The Gemini Brief - Investment Deep Dives

Matson's Jones Act moat faces political and macro risks as CLX earnings normalize

57 min Listen to the original Episode page
Maritime ShippingJones ActMatson IncContainer FreightGeopolitical RiskCapital AllocationTax EfficiencyValuation

Summary

Speakers analyze Matson Inc (MATX), highlighting its regulatory moat under the Jones Act which creates high capital costs but limits competition. They note that while the domestic business is protected, the transpacific CLX service drives recent earnings volatility and is vulnerable to baseline rate collapses. The discussion covers Matson's strong balance sheet, tax-efficient capital construction fund, and share buybacks, but warns that current valuations assume permanent geopolitical disruption. Speakers conclude that the stock may be fully valued given the risks of global container oversupply and potential erosion of Jones Act protections.

Episode sections

  1. 0:00 – 3:07

    The Jones Act Moat and Capital Costs

    Speakers introduce Matson's domestic shipping business, highlighting the Jones Act's requirement for U.S.-built, owned, and crewed vessels. This creates a regulatory moat but results in ship construction costs of ~$333M in the U.S. versus $75-120M in Asia, and crew costs of $11,500/day versus $2,000/day globally.

  2. 3:07 – 8:38

    Barriers to Entry and Market Consolidation

    The Jones Act limits large U.S. shipyards to four, with 35-42 month build times. The Jones Act-qualified fleet shrank from ~250 ships in the 1980s to 91 today. Public Jones Act companies consolidated from eight in 2008 to three, leaving Matson as the only pure-play public container shipper.

  3. 8:38 – 10:42

    Duopoly Dynamics and Failed Competition

    Matson holds a duopoly in Hawaii with Pasha Hawaii (96% capacity) and in Alaska with Todd Maritime. In Kodiak, Dutch Harbor, and Guam, Matson is a monopoly. Todd Maritime abandoned a 2017 plan to enter Hawaii due to the prohibitive $1-1.5B capital requirement and entrenched competition.

  4. 10:42 – 13:57

    Domestic Margin Constraints and Political Risk

    Despite monopoly power, Matson's pre-pandemic ROIC was 9.9-11.9% and operating margins were 6.2-7.4%. High capital costs (depreciation, crew) absorb pricing power. Matson self-regulates prices to avoid political backlash in Hawaii, where 80-90% of goods are imported by sea.

  5. 13:57 – 18:58

    Transpacific CLX Service and Speed Advantage

    The China Long Beach Express (CLX) generates ~50% of earnings but carries volatility. Matson competes on speed (10 days Shanghai-Long Beach vs. 14-18 days standard) and a dedicated C60 terminal with sub-25-minute truck turn times, positioning itself as a premium alternative to air freight for time-sensitive goods.

  6. 18:58 – 21:38

    Pandemic Boom and Post-Pandemic Bust

    During the pandemic (2021-2022), spot rates surged from $1,500 to >$20,000, driving Matson's FY2022 operating income to $1.28B and ROIC >70%. In 2023, rates normalized, and operating profits fell 73% to $348M.

  7. 21:38 – 24:11

    Geopolitical Echo: Red Sea and Tariffs

    FY2024 and FY2025 earnings rebounded due to two shocks: Red Sea rerouting (absorbing 10-12% of global capacity) and tariff front-loading (threatened 145% rates by April 2025). Matson posted $551M operating income in FY2024 and $13.81 EPS in FY2025.

  8. 24:11 – 25:20

    Current Market Conditions and Management Claims

    CEO Matt Cox claims guidance is independent of Red Sea conditions. However, as of March 2026, the Shanghai Containerized Freight Index is down 33% YoY, and spot rates for 40ft containers to the U.S. West Coast have plummeted to ~$1,460, below break-even for many carriers.

  9. 25:20 – 25:53

    Vulnerability of Premium Pricing to Baseline Rates

    Speaker_1 argues that Matson's premium pricing is anchored to baseline spot rates, meaning a collapse in baseline rates drags down Matson's revenue. Speaker_0 agrees that shippers will not pay high premiums when standard capacity is cheap.

  10. 25:53 – 27:35

    Earnings Normalization and Capital Allocation

    Speaker_1 claims Matson's 2023 earnings were $348 million, significantly lower than the pandemic peak of $13.81 EPS, attributing the peak to Red Sea and tariff tailwinds. Speaker_0 highlights Matson's disciplined capital allocation, avoiding destructive acquisitions or fleet orders during peak cash flow.

  11. 27:35 – 29:36

    Share Repurchases and EPS Mechanics

    Speaker_1 details Matson's $1.2-1.3 billion buyback program (Aug 2021-Sep 2025) at $87-92/share, retiring 30-32% of shares. This mechanically lifted baseline EPS by ~41% even if net income remained flat.

  12. 29:36 – 31:20

    Capital Construction Fund (CCF) and Tax Efficiency

    Speaker_1 explains the CCF, a tax-advantaged fund holding $532.7 million by end-2025, used to prefund the $1 billion Aloha class ship fleet without debt. This shields profits from 21% corporate tax but creates a deferred tax liability.

  13. 31:20 – 33:34

    Hidden Assets and Deferred Tax Liability

    Speaker_1 notes the SSAT joint venture is carried at $84.1 million book value despite owning seven West Coast terminals, representing hidden value. Conversely, Matson faces a $693 million deferred tax liability due to CCF usage and accelerated depreciation.

  14. 33:34 – 56:48

    Balance Sheet Strength and Dividend Policy

    Matson's leverage ratio is 0.5x debt-to-EBITDA, described as a fortress balance sheet. The dividend is $1.44/share (10.4% payout ratio), with management preferring buybacks as a more tax-efficient capital return method.

Assets discussed

AssetKindStanceContext
Matson, Inc.MATXequityneutralExactly. And they are centered entirely on one of the most fascinating logistics companies in the world, Madsen Inc. They trade under the ticker Madsen X.

“Stance” is how the speakers talked about the asset, not a recommendation.

Claims worth verifying

A new state-of-the-art container ship built in Philadelphia costs roughly $333 million, compared to $75-120 million in South Korea or China.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·0:26

How to verify: Compare shipbuilding cost estimates from U.S. shipyards (e.g., Fincantieri Marinette Marine) with Asian shipyards (e.g., Hyundai Heavy Industries) via industry reports like Lloyd's List or Clarksons Research. For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The Jones Act requires vessels to be built in the U.S., owned by U.S. citizens, fly the U.S. flag, and be crewed by U.S. citizens.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·4:02

How to verify: Review the text of the Merchant Marine Act of 2026 (46 U.S.C. § 501) on the U.S. Government Publishing Office website. For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

There are only four qualified U.S. commercial shipyards capable of building large ocean-going vessels: Hanwa Philly Shipyard, General Dynamics Masco, C trium Amphels, or Bollinger.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·5:10

How to verify: Check the U.S. Maritime Administration (MARAD) list of active shipyards and their capabilities, or industry publications like American Shipper. For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Building a ship in the U.S. takes 35-42 months, compared to 18 months in Asia.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·5:30

How to verify: Review shipbuilding lead times reported by shipyards (e.g., Bollinger, Fincantieri) and Asian yards (e.g., Samsung Heavy Industries) in industry press releases or analyst notes. For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

U.S. crew costs are ~$11,500 per day, compared to ~$2,000 for foreign-flagged ships.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·6:46

How to verify: Analyze Matson's 10-K filings for crewing cost disclosures or compare maritime labor union wage scales (e.g., Marine Engineers' Beneficial Association) with global crewing rates. For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

The Jones Act-qualified fleet shrank from ~250 ships in the 1980s to ~91 today.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·7:57

How to verify: Review U.S. Maritime Administration (MARAD) data on the U.S.-flag fleet size over time. For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Publicly listed Jones Act companies shrank from eight in 2008 to three today.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·8:22

How to verify: Review historical SEC filings and company profiles for major U.S. domestic shippers (e.g., Matson, TOTE, Pasha, Crowley) to identify public vs. private status. For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

Matson's FY2022 consolidated operating income was $1.28 billion.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·20:12

How to verify: Check Matson Inc's (MATX) Q4 2026 or Full Year 2026 earnings release and 10-K filing on SEC EDGAR. For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

Matson's FY2024 operating income was $551 million and FY2025 EPS was $13.81.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·21:33

How to verify: Check Matson Inc's (MATX) Q4 2026 and Full Year 2026 earnings releases and 10-K filings on SEC EDGAR. For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

