Australian Investors Podcast

Eric Fine discusses fiscal dominance, derivatives risk, and crisis preparedness

50 min Listen to the original Episode page
Fiscal DominanceDerivatives2008 Financial CrisisEmerging MarketsMonetary PolicyRisk Management

Summary

Eric Fine, an emerging markets bond manager at VanEck, shares insights from his career in Russia and the 2008 financial crisis. He argues that the post-crisis cleanup favored European banks and that economic statistics often lag reality, obscuring true liabilities. Fine defines 'fiscal dominance' as a state where central banks cannot raise rates without bankrupting the government, identifying Japan, the UK, and Australia as vulnerable. He advises investors to rely on pre-played scenarios rather than predictions to manage crisis risk.

Episode sections

  1. 0:00 – 2:48

    Introduction and Sponsor Read

    Host Owen Rask introduces guest Eric Fine, highlighting his experience in Russia and the 2008 crisis.

  2. 2:48 – 10:37

    Early Life and Upbringing

    Fine discusses his childhood in Switzerland and Thailand, noting the obsolescence of currencies like the Turkish Lira.

  3. 10:37 – 16:44

    Career Path and Ideology

    Fine explains his transition from politics to banking, preferring market feedback over ideological frameworks.

  4. 16:44 – 24:22

    Russia Voucher Privatization

    He details building Russia's first securities clearing system using KGB-owned fiber optics during the 1992-1993 voucher privatization.

  5. 24:22 – 29:36

    Lessons from Russia and Marriage

    Fine reflects on the importance of cultural adherence to legal frameworks and contrasts American optimism with Russian pessimism.

  6. 29:36 – 31:49

    Global Financial Crisis (GFC) Onset

    He identifies the Fed's $1.2 trillion loan to Morgan Stanley as pivotal and credits Mark Pittman and Lawrence Kotlikoff for revealing the crisis's scale.

  7. 31:49 – 36:48

    Derivatives Notional Size and Crisis Aftermath

    Fine discusses the quadrillion-dollar derivatives market and how the cleanup favored European banks without addressing moral hazard.

  8. 36:48 – 40:07

    Accounting Lags and Monetary Aggregates

    He argues economic statistics lag reality, citing the delayed recognition of M1 as a liability and the discontinuation of M3.

  9. 40:07 – 41:16

    Fiscal Dominance Defined

    Fine defines fiscal dominance as the point where central banks cannot hike rates without bankrupting the government.

  10. 41:16 – 43:14

    Vulnerable Markets and Fiscal Union

    He identifies Japan, the UK, and Australia as vulnerable to fiscal dominance, while criticizing the Eurozone's structural weaknesses.

  11. 43:14 – 44:26

    Scenario Planning Over Prediction

    Fine asserts that pre-playing scenarios allows investors to react to crises, citing his firm's exclusion of Russia as risk management.

  12. 44:26 – 50:00

    Skepticism of Reform

    He expresses skepticism that reform works, advising investors to wait for structural collapses before acting.

Claims worth verifying

The notional value of derivatives was estimated at 700 trillion to a quadrillion.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·32:29

How to verify: Verify via the Federal Reserve's Flow of Funds Accounts (now Financial Accounts of the United States) or BIS derivatives statistics for the relevant period, noting that notional values are distinct from market value. For recent events, verify 2026-08-15 through 2026-11-15. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The US Treasury told IndyMac to mismark its books.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·35:38

How to verify: Check FDIC records or US Treasury Department press releases from the 2026-2026 period regarding IndyMac Bank's resolution and regulatory actions. For recent events, verify 2026-08-15 through 2026-11-15. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The US changed the Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac debt ownership rule from 90% to 91% to avoid counting debt on balance sheets.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·36:19

How to verify: Review SEC filings or Ginnie Mae/Fannie/Freddie regulatory reports from the late 2000s/early 2010s regarding debt consolidation rules and ownership thresholds. For recent events, verify 2026-08-15 through 2026-11-15. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

M1 took two crises before it was formally recognized as a liability.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·36:59

How to verify: Consult Federal Reserve historical definitions of M1 and M2, and academic literature on the evolution of monetary aggregates and money market fund accounting. For recent events, verify 2026-08-15 through 2026-11-15. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

M3 is no longer done/published.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·37:15

How to verify: Check the Federal Reserve's H.6 release history or ECB statistics to confirm the discontinuation of M3 data publication. For recent events, verify 2026-08-15 through 2026-11-15. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Fiscal dominance occurs when central banks cannot hike rates because it would bankrupt the government.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·40:29

How to verify: This is a theoretical definition; verify via academic literature on 'fiscal dominance' in macroeconomics (e.g., works by Thomas Sargent, Christopher Sims, or modern central bank policy papers). For recent events, verify 2026-08-15 through 2026-11-15. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Japan, UK, and Australia are the most vulnerable major economies to fiscal dominance.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·41:16

How to verify: Compare government debt-to-GDP ratios and debt sustainability analyses from the IMF or OECD for these specific countries. For recent events, verify 2026-08-15 through 2026-11-15. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The Eurozone lacks a common fiscal policy and banking union.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·42:03

How to verify: Review EU treaties and European Central Bank statements on the status of the Banking Union and fiscal rules (e.g., Stability and Growth Pact). For recent events, verify 2026-08-15 through 2026-11-15. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Eric Fine bought Rask's RMs (likely a product or brand) when his firm hit $100 million.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·45:22

How to verify: This is a personal anecdote; verify via VanEck company history or press releases regarding milestones, though the specific purchase is a private matter. For recent events, verify 2026-08-15 through 2026-11-15. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Do your own research

