Weil Gotshal's collapse illustrates structural flaws in law firm partnerships and incentive misalignment
Summary
Hosts Tracy Alloway and Joe Weisenthal discuss the sudden collapse of the 95-year-old law firm Weil Gotshal with guest John Morley, a Yale Law professor. Morley explains that law firms are partnerships due to regulatory requirements and economic efficiency, but this structure creates a 'bank run' dynamic where partners fear fraudulent transfer liability if the firm fails. The episode highlights how 'eat what you kill' compensation models incentivize partners to hoist client relationships, undermining firm stability. Morley argues that generational conflict and intertemporal misalignment prevent long-term investment in technology or talent. The discussion contrasts partner-owned firms with investor-owned entities like Slater and Gordon, noting the latter's resilience during insolvency.
Key takeaways
- 1 Partners face fraudulent transfer liability in bankruptcy because their compensation is a discretionary profit distribution, not a contractual wage, allowing creditors to claw back payments made during insolvency.
Joe Weisenthal · 15:49
Episode sections
- 0:00 – 1:03
Sponsor Reads and Intro
The episode begins with sponsor reads for Samsung Galaxy S26 Ultra and Bell, followed by the Odd Lots podcast intro.
- 1:03 – 5:29
Weil Gotshal Collapse and Partnership Model
Hosts Tracy Alloway and Joe Weisenthal discuss the sudden collapse of the 95-year-old law firm Weil Gotshal, noting its irony as a prominent bankruptcy firm. They introduce guest John Morley, a Yale Law professor who predicted such collapses in his 2015 paper.
- 5:29 – 8:33
History and Economics of Law Firm Partnerships
Morley explains that law firms are partnerships due to historical precedent, regulatory requirements for lawyer ownership, and economic efficiency. He cites Henry Hansman's argument that worker ownership reduces conflict because individual contributions (billable hours, client origination) are easily measurable.
- 8:33 – 10:46
Venture-Backed Law Firms and MSOs
The discussion covers how venture-backed legal tech companies bypass non-lawyer ownership restrictions by using Managed Service Organizations (MSOs). The MSO handles administrative and tech functions owned by investors, while the law firm itself remains lawyer-owned.
- 10:46 – 12:41
The Rainmaker Problem and Incentives
Morley explains the tension between firm management wanting client loyalty to the firm and partners wanting loyalty to themselves under an 'eat what you kill' compensation model. This structure incentivizes partners to hoard client relationships, making them vulnerable to departure.
- 12:41 – 19:14
Financial Impact of Partner Departure
When a rainmaker leaves, the firm loses revenue but cannot immediately cut fixed costs like office leases or pension obligations. Remaining partners suffer because profits drop, and they face potential 'fraudulent transfer' liability if the firm goes bankrupt, as their discretionary profit distributions can be clawed back by creditors.
- 19:14 – 23:09
The 'Leave or Stay' Calculus
Morley describes the daily decision partners make to stay or leave. Partners weigh reduced future pay against the risk of having past compensation clawed back if the firm collapses. This creates a 'bank run' dynamic where one departure triggers others.
- 23:09 – 29:01
Weil Gotshal's Strategic Positioning
Weil Gotshal collapsed because it was stuck in the 'middle' of the market, neither huge enough to offer broad specialization like Kirkland Ellis nor small enough to thrive on premium niche work like Wachtell or Cravath. Its profits per partner ranking fell from 9th in 2020 to 20th in 2025.
- 29:01 – 30:03
Intertemporal decisions and generational conflict in law firms
Tracy Alloway suggests Weil Gotshal's past decisions to trim ranks and avoid private equity may have set the stage for its 2026 collapse, highlighting the difficulty of aligning senior partners' incentives with the firm's long-term future. John Morley introduces the concept of 'generational conflict,' noting that unlike shareholders in public companies who hold permanent equity, law firm partners' equity disappears upon retirement, disincentivizing long-term investment.
- 30:03 – 32:45
Cadwallader's merger and the fragility of prestige
Morley cites Cadwallader (Cadwallader, Wickersham, and Taft) as a prestigious firm that pursued a similar conservative strategy to Weil but eventually merged with Hogan Lovells, losing its independent identity. This illustrates that while the strategy was rational, clinging to it too long can lead to loss of independence or collapse.
- 32:45 – 34:45
The mechanics of lateral movement and compensation erosion
Alloway explains that increased lateral movement intensifies generational conflict, forcing firms away from lockstep compensation (pay based on seniority) toward 'eat what you kill' systems (pay based on productivity). This shift rewards those who can leave and take their business, undermining internal cohesion and long-term talent development.
- 34:45 – 39:26
The rise of lateral poaching and changing norms
Morley attributes the recent surge in large-scale lateral partner poaching, pioneered by Kirkland & Ellis, to a shift in professional norms rather than legal barriers. He notes the inherent risks in hiring, as lawyers cannot legally solicit clients from their current firms, making the true value of a lateral hire uncertain.
- 39:26 – 42:47
Slater and Gordon: Investor-owned vs. partner-owned resilience
The speakers discuss Slater and Gordon, an Australian law firm that went public, acquired a fraudulent medical services firm (Quindell), and faced insolvency. Unlike partner-owned firms, its investor-owned structure allowed it to wipe out equity and restructure without collapsing, as lawyers remained paid employees rather than owners whose capital was at risk.
- 42:47 – 1:01:46
Weil Gotshal wind-down and creditor claims
Alloway describes Weil Gotshal's wind-down process, noting that the firm avoided bankruptcy by quickly dissolving to limit fraudulent transfer liability. However, partners will likely forfeit their year-end bonuses, as remaining cash will be consumed by creditors, primarily landlords with long-term lease claims.
Claims worth verifying
Weil Gotshal is a 95-year-old law firm that collapsed suddenly after partners departed and merger talks failed.
Tracy Alloway ·1:13
How to verify: News reports from late October 2026 regarding the dissolution of Weil Gotshal; SEC filings or press releases from the firm. For recent events, verify 2026-08-13 through 2026-11-13. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceWeil Gotshal worked on the General Motors bankruptcy and Lehman Brothers bankruptcy.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·1:40
How to verify: Public court records or firm press releases detailing historical client work for GM and Lehman Brothers. For recent events, verify 2026-08-13 through 2026-11-13. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
John Morley published a paper in 2015 titled 'Why Law Firms Collapse' predicting partner-led collapses.
Tracy Alloway ·5:29
How to verify: Yale Law School faculty publications or academic databases for the 2026 paper by John Morley. For recent events, verify 2026-08-13 through 2026-11-13. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Only Arizona and Utah have altered model rules to permit non-lawyer ownership of law firms.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·10:20
How to verify: State bar association rules or state legislation in Arizona and Utah regarding legal ethics and ownership. For recent events, verify 2026-08-13 through 2026-11-13. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Weil Gotshal's profits per partner ranking fell from 9th in 2020 to 20th in 2025.
Tracy Alloway ·24:37
How to verify: Law360 or American Lawyer annual rankings of law firms by profits per partner for the years 2020 and 2025. For recent events, verify 2026-08-13 through 2026-11-13. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Micah Aiello was a powerful rainmaker at Weil Gotshal whose departure in September was the final straw.
Tracy Alloway ·25:36
How to verify: News reports from September 2026 regarding Micah Aiello's departure from Weil Gotshal to Cravath. For recent events, verify 2026-08-13 through 2026-11-13. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Rule 5.6 of the model rules of professional conduct prohibits lawyers from signing non-compete agreements.
Tracy Alloway ·27:23
How to verify: American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct, specifically Rule 5.6. For recent events, verify 2026-08-13 through 2026-11-13. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
In the UK, lawyers are free to sign non-compete agreements and they are frequently enforced.
Tracy Alloway ·27:42
How to verify: UK legal regulations on professional conduct and case law regarding enforcement of non-compete clauses for solicitors/barristers. For recent events, verify 2026-08-13 through 2026-11-13. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Weil Gotshal announced it was winding down in late October 2026 after partners departed and merger talks failed.
