UBS' Chaisanguanthum on Coops, LMEs, and AI
Summary
Michael Chaisanguanthum of UBS Asset Management discusses the rise in distressed high yield inventory, driven by technology sector distress and CoreWeave. He highlights the trend toward creditor cooperation agreements (co-ops) and narrow court rulings on liability management exercises (LMEs). The episode covers LME strategies, the inefficiency of US Chapter 11 compared to UK schemes, and the limited use of AI in restructuring. Analysts also review specific cases including Getty Images, Xerox, and Hughes Satellite, noting market reactions and financial pressures.
Key takeaways
- 1 The high yield market rally had lasted 75 months (over six years) as of November 2026, measured by the time since the distress ratio last exceeded 11%.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) · 5:06
Episode sections
- 0:22 – 7:27
Market Overview and Distressed Debt Trends
Host Noel Hebert introduces the episode and guest Michael Chaisanguanthum. Analyst Phil Brendel notes that October saw a 33 billion jump in distressed high yield inventory to 110 billion, creating a distress ratio of 7.3%, the highest since June 2024. He highlights that technology is now the top sector for distress, driven by CoreWeave, and warns that the high yield rally has lasted 75 months.
- 7:27 – 13:24
Michael Chaisanguanthum Background and Role at UBS
Michael Chaisanguanthum, Managing Director and Head of Restructuring for UBS Asset Management's Credit Investments Group, joins the discussion. He describes his group as a $60 billion+ manager of leveraged loans and high yield in the US and Europe. He explains his role is defensive, working out 'bumps in the road' for a diversified portfolio rather than originating distressed deals.
- 13:24 – 19:39
Creditor Cooperation Agreements (Co-ops)
Chaisanguanthum discusses the trend toward broader creditor cooperation agreements (co-ops) to protect lenders. He notes that large holders (top 3-5) often drive these proactively. He explains that while co-ops can create trading noise, they are effective protective tools. He advises that co-ops often exclude short-dated bonds or simple tranches to avoid complicating negotiations.
- 19:39 – 26:27
Antitrust Litigation and LMEs
The speakers discuss the impact of antitrust lawsuits (Optum, Selecta, Altisource) and LME court decisions. Chaisanguanthum argues that court decisions have been narrow and distinguishable, failing to derail LME tactics. He cites Serta and Incore as examples where creative workarounds quickly emerged after initial concerns, suggesting the 'LME train' continues despite legal challenges.
- 26:27 – 31:01
NDA and DQL Dynamics
Chaisanguanthum critiques aggressive NDAs and Disqualified Lender Lists (DQLs). He finds NDAs frustrating but acknowledges some provisions are fair if they prevent information sharing between competing creditor groups. He criticizes DQLs that are too broad, destroying liquidity, and those allowing retroactive removal of lenders, which he views as unfair.
- 31:01 – 33:22
Post-LME Strategy and Capital Structure Positioning
Speaker_3 explains that LMEs are typically one-time events and advises positioning at the fulcrum of the capital structure to maximize control during restructuring, as bankruptcy laws favor secured creditors. He notes that LME documentation is usually tight, preventing companies from easily threatening a 'deal away' to extract a second LME.
- 33:22 – 38:51
Guiding Principles for LME Negotiations
Speaker_3 emphasizes avoiding losses on new money and allowing companies to pursue 'deal away' transactions if creditor cooperation is broad, rather than forcing new capital into troubled credits. He highlights that CLOs and flexible funds are adapting by retaining dry powder and selling positions from vehicles unable to hold reorg equity long-term.
- 38:51 – 41:18
LME Dynamics and Management Engagement
The discussion covers the shift away from comprehensive restructuring towards LMEs, resulting in less engagement with management and diligence. Speaker_3 stresses the importance of advisor connections to facilitate deals and notes that steering committee formation is driven by position size and organic relationships rather than willingness to get restricted.
- 41:18 – 49:01
Process Ownership and Maturity Trends
Speaker_3 describes the LME process as reactive, with companies delaying engagement until closer to maturity. He observes that credit agreements have evolved so that revolver maturities no longer automatically trigger restructuring events, leading to negotiations occurring later in the lifecycle compared to 15 years ago.
- 49:01 – 52:25
LME Structure and Discount Expectations
Speaker_3 argues that LMEs are primarily driven by liquidity and maturity extension needs, with discounts being a secondary benefit. He suggests that LMEs are underutilized for comprehensive solutions, such as sponsors injecting significant equity for larger discounts, and notes that pre-packaged bankruptcies are often preferred for complex capital structures.
- 52:25 – 59:52
Bankruptcy Predictability and Roll-up Economics
Speaker_3 supports pre-negotiated bankruptcies for predictability but criticizes disparate in-group/out-group economics. He opposes roll-ups due to opacity and fund compliance issues, preferring hefty upfront fees for new money as a more transparent alternative to complex recovery calculations.
- 59:52 – 1:02:08
Judicial Skepticism and LME Tactics
Speakers discuss the difficulty judges face in approving complex liability management exercises (LMEs) on the first day of bankruptcy, often under pressure that the company will implode without approval. They note that companies have become adept at structuring deals to make valuation challenges difficult, leading to fewer contests compared to the 2009 era.
- 1:02:08 – 1:04:26
UK Schemes of Arrangement vs. US Chapter 11
Michael Chaisanguanthum expresses admiration for UK schemes of arrangement, citing their efficiency and ability to drag creditors into pro rata deals, contrasting them with US Chapter 11 processes. He notes that while UK laws offer flexibility like cross-class cram downs, US courts have not yet faced significant threats from these mechanisms in the cases he has worked on.
- 1:04:26 – 1:39:56
AI Tools in Credit Analysis
The discussion shifts to the use of AI in restructuring work, with Chaisanguanthum stating that most firms are still in the early stages of implementation. He highlights the use of Microsoft Copilot for document review and comparison, and mentions Gemini and Harvey as other tools used by law firms and investors to spot drafting holes in credit agreements.
Assets discussed
| Asset | Kind | Stance | Context |
|---|---|---|---|
| Nasdaq Composite | index | neutral | I do think it's interesting we had the sharp move down in the NASDAQ. |
“Stance” is how the speakers talked about the asset, not a recommendation.
Claims worth verifying
October 2026 saw distressed high yield inventory jump by $33 billion to $110 billion, with a distress ratio of 7.3%.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·2:02
How to verify: Check ICE BofA US High Yield Index data for October 2026 via ICE or Bloomberg. For recent events, verify 2026-08-11 through 2026-11-11. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Technology is now the top sector for distress, driven by CoreWeave, and financials rose to 5.6% distress.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·4:06
How to verify: Review Bloomberg Intelligence or ICE sector distress rankings for October 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-11 through 2026-11-11. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The high yield rally had lasted 75 months as of November 2026, measured by time since distress ratio exceeded 11%.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·5:06
How to verify: Calculate months since last ICE High Yield Distress Ratio >11% using historical ICE data. For recent events, verify 2026-08-11 through 2026-11-11. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
UBS Asset Management's Credit Investments Group manages over $60 billion in leveraged loans and high yield.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) ·10:46
How to verify: Check UBS Asset Management public disclosures or fact sheets for AUM in credit strategies. For recent events, verify 2026-08-11 through 2026-11-11. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceMichael Chaisanguanthum joined Credit Suisse Asset Management in 2007.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·10:17
How to verify: Verify via Michael Chaisanguanthum's LinkedIn profile or UBS press releases. For recent events, verify 2026-08-11 through 2026-11-11. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Michael Chaisanguanthum holds a business degree from Berkeley and a JD from Harvard Law School.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·8:00
How to verify: Verify via Michael Chaisanguanthum's LinkedIn profile or professional biography. For recent events, verify 2026-08-11 through 2026-11-11. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Credit Suisse Asset Management was subsumed by UBS Asset Management in 2024.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·8:20
How to verify: Check UBS annual reports or press releases regarding the acquisition of Credit Suisse's asset management business. For recent events, verify 2026-08-11 through 2026-11-11. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceThe Serta LME court decision did not significantly slow the market because credit agreements evolved.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) ·24:46
How to verify: Review Serta Holdings LLC bankruptcy filings and subsequent credit agreement amendments. For recent events, verify 2026-08-11 through 2026-11-11. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceThe Incore Fifth Circuit decision was reversed.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·25:31
How to verify: Check US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit docket for Incore Holdings LLC. For recent events, verify 2026-08-11 through 2026-11-11. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The Optum antitrust lawsuit was resolved/settled.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) ·21:22
How to verify: Check court records or press releases regarding Optum antitrust litigation status. For recent events, verify 2026-08-11 through 2026-11-11. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
LME documentation is typically tight, and 'LME 2.0' where companies threaten deal-away transactions to get a second bite is not commonly seen.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·31:48
How to verify: Review LME term sheets and credit agreements for 'deal away' provisions and 'omniblocker' clauses; check for precedents of multiple LMEs in the same restructuring cycle. For recent events, verify 2026-08-11 through 2026-11-11. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceBankruptcy laws favor secured creditors, who control DIP financing and plan confirmation.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·32:19
How to verify: Review US Bankruptcy Code provisions regarding DIP financing priority and plan confirmation requirements; analyze case studies of secured creditor control in Chapter 11. For recent events, verify 2026-08-11 through 2026-11-11. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Lenders are increasingly allowing companies to pursue 'deal away' transactions rather than forcing new capital into LMEs, provided there is broad creditor cooperation.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) ·35:13
How to verify: Analyze recent LME announcements for 'deal away' clauses and lender consent patterns; review market reports on LME trends from 2026-2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-11 through 2026-11-11. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Revolver maturities no longer automatically trigger restructuring events due to evolved credit agreements.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) ·42:49
How to verify: Review recent credit agreements for 'going concern' opinion clauses and revolver maturity provisions; compare with historical precedents from 10-15 years ago. For recent events, verify 2026-08-11 through 2026-11-11. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Steering committee formation is driven 80-90% by position size, with willingness to get restricted being a non-factor.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) ·45:10
How to verify: Analyze composition of official committees in recent Chapter 11 cases; review committee formation statements and lender participation rates. For recent events, verify 2026-08-11 through 2026-11-11. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Roll-ups are opaque and present fund compliance issues; Speaker_3 prefers hefty upfront fees for new money.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) ·57:18
How to verify: Review bankruptcy court opinions on roll-up approvals; analyze fund prospectuses for DIP financing restrictions; compare fee structures in recent bankruptcies. For recent events, verify 2026-08-11 through 2026-11-11. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Courts in Del Monte and American Tire cases correctly addressed roll-up economics.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) ·57:18
How to verify: Review court opinions in In re Del Monte Foods, LLC and In re American Tire Distributors, Inc. for rulings on roll-up economics and lender compensation. For recent events, verify 2026-08-11 through 2026-11-11. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Speaker_3’s firm charged a 30-point fee in the Mark IV bankruptcy in 2009 instead of doing a roll-up.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) ·58:10
How to verify: Review bankruptcy filings and fee applications for Mark IV (2026); check for DIP financing terms and lender compensation structures. For recent events, verify 2026-08-11 through 2026-11-11. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceJudge Wiles issued a decision regarding LME tactics where a group was backstopping a deal while holding back participation.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) ·59:52
How to verify: Search PACER for decisions by Judge Wiles in bankruptcy cases involving liability management exercises or uptier exchanges prior to 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-11 through 2026-11-11. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceCompanies have become better at structuring LMEs to make valuation challenges difficult, leading to fewer contests than in 2009.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) ·1:01:16
How to verify: Compare bankruptcy filing data and valuation contest rates from 2026 to 2026 using SEC EDGAR filings and bankruptcy court dockets. For recent events, verify 2026-08-11 through 2026-11-11. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceUK law allows for cross-class cram downs and schemes of arrangement that are cheaper and more efficient than US Chapter 11.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·1:02:50
How to verify: Review UK Insolvency Act 2026 (as amended) and compare procedural costs and timelines in UK Companies Court vs. US Bankruptcy Court. For recent events, verify 2026-08-11 through 2026-11-11. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The speaker uses Microsoft Copilot for document review and comparison of credit agreements.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) ·1:05:28
How to verify: Verify employment of Michael Chaisanguanthum at UBS Asset Management and potential public disclosures or case studies on AI usage in credit investing. For recent events, verify 2026-08-11 through 2026-11-11. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceThe high-yield distress ratio exceeded 11% for 75 consecutive months before rising from 4.5% to 7.3% in the past three months.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·1:07:46
How to verify: Check Bloomberg Intelligence or S&P Global Market Intelligence data for the US High Yield Distress Ratio index for the period 2026-2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-11 through 2026-11-11. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The all-in default rate is close to 2%, including distress exchanges, down from 4% last year.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) ·1:08:24
How to verify: Verify against S&P Global or Moody's distressed debt default rate reports for the relevant period. For recent events, verify 2026-08-11 through 2026-11-11. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Encora's 2022 LME involved issuing $250 million in additional secured notes maturing in 2026, followed by a collateral release.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·1:11:19
How to verify: Review Encora's SEC filings (Form 8-K or Indenture Amendments) from 2026 and the Fifth Circuit appeal docket for JP Morgan/BlackRock v. Encora. For recent events, verify 2026-08-11 through 2026-11-11. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceChapter 11 was previously stated as not being on the table for Geo.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·1:35:38
How to verify: Check prior earnings call transcripts or press releases from Geo regarding their capital structure and bankruptcy contingency plans. For recent events, verify 2026-08-11 through 2026-11-11. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Do your own research
- Verify the $110 billion distressed high yield inventory figure using S&P Global or Bloomberg Distressed Data.
