Beyond the Stars

Tom Whitelaw discusses capacity constraints and liquidity risks as funds grow beyond optimal size

16 min Listen to the original Episode page
Fund CapacityLiquidity RiskPortfolio ConstructionMorningstarInvestment ProcessAsset Management

Summary

Host Shannon Kerwin interviews Tom Whitelaw about his paper 'How Big Is Too Big for an Equity Strategy?', arguing that capacity limits are not fixed numbers but emerge when managers must alter their successful investment processes. Whitelaw distinguishes capacity from liquidity, defining liquidity risk as 'discount risk' where high ownership weights force managers to sell at significant price haircuts. He cites the Neil Woodford case as an example of severe liquidity issues caused by ownership weights nearing 20%. Morningstar's liquidity stress testing model tracks ownership weights against volume thresholds to identify execution problems. Historical data shows managers took nearly twice as long to trade positions after crossing a €2 billion AUM threshold. Whitelaw recommends setting capacity targets with headroom and using soft closures to preserve alpha for existing investors.

Key takeaways

  1. 1
    There is no single 'capacity limit' number for any fund category; capacity is defined by whether a manager must alter their successful investment process to accommodate inflows.

    Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) · 1:52

  2. 2
    Dilution occurs when managers increase portfolio breadth (e.g., from 30 to 50 holdings) to absorb capital, adding supplemental positions that dilute the impact of their best ideas.

    Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) · 4:20

  3. 3
    Ownership weights in underlying companies exceeding 3-5% significantly increase the difficulty of exiting positions without taking a price haircut, as seen in the Neil Woodford case.

    Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) · 7:11

  4. 4
    We do. Um our liquidity model has nine different underlying models in there, and we look at that over different trading environments. So we would say you can sell 20% of the average daily volume over the last month, over the last three years on average, and also in a worst case, like a distressed scenario that we build.

    Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) · 8:03

Episode sections

  1. 0:04 – 1:52

    Introduction and Capacity Constraints

    Host Shannon Kerwin introduces guest Tom Whitelaw to discuss fund size and capacity constraints, referencing Whitelaw's paper 'How Big Is Too Big for an Equity Strategy?'. The segment establishes that while extreme size limits are obvious, capacity constraints often emerge earlier due to liquidity challenges.

  2. 1:52 – 3:41

    No Fixed Capacity Limits

    Whitelaw argues there is no universal hard number for capacity limits across categories due to varying fund approaches. He defines a capacity problem as occurring when a manager is forced to change their successful investment process to accommodate new assets.

  3. 3:41 – 5:07

    Triggers for Capacity Concerns

    Historically, analysts monitored basic triggers like increases in average market cap, portfolio breadth (number of holdings), and cash balances. Dilution of best ideas through adding supplemental positions or holding excessive cash are key red flags.

  4. 5:07 – 6:51

    Liquidity and Discount Risk

    Whitelaw distinguishes between capacity and liquidity, defining liquidity risk as 'discount risk' rather than total illiquidity. He notes that high ownership weights in underlying stocks make it difficult to sell without taking a significant price haircut.

  5. 6:51 – 7:59

    Neil Woodford Case Study

    The Neil Woodford case is cited as an example where high ownership weights (close to 20% in some names) created severe liquidity issues. Ownership weights above 3-5% are highlighted as problematic for executing trades at peer costs.

  6. 7:59 – 8:51

    Liquidity Stress Testing Model

    Morningstar employs a liquidity model with nine underlying sub-models assessing sell-down scenarios across different trading environments. It tracks ownership weights over 3%, 5%, and 10% thresholds to gauge potential execution problems.

  7. 8:51 – 11:02

    Trading Behavior Analysis

    By analyzing 15 years of trading data, analysts found that a specific manager took nearly twice as long to enter and exit positions when AUM exceeded €2 billion compared to when it was below that threshold, revealing hidden liquidity constraints.

  8. 11:02 – 15:33

    Capacity Management Best Practices

    Good capacity management involves setting a target with headroom rather than a hard limit that gets ratcheted up with market growth. Soft closures to new investors are preferred over hard closures at maximum capacity to preserve alpha for existing investors.

Claims worth verifying

Tom Whitelaw is Morningstar's global head of equity ratings.