Tracy Alloway ·29:01
How to verify: News reports from Bloomberg, Reuters, or legal industry publications (e.g., Law360) dated late October 2026 regarding Weil Gotshal's dissolution. For recent events, verify 2026-08-13 through 2026-11-13. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Yale Law professor John Morley published a paper in 2015 titled 'Why Law Firms Collapse' discussing partner-led businesses as inherently fragile.
Tracy Alloway ·29:01
How to verify: Search academic databases (e.g., SSRN, JSTOR) or Yale Law School faculty publications for the 2026 paper by John Morley. For recent events, verify 2026-08-13 through 2026-11-13. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Cadwallader (Cadwallader, Wickersham, and Taft) merged with Hogan Lovells.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·30:03
How to verify: SEC filings or press releases from Hogan Lovells or Cadwallader confirming the merger, or legal news archives. For recent events, verify 2026-08-13 through 2026-11-13. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceSlater and Gordon went public in Australia in the 1990s after rules changed to allow lawyer ownership.
Joe Weisenthal ·39:26
How to verify: Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) historical records or Slater and Gordon's prospectus documents from the 1990s. For recent events, verify 2026-08-13 through 2026-11-13. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Slater and Gordon acquired Quindell, a fraudulent medical services firm.
Tracy Alloway ·40:31
How to verify: Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) filings or court documents detailing the Quindell fraud and Slater and Gordon's acquisition. For recent events, verify 2026-08-13 through 2026-11-13. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceWeil Gotshal avoided bankruptcy to limit fraudulent transfer liability, which accrues during insolvency.
Tracy Alloway ·43:09
How to verify: Legal analysis in Bloomberg Law or Law360 regarding Weil Gotshal's wind-down strategy and fraudulent transfer laws in New York. For recent events, verify 2026-08-13 through 2026-11-13. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Kirkland & Ellis announced a $500 million AI investment over five years.
Tracy Alloway ·51:52
How to verify: Kirkland & Ellis press releases or official announcements regarding their AI technology investment. For recent events, verify 2026-08-13 through 2026-11-13. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Ramona Knee was hired by Kirkland & Ellis and was not going to be the chair of Weil Gotshal.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·46:29
How to verify: Press releases from Kirkland & Ellis or Weil Gotshal confirming Ramona Knee's departure and hiring. For recent events, verify 2026-08-13 through 2026-11-13. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Dewey & LeBoeuf partners faced personal liability, with some declaring personal bankruptcy.
Tracy Alloway ·46:12
How to verify: Bankruptcy court records for Dewey & LeBoeuf or news reports on partner liabilities following the firm's collapse. For recent events, verify 2026-08-13 through 2026-11-13. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Law firms do not typically buy office space but renovate it, and will likely rent AI rather than develop it.
Tracy Alloway ·51:31
How to verify: Observation of law firm real estate trends and AI licensing models in legal tech industry reports. For recent events, verify 2026-08-13 through 2026-11-13. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Do your own research
- Review John Morley's 2015 paper on law firm collapses for theoretical framework on partnership dynamics.
- Examine Weil Gotshal's public filings or news reports regarding its profits per partner ranking decline from 9th in 2020 to 20th in 2025.
- Verify the specific fraudulent transfer laws in the jurisdiction where Weil Gotshal was headquartered to understand creditor clawback risks.
- Check state bar rules (e.g., Arizona, Utah) regarding non-lawyer ownership to assess regulatory trends for legal tech MSOs.
- Analyze Slater and Gordon's financial statements and insolvency proceedings to compare investor-owned vs. partner-owned resilience.
- Review Kirkland & Ellis's public disclosures on their $500 million AI investment timeline and revenue impact.
- Assess the legal restrictions on client solicitation for lateral hires to evaluate the risk of unverified 'books of business'.
- Monitor landlord claims in law firm bankruptcies to understand the priority and lump-sum nature of lease obligations.
Full transcriptexpand
- 0:00
- Joe Weisenthal: Finance is increasingly being built on digital rails. But as the adoption of virtual assets, tokenization, and stable coins grows, can regulation not only keep pace, but help accelerate it. Find out more later in the podcast.
- 0:16
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Oh,
- 0:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): group shot. I'll take it. No, we're good. There's one in every group: the notographer. Best intentions, worst shots. But there's hope. The Samsung Galaxy S26. Ultra on Bell. Super steady videos and perfectly framed shots with my fan cam. And nitography for stellar picks even in low light.
- 0:34
- Joe Weisenthal: I want that. Yep.
- 0:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Postworthy with just a click. All on Bell. Canada's fastest 5G plus network. Visit a Bell store or bell.ca slash Samsung for details. Bell. Connection is everything.
- 0:47
- Tracy Alloway: Bloomberg Audio Studios.
- 0:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Podcasts. Radio News.
- 1:03
- Tracy Alloway: Hello and welcome to another episode of the Odd Lots Podcast. I'm Tracy Alloway. And
- 1:08
- Joe Weisenthal: I'm Joe Weisenthal.
- 1:09
- Tracy Alloway: Joe, we had some shocking news recently.
- 1:12
- Joe Weisenthal: Yeah.
- 1:13
- Tracy Alloway: We had
- 1:13
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
- 1:14
- Tracy Alloway: very so I know. What could she possibly be about to say? No, we had a the very sudden collapse of a law firm that's been in business for something like 95
- 1:23
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): years.
- 1:24
- Tracy Alloway: A
- 1:24
- Joe Weisenthal: big Wall Street one.
- 1:25
- Tracy Alloway: A big, you know, pretty elite law.
- 1:27
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): One that I have heard
- 1:28
- Joe Weisenthal: of. Yeah.
- 1:29
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Which
- 1:29
- Joe Weisenthal: there's not a there's not a long list of law firms that I've I've heard of.
- 1:32
- Tracy Alloway: Yeah, so uh while Gotchol
- 1:34
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
- 1:35
- Tracy Alloway: collapsed, there's some irony here because it's perhaps most famous. for being a bankruptcy firm.
- 1:40
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It worked
- 1:41
- Tracy Alloway: on stuff like the General Motors bankruptcy,
- 1:43
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Lehman
- 1:44
- Tracy Alloway: Brothers as well, I think, and now itself has failed. And of course, this has prompted a lot of questions about the durability of the big law model. And I'm gonna give my standard caveat
- 1:56
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): whenever
- 1:56
- Tracy Alloway: we do a legal episode, which is my husband was a lawyer. Neither of us enjoyed it very much. But one thing I learned, one thing I learned from that entire experience is the law model is just so weird.
- 2:10
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It's weird.
- 2:11
- Tracy Alloway: And no one seems to be particularly happy with it. Like neither the partners,
- 2:16
- Tracy Alloway: partners probably more so than some other people, but certainly not like junior associates. And law firms, they're always going through these efforts where they try to like fix things. Yeah.
- 2:26
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You know,
- 2:27
- Tracy Alloway: they start de-equidizing some of the partners or try to move out some of the older partners, try to make life better for some of the junior associates. And they never seem to quite get it right.
- 2:36
- Joe Weisenthal: No, and this seems totally true. I do not know much either about law firms, how they're structured from a corporate perspective, and also law firms how they're structured from a corporate perspective in theory, as in what is the theory?
- 2:51
- Joe Weisenthal: such that maybe people don't like this system, but it seems to be the least worst system. It does not seem easily changeable. I know that law firms are basically like they're never public, they never have like outside equity holders and so forth.
- 3:05
- Tracy Alloway: There are some
- 3:06
- Joe Weisenthal: publicly traded
- 3:07
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): public.
- 3:08
- Tracy Alloway: I I don't know if they're publicly traded, but they have outside investors. But you're right. You do know one thing about law firms, which is the standard model is the partnership. model, right?
- 3:15
- Joe Weisenthal: Yeah. Standard partnership is the um partnership model. And you know, it's funny is like, okay, we had this collapse of a pretty big law firm. Didn't seem to be a big deal in the sense, like, unlike, say, if there was an equivalent bank that had collapsed, we'd be like, oh, panic, what does it mean? Seems like it just sort of happened and life went on. But the
- 3:35
- Joe Weisenthal: other interesting thing, too, is I remember in 2008 when a lot of the banks literally did collapse, and people were like, Oh, this wouldn't have happened if they hadn't abandoned the partnership model and stuff like that.