- Check the distress ratio calculation methodology (distressed inventory / total high yield) via S&P Global or ICE BofA indices.
- Review the specific terms of the Serta and Incore LME court decisions to understand the narrow legal distinctions cited.
- Examine the capital structure of CoreWeave and recent tech sector distress filings to assess sector concentration risks.
- Compare US Chapter 11 timelines and outcomes with UK Scheme of Arrangement precedents for cross-border restructuring efficiency.
- Analyze the Getty Images prepackaged bankruptcy plan details, specifically the $433 million sponsor package and 37% noteholder haircut.
- Review Xerox's Q3 earnings report and the terms of the 2028/2030 note exchange to understand the negative bond price reaction.
- Assess Hughes Satellite's December 1st exclusivity hearing details and Telesat's CAD 1.9 billion maturity financing status.
Full transcriptexpand
- 0:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Welcome to Fick Focus, where Bloomberg Intelligence fixed income, credit, currency, and commodity strategists and guests discuss current and future market influences. Now, here's the Bloomberg Intelligence FIC Research Team.
- 0:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Good tidings, dear listeners, and welcome to the November 2026 edition of State of Distrust Dent, part of the Fick Focus podcast series where we focus on the U.S. trust, distrust, and bankruptcy markets.
- 0:34
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I'm
- 0:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): your host, Noel Hebert, and joining me to explore the state of play our senior litigation analyst, Nagisa Baluku, and senior distrust analyst Phil Bradell, each of us of Bloomberg Intelligence that's the research arm of Blooberg Bloomberg LP. In addition, we are excited to bring you Phil and the in Gisa's. the Giz's conversation with Michael Chisenwantham. He's
- 0:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): head of restructuring for UBS Asset Management's Credit Investments Group. So really interesting conversation there. But before we get to that conversation, Phil, let's go ahead and come to you. You know, we we are in early November here. October was a pretty turbulent month, a lot of pressure around the edges of the AI narrative. They're Though across high yield,
- 1:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): we saw some relief in treasuries, which resulted, I guess, in total returns or positive total returns to the high yield index through November 6th here as we're recording on the 9th. Uh, you know, excess returns across high yield remain negative, but we have some Santa seasonals coming up ahead. So, how do you view the state of play
- 1:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): here? What's the outlook? And I guess maybe not least in light of the fact that. we just had the midterms and a very strong showing by the Democrats.
- 1:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): The political angle I haven't really fully digested. Um I I think the one clear thing there is that with all the governors swinging towards the left and uh Democrats, you know, that we might see more regulatory hold on uh AI build-outs, build outs that that that that's no the surprise to anyone. I mean, I think that's been the f one of the
- 2:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): focus. focuses in the market. But you know, when we take a look at how October behaved, there's some interesting things going on. Um, distressed high yield inventory jumped by 33 billion, you know, in the ICEUS high yield index uh to hit 110 billion at the end of October. Um that gave us a distress ratio of seven 7.3%. point three
- 2:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): percent. I think that's the highest mark since June 2024.
- 2:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Um, you know, and actually it was such an abrupt jump that we I have this like uh technical signal I look for where I I try and capture two month jumps of greater than 25%, two month jumps greater than 20 billion, and uh reaching a six month high. Um, and three of these
- 2:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): four conditions existed that I might have said, hey, this might be. a good time to get out of high yield. But the fourth condition is that the supply starting point had to be in a lower, you know, call it the lower sixth of uh the past three years of uh, you know, I I I call it the seven lowest months over
- 3:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): the past three years. And it wasn't one of those. It was the thirteenth lowest. So not even that this signal is so great, but uh you know what we're tr what we're really trying to do is because credit cycles typically ended with surges, that hasn't been the case for quite some time. But that also could be because this credit rally is insanely long. But this signal has
- 3:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): gone off already two two times and missed. Um May 2022. Holders of the high yields continued continue to make money from there in March of 2025. Um and you know, there it's a little bit more of a pedestrian r return, but still those signals the the sky wasn't falling on either of those. So I
- 3:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): just point that out because when you do see these sharp jumps, it's time to pay attention, beware. We are coming off of low distress ratio levels. It was like four and a half percent just two months ago. You just gotta be kind of on the lookout. And one of the more interesting things that went on was technology is now atop the leaderboard
- 4:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): of distress. That happened compliments of core weave at the end of October. Um financials also jumped three point three percentage points to five point six percent. Uh so we're we're we're definitely seeing a little broadening out, still utilities and energy. There's literally no distress to speak of. It's kind of interesting. Um
- 4:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): I think you have to be somewhat nimble yet. And I as you pointed out, I that the technicals are starting to swing. This is kind of natural, is that, you know, the the all the months leading to November, uh the six months, that that half of the calendar is pretty negative. And then December we start getting more of an
- 4:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): upswing. So um it's it's never never clear cut, but you know, I I do think that um it is time to be very wary of the length of this high yield market's rally, which I think is, you know, I I track it by looking at how long it has it been since we
- 5:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): had a uh a stress ratio higher than eleven percent and it's been seventy-five months, which is more than a little more than six years. So
- 5:15
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): yeah,
- 5:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I guess uh that kind of maybe answers the question that I was gonna ask whether does anything feel, I guess, different because if we think about, you know, you mentioned 2022, obviously we we had the rate hiking cycle there. We've got twenty twenty five, uh, you know, just in advance of the tariff announcement there. And then we've got uh, you know, last year we had a little bit of a hiccup as relates, or I guess
- 5:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): earlier this year technically with the Iran war, but none of those have had sort of staying power as you look at sort of where we sit today and and you'd mentioned sort of maybe a little bit of broadening out here in terms of where we're seeing the pockets of distress. Anything here that sort of says, hey, maybe we're ready to see more of a cycle or or is it just too premature?
- 5:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): You know, th war didn't seem to take down this market. Political turmoil doesn't seem to take down this market. It's unclear uh that perhaps the market's the only thing that'll you know, it running out of its own steam, uh may be the only thing possible. Um the AI is really interesting because there is just
- 6:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): so much issuance there now and there's so much off the balance sheet off b balance sheet financing. And, you know, to the extent that we start seeing some
- 6:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): some unwinding of uh hedge funds and and you know real systemic risk which you know
- 6:34
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): m
- 6:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): that that's when we really get, you know, when we hit these liquidity gaps. So I and I think for that you basically have to monitor all aspects of the of all the markets. I do think it's interesting we had the sharp move down in the NASDAQ. We know that, you know, I I guess
- 6:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): record high uh security loans of credit uh lines of credit are uh I think it's like one point four trillion dollars of uh debt against personal security holdings. It'll be interesting with some of these sharp moves down. You know, do we get a great unwind? Mind. Um I I'd be I'd be focused on
- 7:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): uh looking for that.
- 7:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): All right.
- 7:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Well so something to keep an eye on for sure. And I guess sets us up here to turn now to uh Nigisa and Phil's conversation with UBS's Michael Chai Sanguantham.
- 7:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Welcome, listeners. Nikisa and I are thrilled to have Michael Chai Sangwantham join us today, November 5th on our State of Distress podcast. Michael's a managing director at UBSS. UBS Asset Management, where he's the head of restructuring for its credit investments group. Michael, welcome.
- 7:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Phil, thank you. And Nagisa, thank you for having me. Uh would just like to tell everyone Phil and I have known each other for what twenty a really long time. I think we went through some restructurings together back in the uh in the GFC.
- 7:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Yes. So
- 7:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): it it's
- 7:58
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): has
- 7:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): certainly been a while.
- 8:00
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It
- 8:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): definitely has been. Before we jump into it, I thought we'd go through a little bit of your bio, a business degree from Berkeley, a JD from Harvard Law School, then Weil Gottshaw. And in 2007, you joined Credit Suisse Asset Management, which is where we first met on Spansion. That was a wonderful outcome, but it was
- 8:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): an interesting uh chapter 11 case. And then CSAM was subsumed by US UBS. asset management in 2024. So you've been there for qu quite a while. Um first off, that that's an impressive background. I'm curious when in your journeys did you realize you wanted to live in this
- 8:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): wonderful world of distress debt?
- 8:42
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah.
- 8:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): I mean, let me start slightly from the beginning, and it's it's not a long story. Like like any kid, you know, you never really have the the right reasons for wanting to do something, but I had in me I had the idea that I wanted to do business undergrad and and go to law school. Um, when I was in law school, I started um with the mindset that I wanted to be a tax lawyer. You know, my
- 9:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): dad being a tax accountant might have might have had something to do with that. And when I was in law school, then I switched to M MA and A just 'cause just because that that was kind of what was viewed as hot at the time. Um, and my connection to bankruptcy and and to Weil, and and obviously very unfortunate what happened to Weil recently, um, and you know, still have no people there
- 9:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): and no lot of people that have left there. Um, but I was I I wanted I liked the transactional aspects of law school, but I also like the the the litigation aspects and the arguing. And and and so people said bankruptcy was the one intersection. where you kind of did both. Obviously there's less restructuring sound and that's a different story.
- 9:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): But so that's that's where I landed at while uh that's how I I went wound up at Weil. And then ultimately moving to the buy side was again trying to come back to connecting both of my backgrounds. You know, the work seemed more interesting on the buy side that you got to see bigger picture. And I think everyone who works at law a law firm knows there's there's a little bit of
- 10:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): better uh balance uh on the buy side than than working on the sell side.
- 10:08
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 10:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): those those are the factors that drove me to my current seat. And as as you noted, I've been at this seat now for um since oh seven.
- 10:17
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Almost
- 10:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): fascinating that you had it you you had it in your mind at a pretty early age that uh you know this is this is what you wanted to do.
- 10:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): For all the wrong reasons.
- 10:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Well we'll get into like some of the dynamics that you've seen is
- 10:31
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it's like a restructuring
- 10:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): sometimes you just need to pick a direction. It's very true. For the sake of direction.
- 10:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): So finally to let our listeners appreciate your perspective, could you describe where you fit in the UBS asset management investment process?
- 10:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Sure. Um so my group is called the Credit Investments Group. We are in a $60 billion plus manager of leveraged loans and high yield focused in both um U.S. and Europe.
