refusing to launder stolen funds rather than waiting for regulators.
Assets discussed
| Asset | Kind | Stance | Context |
|---|---|---|---|
| EthereumETH | crypto | neutral | only from this hack, uh now DPRK holds more ETH than the EF. |
| TetherUSDT | crypto | neutral | tether. |
| BitcoinBTC | crypto | neutral | But do you think that just now the industry being so quick to free stolen funds, could that just eventually push North Korea to always just either try to steal Bitcoin and ETH as or you |
“Stance” is how the speakers talked about the asset, not a recommendation.
Claims worth verifying
North Korea stole $6.3 billion from Binance in 20 minutes on October 29, 2026.
Laura Shin ·2:05
How to verify: Binance official incident report or press release dated October 29, 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-03 through 2026-11-03. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
North Korea's annual GDP is estimated to be about $26 billion.
Laura Shin ·2:24
How to verify: World Bank or IMF economic data for North Korea for the relevant fiscal year. For recent events, verify 2026-08-03 through 2026-11-03. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Nine out of ten major attacks in the last three years started with an infected developer laptop.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·4:48
How to verify: OPSEC or PinkElephant Intelligence research reports on crypto security trends from 2026-2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-03 through 2026-11-03. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceAttackers used EIP-7702 to upgrade a hot wallet to a smart account to sweep assets.
Jonty ·6:05
How to verify: On-chain analysis of the transaction hash on Ethereum mainnet showing an EIP-7702 delegation and subsequent asset transfer. For recent events, verify 2026-08-03 through 2026-11-03. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Binance's initial investigation suggested a compromised DevOps engineer's laptop was the vector.
Laura Shin ·12:14
How to verify: Binance official tweet or blog post from October 29, 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-03 through 2026-11-03. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Mercado Bitcoin in Brazil was hacked for $40 million on the same day.
Jonty ·21:06
How to verify: Mercado Bitcoin official statement or news reports from November 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-03 through 2026-11-03. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
An unnamed EU entity was hacked for $100 million.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·21:25
How to verify: News reports citing ZachXBT or other on-chain investigators from November 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-03 through 2026-11-03. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
North Korea holds more ETH than the Ethereum Foundation (EF).
Jonty ·22:46
How to verify: On-chain analysis comparing the ETH balances of known North Korean addresses and the EF treasury addresses. For recent events, verify 2026-08-03 through 2026-11-03. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Approximately 43% of the stolen funds were frozen.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·32:50
How to verify: On-chain tracking of the stolen funds' movement and status (frozen vs. moved) via blockchain explorers. For recent events, verify 2026-08-03 through 2026-11-03. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Less than 3% of funds were frozen in the Bybit hack.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·32:50
How to verify: Post-mortem reports or on-chain analysis of the Bybit hack from the previous year. For recent events, verify 2026-08-03 through 2026-11-03. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
North Korea stole $6.3 billion from Binance in 20 minutes.
Laura Shin ·33:34
How to verify: Binance official incident report and press release from November 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-03 through 2026-11-03. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Actors swapped assets on low-liquidity DEXs losing up to 10% in slippage.
Jonty ·34:15
How to verify: On-chain analysis of swap transactions on DEXs like Thorchain or others during the hack period. For recent events, verify 2026-08-03 through 2026-11-03. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Market makers and builders made $50 million from the laundering swaps.
Jonty ·34:27
How to verify: On-chain analysis of fee revenue for market makers and builders involved in the swap transactions. For recent events, verify 2026-08-03 through 2026-11-03. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Actors borrowed nearly 20,000 ETH against frozen USDT on Aave.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·35:32
How to verify: Aave protocol governance logs and on-chain transaction records showing the borrow position. For recent events, verify 2026-08-03 through 2026-11-03. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceArkham's tweet claiming direct deposits to Binance was a mischaracterization; funds were swapped on Thorchain first.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·41:13
How to verify: Arkham Intelligence tweet correction and on-chain tracing of asset flows through Thorchain vaults. For recent events, verify 2026-08-03 through 2026-11-03. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Thorchain halted trading on multiple chains after an Ethereum block reorg caused a 10 ETH shortfall.
Laura Shin ·47:12
How to verify: Thorchain official announcements and on-chain records of the halt and subsequent repayment. For recent events, verify 2026-08-03 through 2026-11-03. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Thorchain node operators are controlled and cannot join without permission.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·51:47
How to verify: Thorchain documentation and node operator application requirements. For recent events, verify 2026-08-03 through 2026-11-03. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Thorchain founders are being sued in New York by victims of the Thorfy incident.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·53:03
How to verify: New York court records for lawsuits involving Chad Barraford and JP Thor related to Thorfy. For recent events, verify 2026-08-03 through 2026-11-03. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
FBI, Secret Service, and IRS named Thorchain operators in a request to block transactions.
Laura Shin ·54:34
How to verify: FBI press release or official statement from November 2026 regarding the Binance hack. For recent events, verify 2026-08-03 through 2026-11-03. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceTornado Cash is built on immutable smart contracts and continues to run despite government action.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·1:00:32
How to verify: On-chain verification of Tornado Cash contract deployment and current activity status. For recent events, verify 2026-08-03 through 2026-11-03. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
North Korea stole $6.3 billion from Binance in 20 minutes using a compromised developer laptop and pre-signed transactions.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·1:05:25
How to verify: Binance official incident report or press release from November 2026; verify via Binance announcement page or SEC filing if applicable. For recent events, verify 2026-08-03 through 2026-11-03. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceTrader Traitor is responsible for the Binance, BitGet, LairZero, and Bybit hacks.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) ·1:08:32
How to verify: Cybersecurity firm reports (e.g., Chainalysis, Recorded Future, or Kaspersky) attributing these specific hacks to the Trader Traitor threat group. For recent events, verify 2026-08-03 through 2026-11-03. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Suspected North Korea-linked hacks accounted for nearly 89% of reported crypto hack losses in 2026, up from 15% in 2021.
Laura Shin ·1:13:16
How to verify: Chainalysis 'Crypto Crime Report 2026' or similar annual report published by Chainalysis. For recent events, verify 2026-08-03 through 2026-11-03. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Average reported loss per suspected DPRK-linked hack rose from $50 million in 2021 to $185 million in 2026.
Laura Shin ·1:13:16
How to verify: Chainalysis 'Crypto Crime Report 2026' or similar annual report published by Chainalysis. For recent events, verify 2026-08-03 through 2026-11-03. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
90% of organizations in the crypto ecosystem do not have someone who really knows operational security.
Jonty ·1:14:47
How to verify: Internal survey or security audit data from Jonty's company (Kodowski Security) or industry-wide OpSec survey. For recent events, verify 2026-08-03 through 2026-11-03. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceDo your own research
- Verify the specific technical details of EIP-7702 implementation and its role in the hack via Ethereum Improvement Proposal documentation and post-mortem reports.
- Check Binance's official incident report and any subsequent regulatory filings or statements regarding the $6.3 billion loss.
- Review on-chain data from explorers like Etherscan or Arkham to trace the movement of stolen funds through Thorchain and Aave.
- Analyze Chainalysis or TRM Labs reports on North Korean-linked crypto activity to assess the scale of state-sponsored hacking in 2026.
- Investigate the governance structure of Thorchain, specifically node operator voting mechanisms and admin key controls, to evaluate centralization risks.
- Research the operational security (OpSec) standards of major crypto exchanges, focusing on their use of Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) tools.
- Look for legal actions or regulatory statements from the FBI, Secret Service, or IRS regarding the prosecution of Thorchain operators or North Korean cyber units.
- Compare the freezing rates of stolen assets across different hacks (e.g., Binance vs. Bybit) to understand the evolving industry response to illicit flows.
Full transcriptexpand
- 0:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And he essentially sits there, laughs, shows off his new brand new Aston Martin helicopter, literally with the DPRK flag uh painted on the back.
- 0:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Hi
- 0:14
- Laura Shin: everyone, welcome to Unchained, your no-hype resource for all things crypto. I'm your host, Laura Shin. Just a quick note that this stream was pre-recorded about four hours prior. Before we get into today's show, a quick ask. We're deciding right now right now what Unshade looks like next year, whether we add a weekly recap show, what time we stream, what
- 0:34
- Laura Shin: goes in a premium, and I'd rather hear it from you than guests. So we're running a listener survey. It's anonymous. I read every write-in answer myself. Shout out to the person who wrote, Laura is not very smart. She can get good guests though, since it's a podcast that's been here for 10 years.
- 0:50
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 0:50
- Laura Shin: And never everyone who finishes the survey gets a free month of premium, unchained or bits and bips, your pick. It's at unchainedcrypto.com/slash survey, or you can follow the QR code on screen. That's unchainedcrypto.com/slash survey or use the QR code. It's open through November 8th. Thanks again. This really does help.
- 1:10
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 1:11
- Laura Shin: now for a quick word from the sponsors to who make this show possible. This episode is brought to you by Nexo, the premier digital assets wealth platform. Earn daily interest on your crypto or borrow funds, all through one platform trusted by more than 10 million clients. Find out more at Nexo.com. Geo restrictions to eligibility and terms apply.