- 3:45
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): This is exactly
- 3:45
- Tracy Alloway: what I was
- 3:45
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): saying. But I
- 3:46
- Joe Weisenthal: guess partnerships aren't immune to collapse either.
- 3:48
- Tracy Alloway: Well, this is exactly what I was gonna say because I've been thinking about the partnership model because both of us read Lloyd Blankfein's biography earlier this year,
- 3:56
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
- 3:56
- Tracy Alloway: you can tell he is very wistful for the old partnership model that they had at Goldman Sachs, uh, until they I IPO'd. So we should talk about how law firms ended up being partnerships, why they collapse, why does it seem like rainmakers are such a huge thing
- 4:13
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in the
- 4:14
- Tracy Alloway: legal industry, such that they can basically lead to the collapse of a single firm, like basically overnight? Yeah. And this does have broader importance beyond just the legal industry when you think about ownership. of firms, there is this like fundamental question of whether or not it's better for a firm to be owned by its workers directly
- 4:34
- Tracy Alloway: or by outside investors.
- 4:36
- Joe Weisenthal: Totally. You know, like we go down every year, we go down to the future proof conference,
- 4:41
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
- 4:41
- Joe Weisenthal: there's a bunch of registered investment advisors, independent investment advisors, etc. et cetera. And you know, you always hear I'm always interested in hearing how they those small financial. advisors structure their thing. And often there's like a founder, and then they like sell their equity over time when they're ready to retire to the junior people come up and maybe take out
- 5:01
- Joe Weisenthal: loans. I'm very interested in these different corporate structures and how they how people make them work. And then evidently how sometimes they don't work.
- 5:10
- Tracy Alloway: Yeah, and how they don't work. Okay, so we do, in fact, have the perfect guest. We're gonna going be to speaking with John Morris. Morley. He is a professor at Yale Law School. More importantly, perhaps he published an academic paper that was very prescient in predicting, I guess, some of the pressures that can come to bear on a law firm through the partnership model. So
- 5:29
- Tracy Alloway: Professor Morley, thanks so much for coming on All Thoughts.
- 5:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Thanks for inviting me. It's a pleasure to be here.
- 5:34
- Tracy Alloway: Why don't I start with a very basic question? But how did we end up in a world where the vast majority of big law firms are partnerships? So I mentioned there are some exceptions, famous exceptions, particularly in the UK, but the vast majority of them are owned by the actual partners.
- 5:54
- Tracy Alloway: How did this come to be a thing?
- 5:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): It's not entirely clear,
- 5:57
- Joe Weisenthal: surprisingly. There's not
- 5:58
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): an
- 5:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): obvious answer to that question.
- 6:00
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I'll
- 6:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): answer the question, though, on three levels. So
- 6:02
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
- 6:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): first is history. Law firms started out this way. And because it doesn't require a lot of capital to start a law firm, it really just requires the labor of the workers and the human capital of the workers. You can start one without having outside investors. And so large law firms didn't appear, and by large I mean even more than three or four lawyers, didn't appear until the
- 6:20
- Joe Weisenthal: mid 19th century in either the United States or the United Kingdom. But they've always been worker worker-owned. owned.
- 6:26
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The second
- 6:26
- Joe Weisenthal: level in which I'll answer that question is regulation. Today, the model rules of professional conduct, which have been adopted in some form in almost every state, generally require that a law firm be owned by lawyers, which as a practical matter tends to mean the lawyers who work at the firm.
- 6:44
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Then
- 6:44
- Joe Weisenthal: there's a third level at which we could answer that question, which is economics.
- 6:48
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Big, big debate about whether this pattern of ownership is efficient or not. Should law firms instead be owned by their investors? The best answer to that question was given by a Yale Law School professor named Henry Hansman, who was my teacher and mentor. His argument was that in a law firm, the contributions of the workers are relatively easy to measure
- 7:08
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and perceive, which reduces the risk of conflict among the workers. Imagine if
- 7:14
- Joe Weisenthal: General Motors were owned by its workers. There would be huge
- 7:17
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): conflict
- 7:18
- Joe Weisenthal: between the management
- 7:19
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and the people in the factory
- 7:20
- Joe Weisenthal: floor. There'd be lots
- 7:21
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): of conflict about how much each of the executives paid because it would be hard to measure their relative contributions. In a law firm, it's much easier to measure people's contributions because they bill
- 7:31
- Joe Weisenthal: by the hour.
- 7:32
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And you
- 7:32
- Joe Weisenthal: can often
- 7:33
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): identify which clients they
- 7:34
- Joe Weisenthal: brought in.
- 7:35
- Tracy Alloway: This is the the eat what you kill model, right? That's
- 7:38
- Joe Weisenthal: right. That's the eat what you kill model.
- 7:40
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But even before the
- 7:40
- Joe Weisenthal: eat what you kill
- 7:41
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): model,
- 7:42
- Joe Weisenthal: there were even simpler ways
- 7:43
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): of
- 7:44
- Joe Weisenthal: identifying low
- 7:45
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): lawyers'
- 7:45
- Joe Weisenthal: productivity productivity and structuring their pay, which was
- 7:48
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that
- 7:48
- Joe Weisenthal: every lawyer of a given level of seniority got paid the same amount.
- 7:52
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 7:53
- Joe Weisenthal: worker ownership is more tenable in a law firm than in other kinds of businesses because the workers tend to be more similar to one another. That's the idea. So let's say I'm a private equity guy and I look at a law firm, maybe a medium-scale law firm, and I look at it and I say, I bet they could do service all just
- 8:13
- Joe Weisenthal: as much to their clients as they do just as well if they got rid of all their junior partners and replaced them with this AI solution that I developed. So I'm gonna going to invest in them millions of dollars, tell them to stop hiring new juniors and you. use AI instead. Why doesn't that happen? Is there a legal thing? Why can't let's talk
- 8:33
- Joe Weisenthal: about like someone must have people have this idea. People look at law firms and see opportunities for productivity gains. Are there legal reasons that this cannot be done?
- 8:43
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So, first off, there are investor backed,
- 8:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): venture
- 8:45
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): venture-backed backed businesses doing that now.
- 8:48
- Joe Weisenthal: Okay.
- 8:48
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It's harder to do that with a traditional
- 8:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): law
- 8:51
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): firm. In both types of businesses, the venture-backed businesses and traditional law firms, you have these rules that prohibit non-lawyer ownership. The way the venture-backed businesses get around those rules is by segregating the
- 9:03
- Joe Weisenthal: business into two chunks that each go into a different entity with a slightly different set of owners. On the one hand, you have the law firm, which provides legal services and employs lawyers and is owned exclusively by the lawyers.
- 9:15
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On
- 9:15
- Joe Weisenthal: the other hand, you have what's called a managed service organization or MSO. Okay. The MSO is owned by a mix of investors and the lawyers who work at the law firm. And the MSO does everything other than provide legal advice. Oh. It employs the word
- 9:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): processing people, the administrative assistants, Instance, the finance, the accountants, the financial administrators. It holds the lease. It owns the computers. Oh,
- 9:38
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 9:38
- Joe Weisenthal: see.
- 9:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And so basically what happens is the clients pay fees to the law firm, and then the law firm pays a price for administrative support to the MSO. So
- 9:47
- Joe Weisenthal: this makes a lot of sense. Just real quickly, when you say there are these rules about ownership from non-lawyers, are these state laws? Are they c where do these rules come from?
- 10:00
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
- 10:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): they're essentially um legal ethics rules. adopted by state bar associations and sometimes by state legislatures. So the American Bar Association has promulgated a model set of rules called the model rules of professional conduct. And every state has adopted them in some form. A couple of states, namely Arizona and Utah,
- 10:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): have altered those model rules to permit non-lawyer ownership of law firms, but only those
- 10:25
- Joe Weisenthal: states. Okay.
