Investing by the Books

David Henry discusses 'The Mistake Playbook', emphasizing avoiding bad bets over chasing success and warning against averaging down.

1h 8m Listen to the original Episode page
Value InvestingBehavioral FinanceRisk ManagementPortfolio ConstructionInvestment ProcessGovernancePrivate EquityBook Review

Summary

David Henry, author of 'The Mistake Playbook', explains that investing success relies on avoiding 'killer mistakes' like governance failures and overpaying for peak earnings rather than studying winners. He argues that investors should judge decisions by their risk/reward at the time made, not the outcome, using the 'Fish at the Shark Table' concept to warn against entering unfamiliar industries. Henry advises against averaging down, noting it often lowers initial investment standards and masks deteriorating fundamentals. He shares his shift from concentrated high-quality portfolios to diversified, lower-quality durable businesses with better risk-adjusted returns. Finally, he recommends systematic screening and relying on historical data over management narratives to identify mispriced assets.

Key takeaways

  1. 1
    So I sometimes sort them by name, so A to Z, or I'll sort them by market. cap, smallest to largest. And I'm kind of able to go through them pretty quickly and systematically.

    Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) · 52:21

Episode sections

  1. 0:00 – 6:39

    Intro and David Henry's Background

    Eddie Palmian introduces David Henry, author of 'The Mistake Playbook', discussing his transition from poker and day trading to value investing after reading about Warren Buffett. Henry details his career through Keiki Ori (KKOR), private equity, and a Dublin hedge fund.

  2. 6:39 – 13:47

    The Mistake Playbook and Defining Mistakes

    Henry explains his book's focus on avoiding bad decisions rather than studying successes. He defines a mistake as a 'bad bet' where risk/reward was flawed, citing Annie Duke's concept of 'resulting' and a Texas Hold'em analogy.

  3. 13:47 – 20:15

    Killer Mistakes: The Fish at the Shark Table

    The first section covers 'Killer Mistakes' like weak balance sheets and governance failures. Henry introduces the 'Fish at the Shark Table' concept, warning against entering unfamiliar industries, and proposes the '5-minute Tourist Test' to gauge knowledge.

  4. 20:15 – 25:32

    Governance Failures and Overpaying

    Henry discusses governance failures using FTX as an example of red flags. He transitions to 'Overpaying', identifying the extrapolation of unsustainable earnings as a common error leading investors to pay for peak earnings.

  5. 25:32 – 30:03

    Management Communication and Narrative Risks

    Speaker_1 argues that management communication has a conflict of interest, often avoiding bad news. Speaker_0 notes underpromising is preferred. The discussion highlights how narratives can lead to overpaying if investors fail to separate story from financial reality.

  6. 30:03 – 33:47

    Process Mistakes and Behavioral Alignment

    Speaker_1 categorizes process mistakes into behavioral errors and alignment issues. He emphasizes that a great investment is not necessarily one an investor can hold through discomfort, stressing the need for self-knowledge.

  7. 33:47 – 40:08

    The Danger of Cash Drag and Impatience

    Speaker_1 identifies impatience with holding cash as a major mistake, citing Warren Buffett's US Air preferred stock investment as an example of cash drag leading to suboptimal decisions.

  8. 40:08 – 44:34

    Portfolio Evolution and Quality Constraints

    Speaker_1 describes shifting from a concentrated portfolio of ~8-10 stocks to a diversified one of ~15 stocks. He explains that the 'quality' investing space has become too competitive and expensive, leading him to seek lower-quality but durable businesses.

  9. 44:34 – 50:04

    Selling Discipline and Averaging Down

    Speaker_1 outlines a revised selling strategy: holding positions unless extremely overvalued or a mistake is identified. He rejects averaging down, viewing it as a temptation to lower initial investment standards.

  10. 50:04 – 51:42

    Averaging Down Risks

    Speaker_1 warns that averaging down is risky if the thesis has deteriorated, highlighting dangers of unintentional concentration and failing to recognize when intrinsic value is falling alongside price.

  11. 51:42 – 54:22

    Idea Generation via A-to-Z Screening

    Speaker_1 describes screening entire indices or industries alphabetically or by market cap. He cites examples of UK AIM stocks and US-listed banks, using AI tools to create databases for efficient filtering.

  12. 54:22 – 56:03

    Management Interaction and Evidence

    Speaker_1 states he now speaks to management less frequently, preferring tangible historical performance data over 5-15 years. He believes senior executives are skilled communicators and fundamental evidence in filings is more reliable.

  13. 56:03 – 57:39

    Impact of Writing on Rigor

    Writing 'The Mistake Playbook' reinforced Speaker_1's existing processes. The act of writing forced him to demand predictive evidence for assumptions, moving beyond convincing stories to verify durable quality.

  14. 57:39 – 1:07:42

    Long-Term Goals and Personal Philosophy

    Speaker_1 expresses a desire to generate a strong track record over 50-60 years, prioritizing personal improvement over public recognition. He shares a philosophy inspired by his late grandfather, focusing on contentment.

Claims worth verifying

David Henry's book 'The Mistake Playbook' was published in September 2026.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·0:29

How to verify: Check the publication date on the book's copyright page or retailer listings (e.g., Amazon, publisher website). For recent events, verify 2026-08-17 through 2026-11-17. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

David Henry is from Ireland and currently lives in Limoges, France.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·0:56

How to verify: Check David Henry's professional biography on his personal website, LinkedIn profile, or the Redeye website. For recent events, verify 2026-08-17 through 2026-11-17. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

David Henry worked at Keiki Ori (KKOR) for nearly five years.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·4:43

How to verify: Check David Henry's LinkedIn profile or professional biography for employment history. For recent events, verify 2026-08-17 through 2026-11-17. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Annie Duke wrote a book about 'resulting' and decision-making.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·9:27

How to verify: Search for Annie Duke's bibliography; she authored 'Thinking in Bets' which discusses this concept. For recent events, verify 2026-08-17 through 2026-11-17. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

FTX lacked a CFO and had a strange relationship with Alameda before its collapse.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·22:41

How to verify: Review news reports from late 2026 regarding the FTX collapse and its governance structure prior to bankruptcy. For recent events, verify 2026-08-17 through 2026-11-17. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

David Henry got to know Eddie Palmian in 2023 when Henry visited Stockholm for Redeye's Serial Acquires Conference.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·0:04

How to verify: Check Redeye's conference archives or LinkedIn profiles for both individuals to confirm attendance at the 2023 event. For recent events, verify 2026-08-17 through 2026-11-17. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Management teams have a conflict of interest because they do not want to talk their stock down 10 or 20 percent, which may lead to less candid communication.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·26:31

How to verify: Review earnings call transcripts for specific companies to identify instances where management omitted negative industry trends or growth slowdowns; compare with subsequent stock price drops when information was revealed. For recent events, verify 2026-08-17 through 2026-11-17. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Warren Buffett invested in the preferred stock of US Air because he had too much cash at the time.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·35:15

How to verify: Check Warren Buffett's shareholder letters or interviews (e.g., with Charlie Munger) discussing the US Air investment rationale; verify US Air's financial distress and bankruptcy timeline. For recent events, verify 2026-08-17 through 2026-11-17. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Speaker_1 owns fewer really high-quality companies now than he did two years ago because the quality investing space is too competitive and prices are uncomfortable.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·41:15

How to verify: Compare Speaker_1's disclosed portfolio holdings from 2026 against his holdings in 2026; analyze valuation multiples (P/E) of his current holdings versus historical 'quality' benchmarks. For recent events, verify 2026-08-17 through 2026-11-17. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Speaker_1 avoids paying more than 15 or 16 times sustainable earnings for high-quality companies.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·41:54

How to verify: Review Speaker_1's portfolio holdings for companies with P/E ratios above 16x; cross-reference with his stated investment criteria in 'The Mistake Playbook' or subsequent interviews. For recent events, verify 2026-08-17 through 2026-11-17. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Speaker_1 increased his portfolio concentration from 8-10 investments to approximately 15 investments.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·40:47

How to verify: Verify the number of positions in Speaker_1's disclosed portfolio filings or public updates from 2026 versus 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-17 through 2026-11-17. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

Speaker_1 stopped averaging down and trimming positions because past data showed these decisions did not add value.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·45:31

How to verify: Analyze Speaker_1's historical trade records (if published) to compare returns of trimmed/averaged-down positions versus buy-and-hold equivalents; check for public statements on this policy change. For recent events, verify 2026-08-17 through 2026-11-17. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Investing in the highest quality companies has become a 'really competitive space' with 'a lot of smart people' chasing a small group of companies.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·41:37

How to verify: Review academic or industry studies on the performance of 'quality' factor investing strategies over the last 5-10 years; analyze trading volumes and analyst coverage for top-tier quality stocks. For recent events, verify 2026-08-17 through 2026-11-17. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Speaker_1 expects his current lower-quality holdings to play out over 4-6 years, though he assumes a 10-12 year holding period for valuation purposes.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·43:41

