Atif Mian argues global debt imbalances and wealth inequality stem from unproductive borrowing crowding out investment.
Summary
Atif Mian explains that financial crises arise from a lack of risk-sharing between borrowers and lenders, leading to demand shocks. He argues that since the 1980s, total debt has risen as excess savings from the top 1% and high-saving nations like China have flooded markets without corresponding productive investment. Post-2008, governments ran large deficits to absorb these savings because interest rates hit the zero lower bound. Mian notes that current AI capex booms compete with sovereign debt for capital, raising yields. He recommends supply-side deregulation and progressive tax reforms to address structural imbalances.
Key takeaways
- 1 A structural imbalance exists between the supply of global savings and the demand for productive capital expenditure (CapEx), filled by unproductive consumption debt.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) · 18:17
Episode sections
- 0:22 – 3:05
Origin Story and Academic Path
Atif Mian discusses his background growing up in Pakistan, attending MIT on scholarship, and transitioning from engineering to economics to understand social questions like poverty using mathematical tools.
- 3:05 – 6:46
Thesis of House of Debt
Mian explains that financial crises stem from a lack of risk-sharing between borrowers and lenders, where lenders demand repayment while borrowers spend savings, causing a collapse in demand. He emphasizes the ripple effects of localized debt distress on the broader economy.
- 6:46 – 11:34
The Global Debt Supercycle and Imbalances
Mian argues that total debt (household, government, corporate) as a share of GDP has risen continuously since the 1980s, unaffected by the 2008 crisis. He identifies a structural imbalance where excess savings from the top 1% or high-saving nations like China are not absorbed by productive investment.
- 11:34 – 19:35
Savings Glut and Unproductive Borrowing
The speaker notes that the top 1% have disproportionately high savings rates due to consumption saturation. To absorb these excess savings, economies have relied on unproductive borrowing (consumption debt) by households and governments, rather than capital expenditure.
- 19:35 – 22:40
Zero Lower Bound and Fiscal Deficits
Mian asserts that post-2008, governments ran large primary deficits not due to political failure but because interest rates were at the zero lower bound. Governments were forced to borrow to maintain aggregate demand and absorb excess savings when the private sector could not.
- 22:40 – 27:39
China's Role and Internal Debt
China faces internal pressure to absorb excess savings due to reduced external demand post-2008. Consequently, China's debt growth has surged, mirroring the behavior of other nations facing similar imbalances, rather than being solely an active policy choice to dump surplus globally.
- 27:39 – 30:18
Wealth-to-Income Ratios and Valuations
The wealth-to-income ratio has risen significantly since the 1980s, driven by falling interest rates and higher valuation multiples (price-to-earnings). This reflects the difficulty in finding productive investment outlets for excess global savings.
- 30:18 – 32:12
Regional Investment Failure and AI Boom
Mian highlights the persistent failure of economies to converge and invest productively in infrastructure or regional development. He notes a recent reversal with an AI capex boom, though he frames the prior decades as a period of significant investment failure.
- 32:12 – 34:11
Regional Investment Failure and the $10 Trillion Question
Speaker 1 argues that despite high potential returns, investment fails to reach underdeveloped regions like parts of Africa, the UK, and the US due to deep structural failures. This inability to direct capital to productive areas creates a demand shortfall, leading to the '$10 trillion question' of why productive investment opportunities are missed.
- 34:11 – 37:22
AI Capex Boom vs. Sovereign Debt Crowding Out
The speaker explains that post-COVID reliance on unproductive sovereign debt creates a crowding-out effect when AI-driven private investment booms. Both sectors compete for the same pool of capital, raising interest rates and making it difficult for governments to reduce deficits while private sector borrowing surges.
- 37:22 – 39:30
Market Dynamics: Hyperscaler Debt vs. US Treasuries
Bilal Hafiz notes that international investors are rotating from US Treasuries to hyperscaler debt due to duration constraints. Speaker 1 confirms that 10-year US bond yields rise when hyperscalers borrow heavily, indicating that sovereign and private debt markets are competing for the same liquidity rather than acting as substitutes.
- 39:30 – 42:13
Historical Analogies: Eccles and Bretton Woods
Speaker 1 references Benjamin Eccles, the first Fed president, who testified during the Great Depression about imbalances and inequality. The speaker connects these historical arguments to the creation of the Bretton Woods system, suggesting that current macroeconomic issues are a recurrence of problems addressed in that era.
- 42:13 – 44:26
Policy Fixes: Supply-Side Deregulation
To address imbalances, the speaker recommends supply-side fixes such as deregulation. He cites the UK housing market as a prime example, arguing that excessive local regulation and inefficient taxation (like stamp duty) stifle productive investment and should be reformed to boost housing supply.
- 44:26 – 55:34
Policy Fixes: Demand-Side Tax Restructuring
On the demand side, the speaker advocates for a more progressive tax system to address inequality. He criticizes the current asymmetry where capital income is taxed less than labor income and highlights loopholes that allow income relabeling through corporate entities, suggesting reforms to capital gains and estate taxes.
Claims worth verifying
Atif Mian is Professor of Economics at Princeton University and Director of the Center for Public Policy and Finance.
Bilal Hafiz ·0:41
How to verify: Princeton University Department of Economics faculty page; Center for Public Policy and Finance website. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Atif Mian co-founded the Center for Economic Research in Pakistan (CERP) in 2007.
Bilal Hafiz ·1:00
How to verify: CERP official website or about page; SEC filings if CERP has any public financial disclosures. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceAtif Mian co-authored the book House of Debt with Amir Sufi.
Bilal Hafiz ·1:00
How to verify: Book publication details via publisher (Princeton University Press) or Amazon/ISBN databases. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Atif Mian received his bachelor's degree in Mathematics with Computer Science and his PhD in Economics from MIT.