  • Verify the notional value of derivatives using BIS (Bank for International Settlements) quarterly statistics.
  • Check current M1 and M3 money supply data releases from the Federal Reserve and ECB to confirm publication status.
  • Review US Treasury and FDIC records regarding IndyMac's accounting practices during the 2008 crisis.
  • Analyze government debt-to-GDP ratios and central bank balance sheets for Japan, UK, and Australia to assess fiscal dominance risk.
  • Read Lawrence Kotlikoff's work on the true scale of the 2008 crisis and derivative exposures.
  • Examine the specific rule changes for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac debt ownership thresholds cited by Fine.
Full transcriptexpand
0:00
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0:30
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Is
0:30
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it just me or is the world starting to seem a bit more fragmented? Does it seem like different economic conditions around the world are so different to what we're experiencing here at home? AI and global trade and oil prices, inflation, economic growth, everything just seems a bit different than it was, right?
0:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): In this episode, you're going to hear from Eric Fine, an emerging markets bond fund manager from Van Eck. The majority of this episode you're about to hear with Eric talks about his journey to investing, his journey to becoming that fund manager, and having the EM or emerging markets focus. This
1:10
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): is a man who's been doing it for many decades and has significant experience. in fascinating parts of the world. He talks about his experience going into Russia, helping to build the first actual financial clearing system, so the way money is transferred, how Russians would hand over a physical coupon payment like a piece of paper like this one, and then get
1:30
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): something on a digital record on a server in a bank. He talks about the implications of the global financial crisis and why it's still playing out today. Why those huge government debts that we used to inject into the financial system are still having consequences today. Here in 2026, maybe, just maybe,
1:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): some of our countries are picking up the bill for something that happened a very long time ago. This is a fascinating, truly fascinating conversation with Eric Fine of Van Eck.
2:03
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Hey
2:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): there. Here's a quick note. This podcast contains general financial information only. That means it's not specific to you, your needs, goals, or financial objectives. So don't act on the information until you've spoken to your financial planner. You'll find our full disclosure, disclaimer, and link to our financial services guide in the show notes. Eric, thanks for taking some time to join me.
2:22
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Good
2:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): to be here, Owen.
2:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I'm very excited for this. I've got my notes. on the table. You've been on the road for six weeks throughout Asia and Australia, and you're heading home to the US tonight. Your background is incredibly diverse.
2:38
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
2:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I thought maybe an interesting place to start is to go back to your earliest
2:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): memory of money
2:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): and what that is.
2:48
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
2:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): that's a really interesting question. One of the coolest questions. I've I've gotten. And uh
2:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): the number my main memory of money was that it was a continuous memory. I lived in a bunch of different countries, one very rich like Switzerland. I was born in France, but also a, you know, most would consider, and certainly at the time, a poor country like Thailand. And um I used the currency,
3:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): it was part of my life, but uh my vision of it changed because they all died, not the Swiss franc. But money dies. And uh with my kids, I have a little box of dead money. Turkish Lyra, guilders, Dutch guilders, right?
3:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): USA is very legal, very unique in having legal tender, and it's really impossible. to just sort of eliminate or redenominate the currency. But that money dies is a real thing. Now, doesn't mean it dies in terms of it's worthless. But in the conversion, that's a
3:53
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): process. And it ends up, or is basically
3:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): an important source of information for tax authorities. And so it's not a as simple as saying, oh, we're just trading in this money. Right? And so it does die to an extent. And that was really, really interesting. That's my main continuous memory of money. Trevor
4:14
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Burrus, Jr.
4:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I uh
4:16
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
4:16
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): didn't realize this. So I didn't realize you were born in France. I knew you spent time in Switzerland and then moved to Thailand as far as I'm aware. Yep. Then at 13. I believe you went back to the United
4:28
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): States.
4:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Your father was a spy and economist, and your mother worked for Harry Truman.
4:37
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
4:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): guess the the next question is: what were they like as parents? And
4:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): what are some early memories or stories that you might recount from just being around them? It such seems like such a unique upbringing. Trevor
4:48
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Burrus
4:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Yeah, no, they were very unique. I was born on third base. and I made it to first, right? So, you know, uh uh they were really um amazing people. So one thing is they both came from really serious poverty, right? And so the assumption was I had to work, right? That was the number it wasn't super stated, it wasn't
5:07
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): overwhelming, but that was a basic assumption. Um the other thing is that they were much older. Um so my dad, I think. was 52 when I was born. My mom was 39.
5:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): And that it took me a while to understand it, but I grew up with stories that often people's grandparents would tell them. So it might have given me a much different time horizon than other people. I definitely grew up with a different frame of frame of mind.
5:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): The other thing is my parents were complete opposites and they got along great. Right. Dad, Jewish, atheist. kind of became a believer. My mom, Catholic. That was a point of tension, right? They, you know, just but they got along. And uh um and that made me open to a lot more things. Um,
5:52
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): it was it it was it was pretty cool. And um uh, you know, my mom's story is kind of interesting. Um my grandpa uh
6:00
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): um
6:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): was uh had a fishing buddy named Harry. Truman, and that's you know how it happened. Is he he was also a uh precinct organizer um and uh got the call from um I forget the name, I have it written down, but boss something or other, but they were b literal party bosses. Um does Shirley, you know, want to work for
6:20
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Harry when he become became when he became uh vice president. She was seventeen, 17. and um very soon Roosevelt died. My mom got the call from Eleanor to patch through. She said, I need to talk to Harry. Um and uh uh so that's you know that's that's pretty interesting. My dad's story is you know very different. Um,
6:40
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): but uh young, Jewish in New York, he determined at an early age, he was like many people those days, was more socialist in his uh in his outlook. He determined to be a member of the ruling class, which in America you can do. Now, he couldn't uh so he got his PhD at Colombian economics,
7:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): very rare at that time. That's why he ended up having a high rank when he uh um joined uh OSS, which is uh the wartime, you know, the CIA before the CIA existed. And um uh he couldn't teach it in Ivy,