- 10:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): And I am the head of restructuring. I'm the workout guy. I'm the workout person for our group. And so
- 11:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): we are not a distress shop, but you know, we invariably given our market scale and and the
- 11:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): diversification of our portfolio, we have bump bumps in the road, and my job is to work out those bumps in the road.
- 11:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Got it. And so it it more of a defensive role. I mean, you know, clearly there's always new money opportunities, but you know, and and I'm sure that that that that keeps you on the investment side as well.
- 11:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): That's right. And and there was a a p portion of my career, and I think this was helpful to my background where um I covered par credit for about 10, 15 years. I think the roads to these different positions is is very different for different people. I I covered actually aerospace and defense and gaming for for a while. And yes, we, you know, when I started, we
- 11:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): had a we we did we had a hedge fund. Um, you know, we do have pockets markets to do opportunistic, but you have to be mindful of the vehicles you're investing in. And so, you know, there are opportunities. to increase positions, um, things like that.
- 12:06
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
- 12:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): I I I've I remember when I worked as a workout guy at a big asset manager, one of the things that was said at the time is like we don't really need to invest in distressed when things are really bad because our whole portfolio tends to be that way. So it's like
- 12:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): it was so sort of interesting. from that perspective. Uh well
- 12:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): you you brought up Spansion, I remember, and and I don't know why I remember this, uh I remember we were discussing internally, not not you and I, we were discussing at the time swapping from uh Bering Point. Uh do you remember that name to Spansion? And I don't think we we ever pulled the trigger, but that would have been a fantastic trade.
- 12:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Yeah. To let people know our spansion bonds were in the twenties. We got paid out of par plus accrued, I think, within a year. It was uh just, you know, one of those quick turnarounds that really was dramatic. And and it was uh basically switching from a sale process to a standalone.
- 13:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Yeah, and and even more dramatic, the the junior instrument was trading at like zero to one and got a one forty plus recovery.
- 13:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Yes. It's pretty crazy. That's great. I'm gonna let's jump into it. Nigisa, I'll pass the baton to you because I know you have lots of questions for Michael.
- 13:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah, that sounds good. Thanks, Phil. Um so I guess building on that defensive role, uh, maybe we'll start with creditor cooperation generally. It is clear, obviously, that who who's s is at the table can share. shape a lot of the options available to an investor, but also to the borrower. So
- 13:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): say you're holding
- 13:46
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a
- 13:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): loan, leveraged loan, you hear that other creditors are beginning to organize. I'm curious how you approach the decision of whether and how to join a corporation cooperation agreement. Um
- 14:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): how does it that calculation perhaps change depending on the type and size of the holdings? Who how does that work behind the scenes?
- 14:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Yeah. Um, I guess a couple of comments. I think I think given our when we're large, when our position size is top three, four, five, which it which it often is, we're not hearing about co-ops. We're we're usually the ones talking to other holders and and driving that process forward. And so
- 14:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): there has been this trend towards more co-ops recently and earlier. There's less of a view towards, hey, I want to preserve my optionality to do the in-group-out-group deal. Um, and so I think there has been more of a proactiveness towards co-ops to protect lenders.
- 14:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): um, these sort of open wide co-ops that are offered to the market. And I think big holders are are doing it earlier and proactively. I mean, they're there really, unless you're trying to preserve flexibility, there isn't a lot of downside to co-oping other than your personal time bandwidth. And
- 15:08
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): yeah,
- 15:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): it creates It's a little noise. It may have an impact on trading levels. I don't really try to factor that personally into my decision making. because it's hard to predict the impact. Um, but yeah, it creates noise. You know, it's not viewed favorably by sponsors or companies when you're co-oping their names. But generally speaking, it is an effective and protective tool. And so I
- 15:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): I think I think um I think people are more willing to sign them now. And I'm guessing you have both observed this trend.
- 15:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So the trading flexibility doesn't seem to be a a concern, right? But how about the sort of ability to pursue alternative transactions, especially if you are one of the largest holder? Is that a concern at those initial stages?
- 15:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Um, not for us. I think you know, the flexibility you're probably thinking about is if I could do my own pull away or if I could do a 51%, 49% in-group, outgroup deal. Um,
- 16:07
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
- 16:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): know, there has been less interest in that among I I think both for me and and at my peer shops.
- 16:16
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um
- 16:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): we went through a period of a lot of in-group outgroup Group deals probably last year and and some printed earlier this year, but those I think were negotiated last year.
- 16:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): And and the trading history on those and the performance has not has not been great. And so that flexibility, I think people are willing to to give up more and try to do something pro rata.
- 16:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Um and that takes away this, you know, competitive element where the company tries to pit two sets of lender groups against each
- 16:47
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): other.
- 16:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): What is is there an impact of holding other market positions, whether it's in relation to the same borrower or alongside other creditors holding a position, does that impact the dynamics or um decisions to create or enter a co-op?
- 17:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Yeah, yeah, no, it does. It does. I mean, when you have, for example, shorter instruments that are likely just going to get taken out. anyways by the company, for example, um, or you have bonds, um,
- 17:21
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): or
- 17:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): you you know, whether they're Perry secured or junior, it it does complicate the co op negotiation a lot. If you have like a s very simple capital structure where it's just one tranche or term loan and and just set aside the revolver because r I don't think revolvers are really ever part of the co co-op. op. It's a a fairly simple co-op negotiation.
- 17:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): That it then when you start involving other parts of the capital structure, and if you want to include them to be part of the co-op, then everyone starts looking at their, you know, how their book is set out, you know, where where their weightings are, where their relative rights in the different docks are, which docks control, which docks are tighter, which docks docs are looser, you know, which
- 18:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): docks docs are in which which which security or loan is inside maturity. Um, no one wants to give up their relative position uh when negotiating the co-op. So the co-ops can become very bespoke in in terms of both what is covered by the co-op and then how voting
- 18:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): works in the co-op.
- 18:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): And so, like I'll just give you one one simple example. Like, so if I'm signing a co-op for a loan that matures in 2030 and um there's a bond tranche that matures um in six months,
- 18:37
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
- 18:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): would probably just ignore that bond. Even if the bond tranche is unsecured, you'd probably just leave that bond tranche out of the co-op. There's no no real reason to include it. The company, most docs are loose, you know, being perfectly candid company probably has the ability to refi out that bontranche. So I think the assumption in a scenario like that, if it was a small bon tranche,
- 18:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): would be to just let just let the um that bontranche get repaid by whatever the company wants to
- 19:02
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): do.
- 19:04
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well
- 19:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and that's sweet spot you said as to can being considered a large holder, it sort of comes down to three to five percent. That's kind of the range that's typical.
- 19:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Three to f you mean who the large holders are?
- 19:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah. Yeah.
- 19:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): I think it I I when I said three to five, I meant top three to five. Um
- 19:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): it yeah I think it depends on the capital structure.
- 19:26
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Uh
- 19:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): in in some loans, someone can be the top holder can be twenty, twenty five percent. And some in a really big capital structure, the top holders probably three, four, five percent.
- 19:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah.
- 19:38
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Okay.
- 19:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Um, can we talk a bit about the dispending antitrust cases, which kind of feels like old news now? And uh I could
- 19:47
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 19:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): don't could ask you about those potential chilling effects, which you're probably gonna say there hasn't been any. But
- 19:53
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 19:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): am curious though whether you've seen the market respond in any way uh in terms of tweaking uh certain terms. to perhaps resist litigation in the future, whether that's avoiding cross-class co-op structure, permitting new money opportunities. Have you seen
- 20:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): some of those kind of small changes come out of those cases?
- 20:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): I I have, and and I'm not an antitrust Trust lawyer. That's not on my background.
- 20:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): And so those provisions are usually d driven by antitrust people. But yes, I think there has been some more nuance around the new money. You you point them out exactly the new money provisions in co-ops and and participating in co-op in in in new money financings. Um like you'll see like a
- 20:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): provision that might say if there's a broadly syndicated deal, you can participate and that doesn't violate the co-op, which candidly I think was is the intent. of co-ops. I don't think co-ops are intended to block that. Um, or you might see a provision that says you can do a new money transaction that doesn't amend the existing
- 21:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): documentation, um, i.e., it's uh is allowed under existing baskets. Um, so there has been some move of some movement around there. But yeah, look, like like both of you, I'm I'm eagerly aware. awaiting to hear how that lawsuit uh I think there was articles that that a lawsuit has settled that that you know
- 21:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): optimum is now resolved, but I haven't heard any color on what the settlement looks like. You're right in that the the filing of that lawsuit did not in any way I think slow the market down from signing co co-ops. ops.
- 21:36
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah
- 21:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): and I think it's probably less about a lawsuit, but more about a deal in general, though obviously the lawsuit is most likely part of it. But it I mean, it seems
- 21:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): unlikely at this point that we'll get an answer out of both of those cases, Altiste and Selecta. Uh there's a pending motion to dismiss without a decision in Altis LTs and then Selecta. It's at least from oral arguments, it seems that the judge is staying. away from the whole
- 22:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): antitrust question. So it it it's I think more likely than not that we will not get an answer out of those cases. But I uh do you I mean, i if we don't, do you think there may be other tests to it? And the postures have been different, right? You had LTs from brought by the company, you had the minority lenders bringing uh Selecta. Do you think we may see
- 22:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): other litigations in the space? with respect to co-op formation and to trusts?
- 22:31
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 22:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): d I don't know. I mean, I forgot about Selecta when I was when I was responding, but yes, it is an unusual switch situation in that it's creditors making the allegation, not companies. Um I I don't know because it I think it will depend upon whether or not more borrowers are willing to bring the litigation.
- 22:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): You know, my my understanding, again, not being an antitrust lawyer, is that it's it doesn't have a law to merit to bring that litigation. And so I don't know what it does other than increasing leverage. But as you know, our legal system takes a long time
- 23:06
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): to
- 23:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): play out. So you're not really, other than surviving a motion to dismiss, which seems to be the goal of a lot of litigation. So you can torture people with. discovery. It doesn't seem to be that useful of a tool, at least in in my mind. And I think you're pointing out exactly the other thing, which is that lawsuits decisions tend to be
- 23:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): not very satisfactory in in answering questions the market has. They tend to be very narrow, which they're supposed to be. I think that I I remember from law school that that is a guiding principle of judges are supposed to decide things. as narrowly as possible. And so, you know, we've had all these decisions on LMEs, various different ones, and
- 23:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): you know, they're all pretty narrow and they're all pretty distinguishable from each other. And that the LME train will probably continue to chug along.
- 23:55
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So let's I guess let's stay a little bit um on those LME decisions, and we don't need to get into any of those the
- 24:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): details, obviously. But what would you consider to have been some of the most impactful one and it hasn't been that many right and most of them reversed with certain maitell not not reversed but then we had in cora we we are recording this on the fifth as Phil said and there was the oral argument of the
- 24:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Fifth Circuit were just uh on the second so three days ago. Would you consider one of them or a few of them to be more impactful than the rest? Um, I'm also curious about this kind of impact also because this decisions come years down the line after the LME has already happened, right? So it's also a question
- 24:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): there as to how relevant they are uh that many years down the road.
- 24:45
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
- 24:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Sirta SERT Serta's is a good example of that. So so first of all, since the transaction happened, I think so many credit agreements have evolved so that the open market language is quite different than than the one probably in the Serta language. And so I don't know how impactful that decision is. And then, you know,
- 25:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): I guess the other thing I would say was I I I was when when the Fifth Circuit decision came out, I thought that
- 25:13
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
- 25:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): LME machine might. slow down and then within a week or two you saw
- 25:19
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
- 25:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): what were the um better.
- 25:21
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): My my talk came
- 25:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): out the same day as Sirta actually though. I mean that
- 25:25
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): was
- 25:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Yes,
- 25:25
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and it
- 25:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): went the other yeah, it went the other way. And then in
- 25:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Cora got reversed and then
- 25:31
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): this
- 25:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): regards that's the you are right, there was a there was a period a short period that were there was some kind of uh concern.
- 25:37
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It There
- 25:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): was like a day of concern. Yeah.