- 1:30
- Laura Shin: Election day is Tuesday, November 3rd, and crypto voters can decide close races. Stand with Crypto's Voter Hub shows you where the candidates on your ballot stand on crypto. Check your registration and make your plan at standwithcrypto.org slash vote. Today's topic is North Korea's $6.3 billion hack of
- 1:50
- Laura Shin: Binance. Here to discuss are John T, founder of Pinkelin Intelligence, and Pablo Sabatella, founder of OPSEC. Welcome, John T and Pablo.
- 2:00
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Hi
- 2:00
- Jonty: there.
- 2:01
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Hey
- 2:01
- Jonty: Laura, how are you? Hey, John T.
- 2:05
- Laura Shin: Last Thursday, October 29th, at about 4 p.m. Eastern Time, Binance was hacked for $6.3 billion by North Korea in what is the largest hack in history, not just crypto history. North Korea's annual GDP is estimated to be about $26 billion. So for the country to obtain over $6 billion in 20 minutes is
- 2:24
- Laura Shin: quite a feat. Thankfully, about half of that was frozen, but still it's a huge hack. Uh so um,
- 2:32
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): John
- 2:33
- Laura Shin: T, why don't we start with you? Walk us through how the hack happened.
- 2:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah, okay. So um I I woke up at about 6:30 o'clock my time.
- 2:45
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um
- 2:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and I woke up to about, I don't know, a thousand unread messages online. on my Telegram account of various security researchers, people working for exchanges, analytics companies, et cetera, um, telling me one thing, which was Binance was hacked. So um essentially what what
- 3:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): looked like uh had happened was uh the the assets that have been held in the Binance hot wallets across uh um multiple multiple chains, uh Ethereum, Bitcoin, Tron, Solana, um, had been drained. Um so, you know, this is this was similar to what we saw uh when
- 3:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): when Bybit was hacked, when Wazurex was hacked, uh, when BitGet was hacked uh even even just a month ago. And that's all we knew at at at at that point when we'd first woken up, uh the assets were sat in the uh initial theft addresses, and as people were toting up the toad tools and
- 3:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): looking for more chains and more assets where where Binance hot wallets had been drained, ultimately uh about six point four billion dollars had had been lost, which is as as you just set out, absolutely unimaginable in in scale.
- 4:01
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 4:02
- Laura Shin: Pablo, you were your company wrote um a little tweet thread explaining like what exactly the attacker did. Can you walk us through
- 4:09
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it?
- 4:10
- Jonty: Yeah, about the biggest hack or theft ever until now. Until now. I I really believe things are gonna get far worse than this. So uh yeah, basically what happened here is that from what we know, from what Binance Bainan said, um
- 4:29
- Jonty: a developer's laptop was compromised, right? If we if we see what has been happening in the last three years, nine out of ten attacks of the big attacks that happened, all of them start with a laptop being infected, right? It's not just that it's just the laptop, but they start there.
- 4:48
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A
- 4:48
- Jonty: developer laptop is infected
- 4:50
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): from
- 4:50
- Jonty: there.
- 4:51
- Jonty: they were able to access a service container and they were able to sign transactions, right? What we think, right, because Binance didn't say too much up to now, is that there was no access to the private keys from the hot wallets from Binance, but the attacker was
- 5:11
- Jonty: somehow able to sign transactions, right? So they had it's like saying that you have, let's say, um a pen in a bank that is used to write checks. So every customer that goes to the bank and wants to withdraw money, that pen is used to write the checks. So they didn't steal the check, but they were able to
- 5:31
- Jonty: access the pen inside the bank and sign transactions. So um they basically started signing transactions. and withdrew all of that money. What is kind of different here is that they, in order to do that, in order to steal the money from uh
- 5:50
- Jonty: EVM networks, right? From the uh the ones that are compatible with with Ethereum, they used uh a new technique, right, based on uh an EIP called 7702,
- 6:05
- Jonty: that allowed the attacker to they said this, right? They they realized that they were able to sign transactions, right? But this hot wallet is all the time doing transactions, right? Because people want to withdraw money all of the time. So they pre-signed 50 different transactions, each one of them with a different
- 6:25
- Jonty: nonce, because when you do transactions in a wallet, every transaction has a nonce, right? It's the number. Now I do nonce number zero, then one, then two, then three. So they pre-signed 50 transactions.
- 6:39
- Jonty: Then they sent all of them. And one of those transactions had the exact nonce necessary to be put, let's say, in the middle or or after.
- 6:51
- Jonty: uh one legit transaction. But this transaction that they sent was a special one. It was not one that said, okay, we draw this asset to this address. No, it was a transaction that converted, like let's say, upgraded this hot wallet to some kind of smart wallet or smart account, right? So now this
- 7:11
- Jonty: wallet was being controlled by an external. smart contract. And from there they swept all the assets, right? Uh and were sent to another address. And the problem also there is that while assets were being stolen, people were still
- 7:31
- Jonty: depositing, right? So assets were still going in in the hot wallet wallets and were still being uh stolen.
- 7:39
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yep.
- 7:41
- Laura Shin: Yeah, every time new deposits came in, it w it automatically would take them out right at that moment. Um let's talk about this bit about the EIP 7702 delegation, because uh so this is an upgrade that went live with PECTRA about a year and a half ago. And essentially it lets a
- 8:00
- Laura Shin: standard uh crypto wallet on Ethereum, what's known as an EOA or externally owned account, like a regular address, temporarily borrow the code of a smart contract. So
- 8:14
- Laura Shin: talk a little bit about how they used EIP7702. And also now that this has happened, I'm curious for your opinion on whether you know, now you're sort of rethinking how. safe EIP7702 is.
- 8:31
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 8:31
- Jonty: mean, when EIP7702 was being designed, I remember that I tweeted about this. I said,
- 8:39
- Jonty: I don't like this too much, right? Because it will allow to it will allow basically for drainers to drain more assets in one transaction, right? So I I thought that it it could be an issue. But, anyways, what we have to make clear here is that the hack was not due to this, right? So they were able
- 8:59
- Jonty: to sign these malicious transactions, and after that, they chose to use EIP7702 to withdraw to withdraw the assets maybe faster, right? But it was not a vulnerability from this feature.
- 9:15
- Jonty: But, anyways, what we always have to think is that every time that we add a new feature to a system, we are making the attack surface bigger, right? So that now there is one more thing that can be attacked. So,
- 9:31
- Jonty: my opinion, again, we have to make clear they did not attack Binance because of EIP 7702. But from the beginning, I didn't like the idea of this. Because we have been seen, and John Tikan talk about this, lots of people being drained because they sign a
- 9:51
- Jonty: transaction, right? So you usually sign an approval and you sign that approval for USDT and they drain your USDT. USCT. Well, with this
- 10:00
- Jonty: attackers are able to make you perhaps sign a malicious transaction that will not only get one asset from from you, but all of them, right? So it's a picture that it it can be used in a bad way, basically. Yeah.
- 10:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah, I I totally agree. I I uh obviously we we see um seven seven oh two being used by uh drainer kits like lots and lots these days. Um and yeah, okay that upgrade has been like I guess made their operations more efficient. But really, the the story here is not about that uh that
- 10:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): EIP. Uh uh it's it's a story of operational security, it's uh um a story of uh malware, uh potentially social engineering. Um we don't we don't know the full details at this stage. Um, but this hack would have happened. happened with or without 7702. It just made it
- 10:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): slightly faster.
- 10:56
- Laura Shin: Yeah, yeah. I mean, the the main thing that, you know, what the trend that I'm seeing is so first of all, this setup reminds me a little bit of the Dow attack where essentially um, you know, the like at the base layer, or I don't think that's the wrong word, but just at the at the point of the
- 11:16
- Laura Shin: hack, um it looked like, okay, there's a certain type of transaction here. But what the hacker did was they uh sort of tricked the smart contract into engaging with a different smart contract. And um and so, you know, we look at the industry like if we look at with um
- 11:34
- Laura Shin: Bybit with, you know, the Gnosis safe um code. being temporarily replaced, or how Coinbase apparently writes all of its code and never relies on any third party. Like essentially um what this AIP does is because you know it allows your wallet to now
- 11:54
- Laura Shin: be operating on other code, um, you know, that is is what kind of weakens some of the security, even if it's not. the um initial attack vector. Um, I did also want to ask, so just hours after the attack, Binance tweeted: quote, Binance's initial investigation suggests that the security incident may involve a
- 12:14
- Laura Shin: compromised DevOps engineer's laptop, which allowed an attacker to gain access to a service container and submit unauthorized withdrawal transactions. We found no evidence of any wallet private key leak.
- 12:26
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 12:26
- Laura Shin: next day they added update. Our initial investigation suggested that the security incident may have involved a compromise laptop. However, our subsequent investigation has uncovered additional points of breach. This was a complex attack, and we are doing all we can in coordination with law enforcement to resolve it. We're still gathering the facts. So I'm so
- 12:46
- Laura Shin: curious here. You know, obviously we we don't have all the information, or maybe you guys see secretly do and you can't see it all right now. I don't know. Um, but you know, even if a single engineer's laptop was at least one of the um, you know, vectors of attack, does what does that say to you?
- 13:06
- Laura Shin: Does that say that the security controls at Binance are not as buttoned up as they should be? Or does it say to you that?
- 13:15
- Laura Shin: this is kind of an unavoidable attack vector for any exchange?
- 13:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I think it's uh um fair to say that, and this is all speculation because we we don't have the forecast, but if if it is the case that a single uh person working in DevOps who's potentially been socially engineered to install malware on their laptop has led to a six six point four billion dollar drain.