As of March 2026, the Shanghai Containerized Freight Index is down 33% YoY and spot rates for a 40ft container from Shanghai to the U.S. West Coast are ~$1,460.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·24:50

How to verify: Check the Shanghai Shipping Exchange's SCFI index data and freight rate reports from carriers or brokers (e.g., Drewry, Xeneta) for March 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Matson's premium rate is dragged down proportionally if baseline spot rates collapse from $4,000 to $1,000-$1,400.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·25:38

How to verify: Check Matson's quarterly earnings reports and shipping rate indices (e.g., Shanghai Containerized Freight Index) to correlate premium pricing with baseline rates. For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Matson earned $348 million in 2023.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·25:53

How to verify: Review Matson Inc's 2023 Annual Report (10-K) filed with SEC EDGAR. For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

Matson's earnings peak of $13.81 per share is elevated by $150-200 million due to Red Sea and tariff tailwinds.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·26:06

How to verify: Analyze Matson's segment reporting in 10-K/10-Q filings to isolate geographic revenue impacts. For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

Matson deployed $1.2-1.3 billion on buybacks between August 2021 and September 2025 at an average price of $87-92/share.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·27:41

How to verify: Review Matson's Statements of Cash Flows and Share Repurchase activity in SEC filings (10-K/10-Q). For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

Matson retired 30-32% of outstanding shares, lifting baseline EPS by ~41%.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·28:37

How to verify: Calculate share count reduction from Matson's balance sheet data in SEC filings. For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

CCF balance was $532.7 million by end of 2025.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·30:11

How to verify: Review Matson's Notes to Financial Statements in 10-K/10-Q for CCF details. For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

SSAT joint venture is carried at $84.1 million book value.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·31:23

How to verify: Review Matson's equity method investments or joint venture disclosures in SEC filings. For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

Deferred income tax liability was $693 million as of late 2025.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·32:43

How to verify: Review Matson's Balance Sheet and Tax Footnotes in SEC filings. For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

Global container order book is 31.6% of active fleet size.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·35:51

How to verify: Check industry reports from Alphaliner, Drewry, or Clarksons Research. For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Trump administration granted a 60-day Jones Act waiver on March 18, 2026.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·39:37

How to verify: Search Federal Register or White House archives for Executive Orders or waivers dated March 18, 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

There is a complete absence of insider accumulation at current price levels for Matson.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·52:53

How to verify: Check SEC Form 4 filings for Matson Inc (MATX) for insider buying activity in the period surrounding the transcript date. For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

Matson is fairly valued at best and modestly expensive at worst, trading between $153 and $165 per share.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·53:29

How to verify: Compare the stated price range to Matson's historical stock price data and calculate valuation multiples (P/E, EV/EBITDA) against industry peers. For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Matson's greatest financial triumphs over the last five years came from the CLX service, not the Jones Act monopoly.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·54:53

How to verify: Review Matson's quarterly earnings reports (SEC 10-Q/10-K) to analyze segment revenue and operating income breakdowns between domestic (Jones Act) and international (CLX) operations. For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

The Jones Act is a 100-year-old protectionist law.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·55:58

How to verify: Check the enactment date of the Jones Act (Merchant Marine Act of 2026) and compare to the transcript date (2026). For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Do your own research