- 25:39
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Exactly.
- 25:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): And then and then Better Health and Oregon Tool quickly were done. And the the creative lawyers found workarounds. Um
- 25:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): I think given how muddied and narrow, how muddied and distinguishable and narrow the decisions are, I I don't feel like any of the decisions have really had much of an impact on on LME or not. Um, you know, there has been a trend recently
- 26:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): towards less in-group-out group LME. But I don't think that was decision driven. I think that was just, you know, for lack of a better way of saying it, market frustration with with in-group-out-group deals.
- 26:20
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): That
- 26:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that makes sense. And how about other, I mean, I gotta leave on the aside side of decisions and the antitrust cases. Uh w
- 26:27
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
- 26:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): if you were to think of all the tools that the boarders have and whether they're ridiculous or aggressive NDAs or voting caps or maybe even anti-co-op clauses, I'm curious how if how many of those uh you're seeing. But w any particular effort that you think is gaining more steam than others
- 26:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that creditors may be most concerned about? How how's that landscape now?
- 26:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Yeah, let's I mean, let's take them one by one. I mean, on on aggressive NDAs, I'm not a huge fan of them because the largely the company comes to you and says we need to restrict you and a few top holders because we need to figure out this capital structure. Our capital structure is a problem.
- 27:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): And then they give you this. horrific document to sign. So it there there is a little bit of a funny setup, in my opinion. And and you know, but then when you look at a lot of these provisions, I think a lot of it is arguing about, you know, things that either,
- 27:31
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you know,
- 27:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): we shouldn't be arguing about or the other side shouldn't be asking for. I I think the months of fighting over NDAs in some of these deals. is extremely frustrating.
- 27:41
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um,
- 27:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): but yeah, I guess if you go provision by provision, um like the the typical ones are,
- 27:49
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you know,
- 27:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): the gag, the ability to talk to other people. And that's a big it depends on who we're talking
- 27:54
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): about. Uh
- 27:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): that's something that company lawyers insist upon. Um,
- 27:58
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
- 27:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): know, if there's two creditor groups, for example, fighting each other and and com or competing against each other, I should say, I I don't think it's unfair for a company to to to ask for a DAG. Um if the company might pursue a drop and you're the kind of required lender group and and the company says don't go talk to the the lenders that I'm talking to about a
- 28:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): drop down, I I think that's fair. But like when they say don't talk to the sponsor, don't talk to management, I don't really see a purpose in a provision like that.
- 28:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Anti-interference language, I have a strong palm with. You know, we have signed it in the past, but it it's in kind of very limited sort of sleeves off the vest scenarios. And so I think the market usually gets there on a workable NDA, but yes, it does seem like unnecessary, you know, jostling or breaking new
- 28:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): ground before a negotiation even starts.
- 28:52
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 28:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): how about DQLs? There's a lot of talk about them. I am curious
- 28:59
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): kind
- 28:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): of realistically what the
- 29:01
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): impact of them has been or is now on the ground. We talk about how expansive they've gotten in terms of FLIS, but also the language can is getting broader or
- 29:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): kind of hard
- 29:13
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): to define. Um there's also ways to get around. They're like derivative instruments. What what how what are you seeing there?
- 29:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Yeah. Some DQ lists are are quite ridiculous where it it's almost like the entire market and and and so the debt the debt cannot trade. We're we're not a fan of that. I'm gonna give you a a very maybe answer. I don't mind DQ lists that keep extremely aggressive hedge funds out because I think when it does come to
- 29:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): a restructuring, a lot of times me and my brethren are often more aligned with the sponsor than you know, and I'm not gonna say any names obviously, but like super aggressive hedge fund distressed hedge fund. I do think, you know, some of the remedies on DQ lists seem a little unfair. Like I think there is some language in some credit agreements
- 30:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): that they can retroactively yank people at at the worst of cost or market. I have you seen that. I that seems really unfair to to retroactively DQ somebody and and and
- 30:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I've heard of them. I just uh my understanding was that they're just not that common. But yeah, and I
- 30:17
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): yeah.
- 30:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Um
- 30:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): so you know that that does seem a bit unfair, but yeah, I think I'm not categorically against the DQ lists. I just don't think it's it should be too, too broad and and used too aggressively because obviously it destroys liquidity in a loan. Um, you know, when we go through and obviously
- 30:37
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): if
- 30:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): a new if a primary issue new deal is comes to market and the deal is going well, we don't really have a lot of influence on this provision or who makes the DQ D key list. But when we go through
- 30:49
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): an
- 30:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): amend and extend or or a a liability amend liability management transaction, the lenders do have an opportunity to to try to kind of cut down that D key list.
- 31:01
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 31:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I guess one other thing kind of I'm curious along
- 31:04
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
- 31:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): this size and then and I don't know how involved you are uh in this but
- 31:10
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
- 31:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): there's this and I'll kind of let Phil talk a
- 31:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): kind
- 31:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): of cover this post LME space, but I am curious as to um
- 31:20
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh w
- 31:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): how you prepare for that kind of post LME phase and whether how you make sure that the docs are actually locked. Do you even think of a second LME? How d w kind of w what kind of thought process goes uh goes there when when you are in that when you are in
- 31:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the current LME, obviously?
- 31:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Yeah, we're we're not thinking about a second LME. I think an LME is,
- 31:48
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): at
- 31:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): least I view it, and I think a lot of people view it as one one bite at the apple. Um
- 31:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): typically LME docs are tight. I have not seen the LME 2.0 where where the company can threaten a deal. away transaction to get a second bite. And so I think a lot of how you think about the second phase is it's a restructuring. Um, and you want it's then
- 32:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): then it becomes like classic restructuring. You want to be
- 32:19
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in
- 32:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): the fulcrum and and as high in the capital structure as possible because our bankruptcy laws favor. the secured part of the structure. The first, you know, the secured structures tend to drive these processes. They tend to control dip financing. They, you know, it the easiest way to confirm a plan is to confirm it with your
- 32:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): the top of your capital structure, not the bottom. And so I think we just generally want to be senior, but not too senior. Obviously, you don't you you do want to be the fulcrum.
- 32:49
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Okay,
- 32:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): well, let's let's wait for the chat. chapter 11 planning a little bit,
- 32:52
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): but uh
- 32:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we'll touch on that at the at the end, but still I'll I'll hand it to you.
- 32:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Great. Thanks. Michael, you've been doing this a while. You know, we didn't call them LMEs, you know, like 20 years ago. Um th they they they got that name probably in the teens. Having gone through so many and having gone through, you know, we we talk about like the second round of Mellames, LMEs, but you know. that generally means chapter eleven, you
- 33:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): obviously have learned a lot from all these uh experiences.
- 33:22
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): W
- 33:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): do you have any particular guiding principles when you start when you get involved in an L and negotiation? And i it could be as simple as like I like meetings in person or or virtually, you know, d dynamics of the groups, too many, too few. Just any any sort of guiding principles that kind of like
- 33:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): uh you tend to run by something that makes the hair stand up on the back of your neck when you know you see it happening in it within a group. Just curious.
- 33:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): That's a that's a great one and it's a tough one. I mean I I think what I'm hyper focused now on and then and we're defining LME here as in group outgroup. out group, right? And in group out group, majority, major minority deal. Um
- 34:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): what I'm hyper focused on is not, and it's kind of a lesson learned from older ones, is not losing money on the new money. I think there are a lot of uh examples of that happening in the past. And and so you know, when
- 34:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): you retranch up a capital structure, I think there has been this trend on the more recent LMEs to to do less debt and less appearing of debt into that new money tranche. And, you know, so what if if it's a very thin tranche and it doesn't really trade? I mean, you know, as I was saying earlier, most of these LMEs don't trade well.
- 34:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): And I think a corollary of that is also, you know, not to
- 34:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): not to
- 34:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): not to feel like you have to put in the new money. Like if if I think the market has evolved to now the um if you want if the company is going to do a deal away, um and you're properly co-op and stuff, you let them do the deal away. Like, you know, if if
- 35:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): there's the deal. away only hurts you when the when the c and just for the benefit of the audience, like the deal away is when the company goes and uses its baskets and borrows money from a third party lender. There's a competitive market for that. The company will have to run their processes and those financings aren't are not cheap, but they're not egregious. And so those only really hurt
- 35:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): the existing lenders when there's some uptiering involved. And so if there's no if you have a wide co op. co-op and there's fairly very little opportunity for them to uptier some existing debt into that deal away, I think the market has been willing to test that more and say, hey,
- 35:50
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): do
- 35:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): the deal away.
- 35:52
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You
- 35:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): know. Got it. And and obviously if that company files later, we'll probably have to take out the financing, but at least we'll wait to see that fight.
- 36:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): And I I I imagine a lot. has to do with the kind of funds that you are uh working with. If you're in a CLO, putting new money in isn't necessarily the the heart and soul of that business. Uh you know, put putting in rescue financing or exit financing. Whereas like if you're in a hedge fund, perhaps you want to make
- 36:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): concentrated traded bets and, you know, view those aggressive uh uh co-ops uh ingress in-group out group dynamics. So so when these things start up, how do you protect yourself in these situations? Do you maintain that flexibility to always be able to you know have be able to
- 36:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): participate in the new money? Is that I know that was an issue for you know me I mean back in the days when I was doing this, but you know i it i i from what I've heard, a lot uh of the funds families have gotten to the point where that's less and less of a concern.
- 36:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Yeah, I think it's less and less of a concern. C CLOs are actually subject to their tests, pretty flexible. And I think among our more flexible vehicles, if they're if they're still in in the you know, their early or midlife. Uh once they're post reinvest or in the twilight of their life, then yeah, it's hard to put put up money. And then, you know,
- 37:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): among other funds, we have a lot of very flexible funds. Um, but I generally think I generally think if if you can
- 37:24
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): save
- 37:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): your dry pattern and just take care of it later when you s have a better sense of what the total amount of liquidity is, that's that's one guiding principle. Um but yeah we do try to we do try to going into an element LME or going into a restructuring, if we have funds that for like various reasons are likely
- 37:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): are unlikely to be able to put up capital or unlikely to be able to hold reorg equity for a long time, we probably would look to try to sell from those funds.
- 37:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): And how about difficult personalities in these groups? And you know, y it i was interesting I heard heard you mentioned you don't necessarily mind having some people on the exclusion list. Um and and so I I'm kind of curious what you know you described as aggressive. Like are are you talking about maybe just someone who's like always gonna
- 38:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): litigate and and just run up charges, um, you know, create nuisance value, or is it, you know, aggressive in terms of uh, you know, putting in new money and and and and doing those up-tier deals and that sort of thing?
- 38:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): I think it's more around the latter or the age-old fight over the distressed funds trying to put in put in equity dollars which a lot of par lenders can't but actually CLOs can now um can put in equity dollars which has been one of the big innovations. Um whether they should is a different question, but a lot of CLOs can
- 38:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): can put in equity dollars. So I think it's more it's more that fight.
- 38:51
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Got it.
- 38:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And in in terms of the LM negotiations, can you talk about the dynamic with advisors, management teams, and sponsors? Uh you know, you've gotten to know, I imagine, a lot of uh management teams.
- 39:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Do you think it's important to have those
- 39:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): principle
- 39:08
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): to
- 39:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): principle
- 39:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): relationships?
- 39:10
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um
- 39:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): and does that does that
- 39:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): m
- 39:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): make the
- 39:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): deal better? for you or
- 39:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): make
- 39:16
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that last
- 39:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): look more available to to lenders?
- 39:20
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I'm
- 39:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): curious how you view that, the importance
- 39:23
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): of
- 39:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that.
- 39:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): In terms of management, I think the industry has unfortunately, and this is a function of LME and not doing comprehensive restructurings, has moved towards less engagement with management and less diligence in these processes. I think most people would probably agree with that. Like twenty years ago you got a lot more info.
- 39:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And
- 39:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): that's a
- 39:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): real shame, I think.
