The Meb Faber Show - Better Investing

Jeff deGraaf argues rising real yields make bonds a viable equity alternative and warns of private credit strain

56 min Listen to the original
Real YieldsPrivate CreditMarket RegimesBubble SignalsBond AllocationVolatility Hedging

Summary

Jeff deGraaf argues that with real yields now above 2%, bonds offer a viable alternative to equities for generating returns with lower volatility. He notes that historical data shows the high inflation/high growth regime yields poor S&P returns, prompting a preference for defensives and energy. DeGraaf highlights that private credit is showing strain through 'pay in kind' features and redemption gates as rising rates hit floating-rate loans. He advises using technical confirmation of yield roll-overs rather than hard yield thresholds to trigger bond allocations. The discussion also covers bubble signals in semiconductors and gold, suggesting selling calls as a synthetic short strategy in high-volatility environments.

Key takeaways

  1. 1
    November actually has become, you know, the best month uh from a probabilistic standpoint, about a 77% uh chance historically of probable uh positive returns with about a 260 basis point return, which which is about uh 3x what the normal monthly return

    Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) · 42:49

Episode sections

  1. 0:00 – 5:21

    John Bull and Real Yields

    Jeff deGraaf discusses the historical adage that investors cannot tolerate real yields below 2%, which forces them into risky assets like 1873 railroad bonds or modern SPACs. He argues that with real yields now above 2%, bonds offer a viable alternative to equities for generating returns with lower volatility.

  2. 5:21 – 11:06

    Seduction of Bubble Trades

    DeGraaf uses the example of Sir Isaac Newton and the South Sea Bubble to illustrate how even rational investors are seduced by bubble trades. He notes that while bubbles are irrational, they can persist and grow, affecting seasoned professionals who fail to exit before the peak.

  3. 11:06 – 15:27

    Bonds, Volatility, and Allocation

    The speaker explains that while high real yields do not guarantee equity underperformance, they allow for balanced portfolios (e.g., 65-35) that offer similar returns to stocks with less volatility. He suggests that as equity returns disappoint, investors will gradually reallocate to bonds, which act as ballast for rebalancing during corrections.

  4. 15:27 – 19:10

    Credit Spreads and Market Pressure

    DeGraaf highlights that tightening financial conditions are causing credit spreads to widen, particularly in CCC and BB rated corporate bonds. He observes a sector rotation toward defensives (healthcare, staples, utilities) and value over cyclicals and growth as real yields rise.

  5. 19:10 – 29:36

    Semis and the Bubble Signal

    The guest defines a bubble signal as an index doubling from an all-time high within two years, which recently triggered for semiconductors. He advises a cautious approach to these overextended names.

  6. 29:36 – 32:49

    Hedging Bubble Trades and Tape Reading

    Speaker_1 discusses stopping dividend reinvestment as a signal to avoid adding capital to overextended positions. Speaker_0 explains that high volatility makes direct shorting expensive, suggesting selling calls for synthetic shorts instead, while noting that names like small modular reactors and quantum computing have triggered bubble signals.

  7. 32:49 – 43:53

    Market Cycle Clock and Regime Analysis

    Speaker_0 describes using a 'Market Cycle Clock' plotting inflation vs. growth to determine regime. He notes the current high inflation/high growth zone historically yields poor S&P returns, prompting tighter position sizing and a preference for energy/healthcare over materials/discretionary.

  8. 43:53 – 56:17

    Private Credit Deterioration

    Speaker_0 details how private credit, born from Dodd-Frank restrictions on banks, is now showing strain through 'pay in kind' and redemption gates. He describes the sector as 'stably deteriorating' due to rising rates hitting floating-rate loans originated at near-zero rates.

Assets discussed

AssetKindStanceContext
Goldcommoditymixedthe quantum computing names, right? These things were all triggering a year ago. Gold triggered actually a year ago in October for us, and you know, almost perfect to script, right? The next three months it went up, it cracked in in January, and nobody's cared ever since, right? Like that that's actually getting to the point where there's enough apathy where I'm like, okay, that one's going to be interesting. If we can
BitcoinBTCcryptoneutralwe haven't had follow-through from Bitcoin or crypto. I'm not philosophically a huge bull or bearer either way.

“Stance” is how the speakers talked about the asset, not a recommendation.

Claims worth verifying

Gold triggered a bubble signal in October 2025, rose for three months, then cracked in January 2026.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·30:43

How to verify: Check RenMac Research bubble signal archives for Gold (XAUUSD) for October 2026 and price action through January 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-13 through 2026-11-13. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The 18-month return for bubble-triggered names tends to be poor on average.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·31:56

How to verify: Review RenMac Research historical studies on 'bubble signal' performance over 18-month horizons. For recent events, verify 2026-08-13 through 2026-11-13. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

In the high inflation/high growth quadrant of the Market Cycle Clock, historical S&P annualized returns are only ~40 basis points positive.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·37:56

How to verify: Check RenMac Research 'Market Cycle Clock' methodology and historical backtests for the high inflation/high growth quadrant. For recent events, verify 2026-08-13 through 2026-11-13. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

November has a 77% historical probability of positive returns with an average return of 260 basis points.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·42:49

How to verify: Calculate S&P 500 monthly returns for November over the last 50-100 years using Yahoo Finance or Bloomberg data. For recent events, verify 2026-08-13 through 2026-11-13. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Private credit growth led to lower standards, covenant-light deals, and 'pay in kind' structures.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·45:42

How to verify: Review industry reports on private credit growth (e.g., Preqin, Bloomberg) and specific deal terms for covenant-light structures post-2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-13 through 2026-11-13. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Redemption gates in private credit funds are typically around 5%, with investors requesting 7-12%.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·47:25

How to verify: Check fund prospectuses and investor letters for major private credit funds (e.g., Ares, Blackstone, Oaktree) for redemption terms and recent gate activations. For recent events, verify 2026-08-13 through 2026-11-13. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

A refinance wall is hitting private credit borrowers in 2029.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·51:22

How to verify: Analyze maturity schedules of private credit loans and BDC portfolios for 2029 maturities using S&P Capital IQ or Bloomberg. For recent events, verify 2026-08-13 through 2026-11-13. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Speaker_0 resigned from Lehman Brothers on the day of its stock price high.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·52:47

How to verify: Check Lehman Brothers (LEH) stock price history for September 2026 and Jeff deGraaf's LinkedIn profile or biographical records for resignation date. For recent events, verify 2026-08-13 through 2026-11-13. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Treasury Secretary Bessant mentioned twisting the curve by buying back-end off-the-run securities.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·42:09

How to verify: Search for public statements or transcripts from Treasury Secretary Scott Bessant regarding 'twist' operations or off-the-run purchases in 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-13 through 2026-11-13. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Private credit originated during the SPAC days when real rates were zero.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·46:45

How to verify: Correlate private credit origination volumes with SPAC IPO waves (2026-2026) and Federal Reserve real rate data (TIPS yields) for that period. For recent events, verify 2026-08-13 through 2026-11-13. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Do your own research