- 13:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): That's pretty unfathomable. Yeah. Um and it it certainly
- 13:47
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh it
- 13:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it certainly would ask questions about the security posture of of of the exchange. Uh but we don't know that that's true. And it sounds like by Binance potentially that was a bit uh
- 13:58
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a
- 13:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): bit preemptive for them to release that tweet and they've they found other other reasons. Um, so I'm sure we'll learn more about that as as time goes on. Um, but yeah, uh I I think that a a lot of this story is around operational security, and ultimately that is like the single biggest thing that we keep seeing fail with all of
- 14:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): these large exchanges.
- 14:22
- Jonty: Yeah, what what I think is that uh and uh I can have just send sent you the chat if you want to uh show it, uh
- 14:29
- Jonty: this again everything that we are seeing is suppositions based on the information that we have, right? But a developer laptop was hacked. One thing that we can think is okay, one developer laptop was hacked, and that developer had too much access, and only from his device they were able to
- 14:49
- Jonty: sign transactions that moved. all the assets from a hot wallet. I don't think that was the case, not at all. Like I have never we have never worked with Binance from OPSEC, but Binance has a good security team, so I assume that that was not the case. What I think that may have happened is that the initial
- 15:09
- Jonty: access was through a developer's laptop, right? As it usually happens. And then when the threat actor, maybe uh Jonti can talk more about this, but usually you have like two or three kinds of uh uh let's say threat actors in in their teams. You have the ones that do the
- 15:29
- Jonty: initial infections, like they do social engineering or advanced phishing or whatever, and they are the ones that infect the laptop. Once the laptop is infected,
- 15:40
- Jonty: these guys start moving laterally or doing privilege escalation. So maybe they just got access to this guy's device, and from that device, they were able to access some system, right? With the permissions from this user that didn't allow to do anything. But maybe they then were able to exploit
- 15:59
- Jonty: that system and access more stuff and start moving. around Binance. One thing that is very important
- 16:07
- Jonty: is, and most people do not see this so clearly is that we know about the hack the day that the threat actor decides to cash out. But we don't know if the initial infection was three days before, three months before, or six months before.
- 16:27
- Jonty: We have to assume, and we say this super seriously, people think that I just say it because it's, I don't know,
- 16:33
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh,
- 16:34
- Jonty: I find it funny or whatever. We have to assume that at least one of our devices is compromised, for sure. For sure. One of our devices Access of our accounts, one key, one server, one API key, one account, one email. whatever. Something is compromised. So we need to have compartment
- 16:54
- Jonty: compartimentalization, right? Um so I think that that's what happened here. The initial access was through a laptop, then they were able to move inside the organization, get the accesses that they needed, and then they decide the attack. But what I am pretty sure is that if Binance is transparent about this,
- 17:14
- Jonty: we will see in the end that this initial access was at least many weeks ago.
- 17:23
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
- 17:23
- Laura Shin: that makes sense. Very similar to Drift. All right, so in a moment we're going to talk about more elements of the hack, but first let's take a quick word from the sponsors who make the show possible. What if your crypto could do more than just sit in your wallet? Nexo is a digital assets wealth platform. where you can generate daily interest on your crypto or borrow
- 17:43
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- 18:03
- Laura Shin: decided by narrow margins. Stanwith Crypto built the Voter Hub to help crypto voters. It grades candidates on where they stand on crypto so you can see exactly who's on your ballot. You can also check your voter registration and get what you need to vote. Head to standwithcrypto.org/slash vote and make your plan today. Back to my
- 18:23
- Laura Shin: conversation with Jonti and Pablo.
- 18:25
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So the
- 18:26
- Laura Shin: hackers. stole assets on a whole bunch of chains: XRP, Ethereum, Arbitrum, Avalanche, Optimism, Base, Tron, Solana, Polygon. They also got multiple types of stable coins. Um, so it looks like parts of this hack didn't even require that EIP7702 delegation.
- 18:46
- Laura Shin: And so I know obviously we're not we don't have all the facts, but just from that. alone, does that
- 18:52
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
- 18:53
- Laura Shin: know give you any more to go on in terms of the theory of the case? Like how would it be that they were able to sweep out coins on so many chains?
- 19:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Yeah, so um, as Pablo sort of alluded to earlier, um, it certainly looks like the the wallet signing infrastructure inside Binance was compromised, um, i.e., attackers were able to interact with whatever infrastructure Binance has internally to manage uh the
- 19:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): signing of transactions from their hot wallet to sign malicious withdrawals, and ultimately that's what that's what allowed the transfer of assets. The fact that this affected so many different wallets on different chains um is is like clearly indicative that that's it's the infrastructure that's being
- 19:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): compromised. Uh it it doesn't look as though um private keys have been compromised, i.e. they're not signing transactions directly themselves, but instead interacting with it, it could be internal servers or I don't exactly know how Binance's Binance's wallet infrastructure is is set up, but but they're in interacting with something
- 20:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): internal at Binance to get them to sign things that they shouldn't otherwise
- 20:05
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): be.
- 20:07
- Jonty: Yeah, I think that this in some way we can do like some kind of parallelism with Bybit, in the way that in the Bybit hack there were also no private keys leaked, right? But signers signed something that they thought uh was okay, but it was malicious. And in this
- 20:27
- Jonty: case, again, I assume that Binance to manage his keys uses uh HSMs, that is hardware security modules. That is a very secure way to divide private keys in many hardware devices. But the thing is that if the you have the the keys uh
- 20:47
- Jonty: in a super safe uh hardware, right? But then that hardware trusts whatever is told by this server right then you just need to hack this server you don't need the keys and you need to tell that tell uh the HSM to do whatever you want to do so
- 21:06
- Jonty: I think that that was the um that was the case here so yeah obviously infra what again uh like the industry has to to to to to start learning from this, right? I don't know if you saw, but uh three hours ago Mercado Bitcoin in Brazil was also hacked for 40 million dollars.
- 21:25
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
- 21:25
- Laura Shin: and Zach XPT said that uh a an EU entity which he didn't name was hacked for a hundred million yeah yesterday.
- 21:35
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
- 21:35
- Jonty: totally. I I think that if the industry really doesn't wake up and it it's not waking up, not in my opinion, things are gonna get far worse. Again, we have to understand that with the I'm not saying that AI was involved here, but with the the velocity and
- 21:55
- Jonty: say speed of AI, vulnerabilities are being found too fast, very, very fast. So most systems are gonna be compromised, and we already know how crypto is and the big difference with Tradfy. They hack you once, and most of the funds are gone. This time, maybe uh John T
- 22:15
- Jonty: was talking about this. The industry was quite fast. I think that that was good in freezing funds. Feder, Circle, Ripple, Arbitrum Security Council. Uh, and
- 22:29
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 22:30
- Jonty: think that nearly half of the money was was frozen, but the rest, uh, everything is gone, and only from this hack, only from this hack, uh now DPRK holds more ETH than the EF.
- 22:46
- Jonty: And that's and that's kind of a meme, but it's real and it's super sad. subtle.
- 22:51
- Laura Shin: Yeah, yeah, it's crazy. Um, before we talk about the freezes, I did want to ask a couple other questions. So one is: were you surprised that Binance even had six billion dollars in a hot wallet? Like, is that a sort of an operational no-no or like a security no-no? No no, Or do you feel like
- 23:11
- Laura Shin: that made sense for an exchange that side? Is that that's size?
- 23:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Honestly, not not really. Um, in the Binance is the scale of Binance is just unimaginable. And actually yet I don't think it would be unrealistic that they could have a bank run of more than six billion dollars, uh that uh i.e. lots of users withdrawing six billion dollars very, very quickly and them needing to be able to service those
- 23:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): withdrawals that topping up hot wallets from cold wallets. Um so and it it does also sound like these wallets were distributed across uh multiple different keys. Um so it might not just be uh one
- 23:49
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh you
- 23:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): know one set of hot wallets that's being been compromised.
- 23:53
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um
- 23:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): so yeah so obviously the total amount lost is six $6.4 point four billion dollars but to me that's not
- 24:01
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 24:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I don't
- 24:02
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 24:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): don't think
- 24:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): this is uh necessarily as as clear a
- 24:07
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh I don't know
- 24:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): point
- 24:08
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): of
- 24:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): criticism as in the
- 24:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Bybit
- 24:11
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Act
- 24:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): where I
- 24:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): think that
- 24:12
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): was
- 24:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): quite a lot of money
- 24:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that was uh uh
- 24:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): s
- 24:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): in a single
- 24:15
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in
- 24:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): a single hole
- 24:18
- Laura Shin: okay and one other thing is that it seems that the hacker tested their strategy earlier that day with wallets that had been funded by Tornado Cash. Did like, you know, when you saw the tests later, did you feel that it would have been possible to detect the attack in advance? Or is that the kind of thing that can only be figured out
- 24:37
- Laura Shin: in hindsight?
- 24:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): So so with the tests, all that they were testing was the the mechanism by which they were gonna going to do the um EIP7702 transaction and then use that. to drain the wallet on Ethereum. So there was nothing about the test that would have been indicative that Binance was the
- 24:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): person who was going to be targeted. It could be anybody with a Ethereum hot wallet. So whilst yes, what you can what you can see is if you know that that's But if you know that that's this particular threat act's act is funds, um, this is clear indicators and warnings that. they're going to do something. Um, you wouldn't necessarily be able to go from
- 25:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): A to B and say they're gonna hack finance. So uh the utility purely from that that pre-hack activity is is uh I think pretty limited. And I think it's a bit of a stretch, and we shouldn't be relying on on that as a as a way forward to protect ourselves in this in in these this scenarios. scenario.