Shannon Kerwin ·0:14

How to verify: Check Morningstar's official staff directory or press releases from November 2026 confirming Tom Whitelaw's title. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Tom Whitelaw published a paper titled 'How Big Is Too Big for an Equity Strategy?'.

Shannon Kerwin ·0:33

How to verify: Search the Morningstar research library or Google Scholar for the paper title and author, verifying publication date within the 2026-08-19 to 2026-11-19 window. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

A 1% position in a €100 billion portfolio would exceed the market cap of most small-cap stocks.

Shannon Kerwin ·1:10

How to verify: Calculate 1% of €100 billion (€1 billion) and compare against average small-cap market capitalizations from indices like MSCI Small Cap Europe or S&P SmallCap Europe. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Neil Woodford owned close to 20% of the outstanding float in several underlying companies.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·7:11

How to verify: Review historical regulatory filings (e.g., UK PRA reports or company shareholding disclosures) for Woodford Asset Management's holdings in the Woodford Equity Income Fund during its operational period. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

Morningstar's liquidity model includes nine underlying sub-models.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·8:03

How to verify: Consult the methodology section of the paper 'How Big Is Too Big for an Equity Strategy?' or Morningstar's technical documentation on liquidity analytics. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

A specific fund started at €500 million and grew to over €8 billion, with trading times doubling after crossing €2 billion AUM.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·9:51

How to verify: Identify the fund from the paper 'How Big Is Too Big for an Equity Strategy?' and analyze its historical holdings turnover and AUM data from Morningstar Direct or fund fact sheets. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

Managers often set hard AUM limits that get ratcheted up as markets rise.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·11:39

How to verify: Review fund closure notices and investor letters from major fund houses over the past decade to observe trends in capacity limit adjustments. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

Morningstar uses 'Claude skills' internally to analyze capacity data.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·13:54

How to verify: Check Morningstar's technology announcements or AI implementation reports from late 2026 for mentions of Claude integration in analyst workflows. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Past performance is a primary driver of future money inflows into strategies.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·3:18

How to verify: Analyze Morningstar's 'Flow of Funds' reports or industry data from Lipper/Refinitiv correlating past 3-year returns with subsequent AUM growth across equity categories. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Do your own research

  • Review Tom Whitelaw's paper 'How Big Is Too Big for an Equity Strategy?' for detailed methodology on capacity constraints.
  • Check Morningstar's liquidity stress test model documentation to understand how 'discount risk' is calculated against average daily volume.
  • Analyze the fund's portfolio breadth (number of holdings) and cash balances over time to detect dilution of best ideas.
  • Verify the fund's ownership weights in its top holdings; weights above 3-5% may indicate liquidity execution risks.
  • Compare the fund's trading execution costs and time-to-trade against peers to identify hidden liquidity constraints.
  • Review the fund's capacity management policy for 'soft closures' versus hard limits to assess commitment to existing investors.
  • Examine historical AUM growth relative to market cap increases to see if the manager is forced to broaden the portfolio.
  • Look for case studies like Neil Woodford's fund to understand the real-world impact of high ownership weights on liquidity.
Full transcriptexpand

0:04Shannon Kerwin: Welcome to Beyond the Stars, a conversation with Morningstar analysts about fund industry trends in Europe and abroad. I'm your host, Shannon Kerwin.

0:13Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You

0:14Shannon Kerwin: might remember today's guest, Morningstar's global head of equity ratings, Tom Whitelaw, from our previous episode on how Morningstar Star analysts are using AI tools in their day-to-day work. Well, Tom's back again today to discuss. a topic that often be devils manager research analysts: fund size and capacity constraints. In other words, how can you tell if a strategy has attracted so much investor money that it's lost its magic? Tom has tackled this thorny question in his recent paper, How Big is Too Big for an Equity Strategy? And he's here to talk about his findings. Tom, welcome back. Hey

0:48Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Shannon, thanks for having me.