Bilal Hafiz ·1:00
How to verify: MIT Department of Economics alumni records or Atif Mian's CV on Princeton University website. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The average primary budget deficit for the US post-WWII until 2007 was essentially zero.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·20:14
How to verify: US Treasury Department historical data on federal receipts and outlays; Congressional Budget Office (CBO) historical budget data. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Since 2008, the US primary budget deficit has averaged north of four percentage points of GDP.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·20:14
How to verify: US Treasury Department historical data; Congressional Budget Office (CBO) reports on federal deficits post-2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Total debt (household, government, corporate) as a share of GDP has risen continuously since the 1980s.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·7:26
How to verify: Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Accounts (Z.1 report); BIS Global Debt Database. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The US primary budget was balanced on average between WWII and 2007, including Clinton surplus years.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·20:14
How to verify: Congressional Budget Office historical budget data; US Treasury historical reports. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The speaker identifies a '$10 trillion question' regarding why productive investment opportunities are missed in areas like parts of Africa, the UK, and the US despite high potential returns.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·32:51
How to verify: Check the transcript at [32:51] for the phrase '$10 trillion question' and the context of investment failures in underdeveloped regions. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Post-COVID reliance on unproductive sovereign debt creates a crowding-out effect on AI-driven private investment by raising interest rates.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·36:31
How to verify: Check the transcript at [36:31] where the speaker discusses 'standard crowding out issue' and 'raising the cost of debt' due to fiscal deficits competing with private borrowing. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
10-year US Treasury yields rise when hyperscalers increase borrowing, indicating competition for capital.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·37:57
How to verify: Check the transcript at [37:57] where the speaker states 'the 10-year US bond, for example, goes up when there is more pressure for borrowing from the hyperscalers'. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Benjamin Eccles, the first Fed president, testified during the Great Depression about demand imbalances and inequality.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·39:50
How to verify: Check the transcript at [39:50] for the mention of 'Eccles' as 'first Fed president' and his testimony on 'imbalances' and 'inequality' during the 'Great Depression'. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The UK housing market suffers from supply-side failure due to excessive regulation and inefficient taxation like stamp duty.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·43:46
How to verify: Check the transcript at [43:46] where the speaker cites the 'UK' as a 'classic example of like just the failure of supply side' due to 'regulation on building housing' and 'stamp duty'. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The current tax code taxes labor income more heavily than capital income and allows income relabeling through corporate entities.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·44:45
How to verify: Check the transcript at [44:45] where the speaker discusses the 'asymmetry between how we tax capital income versus how we tax labor income' and 'relabel income and call it going through some corporate entities'. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Keynes' The Economic Consequences of the Peace influenced the speaker's view on creditor-borrower dynamics and the Marshall Plan.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·52:32
How to verify: Check the transcript at [52:32] where the speaker mentions 'Keynes, the economic consequences of the peace' and its connection to 'the Marshall Plan' and 'creditor countries'. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
AI allows for the concentration of power in the hands of a few 'technobros', threatening liberal democracy.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·48:27
How to verify: Check the transcript at [48:27] where the speaker discusses 'concentration of power' in the hands of 'technobros' and the need to protect 'liberal democracy' and 'agency'. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Do your own research
- Verify the US primary budget deficit data from 2008-2025 using FRED (Federal Reserve Economic Data) or US Treasury reports.
- Check the wealth-to-income ratio trends using the World Inequality Database or Federal Reserve Flow of Funds data.
- Review the UK housing market regulations and stamp duty impact via UK Government publications or ONS housing data.
- Analyze hyperscaler debt issuance volumes and 10-year Treasury yield correlations using Bloomberg or Refinitiv datasets.
- Assess the top 1% savings rates and consumption saturation metrics using Census Bureau or Bureau of Labor Statistics data.
- Examine China's internal debt growth and savings glut data via National Bureau of Statistics of China or IMF reports.
- Review Benjamin Eccles' testimony records from the Great Depression era via Federal Reserve historical archives.
- Check current capital gains vs labor income tax rates in the US and UK via IRS and HMRC publications.
Full transcriptexpand
- 0:02
- Bilal Hafiz: Welcome to the Macrohive Conversations Podcast. I'm Bilal Hafiz, head of strategy at Macro Hive. Before we dive in, a quick update. Following Macrohive's acquisition by the BGC Group, BGC has launched a new regulated business called Macrohive Markets. For the first time, onboarded clients can also access execution services via Macrohive At macrohyde Markets. This
- 0:22
- Bilal Hafiz: new workflow will allow macro macroinstitutional institutional investors to benefit from strategy and quantities. quant insights alongside access to global liquidity. Please contact Andrew Simon or Guillaume Sibrian on Bloomberg or click the link in the description below for more details on macrohyde markets and its service offering.
- 0:41
- Bilal Hafiz: Now, on to this episode's guest, Artif Mia. Artif is Professor of Economics at Princeton University and Director of the Center for Public Policy and Finance. Artif's ongoing research. studies the root causes of the economy's long-run dependence on debt and the risks the debt supercycle poses for global stability. In 2007, Artiv co-founded the Center for
- 1:00
- Bilal Hafiz: Economic Research in Pakistan, a nonprofit institute dedicated to promoting economic research, teaching, and innovation. His book, House of Debt, co authored with Amir Sufi, received wide global acclaim for its originality and in policy applications. implications. He received his bachelor's in maths with computer science and his PhD in econ from MIT. Now, onto our conversation. So
- 1:20
- Bilal Hafiz: greetings and welcome, Artif. It's fantastic to have you on the podcast show.
- 1:24
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Thank
- 1:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you for having me, Bilal. Wonderful to be here.
- 1:26
- Bilal Hafiz: Great. Now, before we get into your most recent work, I do like to ask all my guests something about their origin stories. So it'd be great to hear in your own words, you know, what you said studied in at university and was it inevitable you'd end up in academia and policy kind of in parallel. to that?
- 1:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah. So I grew up in Pakistan, did my uh finished my high schooling from there and then um applied to a few universities in the US and was extremely my biggest break was that I got into MIT with scholarships. So I was glad to go there thinking I would do engineering. I was very much interested in sort of science and research.
- 2:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Started doing electrical engineering, computer science.
- 2:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): didn't like any of that. So moved into math, ended up majoring in math. But then the question was, what now? What fascinated me about economics, which I had no idea what the field was about in Pakistan, but so I just took a few introductory classes. And the questions really fascinated me about the society, the economy. I was
- 2:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): kind of always interested in questions like, you know, why is Pakistan as poor as? it is and things of that nature? And it used mathematical tools to answer those social questions. And so it really intrigued me and you know decided to do a PhD. And I always had a sort of an interest in research. So obviously, if I could, I wanted to go into academia. I've been very
- 2:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): fortunate in being able to do that.
- 2:45
- Bilal Hafiz: No, that's great. Now, one of the ways I got introduced to your work was your work or your book actually, that kind. of culminated that piece of work called House of Debt. So there were a whole range of books and pieces that came out after the global financial crisis trying to explain what happened. And yours, the House of Debt, ended up becoming, you know, one of the kind of I don't know sort of popular or
- 3:05
- Bilal Hafiz: accepted, you know, versions of like uh angles of towards it all. So can you just kind of very briefly kind of give an outline of what the thesis of House of Debt was? and then we can go from there onto your current work?
- 3:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Basic thesis is very simple, which is that distribution uh matters across creditors and lenders. So the very definition of debt is uh somebody is borrowing and someone else is lending. And that's a dynamic relationship. It's a relationship that, you know, it's not just that I borrow from you today, I have to give
- 3:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the principal plus interest back to you tomorrow. And that dynamic relationship between borrowers and lenders that introduces a sort of a possible friction in the economy if there is disruption in people all of a sudden, for example, demanding money back from the borrowers.