- 25:37
- Jonty: I am I'm showing sharing the chat there at least. a link. Andrew Mohawk, who is uh a security researcher, published a thread showing how he saw somebody testing what he thinks are transactions for this hack on October eighth, three weeks prior to this. I I I haven't
- 25:57
- Jonty: read in super super detail because what's happening here is that we have one big hack, we start researching and while you are researching, another big hack happens, right? So it's kind of complicated. But Andrew is one of the ones that knows more the most by far. I super, super respect him. And
- 26:17
- Jonty: he found this. So it seems that they were already testing this These again three weeks before.
- 26:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So
- 26:24
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): something that's really helpful for is actually.
- 26:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): responding
- 26:27
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): to the incident.
- 26:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): It helps
- 26:29
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): people
- 26:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): doing
- 26:29
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): digital
- 26:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): forensics
- 26:31
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): to know these things from the
- 26:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): on-chain
- 26:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): activity. Because
- 26:34
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): if
- 26:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): they're
- 26:35
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): testing
- 26:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): a withdrawal mechanism, you know, three
- 26:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): weeks prior to the
- 26:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): hack, that gives you some level of indication that possibly they were at
- 26:44
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): least
- 26:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): had already some visibility into Binance's systems, or they were at least planning how they. were going to exfiltrate funds three weeks prior. So it expands the window of time that you're going to look through your your your logs, um uh you know look look through uh ask ask your developers potentially who
- 27:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): they've been talking to on on LinkedIn um and and sort of you know conduct that investigation. Um but yeah it's it's quite it's quite scary uh that that uh it it was so long ago.
- 27:16
- Laura Shin: Yeah, or actually, I mean, if this had been identified at that time, you know, that's basically um three weeks before the hack happened, potentially like security researchers could have said, Hey, it looks like somebody's testing this as a way to steal funds. Um, you know, maybe
- 27:36
- Laura Shin: do a review of your systems to figure out if it could. be used on your systems or something like that. I don't do you think that would have been effective or helpful?
- 27:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): I I I think that definitely um
- 27:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): passing information like that between uh
- 27:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): trusted contacts is like definitely a good thing. Like I've been involved personally in doing lots of notification work. So actually the hacks you see are
- 28:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): is is is much smaller than the number of
- 28:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): hacks that that you know people like North Korea or others try to do. And
- 28:10
- Laura Shin: okay,
- 28:11
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that's that's almost
- 28:12
- Laura Shin: not reassuring.
- 28:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Lots of hacks are foiled because of this exact type of work. But I don't think that that should I I think that information sharing is good uh amongst trusted networks. Um but I don't think that that the that the takeaway here should be oh if we if we if we just I don't know done this notification better, that's the single highest leverage thing we can do to have
- 28:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): prevented this hack. Like actually the the the operational security, um how you go about um you know securing securing your funds is uh is is much more important and much higher leverage. And we're gonna have much more success if people do that that better, in my opinion. Um
- 28:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that being said, that being said, as a as a threat intelligence analyst, uh like that that is my that's my entire gig. Understand how these people hack people so that we can detect them early and potentially prevent
- 29:06
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
- 29:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): this this these kind of attacks from happening.
- 29:10
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Okay,
- 29:10
- Laura Shin: so now let's talk about the freezers. freezes. Unlike times in the past. the whole, or I don't know about the whole, but a much bigger part of the industry responded extremely quickly with a number of freezes. So one of them was from Circle. Surprise, surprise. They were the villain with the drift hack, but
- 29:30
- Laura Shin: they actually got on board this time. I don't know if it has to do with the fact that they are business partners with Binance, finance, perhaps. Um, but anyway. of course
- 29:39
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): tether.
- 29:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I think we need to call I think we do need to cool call that out. I think that the I think that whilst it's great, and don't get me wrong, I want to see people freeze funds. Like the reason that that there was such a quick response from large organizations like Circle and Tether was because ultimately this hack affects everybody's bottom line. There is
- 30:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): huge, huge incentive. for these companies to step in and freeze the funds. And I'm I'm pleased they did. Uh, but we need to be like realistic.
- 30:10
- Laura Shin: But are you saying that that wasn't true with drift? Like like what's
- 30:15
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): not not in the same
- 30:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): way. Um but unfortunately, drift is not uh to circle what Binance
- 30:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): is to circle. Um
- 30:22
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Right, right,
- 30:23
- Laura Shin: right. That's
- 30:23
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): what
- 30:23
- Laura Shin: I'm saying. That like because circle had a vested interest in protecting their relationship
- 30:29
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): with a
- 30:30
- Laura Shin: oh okay. Oh okay.
- 30:32
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 30:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): but
- 30:33
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I think I think we
- 30:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): need to call that what it is rather than like uh uh I don't
- 30:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): know,
- 30:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): tiptoe around it. Um I'd love to get to
- 30:39
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the right. Oh yeah,
- 30:40
- Laura Shin: no,
- 30:40
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 30:41
- Laura Shin: directly said it because I want people to recognize
- 30:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): no, I I think it I think it's super important, and I think that uh the politics that sits behind a lot of these. freezes is like fascinating. Um and yeah, it's uh I I I can only I can only hope we get to a we get to a stage where um people are willing to there there's political will to
- 31:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): intervene uh even when it it doesn't directly and obviously affect affects your bottom line. But maybe I'm I'm too idealistic for that.
- 31:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): No I
- 31:15
- Laura Shin: agree with you. Um, but but so just to uh paint the fuller picture, yeah. Tether, uh who has long been very responsive in freezing stolen funds, also did so. Arbitrum Security Council also voted to freeze, which they had done earlier. Um, so you know, No, as Pablo mentioned earlier, now
- 31:35
- Laura Shin: we've seen about three $3 billion dollars have been frozen, which is definitely better. than North Korea getting the full six billion. But do you think that just now the industry being so quick to free stolen funds, could that just eventually push North Korea to always just either try to steal Bitcoin and ETH as or you
- 31:54
- Laura Shin: know from the outset or at least swap any funds into those assets as quickly as possible? And and like is it just sort of making it uh harder for us to uh you know uh uh uh like recover any assets?
- 32:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Uh no I I I I don't think that this is necessarily gonna change like North Korea's macro behavior, i.e. they're still going to steal whatever assets they can get their hands on. It might change Changed the way in which they do their initial stages of laundering. So actually like a lot of people have been putting on Twitter about how like the initial stage was quite
- 32:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): sloppy and they they could have got out more funds. Um I'd actually argue that this is probably one of the first times we've ever seen such a response from the industry. Like 40, I think it's like 43% of the funds being stolen is completely unprecedented. Like for comparison to the Bybit instant, in the initial aftermath of that, less than 3% of the
- 32:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): funds were. frozen. So I I don't know that it North Korea has ever been forced to even think about this before. Something that's funny is that after the Layer Zero instant, uh, this particular threat actor, Trader Traitor, um, who is also responsible for that incident, um, has been very, very quick to get funds off Arbidrum,
- 33:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Arbitrum almost almost quicker than they are to swap out of USDC because they uh because of obviously the the Arbitrum Security Council deciding to take action in that instant. It's funny how that immediately changes behavior. So yeah, I think it will change the immediate aftermath of an incident, but it won't it won't like they'll still steal uh as
- 33:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): as much assets as they can get their hands on. Yeah.
- 33:34
- Laura Shin: Pablo, what do you think? Do you think they'll just try to quickly move everything to Bitcoin and Ether going forward?
- 33:42
- Jonty: I think that they have they have already been doing that because they they already know USET and USEC can be frozen. Now maybe USEC was uh was a surprise for them.
- 33:53
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um
- 33:55
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): but
- 33:55
- Jonty: yeah, I in fact I don't know because I haven't like the the on-chain expert here is Juanti. Janti. I haven't looked yet at the detail of the timeline of the swaps, but I I don't know if Teder and Circle were super, super fast in freezing, or for some reason it took them too much time to
- 34:15
- Jonty: swap to BTC or ETH. What I have seen is that to swap other assets, they had to swap so much that in some in some swaps they lost up to 10%.
- 34:27
- Jonty: And map searchers and builders did like $50 million with this. Between map searchers, uh builders, and well, also some platforms like Thorchain, etc.
- 34:41
- Laura Shin: Wait, you mean from their laundering?
- 34:44
- Jonty: Yeah, exactly.
- 34:46
- Laura Shin: Wow.
- 34:46
- Jonty: Exactly. Okay.
- 34:47
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 34:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): actually we're at the sort of scales here. Six six point four billion dollars that swapping assets and like forcing things through protocols like starts to break protocols because there just isn't enough liquidity. Um, so I I know that people on the internet have criticized North Korea for being sloppy. Um,
- 35:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): but actually like managing a laundering operation to minimize freezes on the scale of of this is something that's like really, really, really hard to do. Um and it's not they're not perfect, you know? So uh yeah, that you did get these stupid situations where I don't know, five million dollars was swapped for $72
- 35:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): on on a on a low liquidity uh DEX.
- 35:32
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 35:32
- Laura Shin: I did also want to ask about the usage of DeFi because we saw they also got away with about $60 million worth of USDT by which, you know, like I said, was frozen by selling it to market makers and then borrowing about um, well, it was uh just shy of 20,000 ETH against it on Ave.