- 39:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Spend more time with management. Yeah. And now there's a lot of um we're not going to blow that out, you know, so you can't have it and and you know the the the I think the the diligence level is not as strong in these processes as it was before. Um the advisor connection I think is is is essential. I think I think, look,
- 40:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): I'm this is gonna this may feel and sound like I'm talking my book a little, but like we're usually part of we're usually a large lender, we're usually part of the rec lender group. Usually in most cases, a deal makes sense with us, whether it's an LME or restructuring. And I think the advisor connection, and when I say us, I say me
- 40:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): in and the other par community, not I'm I'm not saying us individually. And so the advisor connection I think helps facilitate a deal and keeps things, for lack of a better expression, on the rails. Um and so it it you know it's the classic like everyone needs to get what they need, you
- 40:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): know, it let the whole you know, the expression in a every is this a need or a want in a in a in every negotiation. And I also like the other one, which is is everyone unhappy? That means it's a good compromise. That's kind of what has to happen in in in these deals.
- 40:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): So let's talk a little bit about um process um and ownership of that process. The debtors typically own the process are uh do as a as a group, um, you know, how important is it to try and be part of that like upfront? up front? Um, you know, I I heard you earlier d describe
- 41:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): it as maybe waiting to that last moment. Um does that change, you know, and I I I guess, you know, debtors are constantly trying to, you know, they they love p pitting creditor groups against each other or third party, you know, the deal away. And I I'm curious how how you view the the benefit
- 41:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): of allying with the uh debtors and you know what's the best approach w how do you find the best way of of doing that?
- 41:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): I think it's a multi-front effort. Um obviously we try to stay plugged in um you know to the advisors um and and our advisors to the company's advisors but at the same time we have relationships with the company through the analysts. We have relationships with the sponsors through the analysts and the and the credit
- 42:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): committee here. So it's a multi-front approach. You always want to stay connected, be a good partner.
- 42:15
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um,
- 42:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): but at the same time, until a company wants to engage with you, you can't force them to engage. They they need to be ready, they need to know what they want, they need to have a business plan to present to the lenders. So it is somewhat of a reactive process.
- 42:29
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 42:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): I think what you were saying earlier is yeah, they they wait until longer nowadays. The process is, if you go back to like 15 years ago, I felt like people would approach maturity a lot earlier, a maturity problem a lot earlier than than they do now. You have, I think we're negotiating early 27 maturities right now. And so
- 42:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): there's been less of concern about the impact of the business of a of uh maturity. You know, credit agreements have evolved where the going concern opinion just because of maturity is no longer an event of default. I remember back in our day again, to keep going back in time. Um remember how the revolver matured around a year before the term
- 43:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): loan. And oftentimes the revolver maturity would catalyze the restructuring. That that doesn't happen anymore now, too. When when has is a you know the revolver always gets extended? When when does a revolver negotiation ever catalyze something?
- 43:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): It's true.
- 43:23
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Can I
- 43:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): gee I ask a quick question on the advisor front, given the importance? Have you seen, I don't know how true this is, uh disqualified
- 43:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): advisor list, is that something that happens or is it just kind of an herbal legend?
- 43:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Is that on the legal side or the financial side?
- 43:38
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 43:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I think I don't I can tell you, but I I've heard I I I don't know. It's just I I have heard people talk about it, but I I don't know how how real it is.
- 43:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): And names would be appreciated there too if you've heard it
- 43:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): I I don't I haven't heard of qualified advisor list. There's definitely the um the common one. What's it called? I forget the legal term like uh approved, like approved uh
- 44:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the ones, yeah, the
- 44:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): approved lender council for those
- 44:08
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): for
- 44:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): BSLs where um sponsors have certain certain lawyers that do the agent work and and and basically negotiate the credit agreement. I have not, but you know, there are there are sponsors that definitely, I think on both sides of of the Atlantic try to influence the council decision.
- 44:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Makes sense.
- 44:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): So one thing I I wanted to get to is the dynamic between these steering steering committees and versus like the the the wider group. And you know, I'm kind of curious how you view, you know, one's position and willingness to get restricted versus uh, you know, relationship um that you
- 44:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): may have with the other lenders. You know, what's the most important thing when these steering groups get formed? You know, the w the the I I I imagine it's the former just uh uh size and willingness to get restricted, but I imagine both could play a role. Maybe you could describe how the the formation of these groups really uh takes place.
- 45:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): I think the willingness to get restricted is now um not a factor because I think everyone has learned that you need to be in the room or you know the deal is going to get negotiated around you and and and and you may get a worse deal. So virtually everyone is now willing to get restricted. I I have the same answer for this
- 45:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): always, which is it's like eighty, ninety percent position size. But then yes, real relationships matter and and who and if certain lenders are closer to other lenders they just talk more. And and then it's just natural. Our our business, going back to the comment about sponsors influence, influencing counsel, it's a highly personality-driven business. Um,
- 45:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): and so people who who are just talk to each other constantly, things come up, and you know, these
- 45:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): group formation, co-op formation, all these things happen organically.
- 46:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Are sponsors active in these processes or or is it tend to be through the advisors and you know the managements and the boards?
- 46:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): In group formation?
- 46:13
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 46:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): no, not necessarily in group formation, but just the LME negotiations.
- 46:17
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Like
- 46:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): is there a lot of principal to sponsor kind of uh side chatter?
- 46:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Not a ton. I I won't I wanna say that a lot of NDAs say you're not supposed to talk to the sponsor without permission, but you
- 46:31
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
- 46:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): may have a call here or there with them. But I think look they have they have they're well advised. So they they have good advisors and so um most of the dialogue is is with the advisors.
- 46:44
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah
- 46:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): and I I I guess with discovery maybe you can talk a little bit how I you know when you mentioned the discovering discovery being you wielded as a weapon. You know,
- 46:53
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): how
- 46:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): how does that impact, you know, how you know, even the research? Um, you know, the the that dynamic I think is kind of interesting because it's it's a world that your whole process might be under a microscope at a certain point in time.
- 47:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): It is. Um, but I I don't I think it's hard to factor in because of the chance that you're in you're involved in the once every five year litigation, right? Like, you know, um
- 47:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): I've only been I've been in with this group for nineteen years. I've only been involved in
- 47:27
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a
- 47:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): handful of litigations. One took a long time, um, but most of the other ones got resolved fairly quickly. Um it's not something I think we really factor in into to to how we operate. Uh obviously I think I hope and I think everyone is mindful of when they're writing emails, I being not being too
- 47:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): colorful, because it always gets used against you when it shows up uh in in discovery. But it's
- 47:54
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you know
- 47:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): yeah I it i i I always just recall w when I was at Merrill Lynch Investment Managers and we had uh a
- 48:01
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): we
- 48:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): were a big position in New World Pasta and we were on the official committee of Unsecureds or going to be. And one of the things that like killed me was I was just watching a hearing and sure enough I see one of my emails showing up on the screen there. Um and it was like y you know, we'd prefer to have a dollar in cash. It
- 48:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): was with regards to a bond paying a coupon instead of going into the restructuring. And it was like it we prefer to buy you know, have a dollar in cash rather than a dollar of equity down the road. And that didn't play well for us. Uh you know, I I can't remember if we won or lost that that particular little skirmish, but it was like it was
- 48:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): like, okay, note to self. Be careful what you say. But generally I totally get what you're saying. Um let's let's move on. Uh post LMA, you've been doing this and yeah, again, uh scene cycles. Talk about the and I think you mentioned earlier you the LME you you view as a one
- 49:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): time thing. And and and I'm curious, you know, it's funny because like one PM described it to
- 49:07
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): me
- 49:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): as LME stands for Let's Mute Eternally, because the they'll d they'll do one, they'll come back to another and yeah. you know, it they tend to be pretty short. One of the problems with LMEs has been debt capacity doesn't really get reduced, or debt service doesn't really get reduced. Sometimes you get a haircut, but then the coupon goes up. What's your
- 49:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): view on that? Is is that taken seriously enough in in in these liability management exercises?
- 49:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): No, because I think most uh L most of those in in-group-out group group LMEs, they're they're driven by three things in in this order. Um, liquidity, they need money. Um, and then second thing is usually maturity. And and and 'cause at the end of the day,
- 49:52
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): getting
- 49:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): more runway to grow Ibita is going to be more important to the company than getting a few points of discount. The But then yeah, number three is while they're at it,
- 49:59
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): let's get
- 50:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): some discount. Like there's a market for discount. I'm supposed to get the market. for discount, is I think how the the company thinks about it. Like, you know, the standard few points from the in-group and a lot more from the out group. Look, I don't think
- 50:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): LME is is um
- 50:18
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): look,
- 50:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): I think LME is a little bit overused, but I think it's a really creative product. And and I wish to to avoid out of court. I I at the I think it I just wish it would be used more comprehensively. Like for example, you could have a structure where you the sponsor says,
- 50:33
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
- 50:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): know, instead of just leveraging my doc to get the standard LME, I'm gonna put in a ton of money, but you guys also give me a lot of discount, like something like that. Um,
- 50:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Um but we haven't seen that. And you know, the that that that like
- 50:49
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that
- 50:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): I think would be a better use of LME than a few points of discount, some m new money and some matrici.
- 50:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): I I'm curious.
- 51:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Start as an LME, but then process wise people kind of circle around an idea that this is a lot easier to do via uh a uh pre pack. And it's uh I I'm wondering if that's that's why we don't see those kind of LMEs and you know may you know where the where the
- 51:21
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): where
- 51:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): the sponsor actually does put in the money. We like multicolor was a good example of that. Um you know it it's interesting maybe maybe
- 51:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): maybe these LMEs are uh some of the these these LMEs are uh actually just uh reasons to slide into a a pre pack plan.
- 51:41
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
- 51:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): multicolor was a pretty big cap structure, right? It probably would have been hard to do without a bankruptcy. I mean, maybe my my um my idea just now works better on a smaller, tightly held structure.
- 51:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Got it.
- 51:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Um but you there are names out there where you're you're kind of surprised that, oh yeah, this got done. The advisors managed to call around and and they got pretty broad support, even though it was a big loan with a lot of holders. Um But yeah, chap chapter eleven is is just has become so expensive that I think there's this
- 52:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): uh desire to avoid it.
- 52:17
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah.
- 52:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Um
- 52:19
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): one last question before I'll let
- 52:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Nagisa
- 52:21
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Gisa
- 52:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): uh to
- 52:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): jump at
- 52:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): some chapter
- 52:23
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): eleven
- 52:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): questions.
- 52:25
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um what
- 52:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): features do you
- 52:27
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): really look
- 52:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): to put
- 52:28
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): into
- 52:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): um
- 52:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): your
- 52:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): new L and me paper um
- 52:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): to
- 52:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): improve your leverage uh for for for that eventual bankruptcy if if it goes you know, if it goes south. Um I'm curious if there's anything in particular that, you know, is is is a pet peeve of yours you you y you you really like insist on in these uh L LME and me negotiations? I
- 52:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): I mean I'm gonna guess the market answer and my answer is probably omniblocker.
- 52:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Kinda. But um no like the drop the dock in an LME should be tight. I mean every basket should be close to zero. Um and yeah, there should be an omniblocker that blocks everything. But
- 53:07
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): yeah.
- 53:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): But there are many of those, right? I mean we we've seen a few but in cases that appear obvious. I think Spirit had one.
- 53:15
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): but
- 53:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): we know we know why now.
- 53:18
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Uh I
- 53:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): mean, is it because you do want some flexibility as a creditor, also? Or is that how many of those are you seeing?
- 53:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): For a new issue, yeah. I don't know why. Actually I actually don't know why Spirit Spirit had a new issue omniblocker, right? Which which was off.
- 53:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Spirit was crazy because the they the equity took a back seat to the rolled paper. I mean, you know, they they they put in new money is pure equity in the fur off the first bankruptcy, and then the new paper had the new omniblocker. And but they allowed a role, a pretty significant role.