- 3:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): That's essentially what a financial crisis is: that lending stops and the definition of lending stopping is that now you're trying to pull money back from the borrowers, saying look, blah, blah, blah we overlent or whatever the issues might be. And the basic insight is that that's a highly disruptive process for the real economy. And so we couched that in the book in risk-sharing terms,
- 4:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): equivalent way of thinking about the same thing, that the problem with debt markets for the real economy, which is about employment, jobs. consumption, demand, and so on, is that if there is a lack of risk sharing between borrowers and lenders, and lenders all of a sudden demand their money back and stop lending to begin with, the overall
- 4:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): economy can start to collapse because the borrowers tend to spend every dollar that they borrow. But when the lenders get their money back, they try to save it on average. And that creates this problem of lack of demand in the middle of a financial disruption. And so the work behind the book, you know, I like to work
- 4:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): with both kinds of conceptual frameworks, but also then testing them out with empirical data, was looking at granular data to see: okay, is there evidence that places where people were more levered and they were forced to pay back or the money stopped coming to them are those. the places that suffered more in terms of
- 5:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): higher unemployment and so on? And then the other core lesson in that work was that we are all connected. And so when people in these over-levered places, when they stop consuming as much as they were doing before, that has ripple effects everywhere. Because obviously their demand is somebody else's production and
- 5:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): supply. And so we also kind of trace out those kind of propagation mechanisms. And finally to put it all together, you know, the key question is why is policy not able to fully respond to these kind of disruptions? And that gets you into monetary policy, macroprudential policy, fiscal policy. So the whole, I mean I find these kinds of questions very interesting. So they go from the
- 5:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): micro to the macro. And so they allow you sort of full of
- 6:00
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And the micro in that
- 6:00
- Bilal Hafiz: in that case was you did like zip code analysis. like neighborhood analysis, wasn't it? I think if I
- 6:05
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): recall that's right,
- 6:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): zip code and even individual, you know, depending on what the data availability is, you want to like, you know, because that's sort of the micro foundations of what we call the macro economy.
- 6:15
- Bilal Hafiz: Yeah, no, that's great. And now in more recent years, you've kind of gone even further and you talk about uh what you could term the debt inequality cycle. And of course, you know, this is, you know, the whole thing about inequality has become such a big salient point in general across the world and it has ripple effects on politics and so on. And so you kind of talk about
- 6:35
- Bilal Hafiz: inequality and debt and that cycle and then sort of saving glutts and investments and so on. So can you kind of give an outline of what this new or extension of your original work now has become?
- 6:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah. So let me first of all try to link how you go from starting studying a boom bus cycle. or in the financial crisis to these questions of inequality and debt and so on. The post-financial crisis or post-house of debt, the book that we wrote, the issue that kept coming back to my mind was that yeah, it's okay to understood the boom and bus cycle of 2008. But if you
- 7:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): step back, what you really notice is that there is a bigger debt super cycle that continues to go on, actually. And while the focus of the financial crisis was very much on mortgage debt and household borrowing, if you take a step back, what you realize is that there was this upward trajectory of total debt. So if total debt is household
- 7:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): debt plus government debt plus corporate debt, what businesses borrow. And total debt has as a share of GDP. So per dollar of income that the economy produces, total debt has been rising. And what was actually remote remarkable was that, or remarkable, is that 2008 crisis did not even put a dent in that upward trajectory of
- 7:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): total debt. And what you see is that while household debt growth sort of stops post 2008, you see a rapid buildup of sovereign debts around the world. And so that raises the bigger question in my mind, which is why it appears like the economy. the global economy, not just the US, is in a sense addicted
- 8:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): to debt. That if you stop one kind of debt, it starts borrowing in another uh source, in this case, sovereign debt post-2008. So that got me interested into these longer-run but slow-moving, even more fundamental forces that may have been responsible for this rise in debt throughout the world, which has created
- 8:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): enormous. disruptions. 2008 is just one example of that. So it was really an attempt to think of a single theory, if you will, of these range of crises that we have observed over the decades, all sort of there's a component of debt everywhere, but what where does the dependence on debt kind of come from? And along with So it, the
- 8:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): second sort of main data point that is of interest is the price of debt. which is the interest rate. So you have this, it looks like sort of a strange coincidence that while the amount of debt is rising, the price of debt, which is the interest rate, had been falling over this long time period as well, which is the interest rate, of course. And so this is this
- 9:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): idea of okay, what how can you explain that? And if you just think of that simple price-quantity Price quantity observation, that if quantity is going up and price is going down, it already suggests that something is happening, that there's more supply of debt, if you will.
- 9:19
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 9:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): so then the question is: where does the supply of debt come from? And the supply of debt obviously comes from important subsectors of the economy wanting to save more and more. And it's that kind of question that leads you to start thinking about inequality a bit more carefully. Let me be sort of clear on a couple. of points here.
- 9:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): First is when I talk about inequality, what matters for this issue that we are talking about, which is like debt or financial markets, it's really extreme inequality that matters. And I'm happy to come back to why. But really, it's like the share of income, disposable income in particular, going to like, let's say, the top 1% roughly around the world. The
- 9:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): second point, which is very important, is that. while inequality is one factor we want to think about, the bigger framing that I actually prefer over inequality is imbalances. And from that vantage point, it could be share of income going to top 1% that becomes an issue that is sort of
- 10:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): feeding into the supply of debt, if you will, that I was referring to earlier. But equivalently, or it's isomorphic to think of imbalance. imbalances generated by a country or an economy that is growing at a very rapid pace and has a tendency to save at a very high rate as well. So now you can think of China as an example of that. So these two, from a macro
- 10:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): perspective, are a bit isomorphic. You know, either the rise in inequality or the rise of nations, if you will, Well, that start to grow at a very rapid pace, but you also have a tendency to save at a much higher rate. You know, it's it's sort of you you introduce very similar kind of problems. And so that's this broader notion of
- 10:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): imbalances, that if somebody is saving and is getting a higher fraction of the pie at the same time, the question is where do those savings go? That's the imbalances problem that I is I think a perhaps a better framing of the overall issue.
- 11:13
- Bilal Hafiz: And just on that, you know, in terms of the you know the more extreme form of inequality, so the implication there is that the 1%, you know, top 1% have a much higher savings rate than the rest of the percentiles or the deciles of the distribution. I mean why you look at the 1% is it just suddenly there's a kind of a hockey stick or something? Some saving rate goes
- 11:33
- Bilal Hafiz: goes up uh dramatically.
- 11:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah. Yeah.
- 11:35
- Bilal Hafiz: Okay.
- 11:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): No, exactly. So I just want to make one thing clear as we discuss these issues is that when I am talking about the top one percent, the motivation for that is not just some political motivation that, you know, we is some class warfare or whatever. Those are important issues, of course. But I want to think of it from a purely kind
- 11:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): of a macro supply versus demand perspective. And that's the other reason why I'm really bringing my focus back to imbalances. Because I think that's it's a very important macro kind of technical problem, if you will, right? And so I think that's why the focus is not just political. It's like, you know, it's a problem that the overall economy can have from a policy perspective. So it becomes a policy issue, not just a
- 12:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): political issue. Now, why focus on the top 1%? Let me come back to your question from that perspective. The reason is empirical, of course. It's not that I particularly care about the top 1% versus the rest. Empirically, when you measure saving rates, let me give you like the basic fact is the following. We're very sort of, if you think about it, it's kind of very obvious. Roughly
- 12:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): speaking, I'm talking about the US, but it's sort of broadly true globally. The bottom half of the population are essentially hand-to-mouth. Like, unfortunately, for you know, the bottom half of the population, they don't have much assets, and hence they don't have much debt. So they are just sort of you know, they consume what they earn on a
- 12:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): month or annual basis. And now think of what that means, by the way, because I'm going to talk come to back to debt, and which is financial markets, which means that the bottom 50% by and large, to first approximation, are sort of not much relevant for the financial markets, unfortunately. But that's the and so really when you want to start thinking about financial markets, you really want to
- 13:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): start thinking about the top half to begin with, right? Now, so let's start thinking about the top half. So the bottom half I've already said, hand to month, so that's zero savings, right? So when you start looking at savings, which is what is saving? It's the financial surplus that someone generates out of their disposable income, and they try to funnel it back into the
- 13:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): financial system through whatever some savings in banks or stock. stocks, whatever the case might be. When you start looking at the savings, which are zero for all, the entire 50% of the population, they start rising gradually. Of course, it's not that as soon as you cross 50%, they they and so because you know when you have disposable income, you first want to be spend on the
- 13:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): basic necessities, education, health, and so on. And then slowly you start to save more and more. So there's a gradual rise in saving, but that really rises a lot more. You know, you start getting into numbers like you start to save up, you
- 14:08
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): know,
- 14:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): 30, 40, 50% and more as you get to the Elon Musk, Jeff Bezos ends of the distribution. And there is very easy to understand. If you're Jeff Bezos, how much can you consume? You know, like how many dinners can you eat, and how expensive can those dinners be? And so you really run up against a very mechanical saturation. constraint that you can't control. So
- 14:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): people at that end of the income and wealth distribution, they save at a much higher rate. And it is because of that, because remember, if I care about financial markets, what I care about is money, the share of disposable income going into financial markets. And that's why the top 1% becomes really important. It's just a quantification, you know, simple sort of math that when you add up how
- 14:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): much money is going into the financial sector. it's really dominated by the top one percent. That's the way to think about it.