- 35:53
- Laura Shin: And of course, they're probably never gonna repay that money. So, you know, it's No, it has echoes of the Kelp Dow hack. Obviously, in that case, it was a little bit different because the money had. been printed out or minted out of thin air. So it wasn't really backed by anything. Um, but still, you know, it's this notion that they're putting sort of bad collateral
- 36:13
- Laura Shin: up to take real money out. Um, and that and that's money that can't be frozen. So, you know, in the Ave forum, in response to the situation, they posted that they decided to quote freeze Ave markets across all networks. The exploiter could swap the stolen funds into any listed asset. So freezing only the stolen token
- 36:32
- Laura Shin: reserves would have left other ways in. So the thing is that,
- 36:37
- Laura Shin: you know, like
- 36:40
- Laura Shin: by doing that, they are also now stopping anyone from opening a new supply or are borrowing borrowing or or opening a borrow position. So users, you know. are they left in this situation where they can repay, they can withdraw, liquidations can occur, but you know, essentially they're kind of uh
- 36:59
- Laura Shin: hampering the the overall operation in order to achieve that. What do you think of how they handle it?
- 37:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So I haven't I haven't actually personally looked too deeply into this because in in terms of actually tracing the bonds funds and following the the directly stolen six billion dollars uh it's it's like not hugely relevant but I guess like speaking generally it sort of shows you like
- 37:24
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
- 37:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): with these this volume of of money that's moving the contagion effect is is huge and like it starts to break protocols and force uh operators of protocols into weird situations
- 37:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Um and yeah, I I think that uh I I don't really want to speak to the Ave situation because I haven't looked too closely uh personally. Uh but uh I think it's going to ask a lot of interesting questions in DeFi more generally over the next uh few few months. Cause because I guarantee this is this isn't gonna
- 37:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): stop. Like there's still billions of dollars left to launder. And who's to say they won't do the same thing with other lending like protocols, you know, right now.
- 38:11
- Laura Shin: Pablo, what do you think?
- 38:14
- Jonty: I agree. Like uh the the the laundering of money and movements of of money there in DeFi is is not my expertise. I I was not able to to look into that again. There there are so so many things going on and the side at the same time that it's uh that's difficult but
- 38:31
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): but do you think like
- 38:32
- Laura Shin: defi might be used in this way more and more
- 38:35
- Jonty: yeah yeah yeah yeah to yeah totally yeah yeah uh
- 38:40
- Jonty: it's the it's uh uh when we say that we that we want per uh to have a system that is permissionless that allows anyone to do any anything and to be censorship censorship resistant. Well, censorship resistance also means this, right? So yeah, it's gonna be used
- 39:00
- Jonty: for that.
- 39:01
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 39:01
- Jonty: think that the real issue for DIFI is not this, but um
- 39:06
- Jonty: like all the last hacks in the last three years, I think that m
- 39:12
- Jonty: nearly all of them were related to other. OPSEC. But let's not forget that smart contract security still exists, right? Uh and I think that's something that may be connected to also
- 39:27
- Jonty: very big transactions or swaps or
- 39:31
- Jonty: moments of stolen money through DeFi. But also if in the future we we start having again DeFi hacks is that protocols should start having um
- 39:43
- Jonty: controls that stop or put or put some kind of pauses uh when
- 39:53
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): two
- 39:54
- Jonty: big amounts of money are are being moved, right? Circuit breakers are needed, definitely. So I think that this will make some
- 40:06
- Jonty: DeFi protocols realize that they will have to start making some changes. I don't know exactly which ones, again, because DeFi is not my my expertise, but some things will need to change for sure.
- 40:18
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
- 40:18
- Laura Shin: I mean the only danger with that is like, especially with AI, I could see if there's some sort of threshold, then you would just send a bunch of. transactions that are under the threshold.
- 40:29
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But um
- 40:30
- Laura Shin: yeah. All right. Well, I did also notice one other thing, which was early this morning. Arkham tweeted, quote, Binance hackers spotted depositing to Binance. The Binance
- 40:41
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): hacker deposited
- 40:41
- Laura Shin: four million dollars and three Binance deposit addresses. These likely represent nested services, which are third-party third party exchanges that use Binance for liquidity provisioning. provision and custody. So I'm so curious. Um, like, do you think that it is possible that the money launderers that are helping North Korea are using
- 41:01
- Laura Shin: Binance to launder this money? And then if so, um, is Binance just going to block it? Or like I I don't know, or or do you think that maybe this isn't happening? Or I like
- 41:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): yeah.
- 41:13
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): so
- 41:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): so it's kind of funny that you have. highlighted this tweet. I actually looked at this tweet slightly before being on the show.
- 41:19
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um,
- 41:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and actually it's like it it's not it's not correct at analysis. Um so it looks like what's happened is Arkham's traced through a service, actually 4chain. Um and so the actual assets have been swapped on on 4chain four chain prior to the interaction. with Binance.
- 41:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): The the interactions that they see with Binance are
- 41:44
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): um
- 41:45
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
- 41:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): trace through the fourchain Asgard vaults and then you look at who's arbitraging against those Asgard vaults. And a lot of those ABAs use Binance for liquidity. So it's the people on the other side of the swap, if you like, is is that's what they've traced. Uh so it's a mischaracterization. to say that funds are directly being laundered through
- 42:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Binance in that scenario. However, I think it's something that is really interesting and will ask a whole load of questions. For for a long time, um, the people who arbitrage uh Thorchain and essentially rebalance the pools, which to some degree enables this laundering. When loads of assets are moved from one chain to another, the
- 42:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): pools need to rebalance.
- 42:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): to
- 42:28
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): um
- 42:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you know supply the swaps.
- 42:31
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um
- 42:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Binance has been the source of liquidity for those arbitrages. And will they continue to provide you know a liquidity source if this only thing that blood chain is doing is is laundering you know its own stolen funds? I don't know. I imagine that's a debate that's being had internally at Binance. I would
- 42:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): love to be a fly on the wall in in that debate. Personally,
- 42:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I I I think we've got to the point where Thorchain is just like
- 43:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): beyond a joke. Um so uh yeah, I don't I don't see any any utility in a in a protocol, decentralized, permissionless. I don't know, insert whatever buzzword you you you like. that that only serves um you know a dictatorial pariah state like North Korea.
- 43:22
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um
- 43:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): so
- 43:23
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and and when you
- 43:24
- Laura Shin: say that like are you is that uh from an analysis like what percentage of transactions on ThorChain are for laundering stolen funds? Is it like some huge
- 43:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So when when when trader traitor trader hacks happen like this and we've seen this in now uh with pretty much pretty much every trader trader hack, uh you know, Bitget, uh Layer Zero, uh the by the app, the Wazir X hack, etc. Um, there are massive, massive
- 43:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): spikes in the the volume of funds that is being moved through Thorchain to the point where uh ninety 99% plus of the volume through Thorchain on those given days is just just people laundering money on behalf of North Korea.
- 44:12
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um and
- 44:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): yeah it's it's certainly true that uh
- 44:17
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 44:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): don't know over all time I imagine it is still the vast majority of of uh volume. Um but certainly true that on those the those particular days, yeah, it is nearly
- 44:30
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
- 44:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): know virtually all of the volume and all of the fees that are being earned by affiliates and all of the fees all of the
- 44:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): spread is going that's going to the arbitragers is it it purely just just people laundering on behalf of trader trades. And yeah, I don't think that that's is I I tweeted the other day, like what what kind of industry do we want to build? I mean if if your principles just lead
- 44:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): to
- 45:00
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
- 45:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): know enabling enabling a state like North Korea to to steal billions and billions of dollars of cryptocurrency.
- 45:07
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um I
- 45:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I I I in an I don't I don't care how
- 45:13
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
- 45:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): how well those principles work in an in an ideal world, in the real world, then they're not offering anybody any any value. And I don't I don't subscribe to the idea that that's a that's an industry that that we wanna we wanna build and that's a hill we wanna die on.
- 45:29
- Laura Shin: Yeah, I mean it's offering value to a single person on the entire planet, which is Kim Jong Jong-un, un, but it's you know further oppressing the 50 million people. who live in North Korea or who are imprisoned in North Korea is essentially what what their existence there is. Um I did want to focus more about uh on Thor chain though because
- 45:49
- Laura Shin: um
- 45:51
- Laura Shin: so you know we we did a show so Tay and I did a show where we um talked with
- 45:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Chad chat.
- 45:57
- Laura Shin: yeah chat yes um so essentially what was interesting was um, you know, there was a moment where I forget which hack it was, but after that hack, when the laundered funds were you know starting to make their way through Thorchain, some of the node
- 46:17
- Laura Shin: operators, they like had a little meeting where some of them seemed to want to not service um North Korea. And essentially they ended up just leaving the whole ecosystem.
- 46:30
- Laura Shin: And
- 46:32
- Laura Shin: something that I find interesting about that is that, you know, these were people who were intimately familiar with the inner workings of Thorchain and just how centralized or decentralized it is. And so, Um, you know, they thought that they were centralized to, you know, come together and organize and act in a way to block these transactions. But
- 46:52
- Laura Shin: now all those people have left. So the only people you have left are the ones who um, you know, refuse to see it that way or or or just don't see it that way, however you want to describe it. Um but anyway, I do want to also just talk about the fact that uh amidst this whole you know
- 47:12
- Laura Shin: incident, so the Binance hack happened on Thursday. right? On Saturday, Thorchain ended up halting trading on multiple chains because of an Ethereum block re reorg that caused Thorchain to pay out 10 ETH that uh one of the vaults had never received. Um, the person who
- 47:32
- Laura Shin: was involved in this transaction actually sent back the money afterwards, so so it's solvent again. But the point is that.