- 10:26
- Tracy Alloway: So the working narrative of what went wrong at Wild Gotchel is this idea of all the rainmakers departed. A bunch of senior partners who had really strong client relationships started walking away from the firm and then it snowballed from there. And we'll get into the snowballing because this is basically the essence of a lot of your academic
- 10:46
- Tracy Alloway: research on this topic. But just on the Rainmaker model itself, this is something that I have never understood about law firms. Because you think about the law firm as an organization, they should want clients to be sticky and loyal to the firm itself. But then in practice, the relationships that are
- 11:05
- Tracy Alloway: sticky are between an individual lawyer and an individual client. Clients. So when a partner walks away, they walk away with, I don't know, like $300 million worth of business. from a specific client. Why is that a thing? Like, why haven't law firms done more to, I guess, institutionalize some
- 11:22
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): of these?
- 11:23
- Tracy Alloway: Yeah, some of these relationships.
- 11:25
- Joe Weisenthal: Because it's hard
- 11:27
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): is the answer.
- 11:29
- Joe Weisenthal: There's always a tension between law firm management on the one hand and individual partners on the other. The management wants to institutionalize all the clients and make sure that the clients loyalty is to the firm, not the partner. The partner wants to keep the clients individual to the partner so that the partner can leave. And also because under an eat what you kill system, the partner
- 11:49
- Joe Weisenthal: might get credit for bringing the business in,
- 11:51
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): which
- 11:51
- Joe Weisenthal: means that the partner wants to make sure that the relationship is unique to that one partner and not spread across other partners as well. And there's a way in which law firms are undermining their own objectives by. adopting any what you kill system. If you pay partners for tethering their clients' loyalty personally to themselves, that
- 12:11
- Joe Weisenthal: is naturally what they will do.
- 12:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
- 12:14
- Joe Weisenthal: on the other hand, if you don't pay them for doing that, well, then they'll sit back and wait for other people to generate business. It's what in economics we call an optimization problem. You're trading off two variables that are in tension with one another.
- 12:26
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We'll
- 12:26
- Tracy Alloway: get back
- 12:27
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): to the maybe the original sin. It sounds like the original sin for a while, maybe it goes back to 2013 or something. But if we're in the sort of like the final few months of the firm this year, a big rainmaker walks out the door. I'm still
- 12:41
- Tracy Alloway: in the door. Tell me why that's bad for me. Because we're describing, all right, there's this bank run-like pressure, or I think you call it a partner run, but whatever. It's a bank run. run-like pressure. What bad happens for the remaining partners when a rainmaker walks out the door?
- 12:57
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Okay,
- 12:57
- Joe Weisenthal: so let's break it into two pieces. One is how does that partner's departure damage the firm?
- 13:01
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah.
- 13:01
- Joe Weisenthal: And second, how do the other partners get hurt as a result?
- 13:05
- Tracy Alloway: Yeah.
- 13:06
- Joe Weisenthal: Okay, so the first piece is when that partner leaves, especially if that partner's a rainmaker, ringmaker, and especially if that partner's clients are personally loyal to him or her, then that partner will take revenues with her, right? The clients will leave and the firm will have fewer revenues as a result.
- 13:23
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Now
- 13:23
- Joe Weisenthal: that's not obviously bad for the firm, because in addition to losing revenues, it also gets rid of some costs. You no longer have to pay that partner, the partner's compensation. Yeah. And indeed, sometimes law firms deliberately fire or de-equitize partners because the partners are bringing in. less than they're taking out.
- 13:40
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
- 13:40
- Joe Weisenthal: if the partner's bringing in more than they're taking out, then to lose the partner is a loss. Here's the bigger issue, though. You often can't cut costs as quickly as you lose revenues. So when the partner leaves, you still got to pay the lease on that partner's corner office. And you can lay off associates, but that's kind of a bad thing to do. You can lay off staff, but
- 14:00
- Joe Weisenthal: that's a bad thing to do. You might have debts to pay. pensioners and retirees from the firm. You might have bank debts, none of which go away simply because that partner left. There might also be other partners who depend on that partner for work. If I'm an MA partner, for example, I'm expected to bring in business. But if I'm a tax partner, all I really do is work on business brought in by the MA partners.
- 14:20
- Joe Weisenthal: So if the MA guy leaves,
- 14:22
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): well,
- 14:23
- Joe Weisenthal: we still got gotta to pay the tax partners, and now they don't have any business.
- 14:26
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So you
- 14:26
- Joe Weisenthal: can't cut costs as quickly as you can cut revenues.
- 14:29
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 14:29
- Joe Weisenthal: answer to the second piece is a bit more complicated. Why does that hurt the partners who stay? Well, the answer is because the partners are owners of the firm and not merely employees. And that causes them to suffer for two reasons. The first is that as owners of the firm, they are paid in shares of the
- 14:49
- Joe Weisenthal: profits. And so if the revenues have gone down while the costs have stayed fixed, the profits have to go down as well. That's just simple math. Which means that once that rainmaker has left, there are fewer profits left over to pay the partners who remain. Just as a matter of arithmetic, they can't all be paid the same. So their pay has to go down. The second
- 15:09
- Joe Weisenthal: reason they suffer is that if the firm eventually files for bankruptcy, and we'll talk about the snowball or the run that might propel it into a bankruptcy, but if it ever does wind down, the partners can face a bunch of forms of liability that are unique to their status as owners of the firm. The most important is a
- 15:29
- Joe Weisenthal: doctrine called fraudulent transfer liability. The basic intuition behind that doctrine is that we don't want a debtor to give away. assets on the eve of bankruptcy. If I'm about to file for bankruptcy, we don't want me to give away my car and my house to my girlfriend and my uncle. So basic rules of
- 15:49
- Joe Weisenthal: bankruptcy say if you give away money between the period you become insolvent and the period you file for bankruptcy, all of those giveaways can be voided or clawed back by the creditors. And here's the case. catch a distribution on profits is a giveaway under that doctrine
- 16:09
- Joe Weisenthal: because it doesn't actually have to be paid. Right? Wages have to be paid because they're contractual debts. If your administrative assistants have worked for two weeks, they've accrued a debt that they have a right to claim against the firm. By contrast, all the partners are entitled to receive is a discretionary distribution of dividends, which the
- 16:29
- Joe Weisenthal: firm can choose not to pay. So for example, Berkshire Hathaway is sitting on billions of dollars of profits, which it's never paid out as a dividend because it doesn't have to. So what happens in law firm bankruptcies is after the firm goes south,
- 16:44
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
- 16:44
- Joe Weisenthal: creditors show up and say, look, there was a 10-month period during which we consider the firm to have been insolvent, but during which you were making payments to partners. We want to claw that all back. And the partners say, you can't do that. We were workers, those were wages. And the courts say, uh-uh, you were not employees, you were owners of the firm, and those weren't wages. Those were discretionary distributions
- 17:04
- Joe Weisenthal: of profits, which standard law can be clawed back in bankruptcy.
- 17:23
- Tracy Alloway: What's next for virtual assets? I'm Jacob Grease, host of Economy Scale, a series exploring growth in key global sectors. And in this episode, we're diving into the digital forces shaping finance. Sean McHugh from Dubai-based virtual assets registry authority has this decided. to say. We're
- 17:39
- Joe Weisenthal: seeing a lot of institutional players come in, digital asset dedicated hedge funds, high frequency traders, and that sort of thing, and folks who service institutional clients.
- 17:48
- Tracy Alloway: As more capital enters the market, adaptive regulation is likely to become increasingly key.
- 17:57
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): globally would like to
- 17:58
- Joe Weisenthal: keep the industry at arm's length. That's the opposite here. I think also what you'll find is that regulation and frameworks can come out, but some of them are maybe a slight
- 18:07
- Tracy Alloway: iteration on some 80-year-old policy and not actually in line with what the technology can do and offer. And again that's very different in Dubai. Listen to the full episode wherever you get your podcasts. This series is brought to you by Bloomberg Media Studios and the Dubai Department of Economy and Tourism.
- 18:24
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- 18:25
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- 18:26
- Tracy Alloway: take it
- 18:27
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- 18:42
- Joe Weisenthal: I want
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- 18:43
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- 18:54
- Joe Weisenthal: So the more a partner thinks that a firm might be heading for failure, the more risk there is that their compensation could be clawed back and that they could be liable for some parts of the business if it actually fails completely. But let's go like one step back and talk to us about what happens in a partner's
- 19:14
- Joe Weisenthal: mind. when they see another high profile partner leave the firm. What are the sort of cost benefit calculations that they're doing in their heads where they're thinking like, oh, this guy's getting a lot of money to go to a competitor. Maybe I should be thinking about doing the same thing. But on the other hand, maybe I really like my firm. Maybe I really
- 19:34
- Joe Weisenthal: enjoy working in the structured finance unit of Alan and Overy or I d I don't know what. What are the sort of thoughts going through their heads?