  • Verify Matson's FY2025 10-K for actual ROIC, operating margins, and CCF balances.
  • Check Lloyd's List or Drewry for current Shanghai Containerized Freight Index trends.
  • Review SEC filings for insider trading activity to confirm lack of accumulation.
  • Analyze global container order book data from Clarksons or Alphaliner for oversupply forecasts.
  • Research legislative bills by Rep. Ed Case and constitutional lawsuits by Kaloa Rumco regarding Jones Act exemptions.
  • Confirm Matson's leverage ratio and dividend payout details in recent earnings releases.
  • Assess the financials of the SSAT joint venture to verify hidden asset values.
  • Compare Matson's capital costs against Asian shipbuilders using shipyard pricing data.
Full transcriptexpand
0:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Imagine you're standing
0:01
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): um
0:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): right in the middle of a massive sprawling commercial shipyard in Philadelphia.
0:07
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Okay, yeah, I can picture
0:08
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that.
0:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Right. And you are staring up at the hull of a brand new state-of-the-art container ship. I mean, the sheer scale of it literally blocks out the sun.
0:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Oh, absolutely. Those things are essentially floating skyscrapers.
0:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Exactly. Now, the company that commissioned this vessel, Madsen,
0:25
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): they
0:26
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): paid roughly $333 million to have it built.
0:30
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Which is a massive capital expenditure.
0:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): It is. But here is the crazy paradox. If that exact same company took the exact same blueprints like, didn't change a thing, and handed them to a shipyard in South Korea or China, that ship would have cost them maybe $75 to $120 million.
0:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, that is. a staggering difference.
0:52
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So the question is why in the world would a publicly traded company voluntarily pay a massive, basically 400% premium for a capital asset?
1:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Well, it sounds like a total dereliction of fiduciary duty, right? On the surface.
1:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah, you're just burning money.
1:06
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah. You're talking about burning hundreds of millions of dollars of shareholder capital before the ship even touches the water. But um
1:14
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): they don't
1:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): do it voluntarily.
1:16
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Wait, they don't?
1:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): No, they do it because they are legally required to. By a piece of American legislation that is over a century old.
1:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Oh wow.
1:24
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah. If you want to operate in a specific, highly lucrative corner of the United States economy, well, you have to pay that premium. It is basically the toll to enter a fortress.
1:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Welcome to this deep dive. Our mission today is to analyze a huge stack of financial research, market analysis, and these recent due diligence reports.
1:44
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Right. And these are dated right up to March 2026.
1:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Exactly. And they are centered entirely on one of the most fascinating logistics companies in the world, Madsen Inc. They trade under the ticker Madsen X.
1:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And we are attempting to answer a multi-billion dollar question here, one that really has Wall Street completely fractured.
2:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Fractured is the right word. Yeah. We're trying to figure out if Manson is, you know, a structurally transformed infrastructure powerhouse, one that deserves a massive premium valuation.
2:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Or, and this is the bear case, is it just a traditional cyclical shipping company that keeps riding these fading tailwinds of global geopolitical crises?
2:20
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Right.
2:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And is about to crash headfirst into a massive wall of oversupply.
2:24
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, exactly.
2:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And to you listening, um even if you never plan to buy a single share of stock, even if maritime logistics sounds totally foreign, you are gonna want to hear this.
2:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Because this deep dive is a masterclass in how economic moats actually function in the real world.
2:40
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yes. We are going to track exactly how geopolitical, chaos-like Like wars in the Middle East, tariff escalations, port strikes, how all that translates directly into corporate. profits.
2:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And we are going to see just how incredibly difficult it is to separate temporary luck from, you know, permanent business brilliance. Aaron
2:58
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Powell
2:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Okay, let's unpack this. Let's start with that $333 million ship in Philadelphia. Yeah. Because that represents the entire foundation of Matson's domestic business. Aaron
3:07
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Powell
3:07
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Right. We really cannot understand this company without understanding the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, which is uh better known as the Jones Act.
3:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): The Jones Act. I've heard the name, but how does it actually work?
3:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Well, it is perhaps the most formidable regulatory moat in American business history.
3:24
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): That's a big claim.
3:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): It is. So the Act was born out of the aftermath of World War I. The U.S. realized it had relied way too heavily on foreign vessels to transport war materials.
3:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Oh, so it started as a national security thing.
3:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Exactly. The government decided it needed to permanently protect the domestic shipbuilding and maritime industry just in case of future conflicts.
3:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Okay, that makes sense conceptually, but what are the actual rules?
3:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): The premise is straightforward, but the economic ripple effects are monumental. The act dictates that any vessel transporting goods between two U.S. ports must strictly adhere to four pillars.
4:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Four pillars. Okay, what are they?
4:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): First, it must be built in the United States.
4:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Which explains the Philly shipyard.
4:06
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Right. Second, it must be owned by U.S. citizens. Third, it must fly the U.S. flag. And fourth, it must be crewed by U.S. citizens.
4:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Quite all four.
4:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): All four. If you miss even one of those requirements, you are barred from moving cargo between American ports.
4:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So if I want to move a container of fresh produce from Los Angeles to Honolulu.
4:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): or I don't know, construction equipment from Seattle to Anchorage.
4:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): You cannot just hire a massive cheap foreign cargo ship that happens to be passing through the Pacific. You must use a Jones Act compliant vessel.
4:40
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): It's basically like trying to open a rival coffee shop, but by law, your espresso machine has to cost five times more than Starbucks.
4:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): That is a perfect analogy. And to put the sheer weight of that barrier into perspective, just look at the actual shipbuilding infrastructure in America today.
4:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): It's pretty sparse, right?
4:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): It's incredibly sparse. If a new competitor wanted to enter the Hawaii route, they can't just buy a ship off the shelf.
5:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Right.
5:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): They have to go to one of only four qualified U.S. commercial shipyards capable of building large ocean-going Ocean going vessels.
5:10
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Only four in the whole country.
5:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah. You are looking at Hanwa Philly Shipyard, just General Dynamics Masco, C trium Amphels, or Bollinger.
5:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): That's it.
5:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): That's it. And because there are so few of them, they operate with multi-year backlogs.
5:24
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So the timeline alone is a massive barrier. You are waiting what three to four years before your business can even start?
5:30
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): You are waiting thirty-five to forty-two months for construction.
5:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Wow.
5:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): If you ordered a comparable ship from a highly automated yard in Asia it would take roughly 18 months.
5:42
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Half
5:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the time.
5:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Easily. And then there's the cost structure. The reason Matson's new aloha class ships cost $333 million isn't because they are full of luxury amenities.
5:53
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): No luxury cruise cabins for the containers.
5:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Right. No. It is because the U.S. commercial shipbuilding industry has almost no economies of scale. Aaron
6:02
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Powell
6:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Because they build so few ships.
6:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Exactly. They lack the massive integrated supply chains for marine components that exist in places like South Korea. Aaron
6:11
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Powell
6:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So every piece of American steel, every specialized labor hour, it all costs an astronomical premium. Aaron
6:17
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Powell
6:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): It does. And um the premium doesn't stop once the ship is actually built.
6:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Right. I was reading through the operational breakdowns and the due diligence, and the crew costs are just as skewed.
6:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Oh, the crew costs are wild.
6:29
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah, because under the Jones Act, your crew has to be American.
6:33
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
6:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): a U.S. crew, represented by domestic maritime unions, costs a shipping company approximately eleven thousand five hundred dollars a day to operate a vessel.
6:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Which sounds high, but you need the comparison to really grasp it.
6:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Right. If you run a foreign flagged ship on an international route. with a global crew, your daily personnel cost is roughly $2,000.
6:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): $2,000 versus $11,500.
6:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): It's a staggering differential.
7:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): It really is. You are looking at operating costs that are five to six times higher, layered on top of a capital asset that costs four times more to construct.
7:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Okay, so when you run the math on what a new competitor would need to actually challenge Madsen. the numbers just become prohibitive.
7:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Entirely. To offer a viable, regular, weekly service to compete in the Hawaii market, you need a fleet of multiple ships. You can't just run one.
7:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Right, because you have to have a schedule.
7:26
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Exactly.
7:27
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Right.
7:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): So the absolute minimum capital investment required just to get a foot in the door is between one and one and a half billion dollars.
7:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): A billion and a half dollars. Just to say hello to the market.
7:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah. That is simply the anti- ante to sit at the poker table.
7:40
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): When the table stakes are that high, it physically starves the industry of new supply. I mean, the research notes highlight that back in the nineteen eighties, the total Jones Act qualified fleet of large ocean going vessels was around two hundred and fifty ships.
7:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And today,
7:57
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that
7:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): number has collapsed to roughly ninety-one 91 ships.
8:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): The entire national fleet has shrunk by over sixty. 60 percent.
8:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Because the replacement economics are so brutally punishing. When a U.S. built ship reaches the end of its 30 or 40 year lifespan, it is often retired and simply not replaced.
8:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Because the owners look at the $300 million price tag and just walk away.
8:16
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yep.
8:16
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
8:16
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): U.S. yards only deliver about five large commercial ships a year across the entire country.
8:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): That's incredible.
8:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And this brutal capital environment has forced massive consolidation. Publicly listed Jones Act companies have shrunk from eight in 2008 down to just three today.
8:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Wow. And Matson stands alone as the only publicly traded pure plate container shipper among them.
8:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Exactly. And that consolidation creates an incredibly tight market structure.
8:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Monopoly, basically.
8:44
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Well, in Hawaii, you are looking at a functional duopoly. Matson, alongside a privately held company called Pasha Hawaii.
8:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): controls over 96% of the westbound container capacity.
8:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah. And it is virtually identical in Alaska, where Matson operates a tight duopoly with Toddy Maritime.
9:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): But in specific, really lucrative pockets like Kodiak and Dutch Harbor in Alaska, which are these massive seafood export hubs, Matson Madsen is the only container operator.
9:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Right. And for the island of Guam. it's effectively a pure monopoly. Nobody else runs a regular container service from the U.S. mainland to Guam.
9:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Just Matson.
9:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Just Matson. The ultimate proof that this regulatory moat is practically impassable actually played out in real time a few years ago.
9:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Oh, the Toadie example. Yes, let's talk about
9:30
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that.
9:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, in twenty seventeen, Toad Maritime, who as you mentioned is already a dominant Jones Act player in Alaska, they announced their intention to enter the Hawaii market.
9:39
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Okay,
9:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): so they were going to challenge Matson on their home turf?
9:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Exactly. They publicly committed to building four new ships in Philly Shipyard to take on Matson and Pasha directly.
9:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Which is the perfect test case. Right.
9:50
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Because
9:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Toady isn't some naive Silicon Valley startup trying to like disrupt logistics with an app.
9:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Right. They are entrenched maritime operators.
10:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): They know the unions, they know the shipyards, they understand the Jones Act. intimately.
10:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): They know all the rules. And yet, by January 2018, mere months after the announcement, Tota T completely abandoned the project.
10:12
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): They just walked away.
10:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Completely walked away from the shipyard slots. When they looked closely at the billion plus dollar capital requirement to enter a market where Matson already had entrenched customer relationships and locked lockdown down terminal space in Honolulu, the math simply broke down.
10:29
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So they couldn't make it work even with their experience?
10:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): No. It is the single strongest piece of empirical evidence that Matson's domestic moat is practically a fortress.
10:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Okay, but this is where I have to push back on the traditional Wall Street narrative.
10:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Okay, let's hear it.
10:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I was parsing through their pre-COVID financials looking for the payoff of this incredible monopoly. Because if a company has an impenetrable legal mode, moat, a functional monopoly in Guam, and a duopoly in Hawaii, the basic laws of capitalism dictate they should be generating Scrooge McDuck levels of profit.
11:02
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
11:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): mean they should be swimming in margin,
11:04
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): but
11:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): they aren't.
11:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): No, they are not. And that is the great paradox of the Jones Act.
11:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): The domestic Statistic margins are actually incredibly mundane. If we look at the clean baseline before the pandemic like between 2017 and 2019, Madsen's return on invested capital, their ROIC hovered between 9.9% and 11.9%.
11:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Which is fine, but not monopoly money.
11:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Exactly. Their operating margins were sitting in the single digits between 6.2% and 7.4%. To put that in perspective, they were only generating a return of about one to four percentage points above their actual cost of capital.
11:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Right.
11:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): That's a razor-thin razor thin spread for a monopoly. So where is all the money going?
11:40
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): It goes entirely into maintaining the moat. The sheer capital intensity required to operate under US maritime law absorbs basically all of the pricing power.
11:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Ah, so the high costs eat the high prices.
11:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Precisely. Yes, Matson can charge higher freight rates to ship goods to Hawaii because there is no foreign competition. But the depreciation expense on a three $333 hundred and thirty three million million dollar ship ship combined with the $11,500 daily crew costs, it eats that revenue alive.
12:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So the mode is expensive to maintain.
12:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Very. The Jones Act guarantees Madsen's survival, and it guarantees them a steady, predictable return, but it fundamentally precludes a spectacular return. Aaron
12:19
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Ross Powell
12:20
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So they operate much more like a public utility than a hyper-growth tech monopoly.
12:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): That is exactly the framework. Think about it. The state of Hawaii imports 80 to 90% of all its consumer goods and roughly 90% of its food by sea.
12:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So Madsen is literally a lifeline for the islands.
12:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): They are. If Madsen tried to aggressively price gouge the Hawaii route to push their operating margins to, say, 20%, the cost of living on the islands would skyrocket so severely that it would spark an immediate overwhelming police. political backlash.
12:52
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): The politicians in Hawaii would be forced to march on Washington and demand the repeal of the Jones Act just to save their constituents.
12:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Exactly. And Matson knows this. So they self-regulate.
13:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Politicians quiet.
13:10
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): If you are an investor, or even if you're just tracking inflation,
13:14
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it is
13:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): critical. crucial to understand that dynamic. I mean, if you have ever bought a pineapple in Honolulu or looked at the price of a gallon of milk in Maui, you are personally paying the margin on those three hundred and thirty three million dollar ships.
13:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): You absolutely are.
13:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): The cost of the moat is passed directly to the consumer,
13:31
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): but
13:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the profit is constrained by those capital costs.
13:34
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
13:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): if the domestic routes are just this steady, low margin, politically sensitive utility. operation,
13:40
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): well,
13:40
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that completely fails to explain how Masson recently generated over a billion dollars in operating income.
13:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Right. The numbers don't add up if you only look domestically.
13:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): To find the source of that massive windfall, we have to look away from the protected domestic waters and turn our attention to the wild cyclical side of the business across the Pacific.
13:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yes.
13:58
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We
13:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): need to unpack the China Long Beach Express, the service they call the CLX.
14:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): This is where the story shifts from a steady infrastructure play to a volatile, high stakes logistical thriller.
14:10
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
14:10
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): mean, the CLX service generates roughly half of Madsen's current earnings, but it carries nearly all of the company's volatility.
14:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): It is the Wild West out there.
14:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): How does this service actually function? Because once Madsen's Matson's ships leave U.S. waters and head to China, they lose the protection of the general. Jones Act, right?
14:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Completely. They are out in the open ocean competing against the biggest shipping behemoths on the planet. Companies like Maersk, Mediterranean Shipping Company, and Costco.
14:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Giants.
14:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Absolute giants. In the Trans Pacific trade, there is zero regulatory protection. To survive against global giants that operate ships five times the size of Matsons, they had to build an operational moat.
14:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Then how do they do that?
14:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): They achieved that. entirely through sheer speed and hyper-efficient logistics. The CLX service offers a transit time of roughly ten days from Shanghai to Long Beach, California.
14:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Which is incredibly fast. Yeah.
15:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I mean,
15:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the standard carriers usually take 14 to 18 days to make that exact same crossing.
15:06
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Right.
15:06
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): How do they physically move faster?
15:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): It comes down to ship design and fuel economics. Matson uses smaller, more nimble vessels, and they are willing to run the engines hotter, essentially burning more fuel to shave days off the transit.
15:20
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So they just floor it.
15:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Basically, yeah.
15:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Uh-huh.
15:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): A massive Maersk ship carrying 20,000 containers engages in what they call slow steaming to conserve fuel because their entire business model is based on massive volume and low cost. But
15:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Matson's Manson's model is based on premium speed.
15:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Exactly. But um the transit time on the water. is really only half the equation. What's fascinating here is that the real differentiator, the actual superpower of the CLX, happens the moment the ship arrives at the port in Long Beach.
15:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Ah, the C60 terminal.
15:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yes.
15:52
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
15:52
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): due diligence reports spend a lot of time on this specific piece of infrastructure. Masson operates out of a dedicated terminal through a joint venture called SAT. Why is having a dedicated terminal so critical to their speed?
16:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Well, to understand the value of the C60 terminal, you have to understand the nightmare of a standard port operation.
16:10
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Okay, paint me a picture.
16:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): At a massive common use terminal in the port of Los Angeles, a ship drops off thousands of containers. They are stacked five or six high in these massive, dense blocks.
16:23
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Like
16:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): a giant game of Tetris.
16:24
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Exactly. So when a truck driver arrives, to pick up a specific container, they often sit in line for hours. The terminal operators have to locate the container, use massive gantry cranes to literally dig it out of the stack, and then mount it onto a chassis for the truck.
16:40
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): It sounds like a severe logistical bottleneck.
16:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): The dwell time can be agonizing.
16:44
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Right.
16:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): But Matson's C C60 sixty terminal is dedicated entirely to them. They utilize a wheeled operation.
16:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Wheeled.
16:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah. Because their ships are smaller, the moment a container is lifted off a Matson vessel, it isn't dropped into a massive stack. It is immediately placed directly onto a waiting truck chassis in their off-dockyard.
17:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Oh wow. So it never touches the ground, essentially.
17:06
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Right. When a logistics company sends a truck to pick up cargo, the container's already on wheels, just waiting for a cab to hook up to
17:13
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it.
17:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): The metric in the research. is mind-blowing for anyone in logistics. Matson averages sub-25-minute truck turn times.
17:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Less than half an hour.
17:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): A truck drives into the terminal, hooks up to the chassis, and drives out in less than 25 minutes. They offer next day cargo availability.
17:30
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And that speed completely alters their competitive positioning. Matson realized they aren't actually competing with Maersk and Costco. They aren't in the business of cheap ocean freight at all.
17:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Who are they competing with?
17:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): They built the CLX to be a premium, time-definite alternative to air freight.
17:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Ah, that is the arbitrage.
17:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yes.
17:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): If you are an electronics manufacturer moving high-value time-sensitive goods, the reports specifically mention things like data center server racks, fast-fashioned Fast fashion apparel, and advanced electronics. Your default was always to load that onto a Boeing 744. 747 cargo plane.
18:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Which is wildly expensive.
18:06
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Very. But Madsen offers a compelling alternative. They basically say, we will take five to seven days longer than the airplane, but we will charge you 60 to 70% less than air freight rates.
18:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): It is a brilliantly positioned niche. They capture the cargo that is too expensive to fly, but way too urgent to put on a slow 18-day ocean vessel. Perfect
18:26
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): middle. ground.
18:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): However, and this is the massive structural caveat that defines Matson's current valuation, it is still an ocean shipping service. And shipping is entirely hostage to exogenous macroeconomic shocks.
18:40
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So they can't control the ocean or the market?
18:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Nope. It is fascinating to trace how events completely outside of Matson's control radically warp the economics of this CLX segment.
18:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): The trajectory over the last five years reads like a roller coaster. You can categorize it into three distinct phases: the boom, the bust, and the echo.
18:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Let's walk through the mechanics of that timeline. Before the pandemic, the CLX was a solid, profitable niche. Then 2021 and 2022 happened.
19:06
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): The COVID supercycle.
19:07
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Right. We all remember the physical manifestations of it. Dozens of massive cargo ships anchored off the coast of California. waiting weeks to unload.
19:16
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
19:16
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you could see them from the beach.
19:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Consumer demand for physical goods exploded while the supply chain physically broke down.
19:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And when port congestion effectively traps ships at anchor, it pulls capacity out of the market. And when capacity shrinks while demand spikes, pricing goes parabolic.
19:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): The spot rate to ship a single container across the Pacific skyrocketed. from roughly $1,500 to over $15,000 and sometimes north of $20,000.
19:44
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Wait, $20,000 for one container.
19:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, it was madness. And because Matson possessed the only terminal, the C 60, that could actually bypass the congestion and guarantee delivery, shippers were willing to pay astronomical premiums to get their goods on a Matson ship.
19:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): They were the VIP lane in a traffic jam.
20:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Exactly. And the financial results were historically anomalous. In FY 2022, Matson's consolidated operating income exploded to $1.28 billion.
20:12
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): A $1.28 billion profit on a company that typically generated maybe $150 million before the pandemic.
20:20
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Right.
20:20
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): That is an eight to nine times multiplier on their normal earnings power in a single year.
20:25
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Their
20:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): return on invested capital for 2022 broke past 70%. It was a literal license to print money.
20:32
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
20:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you know, cyclical peaks always break. Which brings us to the bust.
20:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Right.
20:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): By 2023, the global supply chains finally unsnarled, the ships at anchor cleared out, consumers shifted their spending from treadmills and laptops back to travel and services.
20:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So Trans-Pacific freight rates crashed back to Earth.
20:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): They did. Consequently, Matson's operating profits plunged seventy-three percent year over year, dropping to three hundred and forty-eight million dollars.
20:59
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Now
20:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): three hundred and forty eight million is still significantly higher than their pre COVID baseline. They structurally grew the business.
21:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): True.
21:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): But it was a massive reality check for the stock. I mean, if the story ended in twenty 2023, twenty three, we would look at Matson Madsen as a company that had a great pandemic run and normalized.
21:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): But we are analyzing reports from early 2026.
21:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Right. And their numbers for FY2024 and FY2025 shot right back up into the stratosphere. They posted $551 million in operating income for 2024 and hit a massive $13.81 in earnings per share for 2025.
21:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Yeah, a massive rebound.
21:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So without a global pandemic, what caused the echo?
21:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Geopolitics. Two massive overlapping structural shocks hit the ocean freight market.
21:44
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Okay, what was the first one?
21:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): The first was the crisis in the Red Sea. In early 2024, as vessels faced attacks from Houthi militants in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, global shipping alliances made the decision to reroute almost all of their Europe-bound Europe bound Asia traffic away from the Suez Canal.
22:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Forcing them to sail all the way to the around the Cape of Good Hope in Africa.
22:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Exactly.
22:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Now, for you listening, we have to explain why a conflict in the Middle East impacts a company that sails between China and California. Because on a map, they're nowhere near each other.
22:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Right. Seems disconnected. But it comes down to the mechanics of global shipping networks. It is all about the absorption of global vessel capacity. Well, when a shipping line routes a vessel around Africa, it adds roughly 10 to 14 days to the void. voyage. Okay. Shipping companies operate on strict weekly schedules. They call them strings. If a round trip string takes
22:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): 10 weeks instead of eight weeks, the shipping company has to physically add two more massive vessels into that rotation just to maintain their once-a-week departure schedule.
22:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Oh. So they have to pull idle ships or steal ships from other routes like the Pacific just to fill the gaps in the
22:50
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): ship.
22:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): European routes.
22:52
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Precisely. The Red Sea rerouting effectively absorbed 10 to 12% of all active global shipping capacity almost overnight.
23:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): That is massive.
23:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): It tightened the global supply of ships to the breaking point. Even though Matson doesn't sail anywhere near the Red Sea, the global shortage of vessels drove up freight rates everywhere, including the Trans-Pacific.
23:12
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And right as the capacity tightened, the second shot. shock hit tariffs.
23:16
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
23:16
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): trade war escalation.
23:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah. Because as the U.S. and China engaged in massive tariff escalations, with some effective rates threatening to hit 145% by April 2025, major U.S. importers completely panicked.
23:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Of course they did. If you are importing millions of dollars of goods and you know a massive tax is going to hit in three months, what do you do?
23:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): You initiate what the industry calls front loading.
23:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Right. You order everything immediately and rush it across the ocean to get it into U.S. warehouses before the deadline.
23:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Get it in before the tax hits.
23:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Exactly. That artificial panic driven surge in demand spiked rates yet again, feeding directly into Matson's massive 2024 and 2025 earnings.
23:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Which circles us back to the central tension of all these analyst reports. Are investors completely confused? confusing a structurally improved elite logistics business with a company that just keeps getting incredibly lucky with macroeconomic crises?
24:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): It's the multi-billion dollar question.
24:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): On their Q4 2025 earnings call, Matson's CEO Matt Cox essentially argued the former. He claimed that Matson's financial guidance is independent of whether the Red Sea opens or not, and asserted that the company has completely distanced itself from generic ocean services.
24:29
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, I saw that.
24:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): As an analyst, how do you interpret that level of confidence from management?
24:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Well, it is a remarkably bold claim. And frankly, the current data from the spot freight market heavily contradicts that optimism.
24:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Really?
24:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Oh yeah. As we sit here in March twenty twenty-six, global freight rates are collapsing back to pre-Red pre Red Sea levels.
24:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): How far down?
24:50
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
24:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Shanghai Containerized Freight Index is down 33% year over year. Spot rates for shipping a standard 40 foot container from Shanghai to the U.S. West Coast recently plummeted to roughly $1,460.
25:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Wait, $1,460? To contextualize that number, is that even profitable for the industry?
25:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Not at all. Lloyd's Floyd's list recently flagged that specific rate as being below the physical break break-even even point for many standard characters. carriers. It is an absolute bloodbath in the spot market right now. Aaron
25:18
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Powell
25:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So they are losing money on every container.
25:20
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Many are, yes. Now, management is technically correct that Matson is insulated somewhat because they offer a premium service. They don't charge the baseline spot rate, they charge a premium spread above it.
25:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): But the premium is still anchored to the baseline, isn't it?
25:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): That is exactly the vulnerability. If the baseline spot rate collapses from $4,000 down to the
25:38
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): $1,000,
25:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): $1,400, Matson's premium rate is dragged down proportionally.
25:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Right, because shippers will pay a premium for speed, but they won't pay a 300% premium when standard capacity is incredibly cheap and readily available.
25:53
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Exactly. If we look back at 2023, the one recent year we had without a pandemic, without Red Sea rerouting, without tariff panics, Matson earned three hundred $348 and
26:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): million.
26:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Not a billion.
26:06
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): No. To claim they are immune to global rate collapses seems, well, overly optimistic. The quantitative evidence strongly suggests their recent earnings peak of $13.81 per share is elevated by at least $150 to $200 million, purely due to the Red Sea and tariff tailwinds.
26:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): But regardless of whether that wind windfall was the result of structural genius or just a string of geopolitical luck, the undeniable reality is that Matson generated literal mountains of cash over the last five years.
26:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Incredible amounts of cash.
26:40
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And that cash is sitting on their balance sheet.
26:43
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
26:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the next crucial piece of the due diligence is analyzing exactly how management deployed that capital,
26:49
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): because
26:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): this might be the most genuinely impressive part of the entire Madsen story.
26:55
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): This
26:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): is a masterclass in capital allocation.
26:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): It really is a rare display of corporate discipline.
27:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Why rare?
27:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Well, historically, when a highly cyclical company suddenly finds itself flush with a billion dollars of peak cycle cash, the management team usually does something incredibly destructive.
27:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Like what?
27:12
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): They suffer from hubris, they buy out a rival at the absolute top of the market valuation, or they order a massive fleet of new ships right as demand is about to drop, basically saddling the company with debt and excess capacity.
27:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): But Matson didn't do that.