- 53:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): So we are certainly not getting omniblockers in new issue.
- 54:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Um in an A AE and E that is that that a um
- 54:04
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a
- 54:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): sponsor is, for example, writing a meaningful equity check, we're probably not gonna get an omniblocker. I mean, we'll try, but
- 54:11
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): um
- 54:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): in an AE where a sponsor is writing a token equity check or or zero equity check, we would probably get an omniblocker.
- 54:22
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Okay,
- 54:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): should we should we turn to chapter eleven 11 in this last few minutes?
- 54:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Um I mean it probably tells you a lot how much time we're spending on it. I mean,
- 54:31
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 54:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): how much room do you think there is to to shape the outcome once the case is because as Phil mentioned, we're kind of living in the world of this pre-packaged or predetermined cases. Uh there
- 54:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): almost no valuation fights anymore. Uh the minority economics. are often chal uh challenging and we've seen c some courts and boundaries right on lender control. We saw Converge One, we saw Verick and Tire, but then other courts have been much I mean maybe like even the Sirda Judge uh Judge Lopez opinion,
- 55:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the recent opinion, falls into that category. But then other courts have been much more lenient when you think of the De Monta and Multicolor and the venue opinion. So uh has this made bankruptcy more predictable? Um, are there any particular sort of questions that you expect judges to be
- 55:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): most skeptical of and whether these are deep roll-ups or milestones or backs up economics?
- 55:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Where do we stand on that?
- 55:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Yeah.
- 55:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): You're absolutely right that. um everything is pre-wired, pre pre-negotiated, pre-packed, whatever. Um
- 55:46
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 55:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): think what first brands, only given the situation was like one of the few free fall bank overseas.
- 55:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah.
- 55:54
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Where
- 55:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): you were literally flying, filing and figuring it out. I I um I think it's better, and I think a lot of this is a function of people wanting predictability and and bankruptcy costs. When you have a committee, and not sure you can avoid a committee in in a in every pre-negotiated or pre-arranged situation, but
- 56:12
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
- 56:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): committees are expensive. Longer bankruptcies are expensive. It's obviously not good for the business. So I I do think having everything pre-wired is good. I obviously don't feel like judges should just rubber stamp situations. I think the converge one decision. while a difficult one to implement, I think the idea of um
- 56:33
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in
- 56:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): group, outgroup economics in bankruptcy being very disparate is not a healthy one. I I don't think, you know, it should be that an in group in bankruptcy basically says to the company,
- 56:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): I have two two-thirds thirds of the class of the fulcrum. I'm the only reason I'm the only way you can confirm a plan and get out of bankruptcy. So I have the right to charge whatever I want. I don't think
- 56:58
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 56:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): don't think that works. And I don't think that's good for bankruptcy law. And so, for example, you touched on roll-ups. I'm not a huge fan of roll-ups, actually. Um rollups and and I I think the two decisions, the decisions you mentioned, Del Monte, American Tire, got it right. I think roll-ups should be off. offered pro rata, um, because they're basically recovery
- 57:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): on old claims. But setting that aside, I'm not a huge fan of roll-ups because I think they're very opaque. Um, it's very hard for a judge to tell how much value is being given when you're letting lenders roll up, because a lot of it then goes down to a calculation of recovery and it becomes
- 57:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): further muddy. muddied by what is the roll up ratio, what is the holdback, things like that. And roll-ups present fund issues for big managers like um like us and a lot of people because you know you may own a position in 40 funds, but not all of them can do the not all of them can do a dip.
- 57:55
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): That
- 57:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): being said, I do think lenders look new money in bankruptcies can and should be expensive. Um, people should be allowed to participate, but it should be expensive to compel participation. So
- 58:09
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 58:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): I would prefer that people just charge hefty fees. We did this. I don't remember, Phil, if you were in Mark IV back in 09. We did that bankruptcy back in 09. There was no roll up. Rollups were the craze crazen in 09. We just charged charge like a 30 point fee.
- 58:25
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 58:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): so it it's was basically basically a you could say it was a synthetic roll up. Um I'm much more of a fan of that. And I think that's easier for a judge to see what is, you know, what what one group is getting versus another. Whereas a roll up it's very hard unless you do, you know, you you really sit there and take out your calculator and and and think about what recovery is going to be on the company.
- 58:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): One of the things I I I always find funny is y you'll see a group and they'll have like eighty percent of the debt, and then you see all these additional fees, and everyone's participating in it anyway. And it's like you're okay, you're just diluting yourself here a little bit, but the it you know, it really does become a fee fest. It almost seemed like
- 59:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): for a while there. And uh, you know, we w we've seen sort of some different situations, like Getty Images had a dip that was not even priming and it was like very commercial terms and which kind of tells you maybe w it's a different set of incentives there. But um,
- 59:23
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
- 59:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): know, some of these some of these have just been like every which way, you know, there's a roll up, there's a you know, a funding fee, there's a you know, if people don't want to you know, the the exit paper they can sell it at a discount to me, uh you know, in a fee. And it's like and they're getting paid fees for that. Um, you know, and and then you also see
- 59:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): sometimes the pre-dip dip that's done out of court and that comes with a make hole premium and then that gets rolled up into the it's it's it it does
- 59:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): I don't know how I mean like when you're not in the deal, I it's very hard to understand. I don't I really don't know how the judges understand that. Wasn't there a Judge Wiles decision where he went after this? Because Cause there was like a situation I want to say where the group was backstopping it, but also holding a bunch back. So, like which one is it? Do you want the paper or do you want other people to
- 1:00:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): participate?
- 1:00:13
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
- 1:00:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): no, exactly. It it's it's it it's it's for a judge, and you know, these these things are always like jammed jam through uh, you know, on the first day trying to get interim approval. Um it it it's
- 1:00:26
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): yeah
- 1:00:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I I think that. it makes it like the absence of a committee in that first day and how much they're trying to put in it's it's also I mean that's very difficult for a judge.
- 1:00:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Yeah yeah and they're asked to to they and they're told the world the company will implode tomorrow if you don't approve all of this.
- 1:00:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Right.
- 1:00:44
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Okay. Do you think I mean uh as far as some of this disputes and litigation coming back, say valuation, for example, or even
- 1:00:54
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): chapter 11 becoming more appealing, do what would cause some of this to be coming back? Is it be credit cycle or maybe more junior credit or activism? Like what it can you predict anything that Think may cause some of this litigation to come back?
- 1:01:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Obviously
- 1:01:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): costs are a big issue, right? As you mentioned.
- 1:01:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Yeah, that's a good question. So you're you're you're asking like back in 09, there was a lot more um
- 1:01:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): like people buying below the senior secured and and actually contesting valuation, or like like Caesars, and and and and now there's a lot less of
- 1:01:32
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that. Yeah,
- 1:01:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): I don't know. I think companies have just gotten so good at um tying the knot with secured lenders and putting in all the usual bells and whistles that we all just talked about to to to make it very hard to challenge. Um
- 1:01:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): I think that's a big part of it. And you know,
- 1:01:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): you had a run of of
- 1:01:57
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a That's
- 1:01:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): a streak there where um
- 1:02:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): certain courts would approve everything and so
- 1:02:04
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 1:02:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): yeah, I don't know what what causes this to come back.
- 1:02:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And how about chapter eleven in general? We've seen a lot of uh chapter fifteen's referencing UK scene of arrangement and maybe some concern by US judges about what that
- 1:02:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): what that means for US courts. What what's your view on that? Do you see any of that changing? or um getting even more becoming even more prominent in the coming so
- 1:02:32
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): which part
- 1:02:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): changing? I missed that.
- 1:02:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I mean people going more towards chapter eleven versus chapter fifteen and uh say UK seems uh schemes of arrangement
- 1:02:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Yeah the I'm not the right person to probably answer that question although everyone does talk about how flexible that UK
- 1:02:50
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
- 1:02:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): the UK um the new UK law is and and the cross class cram down thing. Um and and W
- 1:02:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Well Michael, hold hold on a second. I wanted to jump like how m how often is it like kind of broached as a i is it something that's considered in almost every restructuring and and just most of the time it they go US? No, now, okay. Just want to make
- 1:03:13
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): sure it's not like
- 1:03:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): if the UK lawyers will describe some pretty horrible scenarios that that uh from a US hat, like you would be like, wow, you can do that there, like where um where like uh a sponsor puts in new money at the top of the capital structure and is the impaired class and then cramps down a plan on on
- 1:03:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): on the old debt, which is in what in the US would be the fulcrum and the key impaired accepting class. Um but that hasn't been really threatened here in in at least in stuff I've worked on. I've been in scenarios where like there is a UK, the company actually has a UK presence
- 1:03:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): and just you know, and the company reaches a deal with us
- 1:03:58
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
- 1:03:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): they decide to implement in the UK just because the UK um is cheaper. And and by the way, and this this is not the question you asked, but I'm a huge fan of schemes. Two hearings, um, you know, very very efficient way to drag. I wish the US had something like that, uh, a mechanism to drag people into what is by and
- 1:04:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): large a pro rata deal.
- 1:04:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Interesting.
- 1:04:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Um so
- 1:04:26
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): as
- 1:04:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): as we're we're in the final stretch, I promise. Um
- 1:04:31
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 1:04:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): I want to talk to you a little bit about AI, um, and not necessarily, you know, the the the the the whole ecosystem and you know the debt in you know supporting that ecosystem. Um but how how it how you use it perhaps in in in your work process and and how it's being used by other you know,
- 1:04:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): credit shops and you know and and in particular finding holes in LMEs is i is are are there some pretty good tools out there these days? And I I'm curious what you're seeing in terms of the investment process and AI's uh place in that
- 1:05:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): yeah I I think it's still early stages for most people, but I think it is a really good tool. It it is it helps improve efficiency. Um I use it for doc reviews, comparing term sheets, making sure things are consistent. I use it as a sounding board as well. Um,
- 1:05:27
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): but
- 1:05:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): I think it's early stage. I think everyone's figuring out how to implement it. I'm sure some are some are ahead of others. Um, you know, we we happen to use Copilot. I think Copilot is great. I'm I've been actually so surprised by how good it is at Doc Review.
- 1:05:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And and how
- 1:05:43
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): about
- 1:05:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): like I I've heard of Harvey. I don't know much about it. I I know that that's a legal because these LMEs, uh you know, one of the things that has always been a feature of LMEs is the complexity in the documents and and and
- 1:05:57
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
- 1:05:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): know, y you y talk to our senior covenant analyst, Alex Diaz Mantos and he'll tell you that a lot of these things, when they make the documents fr from the get-go, they're they're designing them with holes already in place. And and so,
- 1:06:13
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
- 1:06:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): know, you'd hope that AI would be pretty good at spotting some of that. Have you heard of any tools or people like, you know, and maybe people don't tell you about the tools because they it's a little bit pro uh proprietary. advantage. I don't yeah, just curious if you
- 1:06:29
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): don't
- 1:06:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): know enough
- 1:06:30
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): about har
- 1:06:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): I don't know enough about Harvey. I mean, where where I work we're Copilot is our tool, that's what we're like used. And then I I use Gemini personally. But what the law firms tend to use, I think some use Harvey, but a lot use like Claude and you know, more more of the the the non non-legally legally specialized ones. I mean what I what I will say is you you you you make a good
- 1:06:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): point, which is that a lot of these provisions are all in the drafting, right? Like take JCRU, everyone says, oh, this doc has JCRU protection. And then you read the exceptions and you might as well, it basically doesn't have JCRU protection, for example. Um, so what I try to do is I try to get what I found effective is I use like I have a reference gold
- 1:07:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): gold standard J.Crew JCRW language, you know, saved. And then like I'll ask. co-pilot to compare a credit agreement to that one, which I find helpful. But I'm sure like look, the market is creative, the market will evolve. I'm sure I'll have to update my reference material.