0:50Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So

0:51Shannon Kerwin: Tom, I think most people can intuitively understand why size can be a limiting factor for an investment strategy. I mean, if we take kind of an extreme example, you know, let's say we're talking about a concentrated portfolio of small cap stocks, you can see how that could work great in a portfolio that's maybe a couple hundred million euros in size, but it could actually become mathematically impossible to run that strategy at, you know, a hundred. 100 billion. I mean, at that point, a 1% position in your portfolio would probably exceed the entire market cap of most of the stocks in your universe. But even before you reach those extreme scenarios, capacity can already be a constraining factor much earlier along the way. Liquidity becomes more challenging. It can take longer to move You in and out of names, build the position sizes that you want. So a question that junior analysts will often ask. is something like, Hey, what's the capacity limit for this category? You know, what's the maximum size that, for example, a global small cap strategy can have before we would say that its capacity is constrained? What do you say to that question?

1:52Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, that's a great question because I think everybody comes to the capacity debate with a specific number in mind, or they expect a number in mind. Like if I run assets in X category, what what's the maximum amount of money that I can run? And it just doesn't work like that. Just given the variety of funds and approaches and styles that are in place in any category. And just the where where the managers build their performance from, it means there's no hard and fast number or even even a useful range. You can look a lot across lots of categories and you'll see huge variances, even where funds close the amount of money that they will were run, let alone kind of how much money managers are still able to run and able to run successfully. So when we talk about how big is too big, we look at it from the point of view of if a manager has to start changing the way that they've run money, changing the way that they were successful, then that's when we start to look deeper into whether there is a capacity problem, whether they are now running too much money.

2:47Shannon Kerwin: So, in other words, if the investment process didn't seem broken, why are they failing? fixing it? You're suggesting it's a red flag when the investment process changes, even though it seemed to be working great up until now.

2:58Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Exactly. And that's what we see. So the money came in for a specific reason. And it normally comes in because of performance. Yes, you can have a great story around it, but people are really looking to invest when they see that strong performance. As much as we say past performance isn't a guide to the future, it's certainly a driver. of future money coming into a strategy. So when that happens, if the manager's having to change the way that they're running money, there's no way that they started with kind of an inferior process and developed it in a way that means they can handle more assets now. So it becomes a real concern for us. And it's something that we start to look at kind of what is missing, what might be different now going forward. Has

3:37Shannon Kerwin: your approach to looking at capacity? evolved over the years?

3:41Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,

3:41Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it definitely has. I think when we started on this journey, capacity was was a fairly it was fairly simple data points that we were looking at, and we're talking kind of 10 to 15 years ago. We were really just looking at your kind of how much money has come in and then looking at general basic things on how the portfolio might have changed.

3:58Shannon Kerwin: What kinds of basic things?

4:00Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): So have you had lots of inflows and has that meant that you've had to increase the average market cap of the stocks that you're looking at? So if you're a small cap manager or you're buying mids now or mid cap managers moving into large, et cetera, or looking at uh the number of holdings. So another way to handle capacity is just adding new holdings to the portfolio, adding more holdings. And again, kind of going that back to that point about this isn't how you wanted to run money originally. If you've done really well and built a successful career managing 39 30 names, and then suddenly you start moving to 35, to 40, to 45, to 50, well, your best ideas are in that 30. And then there's all of these kind of supplemental positions that are get adding that are really diluting your best ideas. So again, that was a trigger that we always wanted to pick up on. Similar with cash, if you're increasing the cash balance, maybe you always ran with it a couple of percent as a kind of a buffer to buy into opportunities when you saw them, but suddenly you see that rising to five, 10%, et cetera, especially around big inflows. Again, it's all dilutive to long-term performance. And it's something that we would keep an eye on.

5:01Shannon Kerwin: So how have you deepened your analysis over the years? What other factors have you added to the list of things that you monitor?

5:07Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Well, we felt that within a capacity problem and some of the data points that we just talked about, we felt you could keep those fairly stable and you could actually build up a liquidity problem. And that is what we saw in certain strategies where they weren't adding new names, they weren't adding to the number of names, say, they weren't necessarily moving up the cap ladder, but they were just building larger and larger ownership weights in a lot of underlying stocks. So we really worked on our liquidity analytics and developed a set of liquidity analytics that can work alongside capacity and can allow our team to see if there are potential liquidity problems, if there's a market correction or if there's a big sale at a specific fund house, if a fund house gets hit with redemptions, how would they be able to sell down names? How would they be able to get back that money to investors without having to gate strategies, et cetera? But also, how would they be able to buy into positions again? If you're managing in a certain level of the market and then suddenly you get a lot of assets in and you're your fund ends up growing quite a bit and a lot of your value was added lower down the capter, well, are you able to recycle that money again into those smaller positions without moving the market?