- 14:54
- Bilal Hafiz: And I mean, has that always been the case, or is that more of a recent phenomena? I.e., has it really become a story in the last 20, 30 years?
- 15:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): It's a great question. It's first of all, it's always the case, number one. Now, again, these are like broadly descriptive facts and which don't really change. You know, the pharaohs were very rich and they were saving like crazy such that they were you know would even put their savings under their coffins. It's always been true. What is different more recently is
- 15:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that if there is a shift in inequality, if the share of income going to the top 1% changes, and in particular that has risen over time, that adds pressure in the financial markets in the sense that you now have more supply of savings that are getting pushed into the so clearly that. has always been the case, but it's more the
- 15:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): pressure is greater of those savings going into the financial market. So that's number one. Number two, the other thing is that you know, so far I've only described to you the supply side of these savings. For example, thinking about the top 1%. But what is important, and that's why again I mean I said it's imbalances that I care most about. What is
- 16:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): extremely important is to not now think of the demand side of savings, like who and where are these savings getting absorbed. So let's think about that for a minute. In an ideal economy, this is what we teach in the basics of Econ 101 style courses as well. This is great. Like this not, there's nothing wrong with these savings, of course, right? You want savings in the
- 16:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): economy. So so far, everything you I've said is good news potentially for the economy. It's great that the top 1% are saving because that's what drives growth. But there is an important question to ask on the demand side, which is the extent or the success in driving those savings towards investment. What is investment?
- 16:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Investment is the generation of capital. So investment is capex, if you will. It's to add to the existing capital of the economy by channeling savings in that direction. That is really valuable. Why is that valuable? Because it's that capital creation that then drives future growth. Right? It's a bit like the savers are not eating all the apples.
- 17:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): They want to plant some of the apples back in the ground so you have more apple trees in the future. We want that. So it will be terrific if we can, and that's the job of the financial sector, by the way, right? That they are supposed to then channel the these savings into productive uses. This is where problems start
- 17:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): arising when you look at the data, which is that over these decades, when we while we have had this rise of savings, and this is again why I said imbalances is the right way I want to think of it, inequality is kind of one of the reasons which is feeding into the generation of these imbalances. But once again, they can be generated from other ways as well, if let's
- 17:38
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): say
- 17:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the oil. oil-rich countries or China or others, they're becoming richer and they just want to save more and more. The challenge that the global economy has been facing is that these savings have not been channeled into productive uses. This is what I'm calling an imbalance. It's the imbalance between the supply of savings and the productive use of those savings. There's a big gap
- 17:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): between those two numbers. But remember, supply must equal demand and equilibrium in any economy. So if you can't use all these savings for productive purposes, they still need to go somewhere. And that somewhere is where we come back to first the House of Debt conversation that we had earlier, and then the sovereign debt crisis that we have had
- 18:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): since 2008. Which is that to fill that hole whole of the imbalance or the gap between the supply of savings and the use of those savings. for productive uses, that gap has persistently been filled by unproductive borrowing. What do I mean by unproductive borrowing? Unproductive borrowing is borrowing that is
- 18:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): fundamentally used for consumption expenditures. Not CapEx, not building new capital, but borrowing that is fundamentally used for consumption expenditures. That is what happened during the 2000s, for example, the big run-up in household debt. But that stopped, the government started to do it for the households. Like that's, you know, because the
- 18:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): government was the only player that could borrow at such large amounts that were needed to again bring or maintain the economy in that balance. So that imbalance is really the issue. And so that's what the second strand of my work has focused on is to try and understand this imbalance imbalances, is where do they come from and again inequality? is one important thing.
- 19:15
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And I mean,
- 19:16
- Bilal Hafiz: just on that, I mean the other possibility, say after 2008, was why did the government, you know, maintain large deficits? Why didn't they just deleverage and reduce that debt? You know, that line you talk about debt to GDP has kind of just gone up continuously over time. Why wasn't there some kind of balance sheet deleveraging that that, you know?
- 19:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): That's a great question. And let's think of that counterfactual. First of all, it's not that the government did not try to be more austere. They did. If you remember early on, because you know the pre-2008, by the way, let me give you one fact: primary budget deficit for the US, which is the
- 19:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): difference between revenue the government generates and the expenditure that it has, excluding interest payments. So that's sort of the standard metric of. are you our average balanced or not? Average primary balance of the US post-World War till 2007, the eve of the financial crisis, is
- 20:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): essentially zero. So it's the same US politicians and the same US government that on average was running a balanced primary budget between World War, you know, obviously you
- 20:25
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): have
- 20:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): ups and downs, you have the Clinton. surplus years and then so on. But on average, it was balanced. Since 2008, it's running on average north of four percentage points of GDP, which is an incredibly large primary balance to have for such a long time, which is precisely why we have the fiscal issues we do today. Now, your question, now coming back to your question, you
- 20:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): know, what changed? Why could the same set of institutions and roughly the same two political parties in the US, which were on average were running, you know, what broke post 2008? That's another framing of your question. I would argue that it's not that the politicians all of a sudden got much worse. We need to understand there were deeper forces that
- 21:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): were pushing the politicians towards running larger deficits, and we know why what that pressure was. It's we call that the zero lower bound. Interest rates were stuck at zero for a very long time. We haven't seen that in modern history up until post 2008. So there was a pressure from the macro. That's what I'm this is why I come back to
- 21:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): imbalances. Early on, the US and some other governments, they tried to be more austere. But what they kept finding themselves was a situation of lack of demand. Remember, it took many years to get out of the inflated, unless. unemployment numbers post-2008 recession. It was a grind. And the fiscal
- 21:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): position was being used to generate aggregate demand, to absorb those excess savings. So for a long time, the economy was facing this problem of imbalances, this problem of excess savings. And the government was forced to run larger deficits because the household sector just could not borrow much further. Okay? So the
- 22:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): causality is that way. It's not that the counterfactual of government not running that large deficits, the question we have to ask ourselves is while you are in that zero lower bound environment, and if the government did not do it, what would the economy have looked like?