  • Verify current US Treasury real yields (10-year TIPS yield) against the 2% threshold mentioned by deGraaf.
  • Review Q3 2026 or latest quarterly reports for major private credit funds (e.g., Ares, Blackstone, Blue Owl) for increases in 'pay in kind' interest or redemption gate usage.
  • Check the S&P 500 performance in historical high-inflation/high-growth regimes (e.g., 1970s) to validate the ~40bps annualized return claim.
  • Confirm the definition of the 'bubble signal' (index doubling from ATH in two years) and check current status for semiconductors (SOX) and gold.
  • Assess credit spreads for CCC and BB rated corporate bonds using Bloomberg or ICE BofA data to verify the claim of widening spreads.
  • Read the Dodd-Frank Act provisions that restricted bank lending to understand the origin of the private credit sector.
  • Verify the historical probability and average return for November S&P 500 returns using Yahoo Finance or FRED data.
  • Check for conflicts of interest: determine if deGraaf or RenMac holds positions in the specific assets mentioned (bonds, private credit, specific sectors).
Full transcriptexpand
0:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): My resignation letter was the day of the high of the stock price at Lehman Brothers.
0:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): You only get a few of those in your career. You just top tick something or bottom ticket.
0:07
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): The bubble indicator is simply a doubling of an index within a two-year period of time from a high, not off a low. Sir Isaac Newton had money in the South Sea Company in December of seventeen nineteen. By the end of February, he had quintupled his money. He took it out at the end of February, only to send sit on his
0:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): hands and watch it triple from that point. This is Sir Isaac Newton, the founder of Calculus.
0:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): The technical term for investors is fat and happy. People were fat and happy, bull market all-time highs, not a care in the world. You
0:40
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): worry about the disruption. We've seen it with a SaaSpocalypse, and a lot of that credit was based in the a software name. and age, So that should become existential. Do you still need to have this software company when you could clod code it in afternoon?
0:53
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Stably deteriorating may just turn into deteriorating at some point if there's a lehman-esque moment. What do you look for as a signal for that?
1:00
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
1:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): don't have a solvency problem, I have a liquidity problem. They're the same thing. If your liquidity problem goes on long enough, you have a solvency problem. Bill Clinton, 30 years ago, said, you know, what do you mean my economic plans are beholden to a bunch of fucking bond traders? That's the way it should
1:13
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): be.
1:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): What's up, everybody? Today's guest is Jeff DeGraff, Chairman, Head of Technical Research at Renaissance Macro Hall of Fame, technical analyst. Jeff, welcome to the show.
1:25
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Thank
1:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you, Meb. Good to see
1:27
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you.
1:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I want to go back to 1873,
1:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): which is a year where we can talk about John Bull. You wrote one of my favorite pieces of the year this year. I really love it. loved Talk to us a little bit about what this proverb meant in the old two percent.
1:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah. So that uh 1873, that was Walter Badgett, who was the editor of The Economist. And back in the day, he said, well, he had a famous line, he quipped it, which was John Bull can stand many things, but John Bull can't stand 2%. And the whole idea of that was because it was a hard money system, anything below 2%, investors kind of said, What in the
2:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): world are we doing here? Let's make sure that
2:05
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): we're
2:06
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): getting a return on investment and went out on the risk curve and started looking for other opportunities. And back in their day, it was uh Central American and uh South American railroad bonds, right? So people would go and instead of putting their money with the local bank, they would uh buy these bonds that um, you know, pretty quickly, I
2:26
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): think in four or five years went defunct and defaulted uh because they were, again, going out on the risk spectrum trying to look for higher returns at nine, 10%, 12% yields. And the whole idea was, you know, we were in a very similar environment, really, from the great financial crisis on through about 2022 or so,
2:45
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): where it
2:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): was termed Tina, right? There is no alternative, and that's because
2:50
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the Fed.
2:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): suppressed rates through quantitative easing to a point where you said, uh, what why would I ever own 10-year paper at 150 basis points when
2:59
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
2:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): can hopefully get more than that by going on the risk curve in the SP or something equivalent? Obviously, we had SPACs during that time, and we had some other, you know, really speculative investments that uh that did not fan uh play out well and and similar to the Honduran bonds that default. defaulted, right? But the point of the piece this week was uh or last week
3:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): was really that the real rate, if you look at the difference between nominal rates and the inflation expectations, the the differential there are the real rates. And that real rate is in the high twos. I think it's two sixty five today when we wrote the piece, it was two 290. ninety. Anything above 2%, you know, starts to take you back to that job John Bull
3:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): can stand 2%. Uh, and real investors will look at bonds and say, hey, there's something to be had here, right? I don't need a 80, 15 allocation to stocks versus bonds to get the same
3:51
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): kind
3:52
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): of 7% target return. I can have something that's more normalized, like a 65-35 portfolio with a 5% nominal and uh, a you know, 2.6% real yield, and get something that's close to that without the same volatility. So for us, it was a change in the mindset. It's going to be slow to jump on. You know, people will start to allocate over time. Um,
4:12
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): but we do think that there are alternatives to just being, you know, fully invested in equities here. Um, that finally there are alternatives uh today, not just uh uh not just equities. And we thought it was important for people to understand that.
4:25
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well
4:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it's funny, you you mentioned. 1873, and you were like, ha, we can laugh at people being like, why would you buy Honduran railroad bonds? And then then you made the the very recent example, not too long ago, of SPACs. And you're like, well, okay, I can see how investors kind of they look around and they get seduced into doing these sort of sort of crazy investments
4:44
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that
4:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): many I feel like know better, but you have the the fantasy, right? The idea of like, ooh, like what is the envy of this uh exotic investment that sounds really wonderful?
4:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): It's so seductive, isn't it? I mean, you can you can you know like you're you're a seasoned professional, I'm a seasoned professional. I've read, you know, hundreds of years of of investing. I mean, keep in mind Sir Isaac Newton fell prey to the South Sea, you know, it was like South Sea company at the time. We know it as the South Sea bubble,
5:13
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): but
5:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Sir Isaac Newton, you know. he had money in the South Sea Company in December of, I want to say it was 178, uh, 1719.
5:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): By the end of February, he had uh quintupled his money. He took it out at the end of February, only to sit on his hands and watch it uh triple from that point. I mean, this is Sir Isaac Newton, right? The the founder of Calculus. This isn't, you know, just some average Joe. Um and by the early summer,
5:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): he had taken not only what he had originally made, but also taken shares of this Bank of England that he owned, cashed those in to buy the South Sea Company. What's best understood is probably within two or three weeks of the final top. And when he passed away 10 years later, a substantial portion of his estate was
6:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): still invested in the South Sea Company, which was then starting to earn the moniker of the South Sea bubble, right? So it is so seductive. It's not rational, but it can affect rational people, you know, in the same emotional way that is uh very challenging.
6:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): You're talking about this interesting, very interesting period over the past five, 10 years, really going back to the last 20, where despite bonds. not looking particularly interesting, super low yields, this period of
6:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): essentially no real yield. And right, so you have people that who spent their entire career thus far, you know, many people, 20 years is essentially a career that have been in an environment that is now different. Walk us through kind of some of the ideas of whether it's bonds, whether it's tips, whether it's equity. equities, how do they start to compete? Aaron
6:53
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Powell
6:53
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): What's interesting is the when you have real yields above 2%, right? So let's keep in mind the nominal yields, let's call it 5% as a nice run number, were plus or minus that on any given day here recently. But the real yields, again, are uh accounting for that expectation of inflation, and that's what you're left with other real yields. Some of that is term premium that the the market is saying,
7:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): hey, we're gonna demand more from.
7:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): uh from you as uh as investors, uh, and whether that's because,
7:20
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you know,
7:20
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the treasury is now competing with Google, right, who's issuing debt and meta who's issuing debt. So you have some of that crowding out effect. Um, it could be because they don't trust the the fiscal situation and they believe that they're gonna get kind of swamped with supply. And so they're asking for more here right now. So there's a lot of reasons behind why that can happen. Um, and it's tough to know
7:40
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): exactly what that is.
7:42
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
7:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): this is, and to your point, which is a really important one. You know, we're talking about 15 years of being in this. And the reason we wrote the piece was one, hey, there there really is something here now. Uh, but two, it is to just remind people that there are two sides of the investing business. There's the return business, and then there's the volatility to earn that return, right? And so what you're doing.
8:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): right now is you're able to earn a relatively healthy return. It's not as as much as the long-term play on equities, but it's relatively healthy and with a lot less volatility to do that. Now, I think uh there's a couple of interesting things here. Just because real yields are above 2%
8:20
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): does not mean that equities underperform. There was really no evidence of that. But if you look at a balanced portfolio, what you're getting is the ability to add value without uh by decreasing volatility, right? So there's an important part of that. One of the interesting things, and this does make a difference, one of the interesting things today is that at the time that we enacted this
8:40
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Tina policy through quantitative easing and really suppressed real rates, I mean, there were a time in the 2020s in particular where real rates were negative. You you were actually, it was costing you money to own these. things. And that's why the central banks owned them a lot more than, you know, than uh than John Bull or or Joe the Plumber did at the time, right? Because they were forced out on the risk spectrum. But
9:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): within that, you know, I think there you have to look at it where when that started, the free cash flow at enterprise value of the of the market, right? Basically the market yield, if you will, the stock markets yield, the SP's yield, um, was about four and a half percent. Today, it's right in line with what you're getting on these real
9:20
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): yields, right? So we're about two, two seventy-five uh on a free cash flow basis, real versus real for the equity markets. And so now you're really competing and saying, hey, I can take the SP, which by no means is cheap. We're not big valuation players around that, but by no means is it cheap. And I've got all the volatility that comes with it. or I can take the
9:40
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): real yield for the same return, right? And essentially be by contract, be guaranteed that I'm going to have that for the next five to 10 years. And that's where it really starts to become a trade-off. What it probably means, Meb, to be honest with you, people's hopes, desires, and frankly greed continue to persist until they start to take losses.
10:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And then they start to say, hey, this isn't worth it to me anymore. I need I need another idea. I need to go somewhere else. And so I don't think it really ends up being, you know, kind of a thunderclap. I think it ends up being kind of this gradual move as people show some frustration with equity returns. And clearly that hasn't been the case yet. But
10:20
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): maybe we're starting to see that with some of the unwind of of AI semiconductors and the like where people and frankly th I'm sure there's a fair contingent of people that probably shouldn't be in those names with the volatility and the uh and the valuations where they are that will start to then re-gravitate towards what is a more traditional allocation that makes more sense from a real
10:40
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): yield perspective. Aaron
10:41
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Powell
10:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): So you guys have this really cool five-year return by Gap Quintal. quintile. It goes back to 1953. And what's interesting about this is kind of you look at what percentage of the time stocks win and where equities look cheap relative to bonds. And in this current one, it's saying, hey, look,
11:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you know, it's the second, depending on your perspective, worse quote quart quartile quintile. But it's basically saying, hey, look, you only win When 63% of the time, and you know, the returns are muted versus when equities are. really cheap looking versus this gap.
11:18
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12:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): When you think about a concave strategy, right? So a concave strategy is as the value or the proportion of your investment goes up, your 60-40, right, at some point becomes, say, 70-30 because stocks have increased, then you sell off some of those stocks and you reallocate it right back to a 60-40 portfolio.
12:39
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um
12:40
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that that's uh in a lot of portfolios today, that's not the case. There's no there's no cushion, right? There's no there's nothing to reallocate. And so the point being that if you if you re-allocation, reallocate today back to a 60-40 or, you know, officially it'd be a 65-35 to kind of have that same, that same target. Well, if the SP does have a
13:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): 15 or 20% correction, right, you've got the capacity because you've got these real yields sitting there as ballast to then reallocate. So that that 65-35, if you have a deep enough decline, might go to 50-50, right? And then the next quarter or the next year, you say, okay, well, let's get ourselves back to that
13:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): 6040 portfolio. And that allows you to sell bonds at a gain and buy stocks at a cheaper price or a lower, uh, a lower valuation. Higher real rates are essentially a tightening of financial conditions, right? So that tightening of financial conditions, which is what that that quote unquote signal is, um, should then start to filter into the crowd. credit
13:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): quality or the performance of, say, corporate bonds, right? So as real rates are going higher, your financial conditions are starting to tighten. And then the next kind of shooter drop there tends to be spreads tend to widen, right? So corporates tend to suffer. Now we're seeing that with triple C's. I mean, clearly that's the fringiest of the fringe, but we're seeing that with triple C's. Um
13:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the double Bs are right at the threshold of a trigger for us. We look for basically a 200 basis point spread as kind of a hey, things are deteriorating. We're at about 196 here. So we're starting to see it infiltrate into the corporate market. And then from a style perspective, which I think is really interesting, it was a piece that we did this weekend, um, just following up on this, which was the
14:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): styles tend to shift more towards defensives, which makes an awful lot of sense, right? So if you're seeing tighter financial conditions, it tends to suppress six. cyclicality. Um, for us, cyclicality is pretty easily defined. It's got the highest, um, the highest correlation coefficient to forward GDP, right? So markets are leading uh the economic data. So we measure it in terms of
14:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): what's the the GDP next year and what's the correlation there. The highest correlations to forward GDP are tech, discretionary, and industrials, right? And so we've seen that obviously peel off. this summer, particularly for industrials and uh well, really for the whole stack, but we've had a pretty good rally as energies come in for discretionary. The
14:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): defensives are just the opposite of that. Interestingly enough, there's not a single sector that has a negative correlation to GDP. They're they're either flat or, you know, insignificant to positive. Um, but the least correlated would be healthcare staples and utilities, right? So higher wheel real yields tend to benefit those three areas, particularly at the expense of the previous three. And
15:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): then from a value growth quality perspective, beta, um, all those things tilt the way you would expect, right? Which is higher quality companies tend to do better. They tend to outperform uh with higher real yields. We see the same thing for value versus growth. We've had a big breakout in the value versus growth relative performance here recently. Um
15:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): so the there's more to it than just, hey, how do we think about allocation? You can also apply it to different uh styles um and uh and sectors as we go. So um, you know, it is a tightening of financial conditions. We're finally there. We'll see what Chair Warsh, you know, decides as we go forward with, you know, with the expectations for rate hikes
15:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): um and you know how far that goes. But the market's doing some of that bidding for them right now. here, which I think is important.
16:04
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): As
16:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you're thinking about corporate spreads, you mentioned a couple, the Bs and the C's.
16:09
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And I
16:10
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): was laughing because I actually didn't know that there was a CCC ETF. And there's a whole community of people that just love yield, whatever yield they can find, passive income, yield, max max, all these things, and covered calls, anything that just says. the word yield.
16:28
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
16:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): this sucker, I mean, the triple Cs
16:31