6:14Shannon Kerwin: And that brings us to the point about liquidity. For most people, liquidity is about can I find a buyer when I need to sell this asset? But you look at it a little differently.

6:23Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): No, we do. And this is because our definition of liquidity. is potentially different to other people. And that's largely because everything is liquid at a price. So there's no fund that's really illiquid as in it can't sell. Like if you offer a big enough discount, there's always somebody who's going to be wanting to take those names off your hand. We look at it more as the discount risk. Is it going to be harder for this strategy to sell its names, to reduce its holdings, or even add to those holdings? at the same or cheaper cost than peers. And if you're a small cap manager, sorry, if you've got a small asset base and you're looking to sell down a name, well, it might be 5% in your portfolio, but you might only own a couple of basis points of the outstanding float. If you're a manager in a similar position with a similar weight in your portfolio, but you've got a much larger assets Your under management, you could be a much larger owner of that position. And this is exactly what we saw with with Neil Woodford and the situation that happened there, where this was a manager who owned 20%, close to 20% in a lot of the underlying names. And I don't mean in the portfolio, I mean the actual ownership of those companies. So when your ownership weight in the company starts drifting above 3%,

7:315%, 10%, it really makes it difficult to be able to sell those names without taking a haircut. So without taking a discount.

7:39Shannon Kerwin: Yes. The Woodford Equity Income Fund was a great example of a fund that we downgraded a couple of times over the years because it was clearly too big for what it was trying to do. And that became more and more apparent through various metrics. So how are you trying to catch these Woodford scenarios before they materialize? I mean, for one thing, you've built a pretty sophisticated model for stress testing funds liquidity where you're looking at various um sell down scenarios.

8:03Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): We do. Um our liquidity model has nine different underlying models in there, and we look at that over different trading environments. So we would say you can sell 20% of the average daily volume over the last month, over the last three years on average, and also in a worst case, like a distressed scenario that we build. And then the final three parts of the model are those ownership weights. So we look at where you owe. own over 3%, over 5%, and over 10% to really get an understanding of kind of how big a problem are certain names within your portfolio.

8:34Shannon Kerwin: So that's kind of the snapshot and time analysis of how today's portfolio would fare in various scenarios. But one of the big advantages of working at Morningstar is that we actually have decades of trading and flows data for funds as well. Have you been able to incorporate that data into your analysis?

8:51Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yes, we have. And we've been able to build a suite of analytics around that. And it just allows us a new lens on a manager's behavior and how they're trading. Once you overlay how a manager trades on fund size, you start to see really interesting patterns emerge. There was a manager that we looked at that we talk about in the paper where they had they've been very successful, they'd raised a lot of assets, a lot of the capacity. triggers we talked about kind of haven't come to fruition. On the liquidity side of things, they did look illiquid when they were f they were flashing on our discount risk model. But the manager's telling us that they can sell these names easily. There's no problem here. There are dark pools, there are other places where they can sell them, they can even sell them directly back to families, etc., which is it is all very plausible. But what we were able to do with our trading model was look at how their trading behavior behaviour changed when they were running different sizes of assets. So we broke down their history. It's a fund that started at five hundred million, I think, when we picked it up, ran all the way up to above eight billion. So we broke the portfolios down into a bucket when they were under two billion in AUM and a bucket when they were over two billion in AUM. And then we just looked at how long it took them to establish a position. So get from kind of first buy to maximum. weight, and then how long it took them to exit a position. So to move from max weight all the way to it been out of the portfolio. And there's obviously like decisions

10:11will change within that. So it's not a perfect science. But when you're looking at it over every name they've ever held over 15 years, like a lot of that noise does smooth away. And what we found when we did this was that it was taking them when they were above two 2 billion, it was taking them twice as long nearly to to enter positions. but then over twice as long to exit positions. So that's really showing us that there was a big change in the trading behavior of the managers when they were at different sizes. And that just puts a new shape on the conversation that we can have with the manager and really does add a lot of value at that level.