- 22:20
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It
- 22:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): would have been much higher unemployment and so on. And that's the reason the government was forced into it. Let me give you one other data point in case someone thinks there's something weird about the US. Maybe you know our politicians did go crazy. It's not just about the US. You see the same picture in Europe, number one, but most importantly, you see the same picture in China
- 22:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): post 2008. Because all these countries are facing these imbalances, and China is sort of, you know, one of the countries that is sort of originating these imbalances. And post-2008, post 2008, the rest of the world, they were running huge external surpluses through the trade account to generate demand for their high capacity to produce. Post
- 23:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): 2008, the rest of the world was could not just run deficits vis a vis China of that magnitude. So what does China do? China faces that pressure internally. And if you look at debt growth in China, that starts rising like crazy post post-2008. 2008. So again, my I'll come back with the the key thing to understand is that there is
- 23:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): a more fundamental structural force, which are again these imbalances, inequality is one factor that's feeding into generating those imbalances. And governments around the globe are reacting to that in ways that leads to more debt generation, essentially through policy.
- 23:35
- Bilal Hafiz: When you mention China, I mean, one thing that comes up, you know, at least from Western Commonwealth. commentators at least, is that the Chinese government is almost directly or intentionally or indirectly intentionally or however you want to call it, but they're the driver of the surplus by not having a, you know, a social safety net, by, you know, redirecting the financial sector to subsidize production and so on. So it
- 23:55
- Bilal Hafiz: implies a lot of agency by the Chinese government as a driving force. And it then implies that the Western countries, say the US is is almost kind of passive to that. But is there also a case that the government in the US has been actively pushing things in that direction? Because I mean, you kind of framed it as, you
- 24:15
- Bilal Hafiz: know, the governments are kind of responding to external factors. But in the case of China, the Western framing often is actually the government is not passive, it's it's actually actively creating those excess savings.
- 24:26
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Let
- 24:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): me start by saying just the obvious. I think it would be incorrect to say one government is active and another one is passive. All governments around the world are active in the sense they're running some various kinds of policies, right? It would be wrong to say China is running an industrial policy and the US is not, or whatever. I know there is politics behind these things, but I try to remain
- 24:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): objective as a citizen of the world. And because that's the only way we can make progress on these questions, very important. questions. All governments run active policies of one sort or another, number one. Number two, no country in the world, no government in the world, regardless of how much agency or power they have, none of them can fight the basic economic
- 25:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): principle, which is supply must equal demand. So, in that sense, you no country in the world can run imbalances in that sense of the world that supply is not equal to demand. What they do try and do is they try to push the problem somewhere else. They try to kick the can somewhere else. So, first of all, like that's the way to think of the whole situation. And there's an interesting question of why is China able to push
- 25:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the can externally, so to speak, and why is the rest of the world less able to kind of push back? That's a very interesting uh conversation. But let me make one other point in response to your question, which is it's not just about China. Again, the broader problem is imbalances. And China is a factor in the sense that I've
- 25:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): already mentioned. But an equally important factor is that the US is generating those imbalances within its own borders as well. So if you come back to the inequality Equality conversation, the top 1%, that rise in the top 1% share of disposable income has been going. on since the 80s in the US. And as a
- 26:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): result of that rise in top 1% share, given the much higher saving rates of the top 1%, as we have already discussed, has had an implication that there has been a rise of imbalance of roughly the same magnitude inside the US as the imbalance between US and
- 26:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): China. So it's, and now is that policy driven? Is that agency driven? We can have long debates on that. But my broader point is that these imbalances are pervasive, they are global, there are various factors that go into those generation of those imbalances. And the key problem, once again, is that our global response, one way
- 26:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): or the other, has been that all governments, this is what's common across all governments, that when put push comes to shove, all governments have responded to deal with those imbalances by absorbing them through unproductive debt. That's my core thesis, if you will. And again, the factors are varied in terms of what goes into producing those
- 27:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): imbalances and reasons for why one country absorbs it in household versus another country absorbs it on the sovereign side.
- 27:11
- Bilal Hafiz: That's excellent. point. One thing we haven't talked about is wealth. And so in the case of the US, you know, while debt has gone up, wealth has also gone up as well. So what's the right way? I guess these are all accounting identities, debt is wealth and, you know, and so on. But I mean, how do we think about wealth here? And how does wealth link to productive
- 27:31
- Bilal Hafiz: capacity and unproductive capacity and things and
- 27:33
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): things
- 27:34
- Bilal Hafiz: like that? I mean, it's a you know, when you start thinking about this, your head start stop getting dizzy. Yeah.
- 27:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Absolutely. Let me try and prevent us from getting dizzy by saying, look, but you it's the classic kind of stock flow question. Income is a flow, wealth is a stock. And the question is, okay, the two are obviously connected. People use their income to build wealth and so on. But what is the relationship between the two? For me, the best way to
- 27:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): think of this whole question is to not to think of wealth separately from income. or one at a time, but instead to think of wealth to income ratio. How much wealth do we have today for every dollar of income that we are producing? And when you pose the question that way, what you realize is that there has been a tremendous rise in wealth to income ratio
- 28:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): from the 80s onwards. So think of that as the third main data point. So the first main data point that I mentioned was that there's been a rise in total debt. since the 80s. The second was that over this time period there has been this decline in long-run interest rates. We'll come back to what's happening more recently. Obviously, there's a reversal, and that's it's all connected. So, you know, when the but we are still
- 28:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): building up our story of the long run. And the third important fact is that while debt has been rising and interest rates have been falling, wealth to income ratio has been rising. So what is what is that wealth to income ratio? Well, it's for the same dollar of income. But the way to think of this is that for the same dollar of dividend, let's think of capital income. For the same dollar of dividend that firms are
- 28:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): paying out, the stock is worth a lot more. That's what wealth to income means. Wealth to income is another way of thinking, it's price to earning ratio, if you will. So we are now living in a so that's but that's just a valuation effect. And it's the inverse of interest rates falling if at one level. The only other possibility could have been that you say, okay, expected growth is shifting over time and so on. And you know,
- 29:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): while that is obviously a possibility, over this the long run growth has not materially shifted over this time period. And so what is more likely is that valuation ratios have just gone up over this time period. Which by the way is exactly what you would expect when the world is more and more imbalanced. Because when the when people are trying to save more
- 29:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): and more
- 29:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): they are trying to have that money get absorbed somehow. And one of the effects of natural consequences of that is that valuation ratios go up, you have downward pressure on interest rates, valuation ratios go up. That's again, that is the system's way, the price mechanism way of dealing with those imbalances. balances.
- 29:58
- Bilal Hafiz: Yeah, that's clear. And what we've said is over the last 30, 40 years, the debt's gone up, net investment in some ways, well, unproductive investment's kind of gone down or sideways or down. So it kind of begs the question of why wasn't that invested in something? You know, roads could be improved, you could do internet, whatever, and so on. And of course recently there's been
- 30:18
- Bilal Hafiz: this huge investment boom, CapEx or boom. You know, recently, so you're kind of seeing the reversal of that. So presumably the savings are now being deployed. But why now? I mean, it it seemed almost like COVID led to some kind of fiscal activism, perhaps. And then we've had this AI story. Some combination of the two has kind of led to something. But
- 30:38
- Bilal Hafiz: why not earlier?