7:14
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): right?
7:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Right. Jews were, you know, blackball. That's part of history.
7:20
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): He was very positive on it. He always said, Eric, quick, name a famous economist who's not Jewish. If you ever got that question, Adam Smith, maybe.
7:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): That was a surprisingly cool, positive take. And FDR, which is why FDR was popular um among a lot of people, hired anyone but Jews. And so uh he was a PhD, gave him a rank of his cover was Army Colonel, but that was a GS system ranking, right? If you had a PhD very rare,
7:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): that's what you were. So at a young age he had that. And so uh um and I always told him that uh
7:57
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
7:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): like I said, I would think I was born on third base, made it to first. Um I always told him that uh I could never do what he did because he went through poverty. And in America, there is this kind of mythology about poverty, and he hated that. He said every bad trait he had was from poverty. My mom agreed, right? So that was the underlying tone, which you know,
8:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): most of my friends, their parents were boomers. Right? You're a boomer. Odds, I mean, you know, you're just sitting on a boat that's just rising. And so uh very different attitude. And I'm only kind of realizing this now that I'm telling you, yeah.
8:33
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Uh
8:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that's fascinating. It's so fascinating.
8:36
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um
8:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): was that the reason so uh when he became a diplomat, was that the predominant reason that you were born in France, Switzerland, Thailand?
8:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Yep. My my dad was uh actually assigned to the OECD. um which was headquartered in Paris. And uh my mom was uh a foreign serv uh uh an a foreign service officer in the embassy in Paris. And um a friend of theirs introduced them.
9:06
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): My mom said she never met a man she wanted to marry, and she met him and she said she never you know m uh met a more interesting guy, and he's very a interesting guy. Um and uh yeah that was that was the beginning. Uh my first words I you know were C'est un garçon, right? So I was born in the Neuilly uh uh the American hospital
9:26
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): which is in Neuilly and uh I was only there for a year, right? But uh I speak French because of Geneva, Switzerland. Um but uh no I you know I'm I'm I feel attachment, right? If you're born somewhere you you know you uh and I go regularly. I've taken my family there and uh um so uh but yeah, that's that's how they met.
9:46
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah.
9:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Now we'll get to it, but you managed I mean you manage an investment portfolio that invests in all of the parts of the world that most listeners probably don't have any experience in or any exposure to. And we'll circle back to all of that in a moment, but there's a huge story here with your
10:06
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): uh upbringing, your journey.
10:09
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
10:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): read on your LinkedIn and I've got it here. You've lived and worked in Paris, Geneva, Bangkok, Panama City, Moscow, and London.
10:17
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um you've
10:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): been to Brazil more than to China, and you're comfortable with many languages. The the kind of mix of experience is so unique in who I talk to on. this show. But maybe you can take us to
10:31
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): um
10:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you've moved from Thailand to the US.
10:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): What was the journey from there to say graduate school or university? Um did you want to follow in your father's footsteps in terms of economics and finance, or was there something else?
10:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Um I was the vaguely minded to follow in the national security or diplomacy track. But a lot of it was that that I it was more natural for me, and it was easier for me to get into the schools on that basis than what I
11:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): uh really kind of always knew I wanted to do. So I'll tell you a very specific story. So I started Young Democrats at Langley High School, public high school in Northern Virginia. And and the name is, you know, it is near um the CIA, but that's totally a coincidence. Um and uh um I started Young Democrats, which is essentially and
11:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): I'm non political, nonpartisan now. I'm you know, I'm very non ideological. That's one of my core things I've uh become. Um but um uh it was essentially a labor force for Democratic candidates.
11:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): And
11:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): that was a pretty good path. The gentleman I worked for was attorney general of Virginia, a lieutenant governor, became governor, and then senator.
11:52
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): And I was asked when I was in graduate school, I think it was, yeah, I think it was in graduate school or about to go into graduate school. And uh I got the call to do you want to be Chuck's driver for the summer? Um for sorry for the campaign. And uh that is a huge job because you're s with you
12:12
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): know the candidate all the time. You're doing everything with him. Um it's a it's a really big job. But the year before I drove cross country when the speed limit was 55, I'm not driving 55 across the United States And my driver's license was suspended because I got too many speeding tickets in a row. And it
12:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): and back then it took a long time for the states to
12:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): communicate to Virginia, where I was, uh that this happened. And uh I did ask if something could be done, and uh the and to the great you know credit of our system, no. Um and I had to say no. I can't drive without a driver's license. And so I quickly got a job at a bank. Um I you
12:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): know, I was auditing their loans, I was just making sure all the documents were correct. And uh but my parents they like that kind of uh field they were more okay with, especially my mom, given the way you know she grew up. Um but uh they generally didn't want me in government. Um and that's very common for folks of their generation, not because they're not in favor of it, but they
13:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): had two reasons. One one was maybe somewhat of a critique, but they said it's different now than it was then. So my dad said he had one job in the OSS, that's to defeat the Germans or and the Japanese. That's it. Not get a big budget. He he was a socialist, his best friend was a conservative. They didn't care. count. That was hardly it did it was meaningless.
13:40
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): And the second thing they said is that
13:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): if I go into the private sector, I'm going to be more valuable if I ever want to go into the public sector. I'm not especially interested. I am a senior fellow at a think tank, the Atlantic Council, and their Middle East-North Africa
13:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): futures group, which is really fun. I like learning, and you
14:02
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): know
14:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): it's a different
14:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): uh job. I commit to write papers for them on a sequence on the region. Um also, you know, I wanted to make money. And um uh, you know, that was the an underlying thing. I didn't wasn't really aware of how profound, you know, the sort of expectation was. Um and uh so when I went to graduate
14:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): school, it was easier for me to position myself as a national in security. or diplomacy, that sort of thing. Um but uh I pretty I pretty much knew that I wanted to be in the private sector. And um
14:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): because in that world, in the political world, everyone thinks they're right forever. That's not serious, right? You've gotta got be to able to say, I'm wrong, and I'm gonna move on. Um and uh that's just not my style, right? I'm not an ideologue. Uh if I have an ideology, how am I supposed to analyze Chile and
14:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Venezuela? Radically different countries. Right? Communism, socialism, you can't have one view on it. I'll be controversial. It's had some great it m it did, it educated everyone in these countries so much so that they had a revolution against it.
15:14
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah.
15:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Right? But you can't, I I'm very allergic to these black, white, it's all bad, all good. Um and in markets, what I really love is if someone tells me I'm wrong, I pay them more. There is no any good investor is not going to be married to their because that's you know really, really dangerous
15:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): to be uh blind. And um and I often I think w we think what we think, we have a process, it's very orthodox.
15:44
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): If it sounds strange but wins, it wins and it's right in finance. But in normal life, all people think about and remember is that it sounded strange and maybe still does. Um and I don't want that. I just want to have a job that's focused on being right. and that's
16:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): it. And um so uh after graduate school, I got a job. It's not on my LinkedIn because it was such a long time ago, but I um worked for an investment bank for a few years, learned the industry, but I worked for the CEO's office analyzing different business units. Um and uh but I
16:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): knew I wanted to pull triggers, I knew I wanted to do something very specific. And emerging markets was generally what I liked. I love um I really like uncertainty because it's not as uncertain as it seems, right? That's the great thing. It's the uh but um and then I got a call from a friend in graduate school to
16:44
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): see uh if I wanted to go and the way I describe it is to be a suit in Russia. Um
16:49
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): which
16:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): is fascinating to me. because I did hear about this. I I saw it on your bio.
16:54
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um if
16:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I'm not mistaken, you graduated from Harvard, is that correct?
16:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Kennedy School of Government, uh 89, two-year MPA, International Trade Finance, yeah.
17:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): So then you went on to do the investment banking for a little while.
17:07
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um
17:07
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): and I was doing some research on this and the lead up to today's conversation. It was around so this is the the nineties in Russia was kind of a famous period for oligarchs, and um around the mid 90s was when I believe it's RTS, the the Russian trading system,
17:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): um was was now is now in history as an a pivotable time. Can you talk us through what that phone call was that you received and why it was so I guess tempting for you to be like, yeah I I'll go and do that. That sounds fascinating to me.
17:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Yeah, well, um, first, I don't know who would say no. I just find I just it's go to some place that's this was our major adversary for my whole life. And I get to go there and see it. And I had been there before, but as a student, um, and this was during the Soviet Union, when it was the Soviet Union, it wasn't Russia at the
18:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): time. Um uh it hadn't broken up. And um uh
18:06
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): my experience in Bangkok, I was somewhat of a free-range kid. You know, I could just wander around the streets of Bangkok in the 70s, which is you know, not you know, very, very different uh thing. I just really like it. I think it's exciting, interesting. It's not, you know, once you've done it, you kind of know that you, you know, it's not as scary as it seems. Um
18:26
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): yeah. So a friend of mine from graduate school had a consulting company. Um it was technology. And uh he had a contract with uh Harvard, Harvard Institute for National Development. And the contract was to build a clearing system. So uh the person who managed that To or was basically in charge of
18:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): that program was a gentleman named Andre Andrei Schleifer, an economics professor at Harvard. Um, pretty sure I do, I think my memory is correct. He he designed or or was the I uh the force behind the Czech voucher privatization program, now called Czechia. Um uh and uh uh they decided to do the same in
19:06
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Russia. So this was a very unusual period. I was only there in '92, '93, in ninety two, ninety three, but you know, sometimes decades happen. Um and uh they issued 150 million vouchers, physical pieces of paper,
19:19
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
19:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): to every Russian. You're six months old, you get one. And um you needed a way to walk in with this voucher, give it to someone, and then make an electronic record of, well, of what? So
19:35
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): what
19:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): do you want to own? Luke oils, Surgutnyv Surgutnev Gas. which which company? Do you want to own it um in uh at a specific price or um you only want it at a certain level? So we uh went and you know Russia has thirteen time zones if you include Kaliningrad and we did do one there. Uh so we
19:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): put servers in banks. It wasn't straightforward getting into the banks, right? You think uh back in those days. we were we were very obviously connected. Anatoli Chubayas was the head of the privatization ministry. That's was where I went to work. I had a security pass, right? It was very, very unusual.
20:16
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Especially
20:16
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): for a Westerner to go in and to Russia at that time.
20:20
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): It was, but there was an army of a small army. They called us the Harvard Mafia. I didn't understand it at the time. Now I do. The job, and the basic initial job, was designing a system that could do that. What we specifically did was you'd go into a bank. Sometimes they wouldn't let you
20:40
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): into their offices. And so you had to call Moscow and just get more senior and you know, get them to let you in. Because there's just profound suspicion and great reluctance to interact with. foreigners, because it was one of the most dangerous things you could do in the Soviet Union. Just talk to a foreigner for a couple minutes, your life could be changed, right? Permanently.
21:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): And so there was a very you
21:02
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): know
21:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): very great wariness. So I'm not blaming, I'm not I'm just observing. I think it's totally fair. Anyone would be that way. Um but uh you go into the bank, you put in a server, um, we uh connected it to uh
21:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): um
21:16
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): we discovered that they had a um a nationwide fiber optic cable system which was owned by the KGB.
21:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): And uh uh and Sprint
21:27
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): um
21:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): used it. And that was uh that in the form of a packet switching network, which is just this the way things were done there when you were transmitting uh data. Um and uh so we'd put the server in, we'd train the people, and so someone to to take the voucher, enter it. Um, but
21:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): it was a system that connected uh 33, yeah, I think 33 banks across 13 time zones. And the this these were very in early stage banks. All the banks that I got to know when I was at Morgan Stanley in the late 90s, they none of those things existed. And
22:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): so it was a core of a few banks. The number of banks was beginning to increase dramatically. That's always a dangerous sign in a country, is the more one of my rules is if I see more bank billboards and with different
22:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): brands, I'm very nervous. Um, And it was the first
22:25
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
22:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): securities clearing. system in the country. And um they take the voucher and shred it. I have a a loose eight filled with shredded vouchers. I'd walk out of the subway all the time, and there were folks with a box um uh filled with rubles, and it said they're a buyer of vouchers, right? This was you might
22:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): remember uh Credit Suisse was very active there, but they paid these people to you want to sell your voucher, instead of turning it in for stock, we'll we'll buy it and we'll we'll we'll take the stock. Um so uh that was the system. And as Russia developed, I was out after '93, I'm at Morgan Stanley, um,
23:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): but um it became um a a core system, but not in the sense in in the sense of the server is there. the modem is there, the fiber optic cable is there. That's kind of like a pipe, and you can do all sorts of stuff on it. You can put different software. So um it was the first
23:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): one and it's still being used, uh MySex, the stock exchange. Um I do remember because my friends were telling me that they uh used it. Um but uh you know, when you build something like that, it's one of my uh there there's a great uh science fiction genre, I think it's Ian Banks, um, and he talks about uh how
23:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): if the the the the coding from 20, 40 years ago is really important. And you often, if you don't know these layers, and his books talk about how you get these trapdoors, Wars. um, you know, one of my fantasies is it is that uh all of a sudden people are going to need uh
24:06
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): coders who know uh turbopascal. That was my last language, right? Um and uh it is it's a real thing, right? There are these legacy systems and you just put stuff on it, and you know, if you don't really know what was there at the beginning, you know, maybe you don't know anything.
24:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, yeah, for sure. So just to confirm that with this privatization in Russia, it was effective. effectively like you would hand in these coupons and you would get ownership of thing.
24:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Electronic ownership of a share.
24:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, okay.
24:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): So you got uh you got a piece of paper that had numbers, I forget the details, but it had your name, had numbers, and it said you own this share. And uh but it was electronic. And the idea of voucher privatization is and it was a sound idea, but many sound ideas are not. applicable everywhere, was that it gave everyone a
24:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): stake in the economy, in the future. Great concept, uh, but um you can't just walk into a country and tell them, you know uh one of my colleagues, well you know, uh in uh in general on another team, I hadn't uh we were just friends and I knew what he was doing, um, wrote the corporate code
25:14
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): for
25:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Russia. right? Um you can't just do that. Unfortunately. I was a true believer, right? And you know, you know, you learn when you go through things. There's a great Russian movie called Ruski Reid, and it's about crime in the 90s.
25:30
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You
25:30
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): know how they obeyed the law?
25:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): How's that?
25:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): I need signature, then I own
25:36
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it.
25:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Right? Uh and the whole movie is about that, and it's great. You get these small armies trying to take over a place, trying to get either the kids or right. And uh um and so uh an amazing lesson of you can have great form of law, but don't just expect it to work. We're so
25:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): lucky in the West, and especially in common law countries, but in general in the political West and a lot of Asia. I don't want to say that only the political West um um has that right. It's a you know it was an important lesson. You know, you can't just design this perfect system and and assume it's gonna work in all these situations. It's partially why I've really become less ideological.
26:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): I really believed in it. I think that was wrong, and that's why if I'm in markets and I don't realize I'm wrong, then I'm not gonna survive in markets. For
26:26
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): sure.
26:27
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
26:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): mean, we could spend a whole episode talking just about that experience. But um
26:31
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): met
26:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): my wife.
26:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Oh right.
26:33
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Okay.
26:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Married over thirty years. Um she's
26:37
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Russian?
26:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): She's Russian. Um and uh neither of my kids are allowed to go back. I understand. You know, I I would like them to th uh uh practice the language. Um my m her mother, my mother-in-law, mother in law, who's passed away, but uh moved in with us when my twenty one year old was born, so they grew up only hearing Russian. They don't, you know, I don't want to quali
26:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): qualify I don't want to describe their abilities. Um but uh uh it's a very common thing that you know folks don't want to go back, right? And that's you know somewhat of an indictment, right? If uh uh um I'm not making that indictment, I'm just saying that's a kind of a bad sign, obviously. It characterizes some Western countries too, right?
27:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): It's
27:18
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): not
27:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): just a Russian thing. But uh
27:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Russians are the complete opposite of Americans, and I have no problem with that. I learn. They're pessimists. How could you be optimistic? We're optimistic. How could you be pessimistic if you're American? Two oceans, all these natural resources. Um, They're very intellectual. If you're poor and small, smart, you're smart. We're very anti-intellectual,
27:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): and I like that too. If you're rich and you're not smart, we think you're smart, right? Now, some of that's misattributed, but we're practical. I like that attitude from both countries. Um and uh also, and this is gonna sound strange because I know Russia in most people's heads is completely different than the Russia I experienced.
28:02
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
28:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): was there.
28:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): US was super involved and super cooperative, and we were looking for Russians that shared our values and we'd recommend them for jobs. And so these were allies, right? And no one really has that idea of Russians that they were these were folks that were that we were
28:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): supporting and championing as Americans. as you know, patriots working, well, I don't want to say patriots, but as people working to implement U.S. government policy. Um and uh so I'm not just gonna change that mindset because the world changed. I these are people I knew. Um but yeah, married for a long time and you know,
28:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): learned a lot. Learned a
28:44
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): lot.
28:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): You learn a lot when someone's in general. I've heard that um uh marriages and relationships work really well. if you have very similar characteristics or if you have a lot of exactly opposite ones. I'm not a psychologist, but that sounds that sounds reasonable. Like two INTJs are good, but um but if you're not an INTJ, if
29:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): you're the opposite on the other, and I just read this, I think I read this somewhere. Um that's good. But a mix is confusing apparently to humans because you're similar on some but different on other, but if you're different on everything,
29:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): I get it, right? Yeah,
29:16
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): opposites attract. Yeah.
29:19
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
29:20
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you you came back and um worked at Morgan Stanley for quite a long time. And that was in the lead up to the global financial crisis. In 2009, I believe it was, was when you joined Van Eck. There was a something that you said recently, and we just talked about it just off air a moment ago, about
29:36
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): um
29:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): effectively what you saw kind of coming, and you would talk to your colleagues even at um Morgan Stanley back in the day.
29:44
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um
29:44
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): can you just maybe we'll just do a pit stop in the GFC and where you were and anything that that major financial market condition taught you, and something that you've carried with you today?
29:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Absolutely. Um most important event in financial history since
30:02
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the first time.
30:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): World War II, arguably. It all started with the GFC. The first super precise answer is you only knew what really happened a couple years later. There was no contemporaneous understanding of this.
30:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): The big moment, I'm sitting at Van Eck, I see the headline go across, I'll get the precise number wrong. But it was Fed lent $1.2 trillion to Morgan Stanley, to one bank. $1.2 trillion. Immediately, me and my Morgan Stanley crew, oh what a
30:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): typo, how ridiculous. Right? We couldn't just um uh but it was true. And so uh what this was was the result of a few heroes. Um one a journalist. I think Mark Pittman is his name, Bloomberg News, arguably the best journalist at the place, super sophisticated, covered
30:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): derivatives. Um, and he got Bloomberg to sue the Fed. And the Fed, before the case went to the Supreme Court, which is a very sensitive issue for the Fed, uh just released all the documents.
31:12
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um,
31:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): it was very hard to organize. And so the next hero of this story, and I'm sure there are others, this is just my the ones I you know uh learned this from, uh was Lawrence Kotlakoff. Uh uh uh he's uh Harvard PhD in economics and in history.
31:29
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Uh
31:29
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): because I as an EM person have seen these movies uh eighty times. As a historian, you can too. But as an ordinary investor, there's really no way you're gonna know. going to about the stuff about what fiscal dominance and those sorts of things. We can get into that later. This was a run on derivatives, right? And uh uh
31:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): so Lawrence Kotlakoff started getting the numbers out. He dedicated his whole economics team uh at Boston University to analyzing this. Um and uh and these numbers are now in the Federal Registry, right? This is a real thing. But humans, if you don't know it contemporaneously, a lot
32:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): of people just don't want to go back. Some famous central banker said it's a one in a thousand year storm. That's good enough for me, is what most people said. I'm not that way, right? I think that's fine. Um and uh And then the Levy Institute um in uh um it's um economics institute did a lot of
32:29
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): serious work on this, but it was run on derivatives, the notional was let's call it 700 trillion or a thousand trillion, maybe a quadrillion. Incomprehensible number. So I uh when I was growing up at Morgan Stanley, uh I was kind of at the kids' table, right? I wasn't covering Germany, Japan, those
32:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): were considered really um uh good countries. And um but I had my experience, and I was describing the global financial crisis to my cool kid grown-up table friends, like one of my good buddies is ran the treasury desk, who's on the Treasury Borrowing Committee. I told him my version of the story, and he's like,
33:08
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that
33:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): sounds totally right. Nobody's saying that. And so 15 years ago, we wrote our first piece. Uh it was in four. Forbes, and we've been updating it. We've got an update, I think, coming up in Australia any day now. It's a way of understanding the implications of the global financial crisis precisely. I don't want essays
33:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): how bad it is or how good it is.
33:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Now, the net. So I was in London when they had the Saturday and Sunday.
33:39
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
33:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): don't know what they call it, the cleanup. Right? So I traded a lot of CDS, for example. There wasn't an established convention. Well, there was a convention, but there was no enforceable understanding of when I need to pay you or you pay me if I'm in the money. And so this is a
33:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): totally stylized version of it. Um the banks I'll mention are are not necessarily the first ones, right? But this is just an example of the how it worked. I think Merrill was one of the first ones. They went to Morgan Stanley and said, Well, yours
34:15
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a
34:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): trillion. I'm not I don't remember this particular number. Um and Morgan Stanley said, Well, uh, and and this is totally unofficial. I I don't know this stuff. I'm just giving an example to be totally clear. Sure. Um I don't remember those details from the um and Morgan Science said, well, how did you calculate that? And they said, well, this is how. Um and they uh
34:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): um and so Morgan Science said, well, if we calculate it that
34:39
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): way, um uh
34:40
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): credit suisse owes us two trillion.
34:43
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
34:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): don't know if it was specifically two trillion. Now
34:46
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
34:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): in the system, when they fixed it, they collapsed all the trade. So there's one side, another side. So on net, no real money was
34:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): used. And it technically, I'm I endorse this, it was the right thing to do. Two big problems. Number one, most of the money went to Europe.
35:09
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Right. Right.
35:10
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): And we've seen what's happened to European banks in since 2008. These things don't just go away. Um, and the other is um that uh there was no moral hazard. Right? These things continued. No one was punished, right? Um and uh and a lot of it was because the regulators were a bit panicked
35:30
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): and did things that only emerging markets do. For example, you can't ignore that um IndyMac Indie Mac
35:38
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
35:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): was told to mismark its books by Treasury.
35:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): That's a fact. I get it. But that's not U.S.
35:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): top-tier transparency and all that, right? That's a bit EM. A good example, after the global financial crisis, the IMF went to the U.S. and said, what's up with Fannie Freddie?
35:58
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Is
35:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): that government debt or not? And the U.S. is the as biggest shareholder. changed the rule. I believe it was used to be if you own 90%, you had to count it on your books and they changed it to 91%, something like that. You know, this happens to long time, I don't remember the precise percent, but I think I think those are the right numbers. Um and uh and so just changed the rule. So at the time, that
36:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): was that would have been 70% of GDP, um, the amount of debt there. Um so uh this was a guarantee on derivatives.
36:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Let's call it $1,000 trillion, right? There's a range of estimates. We've written a paper for ourselves on this, but you know, I don't think we'll want to publish it. And here's a key point. A lot of people, a lot of economists, uh, since 1980, I think, the big PhD e-com programs don't require history.
36:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Where did M0 come from? It came because a politician saw a run from South Carolina dollars into federal dollars, and you guarantee it.
36:58
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
36:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): if you back a run, that becomes a money liability. Now, the accounting for it and the acknowledgement of it in economic statistics often lags. M1, which includes money markets, took two crises before it was formally recognized as a liability.
37:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): M3, which is a very useful survey, service or measure, isn't done anymore.
37:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): But if a run is met,
37:26
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): it doesn't go away, right?
37:29
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): The market thinks it's still there. And it's a big problem because it's essentially saying: here's a version of
37:37
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it.
37:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): every book is mismarked. If I'm buying protection on Brazil,
37:46
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): at I
37:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): don't know, 250 over on a CDS contract,
37:49
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
37:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Deutsche Bank is trading at 300 over, what's up with that? Should I discount? I should discount that contract by the 300 basis point, which I I see on a screen as a risk, and that's not done.
38:01
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um
38:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): and so it's a really big problem. Um and the fact that it crossed lines to Europe
38:09
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
38:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): obviously brings up political issues, right? Uh do you want to be in the s testifying in the Senate Banking Committee and explaining politically why you paid while you sent money to European banks? It's you know
38:22
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): if
38:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): that's a good thing or bad thing, that's not what the Senate Banking Committee is going to be thinking about. They will, they've got r really serious people. But it's a big political issue. And no one's it's going to be very hard to sort of explain or defend something like that. So global financial crisis is still playing out, and uh um and uh
38:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): a lot happened and a lot of people elided eligible over it. One in a thousand-year thousand year storm, no nothing to see here. And uh But no,
38:50
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): no, no.
38:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): there was a lot to see there, and it's still playing out.
38:53
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): So, Eric, I think just listening to you, I could probably talk to you for at least five hours, and we would probably only have to walk away just for lunch.
39:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Your questions are awesome, I must say.
39:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): But there's so much ground to cover, and you've done plenty of work on this. Like you said, it's kind of longitudinal. You've got um all of this body of knowledge and these things that you have been talking about for such a long time. You manage a emerging market debt. You're the only one that's ever come on the show that has investments in Hungary, Indonesia, uh,
39:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Abu Dhabi all at the same time. And so I would direct people that are fascinated by how you think about markets specifically to go to the Van Eck website. And I'll put full resources in there. And we're definitely gonna do a part two because I just wanna want to see how this all ends, so to speak. and where it led you. But I know that there's this
39:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): one topic I really wanted to get your kind of most succinct version of, which is this idea of fiscal dominance, which is something that you've been calling for a very, very long time, further back than anyone that I know. Can you explain to listeners the concept here? And I'll refer back to literature for their benefit, but can you explain what that is
40:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): and why it's important to people that allocate capital to understand?
40:07
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Yeah.
40:10
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): But I'll define it in more normal language. But the common way an economist would say or define it is it's the moment when monetary policy loses traction, when fiscal policy is dominant. I like saying if I like a different version, which is at high levels of government debt, central
40:29
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): bank can't hike rates solely focused on inflation because it'll bankrupt the government and financial system.
40:36
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
40:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): that has implications. And the implication is inflation
40:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): and eventually stagflation. And look at where we are. Right. Um now in stagflation, the theflation can tell you there's no stag,
40:53
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
40:53
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): you often find out about the stag a few years later when statistics are redone. Um, but that's the simple proposition. And so think about what happens when a central bank hikes rates. In fiscal dominance, you're only confirming future monetary forbearance. Market's first thought is going to be how are you
41:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): financing this?
41:14
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um
41:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): you can't afford it.
41:16
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um
41:16
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): and uh you will just forbear. Uh so it's real thing. I don't think the US is the primary
41:23
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
41:24
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): uh victim of this right now. Generally speaking, you could say this, but the US is very exceptional. That's really true. Um and also money flows from one place to another. And in terms of the big countries, the big currency markets, uh Japan, UK, even Australia,
41:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): are the vulnerable ones. Um and uh money could or should flow to the dollar, the core rather than the periphery. Um Eurozone, if I do the numbers, doesn't look as Is bad, but I don't know the phone number. Right? Right? You know, you're uh you know, you you do Belgium, you do Spain. you do Italy.
42:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): That's how that system works right now. They don't have a common fiscal policy, they don't have a financial union or a banking union. Um
42:12
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): but that's fiscal dominance, is debt matters. Um and often the pain is uh stagflation. Inflation. Inflation covers a lot of sins. It can get out of control, though. Um, and in this geopolitical environment, obviously. there are some things that central bank can't really address.
42:30
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, we're already starting to see potentially some of that now. Final question that I wanted to put to you is
42:38
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it
42:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): kind of like a somewhat of an inversion. It's you've seen so many markets, you invest across the world, and you've been to parts of the world that many of us will never go to, experience financial systems, built them, and so
42:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): on. What's something that you believe about investing that maybe few others would either agree with you on or even just be aware of?
42:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Yeah, another great question. So I guess I guess I would say two things. One is, this is gonna sound strange to a lot of your listeners. I've never seen a crisis where investors didn't have time to deal with
43:13
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it.
43:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): So what we always do is if we think something is a one in ten or a one in a hundred but impactful scenario, we play it
43:24
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): out.
43:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Not because we think it's going to happen, but because you don't want to be thinking about it for the first time when it becomes evident. So I think I've said this to a number of my friends, you know, I've been doing this a long time, and they've generally they agree.
43:40
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um
43:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): this was kind of true in the Russia, in in the um when um
43:45
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh uh uh
43:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): the US sanctioned the Central Bank of Russia. Um that was, you know, that there was time, it's just that it seemed so outlandish if you
43:55
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
43:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): if you didn't have time, if you didn't think about it beforehand. Um it was a big part of the benchmark. A lot of investors, a lot of my competitors came. can't eliminate something. We can eliminate a big a good amount, not a huge amount of our benchmark, but we do have some flexibility and we used it. We're the only Bond fund that didn't have Russia. But for two years, people came back and said we predicted it, and we
44:16
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): did not predict it. We're not in the predicting business. It wasn't we weren't getting paid enough, we found better things. It's not it's not uh uh that kind of thing. The other one is um
44:26
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
44:26
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): and this will maybe seem depressing, but I think truth is never depressing. Um reform doesn't work. I'm such a seller of reform. The person who tries to reform is gonna get blamed for the problems. You just if they're termites on a table, I just stay away from the whole table. Um wait for the thing to come down and then pick up whatever
44:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): pieces um after the termites have gone. But uh um it's very uh it's you know you could argue it's depressing, or you could uh argue that look, knowing the truth and having a clear head is is the only thing you can do.
44:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Eric, like I said, I could talk to you for hours, but I know that you're long overdue getting back home. Uh and I really do appreciate you taking some time here in Melbourne. I know you you frequent Australia. Um if you haven't already had a chance, Jukes Coffee Roasters here in Melbourne is a good tip. from me, maybe a bit of a local uh secret.
45:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): I hope you noticed my RMs. I
45:19
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
45:20
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): didn't
45:20
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): know. When we
45:20
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): got to
45:21
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): our first hundred
45:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): million, I bought them um in Australia. Um and uh what a great, what a great product. I hope that's uh appropriate or not
45:30
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): inappropriate for me
45:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): to mention. But
45:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): um and I love Australia. I
45:33
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): mean
45:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): it's just fantastic. I've been coming here for eight years and it's such a such a great crew and we have got a great great team here. Uh indeed
45:40
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you do. And uh it sounded like a sellout crowd for you in Singapore and throughout Australia. And I'm sure next year this conversation is something gonna be more interesting. So um I really appreciate you taking the time out and sharing some of your journey with us.
45:53
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Thank you. Oh no, this this is I've never gotten questions like this before. I really had to think. This was really fun. So thank you. Thank
46:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you. As you can see and hear Eric. is one of the most interesting capital allocators we probably ever had on the show. His experience is so varied, but also the way he thinks about markets and systems is also very unique. There is a lot of literature available on the Van Eck website that describes some of
46:20
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): his views. The most interesting for me is this idea of his uh which is he's been calling for well over. a decade, the idea of fiscal dominance. And you heard him talk about it just there. This idea or this concept where you can have such a large amount of government debt that it basically means that your
46:40
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): central bank, say like the RBA here in Australia or the Federal Reserve in the United States, becomes somewhat hamstrung by the decisions that it can make. Because if it sees inflation getting out of control, it normally would be prompted to increase interest rates to bring down the inflation.
47:00
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Now,
47:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): if economic growth like GDP isn't there, so say for example, GDP is either flat or negative, at the same time inflation is going up and unemployment When is going up, which can happen, that's when we get something called stagflation. A big part of uh Eric's work talks about emerging markets and how the trade-off between developed markets like
47:20
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Australia, the United States, UK, Europe, et cetera,
47:23
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
47:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): emerging markets like say Brazil, parts of Asia, so on and so forth, a big part of his work talks about how those economies seem to be growing and are able to function more like a regular central bank and economic system. Remember the central bank and interest rate policy, that's set that's called monetary policy. What the
47:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): government does is called fiscal policy. Those are the decisions that the countries make at certain times. This brings up fascinating complications and implications for both developed markets, like say Australia and our debt position and our interest rate policy and our economy and those of emerging markets. like, say,
48:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Thailand or Indonesia and places like this, the next decade could be even more interesting and more fascinating than anything that we've experienced in the past decade. And this conversation, I think, is a very simple eye-opener into potentially what all investors need to be thinking about, not just those who are interested in
48:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): government bonds or fixed income, but retirees who are looking at super. superannuation funds, or maybe younger investors who are looking at the income opportunities or the yields on government bonds and emerging markets and these types of things. I would love to do a part two with Eric. And uh if you would like to hear it or see it, please let
48:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): me know wherever you get your RASC Rask podcasts, whether it's uh on Apple, Spotify, YouTube, or one of those other free. fringe podcast platforms. You can also write into us at rask.au/slash question, and you can get in contact with me and the team directly. Thanks for listening and watching this episode of the
49:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Rask Podcast.
49:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Thanks for tuning into this Rask podcast. As a reminder, this episode contained general financial information only. It's not personalized financial advice like you get from a financial planner. So don't act on the information until you've spoken to one. And if we've mentioned things like financial products, they come with something called a product disclosure statement or PDS and a target market determination
49:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): or TMD for short. These documents are essential to read and understand before you acquire or dispose of that financial product. You'll find our full disclaimer, a link to our financial services guide, and a range of free education. by following the links that are available in your show notes. Thanks for tuning in to this Rasp podcast. Don't forget to
49:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): share this episode with a friend or family member that we can help.
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