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): yield like
16:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): high
16:31
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): teens, I think, right now. And
16:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I'm just surprised
16:34
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the world hasn't, you know, the the
16:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Reddit
16:36
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and uh some of
16:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the forums haven't found the triple Cs
16:40
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): yet. But, you know,
16:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that's kind of par for the course
16:43
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): for them.
16:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): They kinda always have the big giant
16:45
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): yield
16:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): relative to uh the stuff
16:47
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that
16:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): doesn't default as much, I guess. Aaron
16:49
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Powell
16:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): They do. Uh Um there's a couple things to to watch there, and I'll be close, so don't, you know, don't quote me exactly on these. But
16:58
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): um
16:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): if you look at the you know the current triple C's, I think it's around twelve hundred basis points last I looked, but interestingly, uh the median is substantially lower than that. So what it tells you is that there's about there's about four, maybe it's five issuers that are really accounting for that stress, right? So, and obviously the
17:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): higher that yield, the the closer you are to default, right? Because it means the value of your bonds are going down, so I can get that high yield. The good news for the economy is that it's not broad-based in the CCC complex, right? It still is a relatively narrow focus of the triple C's, but it is deteriorating, right? So we are seeing that shift. So one of the things that we watched watch for is what's
17:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the breadth of say names that are trading 80% of par um, because that is, you know, kind of your dividing line of good credit versus shaky credit. And, you know, is this really going to pay me back? That number, right around 7% right here. So not terrible, but it is This expanding. Um so we're, you know,
17:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we're watching that. But most of I'd say a third of that. triple C spread is being driven by about 25 percent of the issuers that are that are out there, cable names. The hyperscalers, in fairness, the hyperscalers are in in that that cohort. So we you know we are seeing um the concern around the hyperscalers, they are
18:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you know in that uh in that elevated area that uh makes uh should make you a little bit more uncomfortable, right? So anything basically above a thousand basis points in spread is uh in that uh uncomfortable zone. But a third, I've got the data right here, a third of the um hyperscalers are
18:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): trading at um at their widests over the last two years. We are definitely seeing, you know, the credit markets and it the credit markets are doing exactly what they should do, right? Which is um they allocate capital based on price. and based on return. And, you know, that's what you expect. Bill Clinton back 20, well, it was 30 years ago now said, you know, what do you mean I'm um
18:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you know, my economic plans are beholden to a bunch of fucking bond traders, right? I mean that was a direct quote. Um and guess what? That's the way it should be, right? Uh you know, no politician, R or D should have, you know, the ability to just wave a magic wand and get things done. At some point you have to answer to somebody. And if it's not going to be Congress, then it'll be uh the Treasury having to go
19:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): out and sell those bonds. And so that's happening globally. And I think that'll be a really interesting take to see how that plays itself out, because clearly there is that premium here, and it's happening globally. So whether that's crowding out, whether that's fiscal problems, whatever the case may be, it is a uh the day after the election here today, right? So uh we'll see exactly some of these plans that people have, both on the R
19:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and
19:38
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the R.
19:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): D side, uh how those end up playing themselves out in the eyes of the bond market, because that will be uh you know kind of the final adjudicator of those uh those ideas and concepts.
19:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): You mentioned in passing some of the various stock sectors, how they relate to GDP. Y'all had a piece earlier in the year talking about the semiconductors, everyone's favorite industry. Talk to us a little bit about what you were writing about, what signals were firing back in April, springtime, and then walk us through to where the industry is today.
20:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): The bubble indicator is simply a doubling of an index. It has to be diverse, doubling of an index over or within a two-year period of time from a high, right? Not off a low. You can't say from a low, it doubles. You have to say from an all-time high, it doubles from there in a two-year period of time. Happened in the Hang Sang, happened biotechs, happened in semiconductors
20:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): recently, happened in China in 2008. Um, it's happened across the across the board. For commodities, we tend to, because it's a it's it's singular and single stocks, we tend to reduce that down to a six-month window, right? So it's more idiosyncratic. And what it simply means is the bubble signal just says,
20:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): hey, you're dealing in a very unique situation. And we generally, as practitioners of uh technical analysis and just the the the study of markets, don't tend to believe in V tops, right? In other words, things don't go straight up and straight back down. They they they do, that happens, but it's not how you
21:07
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): want to play the game persistently, right? I mean, we are nothing more than card counters at a blackjack table just doing this for the market. markets. And what we what we saw was when we get that bubble signal, now we have to rethink that V top formation because the probability actually shifts very dramatically towards a V top, right? So we'll
21:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): use more traditional breakdowns and crossover techniques for, you know, kind of any other market cycle or or you know, industry group, whatever, because the supply and demand kind of gets out of whack and then it's it starts to just, you know, slowly arc over.
21:41
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
21:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): a bubble, that's not the case. What we do know, because we've we've studied it, what we do know is that after the bubble triggers, if you said, um, you know, if I came to you and said, Meb, we got a bubble signal, you say, great, what am I supposed to do with that? I'd say the next three months, buy it. Like you own it for the next three months. It's unlikely it's going gonna to fall out of bed right here. So this is not a, hey,
22:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it's in the crosshair as you shoot. This is just, you know, be prepared. This thing is is gonna go, but it probably doesn't have more than a six-month shelf life. The th the first three months, 80% of the time, it's gonna be higher. Um, six months, more 50-50, but you're already rolling over. And so from that point, and we we coined a phrase this uh this summer called shoot 'em Them in the back,
22:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): right? We get the we get the bubble signal. You don't want to shoot it on the way up because you're gonna have the phone. FOMO that Sir Isaac Newton had, right? And at the very end, you're gonna be like, damn it, I gotta go back in. So you're better off just riding the thing as far as it goes. I can't tell you if that's gonna go up 80%. I can't tell you if it's gonna go up 20%. I just know that from the bubble signal,
22:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): wherever it peaks, it's gonna come all the way back down to that bubble signal. So you're basically on borrowed time, right? That entire time you're on borrowed time. So the best way you can maximize. the wealth is you shoot them in the back. You take it as far as you can. You understand you're not going to sell the top tick. You're going to sell it on the way down, but you're shooting them in the back and you're preventing the FOMO from
23:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): taking over. The only regret is that, you know, you might have taken a million dollar account to say 7 million. And by the time you shoot them in the back, you're left with six or you're left with five. And you say, what happened to my other $2 two million? dollars? Right. Well, the reality is if you were selling on the way up, you might have turned a million dollars into two million dollars,
23:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): or you might have turned it maybe into a little bit more than that than three. But your terminal wealth is going to be better by shooting it in the back than believing that you can pick the top on the way up. So that's what we saw back in, it was actually late April. I remember this because I was at Stagecoach, um, the the festival in Coachella. And we got the signal and I went on CBC and I,
23:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you know, I I mentioned
23:43
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it. Said,
23:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): look, three months, you got three months here, but after that, it's gonna be really dicey. Um, six months and they'll be lower. And, you know, we're gonna want to shoot them in the back. And um, you know, I think we peaked at the 22nd of June. So it wasn't, it was about two months um in in the semis. And the whole time, uh 85%. gross margins, these
24:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): are cheap, et cetera, et cetera. And my point around that is historically,
24:08
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): when
24:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you get into these situations, the market and the participants become what I call very one-dimensional, right? They're focused on one thing. In this case, it was the AI trade, but they even get more specific than that, right? It's memory, it's the margins, it's the capacity is is built out for the next three years. There's no way these can go down.
24:29
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And there's a famous uh Greek saying, the clitodies or something like that. I can never remember his name, but the saying is you never stand in the same river twice, right? And the idea is that by the time you come back, even the next day, the river's changed, you've changed, something's changed, that something is different. And it's the same thing with markets. And so one of the things that we
24:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): were pointing out in the summer is that, hey, well, while everybody's focused on the quote unquote cheapness and the valuation of these names, nobody's really paying attention to the credit side of this, right? That that was a relatively new phenomenon in the uh midsummer. And then more recently, in say August, we started seeing the Calci markets discount what happened last night, right? In other words,
25:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the probability of the Republicans holding the Senate started going from something that was close to 60%,
25:16
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): continued to deteriorate down to 40%. And as of Sunday, the Kelsi market had the blue wave ticking both houses at 70%. The market knows this, right? There's not a piece of data that's out there somewhere that collectively the market doesn't see, right? That just doesn't happen in our world or this business. And so while people were focused on, you know,
25:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): data center build-out and compute and everything else. the point was: hey, does the regulatory environment start to shift, right? In other words, you were standing in a different river in May and June than where we are in September. And whether that's because of compute, whether that's because of uh financing, whether it's because of regulatory, it's gonna be something else.
25:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So we're always trying to pay attention to when the market becomes very singularly focused and very one-dimensional. because that's when there's a lot of opportunities. And very simply, you know, I use the phrase when we get into those, think about what can go wrong, right? It's easy to whip ourselves up, have a couple of scotches, and you know,
26:16
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): be I'll see you're up 200% and raise you up 250, right? And you see that with price targets. It happens all the time. You see it with price targets where, you know, Cowan will come out and then Piper will. come out and then Bank America comes out and they're like, I'll see yours and I'll raise you. And it happens all the time. It's just the opposite. During uh during the the tariff tantrum,
26:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): our line was: look, people are one-dimensionally focused on tariffs and what they think of the neck the negative ramifications. Maybe, maybe not, but it's become so, so well embedded that we should be thinking about what can go right, not what can go wrong, right? And that's that worked out. Both of those have worked out very, very well. So for us, um we see it through momentum, we see
26:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it through the price performance of momentum,
26:58
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
26:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we see it through our bubble indicator. And those two things really tipped us off that said, hey, you know what? We're gonna step aside and be really willing to shoot them in the back as they crack. Um, because as you start to take momentum out, um, it just builds on itself. And that's what becomes most dangerous. And you know, we we we had a chart on Twitter that we did about that time,
27:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I think it was in June, where we showed the earnings estimates uh for the stocks uh back in uh back in 2000, right? So we we recompiled those estimates using point-in-time data. And the stocks was down 40% by the time you had your first earnings estimate revision downward, right? So you
27:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): know, when people were talking about, well, I just need to look at the revisions, and I'm like, that's not going to help you. That I I it feels like that's the right thing to do. And logically, quote unquote, logically, that makes sense. But for God's sakes, just go back and look at the data. That it doesn't work. Like the analysts who are using those estimates are falling
27:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): victim to the same psychological traps that are out there, right? So that's where. we where we were. You know, are we where are we today?
28:06
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Are
28:07
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we midway through it? I think we're probably midway through it, maybe a little bit more, but it's gonna be more time than price, in my view, at this point, which is you you tend to kind of elongate these things. You crack them. We haven't had the first revisions downward yet that I've seen anyway. And so you'll have that. Then it kind of becomes a feeding frenzy on the revisions downward.
28:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And again, these regulatory issues or whatever it becomes will start to work their way in. And then you'll start to get into a disgust phase, right? And that's where you start to see outflows and ETFs. That's where you start to see the option data, you know, uh pressing on the downside, not looking for the escape to the upside. You'll start to see those shifts take place. And you know, we've
28:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): taken the sentiment to something that's more neutral. but we certainly haven't seen the washout. And that usually is a reflection of both time and price. And I think we've had enough of the price to maybe get there, but the time element is um has not drug itself out long enough. And if you were to script it, you know, and look at it historically, it's about a 13-month window. So
29:07
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that puts us in July of next year.
29:09
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): There,
29:10
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you know, you could drive a truck through that with the deviations, but I think it's fair to say it's a 2027 event. not a 2026 event.
29:16
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): You guys did a kind of a companion paper talking about dynamics of equity bubbles. And I think that one was talking a little bit about individual stocks. Do you see it firing on a certain amount of stocks? And this was interesting to me because long-only managers, say you're Vanguard or say you're somebody who wants short exposure, this is a pretty cool idea.
29:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And you can talk about it. But the way that I was thinking about it. is, you know, hey, maybe instead of just letting these run, I don't have to outright sell them or short them. But maybe I'm going to stop rebalancing or start stop reinvesting my dividends into these companies almost like as a signal like, hey, this has gone pretty far. Maybe let's uh maybe let's not put new money into
29:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): this idea. Also think it's kind of interesting from a short edge, too. Uh talk to us a little bit about that on the individuals'. as well.
30:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah. I mean, I'd love to be able to look at it from a you know put perspective. The problem is the volatility is so damn high that you just pay, even if you're doing it on the downside, you're just paying through the nose. I mean, the best way to do it, it just carries a ton of risk. And you know, you just have to you know I'm always uh watching over my shoulder for that, would be you know, using a call, selling a call
30:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): to create a synthetic short, right? So you capture the upside with the volatility and then you use that to offset. Um, clearly, you know, if it's in that first three to six months, the risk is that you get the one out of out of eight that just keeps going and it just, you know, it's gonna steamroll you. So you gotta be a little careful with that. But there's enough of the other ones that the downside is pretty good. So
30:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we've looked for ways to kind of try to chisel, chisel the edges off of that and and find, you know, find names. But a lot of kind of small modular reactors. reactor types, the the uranium names, uh oh the the um
30:56
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
30:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the quantum computing names, right? These things were all triggering a year ago. Gold triggered actually a year ago in October for us, and you know, almost perfect to script, right? The next three months it went up, it cracked in in January, and nobody's cared ever since, right? Like that that's actually getting to the point where there's enough apathy where I'm like, okay, that one's going to be interesting. If we can
31:16
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): break gold out, like we've we've kind of done the cleanse. We've gotten all the way back to where the bubble signal was. People have lost interest. Um, we're seeing the the outflows. They're not extreme yet, but we certainly have done enough, you know, enough damage that if it starts to turn, you know, if I I feel like most of that damage has been done. But yeah, there's there's definitely opportunities to to hedge
31:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): around the other ones to wait for those crap. cracks. And there's a long way to fall with those names when they when they happen. It's a pretty good system to be, you know, sniffing around and looking for names, at least to your point, you know, to keep the FOMO uh in your pocket and and not uh not say, okay, I'm gonna buy into, you know, whatever the the latest uh
31:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the latest and greatest is. The 18-month 18 month return tends to be pretty poor on average for those names. So definitely be careful there.
32:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): You guys put out some some uh you know more current research just looking like like what's going on in the world. So open mic, talk to us a little bit about um what what your latest weekly piece says, what's going on, what what should people be thinking about, looking about, look what looks good, what looks terrible, all that good stuff.
32:22
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): If
32:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): you're not already using the idea farm, do yourself a favor. We hand handpick the best investing research and podcasts on the internet. Stuff usually locked down behind $100,000 institutional paywalls and post it every single day. Bookmark theideafarm.com and check it out daily. Sign up for the free Sunday newsletter. I get
32:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): the highlights straight into your inbox. Either way, no cost. Check it out, the ideafarm.com.
32:49
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We
32:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): always start with a tape. And that's not, I didn't get into, you know, I didn't get into business. I didn't come out of technical analysis school, right? There was no such thing at the time. I'm I'm a I'm a born-bred fundamentalist, and you know, that was the way it worked. I moved to the dark side uh because of, you know, being disenfranchised with just, you know, how the fundamentals really played out
33:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): practically. And maybe it's my lack of patience, you know. Um, but it was always difficult. philosophically to know, and I don't I don't think it's knowable, you know. And and you've been in the business long enough where people are like, what's your highest conviction idea? What's your highest conviction idea? And I'm like, well, what's what's the difference between conviction and stubbornness, right? It's outcome. That's the
33:29
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): only thing that's different, right? So, you know, am I an idiot or do I have conviction? It's the same thing. It's just the outcome, right? So if you missed something, you were stubborn. If you happen to get it right and the market agreed, you know, it was it was conviction. There's nothing wrong with with having conviction in an idea, but I think you have to be malleable and
33:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): pliable and uh not dogmatic in this business. You have to be pragmatic. And and the technical analysis side is the only the only thing that I've found Down to allow you to really be pragmatic and stress test your ideas almost on a daily basis. Now this kind of this illusion of control, people want to buy the bottom tick and sell the top tick, and that's you know, that's great if you can do
34:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it, but that just doesn't happen that often. Um, and so I think you have to be really careful with that. And it's just easier, and all the data that we've gone through and and and we've done hundreds of studies, you know, up is good, down is bad, just to say it very frankly and and and uh easily. So buying stocks going down is usually not a great idea. Um selling
34:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): stocks going up is usually not a great idea. You want to do just the opposite.
34:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Well, even going back to your piece earlier on the uh fundamental with equities versus rates, there was a trend component where you kind of like thinking about confirmation, thinking about how, you know, what is the trend Been doing on on equities as well as a as an idea. So I love to hear that because uh
34:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): definitely definitely feels familiar to probably a lot of our listeners on things Meb Meb might say.
34:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Thanks for bringing that up, actually, because um that was an important part of the discovery. I I kind of forget about it because that's just what I do. That's my standard operating procedure, right? But so just to go back and help the listeners, the the difference between when do you allocate, right? So you have the you have the real yields at 2% plus, which says that buy. bonds are a value. All right. Well, once you get to 2%,
35:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): should you do it? Or, you know, is there a better trigger mechanism? And we found hands down, statistically, you know, significant that you're better just letting it go. So two on its way to three or three on its way to four, whatever it is, just let it go until you start to see it actually roll back over. And then the you have the technical confirmation, and then you start to make those shifts
35:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that the markets finally kind of. given up on it, right? And that's a much, much better um allocation process than it is just, you know, using some hard number that, you know, might may or may not feel random.
35:48
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um,
35:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): but having the assurance that the market is now on your side makes a big, big difference. And so we really, and that's that's two-thirds of the reason why we started Renmac 15 years ago, was um, you know, taking that experience that we had learned at Merrill at Lehman Brothers. at ISI, et cetera, and kind of honing the process and then just saying, hey, now let's build our own database. Let's make all this
36:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): stuff ours. Let's make it proprietary. Let's, you know, let's just be able to, you know, almost have this academic lab that we're just testing and having fun with. And hey, it just happens to work and make people money and they pay us to do it. Okay, that's that's a pretty good, it's a pretty good fun business. I enjoy that. And so that's you know, that's kind of the genesis of the whole thing. But what we've found is that, hey, when
36:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we bring in other things, right, um, that that can complement this, and we call them conditional factors. It's become uh is become more, I think recently colloquial known as regime analysis, right? So what happens in these different regimes, and you could say real yields above 2% is a regime that's different than real yields goods below 2%. That's fine.
36:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Um we call those conditions, but it doesn't matter. It's just semantics. And so one of the things like right now that we that we're always looking at and our clients uh really enjoy is um this matrix that we call our market cycle clock. And the market cycle clock is really a juxtaposition between inflation on the y-axis
37:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and uh growth on the x-axis. And there's a bunch of different ways that we measure this stuff. We don't use CPI. Um We use
37:16
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): a bunch of proprietary inputs that, you know, we we look at the the um the dependent variable ends up being the SP versus GDP. So when we we do that, um, you know, today we're actually in a very high inflationary zone, uh, top third back to the mid-1940s. So we have a ton of data on this. Um, and our growth is kind of right at that
37:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): top, uh, that top third, right, somewhere between 60 and 60. 65 percent, somewhere in that zone. And when we look at the that zone, we break it up into nine quadrants, so three at the top and three along the the sides, we find that the historical annualized return for the SP in this zone is the worst of of any. Now, the good news is it's still positive, but
37:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it's only positive by like 40 basis points or something. So it's not, you know, this is not where we would just given the inflation and growth. um data, we would not be leaning into an equity call here. Again, we're market players, we're trend followers, we're not selling it just because of that condition, but we're attuned to it. And so what that means is we can tighten all these things
38:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): up, right? We can say, hey, we're gonna our frequency or our trigger levels are gonna be tighter than they otherwise would be because we know that these underlying conditions are so poor. Well, guess what? In this zone, it's also the zone where you would expect high real rates, right? So all of a sudden we can start piecing together some of these other areas that say, hey, when this happens, these other things
38:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): happen. And oh, look, that's happening too. And this is it. So we can stack these up, which says not so much when do we do it, because that's we're gonna rely on technicals to do that. But when we do it, how many chips are we pushing into the middle, right? And that's what that's that allows us to do. So the conditional factors, the regime analysis tells us how much to bet,
38:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): how you know how big we're swinging when we're swinging. And then the trigger is how much we're, you know, or I'm sorry, the timing of when we're going to make that. So, you know, in a in a you know, uh a more analogous way, the conditions are how much fuel's in the tank, right? And then the technicals are where's the
39:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): spark come in, right? So I can have a bunch of fuel. If I don't have a spark, there's nothing to do, right? But when I have a lot of fuel and I have a spark, there's a lot to do. And, you know, probably a pretty big bang that can go with it. So that's how we think about it. And again, the market cycle clock where it is, which is consistent with higher rates on the back end, Again, a flattening curve,
39:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): higher real rates, like all these things are playing. What's interesting. is also it's the best zone for energy. We've been there for uh six, eight months in this market cycle clock, which is again a testament to why we use the technicals, because if we just used the market cycle clock, we would have been a seller in probably February, and that would have been way too premature. But it did say,
39:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): hey, you know, what works here is energy and healthcare works here. And what doesn't work are materials and what doesn't work are just discretionary names.
40:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): You made an important point that is often overlooked, which is position sizing. You know, we'll we'll talk to people all the time and they'll hem and haw and spend a ton of research on some decision. And then you ask them, oh, like what percentage of your portfolio is this or something? And and you know, and it's like a meaningless decision.
40:24
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Like, why even spend the time on this? And so think thinking about that, that particularly a lot of the, you know, systematic quants and speaking of card counting, you know, the position sizing is really everything. You know, you have the odds and you have the setup, but also how much to bet and win, I think, is is is a big key
40:44
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): to figuring all of this out, at least feels like it.
40:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): It is, you know, we we employ the Kelly criteria with things. Um, so noise to signal ratios. Obviously, the conditions go into, you know, the parameters of how big can it be or how small can it be to your point of being irrelevant, like why are we even bothering if that's the case. And then you volatility adjust, right? So what you're trying to do
41:06
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): is you're trying to make sure that your positions, whatever you're getting out of those positions, are based on those inputs, not based on beta, right? So we try to take the the the beta and neutralize that or the volatility and neutralize that. And I think that's one thing. I mean, look, Citadels, all
41:26
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the quants are d are certainly doing that, but I think the average to above average investor, call it the, you know, the A minus and down investor. Um a lot of there are very a lot of very good B plus and B B investors. But to really volatility adjust it and say, hey, do I have the same proportional risk in each one of these? Um that that gets overlooked, I think, um, more
41:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): than it should. Particularly in this day and age, it's very easy to to do that and determine, you know, how big a how big a swing you're taking that's going to be neutral across the book.
41:56
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Aaron Powell
41:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Anything else the tape that tape's saying to you right now that stands out? Anything you're looking at that's particularly non-consensus, exciting, interesting, different?
42:06
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Well, I do think the um
42:09
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you know,
42:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we haven't had follow-through from Bitcoin or crypto. I'm not philosophically a huge bull or bearer either way. I've just kind of play it with trends. It did definitely diverge um after Treasury Secretary Bessant You know, mentioned kind of twisting the curve a little bit, buying, uh, buying the back end off-the-run securities. to try to tighten things up, et cetera. And you know,
42:29
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): had both gold and and crypto rally. Gold gave it all back, crypto didn't, which was interesting. And so, um, you know, that's that's something that we're keeping our fingers on the pulse of. The trends are positive there, uh we haven't really had much follow-through since then. So, you know, we're watching that pretty closely. But that's kind of an early uh potentially burgeon uh trend change, bullish trend change. So
42:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we're we're we're keeping our eye on that. Um, you've got the seasonality here. November actually has become, you know, the best month uh from a probabilistic standpoint, about a 77% uh chance historically of probable uh positive returns with about a 260 basis point return, which which is about uh 3x what the normal monthly return
43:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): is on any given month. So it's a it's a good month. And you've got that seasonality going into the end of the year. And that's the that's the tricky part for us because you got that tactically happening while we have structurally more of these things that, you know, suggest to us that we want to be thinking about that not as as robustly or wide eyed as I think the consensus has been for most of twenty twenty six. We'll
43:29
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): play it. Um, but um we're gonna watch that very carefully and look for natural points of resistance where things should fail. And if they do, we'll, you know, we'll be hammering those and uh looking to uh to make those adjustments.
43:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): One of the things you talked about, which we haven't covered that much on the show, but it has been an increasingly larger asset class strategy, whatever bucket you want to put it into.
43:53
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And that's private credit.
43:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah, so private credit's got a long history to it. R ri really came out of the GFC Dodd-Frank um when the banks typically would, you know, take on these
44:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): loans and hold them on the on the books as
44:12
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): assets. And the Dodd-Frank basically said you can't do that anymore. We're done with that. And so it created this entire side hustle business of private credit, which is kind of shadow banking, right? So the traditional corporate lenders uh would became less entrepreneurial, very spreadsheet, you know, things had to be exact. And these private credit guys, you know, uh
44:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): saw that opportunity, that niche and and took it over. A lot of those were funded through private equity, right? So private equity firms now have uh huge, massive private credit arms, which are frankly bigger than their private equity arms in most of the cases. And the idea was that, hey, we can lend out, you know, pretty uh efficiently and without a lot of the red tape. And we can
44:52
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): bundle these things, we can securitize them, we can do a lot of the things that the banks were doing before.
44:57
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): They
44:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): did it for mortgages. That's what ended up being a big problem. It's not to say that that's the same because it's
45:02
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): not.
45:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): But they could apply some of those same techniques, right? In private credit and then go off and and sell those Um at really healthy spreads and in uh into the marketplace. The question is, you know, when you do this. now, um there's some opacity to it. How do you market what's the value of that credit?
45:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And uh is it still good? Uh do you get paid in kind? In other words, hey, I'll, you know, I'll gladly pay you Tuesday for a cheeseburger today kind of thing, right? And that that's been happening. Um extend, uh pretend and extend is, you know, uh a uh uh an axiom that's that's developed. here. So there's there's a lot of opacity. And
45:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the first place, just because there's so much growth in private credit, whenever I see growth in financials for an extended period of time, anything financial, you have to worry about because that growth becomes kind of the mantra, right? People are trying to grow, grow, grow, grow the book. And well, to grow the book, what do you do? You lower your standards, right? And so they they tend to lower the the standards. Um, it's
46:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): become very complex. competitive, right? So get these deals. Um, I'll offer you better terms, we'll take these covenant, we'll call them covenant lights,
46:09
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you know,
46:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the collateral, et cetera. Um, and we saw it last year with um first brands. There's a couple that, you know, have have since imploded with uh, you know, three, four X, the collateral overcollateralized, over collateralized, right? That they thought didn't it, you know, didn't exist, or people driving their cars to Mexico and then
46:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): shop shops. I mean, some of that stuff was just like you can't make this stuff up. It was great. Anyway, so there's that that opacity. And that started to that started to come under strain. Now a lot of these are floating rates. A lot of these were struck back in the SPAC days, right? When when real rates were zero. And so these companies have been kind of going along, going along, going along,
46:45
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): but
46:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): they're paying floating rates. And as these rates and as these real rates start to kick in, it's becoming more and more burdensome.
46:51
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): for
46:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): them to make those payments. And so in where we normally see it maybe in the in the public side through uh the triple C spreads, or we'd see it in the banking system uh through loan write downs, we've got this more opaque structure over here that, you know, has uh has a few more um
47:10
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
47:10
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): levers to pull that we don't know exactly what's going on. And so there's ways that we measure that.
47:16
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
47:16
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): big way for us is look at the gates, right? So if you're if you're a private credit investor and you say, hey, I want, you know, I want my money,
47:24
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): well,
47:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): they put up gates. And the gates are you can, you know, you can have a 5% redemption, or there's different structures, but most of it was around 5%. And a lot of these were seven, 10, ten, uh, 12% twelve percent asking for their money. And they said, no, we're just going to give you the five and wait in line, right? So what that did is kind of solve the old problem, which is
47:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I don't have a solvency problem, I have a liquidity problem, right? And it's like, they're the same thing. If you know if your liquidity problem goes on long enough, you have a solvency problem. Well they put up the gates and that that helps that, you know, to to relieve some of that. So we've seen evidence of that because of the pay in kind and some of these, these mechanisms
48:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that they uh that they employ. It's not a disaster, but it's it's turning in the wrong way. And that's, you know, that's where we'd expect it first, because that was the gross side of the business, um, it's the ones that should have the immediate impact on the higher rates. Um, it's the lower, the lower tier credit quality. And you're seeing it in the the BizD, which is the you know, the
48:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the private ETF, the the um business development company. companies is what the many of them are known as. You're seeing it in the private equity side, the PSP, which is a private equity uh ETF, right? Those have been under pressure. Um and so the the market is confirming what we're seeing in, you know, in some of that research that we did.
48:42
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
48:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that was done, that piece came out in the middle of of April. Um and and I I will say, you know, almost every data point that we've been monitoring and we like to do this, we'll we'll write a report and say, hey, here's where we are today, here's where we think the problems could be. We might be wrong, but here's the path, right? We we think the path is 60%, we're going down this path.
49:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): We think it's 30% this path and 10% this path. And and then we'll just keep updating that, At right? Um, maybe weekly, maybe uh monthly, whatever the case may be. And that path, which was kind of a slow credit cycle when we started, is now a turn, right? A real credit cycle turn. It's not
49:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): systemic, it's not, you know, uh recession type of GFC type of, you know, this is this is a big problem. But it's something that's kind of festering and just is a is a scab that won't heal, if you will. And so the question is, does that get worse? Is it is it um cauterized? and and ring-fenced? And right now it seems to
49:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): be stably deteriorating, is the way I would uh I would put it. But it's cons again, it's consistent with a lot of these other things that we look at, um, which is I think the business cycle is is starting to turn or trying to turn. And it's been um it's been slow in the making, mostly because AI has is has kept it going. So we'll see how long that that lasts.
50:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I'm gonna going to use that phrase at some point. Stably deteriorating.
50:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): The interesting part about the private equity, private credit, excuse me, private credit is,
50:08
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
50:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): know, particularly for all the advisors and people who've been allocating the past five, 10, 15 years, this has been new to them. You know, I don't know that they've seen a
50:18
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): kind
50:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): of a full credit cycle. Like I, you know, they're going to gonna kind of not really know how to behave, at least, or at least it might come as a big surprise. You mentioned some of the gating stuff going on, but uh, you know, the the steadily deteriorating, stably deteriorating may just turn into deteriorating at some point if there's a lehman-esque moment. Um,
50:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you know, what what what do you look for as this as a signal for that?
50:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): We go to the public markets, right? So those triple Cs are important, and then the breadth of that, right? So we mentioned it's 25% twenty-five percent is really kind of accounting for most of it. We'll look for the percentage. that are below 80% apart, right? And if that's building out, which it is, it's slow, but it's building out, then you're getting into that or y you have to ask your question. It's it's always hard to know exactly where it is,
51:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): but have we pushed the rock past the peak, right? And you know, you know on the way up that's a that's a hell of a burden to be pushing that rock. But once you get it over that peak, the burden's a lot harder to stop that rock, right? And that's what you have to worry about is where's that peak? So I feel like we're we're still moving towards that peak. Um we haven't crested that hill yet, but that's the that's the concern.
51:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): There's a refinance wall that's hitting more 2029. So that's still out there a little bit. But you have to worry about all this paper that was created when rates were, you know, 3%, 5% maybe for a loan that are now gonna reset at 10. Um, you know, that's uh that that's a come to Jesus moment for a lot of companies. And then you worry about the
51:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): disruption, right? I mean, we've seen it with a SaaSpocalypse, and a lot of that credit was was based in uh in the software names, and that's one of the reasons why they were under such such pressure, because uh not only was there risk of the business slowing down, but it actually became existential. Like, do you do you still need to have this software company when you know you could claw
52:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): code it and in after in
52:02
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that?
52:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): afternoon, maybe. Um and so, you know, all these things kind of uh come together. And you know, right now that confluence, that river is not swelling, uh it's running fast, but it's not swelling, you know, to the dangerous point, but we're keeping an eye on it.
52:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): We always ask the first-time guests, uh, what you know, what's been your most memorable investment? You could you could uh frame this one as is also your most memorable call as well.
52:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Well, look, I have a lot of good friends from Lehman Brothers,
52:28
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
52:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I love that place. It was a really fun entrepreneurial place. And this was not uh this was not planned. I was I was tired of kind of some of the things that were going on, and I'm not going to sit here and take credit and tell you that I thought it was going to go to zero, because that's not a true story. Uh I wasn't happy with the way things were were being run and in in kind of the overtake of fixed income into
52:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): inequities, equities, et cetera. My resignation letter was the day of the high of the stock price at Lehman Brothers. So that was uh that the in retrospect that felt pretty good. Now it was not for all the right reasons, but that was um that was a pretty good trade uh for maybe not all the right reasons.
53:03
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): That
53:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): happens too. You can be lucky in this business as well as good.
53:06
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Listeners, uh Jeff and Ren Mack Matt crew have been extremely kind to give us a QR code that will lead you to some of their research
53:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Um, where also can they find uh the domain? We'll put it in the show note links, but uh what's the best place to find y'all and what you're up to?
53:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Well, if you, you know, love my uh lyrical voice, we do a podcast uh not as uh not as well known as yours, but the three of us, Steve Padlock, who handles our Washington policy, Neil Dutta, who handles our economics and obviously I do market strategy. We get together for about 40. minutes on Fridays and shoot the poo about what's going on for the week
53:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and kind of what we're watching and what's happening. So it's a it's a decent way to kind of keep up with our thoughts. Uh we call it off script, run back offscript. You can find it on YouTube or Spotify or Apple. And it legit is off script. We don't have any, you know, any idea when we're going in. I mean, obviously we've been writing research and talking to clients all week, but um there's no uh there's no format other than
54:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): uh you know trying to tease out of each other uh a few barbs and uh and maybe some wisdom. Maybe.
54:10
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And lastly, renmac.com, r-en-m-ac.com. Um the biggest compliment I can give you, Jeff, is y'all's research often um
54:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): our ideas, thought processes, systems that I've never seen before, right? So much. in our world, you know, say, oh, I've seen this chart, I've seen this way of thinking a million times. Uh what's refreshing about reading what y'all do is often it's a totally unique thought process or spin on something. Uh so uh kudos and thanks so much for joining
54:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): us today.
54:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Thank you for that Meb. I really appreciate it. And uh you know, maybe it's just the uh uh the schizophrenic nature of how we think about the world.
54:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): That nobody has the same curse that we do. But uh I yeah, I have had clients say, Look, nobody does what you guys do, and that's why we find it refreshing. And I'm like, I I think that's actually a compliment. Thank you very much. So I appreciate it.
55:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Different perspective sometimes from the porch and tell your ride all the way to Connecticut and in between. Uh thanks for joining us today, and let's do it again soon.
55:10
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Sounds great. Thanks for having me, Meb.
55:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Podcast listeners will put
55:15
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): post show
55:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): notes to today's conversation
55:16
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): at Mebfavor.com
55:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): forward slash podcast. If you love the show, if you hate it, shoot us feedback at the MebFavorShow.com. We love to read the reviews. Please review us on iTunes and subscribe the show anywhere good podcasts are found. Thanks for listening, friends, and good investing.
55:37
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
55:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): preceding content. is provided solely for informational and educational purposes and reflects information available as of the day created. Nothing contained herein should be construed as investment advice, a recommendation, or a solicitation to purchase or sell any security or to engage in any investment strategy. The suitability of any investment or strategy depends on an investor's specific circumstances, financial situation,
55:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): objectives, and risk tolerance. Any views or opinions expressed by third parties are their own. Such opinions are subject to
56:02
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
56:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): change without notice. While information presented has been obtained from sources believed to be reliable, no representation or warranty is made regarding its accuracy, completeness, or adequacy. Past performance is not indicative of future results. Investing involves risk, including the potential loss of principle.
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