- 19:41
- Tracy Alloway: So this is what I call the leave stay decision. You might not wake up as a law firm partner on a Wednesday morning and think, should I stay or should I go? But implicitly, you face that decision every day.
- 19:54
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 19:55
- Tracy Alloway: so you're going to walk through three kinds of calculus. The first is to say, well, because that guy left and took revenues. with him and the costs of the firm are going to stay the same, we in the aggregate, me and my other partners, have to be paid less as a result. So I'm going to get paid less. But the amount I can get paid by moving
- 20:15
- Tracy Alloway: across the street to Kravath is going to stay the same. So whereas previously I was making $5 million at Weil while and being offered $4 million at Kravath, if now I'm making $3.9 at Weil, While, suddenly I might be content. begin to move.
- 20:27
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 20:28
- Tracy Alloway: second thing I'll ask myself is, well, what about my liabilities? And I'll be saying, hmm,
- 20:33
- Tracy Alloway: if everybody follows the same logic I'm following, they might leave before me. And then one guy leaves and another guy leaves, and all of a sudden we're in a run on the bank. And if the firm ultimately collapses, I'm gonna going to have to give back all or a portion of the money I received receive from the firm between now and the date of collapse. So suppose that I'm a partner
- 20:53
- Tracy Alloway: while Godshaw in this past September, and I think most of my compensation is going to be paid to me in January. This is a typical feature of law firm compensation. Partners get paid a little bit every month or every quarter, and then they get paid a big chunk, maybe 50% or more of their compensation in January after the books for the prior year have been saddled. And you say, okay, it's September.
- 21:13
- Tracy Alloway: I think there's a 50%. chance this firm is gone in February. If it is, every dollar of compensation I receive between now and February is going to get taken back from me. So if I'm expecting $2 million in compensation over that period, I have to apply a 50% discount. It's really only worth a million to me. So then if Gibson
- 21:33
- Tracy Alloway: Dunn comes and offers me $1.5 million, it looks on paper like a pay cut, because why Weil's offering me two, but in fact it's a pay raise because the expected value of Compet Weil is a million, whereas at Gibson it's 1.5 and it's also less risky.
- 21:49
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 21:50
- Tracy Alloway: third calculus I'll be making is what about the viability of my practice? So most law firms now, including Weill, have eat what you kill compensation systems. You get paid according to your productivity. Well, if I'm a tax lawyer and I'm in the business of servicing MA deals brought in by MA lawyers, then if all the MA lawyers have left, I'm not going to look even to my
- 22:10
- Tracy Alloway: own firm's managing partners as if I'm very productive. In other words, my own practice might become unsustainable. So as each partner leaves, the predicament of the remaining partners gets worse and worse in a spiraling cycle that becomes a kind of run on the bank. That was excellent. And I love this idea of like,
- 22:29
- Tracy Alloway: even though the lawyer doesn't think so, actually, in reality, every day they do wake up in the morning and make a decision whether they're going to leave or stay. Hard not to be reminded of the great 1882 essay Say What is a Nation by the French philosopher Ernest Renan, where he called a nation
- 22:49
- Tracy Alloway: a daily referendum. And even though we don't vote every single day implicitly as citizens of a nation, we all decide every single day whether we want to continue on together as a nation. All right, let's try to talk more about why and the original sin here and why certain rainmakers
- 23:09
- Tracy Alloway: perceived opportunities elsewhere. Is there an equivalent term like Wall Street? for the legal
- 23:15
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): field?
- 23:16
- Joe Weisenthal: Magic circle.
- 23:17
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Is
- 23:17
- Tracy Alloway: there like
- 23:19
- Tracy Alloway: is there like a term that's sort of like a uh what's it like a anyway, whatever. Elsewhere in the legal field. Listeners to the Oddlots podcast know that a lot of money was made over the last several years and things like private credit, private equity,
- 23:33
- Joe Weisenthal: et
- 23:33
- Tracy Alloway: cetera, all kinds of deal
- 23:34
- Joe Weisenthal: making. And everything I read seems to point to some like fateful early decisions. in like 2013 coming out of the great financial crisis, where Wiles sort of like they sort of missed the boat on that. Is do you agree with that characterization?
- 23:47
- Tracy Alloway: I do. And I want to be clear. I don't have any inside knowledge about what I'm
- 23:51
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): saying. No, sure, sure.
- 23:52
- Tracy Alloway: I'm just um speaking based on what I've read in news reports. But
- 23:55
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in
- 23:55
- Joe Weisenthal: terms of the news reports in your framework.
- 23:57
- Tracy Alloway: Yeah. I think one of the things that people found especially striking and prescient. about my framework, if I can be a little bit immodest for a moment, I specifically predicted that a firm could collapse even when it had no meaningful debts, and even when its profits were not just large, but increasing.
- 24:17
- Tracy Alloway: A firm can collapse basically whenever its profits are not increasing as quickly as its peers. In other words, what I call its relevance. relative profitability is decreasing. And that was unambiguously true of Weill. Weill's position in the profits per partner ranking fell from nine in
- 24:37
- Tracy Alloway: 2020 to I think 20 in 2025. And I think that the fall was even starker if we go back further in history. So why did We Weil fall relative to its peers? And I want to be clear: its profits were still increasing, yeah. year over year, just not as quickly as Kirkland analysis. So why did Weil's profitability falter
- 24:57
- Tracy Alloway: relative to its peers? I think the answer basically is that it didn't expand and it didn't shrink. Law is big law. That's the term that we'll use. Big law is in the midst of this sorting that actually resembles the sorting we've seen in many other industries, where the middle is getting hollowed out. and you're seeing this
- 25:16
- Tracy Alloway: gravitation towards either becoming humongous or becoming really small. And while was uncomfortably in the middle. And that was a deliberate choice. My understanding is that there was a very powerful rainmaker there named Micah Mike Aiello, Yello, whose departure in September was kind of the
- 25:36
- Tracy Alloway: final straw that really to mix metaphors. here, pushed things over the edge. Aiello, understandably, in my opinion, wanted to work at a place that wasn't gigantic. He thought, you know, he was a little bit wistful, like Lloyd Blankfein, about the kind of smaller familial feel of the old while Gotchal.
- 25:57
- Tracy Alloway: Which is why, by the way, the firm he left for was Cravath, Kravath, which still has that feel. But the problem was that Weill wasn't keeping pace with its competitors. And clients increasingly want firms that can offer a very large platform with a high degree of specialization. And that's something you can
- 26:17
- Tracy Alloway: do if you're like Kirk Lynn and Ellison, you're really gigantic. It's much harder to do on a smaller platform. There's only a couple of law firms that manage to stay small in the corporate transaction. transactional space and do really well. Basically, it's Wachtel and Kravath. But even those firms have been struggling. They've made it work by
- 26:36
- Tracy Alloway: doing only very, very premium work on super duper high-end stuff like public company MA. But even those firms are experiencing a bunch of poaching. They are under profound pressure. And Weil just was not strong enough to withstand that.
- 26:49
- Joe Weisenthal: Yeah, we've seen a similar dynamic. in banking as
- 26:52
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): well,
- 26:52
- Joe Weisenthal: right? Where clients want, like they want the treasury functions.
- 26:55
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): They
- 26:56
- Joe Weisenthal: want corporate MA and everything basically offered on a single platform. A lot of people will be listening to this and thinking, well, if so much of the business depends on single individuals or personalities or rainmakers, why don't law firms have non computer? non-competes that
- 27:15
- Joe Weisenthal: prevent them from, you know, just automatically leaving the firm and taking all their clients with them? What's the answer to that question?