- 47:39
- Laura Shin: once like there is so the system has what's called a solvency checker. And so when it said that there was a shortfall, within two minutes, the node operators halted um, you know, Ethereum transaction signing. They halted the these other chains: Cosmos, Bitcoin Cash, Binance Smart Chain, Bitcoin, Doge, Litecoin, Solana, Tron,
- 47:59
- Laura Shin: and Zcash. Um, And it only triggered it. sorry, it only took three node votes to trigger this emergency halt. So that just gives you a kind of a sense of, you know, this the operation, uh centralized, or you know, whether or not you view that as decentralized. Um, well, actually, yeah, before I ask what
- 48:19
- Laura Shin: I was gonna ask, just talk about that. Like, what does that say to you about how centralized or decentralized they are? Because the the one argument that he made to me and Tay was, oh, you know, if you look at like the Bitcoin mining pools, or if you look at um
- 48:37
- Laura Shin: uh the Ethereum top staking pools, then essentially like big big portions of those networks are also controlled by a small number of entities. So he was saying that there's an equivalency between
- 48:51
- Laura Shin: um the the networks that we in crypto view as decentralized Bitcoin and Ethereum, and and he was saying Thorchain was the same. So I'm curious what you think about that.
- 49:04
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um
- 49:06
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 49:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): th I think the word decentralized
- 49:09
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): is
- 49:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): It's kind of at this point sort of lost all meaning. Um and it's you know what point is something decentralized? Um
- 49:18
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 49:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): think it's certainly what's certainly clear is that Thorchain operates a little bit like
- 49:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): a cult. Certainly follows uh the
- 49:29
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): what
- 49:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): follows the crowd in the opinions of of of you know influential people like like Chad Areford, like like JP Thor, and uh Node. operators clearly tend to tend to all vote um in a in a herd. Um you know it's rare to see
- 49:46
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
- 49:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the the leaders ask for something and the the node operators dissent.
- 49:51
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um
- 49:52
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): yeah
- 49:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): what
- 49:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): does that say about
- 49:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): centralization?
- 49:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Uh
- 49:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): yeah I think you could argue that to some degree that's you know
- 50:00
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that
- 50:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that would that would be one feature of a more centralization cent more centralized system. But yeah, I don't know. I think I think the more interesting thing than the protocol freezing in this situation is actually now the protocol has remained frozen for uh you know, what is it, days now. Um, you know, nobody's in theory the
- 50:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): node operators could turn it back on whenever, um, but they they haven't yet. And not only that, the node operators are going to have to vote to upgrade the protocol and switch it back on. And if you're a node operator in that case, you're you're knowingly doing so
- 50:37
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
- 50:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): in anticipation that North Korea is going to start uh using your protocol to launder uh literally like billions of dollars of of stolen money.
- 50:49
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um
- 50:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I I I personally wouldn't would wouldn't vote for that to happen. Um I imagine that that some of the doorchain people are very sad about the the fees that they're missing out on uh on on getting um uh yeah and
- 51:07
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 51:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): don't know I think I think the whole the whole situation's got got beyond beyond words at this point. Um yeah i i i don't support i don't support north korea and i don't support people who enable enable them and that's what they're doing
- 51:25
- Laura Shin: tabla
- 51:27
- Jonty: yeah also one thing important here is that uh on one hand they say that they are they are decentralized but if now I wanna become a node operator, I cannot do it. So that's that's why it listed, right? So not not
- 51:47
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): anyone can join them.
- 51:48
- Laura Shin: Wait, because what?
- 51:51
- Jonty: Because they because they control who can become a node operator. I c I cannot because if not, it's what we had talked the other time in the in the podcast. Okay, we start organizing, we become node operators for third chain, we have many node operators, and we basically do like a governance attack and we start deciding also what has to be done. But if you wanna become a
- 52:11
- Jonty: node a node operator, I wanna become a node operator, I will not be allowed. If I wanna put a Bitcoin node, I can do it. If I wanna put an Ethereum node, I can do it. If you wanna put a third
- 52:23
- Jonty: chain node, you cannot do it without their
- 52:29
- Laura Shin: Yeah. Yeah.
- 52:31
- Jonty: So
- 52:32
- Jonty: that's not so decentralized.
- 52:34
- Laura Shin: Yeah, this goes to uh what I was saying about how the people who had a different view are no longer part of the community. So
- 52:41
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): um okay.
- 52:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Something else, uh it's maybe a slightly funny anecdote. Um Chad Chad Barraford and JP Thor are currently literally being sued in in New York, um, if you go look it up, and uh by victims of the whole Thorfy incident. One of the defenses that they're making is um
- 53:03
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): so
- 53:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the the argument is that uh admin keys that that were held by uh there were two admin keys that could unilaterally freeze the the the protocol uh at any time they liked were used. in that instant, and that caused a whole load of issues and loss. And um, you know, ultimately, ultimately their users were the people that that lost out. They're being
- 53:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): sued for that action. And one of the defenses they're making is that oh, if you'd actually read the documents, uh, you know, the docs for Thorchain, you would have realized that Thorchain is not as as decentralized or is is it entirely is central. centralized when it comes to uh the the admin keys. Um those
- 53:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): keys have now been removed, but I th I find that I find it baffling that the on on the one hand, the defense that's being made in that situation is well, clearly we always said that we were centralized all along. And if you'd just done your due diligence, then you would have known that. But obviously that's that's that's very
- 54:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): different from the I guess the view or or the the yeah, the view that that JP Thor and Chad Barrafo put out on the internet for the years at this point.
- 54:14
- Laura Shin: Yeah, well, I did want to also go back to how they haven't restarted the chain because that same day that they paused, um, or or I guess it's it's only certain chains that they paused, but um that same day, the FBI, the United States Secret Service, and the Internal Revenue Service Criminal Investigations Unit all asked,
- 54:34
- Laura Shin: quote, ThorNode operators, RPC node operators, instant exchanges, DeFi services, blockchain analytics firms, and other virtual asset service providers to block transactions with or derived from addresses trader-trader trader trader actors are using to launder these stolen assets. So what's so interesting is they're the only ones that were named
- 54:54
- Laura Shin: by name. So what do you make of the FBI calling them out? Like, do you feel like
- 55:01
- Laura Shin: essentially they have a target on their back from the government to be named that way? Like, is it does it say to you that it seems like the US government seems to believe that that Thorchain is centralized enough to do it? Or is it simply just they know that DPRK mostly uses Thorchain to launder? You know, as the
- 55:21
- Laura Shin: uh Jimmy Green guy and Zach XBT's underground investigation said, uh, oh, if you want to get into the money laundering business, all you need to do is use Thorchain. So, yeah, what did you name of make of the fact that they were named?
- 55:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I think if you're being named in an FP. FBI press release as one of the enablers who could help launder the funds from literally the biggest hack ever,
- 55:47
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
- 55:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): yeah, I I I don't think that's a place that you want to be, and I would take that warning extremely seriously.
- 55:54
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um
- 55:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): yeah, I the US government sees North Korea getting
- 56:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): six billion dollars now. three point six billion dollars is like a major, major national security issue. So if you are somebody who is going to participate in enabling
- 56:15
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
- 56:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): though that regime to uh ultimately launder their stolen stolen funds, cash out and and use use those funds to pay for things like nuclear. weapons um you're not gonna make best friends with the the united states government and
- 56:32
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
- 56:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): i imagine that uh probably the the US like public who democratically like elect in their their government probably I imagine would would would also take that stance that this is probably not something that we wanna we want to enable. So um yeah I don't think
- 56:51
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 56:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I I don't think that's a place you want to be. I think it's I think Tay tweeted the other day that this is clearly a clearly a warning shot. Um I I don't know why
- 57:01
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
- 57:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the powers that be at Thorchain are so insistent on you know the take take taking dying on this hill. Um I I wouldn't um and yeah I wouldn't I would encourage anybody who's commenting on Thorchain to go and watch the uh seven news
- 57:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): documentary after the after from Australia after the uh Bybit incident where JP Thor is interviewed extensively and he essentially sits there, laughs, shows off his new brand new Aston Martin helicopter, literally with the DPRK flag uh painted. on the back um sort of
- 57:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): shows off about the amount of fees that people have made and uh
- 57:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): yeah ultimately argues that North Korea uh uh might might have stolen this stolen this money to to pay for you know food to put inside you know North Korean children's mouths.
- 57:59
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um I
- 58:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): think I I think that's crazy personally. Um I think that JP Thor should should potentially go to North Korea and see see what it's like to live as a citizen citizen there and like take a take a look at himself and see see whether this is something that he wants to be enabling. Yeah. And I think
- 58:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I think once you watch that you'll see quite quite clearly how angry this makes uh normal normal people and people who have to deal with the consequences of of this small handful of people in a discord who seem insistent that their principles uh are are more important than the the
- 58:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): stability of the world.