- 30:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): So let me you've asked a number of very deep questions, and they're so let me try to unpack it a little bit. So let me first answer your question of why the lack of investment before we get to COVID in the pre COVID world, let's say, why the lack of investment in the pre COVID world? That is like a $10, $20 trillion
- 30:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): question that nobody has a good answer to. What we know is that did not happen. Number one. Let me just say one other thing. It's a very deep question.
- 31:08
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 31:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): let me just frame it a little bit differently. I started off, you asked for about my story of becoming an economist. I started off as a development economy. Being from Pakistan, I was naturally. And the big question from a development perspective is just this lack of convergence around the world. You know, the basic economic theory is diminishing returns that says, okay, if you're poor, you should be growing
- 31:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): faster. And it's remarkable how much I mean, I understand China has grown and there's been some convergence. But broadly speaking, it is extremely difficult for the world to converge. In fact, you might say there are institutional differences across Africa, Asia, Europe, and so on. Forget all of that. Let's just think of the US. You know, it's a
- 31:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): well-functioning country, or at least it used to be until a few years ago, perhaps. But take the US. And you know, in the US, people use these pejorative terms like flyover Our country, like saying, you know, the the only econom or most of the economic activity is in the coast, and there's not much happening. And to some extent it's true. Why has the US failed to converge?
- 32:08
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It's assuming the UK as well. I
- 32:09
- Bilal Hafiz: mean, we have a huge uh regional disparity here where
- 32:11
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): London
- 32:12
- Bilal Hafiz: Southeast dominate and the rest of the country hasn't. And every government talks about leveling up
- 32:16
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): or regionalizing and it
- 32:17
- Bilal Hafiz: nothing happens and we carry on.
- 32:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And it's the you know, you know, but we can say, look, Europe has whatever Europe. Like I mean, the US is supposed it's one country, right? I mean, no, you know Europe has multiple sort of challenges that the US presumably does not face because we have fiscal consolidation, things like that. My broader point is that even if you take the country which is supposed to be have the kind of the best financial institutions, innovation,
- 32:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): whatever, labor mobility, and so on. Even in that country, we have struggled to bring in investment in places that should have the highest return.
- 32:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): through basic diminishing return, econ 101 kind of logic. And it does not happen. I'm basically saying I don't know the answer to your question. Nobody knows the answer. And this is what I'm trying to say. It's a very deep question. We don't really know the answer to this question. It's one of the most important questions, right? Because we need to understand there how can anyone tell me that there are no investment opportunities in Africa? You
- 33:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): know, let's just think about it, right? And so, but the same is true for parts. of the UK, the same is true for parts of the US and so on. So I think it is what it is. Like there is some deep failure of us coming together, externalities, whatever. We can go back into various hypotheses and so on. My point is come bringing the conversation back. Whatever the reasons might be, it might be some
- 33:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): policy failures, whatever. At the end of the day, it's simple accounting for the for the financial market. It's not happening. And so you take it as given and then you are you're talking about how to fill the gap. And the key question is is that the best way to fill the gap? Right? That's another way of framing that. And so that's another way of, you know, we can go into the policy discussions later on. But before we do that go do that, I want to come back to
- 33:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): your question, which I as I said had multiple questions embedded in it. So this is one of was one of them. So let's now unpack the rest of it, which was your post post-COVID COVID kind of question or and the AI investment boom question. And I want to make two points there. The first one is let's go back to my story, my narrative of this rise in debt and the unproductive debt.
- 34:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): The reason I feel that that is such a problem is precisely because of what happened post-COVID. Let me try and explain what I mean by that. The issue with debt is that it's a dynamic contract. Once you issue it, it to issue it, you may have solved the problem for two. today, but you may have written in bigger problems tomorrow. That's the
- 34:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): problem with debt, number one. Especially when you are issuing debt to solve a short term problem of demand, like I was explaining before, through the political process, which is borrowing governments borrowing or running large deficits. Because once it's easy to ramp up spending, few politicians.
- 34:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): complain too much. You know, they might initially say, well, whatever the long run, but once you say there's a need, okay, if there's a need, let's do it. Bringing it back is a whole different ballgame. So there is this ratcheting up that is so this is the key issue. That the structural forces may have pushed you into relying on debt. But now imagine that the world changes all of a sudden. So let's go, you
- 35:11
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): know,
- 35:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): so it's like, remember the the reason was, let's go back to this narrative. The reason was. you were you had a world of imbalances. You wish you had productive investment opportunities, but you didn't for whatever reason. That's my $10 trillion question. The way you respond to that is you respond to that by leaning on unproductive debt and governments start running deficit. Now imagine that I change the
- 35:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): world on you for whatever reason there And is AI and something, and I say, now we have all of a sudden a great investment opportunity, which is truly remarkable. of course. You know, I mean, I'm blown away by what AI can do. I did not expect this, I will be honest. So it is something very structural. How we can talk about whether it's a bubble or that's another conversation. But it's clear that this is something structural. It's clear that there
- 35:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): is a need for investment. How much is too much? That's a separate question. But clearly, we need to invest in this new sector. When you do that, you're now all of a sudden start competing with the fiscal side, because the fiscal side is also. borrowing. So now you have the standard crowding out issue, right? But you've locked yourself in because you have so go back to the same politicians and
- 36:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): say, please, can you go back from four percentage points of GDP of primary deficit to zero, at least zero? You know, you may need to run surpluses for a while. Can you go back to the that's huge? Think of four percentage points of adjustment. I mean, politicians are not going to do that. So now you have a problem, right? So, yes, absolutely. Now you have a standard. This is the standard
- 36:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): problem that we always wanted to avoid. This is why we want governments on average to run balanced budgets and so on. On average, the cyclical issues, of course, you need to deal with. But what I what I want to go back to is to just illustrate that there are these deeper reasons why at the macro level you can have these imbalances. And it is of central importance for the long run. health of
- 36:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): our global economy that we deal with those imbalances in ways that are sort of better from a long run perspective. Unfortunately, the way we dealt with those imbalances was by loading up on unproductive debt. That's the bottom. And I think that has had consequences in this post-AI world as well, because now you're stuck with that debt, you're stuck with that high level of
- 37:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): deficits. And now those deficits are actually competing, they're crowding out. productive investments by raising the cost of debt, which is the interest rate too high. That's the new problem that we are facing with. You
- 37:22
- Bilal Hafiz: know, and say in the trenches of markets, and you can see that all the time in terms of uh conversations around can debt markets absorb all of this uh bond issuance by the hyperscalers? Is there enough There's capacity? And then if I look at cross-border capital flow data, what I'm finding is if you look at international. investors, they're starting to buy less US
- 37:41
- Bilal Hafiz: treasuries and buy more hyperscaler debt. They want to do the rotation, basically. You know, they've got a certain amount of duration risk that they want to take and they're basically all credit duration, then they say they prefer to take hyperscalar risk than, you know, so there's kind of it seems to be some kind of budget constraint.
- 37:57
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You're the
- 37:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): expert, Bilal, but even to someone like me who's looking at it from sort of the outside, it's in comma. It's so clear that the 10-year US bond, for example, goes up when there is more pressure for borrowing from the hyperscalers.