10:42Shannon Kerwin: That's such a fascinating addition to the analytical toolkit. We're really in an exciting phase where we're starting to harness data that we've kind of been sitting on for years. in new ways, thanks to AI. But in terms of capacity, you know, another big part of the conversation is, of course, how managers deal with this topic. And it's not all doom and gloom. There are a lot of managers out there who are proactive about limiting inflows so they don't become capacity constrained, which of course we love because that's how you preserve your alpha generation and protect your existing investors. So, how would you describe good? capacity management? What are the best practices that fund managers should employ?

11:19Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): That is a really good question because it it's very difficult to set a limit that's going to stay there the whole time. And what I mean by that is managers will often set a hard AUM number, like a dollar number or a pound number or a euro number, and markets change. So if the market adds 20%. over a period of time, well, really that capacity number can change by 20%. And it's why you often see managers setting a hard number that does change and does get ratcheted up. And it's our job to understand why it's getting ratcheted up and if it's moving for the right reasons, not that they just set a limit, they hit that limit, and then they're they're get getting pressure to add more money to that. You'll also see a manager setting percent of universe target, which is also an interesting way to do it. And you see that often lower down the cap ladder. But I think good capacity management really looks like setting a number and sticking to it unless the underlying fundamentals in the market have changed, like we just talked about, kind of general performance, adding value to stocks, etc. Any closure needs to be done with headroom. You don't want a fund to close because there's existing investors in it who can no longer add to it. So often you see the soft close. where they will close to new investors. That's always a good way to do it. But again, kind of don't soft close it at your maximum limit. Otherwise, it's very difficult. You will get outperformance, hopefully, and that outperformance will increase your relative capacity

12:39and make it harder. And then maybe you kind of soft closed and hard closed, and then you still need to start making changes to how you run the strategy. Your style has to start changing. But yeah, we we're just looking for firms who've got a sensible approach to it. So where something is clearly planned out, there's a number in place, and there's a method behind picking that number.

12:58Shannon Kerwin: So, as in so many things, there are no simple answers. It's about using common sense and putting investors' interests first. What about, and this is the last question we have time for today, what advice would you give to fund investors who might be trying to understand if a fund is too big?

13:15Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): It's really just making sure that there's headroom within the target that they've set, like I mentioned previously, uh making sure that the managers have thought about it. You can look at relativities, uh, but even our analyst struggle when they come to assess this, because like we said at the very start, there is no hard and fast number. So what we've developed in the paper is a framework for capacity, liquidity, and trading analytics. And what we we've been able to do in our inside our internal teams, which we hope we'll be able to put into some of our our research products. So Morningstar Direct hopefully in the future, a wrapping skills around this. So almost like an agent that is skilled at analysing capacity. So internally we use Claude skills and we have we have a capacity framework, the capacity framework that's in the paper that a Claude skill follows. So we really provide it with all of the underlying data. It goes through and it provides the assessment. It's not providing an answer. It's not saying this fund has a capacity problem. It's saying this fund has areas that you need to review. And then the urgency of that review depends on how big a problem they are. So it goes through the whole thing. It looks at capacity, liquidity using our discount risk rank uh scores for liquidity, and also looks at any of those trading signals where it looks like the underlying trading behavior's changed. And that's one of the things with the advent of AI now and what we can do here. We can just

14:34look at more behavioral patterns, I guess, of the manager, looking for more shifts in that behavior. And it just helps us identify if those shifts, if those changes look like they're aligned with changes in large inflows or or even large outflows. And again, it just gives more fodder for the analysis. analysts to one talk about with the managers, but also to investigate themselves.

14:56Shannon Kerwin: Absolutely. Exciting stuff, Tom. And as usual, this has been a fascinating discussion with you. So thanks so much for stopping by.

15:03Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Thank you,

15:03Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Shannon. Thanks for having me.

15:05Shannon Kerwin: For listeners interested in reading Tom's paper, we've included the link in the episode description. And if you're interested in hearing more insights from Morningstar analysts, but you haven't yet subscribed to our podcast. well be sure to do that now. With that, thanks for listening. This has been Beyond the Stars.

This page was produced automatically: the audio was transcribed with nvidia/parakeet-tdt-0.6b-v3+sortformer-v2.1 and interpreted by Qwen3.6-35B-A3B-UD-IQ3_S.gguf. Transcription and interpretation can contain errors; always confirm against the original episode. Nothing here is investment advice.
All insights