- 58:42
- Laura Shin: Yeah, yeah. I mean that statement is just stunningly ignorant about North Korea. Like, of course, Kim Jong Jong-un un would rather feed himself um than than any of the normal everyday citizens. He just leaves them to starve. So that's crazy that he thought that it was going to feed anybody in North Korea other than Kim Jong-un himself. Um, I did
- 59:02
- Laura Shin: also want to ask though, because um, you know, we had something sort of similar where the US government was targeting a very specific uh privacy preserving service in uh crypto, which was tornado cash. And ultimately, obviously, um, the government lost in
- 59:21
- Laura Shin: court around that. But I'm curious to hear how you think Tornado Cash differs from Thorchain. Like, why should Tornado Cash be protected and um, you know, not be targeted by the government? And why do you think that Thor chain should be?
- 59:39
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 59:39
- Jonty: I want to say something very short because I'm not not an expert here, but
- 59:46
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): from
- 59:46
- Jonty: what I understand, Tornado Cash or or the developers
- 59:51
- Jonty: are not making money because when people are using Tornado Cash, right?
- 59:57
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um
- 59:59
- Jonty: that's that's a main thing, I think, here. In this in this our case, uh in Torchain, they are making money. They are making a lot of money. With Tornado Cash, from what I understand, no, they are not generating fees because people are are using them. But Johnti, correct me if I'm if I'm wrong.
- 1:00:19
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah, so I I
- 1:00:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): think the
- 1:00:21
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the clearest difference between the
- 1:00:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): the the
- 1:00:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): protocols
- 1:00:25
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): is that um
- 1:00:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): even
- 1:00:26
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): despite all of the us government's action against tornado cache like
- 1:00:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): tornado cache
- 1:00:32
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): is
- 1:00:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): built on
- 1:00:32
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): immutable smart contracts and
- 1:00:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): that
- 1:00:35
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): protocol still runs to
- 1:00:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): this day and there's nothing there's there's
- 1:00:39
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): something
- 1:00:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that that the the layer
- 1:00:41
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): one blockchains could do
- 1:00:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): about
- 1:00:42
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that
- 1:00:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): um and and we
- 1:00:44
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): can have a
- 1:00:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): debate about whether they should or or not but there's nothing necessarily that
- 1:00:48
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that
- 1:00:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Roman Romanstorm storm uh uh himself himself could could do to stop people from using Tornado Cache now. And I
- 1:00:54
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): think uh
- 1:00:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): unlike unlike
- 1:00:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): uh
- 1:00:59
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh I
- 1:01:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): guess I
- 1:01:00
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): guess Roman
- 1:01:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Storm could
- 1:01:01
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): could
- 1:01:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): try and gather the support of the
- 1:01:03
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): tornado cache
- 1:01:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): tornado
- 1:01:05
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): cache
- 1:01:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): dower
- 1:01:06
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): um
- 1:01:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): but yeah it's it's it's not the same situation as as Thor ThorChain Chain where you have this herd mentality of people following loud voices within that community, this small community, and things could be done. Uh yeah, I've been conflicted on Tornado Cache actually personally for a long time.
- 1:01:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Um I I don't think necessarily
- 1:01:29
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
- 1:01:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): tornado cache when it when it was deployed was super well thought through the I I either
- 1:01:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the the way in which bad actors could could could you could abuse tornado cash for for gain um
- 1:01:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): do i think that you should be held criminally liable for that i i don't know i think that's a much i think that's a much deeper debate and i'd rather see that resolved with debate uh than uh than arrests um but yeah ultimately i think if you if you start to start to play with the
- 1:02:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): with with nation states and geopolitics and
- 1:02:10
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): um you
- 1:02:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): know big big powers like the US government,
- 1:02:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
- 1:02:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): yeah that's that's where you start to it's it's that's a that's a hard theater to to to win. And um yeah I wouldn't want to be in the position that that the 4 Fourchain chain finds itself in. right
- 1:02:27
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): now.
- 1:02:28
- Laura Shin: Yeah, yeah, I agree.
- 1:02:30
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um,
- 1:02:30
- Laura Shin: I do want to ask one other aspect about the hack itself. Um, a little over 24 hours after the hack, on-chain lens tweeted, Dear Mr. Binance hacker, what the fuck are you even doing here? This is seriously seriously one of the most maddening laundering operations we've ever seen. They haven't even started using mixers. And then there was a graph.
- 1:02:50
- Laura Shin: graphic showing funds from the original 10 wallets moving to over 100 new addresses. And then the next hop being maybe like, I don't know, 400, roughly two wallets. And then the next top being two even more wallets than that. The graphic just looks insane.
- 1:03:09
- Laura Shin: It looked to me, you know, that this like this was machine driven, not human-driven. human driven. So I'm curious if you could talk about how this differ from differs from their typical laundering pattern and whether or not it says, you know, maybe that AI is is part of the evolution of their methods.
- 1:03:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So actually, um uh there's there's a few things to understand here. Uh this this particular threat actor, trader traitor, typically relies on third parties to launch. launder their proceeds. Um, often Chinese speaking money laundering organizations. And so that mess of transactions that you see is is likely actually these
- 1:03:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): money laundering orcs, not not North Korea. Um secondly, um using automation and scripts is is that's actually not something that's that's new. We've seen that. Even dating back way, way back until uh the sort of Ronin Harmony era back in 2022 and three.
- 1:04:07
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um
- 1:04:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): potentially the scale of this operation, how quickly they've done it this time, uh, you know, if they want to write scripts that they can use to uh wash money in this way. So the reason that they're another thing to understand is the reason that they're doing this is to essentially evade the eyes of transaction monitoring software. your chain analysis,
- 1:04:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): TRM, elliptics of the world.
- 1:04:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Those softwares, by and large, operate on the idea of attribution, i.e., analysts saying that X wallet belongs to Y threat actor, and taint or exposure. So when uh a protocol or an exchange or anybody screens a transaction to look at
- 1:04:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): source of funds, it traces back those funds automatically until it reaches a known wallet and then comes up with the pie chart of what uh you know what makes up the funds that you're about to receive and is that is that illicit or or uh licit. Um what they're doing in this sort of washing machine like
- 1:05:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): activity is trying to get rid of the taint and obfuscate their source of funds. Um so they're passing money around like wallets between each other to try and to try and uh break that exposure algorithm.
- 1:05:24
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um
- 1:05:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and yeah, I I think that nowadays it's like obviously way easier to write scripts to do this at at scale. So it's just yet another part of this whole kill chain, if you like, that uh becomes so much easier and so much quicker with AI. Yeah, it's
- 1:05:44
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): who
- 1:05:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): who knows if they used AI. I think everybody, if you know, if if if you're scripting things these days, like everybody is using AI to write basic scripts like this, and I I see no reason why DPRK wouldn't be doing, or that the Lord Murray is on behalf of DPRK wouldn't be doing this.
- 1:06:03
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Okay,
- 1:06:03
- Laura Shin: so I did also want to ask um about Trader Trader because uh we keep mentioning them you know throughout the show. And Janti, you did tweet, quote, Lazarus doesn't mean anything anymore. You said it's just a collective name used to describe various North Korean cyber operations. And then you had this whole diagram with a whole
- 1:06:23
- Laura Shin: swarm of different entities. Um Trader TraderTrader Trader also. also has like some other name, UNC4899. Um, but can you give us an overview of these different groups and how they differ from each other and why we keep hearing about Trader Trader when it comes to these crypto hacks?
- 1:06:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah, so this this diagram actually isn't isn't my diagram. It's from Kodowski Security, but it's a great resource. Um, what this is is uh essentially an org chart or for the uh different cyber actors that make up
- 1:06:55
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
- 1:06:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the the DPRK's cyber operations like suite, if you like.
- 1:06:59
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um
- 1:07:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): imagine a military organization. This is literally a military organization. You would have different departments in that military organization that do different things.
- 1:07:09
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um
- 1:07:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): So you might have,
- 1:07:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I
- 1:07:11
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): don't
- 1:07:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): know, one
- 1:07:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): department that's focused on espionage.
- 1:07:15
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): one
- 1:07:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): department that's focused on
- 1:07:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): propaganda,
- 1:07:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): influence,
- 1:07:21
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): but
- 1:07:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): you'll also
- 1:07:22
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): have
- 1:07:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): various
- 1:07:23
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): different
- 1:07:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): departments
- 1:07:24
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
- 1:07:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): sub departments
- 1:07:25
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): focused
- 1:07:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): on cyber operations.
- 1:07:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And what we've what what analysts have seen over the course of uh the last uh
- 1:07:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): particularly last sort of five, six, seven years. Um the RGB, uh the reconnaissance general bureau. North Korea's spy agency, has pivoted vast swathes of its work workforce to specifically targeting cryptocurrency organizations. So actually, what started is the Lazarus Group, which was probably
- 1:07:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): a small department within the Reconnaissance General Bureau tasked with stealing cryptocurrency over the last years, has grown into a much, much bigger department and has split into smaller sub-departments where different teams work on different things. And when we talk about Trader Traitor, Apple Juice, Contagious
- 1:08:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Interview, Dangerous Password, all of these different names are just code words essentially we're using to refer to the different departments. Um Trader Traitor is probably the most prolific. So there's a particular threat group that we track um that that is responsible for well this hack, but also
- 1:08:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): the BitGet hack, the LairZero hack, the Bybit hack. Um and by looking at the uh like technical
- 1:08:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): activity and and tactics, techniques and procedures used in different attacks, we're able to cluster different uh uh intrusions together. based on their activity and try and work out how
- 1:08:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): which one of these groups that operate quite differently is responsible in in in different scenarios. Um the reason it's important to do this modeling is that uh this intelligence gives allows you to make much better decisions. So um if Binance has a deep understanding of how Trader
- 1:09:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Traitor operates, how they hack people, how they uh now subsequently launder money, it allows them to respond to this much, much quicker and easier than going and learning like what's going to happen next. Um, because Trader Traitor has a MO for laundering money, and it's super helpful in in response situations to know that. Uh, but also like,
- 1:09:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): secondly, the way in which you defend against each one of these. organizations, each one of these units, like differs slightly. And understanding how each one of these orgs is doing their social engineering right now is going to ultimately protect you when it comes to trying to mitigate the probability that you're going to
- 1:09:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): get hacked. So I've I been very vocal about this in that I don't think the general understanding.