How to verify: Compare the actual holding period of Speaker_1's recent investments against his stated 4-6 year expectation; verify if he holds positions for 10+ years based on portfolio turnover data. For recent events, verify 2026-08-17 through 2026-11-17. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Speaker_1 screened every stock on the AIM stock index to find mispricings caused by institutional money leaving the UK market.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·52:02

How to verify: Check historical institutional ownership data for UK AIM-listed companies via London Stock Exchange or fund reports from 2026-2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-17 through 2026-11-17. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Speaker_1 used AI to create a 'Moody's manual' for all US-listed banks to facilitate screening.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·53:08

How to verify: Review speaker_1's public communications or blog posts from 2026-2026 describing his AI tools and banking analysis process. For recent events, verify 2026-08-17 through 2026-11-17. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Warren Buffett bought large blocks of companies with sub-$10 million market caps in his early career.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·1:02:27

How to verify: Verify via 'The Snowball' by Alice Schroeder or SEC filings from Buffett's early partnership years (1950s-1960s) for small-cap acquisitions. For recent events, verify 2026-08-17 through 2026-11-17. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

Speaker_1 has no social media presence.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·1:06:37

How to verify: Search major social media platforms (X, LinkedIn, Instagram) for David Henry's official profiles during the verification window. For recent events, verify 2026-08-17 through 2026-11-17. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Speaker_1's grandfather was a small farmer in rural Northwest Ireland.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·59:32

How to verify: Verify via biographical details in 'The Mistake Playbook' or local records in Northwest Ireland if publicly available. For recent events, verify 2026-08-17 through 2026-11-17. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Speaker_1 recommends rereading 'There's Always Something to Do' by Peter Cundill.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·1:01:20

How to verify: Check the book's publication details and Peter Cundill's track record via SEC filings or fund fact sheets. For recent events, verify 2026-08-17 through 2026-11-17. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

Speaker_1 considers 'The Snowball' the greatest book he has ever read.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·1:01:55

How to verify: This is a subjective opinion; verify via the transcript itself as a claim of preference. For recent events, verify 2026-08-17 through 2026-11-17. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Speaker_1 made his first LinkedIn post after finishing his book.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·1:06:37

How to verify: Check the creation date of David Henry's LinkedIn profile or posts via LinkedIn's 'View Profile' history. For recent events, verify 2026-08-17 through 2026-11-17. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The podcast is produced by Redeye.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·1:07:09

How to verify: Check the podcast's website or Apple Podcasts/Spotify show notes for production credits. For recent events, verify 2026-08-17 through 2026-11-17. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Speaker_1's grandfather passed away a couple of years before the interview (2024).

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·58:43

How to verify: Verify via obituaries in Northwest Ireland newspapers from 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-17 through 2026-11-17. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Do your own research