- 1:07:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Yeah. That's that's the one thing that seems pretty clear is there's always a hole. So l let's talk outlook. Um what's what do you view as filling the pipeline these days in workouts and does is 2027 look busier than 2026? I you know, one of the things I do on a monthly basis, take a look at the
- 1:07:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): distress supply, you know, all of the distress debt. And, you know, in in high yield at least, we've gone seventy-five months without the distress ratio going past eleven percent. And that that exceeds like, you know, that that great run up we had before the the great. recession in in the aughts. Um now it
- 1:08:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): just over the past three months it soared from to seven point three percent from four point five percent. So it does seem to be um there there is there is an there is definitely some uneasiness out there. Any thoughts uh around the outlook for uh two thousand twenty seven?
- 1:08:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Yeah that that is interesting. I mean we're we're um our platform is more exposed to the loan side and and right now um the all in default rate I think is close to two percent, which and that it that includes distress exchange, which is which is low. Last year it was probably like four percent.
- 1:08:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Um
- 1:08:45
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): we
- 1:08:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): don't have a ton of buildings products exposure uh which is uh uh uh definitely a challenge sector. Them's is, I think, on a little bit of a hiatus because of the Iran war. So, but that that is definitely a challenge sector. Um, for us, I think the
- 1:09:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): pipeline on on whether you call them liability management, AE, or or restructuring is software. There, there are a lot of software maturities that that are in our pipeline. to address. Got it. But do I think 27 will be a crazy year? I I don't think so.
- 1:09:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Okay. Busier or less busy than 26?
- 1:09:25
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 1:09:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): think it'll be similar.
- 1:09:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Okay. Well, Michael, this has been fantastic. Thank you so much for taking the time.
- 1:09:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): It was a pleasure. Thank you both for having
- 1:09:37
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): me.
- 1:09:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Welcome back, listeners. We now turn to that part of the program where Nagisa and Phil, while they dig into the particulars
- 1:09:47
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): of
- 1:09:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): given distressed and bankruptcy situations,
- 1:09:50
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): we
- 1:09:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): always do enjoy starting with the courts. So, Nagisa, let's go ahead and start with you. And let's start maybe with the oral arguments uh regarding Incora's LME.
- 1:10:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Uh, sure, no. So this uh is probably. the last time we'll be talking about Encora until the circuit decision. I know. That's how I feel too. But um I and I don't think that this is probably gonna be a while. So this is the appeal of JP Morgan, BlackRock, and other uh note holders excluded uh from the
- 1:10:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): LME Me if in back in twenty 2022, twenty two. This was an uptier exchange. Uh Judge Isger. had said that that transaction had violated the underlying indenture. The district court reversed, and the Fifth Circuit will likely have the final word on the matter. This is one of the very few
- 1:10:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): LME cases that have made their way through the appeal process. So it it did involve a bond, bond indentures in that church versus credit agreements. So uh different in in structure in kind, but it did introduce questions surrounding this multi-step liability
- 1:11:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): management uh transactions that could be helpful and certainly interesting, right? But I I guess to just briefly describe what it was, though we've talked about it many times here. Uh in 2022, uh Westgore and Core received the required majority vote to pursue an initial
- 1:11:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): exchange in in to the indentures, initial change to the indentures that uh authorized 250 million uh in additional secured notes maturing in 2026. And then including those new notes in the tally, um more than two-thirds of the votes favored releasing
- 1:11:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the collateral under the original secured inventors, and that rendered the
- 1:11:45
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
- 1:11:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): prior notes uh unsecured obligations. So um as to what um I kind of gathers from the oral argument, and it's always tricky to figure out uh what the questioning from the panel tells you, but
- 1:12:00
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 1:12:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): guess it did appear that the Fifth Circuit. was skeptical of the district court's reasoning. Uh, it spent little time on that, uh, but also perhaps it may be reluctant to endorse the full breadth of Judge Isgar's analysis. It
- 1:12:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): tested many times whether uh the excluded holders could prevail with. without treating every step of the transaction uh as part of an integrated breach, that doesn't necessarily signal that uh it would agree, it will agree with the district court. It could instead look for
- 1:12:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): narrow basis to determine to determine when sequential steps that are individually permissible can collectively violate an indenture. So that could potentially limit Judge Isker's reasoning uh while perhaps preserving uh his ultimate conclusion. I think
- 1:12:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that what may become important for the Fifth Circuit is to make sure that whatever the decision decision says, inter uh economic interdependence of steps doesn't necessarily wouldn't necessarily convert uh independently authorized transactions into contract contractual breach
- 1:13:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and uh it seems that there may be some discomfort in embracing this heavy reliance on approximate cost concepts that could sort of make outcome make outcomes of uncertain whenever one one sort of permitted transaction enables another. And um I think if you
- 1:13:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): look at each side's response, I think the participating noteholder's strongest response here is just the simplicity of this step-by-step contractual argument. The indenture permitted the additional notes to be issued with a majority The voting threshold. Nobody's
- 1:13:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): arguing against that. And then the supermajority was there for a collateral release. The company did comply with the applicable thresholds in each step of these two amendments, the Third Amendment and the Fourth Amendment.
- 1:14:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And that argument in its own is simple, but it also puts considerable pressure on what effect means with participating noteholders note holders maintaining. uh that the indenture asked about the effect of an amendment, not the eventual effect of the entire transaction.
- 1:14:35
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 1:14:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the effect of the initial amendment, the third amendment in this case, was to just simply permit the additional, the 250 million additional nodes. If you go back to the excluded lenders here, and I think their strongest argument is probably.
- 1:14:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): this notion that the company, alongside with PIMCO and SilverPoint here as participating note holders, used prearranged series of steps to accomplish. I guess kind of the idea is indirectly what they weren't able to accomplish directly. uh When the transaction began, they
- 1:15:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): uh the company lacked the supermajority to release. the collateral and all the steps ultimately enabled this
- 1:15:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the the ultimate the ultimate up here. Um it there's been always this emphasis that the steps were negotiated together, the documents were released together and that this focus on times that everything happened within this kind of within minutes basically.
- 1:15:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And I think there's also a focus by the appellants on this sort of narrower textual route rather than broadly trying to collapse the entire transaction. This again going back to this definition of effect, and both parties uh see kind of the meaning behind effect different,
- 1:15:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): whether it's uh consent for the internal entire transaction or kind of focus on the on the individual amendment. amendments. One of kind of the interesting thing to kind of make it simple in a way to simplify for the First Circuit is also this notion that uh this economical uh just the the the Fourth Amendment basically
- 1:16:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): would not have existed but for the third uh and this focus on this causation-based causation based interpretation and um that framing could uh allow the Fifth Circuit to to avoid this broad holding of this economically inter interdependent steps, which I I don't think it'd it
- 1:16:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): would like to go there. Um I think that another aspect of the decision, if the court sides with the excluded holder is this is the damages point and uh I think that's always been an important aspect of the of this of this decision that kind of is secondary to
- 1:16:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the ultimate ruling. And I think here the Fifth Circuit did ask a few questions about the appropriate relief, but it and it may not need to reach the damages question at all if it upholds a district court reversal of Judge Iskor's Iskers ruling, but if it sides with the excluded lenders. So and but ends up awarding
- 1:17:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): just an unsecured claim for money damages. So even if the breach is found here, it would significantly lower the risk faced by majority holders. Um and it would go ultimately against Iskers approach to to damages. And um in uh the the excluded lenders maintain that kind of go
- 1:17:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): back to Iskers approach, read they was there's they're seeking for a restatement of the liens. And uh that would in that wouldn't that instead of leaving the excluded lenders with uh with an unsecured claim, they would leave PIMCO and Silverpoint, which had contributed $250 million, also
- 1:17:54
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): with
- 1:17:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): an unsecured claim, which would be zero in this case. So there's there's no easy decision here on damages. I think what whatever uh the ultimate ruling will be if the excluded lenders succeed is that it it will ultimately sound unfair either way, whatever whatever that means. But um
- 1:18:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I think that I probably the damages ruling will may be even more impactful than uh the court's analysis of the uptier up tier itself kind of in the long run. If you look at uh the impact on LME and LME decisions generally.
- 1:18:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, a lot. You know, I'm not kinda kind of a little bit dumbfounded there, but that's all right. We'll we'll get we'll get through it. So so maybe Nagisa, let's stick with you and and we kind of pivot here a little bit to Getty images uh a kind of a name and a blast from my past, but uh what's what's going on there?
- 1:18:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Okay. So this may be a little simpler.
- 1:18:50
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and at
- 1:18:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the
- 1:18:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I'll send it as day.
- 1:18:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Uh I think we have I I guess kind of broad picture. I think we also we have another case here that's texting testing the limits of what an expedited prepackaging restructuring looks nowadays. Uh there's a broad creditor support here, but there's this fight coming from investors who get nothing. So echo equity to others holders who get nothing.
- 1:19:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): uh, and question how and why the company's controlling shareholders, the Gary family family here and the and call equity will take ownership after bankruptcy. And there's this overlap between being a controlling shareholder, being a dip lender, and also becoming uh the future owners. Um, there's kind
- 1:19:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): of two, I think, main questions here also connected. What is the company worth? And are the sponsors paying a fair price for the ultimate reorganized business? And as far as the economics go, we have kind of the typical reduction in funded debt. It's about $500 million here, reduction of
- 1:19:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): annual debt service. And um as far as the classes, we have this interesting aspect where the holders of at least as of the first day, 83% of unsecured notes, uh supporting the deal, with uh the 200 that $270 million uh
- 1:20:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): class receiving, agreeing to receive about $170 million in cash, and that's about 63 six to three cents of on the dollar. Um, general and unsecured secure claims remain. unimpaired and then this existing equity and warrant holders receiving nothing. There's the sponsor package here
- 1:20:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that obviously plays a role. The the the Getty family and the call equity development, the affiliates of them own seven to thir three percent of the stock. So that they would become as I said the exclusive owners of the company. Um and that sponsor package contemplates a combination of cash commitments, about
- 1:20:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): $433 million, and then the equitization of about 100 million of sponsor held loans, and then the conversion of the financing into equity.
- 1:21:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): There's an ad hoc ac equity group from the beginning of the case. I think their strongest line of attack.
- 1:21:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): is likely to be uh questions about this price paid for the new equity and how that price was established and whether it was tested. There was no formal prepetition sale here, uh no pa post petition rise offering, and obviously get us responses Is that the the sponsors are
- 1:21:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): not are receiving new shares for substantial new. capital that's contributed, uh, kind of raising this distinction between the absolute priority rule and also what the new value exception does to the new uh absolute priority rule. And then
- 1:21:52
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
- 1:21:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): defenses here are obviously the valuation from um surrounding what it would take, what what additional value take would need to be established for existing equity to get. on your recovery. They put that value to $390 million in additional
- 1:22:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): additional value. But also
- 1:22:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): there's this point that I mentioned earlier, noteholders accepting a 37%
- 1:22:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): haircut um that is after rejecting earlier proposals, considering consider it the a bid bit for the company and Getty can point to that history also as evidence that these are sophisticated parties that tested the alternatives and just couldn't come up with anything better. I think
- 1:22:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that something to keep an eye on is this potentially, I think, pending request for an official equity committee. That's a request that first goes to the United States trustee that could give shareholders more resources to investigate. That appointment
- 1:22:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): typically would require some credible showing that there's a potential here for there's a reasonable potential for equity recovery. Uh One of the questions question that cuts against here is obviously that there's already existing representation by the equity holders. We saw that during the first day hearing.
- 1:23:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): But the other practical concern that kind of cuts on the other side is that there are no other parties here. There's no creditor constituency that would have an incentive to challenge valuation. So there's that that you'd look at a creditor's committee to do that, but here we have trade claims that are unimpaired, uh general and security claims
- 1:23:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): are unimpaired, and the note holders already negotiating uh that settlement. So that may kind of that that may support an equity committee. But um
- 1:23:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we are, as I said, I guess started saying that we will be seeing kind of the this this very
- 1:23:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): watching the clock, I guess, closely and seeing what whether this restructuring timeline, which is um targets this confirmation within fifty-five days, emerging within seventy-five, will will survive. Uh the court so far, at the very beginning of the case, appeared receptive of the
- 1:24:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): timeline, but there's a lot of potential scrutiny here surrounding valuation that could change that.