- 38:12
- Bilal Hafiz: Yeah.
- 38:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And when there is this feeling that those guys cannot borrow as much, and hence the sort of the demand for that at the US Treasury falls
- 38:20
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): as
- 38:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): well. The 10 NDF
- 38:21
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): year treasury falls fault
- 38:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): as well. So it's not like some default risk or whatever. It's not behaving like that. It's clearly
- 38:26
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that they
- 38:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): are both competing for the same
- 38:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): debt market. And imagine that we somehow could have lived in a world where we did not have so much sovereign debt, where governments were not competing on a flow basis to continue to issue so much new debt because they are running large deficits. It would have been a very different world. The private market could have absorbed a lot more debt because it would have
- 38:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): been lower prices. priced, right? And we would have had a lot more investment, productive investment, which is good news, which is what you want. But now we are stuck in a world where this unproductive debt is competing with productive debt.
- 39:03
- Bilal Hafiz: Yeah. I'm just wondering, are there analogies to you know war economies? So during the Second World War, the government governments had have to ramp up their spending and debt and so on, and then you leave. the wars, the government scale it back. You know, I I'm just thinking aloud here. I mean, is there some analogy with sort of that phase
- 39:21
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): where
- 39:21
- Bilal Hafiz: you know where you kind of have that, you know, very large deficits and then you can somehow scale it back and rely on the private sector thereafter or not?
- 39:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I mean wars are obviously they have their own dynamics and then you know when you're in a war you you know you're not worried about the interest rate anymore. You're just trying to whatever survive right? However, for a historical comparison, let me go back to Eccles, you know, who was the founder of the US Federal Reserve. He was the
- 39:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): first Fed president. Sort of, you know, that's how the US the modern US Federal Reserve system comes into being. There's a famous Eccles building in Washington, DC, where the Fed board sits and all of that. Now, Eccles was a banker, actually. a private banker. So he was no Bernie Sanders from Utah. And yet he gave a very powerful
- 40:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): testimony in during the Great Depression, basically. But he actually talks about exactly this problem. And he talks about, and he's, you know, the exactly what we were talking about, the imbalances. Because that is the time period when inequality also is rising very rapidly or happening. has risen very rapidly. And he comes into
- 40:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Congress and he testifies where he says, look, one of the core issues we are facing are these imbalances. And we need to sort of deal with these imbalances at the root source rather than trying to ignore it, because that's what's driving this lack of demand and this crisis that we are facing. And partly because you end up
- 40:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): having a war, and so there is this, you know, you sort of ultimately get out of it in some sense. But of course, that's not you know, you don't want to do it that way, of course. So my deeper point is that yes, there are historical analogies that one can use. In fact, Eccles was talking about exactly and others, you know. So this is the the the by the way, the arguments I'm making here, I'm not the first
- 41:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): one to make those arguments. You can go back to Hobson, you can go back to Eccles, you can, you know, but somehow. we ignore those. These issues, by the way, are also very much connected to why the Bretton Woods were set up in the first place, and then why these problems start coming back when we move away in this post-Breton Woods era. Again, my broader point is that I think that there is something
- 41:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): deeper that we are being reminded of, which was there. You know, it was one of the reasons, it was in the Maloo malou of those conversations of the big in. sort of the intellects of that time who were saying, okay, let's think about it, that you know, Keynes and Robinson, and they were all having those conversations on what the new structure should look like. And out of those conversations first came the
- 41:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Bretton Woods. And then we thought, okay, those things are behind us, and we went into this post-Breton Woods era. But I think these problems have always been there, and they we need to sort of continually deal with them and think about what the best policy responses are.
- 42:03
- Bilal Hafiz: I mean, speaking of policy responses, then what would you recommend on the policy side? So let's say you were sort of policy dictator in the US, what
- 42:11
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): would you what would
- 42:12
- Bilal Hafiz: you do?
- 42:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): We all want to be policy dictators,
- 42:15
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): right?
- 42:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): That's uh that's
- 42:16
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that's
- 42:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): um look, as with any other big issue of this sort, you want to address it from both ends, the supply and the demand side of it,
- 42:25
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): right?
- 42:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): So you want to think of supply side economics and you want to think of demand side, you know, the taxation type of taxation and so on. So I think both of those sides are very important. Number one. For example, we have already talked about the supply side. That's again the $10 trillion question that I was referring to. The why is it so difficult to have
- 42:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): productive investment when you can see many ways we should be able to do it. Like, you know, like I was saying, you know, there are places that need better infrastructure, there are places where people should have better education, that they should have higher productivity. You know, why are we failing to invest in those areas and so on? Some of it at least has to
- 43:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): do with, you know, you need government to coordinate the private sector. So, for example, if you think of, you know, that's true for most new technologies, like when we're we talking about electricity. electrification, when we were talking about electric vehicles and so on, you can see that there is this question of this infrastructure, there is this question of coordination on what the new rules of the game are going to be, what are the industry or the market
- 43:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): standards that we should follow for you know battery safety thing, whatever those issues might be. So there's always a bunch of those things. Regulation, you know, how much think of housing. You're sitting in London, I I presume, when and you know you look at the UK. I mean, UK, UK is just this now this classic example of like just the failure of supply side. Like there's just so much regulation
- 43:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): on building housing, you know, at a local level. The UK has this system of stamp duty, but which is very inefficient way of, you know, you try to tax transactions, but then you don't have property tax, you don't have if you don't have much land taxes or property taxes. Like that's a very inefficient. If I wanted to boost housing investment in the UK, like that would be
- 44:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): like the first place I would like to start addressing C. But you can imagine that's a thorny political issue because everybody, many people own a home and so on and so forth. It's those kinds of deregulation, those kind of supply side issues that we need to think we do need to address. And so I think that's legitimate, right? Okay. So that's sort of my maybe conservative hat, and I'm saying, look, those are
- 44:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): real issues. That's one way. to resolve this imbalances. Let me now bring on the progressive side of things, if you will. That's what I'm calling the demand side. You know, I think there are important fixes that need to be made on that demand side as well to deal with this inequality. I think the taxation system needs to be more progressive, less regressive overall.
- 44:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): We know, like, for example, the average tax paid by the very top end is not that much. different, perhaps even lower than, I mean, that doesn't make any much sense. We should not be taxing labor as much as we do, especially in this new world of AI. So this huge asymmetry between how we tax capital income versus how we tax labor income
- 45:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): versus capital income. I don't think that's healthy. You know, that's another problem we have. The way we have created ways through the tax code that you can just relabel income and call it going through some corporate entities and you have you can pay much lower. I mean, that's not fair. It but forget again, I'm not talking about fairness as I said in the beginning. It doesn't add
- 45:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): up at the macro level. You start having issues at the macro because of these imbalances. So I think we need to address all of those issues. Capital gain taxation, it's a very important question. Estate taxes, right? That's a very important. question. And many people have given a number of very reasonable solutions to those problems. You know,
- 45:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): starting with housing on the supply side or other deregulation to here. And it's just that we have been unable to move on those margins. I mean, I think that's our collective failure. So at some level, like it's not that we don't know how to respond to at least some of these issues, not all perhaps. They are difficult issues, I understand. But we haven't made much progress in like, you know, the
- 46:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): tax code remains like very inefficient. It like it sort of favors generation of these imbalances rather than dealing with those imbalances. And then we have fundamental issues on like boosting productive investment on the supply side.