  • Verify David Henry's background and current role at Keiki Ori (KKOR) and his Dublin hedge fund experience via LinkedIn or firm websites.
  • Check the publication date and content of 'The Mistake Playbook' (September 2026) to assess its relevance and any potential conflicts of interest.
  • Review Warren Buffett's US Air preferred stock investment details in SEC filings or Berkshire Hathaway shareholder letters to understand the 'cash drag' argument.
  • Analyze FTX's bankruptcy filings for governance red flags like lack of a CFO and related-party transactions with Alameda, as cited by Henry.
  • Research the performance of UK AIM stocks and US-listed banks to test Henry's systematic screening methodology.
  • Compare Henry's 'quality' investing threshold (15-16x sustainable earnings) against current market multiples for high-quality companies.
  • Read Annie Duke's work on 'resulting' to understand the distinction between decision quality and outcome.
  • Verify Peter Cundill's 'There's Always Something to Do' and Alice Schroeder's 'The Snowball' for the recommended investment philosophies.
Full transcriptexpand
0:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Hello everyone and welcome to Investing by the Books, a podcast by Redeye.
0:03
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I'm your
0:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): host, Eddie Palmian, and today we're thrilled to have David Henry on the show. David is a thoughtful investor from Ireland that I got to know in 2023 when he visited Stockholm for Redeye's Serial Acquires Conference. Now David has released his first investing book, The Mistake Playbook. This is a very practical guide with many examples of costly
0:24
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): errors that David has experienced in his investing career. and seen others' investors make.
0:29
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
0:29
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Mistake Playbook was published in September 2026, and we're delighted to have its author on the show today.
0:35
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Here
0:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): comes our conversation with David Henry.
0:43
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Hi
0:44
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Dave, and welcome to Investing by the Books Podcast.
0:46
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Hey
0:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Eddie, thanks so much for having me on. It's uh it's a real privilege to be here and um really looking forward to
0:51
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it.
0:52
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): It's our pleasure to have you on. Where are we reaching you today?
0:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): So I am in uh the middle of France in a town called Limage, which was probably not very well known up until uh a couple of weeks ago because our uh our city hall was burnt down and maybe a few more people have seen it on the news. Uh but yeah, I'm in I'm in France.
1:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Turbulent times. But uh you're not uh originating from France.
1:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): No, I'm from Ireland. Um, and how I ended up here was uh my lovely wife is French. So we had our first child, and then after that we decided to to change and upsticks and and live a little bit in France.
1:30
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And to begin, where did you come across in investing for the first time and and when was
1:34
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it?
1:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, so it's funny, I I never had any exposure to investing growing up. Um, Ireland is much more obsessed with property than stock portfolios. And none of my family or friends or school would have had uh invested personally or worked in the industry.
1:51
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
1:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I actually came to investing uh through the world of online poker. So I played a lot of Texas Hold'em Them as a teenager, and in my late teenage years, I would have um never met with a kind of group and we would have chatted about strategy and ideas. And uh one of the guys in the group was, I guess, a part-time poker player and
2:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): a part-time day trader. And it's funny, when he was losing more in poker, he was uh day trading more, and when he was looting more in day trading, he was playing poker more. So he was a bit of a degenerate gambler, but he was a lovely guy, and he was telling me, Hey, you got to get in on this. day trading stuff. It's super easy. You can get lots of leverage and make loads of money.
2:31
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Uh
2:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): famous last words.
2:33
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um
2:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): so he sent me a lot of books to read. And what he was really doing was uh day trading currency pairs and microcap stocks using technical analysis. So I read all his stuff. Uh none of it really made sense to me. I if I zoomed in or I zoomed out on these charts, all the patterns changed. So I couldn't figure
2:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it
2:54
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): out. Um,
2:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): but somewhere in that rabbit hole, I came across the Roger Lowenstein book on uh Buffett the Making of American Capitalist. And is it the total cliche, but that book just instantly like was like a ton of bricks falling on me, and it made so much sense. So the idea that like stocks are or businesses think about the underlying returns, they just generate
3:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): for shareholders. You're trying to buy a company for less than it's worth, and hopefully the the mispriced bet.
3:21
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
3:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it just made so much sense to me. And uh that kind of started a bit of an addiction where I was reading everything and anything I could on investing, trying to speak with everyone in the industry.
3:32
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
3:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): yeah, I guess that addiction turned into a vocation. So um it was probably about nearly 20. years ago when I first read the book. And I've I loved it just as much now as I did back then. And I can probably appreciate it a lot more now. Uh so that was my intro.
3:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And what was your path otherwise to become a professional investor? And and how was that work for
3:55
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you?
3:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, so it became a bit more traditional then. Uh so I went to university and I studied finance and did a master's. in finance. And my lucky break came when someone who worked in Keiki Ori had given their business card to a lecturer of mine.
4:10
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
4:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I asked, Could I get his email? So I sent a kind of cold email to him and said, Look, I'd just love to meet and chat about investing. Nothing other than that. Can I just buy you a coffee?
4:20
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
4:20
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): he said yes. And so we had a a 30-minute thirty minute chat that turned into really, I guess, uh two and a half hour conversations. conversation on everything and anything.
4:29
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
4:29
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): at the very end he asked me, uh, so I guess you're interested in an internship. And I just blurted out, absolutely, uh, despite I was supposed to be joining a a corporate finance house in a graduate role in
4:41
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in
4:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): two and a half months time.
4:43
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
4:44
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I swapped my I guess my last summer of freedom uh
4:47
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): where
4:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I was supposed to be interrating across Europe for learning about CL. CLOs and leveraged finance.
4:53
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um,
4:53
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): but I absolutely loved it. I spent almost five years with KKOR. Um I started on the credit and the investing side. And uh that's a great place to learn. Like you really get a huge exposure to a lot of different types of businesses and industries. You really see the business cycle in a bit of an accelerated fashion, and you can really
5:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): see how businesses fail. and particularly balance sheets fail pretty quickly. So I love that. And then at the end of my KQR time, I got to go to London and work in private equity for just over a year. And that was a great exposure to a different side of investing.
5:28
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
5:29
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I learned a huge amount. But I probably was always most interested and fascinated I'm with public market investing. I actually spent my first couple of months in KQR KKOR on looking at public investments.
5:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And that's always where my heart lied. And I got lucky that there was an investment fund or a hedge fund setting up in Dublin. And I met them, and luckily there was an opening for someone on the investing team. And yeah, I joined them. And it was
5:57
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it
5:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): was a super experience where uh we were a very small, close-knit team, and they're a wonderful group of guys. with a really great mission and just a huge amount of learning. It was during the COVID period, so learning was really accelerated. Uh a very strange time to be investing.
6:14
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Uh
6:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): and I stayed with those guys for just over four years. And then I I very reluctantly made the decision um
6:21
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): to
6:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): go out on my own and see if could I'd I be a private investor.
6:26
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): We'll speak more about your experiences now and what you're doing in your investing. But today we will speak about your book, The Mistake Playbook, that I have here.
6:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Can you briefly explain what the book is
6:41
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): about?
6:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, I guess
6:43
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
6:44
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): simplest way to think about it is it's a bit of an inversion of the traditional investing book. So
6:49
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a lot
6:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): or most. investment books will focus on success and studying the best companies. What does a great investment look like? What does a great company look like?
6:58
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
6:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I guess with the mistake playbook,
7:00
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
7:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): was trying to turn that on its head a little bit
7:02
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
7:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): instead look at what a bad decision or a mistake look like and how can we avoid them over time. And look, studying success is hugely important for being a great investor. but it kind of only tells you half the story. So
7:17
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): when
7:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you add in mistakes and failure, you can get a bit more of a complete picture.
7:22
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
7:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I think it's really great for helping separating uh luck from a great decision. And in particular, it re reveals risks really
7:32
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): well.
7:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And I've always felt that a kind of deliberate focus on mistakes is a very powerful and maybe underappreciated way of improving your long-term performance over time.
7:45
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It
7:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): might be a little bit more achievable, like it might be easier to try and make one or two less avoidable mistakes than finding one or two more brilliant investing ideas over time.
7:55
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
7:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I guess maybe the most important principle kind of flowing through the book in the different sections is. that survival is the name of the game and it is crucial. And like to have a successful investing career or an ex a successful investing track record,
8:13
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
8:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): have to stay in the game because compounding doesn't work if you blow
8:18
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): up.
8:19
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
8:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the book itself, I guess, focuses on the
8:22
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
8:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): 16 most common and costly mistakes that I think about investing. And I try to make it as practical as possible. Um, like go through the theory of the mistakes and how they might happen, but use real examples of companies or situations with investors to see them in real time. And then look at maybe some tools,
8:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): techniques, and checklists and warning signs to hopefully uh make less mistakes going forward and uh and improve your your own company. kind of decision making. So
8:53
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
8:53
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): think what a great outcome for me would be that a reader of the book could hopefully make uh one or two less mistakes over time.
9:00
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Uh,
9:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): because it'd be pretty wonderful not to have to learn every single investing lesson with your own capital. Unfortunately, investing um learning can be quite expensive.
9:12
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Definitely. And when we speak about mistakes, um, people always have their own ideas about what it means, of course. How do you define a mistake?
9:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, and it's it sounds like it should be pretty simple and straightforward.
9:27
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
9:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): think it's complicated a little bit by the fact that we can really focus on outcomes when we're judging a decision. And that's a concept called resulting, which was it was a great book, Annie Duke. actually wrote about it. And
9:41
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): what
9:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): happens is when we see a great outcome, we tend to look back and say, Oh, that was a great decision. And if something went really badly, we could say, Well, clearly that was a mistake, like that was an awful decision. Um, but you can't reliably really judge the quality of a decision based on an outcome, like you could just get lucky or you could get unlucky, and so what I
10:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): think
10:02
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the better
10:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): way to approach it is you
10:04
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
10:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): go back to the moment the decision was made and you kind of ask yourself, well, was that a good bet? So for me, a mistake is is kind of simply a bad bet. Like it was a decision you made in the moment
10:17
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that
10:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): was a bad decision. And it's one where the potential reward was never going to compensate you for all the risks you were taking where you could lose capital. And if
10:28
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): if
10:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you kind of make dozens of those bets over time,
10:31
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
10:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): well, you're going to lose money. So
10:33
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): to
10:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): bring it back to kind of my my poker origins, Eddie, if you and I are sitting and playing a game of Texas Hold'em
10:40
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
10:40
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): we're good gamblers, so we're playing with the the cards facing up,
10:43
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
10:44
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you get dealt uh pocket aces, ace is the best starting hand, and I get dealt uh a 2-7 offsuit, which is the worst starting hand.
10:51
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
10:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): for some reason I decide to go all in.
10:53
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well,
10:53
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that's brilliant for you. Like that's almost a 90% probability that you're going to win this hand. And if we play a hundred hands, well, uh, if you bet reasonably you're going to walk away very rich. And unfortunately, my my poor infant son is going to go hungry. Um, because you've got uh you've made a great decision, and I I have
11:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): not.
11:14
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um But
11:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): on average, I should still win maybe 11 or 12 of those 100 hands. And I might be celebrating and jumping for joy when I when I win. But it was a terrible decision. And the outcome doesn't change that. And unfortunately, you might be raging when you lose, but you still made an excellent decision. The outcome doesn't change that. Um, But you just have to
11:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): survive. So unfortunately, uh, for good decisions to play out. we have to survive over time. So you could have bet all your money on one of those hands, and unfortunately, it was the unlucky one where where I got trip sevens and uh and you would lose.
11:49
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
11:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that brings back in like it's not just making good decisions, but it's surviving to let those decisions work for
11:55
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): us. Yeah,
11:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): so for me, simply a mistake is not losing money, it is a bad bet in the first place.
12:03
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
12:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): how do you compare that to other disciplines where
12:07
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): they
12:07
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): have learned over the years and years that we should not make the same mistakes? Are investors learning?
12:16
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): It's a great question. Um, I think it can be potentially harder in investing. Um, and it's definitely different than other careers like medicine or engineering. Um Obviously, we have to deal with a lot of uncertainty and unknown probabilities.
12:32
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
12:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I think for me, the bigger issue is always we have this very strange feedback loop in investing, where we make a decision and the feedback we get on that decision can be noisy, it can be messy, and it can take years before quality feedback comes back. And that's that makes learning really
12:52
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): challenging because it can reinforce the wrong lessons.
12:56
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
12:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): if you take like a surgeon, my brother is a surgeon, so I like to think about that field a lot. But if they make a technical mistake in the operating theater, they can get pretty direct feedback straight away and learn almost instantly.
13:09
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
13:10
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): if we're in a bull market and uh I'm making a lot of terrible decisions. well, I can be rewarded for years on end. And you can actually be penalized for making good decisions during those periods in the short term.
13:23
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
13:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it's not really until the euphoria ends that you're going to see, well, my my brilliance was actually luck, and I was just making really bad decisions. Um, and yeah, that's the big danger. The this weird feedback loop can reinforce bad ideas and bad. decisions over time. And that makes learning quite challenging and
13:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): also expensive, as we talked about before.
13:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So let's go deeper into the book. You have structured it into three parts. And the first section is called Killer Mistakes, which sounds really bad. What are these?
13:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, and uh deliberately designed to sound a bit scary. So the structure of the book, I guess I was trying to follow a little bit of my own investing process. And it starts with this core idea that like mistakes are not all equal and they don't deserve the same treatment. Um some are painful,
14:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): but you can get over them. Um but then there are these killer mistakes, which uh they're the most dangerous, they're the most fatal, they
14:26
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): can
14:26
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): take you out of the game, and they are by far the most important ones we have to make the right decisions around. Um
14:34
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): so
14:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the first step for me is trying to rule out any of these risks that that jeopardize survival. And some of the ones we look at in the book are um
14:42
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): really
14:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): weak balance sheets and over leveraged companies, or dangerous levels of of fragility or or complexity.
14:49
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um
14:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And
14:50
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): yeah,
14:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it doesn't really matter how brilliant you are with the rest of your analysis. Like the real problem with the killer mistakes is
14:56
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): if
14:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you make a wrong decision there,
14:58
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): well,
14:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you're taken out of the game. The investment could be over. So I I kind of think about them as a gate in my decision process that I have to get comfortable with to go through before I get to the the more fun and interesting parts of uh investing.
15:15
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
15:16
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): recommend everyone to buy the book to read all
15:18
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): of
15:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): uh your examples. But the first killer mistake that you bring up is the
15:24
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): to
15:24
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): be the fish at the shark table. Please tell us more about this.
15:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, and it it kind of comes from the poker saying, which is um
15:34
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
15:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): most dangerous place to be in is a place where
15:37
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
15:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): think you know something and you really don't. And that can lead to you making an awful lot of mistakes. Like my mistakes when I started as an an early investor, they were from going into businesses I just did not understand. And more importantly, I didn't understand the risks involving them. And I can think about
15:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): several investments I made where the share price went down 20 or 30% percent for something I never even thought was possible.
16:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And
16:04
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
16:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): idea of it really kind of hits home that like investing is a very competitive space. Like there are lots of really well-incentivized, hungry investment professionals out there trying to get great returns for their for their investors.
16:19
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
16:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): there's also loads of amateurs who, in some cases, like work harder than even their professional peers. And it's very difficult to outperform. And like you might think you've found a a great idea and it's a great investment. But the reality is you're just wrong. You didn't understand the company. You didn't understand the risk profile.
16:37
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
16:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): unfortunately over time the feedback you're going to get is that uh you made a bad decision.
16:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): One term related to this that you use in the book is uh industry tourist. And this is to test your your competence. Is this something that you came up with? I I think it's brilliant.
16:53
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, I I think I did, and I sincerely apologize if I've stolen it from someone unwittingly. Um
17:00
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): but
17:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the industry tourists is trying to describe like this overconfident person who has this, I guess, superficial knowledge of a business. Like they think they understand something well, but they really don't. And the real things they misunderstand is all the risks that are involved. in it and that they might be taking.
17:17
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
17:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it's a bit of a thought exercise to get you out of your head and try to be a bit more honest with yourself.
17:23
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
17:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you can imagine yourself in a room where you're standing at the table and some guy comes over and you you learn that he's been an investor in an industry that you're studying for 20 years, and then a CEO comes over and he's worked in the industry for 40 years,
17:37
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
17:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it's really about like, how long is it going to be before those guys expose my lack of knowledge? Like, is it 30 seconds? Is it a minute? Could I hold a good conversation with them for an hour? What could they ask me that's really important, but I have no understanding of them and couldn't answer? And I think we can all kind of imagine that type of scenario, or
17:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): we've been in something similar, and that envisaged embarrassment.
18:03
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): can
18:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): help add a little bit of humility and help you be a little bit more honest with yourself. And the goal is not to see like can you handle yourself in that kind of a situation. It's to understand like the limits of your knowledge. And hopefully you can come away from it thinking or or coming to the conclusion that I need to do more work and understand this better.
18:22
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Or
18:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): maybe it's something that I just won't understand and I need to put in the two hard too pile and move away from. I'm always going to be the the fish at the at the poker table on
18:32
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it.
18:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Um
18:33
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
18:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it's not that you need to be the most knowledgeable person to make a great investment. You need to know enough for sure.
18:40
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um,
18:40
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): but you can also make a great decision if everyone else is acting irrationally and you're acting more rational. But I think you really need to understand where you stand with your. your knowledge level as a as a starting point.
18:54
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
18:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you've said it for for five minutes, you need to last for five minutes in this kind of environment. Uh is there a a reason for that?
19:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): No, there's no scientific uh methodology. It's more kind of a a framework to think like you're not just going to get exposed in the first minute. Like that's not where your level of knowledge is. So a five minute is a bit of a heuristic to
19:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): jump on it.
19:17
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
19:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and practically, do you have any ideas of how you expose yourself to those situations? Do you uh call up uh in an industry veteran and actually do that in your own investing?
19:30
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
19:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I definitely do. I try to speak with a lot of people in companies and industries that I'm looking
19:36
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): at,
19:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): and I think you get a very good sense. of what you understand or don't understand from speaking with others. I think reading lots of different material on not just the company you're looking at, but the industry, its competitors, its suppliers, its customers helps you kind of fill in what you may understand or not understand.
19:56
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
19:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I do find I'm speaking with other investors who've spent a lot of time looking at useful as well. Um
20:02
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
20:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): probably listening a lot more than asking questions. I think you can uh gain a lot more from uh exposing where you don't know if you let that person um go down a couple of rabbit holes.
20:16
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Another chapter of the killer mistakes is about governance failures.
20:20
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
20:20
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I think this is a bit under underestimated by investors. So can you give an example of a governance failure? government governance issue that you find particularly worrisome?
20:30
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, and it's it's definitely one of the ones that I certainly spent a lot less time on growing up, and I I probably would have seen others maybe dedicate less time to maybe deliberately focusing on or talking about. And governance failures can range from like the slow siphon of value from investors to insiders.
20:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Or there can be the more major accounting scandals and blow ups or misappropriation of assets. And I think it's those latter ones that are a lot harder for investors to deal with. And they're very hard to prove in advance. Like it's very hard to prove a serious failure, or in the worst cases of fraud, before it's actually happened.
21:11
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
21:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I think what can be a useful framework for dealing with. it is rather than approaching it as like an investor or a short seller who's looking to prove the fraud,
21:22
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): what
21:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I'm asking as an investor is am I happy in trusting my capital with those people and investing with that company? And I think that's a little bit of a subtle shift in your analysis where rather than trying to expose something, you're just looking for flat. flags that might indicate there's a much higher risk involved here and
21:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that you don't want to be involved with it.
21:45
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And the
21:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): flags I go through in the book, they don't prove anything and they don't prove that something serious is happening. They just indicate that the risks are higher. And
21:55
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that
21:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): comes with a cost. That conservatism can lead to you missing some perfectly good companies and and some false positives coming up.
22:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): But I do think it's a good trade-off for helping
22:07
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
22:07
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): miss and avoid a lot of these more serious failures. And
22:12
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): an
22:12
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): example I kind of used in the book, which was maybe a bit more popular in investing circles, was FTX, the cryptocurrency platform.
22:21
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
22:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I think that if you looked at that company with the information that was available before the collapse. you would have had questions that would have been raised that would have potentially looked like flags to you. And again, they didn't prove anything. They're just measures that the risk might have been higher than it looked like. And for me, some of those would have been the
22:41
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
22:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): apparent lack of a of a CFO, this kind of strange relationship and common ownership of um FTX and one of its biggest trade-ups. trading partners, which was Alameda, um, and that potential for kind of conflicts of interests or or related party transactions.