- 27:23
- Tracy Alloway: The answer is Rule 5.6 of the model rules of professional conduct, which prohibit a lawyer from signing any agreement that would restrict their right to practice. So that includes non-competes and similar kinds of agreements. Now to be clear, other countries don't have these rules. In the United Kingdom, lawyers are
- 27:42
- Tracy Alloway: free to sign noncompete agreements, and law firms generally require that they do. And my understanding is that they are frequently enforced. Those restrictions also don't appear in other industries. You can impose those kinds of restrictions in accounting, in engineering, in management consulting. Thing. I would say, by the way, Joe, so you'd asked earlier what is preventing investors from
- 28:03
- Tracy Alloway: owning law firms. Well, one answer, and the most commonly given answer, is the one that I gave a moment ago, which is the rules limiting investor ownership. But another and perhaps more important answer is these rules prohibiting non-competes. And the reason is this: if you're a private equity fund looking at investing in a law firm, you're going to pay all these partners a bunch of cash to buy out their equity interests. And then
- 28:23
- Tracy Alloway: what are they going to do? They can leave the next day.
- 28:26
- Tracy Alloway: And you can't force them to sign an agreement committing not to leave. So the best solution you have is to give them equity in the MSO and require them to forfeit that if they leave, because that's not a restriction on the lawyer's right to practice. That's a forfeiture condition on an equity stake in an unrelated business, in like a distinct
- 28:46
- Tracy Alloway: business. It works pretty well, but whether it works well enough is going to be one of the central questions of the new private equity boom in law firms.
- 28:55
- Joe Weisenthal: Okay. While it didn't grow as fast, it wasn't aggressive enough, et cetera.
- 29:01
- Tracy Alloway: Maybe it was a little bit too conservative going back a couple of decades. Couldn't that have been rational from the perspective of senior lawyers at the time some of these decisions, maybe some of whom have retired. by now. So it's like we go back to like 2010. They're like, you know what, we don't need to like go super crazy on the
- 29:21
- Tracy Alloway: private equity, private credit deal making stuff. We think, and you know what, we're gonna like trim some of our ranks and so forth. And maybe that set the seeds for the uh destruction in 2026. But if I'm maybe they retired in 2021, that seems like a big, especially now, again, like thinking about. future investment or
- 29:40
- Tracy Alloway: AI, et cetera, this sort of like intertemporal relationship of the lawyers and how long they're gonna actually stay there and how much they care about what the firm is gonna look like in 20 years.
- 29:51
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah. So
- 29:52
- Joe Weisenthal: look, it's hard to know the future. Law firms
- 29:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): face
- 29:55
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
- 29:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): same uncertainty in
- 29:56
- Tracy Alloway: business decision making
- 29:57
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that but every other kind of business
- 29:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): does. And
- 29:59
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): let me say there's
- 29:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): lots of firms that
- 30:00
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): took
- 30:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the path that Weil took.
- 30:03
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): but
- 30:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): most of them have since changed course. A good example is Cad Wallader.
- 30:09
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Okay.
- 30:09
- Tracy Alloway: Cad Walleter
- 30:10
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): is a the full name
- 30:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): of Cad Walleter was Cad Walleter, Wickersham, and Taft. Taft being the former president and Chief Justice of the United States. It
- 30:17
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): was a very,
- 30:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): very prestigious
- 30:18
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and Yale
- 30:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): law professor, I
- 30:19
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): might add. Very, very
- 30:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): prestigious firm that was for a time
- 30:22
- Tracy Alloway: extremely profitable. But like Weill, Weil, it didn't grow and it eventually. very recently, had to find refuge in a merger with a much less prestigious firm, Hogan Lovells. Apologies to all the people at Cadwalleter and Hogan, but um Hogan doesn't have the history that Cadwalleter had. And so, so
- 30:41
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
- 30:42
- Tracy Alloway: point is to say Weill was not crazy in pursuing the strategy. However, it was crazy in and hanging on to it for a little too long. But you asked a deeper question, Joe, also. which was:
- 30:52
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): are
- 30:52
- Tracy Alloway: the partners of the present or past willing to invest for the future? Yeah. And the answer is, well, not necessarily. So I'm working on a new project that I recently put online about a concept that I call generational conflict. Generational conflict is a problem in many kinds of businesses that don't have what
- 31:12
- Tracy Alloway: I call permanent equity.
- 31:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 31:14
- Tracy Alloway: let's imagine General Motors or
- 31:16
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Microsoft. When you buy a share of stock in General Motors or Microsoft, it lasts forever. It lasts as long as the firm does. And so even if I'm going to sell my shares in Microsoft next week, I'm still happy for Microsoft to incur costs today in order to build technology that will yield profits 10 years from now, because the price at
- 31:36
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): which I sell next week will reflect. the buyer's expectations about what will happen 10 years from now.
- 31:42
- Tracy Alloway: The
- 31:43
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): share lasts
- 31:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): indefinitely,
- 31:44
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
- 31:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): therefore prices paid in a market for those shares will reflect the value of the indefinite future. Well, not so in a law firm.
- 31:52
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): When
- 31:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I retire from a law firm, whether that's Crevath
- 31:55
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): or
- 31:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Covington and Burling, my shares simply disappear. They're extinguished. Nobody buys them back from me. They're just gone.
- 32:02
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And so if
- 32:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I'm a 31 year old partner and you're a 61 year old partner,
- 32:07
- Tracy Alloway: I'm
- 32:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): going to be a lot more interested in the future of the firm than
- 32:11
- Tracy Alloway: you are. And there's not really an elegant way to get you to care about the future because when you retire two years from now, the value of any investment you made in the firm is going to be gone.
- 32:22
- Joe Weisenthal: This also goes back to partner incentives, right? Where if all of their compensation is based on bringing in clients and none of it is based on nurturing the next generation of talent, like no one
- 32:33
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): is
- 32:34
- Joe Weisenthal: actually going to be paying attention to that. Like there are some great lawyers, senior lawyers out there who will mentor junior associates, but they seem to be few and far between.
- 32:45
- Tracy Alloway: That's right. So this problem of generational conflict, it's not just between the old and the young, it's also between the people. who are here now and will also be here tomorrow and the people who are here now but might leave tomorrow. And you know, as the pace of lateral movement has picked up, the generational conflict between present and future has become
- 33:05
- Tracy Alloway: much more intense. And it feeds back into everything that happens at a firm, including compensation. If I can leave it at any time, it's hard to pay me anything other than my market value. So again, turning to Wachtel and Kravath, they both had lockstep
- 33:25
- Tracy Alloway: compensation periods for a long time. And under a lockstep system, lawyers get paid the same based on their seniority rather than their productivity. Well, a system like that creates winners and losers. And the losers, the people who are getting underpaid, are likely to leave. And so the pressure of lateral movement basically forces the firm into an eat what you
- 33:45
- Tracy Alloway: kill system. An even broader way to think about it, to return to your analogy about nations, Joe, is to say it really is like nations where people can come in and out as well. If you overtax billionaires in California, for example, they will leave. And if you pay really
- 34:04
- Tracy Alloway: generous healthcare subsidies and poverty-related transfers, a lot of people who are in need of that assistance will come in. And you get the same thing in law firms, right? If you make transfers from the successful partners to the less successful ones, you'll get fewer successful partners and
- 34:24
- Tracy Alloway: more unsuccessful ones.
- 34:26
- Joe Weisenthal: We've talked about this briefly on a couple of episodes in the past, but since we're talking about it again now, this whole thing of like big star lateral hires where like one firm spends a lot of money to poach a rainmaker from This is a fairly new thing. Like right in the history of sort of big law, this is a relatively recent phenomenon.
- 34:45
- Tracy Alloway: It is. I mean it's really
- 34:46
- Joe Weisenthal: Is this a norms thing? Like was it just not the norm that this was done? and then someone broke the norm? Like, what is it now such that this has become a more prevalent phenomenon than it used to be?
- 35:00
- Tracy Alloway: It's a hard question to answer convincingly because I think ultimately it was a norms thing. There was no hard obstacle to it. Yeah. There was nothing in 1975 preventing a partner from leaving Kravath and moving to Kirkland and Ellis. There's nothing preventing that. And yet they just didn't do it. They just didn't do it until really the last 20 years. And that
- 35:20
- Tracy Alloway: with every passing year, the volume of lateral partner movement increases. I mean, the firm that really started the action was Kirkland and Ellis. They were the first ones to do this kind of poaching at a really large scale, and they did it very well. I should say there are substantial business risks to doing that kind of
- 35:38
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): thing.