- 46:18
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
- 46:18
- Bilal Hafiz: that's great. I mean, we could go on talking uh about this all. And uh I should also give a time uh stamp. We're recording this on the second of November before the midterm. So by the time our audience is listening to this, we'll see the midterm uh election results or see what policy comes out of that. I did want to round off with a few more down-to-earth questions, or maybe not down-to-earth, but you
- 46:37
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): know,
- 46:38
- Bilal Hafiz: one thing I'm finding is that many youngsters who've um close to graduation or have left university looking for jobs, they're all very nervous Us at the moment. What advice would you give to youngsters in the job market?
- 46:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I'll First acknowledge that I think this is a world of the uncertainty has risen on these questions. So it's not like I have a very clear lens to advise people. What I will say is that again, keep your focus on the fundamentals. We have seen major shifts before. It is true, it is very clear that
- 47:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): certain skills, uh, you know, there is sort of a reevaluation of which skills are. relatively more important than not. So coding is the obvious one, it's not that important. But if you think of coding, you know, the value was always in sort of what you're trying to do with coding, right? So what problem you're trying to solve. And I
- 47:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): think that if you keep your focus on you know how to think of open-ended problems, how to be creative and solve those problems, the focus should be so we all need to kind of be more flexible in how we train ourselves and so on. The value of human relationships, the soft skills that we talk about,
- 47:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): communication, writing, the art of argument, so to speak, those remain extremely important in my view. So, you know, boost up those skills, you know, do go to debate college and things like that. You know, I would just think of these things. as more holistically in that uh shape and form. Having said all of that, I do think it's an
- 48:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): extremely important question going forward of how we respond to it from a policy perspective in this age of AI. I do worry a lot of this rise of techno bros around the world, is this concentration, because what AI is allowing you to do is it's allowing the concentration
- 48:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): of power in various dimensions of power, not just financial, but also other dimensions of power, control in that control sense, in the hands of a few technobros, right? We all know who they are. And I feel very you know that's I mean I'm very much I think the core thing we need to protect is sort of this idea of liberal democracy. That
- 48:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): we don't, you know, and so I think there are going to be some very important political questions of AI can might be able to do whatever it does, but a human being should be able to maintain their voice and agency in this new world. You know, that notion of equal rights, equal voice, one person, one vote. That, you know, it's
- 49:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that's a big struggle in my mind. And so I think there's this huge political question that we should all, as individuals, whatever happens to us in the job market, we'll do our best or try and do our best. I would say one thing we all need to do a lot more of is to we should all contribute in the political process. That's extremely important. So
- 49:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you know do go and vote. I mean this is I don't know people will this will be too late. But I think whenever elections happen or whatever the you know do I'm a big believer in like the you know the like aggregation of political voices it's good for societies in the long run and so I think one thing I would say is the job market or whatever is that you should
- 49:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): and then give that's another example of soft skills like do engage in the proper way in the political process in the dialogue process because I think it's like we, the collective human we must sort of fight the machines in that in that sense.
- 50:00
- Bilal Hafiz: No that's a great uh great answer there. The other question was on books. Uh, you know, you've written books yourself. What are some of the books that influence you over your uh career, or maybe even recent books that you'd like to recommend to our audience?
- 50:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): So on the recent stuff, you know, whatever it is, the new stuff that sort of hits you in the face. So AI is one. There's a very nice book. I think it's called Brief History of Intelligence. I really like sort of it's a lovely book. I highly recommend people read it or to think of intelligence. from first principles. It starts with biology and sort of goes ultimately to compute and all that. That was very
- 50:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): useful. There's another book I'm reading, sort of 13 Nations, I think is the title, which is talking about how the US is broken up into these various subgroups, their history, why they think a certain way. Like that's I've always been fascinated by that, like these big ideological debates. We all pretend to be objective, but then we all have some. ideological framing. And it's always
- 50:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): fascinated me. I mean, you know, and so that book goes into the history of that for the US. But really overall, there are very few books that really have an impact on you in at a deep long run level. But those are the classics often, right? And so for example, like it's a short thing, like the trial and the dialogue of Socrates, right? So it's uh
- 51:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): for me that has always been because it's like Socrates is saying, All I'm doing is talking. I'm just, I don't have a I'm not carrying a weapon and so on. Why are you guys against me? You know, why is the whole machinery against me? You know, that simple sort of dialogue has always resonated with me as something very deep. I think those are always the issues of even today, like you know, when
- 51:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): governments come after people who are just trying to share a point of view and no, you can't say it that way and then go to different ways. I mean, we're living in a very distorted world right now. You know, we're you talk about war, there's there's a lot of destruction happening around the world. And you know, at the same time, you're not allowed to talk about some of those issues. Like, why? And so I think those struggles are much very deep. They've they're
- 51:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): historical. Those kinds of books on like Ibn Khuldun Muqaddama, like that's just a beauty, right? It's like it's a reminder that this modern social science. there are these people who are talking about these issues of how to make sense of history, how to think of labor markets and taxation and public finance. So Ibn Khuldun's
- 52:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Mukadma is something I would recommend to everyone who's interested in social science. But on a more sort of modern sort of time period, I uh loved Keynes, the economic consequences of the peace. It's very much, I mean, that was partly sort of it was always stuck in my mind, the motivation for the whole house of debt and all that this
- 52:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): sharing, because he talks about these paper entanglements and he's saying, look, you know, you it's in your advantage to, you know, you're the creditor countries. It's in your advantage to go easy on the on the borrower, you know, the the Germany that you have defeated, and so on. And so I think that notion uh yeah that's purely economic. idea, right? It's not making a political
- 52:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): statement. He's saying you might think whatever, you may have ill feelings towards Germany and so on. But it's actually in our collective and and I think out of that comes ideas like the Marshall Plan and so on. So I've always sort of I thought Keynes that was in my mind like that was the real genius of Keynes to say look the sum can be bigger than the parts and we should we need to think about these linkages even when we are thinking
- 53:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): globally and even when we are thinking of an adversary so to speak. That really resonates with me. And I think those are important sort of lessons as we think about the world going forward.
- 53:21
- Bilal Hafiz: No, that's great. And then final question if people wanted to follow your work, follow you in some way, what's the best way for them to do that?
- 53:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Just the usual, you know, I whatever I write, it's on my website. And so I'm trying to, you know, write up a more uh for the broader audience, hopefully a book as well. So stay tuned.
- 53:37
- Bilal Hafiz: Great. That's great to uh great to hear. So thanks a lot, uh Artif. It's fantastic speaking to you. We kind of covered all the big issues. We could talk more, and I definitely want to have you back uh soon as well. So once again, thank you very much, Artif.
- 53:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Thank you, thank
- 53:49
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you.
- 53:51
- Bilal Hafiz: Thanks for listening to this episode. Please subscribe to the podcast show on Apple, Spotify, or wherever you listen to podcasts, leave a five-star rating, a nice comment, and let other people know about the show. We'd be very, very grateful. Sign up for a our free newsletter. at macrohybe.com. Macrohive Limited Macrohybe retains all ownership, title, rights and interest in this audio and video and all related
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