22:59
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um,
22:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): and then maybe the board structure and its kind of independence. And yeah, maybe the
23:05
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
23:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): ultimate outcome for FTX was probably worse than what the flags might have even raised.
23:10
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
23:10
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I think that framework of
23:12
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): of
23:12
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): thinking about look, I'm not trying to expose the next Enron or the next big fraud. I'm just trying to avoid them and not have them in my portfolio might be uh
23:22
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a
23:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): better way to approach
23:24
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it.
23:26
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): These were the killer mistakes, and then we have some mistakes that are can be terrible, but uh they might not kill you. And uh this is what the second and and the third part of the book is. And the second part is about overpaying. And this is common and difficult to judge in something every every investor
23:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): grapples with. What is a common mistake that causes investors to overpay for stocks?
23:51
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
23:52
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): and overpaying is really interesting. Um I think there's kind of two types of overpaying. The
23:59
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
23:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): first one might be you
24:00
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you've
24:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): got your business analysis right and you're your forecasts are broadly right,
24:04
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): but
24:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you've just paid a very high multiple of cash flower earnings. And
24:09
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in
24:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the book, I try to deal with the other type of overpaying, which is more a consequence of a mistake in your analysis. So you got something wrong. You are wrong about
24:19
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
24:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): actual level of earnings at the moment.
24:22
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh,
24:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): You are wrong about the growth of those earnings, or you were maybe wrong about how those earnings transform. translate into cash flow uh for shareholders.
24:29
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And I
24:30
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): think that's the real danger. You think you're paying a low price and a low multiple for something, but actually you've just made a mistake and you've ended up paying a very high price. And I think
24:40
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
24:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): mistake that I see a lot and have made myself is extrapolating unsustainable current earnings. So
24:49
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
24:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): see a company. that has had really good growth for a couple of years, you lock that in as permanent,
24:55
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
24:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): think, hey, it's earning about $100 million. And I think it's going to compound from here, but actually it's earning $50 or 60 million. You've you've extrapolated something that was never going to be sustainable. And uh you didn't buy
25:08
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
25:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): cheap earnings, you you bought peak earnings. And we can kind of think as that as happening a lot. in commodity companies, but it happens in many different types of industries, particularly ones where demand can be a little bit different up and down the value chain. And you can have these periods of of over earning that can
25:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): uh yeah, they can really throw off an investor's analysis.
25:32
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): At
25:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the end of the day, it's always your responsibility as an investor to to judge that of course and take the decisions to invest in something. But uh, how do you think management and the company can avoid this happening to their investors?
25:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): It's a hard one. I think the biggest one is always candid communication. Like if you're very honest about how your business is performing, why you're experiencing this great growth, um,
26:00
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): what
26:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you're seeing in the industry to would lead you to believe that that's that is sustainable. I think that's the most powerful. And ultimately you would hope that that's what the management team is doing anyway, because they're making decisions to allocate capital and resources based on what they think the future growth prospects of an industry is. And
26:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I think the challenge for them is that unfortunately might temper uh some investor fervor for the stock. And it you might end up talking about things that can lead the stock to go down, which
26:31
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): is a
26:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): bit of a conflict of interest for the management team. That's not really what they want to do. They're not really in the business of talking their stock down 10 or 20 percent.
26:39
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Sure.
26:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): But I think, yeah, in the short term, yeah. And I do think the best management teams that I've seen are very good at being very candid with investors about what they see and
26:50
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): what's
26:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): happening. in their industry and what's driving the actual performance.
26:53
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
26:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I'm invested in a small company
26:56
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in
26:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the UK,
26:57
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
26:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it's kind of got some exposure to,
27:00
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
27:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): guess, the high end of housing transactions.
27:03
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
27:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it's just constantly a worry word. Like it's always saying this is never going to last. These conditions are way better than we think they are. This is what we're seeing at the ground level. Um, So they've kind of taken the opposite route. They're maybe too conservative. in their in their candor, but it's um it makes it very uh tangible for the investor when you can appreciate that the management
27:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): team is is giving you the feedback as they see
27:25
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it.
27:26
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Underpromise and overdeliver. That's that's what we usually prefer, I think.
27:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, exactly.
27:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Uh And related to this, I think there's always this this narrative in the market about different stuff. stocks and different segments of the market that are more popular. And I
27:43
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
27:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): recently interviewed Ian Kessel about his new book, and we talked about his journey from being a a story stock investor to now focus more on the fundamentals and the longer investment case.
27:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): ambassadors think think about that you
27:59
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): yeah
27:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): stories are really difficult um and I think they are an area that can really lead you to overpaying because it's very easy to get captivated by a great story and a great narrative. And I think what we really have to do as investors is separate the narrative from the reality.
28:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): So it's like okay you've said
28:21
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): this
28:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): is a great company with great growth prospects, but why? Like why is that? What
28:26
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): is
28:26
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the prediction predictive
28:27
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
28:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): elements here that I can hang my hat on these great assumptions to suggest that yeah, this is actually a very plausible scenario that's going to happen in the future.
28:36
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And I
28:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): think what we really have to do as investors then is relate that back to price because it's about what's priced in. Investing is a funny game. I think there's a tendency to think it's um
28:48
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a
28:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): lot less different to horror. horse racing and the horse betting than it actually is, because it's not just about how great the company is, it's about the odds that are priced in. And you can make a terrible bet on a wonderful horse if the odds are bad, and you can make a really bad bet and investment on a great company if you massively
29:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): overpay for growth, and uh
29:11
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
29:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): expectations for the growth are way too high. So what I try and do is really strip away the narrative and bring it back down to facts and reality as much as possible and add in context to what the narrative that is is being sold. Because
29:27
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
29:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): unfortunate reality is in a lot of different participants in the investing world are trying to sell you something, whether it's investment banks or even other investors or the media, and we just have to break it down to what the the reality is here. And we have to see the world the way it is, not the way people are describing it to us and and uh telling
29:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): us it should
29:48
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): be.
29:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So avoid the killer mistakes and try to not pay too much for things. And the last part of your book is about process mistakes. How would you describe this section of the book?
30:03
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
30:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): so exactly the first two sections I guess focus more on the investment itself. And then the third section kind of shifts that more inward
30:12
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
30:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): looks at you as an investor.
30:15
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
30:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I guess the process mistakes I deal with they kind of fall into two categories. The first one are behavioral mistakes that lead you to make bad decisions, which might be impatience or not selling a mistake in your portfolio. And the other kind are more, I guess, alignment-based. They deal
30:35
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): with
30:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): who you are versus how you're trying to invest. And it probably took me far too long to realize
30:42
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that
30:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): there's a big difference between
30:45
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a
30:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): great investment and a great investment that you're capable of holding.
30:49
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Like
30:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you can do wonderful analysis. and be be right about where the company ultimately ends up.
30:54
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
30:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): if you're not capable of holding that investment the whole way through, well it doesn't matter. And every investment comes with a little bit of discomfort. Like there's no such thing as the free lunch. Like there's something that's going to be uncomfortable for you when you're making a great investment.
31:09
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): If
31:10
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you're a deep value investor, it's owning things that are really ugly and unloved and and everyone else hates. If you're a quality investor,
31:17
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): well
31:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you have to pay higher prices than than average and deal with that.
31:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And I think there's a real edge in knowing yourself and who you are and aligning that temperament with how you invest. I think that's
31:32
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a
31:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): great way to try and improve your decision making over time.
31:36
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
31:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it's probably more fun and more enjoyable. And a game that's more fun might be an easier game and certainly a more sustainable game. But that can be very hard. I mean, introspection
31:47
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): is
31:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): uncomfortable. It's hard to
31:49
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): take
31:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): off all your clothes and look in the mirror and judge yourself. And you might find that you're not the person you thought you were. So if you thought you were a very concentrated investor, but then you
32:01
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): go
32:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): back and study all your mistakes. and you realise, well actually I handle the volatility
32:05
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): of
32:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): being very concentrated very poorly,
32:08
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): well,
32:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you're not the person you thought you were.
32:12
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
32:12
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I think we can spend a lot of time trying to find like the optimal theoretical best way to invest when it might be better
32:21
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): to
32:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): look at the ways we can best fit uh ourselves around our investing style and and who we are.
32:27
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And it's
32:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): not to say that we can't grow and change, like absolutely we can grow and evolve and improve over time,
32:33
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): but
32:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I think we need to know the person we are today as a starting point.
32:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): How much did you think about the process of investing when you started out versus now?
32:44
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): So much less. It's it's the classic way where you you think you're just this great analyst and all I have to do is analyze better than everyone else. I'm going to make great decisions. And then you get hit by life and reality, which is
32:58
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that
32:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the world is very different than the world you see in a spreadsheet and that you're analyzing. And again, like I said, it's very different looking at what's a great company and what's a great company for you to invest in. And I think unfortunately that just takes a bit of time. It's very hard to learn that. particular lesson vicariously, but it's very important to be aware of it.
33:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And that might help you learn it quicker rather than uh never make the mistake.
33:24
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): That's also my impression that most
33:27
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
33:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): more aspirational and uh newer investors are not thinking so much about the process, and and seasoned investors are thinking a lot about it, maybe too much. Uh
33:38
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): can
33:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you give an example of a process mistake that you see also very experienced investors make over and over?
33:46
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
33:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I think the one that really resonates with me as well in particular is a behavioral mistake around impatience, and it really relates to holding too much cash. And it's funny, like holding cash at the start, it it feels pretty fine, like it's optional. optionality, it's firepower, it's a bit of a safety blanket if markets are
34:06
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): declining. But that feeling changes pretty materially in a rising stock market. So if you have 20 or 30% of your portfolio in cash and the market's going up 20 or 25% a year,
34:19
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
34:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you can't find any good ideas to deploy, that's a very visceral feeling where this anchor around your neck of cash is pulling down your returns. And you're like, my God, I just need to find something to get this cash out. Look at how bad it's it's making my performance relative to everyone else. And that really kind of builds this
34:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): temptation to lower your standards, lower your hurdle rates, take on risks you you wouldn't have taken on before, and make investments you never would have made before. Because nothing has changed with the investment opportunity.
34:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): You just become more impatient. And it's really hard. Like I it's funny, the
34:58
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
34:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): saying investing is like the four most dangerous words are this time is different.
35:02
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
35:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I probably put up there uh it's better than cash has has caused a huge amount of damage as well. And
35:08
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): look,
35:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it's really hard. I
35:10
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
35:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): go back and you study the great investors, and one of the contributing factors. to
35:15
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): to
35:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Buffett invest in
35:16
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in
35:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the preferred stock of US Air, he said was he had too much cash at the time.
35:21
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And the
35:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): old joke Munger used to have was when when Warren has too much cash he needs to go down to the bar because he's in danger of doing something he shouldn't do. So it's a very hard one to deal with. And I have had periods in my uh in investing career where I'm holding cash and
35:37
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): yeah
35:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it's hard. It's a really hard one to deal with. And we've been in an environment where
35:41
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
35:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): stock market's been been going up a lot recently and it's it's trained at high valuations. So it just makes that mistake more and more dangerous.
35:51
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): At
35:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): least some some parts of the stock market.
35:54
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um
35:57
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Is
35:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): there anything else from the book that you'd like to highlight
36:00
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): here?
36:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): One of the kind of very interesting and um challenging questions I got when I gave a couple of the drafts to to friends who are way smarter than me was that um
36:13
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): is
36:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): there a danger that overfocusing on mistakes and risks can lead to you um not making good investments? And I just didn't think about that for a while because it was a great question. And
36:26
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): so
36:26
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): in the first case, I don't believe that being more aware of mistakes is ever a bad thing. And I don't think being extra diligent about a bad balance sheet or bad capital allocation will prevent you from making a great investment. The danger is when that gets It's taken way too far into the
36:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): extremes, where you're so focused on making mistakes that you're terrified to make any decision. decision. And you're you're so bamboozled by uncertainty that you're just sitting there
36:56
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
36:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): doing nothing. And
36:59
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): like
36:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): there is no such thing as total risk-free investing. There is always risks. And when I first started out in KKR, um
37:07
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
37:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): was saying no to every single debt investment that was coming across my desk. And my excellent boss at the time took me aside. and said, uh, David, we're not lending to Berkshire Hathaway here. You know, every business has risks. Our job is to analyze those risks and make sure we're being adequately compensated for them.
37:26
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And I
37:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): think that's the really important distinction. Like we're not trying to eliminate every single risk under the sun when we're making an investment. We're trying to eliminate the risks that we're not comfortable with. And
37:38
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
37:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): ones where we're just totally not getting paid and and compensated to make. And I think that's
37:44
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
37:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): way I would frame that potential danger of being too negative um around focusing on mistakes.
37:52
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
37:52
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that comes back to Annie Duke's book, Thinking
37:55
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in
37:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Bets then, as you started this conversation with
37:59
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
37:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): some something I also thought about when I read the book is this study of success and failure. And Chris Mayer has been on talking about Hundrebaggers and also his new book now. He has studied all the best stocks and he has received some criticism for not studying the failures. And when we spoke to him
38:16
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in
38:16
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): episode 13, then he mentioned that, well, many of the failures they were doomed from the start. There's no point in studying them. It's better that you study if you should study failure, you should study after. the success and then they fail. And why did they then fail once they had been successful? What are your thoughts on that from
38:34
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): an
38:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): investor perspective?
38:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, absolutely. Like the
38:38
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it
38:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): gets back to the point we were talking about early, Eddie, which is you're really trying to understand the decision and not the outcome. And just like you can get a bad feedback on a good uh outcome.
38:50
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
38:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): can get bad feedback on a bad outcome. So, like all mistakes are not bad. You can make a uh a good mistake, I guess, over time, um, because something randomly came out of the the woodwork on
39:04
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it.
39:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And like one example I kind of think about would be um
39:09
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): if
39:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you and I had found a great cruise ship company and it was got a great management team and a great balance sheet.
39:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): and uh we could buy it at a great price.
39:19
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Uh, but
39:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): unfortunately it happened to be October 2019 when we bought it. Well, it didn't matter how great our analysis was, and it could have been a very good decision, but we got hit with something that was a really, really unusual low probability outcome,
39:31
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
39:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it really impacted our investment. But again, we weren't making a mistake. I'm not sure if I'm directly answering your question. I'm I'm prone to go off on untangible. on tangents. Um, but I don't know why that example just jumped out to me. Um,
39:43
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): but
39:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): yeah, we can absolutely learn the wrong lessons from failure. So it's important to learn um
39:49
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): what
39:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): are the right things to take away from ideas that didn't work as opposed to just something that didn't work.
39:55
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Now
39:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I'm really curious to hear more about your own investing. And it was about three years ago since you left your your previous employer. Uh How has your investments developed as a private full-time investor?
40:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, and it's it's just over three years uh since I went out on my own. And in investing there's uh no experience like actually doing it uh particularly for learning. And I don't think there's been a massive radical change in how I invest. I think I've probably spent a lot of time looking at my own
40:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): decisions and processes and learning what I can from where I made mistakes and even where I think I'm better suited to make a better decision or in areas where I think I'm going to make a worse decision. And that's probably resulted in me being a little bit less concentrated than I was before. So
40:47
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
40:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): could have added eight to ten investments before, maybe less. And now I'm closer to 15. And I also don't trim as much as I used to, or average down as much as I used to. And we can
41:00
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): go
41:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): into that a bit later if you like.
41:02
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
41:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): then probably one of the bigger changes, if you look at my portfolio today versus how it was a couple of years ago,
41:09
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): which
41:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): is not driven by choice, but more the opportunity set I kind of see in the investing world.
41:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): is I own fewer really high-quality companies than I used
41:20
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): to.
41:20
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And I'm probably about to get myself in trouble here and invoke the wrath of the quality gods. Um, but I'm finding and have found for the last couple of years investing in the highest quality companies to be a really competitive space. There's a lot of
41:37
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): very
41:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): smart people.
41:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): with a lot of capital chasing what is kind of by definition a pretty small group of companies.
41:46
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
41:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I think everyone has gotten maybe a little bit better about understanding quality.
41:51
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
41:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that's kind of led to me
41:53
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
41:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): seeing prices I'm a little bit uncomfortable paying. And I uh I don't like paying more than 15 or 16 times what I think are sustainable earnings. And there's nothing magical about that number. Uh it's just uh I find it hard. And a business can be totally worth far more than that and can be a super investment. And I've made
42:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): investments at higher multiples than that, but I just know it's not situations where I think I'm best suited to making great decisions and and holding investments over the long term.
42:25
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
42:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the problem for me.
42:27
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it
42:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): isn't really finding wonderful companies, it's finding the wonderful companies
42:32
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that
42:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): are even more wonderful than everyone else thinks they are or that they're priced to be.
42:36
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
42:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that gets back to something we talked about earlier already, which is the parimutus situation that investing is where it's not just about
42:43
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): how
42:44
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): great the individual company is, it's about great the
42:47
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
42:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): risk-adjusted investment opportunity is.
42:51
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
42:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that's probably led to me looking a little
42:53
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): bit
42:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): lower on the quality scale in terms of the companies I'm looking at. And it can be very dangerous to go down and look at lower quality companies. I try to keep myself disciplined and only look at
43:05
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): what
43:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): are still good, durable businesses that can earn a good return on capital through the cycle.
43:10
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
43:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I'd be very happy owning them for for 10 ten years privately if I had to. Um
43:15
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): but
43:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I'm probably not just going to own them forever. Like this is not the
43:18
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
43:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): brilliant company I want to own for ten or twenty years. It's a really great risk adjusted investment. And when I weighed those uh lower quality companies up against the really higher ones, that's where I just felt that I think they were better investments for
43:35
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): me.
43:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): What do you think your holding periods will be in these kind of stocks?
43:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I would probably expect that they should play out over four to six years. And maybe it can be a little bit shorter. And it's in some cases it has been shorter, and maybe it can be a little bit longer.
43:53
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
43:53
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I think the key thing for me is that
43:56
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): like
43:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): these are still businesses that are creating value. So if I have to hold them for longer, they're not going to be these valuable. value traps or or a topic I talk about in the book, which is asset traps, where I am being penalized for holding them longer.
44:09
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um,
44:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): they're able to deliver a fundamentally good investment return to me. So when I look at
44:14
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): them,
44:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I assume I'm going to hold them for 10 or 12 years. And as long as that still presents me with a pretty attractive investment opportunity,
44:24
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I'm
44:24
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): happy to hold them. So if they eventually need to hold for 10 years, they should be uh still good investments if I was right in my uh decisions.
44:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And if the valuation suddenly pops up to 20 times or 25 times earnings, are you out then? Or
44:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): yeah, I've probably changed a little bit how I deal with selling companies as well. So I've tried to
44:51
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): like
44:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it's funny, I think when I was early in my career, you you focus a huge amount on the buying and a little bit less on the selling, even though like selling is incredibly important too and you really need to get that right and you can create a lot of value from
45:03
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it.
45:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And I've probably changed that in unless the company gets really, really expensive, I'm probably not going to sell it unless I have a better opportunity
45:13
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): than
45:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that idea. Because one, there's a tax consequence to it. But two, I spent a lot of time looking at my decisions where I was trimming back stocks that I thought were ex expensive or they were increasing in price, or where I was selling companies for cash. And over kind of my
45:31
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): my
45:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): time frame, I was looking at, it's not a huge time frame, so it's not the best sample size of data, but I I think it was indicative.
45:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): was that these these decisions were not adding value. If I just held those companies because they were fundamentally generating value over time, it would have been a better investment outcome for me.
45:49
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um,
45:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): so I won't sell unless
45:53
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
45:53
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): position gets way, way overvalued.
45:56
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um,
45:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): or I think I've made a mistake, and that's probably one of the
46:00
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
46:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): bigger ones. Um,
46:01
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and I
46:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): might think about it a little bit if it's become a massive part of my portfolio, but they are kind of good problems to have
46:08
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
46:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): in in investing.
46:10
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And the reason for increasing your diversification, what is that?
46:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah. Um maybe a little bit of humility as you get older in life, that a small bit of diversification is a pretty low price to pay for guarantees. guaranteeing survival and that that you're going to be in the game for 50 or 60 years. Um
46:32
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
46:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): think the big one for me was when I was
46:35
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): kind
46:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): of looking at having eight companies in my portfolio, having a minimum starting position that was maybe 12 or 13% of your portfolio was a very high bar. And I looked at companies I passed on because I said I I just couldn't get quite there on. them being a 12% position, but I was very happy if they could have been a
46:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): five or a six or a seven percent. And
46:58
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
46:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): think they would have been very good decisions had I made them, and I think they would have been great additions to the portfolio.
47:04
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
47:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): actually think I probably would have enjoyed that style of investing a little bit more because I like turning over lots of rocks and finding lots of little quirky things uh in the investing world.
47:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): So
47:16
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
47:16
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): decision to be a little less diversified was probably half, maybe a little bit less than half, the humility side, but more it allowed me to make investment decisions that I thought were good ones that were being held back by that kind
47:30
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): of
47:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): strict limit on this needs to be a bigger than 10% position to make it into the portfolio.
47:37
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
47:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): your ambition is then to have an equal size of the positions in the portfolio?
47:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Kind of, yes. Yeah. What I have looked at is
47:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): changing sizes, like overweighting and underweighting my decisions didn't seem to have a massive impact on my investment performance. Like I had some small positions that worked out really great. I had some bigger ones that weren't as good as some smaller ones. So I kind of removed a little bit of that part of the decision process, and
48:07
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I'm much more happy making mostly kind of similar-sized positions. And there's definitely situations where I'll have an over 10% position, and I have a few of those today.
48:19
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
48:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): kind of natural way they get there is by outperforming, and then I'm more comfortable with them in that way. Um But yeah, it's just a bit of an evolution. from going back and studying my own investing track record and whether it actually added benefits or not. And I I didn't see a huge amount of benefit in uh in my previous decisions. So
48:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): hopefully that is the same for it going forward and it it adds a bit of value.
48:43
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Is
48:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): there any other reason for you not averaging down or or trimming as much or at all?
48:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah the averaging down is a really interesting one. Um
48:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I think for me personally, when I
48:57
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): when
48:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I think I have this option available to me to average down, there is this little bit of temptation or permission you're giving yourself to maybe lower your investment standards and get that position in in the first place. Because you're like
49:12
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): maybe it's a little bit overvalued. And I think this. mistake falls much more into the overvalued camp.
49:17
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
49:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it's like maybe it's a little bit overvalued, but you know what? If it falls, I can buy more. And it was a way for me to probably push through some investments that weren't meeting the kind of strict criteria that I had, particularly maybe on the return side. I don't think it was the risk side where where I was um wrong, but it was
49:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that um I'm I'm compromising a little bit my hurdle rate to get it into the portfolio.
49:42
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
49:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I do think that was kind of a combination of when you have a lot of cash and again you just want to get these ideas in to
49:49
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): to
49:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): soak up a little bit of cash. And I'm probably a lot more aware and concerned of averaging down than I was before. Like averaging down is
50:03
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it
50:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): can be a great thing if nothing has changed and if the investment is just simply at a lower price and you're getting a much better return. But what can frequently happen simultaneously with averaging down is the investment is doing worse. So something bad happened, the share price fell off, you're looking at it and saying, Yeah, something not great has happened and the share
50:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): price has fallen, but it's actually fallen too far. and it's still a great investment. So I'm going to average down and buy into it more.
50:31
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
50:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I think there's two risks with that. The first is that you can keep averaging down into a position and a company you thought you would have put maybe 10% of your portfolio at cost into, well, now you've actually put like 20% or more because you've kept averaging down and you've made it a way bigger decision than you ever originally set out to make it. And also,
50:52
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): like a company that is declining in your estimation of value over time, and the discount between what it trades it in the market and your value is always there because both the share price and your estimate of value is falling is maybe telling you something that maybe you're making a mistake here. Maybe like something
51:12
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): is fundamentally wrong in your analysis, or
51:14
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you've
51:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): got you it. wrong from the start, or the business is changing and management is is destroying value.
51:20
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um,
51:20
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): but I'm much more aware of falling for that kind of trap because it's it's very easy to facilitate yourself into thinking about averaging down into a position. Um
51:31
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
51:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it's not that simple, I think, when you break it
51:34
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): down.
51:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): You said you like to turn over many rocks. How do you find new in investing ideas?
51:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, I've I've probably changed my um new idea generation process uh since going out on my own. And what I
51:52
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): do
51:53
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): pretty much 95% of the time now is I just go A to Z on either a stock index or an industry. So for example, um
52:02
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a couple of
52:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): years. ago, I was thinking that there's a lot of institutional money leaving the UK and there's a lot of worries about that market. There's potential for maybe more mispricings there. So I just took every stock that was listed on the AIM stock index or the kind of junior exchange in the UK,
52:21
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and I
52:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): went down through them all. So I sometimes sort them by name, so A to Z, or I'll sort them by market. cap, smallest to largest. And I'm kind of able to go through them pretty quickly and systematically. And I have the judgment to kind of separate what's potentially more interesting for me and what's not, and rule out
52:39
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
52:40
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): killer mistakes first. And that's probably how I've found most of my most recent investments.
52:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And the other kind of example of that is Go Industry. So a project I did last year was um looked at all the US listed banks from the the giant megafinancial banks to the tiny regional uh community bank. And uh thanks to the
53:08
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
53:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): genius of Claude and the wonderful AI tools you can you can create, I was able to get an API to the FTIC and create
53:16
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a
53:16
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): little bit like a Moody's manual for myself and all these banks. So I just went through them
53:21
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): all.
53:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Um I was pretty confident in what I was looking for in in those types of investments, so I could sort through quickly. And
53:28
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
53:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): couple of hundred listed US banks became maybe seven or eight I
53:33
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): was
53:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): very interested in. And then I eventually made investments in two of those.
53:38
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um so
53:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I used to spend a huge amount of time screening, and I still do read a lot of uh like the Value Investors Club and different newsletters and stuff like that. But I just find my actual ideas I'm getting into the portfolio organically come much more through that rock turning A to Z, which is look, it's
53:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): not for everyone. It's actually it can be really boring, it can be really frustrating. It does take a long time.
54:04
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
54:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you have to be willing to invest that time up front to find some of these more
54:09
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
54:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): off-the-beaten path investments.
54:11
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Uh,
54:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): but it's just something that works well for for my personality and style.
54:16
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And how much do you speak to management and other people are in the in the companies?
54:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): A little bit less than I used to. Um, so that would have been a huge part, particularly when I was in. KKOR and on the private equity side. Um, and maybe it's a function of I probably don't have as much access to management teams as I used to be in a one man band and a private investor. Um, but also I I kind of do
54:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): believe that like to find some of these really great investments, it's not absolutely crucial to speak with management. Like what I really want is
54:50
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the investment.
54:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): case very clear and simple from reading the filings and understanding the industry
54:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): without necessarily getting management to explain it to
55:02
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): me.
55:03
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Now
55:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I think that's also a little bit of a function of I've done a huge amount of that already. So I've spent hundreds and hundreds and hundreds of hours speaking to lots of different management teams and lots of different industries across my career.
55:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): So I don't need to understand it as well. And I think a little bit of it gets back to
55:21
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
55:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): narrative point we spoke about earlier, Eddie, which is what's more important for me is the evidence that I can tangibly see in the performance of the company over the last five, 10, or 15 years rather than what management is telling me. Because you get to these very senior positions in a company. by being an excellent communicator and telling
55:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): a great story and getting people to buy into what you're what you're saying. And I'm more interested, I think, in a little bit, the story is in the numbers and the fundamentals rather than in the pitch.
55:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Did writing the book in any way change your investing practically?
56:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Um
56:04
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
56:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): again I don't think it made a radical change to anything. I think it helped reinforce what was probably happening organically and that I was already discovering and thinking about
56:15
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
56:16
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): helped me maybe come to a conclusion on that sooner.
56:19
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Like
56:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): writing is pretty incredible. Um, particularly writing for others, it really forces you to think very deeply and drives a different level of understanding when you're trying to explain something to someone you never met. Uh, it's harder and uh
56:34
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
56:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): think it improves your overall thinking process.