- 1:24:22
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 1:24:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you said it was simpler, but I'm not sure that that sounded simpler, but
- 1:24:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I I really think it was simpler
- 1:24:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Phil let's bring you into the conversation here and uh you know let's uh let's talk about it uh another name that sort of goes back a little ways here uh Xerox
- 1:24:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Xerox um yeah no it's uh they just reported their third queue numbers um you know if you recall in the beginning of the year we started picking up of the this distress coverage um the they've their three pillars were about stabilizing revenue, improving profitability through their integration of LexMark and
- 1:24:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): um another uh IT company they acquired recently. And and then the final one was d-leveraging. And uh they seemed to have good strategic goals. However, it's execution that matters. And in this regard the it doesn't look like profitability is going to really be matched for the
- 1:25:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): year. Revenue, they're sticking with the top line being unchanged, but the mix there might be uh hurting their profitability as they're doing well in the production, which is the high end uh printing, and the very low end uh entry, which is you know where Lexmark had big present.
- 1:25:38
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
- 1:25:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): the mid range mid-range is where they are usually profitable on equipment sales, and that is shrinking. So that's gonna
- 1:25:47
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): hit uh
- 1:25:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): profitability early. Um, but the one place where they're making some progress on, sort of, is uh d-leveraging. Um they announced the same day that they came out with their third third queue numbers that they were exchanging 174. million of its their nearest mat large maturity, 5.5%
- 1:26:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): 2028 unsecured notes, for 10.25 cent
- 1:26:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): 2030 first lien notes. And that that exchange is taking place at about 69 cents on the dollar. So you get some deleveraging there. They're also giving them some common stock. Um about $9 million worth. And that will actually reduce their 2028 obligation, that
- 1:26:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): maturity, to $382 million, which is down significantly from $750 million at the start of 2026.
- 1:26:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): The downside here was uh
- 1:26:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): they just came out with guidance at the last. call and they affirmed it. And within, you know, like with two months left in the year, it Xerox cut the lower end of it, their 2026 adjusted operating income guidance by nineteen percent. That that's uh they dropped it to two hundred four hundred and fifty
- 1:27:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): to four hundred and seventy-five seventy five million from five hundred and fifty-five fifty five to six hundred and five million, which is a large drop. especially so late in the year for full year guidance. It implied about a 43% drop in back half of the year operating income. And you know it they
- 1:27:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): had noted that higher memory chip prices and higher energy wo w might put their their forecasts at risk, but in reality it's it seemed like they were wishful thinking that they were hoping that that the those things would take a dive in price. And memory, there the
- 1:27:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): it's there seems to be a recognition that memory chip prices are gonna be higher for longer, uh for a while now. Um the to give you some context, they said on the call that chips w represented just two percent of the machine cost. costs in early 2026. Now that's ten percent,
- 1:28:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): and they are foreseeing that it's heading to fifteen percent in two thousand twenty-seven. Um so i
- 1:28:15
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it
- 1:28:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): operations are getting tighter. This company doesn't have a lot of margin for error. Um the fourth quarter is usually a very good cash flow month. Um diff cash flow quarter, it's their best of the year. So I don't anticipate any near term event. But, you know, as we start going into the new year, the first quarter could be particularly
- 1:28:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): tough. And what we saw the market do with these numbers, um, you know, the exchange is interesting, right? Because you y y when you skinny when you get an it to an exchange done, a distrust exchange done, um, you know, the near term maturity can often rally because the the just the amount due is less. Um and so you
- 1:28:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): say, hey, maybe they can actually get over that hurdle. In this case everything fell. Um you know even the even the ten and a quarter uh first link notes that were due in two thousand thirty, they dropped from eighty to sixty one cents. Um the two 2028 thousand twenty eight notes they were trading in the mid-fifty mid fifty mid mid-50s. fifties, they traded down to twenty cents on the
- 1:29:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): dollar. So across the board, this company's now looking like it's uh the people investors aren't convinced that they're gonna be able to avoid a chapter eleven. So I it's it's gonna be interesting. We're we're watching it closely. Um they they have very little room for operating error er and
- 1:29:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): operating margin, uh missing missing. sales. They have very little room for missing profitability. I I I will say there were some, you know, signs of life. Uh their equipment sales did um they did post uh a positive uh their first
- 1:29:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): quarter of positive organic growth um in three years and so that was that gives them hope that and you know, there there's a they make a lot of their money on, you know, supply
- 1:30:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): post print post sale um supplies and also servicing. So maybe that'll be good to come, but I don't I'm not sure that's enough.
- 1:30:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah. When you talk about sort of that that early maturity, I always think back, I mean that was like uh JCPenney JC Penney
- 1:30:26
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): when
- 1:30:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I think back to them where you had that for sort of front dated short maturity at like two hundred thirty million outstanding trading in the nineties until they filed. So and then it was nobody in the nineties anymore.
- 1:30:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): You get incredible volatile situations. I I remember the Revlon, um, they had a maturity and eighty percent of the bondholders actually did an exchange. And then for the remaining twenty 20%, percent, the company Revlon actually caught called that before they filed it to bankruptcy. They called those unsecured notes out at par if it's
- 1:30:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): accrued. And then uh so you get you get some unusual events, and each situation is very uh unique. And you just have to sort of be nimble and be kind of prepared for a lot of volatility.
- 1:31:11
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
- 1:31:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it's a complete coin flip. Uh Nagisa, Nigisa, let's bring you back in here. and uh maybe talk a little bit about uh Hughes.
- 1:31:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Sure. And I'll I'll be brief on this. Um Hughes is trying to preserve the exclusive right its exclusive right to propose a Chapter 11 plan. This is the code affords it that uh there's obviously an in initial 120 day periods that a debtor has room to address
- 1:31:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): operational problems, balance sheet and propose a plan. And it has succeeded so far, uh, despite uh requests and pushback by creditors. Um it has succeeded though, but solely on an interim basis. There's we s we're seeing the Texas Court to adjust for as just being mindful and trying not to
- 1:31:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): kind of reach final decisions that may inhibit case progress or um or consensus or settlement or deal talks as much as possible. So he did enter an interim ruling that does put the company under pressure to show that uh more time can
- 1:32:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): produce uh potentially viable restructuring results. The next major checkpoint here to keep an eye is the 10%. December 1st. That's the final exclusive exclusivity hearing. And the central issue there will remain liquidity. Can Hughes fund bankruptcy? Can it pay
- 1:32:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): administrative claims? Can secure enough exit financing to emerge? So all those questions will probably arise. And there may need to be some answers on December 1st. Um they uh
- 1:32:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): when you seek when creditors obviously sought to terminate accessibility, they're looking for a way to open the door to competing plans. Uh there's a we w were shown over and over again that that's a pretty high standard. Uh, and the court here particularly noted that uh the absence of kind of a negotiated plan or the fact
- 1:33:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that EcoStar continues. to own the company and um the fact that there is credit or support for an alternative proposal does not really justify terminating exc exclusivity. But uh what does and what may ultimately is this um worry of administrative insolvency. So the
- 1:33:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): risk that uh the company cannot pay the obligations during the bankruptcy and that probably and the code noted that that's probably the closest call here. So uh this was is a conditional pause until uh December 1st. And um I guess we'll we'll sort of see what happens there. And
- 1:33:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the court did point the need for a confirmation um by January or in January. So that's uh it's a pretty kind of tight timeline there.
- 1:34:04
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): All
- 1:34:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): right. Something to keep uh keep an eye on. And Phil, let's maybe come to you for last words, staying uh sort of in that uh space-oriented related space. Not to double use the word space, but uh finish with you on Teleset.
- 1:34:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Sure. Um so telesat, uh the I I I think of Teleset as like that procrastinating student who just doesn't do anything until like the very last m minute and crams the night before. Um this is this has been a long coming uh December maturity. Uh
- 1:34:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Telesad faces a w uh a maturity of like one point nine billion billion dollars of Canadian dollars and five hundred forty forty-nine nine also Canadian um note maturity in early December. Uh and they had a third call, a third quarter call where they just didn't really discuss much about it.
- 1:34:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): They th they noted at the beginning of the call we're not going to discuss it. Um there's there's conversations obviously with creditors, um, but there really hasn't been progress per se. And this is, you know, this the we're w we're the it's obviously getting tight. Um and and I and so I start wondering, well, why would
- 1:35:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): they not let us know anything? Why why wouldn't they actually make, you know, it you gotta pick a direction and uh you know, do something as opposed to going to a free fall. You just don't see many free falls these days, uh unless, you know, liquidity dries up really quickly. And what I've come with i I I I I
- 1:35:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): I imagine that they have sort of a backstop plan in that that they're considering. Um this is all just pure speculation at this point. You know, maybe they have another third party who's ready to help them uh finance this. Um they in earlier calls they said, you know, chapter eleven really isn't on the
- 1:35:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): table. So that you it sounds like they might have pockets of money. What we do know is there have been news reports. Uh the FT noted that they had seen a term sheet and that they saw a a proposal from the legacy lenders here. And there there were three big legacy lenders, um Golden Tree,
- 1:36:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Silverpoint, and Soundpoint. And the apparently this proposal, which they've put in front of them twice, um involves a
- 1:36:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): $1.7 billion Canadian raise, equity raise, and $1.5 billion also Canadian in a loan. And that would basically take out the legacy debt.
- 1:36:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): So my best get guess here is that they are uh they have something in mind that could beat that and they're maybe Trish trying to get the best terms, and then we're gonna all of a sudden see some announcement. If we do hope go into a proceeding, um, this could get ugly.
- 1:37:00
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Now
- 1:37:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): their third quarter numbers, it it it's nothing unexpected here. The legacy geo segment is deteriorating. Third quarter revenue fell 21.5% 21 and a half percent from 2025 uh to 79 million. uh Canadian. Um Geo generated just 36.4
- 1:37:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Canadian million i in uh third quarter EPITA. And the Leo segments just a drag because there's no revenue. Um Leo's backlog is i is growing. It's like uh I think around five point six billion Canadian now. Um
- 1:37:37
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): they
- 1:37:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): have finance. financing over there because the government has provided financing. They also have financing because of uh payments under the escape uh program where the Canadian military is i is uh giving them money to build this constellation out. But that's the big exciting thing is we're also gonna have the build-out start.
- 1:37:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Um the plan is right now it's they're going to be deploying fifteen 15 satellites every three. weeks, um, you know, to complete their 225, and that's starting in September of next year, and that would uh complete its 225 satellite constellation by June of 2028. Um
- 1:38:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): so and you know, they keep marking up the warrants because of some valuation of their uh of their Leo business, which they now
- 1:38:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): you know, I'm I'm using their their warrant valuation, which is on the books, at 1.41 billion. I I think that implies basically a Leo enterprise valuation of close to thirteen billion Canadian. So you've got one side of the house that's completely falling apart and
- 1:38:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): that's where all the debt is. And then you've got the other side of the house where it's like
- 1:38:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): they've got this fantastic valuation, but they haven't actually cr had a dollar of revenue in it.
- 1:38:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): So it talk about volatile situations. That's uh it's it's gonna be really interesting, and the fact that this is gonna get resolved over the next month makes it doubly interesting.
- 1:39:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): All right. So more to watch there, plenty to watch as uh cover covered throughout today's podcast. So
- 1:39:15
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): with that,
- 1:39:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Nagisa and Phil, thanks as always for your insights. And of course, thank you to Miriam Adidia and the rest of our editorial team for their continued support.
- 1:39:25
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 1:39:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): of course, uh, we'd be remiss without offering a special note of thanks to this month's guest. That was Michael Chizenwontham. He was head or is head of restructuring for UBS Asset Management's Credit Investments Group. Till next time, this has been State of Distrust Ed.
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