27:24
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): No. Matson's management avoided all of those traps. Instead, they engaged in a textbook display of financial engineering to permanently elevate their per share earnings power.
27:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): The buyback machine. Yes.
27:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Let's
27:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): dig into the share repurchases. because the mechanics of what they achieved here are phenomenal.
27:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Between August 2021 and September 2025, Matson deployed between 1.2 and 1.3 billion dollars to aggressively repurchase their own stock in the open market.
27:53
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And they executed these buybacks at an average volume-weighted price of roughly $87 to $92 a share.
28:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): To understand why this is so mathematically powerful, we have to look at how earnings per share actually works.
28:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Right, the denominator
28:06
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): effect.
28:06
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Think of it like a pizza. When you buy a stock, you are buying a fractional ownership of the company's total net income, one slice of the pizza. Before the pandemic, Madsen had roughly $43 million shares outstanding.
28:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Exactly. What management did with that billion dollars of pandemic cash was go into the open market.
28:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and systematically buy back roughly 30 to 32 percent of all those outstanding shares. And once the company buys them, they retire them. They cease to exist.
28:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): By shrinking the denominator in the earnings per share equation by nearly a third, they mathematically forced the value of every remaining share upward.
28:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): They didn't necessarily bake a bigger pizza, they just sliced it into fewer pieces so every remaining shareholder. got a massive slice.
28:52
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): That's a great way to put it. It was a structural lift. Because they retired over 30% of the float, Matson mechanically lifted their baseline EPS by approximately 41%.
29:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): That is the magic of a massive buyback at a reasonable valuation. I mean, even if Matson's underlying ocean shipping business completely flatlines, even if their net income never grows another dollar for the next decade, they're only their earnings per share is permanently 41% higher simply because the profits are being divided among far fewer shares.
29:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): It's permanent value creation. And that
29:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): discipline extended
29:24
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): beyond just repurchasing shares. They
29:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): utilized a unique, highly specific legal structure to shield their capital from taxes and pre prefund fund their massive capital expenditures.
29:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Ah, let's look at the CCF, the capital construction. Fund.
29:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): This
29:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): is a fascinating mechanism.
29:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): It operates almost like a specialized corporate 401k, but specifically designed for heavy maritime machinery.
29:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): That is a very accurate comparison. The CCF is a tax advantaged vehicle established by the U.S. government to encourage domestic shipbuilding.
29:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Okay.
29:56
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
29:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): during the hyper profitable years of 2021 twenty twenty one and 2022, twenty twenty two, Matson didn't just pay standard 21% twenty-one corporate. percent income taxes on all that COVID cash. They legally funneled hundreds of millions of pre-tax dollars directly into the capital construction fund.
30:10
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Just
30:10
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): barked it there.
30:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Right. By the end of 2025, the balance of the CCF was sitting at five hundred and thirty-two point seven million dollars held safely in cash and short-term US treasuries.
30:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Earning interest while shielding the principal
30:24
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): but
30:24
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the catch, just like a 401k is that the money is trapped, right? You can't use CCF funds to pay executive bonuses or issue regular dividends.
30:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Correct. It is strictly earmarked for acquiring, constructing, or rebuilding U.S. flagged vessels. But remember those three new Aloha class ships Matson ordered from the Philly shipyard for roughly a billion dollars?
30:45
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
30:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): ones we talked about at the start.
30:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yes. That massive capital expenditure is almost entirely.
30:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): prefunded by the tax shielded cash sitting in the CCF. They don't have to go to the bond market and take on massive high interest debt to build those ships.
31:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So the capital is already secured, generating about $15 million a year in interest while it just waits to be deployed to the shipyard.
31:07
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): It significantly de-risks their future. Trevor
31:09
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Burrus,
31:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): It really does. And the CCF isn't the only hidden value fitting on their books. We discussed the S. SSAT joint venture earlier, the entity that operates the highly efficient C60 terminal in Long Beach. Trevor
31:20
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Burrus, Jr.
31:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Right, the one doing the sub 25 minute truck turns.
31:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Exactly. The due diligence notes that under standard accounting rules, Madsen carries this joint venture on their balance sheet at a historical book value of just $84.1 eighty-four point one million. dollars. Aaron
31:36
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Powell
31:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Which is a massive understatement of its. true economic value.
31:40
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Why?
31:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Because SSAT doesn't just operate the C sixty terminal. They operate seven different massive terminal facilities across the US West Coast.
31:49
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Oh
31:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): wait, seven.
31:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah. Including highly strategic, irreplaceable acreage in Long Beach, Oakland, and Seattle.
31:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Oh wow. If you tried to acquire those leases and the operational infrastructure today, the market value would undoubtedly be multiples of that $84 million carrying cost.
32:06
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Oh, easily. It is a classic hidden asset that automated financial screeners completely miss when evaluating the company's book value.
32:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): However, we have to look at the other side of the ledger. There's a severe catch to all this tax advantaged financial engineering.
32:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): There always is.
32:20
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Because the taxman Taxman's is patient, but the tax man always collects eventually.
32:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): The deferred tax liability.
32:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yes.
32:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): This is the detail that the structural bulls often gloss over. By aggressively utilizing the CCF to shield operating profits, and by employing accelerated depreciation schedules on their new vessels, Matson has built up a massive, looming deferred income tax liability.
32:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): How massive.
32:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): As of late 2025, that liability stands at an imposing six $693 hundred and ninety-three million million. dollars. Aaron
32:49
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Powell
32:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Almost $700 million in taxes that are essentially just legally delayed.
32:54
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah.
32:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): How does that eventually hit the company? Do they just get a giant bill one day?
32:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): No, it isn't a lump sum debt due tomorrow, but it acts as a permanent structural headwind to their future free cash flows.
33:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Okay, explain that.
33:06
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): As those new aloha class ships are delivered and put into service, their tax basis will be significantly lower because the CCF funds used to build them were already are pre-taxed.
33:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Right.
33:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): This means Manson will have far less depreciation expense to deduct against their future income. So over the coming decades, as they operate those ships, their effective cash tax rate will climb significantly, slowly bleeding out that $693 million liability.
33:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): It is the delayed cost of the magic trick.
33:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Exactly.
33:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): But even factoring in that future tax burden, the current snapshot of their financial health. is astonishing for a company in such a capital-intensive industry. Madsen has paid down so much of their historical debt that their current leverage ratio is sitting at just 0.5 times debt to EBITDA.
33:52
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): To contextualize that 0.5 figure, standard industrial shipping companies often run at leverage ratios of three or four times just to sustain their fleets.
34:01
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
34:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): operating at half a turn of leverage. means Madsen has an absolute fortress balance sheet. They are virtually immune to short-term credit shocks or interest rate spikes.
34:12
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): They are very well protected. Aaron
34:13
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Powell
34:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): With that much cash flow, are they distributing it to the shareholders? Aaron
34:18
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Powell
34:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): They do pay a regular dividend. It's currently sitting at $1.44 per share annually.
34:24
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Okay.
34:24
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): But what is really telling is how conservative that payout. is. That dividend represents a payout ratio of only 10.4% of their projected FY 2025 earnings.
34:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): That's pretty low.
34:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): It is. Management ran the math and clearly determined that aggressively repurchasing their own stock, shrinking the share count, is a far more tax-efficient and value-accretive Creative way to return capital to shareholders than issuing heavily taxed dividends. So
34:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): to synthesize. the financial picture, Matson played a near perfect hand of capital allocation with their pandemic winnings. They mathematically boosted their EPS through massive buybacks, they prefunded their billion-dollar fleet renewal tax-free, and they bulletproofed their balance sheet against high interest rates.
35:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): They look invincible on paper. Aaron
35:09
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Powell
35:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): On paper, yeah. But as they look out from the bridge of their ships toward the end of the decade, a massive multifront storm is brewing on the horizon.
35:17
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
35:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): analysts have identified severe structural risks threatening both the domestic moat and the international CLX service.
35:24
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): The risk profile is shifting from theoretical to highly material as we move through 2026.
35:29
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Let's start with the threat to the uh party in the back, the international China Long Beach Express.
35:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Right. The global order book flood.
35:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): We talk about how spot rates are already collapsing. but the physical supply of new ships about to enter the ocean is staggering. Let's look at the specific delivery schedules.
35:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): This is perhaps the most alarming single macro statistic in the entire deep dive.
35:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Let's hear it.
35:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): The global container order book, which represents all the ships that ocean carriers have ordered from shipyards but haven't yet received, is currently sitting at 31.6% of the size of the entire active ship. global fleet.
36:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Wait, 31%? To put that in perspective, what is a healthy, normal order book ratio for the industry? Aaron
36:11
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Powell
36:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): A balanced market usually operates with an order book around 10 to 15%,
36:16
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): just enough to replace retiring ships and accommodate baseline global GDP growth.
36:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Right.
36:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): A 31.6% thirty-one point six percent ratio means a third of the existing global capacity is currently. under construction. It is the highest order book to fleet ratio the industry has seen since the massive shipping crash of 2010.
36:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And the delivery schedule is heavily front-loaded over the next thirty-six months, isn't it?
36:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): It is.
36:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): To 1.7 million TEUs, 20-foot equivalent units, which is the standard measure of container capacity.