56:37
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I do
56:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): think it probably reinforces literally what we were just talking about, which is being more rigorous about the evidence that's supporting my underlying assumptions. So,
56:47
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): like
56:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I want my my forecasts and investments to be supported by
56:52
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): like
56:52
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): genuinely predictive evidence, not just a great convincing story. And if I'm saying a company is a quality company, like why is it a quality company? Like what is actually going to prove and like be predictive that this is going to continue to be a quality company?
57:07
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Has
57:07
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it been a good company for one or two years, for 15 or 20 years? Is the whole industry generating great returns is just this one? Like what gives me really high confidence
57:17
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that
57:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): my prediction is going to be right? Um
57:20
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
57:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I think that's probably been a very good uh OROI exercise for me. And it's probably something the book has definitely accelerated.
57:29
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): If we have this kind of conversation in in 10 years, where do you want to be then uh in terms of investing but also in life?
57:39
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
57:40
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): on the investing side, um
57:43
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): so
57:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I'm quietly
57:44
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a
57:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): super, super competitive person. Uh
57:47
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
57:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): played a lot of sports growing up, but when I was on the basketball court,
57:51
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it
57:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): never looked like I was I wasn't the guy shouting or I wasn't the guy like uh getting everyone to
57:56
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): to
57:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): be roused. But internally, like I just wanted to win so badly. And my siblings and wife uh probably know that better than anyone.
58:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): So,
58:04
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): like,
58:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): even beyond the next 10 years, but I want
58:07
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): to be
58:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): able to generate a great investment track record over the next 50 or 60 years. And that might only be for me personally as an investor, and that's perfectly fine. Or maybe it'll be for someone else. I don't know. I haven't made that decision up.
58:22
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
58:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I want to do everything I can to to help me help me generate that that. really great record. And I'd like to
58:29
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in
58:29
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): 10 years' time look back and say I'm a way better investor than I was 10 years ago. And uh that'd be a great outcome there. On the life side, um
58:41
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it's
58:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): pretty interesting and maybe it's because
58:43
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
58:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): anniversary of his his passing was last week, but um my granddad passed away a couple of years ago and uh just before he he passed, he said to my grandmother, whose whose name is Patsy, uh, Patsy, haven't we lived just such a great life? And that has had a a massive impact on how I think
59:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): about
59:04
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): like
59:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): not just my life, but my
59:06
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): my
59:06
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): career, my families, my relationships, where I want
59:09
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): to
59:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): focus and spend my time and what I'm trying to achieve with my life. And yeah, those words
59:16
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): have
59:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): really become internalized with me, and uh they stayed with me ever since. Like my granddad, he was a small farmer in rural Northwest Ireland. He certainly never had any stocks, but he never had much money. He had lived in a small house, had a very modest life.
59:32
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
59:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): he was so content with the life that he had lived.
59:35
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um,
59:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): he was able to have those feelings when when. it was all over, and it wasn't a feeling of regret. He was genuinely so thankful for
59:44
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
59:44
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): life he had lived. And he took such joy in the small moments, like he loved playing uh games of twenty-five, this this Irish card game with with family and the grandkids, and loved a bit of local crack in uh in his community.
59:58
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
59:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): yeah, that's really revolutionized how I think about my life and hopefully I can
1:00:04
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): get
1:00:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): to a place and be as happy as my granddad was when when it's my time. And uh that's a little bit how I am approaching the life side of the question.
1:00:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): That's beautiful. In investing can be tough. Uh it can be rewarding as well. I'm looking forward to following your your journey ahead. Uh something that I do know that you love doing is reading. And uh therefore I would like to know
1:00:30
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): if
1:00:30
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you have any recommendations for our listeners, one or two books that you think more people should read.
1:00:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, and I've
1:00:37
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
1:00:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): probably changed my reading habits a little bit over the last couple of years. I reread a lot more books than I used to. Sometimes I'm on my fourth or fifth or sixth rereading. Um I think
1:00:49
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
1:00:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): find myself a bit of a different person when I reread a book like four or five years later. I have a different set of experiences, more knowledge. I can appreciate different things differently in a book, and some parts might resonate a lot more with me. Um,
1:01:05
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): so
1:01:06
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): in terms of the books, I'd recommend,
1:01:09
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
1:01:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I'm probably not going to be very original, but I do think originality is overrated, and uh I love There's Always Something to Do, the the Peter Cundal book. I think it's
1:01:20
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a
1:01:20
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): brilliant fundamental message
1:01:23
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that,
1:01:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): like, if you have this unbounded curiosity, the invest in world is so big and varied, and different things going on in in different parts everywhere. You can uh have that rewarded, like turn over enough rocks and you'll find something. It's just a great message. and very powerful. It resonates a lot with me. And Peter Connell had a
1:01:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): really interesting life. He obviously had a brilliant investing track record.
1:01:46
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
1:01:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it's a very easy book, and I I read it a
1:01:50
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): lot.
1:01:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And
1:01:51
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I'm
1:01:52
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): probably going to give the least original answer here,
1:01:54
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): but
1:01:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I think the Buffett book The Snowball is the greatest book I've ever read.
1:01:59
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
1:01:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it's the book I've reread the most. And like
1:02:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it's fascinating what sticks with me now versus the first time I read that book. And like Warren is
1:02:12
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
1:02:12
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): greatest investor of all time. And he's an unbelievable thinker. He has this unbelievable mind, an incredible memory. He's so good at understanding not only companies and businesses and industries, but human behavior and management teams.
1:02:26
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
1:02:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I think something that I appreciate so much more is like he
1:02:29
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): was
1:02:30
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): absolutely hustling it when he was a younger investor. Like he was pounding the pavement, uncovering all these super quirky investment ideas where he had colleagues going around door to door in Nebraska trying to find shares of American America national fire insurance and uh buying big blocks of companies that
1:02:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): were like sub sub-10 million market caps today. So his idea generation for like pounding the pavement and finding these really off-the-bean path ideas um was incredible. And that's influenced a lot how I think I could potentially find mispriced companies. And yeah, I reread probably the
1:03:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): section from when he
1:03:11
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): he
1:03:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): goes into the investing world till the end of it. Uh maybe not every year, but every year or every two or three years. So those would be the books I'd recommend reading
1:03:22
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): if
1:03:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you haven't read them, and I'd certainly recommend rereading them if you've already read them. Uh you might take away a different lesson or
1:03:28
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): two.
1:03:29
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Excellent suggestions.
1:03:31
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): When
1:03:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it comes to writing, do you want Wanna to create more books?
1:03:35
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um
1:03:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): no, is the answer. to that. Um I think I was incredibly sick of looking at my blue cover by the end of it, and I couldn't stomach reading another word that I probably read three or four hundred times. It's funny, Eddie. Um the first maybe 75% was super enjoyable and I I really liked it. The
1:03:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): next 20%
1:03:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): was very challenging,
1:04:01
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
1:04:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the final five 5% was excruciating. And I found it very hard to carve away. So you get your kind of first very rough draft and then you improve on it over time. But I found it really hard to carve away the book at the end where there were parts you might really like in it, but you have to
1:04:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): strip them away because you know they're not really beneficial for the target reader that. that you're aiming for. And there's a little bit of destruction of your work there. And then there's an ego part where there's a part you really love and you know it might make you look really smart and great as an investor,
1:04:39
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): but
1:04:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it's no ways beneficial for your reader. And the best choice is to pull that out. But that's really hard. And it's it's hard kind of pulling apart this creation. that you made.
1:04:52
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
1:04:52
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): then I found the editing and like really final tedious parts really, really hard to do. I had probably come very close to giving up multiple times, and I had to take a week off and come back to it and clear my head. So uh for the moment, absolutely not, though it's it's interesting. Um,
1:05:11
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): probably
1:05:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the second I had hit published, publish, there was three or four things I thought, damn, I would have loved to put. those in the book. They could have been great. Um, but there certainly will be no second edition for uh a long time coming. I think
1:05:22
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
1:05:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): other thing it did it, it really hit home how much I missed like spending all my time on the day job of investing, and like I just missed reading annual reports and going through companies. And that became very pronounced as I was trying to finish the book and and spending a lot more time on it. Um so for the moment, no, I'm I'm looking back. I'm looking forward to just being
1:05:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): buried in
1:05:43
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a
1:05:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): big stack of 10Ks that's sitting uh on my desk
1:05:46
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): here.
1:05:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): You should be proud over your achievement. Congratulations on the book once again. Dave, thank you so much for coming on Investing by the Books Podcast to talk about you and your new book, The Mistake Playbook. Do you have something more you want to add here before we finish up?
1:06:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): No, I don't think so. Um I would put out a call, which is that if if anyone reads the book and thinks I've made a big mistake, uh reach out to me and tell me. I would love to uh I'd love to learn that way too. Um so there's a little website, the Mistake Playbook, where there's an email address there. Um or if you've got a great quirky
1:06:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): idea,
1:06:21
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
1:06:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that's it could be a great investment. Uh I talk about this stuff all day long, so I'd love to chat about that too. So, yeah, feel free to reach out to me on any of those.
1:06:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Great. Any other ways for people to follow you in your work?
1:06:36
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um,
1:06:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): so I'm a pretty private guy. I don't tend to uh have much of a public presence. I have no social media. I think I made my first ever LinkedIn posts when I uh had finished the book. Um, so uh no, if you can just find my email on the address and reach out to me, I'll be much happier than uh anything in a more public format.
1:06:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Perfect. We'll put that in the show notes. Thank you so much for joining us, David.
1:07:00
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
1:07:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): thanks so much, Eddie. It's been really brilliant to be here with you guys. Uh I really appreciate taking the time to speak on me. It's been great.
1:07:08
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Thank
1:07:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you for listening to Invest in Buy the Books, a podcast by Radeye. Redeye. Follow us on Twitter at IB underscore Radeye. Redeye and email us at ib.podcast at Redeye.se. To improve, we'd love to hear your feedback, so please rate and review us. Notice that the content in this podcast is not and shall not be construed as investment advice. This information is meant to be
1:07:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): informative and for general purposes only. For full disclaimer, visit Redeye.se. I'm your host, Eddie Palmyan, and until next time, I sincerely wish you the best of luck on your journey through life. and investing.
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