- 35:39
- Tracy Alloway: poaching. Okay. When you interview a lawyer to move to your firm, you ask the lawyer how much business she has, and she's going to say, Oh, I generate a gazillion dollars a year. But both professional ethics rules and that lawyer's fiduciary duties to their current firm prevent them from actually talking to
- 35:59
- Tracy Alloway: their clients and asking if they'll be willing to move. Also, if the lawyer's current firm found out that they were shopping around, that lawyer might get fired. So you basically don't know. The lawyer says I'm bringing in X amount, but you don't really know. And I think for a long time people were just skittish about hiring under those
- 36:18
- Tracy Alloway: conditions. But people have overcome their fears Interferes and they're now willing to make big bets. On the norms question, let me just say one other thing, which is that I really feel like law firms are kind of a microcosm of modernity. You know, they really are like nations in the sense that they have one person, one vote rules. They have systems of
- 36:38
- Tracy Alloway: redistribution. People relate to them in a variety of ways. They want not just money, but also satisfying Fying social lives, a nice working space, right? They have multiplicitous demands of this organization they relate to. People are conflicted in how they vote to it. They're voting on their own compensation, in a sense, in the same way that we vote on our own tax
- 36:58
- Tracy Alloway: rates implicitly by electing the people who will establish them. So a lot of the problems of public governance also creep into law firm governance and replicate themselves in weird ways. And so what I would say about norms is just that in the same way, all of human life has become more calculated.
- 37:15
- Tracy Alloway: more self-interest seeking, more formal, and more commercial, less familial, less communal, less traditional. That's happened at law firms. And so, like, you know, at Cravat, there used to be, I don't know if there still is this tradition wherein the partners of Kravath Math would be the pallbearers at a partner's
- 37:35
- Tracy Alloway: future funeral. You know, like a an illustrative example. of like the tradition that attached to these organizations. But like that's all fading away. And when it does, people act on the basis of self-interest seeking and money. There's nothing wrong with that. It's just a very modern way of thinking about human relations.
- 37:52
- Joe Weisenthal: Joe doesn't like the term peak capitalism, but it's very peak capitalism. Come on.
- 37:58
- Tracy Alloway: If The peak could get higher still.
- 37:59
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): than the case,
- 38:00
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): That's right.
- 38:00
- Joe Weisenthal: That's it's true. It's true.
- 38:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I'll take it.
- 38:21
- Joe Weisenthal: No, we're good.
- 38:22
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- 38:36
- Tracy Alloway: I want that.
- 38:37
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- 38:48
- Joe Weisenthal: Hi, I'm Carol Masser with a help. helpful tip to keep you plugged in throughout the market day. Subscribe to the Stock Movers Report from Bloomberg. These are short audio episodes, five minutes or less, delivered right to your podcast feed. Stock Movers fills you in on the day's winners and losers on Wall Street and tells you about the news and data that's driving those gains and losses. Why
- 39:08
- Joe Weisenthal: spend all day watching tickers scroll across your screen? Subscribe to Stock Movers today, an Apple on Spotify. or anywhere else you listen.
- 39:18
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 39:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): just want to go back to the sort of classic theory of ownership stuff. And I mentioned in the beginning, we do have some
- 39:26
- Joe Weisenthal: investor-owned law firms. And there's a famous example that you talk about in your paper,
- 39:32
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): an
- 39:32
- Joe Weisenthal: investor-owned Owned law firm that came very, very close to collapse. But because they didn't have the partner, partnership model, they ended up being able to restructure and sort of emerge from the bankruptcy process more or less in one piece. Can you talk about how that difference in ownership structure actually played in that example?
- 39:51
- Tracy Alloway: Yeah. So the firm was called Slater and Gordon. It was a conventional partner-owned law firm in Australia that went public and listed on a stock exchange when Australia changed its rules about lawyer ownership. back in the 90s. And after going public in Australia, it used the capital it raised to acquire other firms in both Australia
- 40:11
- Tracy Alloway: and the UK, and it eventually listed in the UK as well. So it was basically just an investor-owned business.
- 40:18
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 40:18
- Tracy Alloway: it had so much capital and so much ability to raise it that it eventually did kind of add-on add on acquisitions of related businesses that weren't law firms. and acquired a business called, if I remember correctly, Quindell,
- 40:31
- Tracy Alloway: which was a medical services firm as well as a legal services firm for people who'd been in car accidents. The idea was somebody gets in a car accident will represent you as a lawyer and treat your whiplash. Well, Quindell, it it turned out, was just a fraud. The The accounting, the books had been cooked. I'm shocked. Shocked.
- 40:50
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 40:51
- Tracy Alloway: Slater and Gordon realizes that it's massively overpaid for this asset that now turns out to be worth a fraction of its accounting value. So it was just insolvent in the same way an auto parts manufacturer would be insolvent if it made a bad acquisition. All right. So what happened was the firm went to the hedge funds that
- 41:10
- Tracy Alloway: had lent it money. It went to the banks that lent it money and said, we got to do a workout. They wiped away the equity. They turned the junior debt into equity. They split the business between its Australian and UK pieces, and they kept operating. And the question is, and it's they're still in, they're both still in business today. Why didn't that
- 41:30
- Tracy Alloway: collapse in the way the Wild Godshaw collapsed? Well, the answer is because the lawyers weren't owners of the firm. Their pay did not decline. when the business became less profitable. They didn't face any risk of liability. They were like the pilots at Delta Airlines or the factory workers at General Motors, both of whom continued working for those businesses when they went bankrupt
- 41:50
- Tracy Alloway: because they continued to get paid. The key difference in an investor owned firm is that investors can't pull back their money. Right? In an investor owned firm, you can sell your shares, but you can't take back the chunk. of the company's assets that correspond to your interest. So Slater and Gordon was able to say to its equity holders, you're wiped out, go
- 42:10
- Tracy Alloway: away. And they just did, but the money stayed inside the firm. Now imagine if Weil Gottshaw tried that. Imagine if it said to the equity holders, You're wiped out. The With creditors of the firm now own the firm. What would those equity holders do? They would go to Kravath. Yeah. Because they're partners of the firm and they can. could just walk away.
- 42:27
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 42:27
- Joe Weisenthal: wait, what happened? So actually, just for including me, like in the last several weeks, so the company collapses. Is there something called while still? What does the wind down look like? Is there a last lawyer who leaves? Like someone who has to turn, you know, someone's got to be the last lawyer to like find a job somewhere else. How does it actually what's the
- 42:47
- Joe Weisenthal: actual goodnight good night process?
- 42:49
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It's
- 42:49
- Tracy Alloway: gonna be fascinating to watch this. all unfold. So let me first of all say I think that that, not surprisingly, for a firm that does bankruptcy for a living, Wiles actually handled the wind down remarkably well. You know, the best decision they made was to wind the thing down quickly. Remember fraudulent transfer liability. Fraudulent transfer liability commences the moment the firm becomes insolvent and it ends the moment the firm
- 43:09
- Tracy Alloway: winds up. And it's really hard to say when a law firm becomes insolvent. not least because they have very few debts. But in many other collapsed firms, that period has lasted six months, eight months. At Dewey and LaBeouf, it was something like eight or nine months. And so by calling an end quickly, Weill
- 43:29
- Tracy Alloway: basically avoided a bunch of fraudulent transfer liability for its partners.