36:53
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Okay, 1.7 million.
36:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): That is already a heavy delivery year. But in 2027, the deliveries surged to 2.8 million TEUs.
37:00
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Oh
37:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): wow.
37:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And by 2028, a staggering 3.5 million TEUs of new capacity will enter the market in a single year.
37:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): But logically, the major carriers must be retiring and scrapping their oldest, most inefficient ships to balance. out this massive influx of new supply. Right. They wouldn't just add without subtracting.
37:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Well, that is what the industry models assumed would happen, but the reality is the exact opposite. Scrapping has effectively collapsed to a twenty year low.
37:26
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): A twenty year low.
37:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): In twenty twenty five, a mere eight thousand one hundred and seventy two TEUs of capacity were demolished.
37:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): That is essentially zero. Why aren't they scrapping the old ships?
37:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Because of the Red Sea crisis.
37:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Ah, of course.
37:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Since the rerouting around Africa requires so many extra ships just to maintain schedules, even the oldest, least fuel efficient rust buckets are currently marginally profitable to operate. The major carriers are keeping every single asset on the water.
37:53
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So supply is completely detaching from demand.
37:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Totally. The math of the oversupply is terrifying. Global demand growth for ocean shipping is forecast to grow at merely 0.5% to 3% annually over the next five years. Yet the physical supply of ships is going to grow by nearly 4% or 5% annually, net of any minor scrapping.
38:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So if we model this out, structural physical oversupply is mathematically guaranteed through at least 2029.
38:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yes. Unless the world experiences a continuous, unbroken chain of geopolitical crises to artificially trap all these new ships at sea, the Trans Pacific freight rates are going to be crushed under the weight of millions of empty containers chasing flat demand.
38:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And as the baseline rates collapse, Matson's CLX premium yields will inevitably be dragged down with them.
38:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): That's the fear.
38:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Okay, so the international CLX faces a literal tidal wave of supply.
38:48
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
38:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the bull case always retreats to the safety. of the domestic business. Matson has the unassailable, legally protected Jones Act moat in Hawaii and Alaska to fall back on.
38:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Which brings us to the second major threat, the political siege on the Jones Act itself.
39:04
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Now
39:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): a quick caveat for you listening. We're going to dive into some recent political developments in Washington. We are analyzing this strictly and impartially from a corporate risk perspective. Trevor
39:14
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Burrus, Jr.
39:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Right. We aren't taking any partisan stance on the legislation.
39:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Exactly. But when a company's entire domestic profit engine is predicated on a single federal law, the political climate is the fundamental business risk. Trevor
39:26
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Burrus, Jr.
39:26
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): In the foundational premise of the Matson Bull thesis, the idea that the Jones Act is functionally invincible and politically untouchable, well, it took a massive psychological hit on March 18, eighteenth, 2026. twenty twenty six. Aaron
39:37
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Powell
39:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): The
39:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Trump administration waiver What were the exact mechanics of that decision?
39:40
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Amidst a sharp escalation of conflict with Iran, which caused severe disruptions to global energy markets and shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, the Trump administration bypassed Congress. They utilized executive authority to grant an unprecedented 60-day Jones Act waiver. Aaron
39:58
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Powell
39:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): A sixty-day 60-day waiver.
39:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yes. This waiver specifically allowed foreign foreign-flagged flagged vessels. to transport critical energy commodities like oil, luquefied natural gas, fertilizer, and coal between U.S. ports to stabilize domestic energy grids.
40:12
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Now
40:12
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Madsen is a container shipper. They move dry goods, electronics, and food. They don't operate massive oil tankers. So why does a waiver for energy commodities threaten their container business?
40:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): It threatens them because it shatters the precedent.
40:24
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): For decades, the Jones Act was viewed as the untouchable third rail of American maritime politics, fiercely defended by a powerful bipartisan coalition of domestic shipbuilders, maritime unions, and defense hawks.
40:35
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Right.
40:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Nobody touched it.
40:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): While this specific waiver was limited in duration and scope to energy, it broke the psychological dam. It proved that the executive branch is willing to override the law to alleviate localized economic pressure. It brought the concept of Jones Act's suspension into mainstream actionable political discourse.
40:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Once that dam has a crack in it, the pressure from other groups starts compounding. Where else is this pressure coming from?
41:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): It is a multifront assault. From the policy side, prominent think tanks like the Cato Institute are actively publishing extensive research advocating for the complete abolition of the act, arguing it is a protectionist relic that stifles. economic growth.
41:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Okay, that's the think tank side.
41:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Right. And the Heritage Foundation's Project 2025 manifesto explicitly calls for repealing or substantially reforming the Jones Act to lower domestic shipping costs. Aaron
41:27
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Powell
41:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And there is movement inside the legislative branch as well. Representative Ed Case, a Democrat from Hawaii, has introduced three separate reform bills in recent sessions.
41:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Representative Case argues with substantial mathematical evidence that the law artificially and severely inflates the cost of living for his constituents in Hawaii. He is pushing for exemptions that would allow Hawaii to bypass the U.S. build requirement.
41:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And finally, there is the judicial vector.
41:52
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah. The legal challenges are becoming more sophisticated. In March 2025, the Pacific Legal Foundation filed a direct constitutional challenge in federal court on behalf of Kahlora. Kaloa Rumco, a Hawaiian business, arguing that the lack of affordable domestic shipping capacity violates the Commerce Clause.
42:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So they are suing over it.
42:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yes.
42:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah.
42:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And the threat to Matson is so direct that Matson's legal team actually had to formally intervene in the lawsuit to defend the federal law.
42:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Wow. So you have executive waivers, coordinated legislative reform bills, heavy think tank advocacy, and act of constitutional litigation. all striking the moat simultaneously.
42:29
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): For the first time in modern history, the Jones Act faces genuine, quantifiable structural risk.
42:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Investors have to price in the possibility that even a partial reform like Congress, simply dropping the requirement that vessels might be built in U.S. shipyards, which would allow competitors to buy $75 million Asian ships and crew them with Americans, would instantly and fundamentally destroy. Matson's cost advantage and invite massive
42:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): new competition into Hawaii.
42:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And even if the Jones Act holds perfectly intact, Matson faces a third major risk. The underlying demographic and geopolitical realities of the specific routes they serve.
43:06
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Let's look at the demographics of Hawaii. I mean, you can have a perfect monopoly on a shipping route, but if the destination island is slowly emptying out, your monopoly is shrinked. shrinking.
43:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Hawaii is battling a severe compounding demographic headwind, driven largely by the intense cost of living crisis, where the median price of a single family home frequently exceeds a million dollars and basic goods carry that Jones Act premium, the state is experiencing significant net out migration.
43:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): People are leaving the islands for the mainland.
43:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Yes.
43:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Since the 2020 census, Hawaii's resident population. has declined by over 22,447 people. That represents a 1.5% drop in the total population.
43:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And in the shipping business, fewer residents means fewer mouths to feed, fewer houses to build, and ultimately fewer containers of goods that Matson needs to ship across the Pacific.
43:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Now, in fairness to Matson's Madsen's operational resilience, their domestic container volumes have actually held up. reasonably well despite the population loss. Their Hawaii container volume was actually up 1.6% in FY 2025.
44:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): How is that possible with fewer people?
44:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): This divergence is likely due to strong per capita consumer spending and a robust tourism industry that continues to demand high volumes of imported goods. Aaron
44:22
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Powell
44:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Okay, that makes sense.
44:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): But mathematically, a shrinking permanent population is a heavy structural. ceiling. It essentially cements their long-term domestic volume growth rate at zero.
44:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Which means they remain completely dependent on the volatile international CLX route for any real corporate growth. And that route is navigating a geopolitical minefield between the United States and China.
44:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Oh, the volatility of the US-China trade corridor is extreme.
44:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah, we saw a stark example of this in April 2025 when a massive round of U.S. tariff escalations was implemented. In response to the shock, Madsen's China container volumes plummeted by 30% year over year in a single month.
45:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): 30% of your volume just vanishing overnight purely because of a policy signature in Washington.
45:06
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And they are facing another critical policy cliff right now.
45:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): They are. In October 2025, the US and China negotiated a temporary de-escalation. known as the Busan rapprochement. As part of this deal, China agreed to suspend a massive retaliatory port fee that they had explicitly slapped on U.S. flag vessels operating in their ports.
45:26
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): That fee represented an $80 million annual headwind directly hitting Matson's operating costs.
45:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Exactly. The suspension of that fee basically saved their margins in late 2025. But, and this is the critical risk. factor, that diplomatic deal was explicitly structured as a temporary one-year suspension.
45:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Which means it expires.
45:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): It is set to expire in November 2026. This creates a massive binary risk event sitting just months away. If geopolitical relations sour and the agreement isn't renewed, Matson instantly gets hit with an $80 eighty million dollar annual tax just to dock their ships in Shanghai.
46:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Wow. So synthesizing everything we've covered, if you are an analyst or an investor evaluating Madsen right now, you are staring at an incredibly complex paradox.
46:10
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): You really are.
46:10
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): You have a company posting record-high crisis-fueled earnings, backed by a fortress balance sheet and brilliant capital allocation. But those earnings are colliding head on with record-high High global ship oversupply, a genuine political siege on their domestic monopoly, and massive demographic and tariff headwinds.
46:29
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Which leads directly into our final section: the ultimate identity crisis. How does the market actually value this company?
46:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Valuation is where the theoretical arguments meet the cold reality of capital markets. How do you assign a multiple to a company with this specific contradictory profile?
46:44
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Right. Let's break down the current market pricing based on the March 2026 data. The stock is currently oscillating in a range between $153 and $165 a share.
46:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Okay.
46:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): If we use their FY 2025 earnings per share of $13.81, the stock is trading at roughly an 11 times price to earnings multiple, an 11x PE.