- 1:10:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): like deep understanding of how North Korea operates in the cryptocurrency industry matches the threat that North Korea poses to the cryptocurrency industry. And if if if you don't understand at a basic level, like anything that I just said, um you you need to learn it or or hire somebody who already knows and ultimately
- 1:10:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): that's gonna uh protect your organization.
- 1:10:26
- Laura Shin: And and just to make sure I understood, so Trader Traitor is one of the groups, and they seem especially focused on these big crypto hacks and laundering those funds. Um, and that's why they are responsible for Bybit, Ronin, Kelp Dow, like the some of these really big ones. But these
- 1:10:45
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): other
- 1:10:46
- Laura Shin: oh keep going.
- 1:10:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Yeah, so so Trader Traitor actually gets its name from uh the fact that when uh when when this group was initially observed, uh they were using Trojanized trading applications as the malware decoy uh in their social engineering. So essentially they were reaching out to Trader
- 1:11:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Traitor typically hacks people through um fake job interviews, so uh they will reach out to developers. with the offer of a offer of a job and
- 1:11:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): she
- 1:11:19
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): go
- 1:11:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): through an extensive interview process, fake interview process, um, essentially involving multiple rounds. Uh, but one of those rounds could be a coding test. And all this is is uh allure for that that developer to download some code that they have written onto their laptop and and run it on hopefully their.
- 1:11:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): their corporate laptop. That when when this group was initially spotted, the the code LUR that they were using was Trojanized like crypto trading apps. Hence that's where Trader Traitor came from in the in the like CTI uh community. Um but yeah that's I hope that answers your question.
- 1:11:57
- Laura Shin: Okay. And but then um essentially like in that whole diagram, those other sort of little criminal groups within the North Korean government, they focus on other ways of stealing money for the regime. But trader trader and maybe a few other ones are focused on crypto. And so
- 1:12:16
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): is that okay.
- 1:12:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): So um there are several subunits Units of the Reconnaissance General Bureau and actually the Korean Workers' Party that that that are focused on. stealing cryptocurrency and the way in which each one of those units goes about doing their social engineering, doing their reconnaissance, uh, developing personas, um,
- 1:12:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): exfiltrating funds, laundering funds, where they're physically located, um, you know, whether they interact with one another is is different for each of those different groups. And that's and it's it's those differences that allow us to cluster these. these different activities like under different umbrellas.
- 1:12:55
- Laura Shin: Okay.
- 1:12:56
- Laura Shin: Okay. Well, um I have to of course end on a note where we look at what the industry can do better. You know, uh Chain Elsis tweeted, quote, suspected North Korea linked hacks account for nearly 89% of reported crypto hack losses so far this year. In 2021, that
- 1:13:16
- Laura Shin: share was 15%.
- 1:13:18
- Laura Shin: The average reported loss per suspected DPRK linked hack rose from 50 million in 2021 to 185 million in 2026. Year to date, that's about three and a half, three, three point seven times larger. So it sort of seems like North Korea's track record rec is improving and potentially the
- 1:13:38
- Laura Shin: Ethereum. Ethereum's track, the industry's track record is um declining. Uh maybe not big based on how big the industry is compared to, you know, back then. But point is, you know, North Korea is definitely getting better. So I'm curious like how you guys would grade the industry's efforts to prevent these hacks. Tax. And do
- 1:13:58
- Laura Shin: you feel like there's any low-hanging fruit out there that the industry isn't doing? that you think it should? Like if you could give like one, you know, message to everybody, you know, about how to prevent these kinds of things, what what would it be?
- 1:14:12
- Jonty: Yeah, I have one take. Many people will hate me for this, but I prefer people to hate me for this than to keep on financing North Korea. One problem that this industry has is that well, it's not a problem, it's a reality, is that most security researchers are smart contract security researchers that
- 1:14:32
- Jonty: do not come from traditional cybersecurity. There are coders that then started auditing smart contracts, auditing code, so they do smart contract security. Operational security is a whole different thing.
- 1:14:47
- Jonty: I would say that easily 90% of organizations in this ecosystem don't have someone that really knows operational security on in their company. And the worst issue is that many of them think that they are okay. They are not okay. Not okay at all.
- 1:15:05
- Jonty: So I would say
- 1:15:08
- Jonty: number one thing get another get an operational security, right? I am obviously biased because that's what my company. does, but I think that with what's happening in the ecosystem, it's pretty obvious. And then if there's one thing that they can even do without hiring any company is at least get an EDR, right? I
- 1:15:28
- Jonty: think that we already talked about this.
- 1:15:30
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): An
- 1:15:30
- Jonty: EDR is some it's a tool that is more advanced than an antivirus, right? An antivirus just knows hey, this file, this file, and this file are viruses, so they detect when you have that exact file. An EDR is a tool that is that stands for endpoint detection and response, and that lives in your device with root
- 1:15:50
- Jonty: access and checks all the behaviors and stuff happening in your computer, right? And it it stops malware and most of the threats. Most companies in this, most organizations in this ecosystem don't use CDRs with because they say, oh no, it's a problem for my privacy.
- 1:16:09
- Jonty: People will know what I'm doing in my computer, so no, no, I want privacy, so I will not have that. And in the end, what happens? They get hacked, they have no privacy because everything is leaked, and they now they have no privacy and no money. So if companies can do one thing, go and pay for an EDR, crack. CrowdStrike is very good, $150
- 1:16:29
- Jonty: per year. And that will be like, it's not everything, but if they can do something, it's that. Why? Again, because most of the stuff starts because a developer or someone at the organization laptop gets infected, right? And many people think, no, no, no, no, I am smart enough. I have lived with
- 1:16:49
- Jonty: the internet all of my life. I will not get infected. Yes, we will all be infected eventually, right? So that's why we we need these tools.
- 1:16:59
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
- 1:17:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): 100% agree with everything Pablo just said. Um, absolutely go and buy EDR if you haven't haven't, if you're not if you're not using managed devices with EDR right now, like you have don't to do that. Um, two things I would add. Um
- 1:17:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): I think that leaders and security professionals, compliance professionals, and generally your entire org really should have at least a high level understanding of the the adversaries that operate in this industry. Like the threat, you can't effectively make decisions about how much
- 1:17:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): resources, time, effort you're going to allocate into things like. security and compliance if you have no understanding of the threat that you you face. Um, so I would I would definitely spend time like educating yourself. And I think that I think that that's super important. Uh the second thing I would appeal for
- 1:17:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): the industry to do um slightly less on the security side, but after these instances incidents happen, we need to just the decide as an industry that we're not going to stand for uh people being able to just freely launder launder money. Like all that's going to happen if we continue to enable this is so much wealth
- 1:18:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): is going to transfer from normal retail uh users who want to you know uh take advantage of all the benefits that that uh blockchain technology, cryptocurrency can uh
- 1:18:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): can provide. We're gonna transfer all of that wealth to bad actors who eventually will just make up so much of the industry that it offers no utility to the good people. And I see this personally as an as a real existential threat to to the cryptocurrency industry. You're never gonna going to realize any of the good things
- 1:18:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): that crypto can build if you're just enabling bad actors. Um, so I would encourage people to seriously start having these debates on you know what what what what does decentralized even mean? Is there anything we can do? Is permissionless, you know, in the literal sense, the even the right way forward. Um
- 1:19:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): uh all of these debates are good debates to have. And I would encourage where people can take action to do things to stop these bad actors, they they should take that action. Um and they shouldn't be sat here waiting for some law enforcement agency or some regulator or whatever to come and get all up in the
- 1:19:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): cryptocurrency industry and tell tell people what to do because that's that's never going to end well. This should be industry-led, industry led and we can do something about it. I would love to get to a situation where I can. interact with a protocol, tell them or or even exchange, tell them about clearly verifiably, uh you know,
- 1:19:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): funds that are sourced from insert hack here are being laundered through your project. And somebody doesn't turn around and ask me to go and tell a police officer. I I think that that is one of the highest leverage thing things we can do as an industry. And I uh yeah, I I hope that uh we take action but before it's too late.
- 1:20:08
- Laura Shin: All right. Well, you guys, this has been such an amazing interview. Thank you both so much for sharing your insights on Unchained.
- 1:20:16
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Thanks
- 1:20:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): all.
- 1:20:18
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Thank
- 1:20:18
- Jonty: you very much.
- 1:20:19
- Laura Shin: Nothing you hear on Unchained is investment advice. This show is for informational and entertainment purposes only, and my guests and I may hold assets discussed. on the show. For more disclosures, visit unchainedcrypto.com.
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