47:07
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Now, in a broader stock market like the SP 500 that regularly trades at 20x or 25x earnings, an 11x multiple looks like an absolute screaming bargain.
47:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): It looks incredibly cheap. If you fundamentally believe that $13.81 is the new permanent baseline for their earning power. And this is exactly where Wall Street fractures. Let's look at the two opposing valuation models.
47:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Starting with the bull case.
47:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Yep.
47:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): The bulls, championed by research firms like Stevens, have slapped a massive $213 price target. on the stock. What is the structural logic driving that optimism?
47:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): The Bulls argue that the global logistics market has structurally permanently changed since the pandemic. They believe that $13 to $14 an EPS is the new normal.
47:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Okay, why?
47:52
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Their thesis relies on the idea that the expansion of the CLX service is highly durable. They think that the explosion of e-commerce and the need to rapidly move high value. high-value technology infrastructure like AI server racks will permanently sustain the demand for expedited ocean freight.
48:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So they believe the air freight arbitrage is a permanent schist, not a temporary pandemic anomaly.
48:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Exactly. Furthermore, they argue that the new aloha class ships, prefunded by the CCF, will significantly lower Matson's domestic operating costs due to fuel efficiency. And
48:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): crucially, the bulls rely heavily. on the compounding math of the buybacks, right?
48:29
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yes. They project that Matson's ongoing 6.7% total shareholder yield, combining the dividend and the share repurchases, will continue to mechanically compound EPS indefinitely.
48:40
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Therefore, the bulls argue the market needs to completely re-rate the stock. The market needs to stop treating Madsen Massum like a highly cyclical, boom and bust shipping company that deserves a low 11x multiple. and start pricing it like a highly protected, specialized infrastructure franchise that deserves a 15x or 18x multiple.
48:57
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): That is an
48:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): incredibly convincing argument. The math of
49:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): the buybacks alone
49:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): provides a massive floor.
49:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): It does. But then you read the bear case. And
49:06
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the bear case is backed by serious
49:07
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): conviction. Asset
49:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): management firms like Diamond Hill Capital
49:11
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): have
49:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): taken out active, publicized short positions against the stock. betting the price will fall. And
49:16
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Wolf has a model out too.
49:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, research funds like Wolf have published models projecting that Matson's earnings will crash to just $10 per share by 2026. The Bears argue that the current earnings power of $1381 is a complete illusion.
49:30
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): They view it as a mirage created by the Red Sea and the tariffs. Aaron
49:33
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Powell
49:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Yes. The
49:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Bears point out that 1381 is still two 2.5 point five to four 4 times higher than Matson's.
49:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): true pre-COVID structural baseline.
49:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Right.
49:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): They argue that once a diplomatic resolution eventually reopens the Red Sea, the massive 10% chunk of global capacity that is currently tied up sailing around Africa will flood back into the market. Combine that with the 3.5 million TEUs of new ships delivering from the shipyards, and Trans-Pacific rates will suffer a historic collapse. Aaron
50:02
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Powell
50:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): So
50:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): they estimate. the true normalized mid-cycle EPS is realistically sitting somewhere down between $8 and $10 a share. Aaron
50:10
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Powell
50:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And if the market wakes up and realizes that Matson only generates $8 a share in a normal macroeconomic environment and applies a historical cyclical shipping multiple of maybe 12x twelve X or 14x to those normalized earnings.
50:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Stock price could easily plunge twenty to thirty percent, dropping rapidly back down into the one hundred to one hundred and twenty dollar range.
50:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Exactly.
50:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): It is a profound analytical tug of war. Structural infrastructure franchise versus a lucky cyclical trap. But you know, whenever I see analysts locked in a theoretical battle over multiples and mid cycle earnings, I always look for a different signal.
50:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): What's that?
50:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I look at what the people actually run running in the company or doing are with their own personal wealth.
50:52
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Ah, the insider signal.
50:53
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Because the executives inside Madison aren't guessing. They see the internal dashboards, they see the forward booking rates for the CLX out of Shanghai.
51:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): They know the actual intensity of the political pressure on the Jones Act.
51:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): They know the truth better than any analyst on Wall Street.
51:08
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
51:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the due diligence reports from March 2026 unearthed a highly critical, undeniable. piece of data.
51:16
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yes, over the trailing six months leading up to March 2026, across the entire executive suite and board of directors, there have been 11 distinct instances of insider stock sales.
51:26
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Eleven sales.
51:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And over that exact same six-month period, there have been exactly zero insider purchases. None.
51:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): That ratio is stark. Eleven 11 to zero. 0. And we aren't just talking about mid-level managers. clearing out a few restricted stock units to pay a tax bill. We are looking at massive block sales from the inner circle. It's
51:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): like John Lauer.
51:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Right. The executive vice president and chief commercial officer who was notably retiring in July 2026 dumped $1.43 million worth of stock. Another executive vice president, Peter Heilman, sold a massive block worth $2.15 million.
52:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Now to be perfectly analytical, executive executives sell stock for a myriad of personal reasons. They might be diversifying their personal portfolios, buying real estate, or in Lauer's case, organizing their estate ahead of retirement. You cannot always read impending corporate doom into a single executive sale.
52:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): But
52:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): but as an analyst, you absolutely read volumes into the complete and total absence of insider buying.
52:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): That is the crux of the issue. This raises a fundamental question. for anyone evaluating this company. If the structural bulls are right, if Mabson has permanently transformed into an elite logistics franchise, and the stock is sitting at an incredibly cheap 11x multiple with a clear path to 213 a share, why isn't a
52:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): single executive stepping into the open market and putting their own personal capital to work to buy it?
52:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Right. If the people steering the ship believed it was a screaming, bargain, they would be buying.
52:52
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Exactly.
52:53
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): The complete absence of insider accumulation at these price levels strongly suggests that management internally views the stock as fully valued based on their forward projections.
53:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So drawing all these complex threads together, where does that leave us in our final assessment of Matson?
53:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): If we synthesize the entirety of the due diligence weighing the incredible cash generation, the brilliant execution of the share buybacks and the fortress balance sheet, and balance that against the impending tsunami of global ship supply, the spot rate collapse, and the structural cracks forming in the Jones Act, the most logical risk-adjusted conclusion is that
53:29
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Matson is fairly valued at best right now and modestly expensive at worst.
53:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Wow.
53:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): At $153 to $165 a share, the market is pricing in a perfection that the macro environment likely cannot sustain. The margin of safety at this valuation is entirely dependent on one highly precarious assumption.
53:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Which is
53:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you have to fundamentally believe that global shipping disruptions, entrenched geopolitical chaos, and extreme trade volatility are now permanent structural states of the global economy rather than temporary macroeconomic anomalies.
54:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): If the world actually normalizes, the stock holds significant downside risk.
54:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): It is essentially a multi-billion dollar bet on permanent global chaos. Which leads me to a final, somewhat provocative thought to close out this deep dive. Something for you to mull over as you watch the global supply chains shift over the coming years.
54:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): All right, what is it?
54:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Well, we started this analysis by looking at the dichotomy of Matson's business. the heavily protected, low-margin Jones Act utility in Hawaii, contrasting with the wild, unprotected, hyper profitable CLX trade in China.
54:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Right, the corporate mullet.
54:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Exactly. For decades, the dominant political and corporate narrative has been that Matson desperately needs the protection of the Jones Act to survive as an American maritime company.
54:49
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
54:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): look closely at what they do. have actually achieved over the last five years. Trevor
54:53
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Burrus, Jr.
54:53
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Their greatest financial triumphs didn't come from the monopoly.
54:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Exactly. Their massive success, the billions of dollars in supercycle profits, the brilliant logistical innovations of the wheeled operations, and the 25-minute truck turnarounds at the C60 terminal. All of that innovation speed and profitability was generated by the CLX service.
55:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): It was.
55:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): It was forged in the unprotected, hyper-competitive, open waters of international shipping. They proved definitively that they could go head-to-head with the massive global shipping cartels, utilizing smaller ships and win based purely on operational excellence and speed.
55:30
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): They built a better logistical mousetrap without needing a government mandate to force customers to use it.
55:35
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
55:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): here's the ultimate paradox.
55:37
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Could it
55:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): be that Madson's overwhelming success in the brutal free market international trade is exactly what makes them so politically vulnerable at home? By proving so decisively to the market that they can thrive, innovate, and generate billions in the ruthless open waters of the Pacific, do they inadvertently provide the strongest possible empirical
55:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): argument to the politicians in Washington that they simply no longer need the archaic 100-year-old. protection of the Jones Act to survive.
56:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Wow.
56:05
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): That
56:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): is a deeply fascinating perspective.
56:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Does a regulatory moat actually make a company weaker and more stagnant in the long run by isolating it from market reality while their unmoted, unprotected business is the one that actually forced them to become truly great?
56:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): The idea that their success in the free market actively undermines the foundational justification for their protected domestic monopoly.
56:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): It is the ultimate corporate irony.
56:29
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): To
56:29
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): everyone listening, keep questioning the economic structures around you. Keep looking for the hidden mechanics, the regulatory moats, the logistical bottlenecks, the geopolitical tailwinds that actually dictate how the world works. Thank you for taking this deep dive into the fascinating, highly contradictory machinery of global trade with us. I'll catch you next time.
This page was produced automatically: the audio was transcribed with nvidia/parakeet-tdt-0.6b-v3+sortformer-v2.1 and interpreted by Qwen3.6-35B-A3B-UD-IQ3_S.gguf. Transcription and interpretation can contain errors; always confirm against the original episode. Nothing here is investment advice.

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