- 43:34
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 43:35
- Tracy Alloway: what they're doing now is winding up the firm. There's a few lawyers still left at the firm. They need a place to continue representing their clients. Their clients have ongoing needs that need to be serviced. And to the extent people still at Weill are continuing to represent clients, the fees for those representations are all going
- 43:55
- Tracy Alloway: to go into Weil. But all of the cash, including the fees that are brought in over the next few months, all of that's going to get eaten. up by creditors. Now, Weil didn't have a lot of financial debts. That is to say, he didn't have bank borrowings, but it still has lots of creditors who have claims on the firm. The biggest category by far is going to be the landlords. Now,
- 44:15
- Tracy Alloway: people often say, well, you know, landlords' rent doesn't account for that big of a law of a chunk of law firm's revenues. That's true month to month. But if there's 10 years outstanding on that lease on the general mobile, Motors Building on Fifth Avenue and 59th Street, the landlord can probably make a claim for all 10 years of it today. Well, that's going to be more than enough to
- 44:35
- Tracy Alloway: eat up whatever cash is left inside that firm. So even though the partners at Weill are not gonna face a bunch of liability, things are not gonna Going be to happy for them. Law firm partner compensation is ordinarily spread. out unevenly across the year. Every month or every
- 44:55
- Tracy Alloway: quarter, they'll get paid a little bit of money. But then they'll get a big chunk amounting to like 50 or 60 percent of their total annual compensation around mid-January when the books for the prior year have been settled. What this means, in effect, is that the partners at Wild Godshell Godshaw worked for 10 months out of the year.
- 45:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
- 45:14
- Tracy Alloway: they're never going to see the 50% of their compensation for that period that would have been paid to them in January. That's all going to get eaten up by creditors. So it's kind of sad for the partners at Wild Godshaw.
- 45:26
- Joe Weisenthal: Yeah, it's a rough year.
- 45:27
- Tracy Alloway: I genuinely feel bad for them. A big question is whether the firm's going to file for bankruptcy. They've said they don't intend to, and I think they probably won't have to.
- 45:37
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 45:37
- Tracy Alloway: reason is that bankruptcy. is fundamentally a solution to a collective action problem. You have a lot of creditors who need to work together to recover on the debts, and you need one person who can represent them.
- 45:52
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 45:52
- Tracy Alloway: collective action problem at Weil Gottshaw is not going to be as acute as it was at many other law firms, such as Dewey and LaBeouf, for example. Because, first off, there aren't going to be many creditors. There'll be a few landlords, basically. And there aren't going to be that many debts for it to collect upon because
- 46:12
- Tracy Alloway: the partners aren't likely to be liable. Like in Dewey, you needed a bankruptcy to trustee to go out and sue each one of the partners. And famously, there were a few partners at Dewey who declared personal bankruptcy as a result of those liabilities. But we don't need anyone to do that process of collecting. collection at Wild Gotcha because the partners aren't going to be liable.
- 46:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, we're recording this on November 10th, and there's a news story just across the Bloomberg now saying that
- 46:35
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
- 46:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Wild partners have voted to dissolve the firm and they've named their wind-down committee. So I guess they'll be making
- 46:41
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): some decisions soon.
- 46:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): But I hadn't realized this, but like the ultimate injury added to insult, the the woman who was going to lead the firm as executive partner, Ramona Knee, I didn't realize she's been hired by Kirkland Ellis.
- 46:57
- Tracy Alloway: Yeah.
- 46:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): So she said she didn't want to become she didn't want to take on the executive partnership and things kind of spiraled from there.
- 47:03
- Tracy Alloway: You know, I have to say the moment that I thought, wow, the end is near for Wild Gotcha. I knew that they were in trouble for since midsummer basically. But the moment when I thought it's inevitable, it was when I found out. that Ramona Knee was not going to be the chair of the firm, and that there was a debate about whether she had known that for several months before disclosing it to the rest of
- 47:23
- Tracy Alloway: the partners. You know, a law firm collapse is kind of like a bank run. It's a crisis of confidence. Franklin Delano Roosevelt said, we have nothing to fear but fear itself. And what he meant was the fear that propels bank runs is itself a thing to fear. And I think
- 47:38
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a
- 47:38
- Tracy Alloway: big part of Weil's problems, which I didn't describe earlier, is that in addition to having unfavorable economics, it had by all accounts a pretty toxic governance culture. And when Ramona knee, when that news about her came out, I thought whatever faith was left in the management of this firm is going to be gone. And people are not going to have any reason to stay other
- 47:58
- Tracy Alloway: than money.
- 47:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Well, can you talk a little bit more about that? Because when I think about law firms, again, much like banks, all of these companies or partnerships, they like to talk about the importance of culture and
- 48:09
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): putting the client
- 48:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): first, and we're all one big family.
- 48:13
- Tracy Alloway: But
- 48:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): then when you look at what's been going on recently with some of these lateral hires, uh with the way some partners treat junior associates and stuff like that, it is there culture left at a lot of these. firms?
- 48:27
- Tracy Alloway: Less and less. Less and less. I mean, again, law firms are microcosms of modernity, right? There's a loneliness crisis for a reason. We all love to talk about how much we value our families, and yet we so often move away from them. We have fewer children. We have less close relationships with our siblings and our parents. And yeah, I think law firms are finding it harder and harder and
- 48:47
- Tracy Alloway: harder to sustain. The way I think about it is that fast. families are places of what my Yale University sociology colleague Nick Chrystakis calls mild hierarchy. He describes mild hierarchy as the default mode of organization in every small to medium-sized group of human beings. Well, that's what
- 49:07
- Tracy Alloway: feels like a family. Like dad and mom are sort of in charge, but like, you know, eventually the kids will take care of them and they sort of have obligations. to the kids. Law firms could feel like that in the days of lockstep compensation. But like now that you can fire brother, and now that sister can
- 49:27
- Tracy Alloway: leave, it feels less like a family. Or maybe in some weird way it feels more like a family now that there's all these news stories about children cutting off their parents, right? It's it's it's like
- 49:37
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a
- 49:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): traditional family.
- 49:38
- Joe Weisenthal: it's
- 49:38
- Tracy Alloway: a modern family, is
- 49:40
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): what it is, which is
- 49:41
- Tracy Alloway: a very disconnected one. Yeah.
- 49:43
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): This
- 49:43
- Joe Weisenthal: is a very deep uh conversation. Did you mention and I and I've heard about and maybe we'll do an episode at some point about some of these like AI native law firms. And I know there are some efforts, um, like you mentioned Arizona, where there may be Maybe like an investor bank, bag, like people are trying different models and so forth. And actually speaking of
- 50:03
- Joe Weisenthal: Kirk Lonellus and AI, there was a story earlier this year, like they're gonna build their own AI model, et cetera, and have their own fine-tuned model on house. I'm just curious from your perspective, from this sort of the generational warfare framework that you characterize, AI, et cetera, like, can you give us some thoughts on like whether you
- 50:23
- Joe Weisenthal: think that for some of these big legacy firms?
- 50:27
- Joe Weisenthal: they're going to successfully make investments that will just like sort of kind of come out of the senior partner's pocket in a way. They might never they might not be l long around long enough to see the fruits and actually like sort of like navigate a transition to some meaningfully different type of economics.
- 50:47
- Tracy Alloway: So if you believe my story about general conflict, you would predict as I do.
- 50:51
- Tracy Alloway: that although AI will transform the practice of law, very little AI technology will be developed by law firms. Because it's really hard for the partners of today to incur a big expense for the benefit of the partners of five years from now, because the partners of today and the partners of five years from now will be different. People will enter, people will
- 51:11
- Tracy Alloway: exit. Okay, but that doesn't mean that law firms never invest at all. They invest in branding, they invest in the training of associates, they invest in the renovation of office space. They've always made investments, just not really big ones. And I predict that's how investment in AI will unfold. They will make investments, just not really big
- 51:31
- Tracy Alloway: ones.
- 51:31
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A
- 51:32
- Tracy Alloway: nice illustration is: law firms renovate office space, they don't buy office space. Law firms will renovate AI. They won't buy or develop AI. They will rent it. They'll pay licensing fees to third-party providers. Now, let's talk about Kirkland and Latham, both of which have announced
- 51:52
- Tracy Alloway: large investments in AI technology. Why are they able to do this? First off, the investments aren't that big in the scheme of those firms' revenues. I'm shooting from the hip here a little bit, but it's no accident that those two firms are the largest law firms by revenue in the world, because they're the ones that can handle a big
- 52:11
- Tracy Alloway: investment. So Kirkland's revenues are something like 10 billion a year. And they are, they've announced that they're going to make a $500 million investment over a period of five years. Well, if we assume Kirkland continues the same growth trajectory. of revenue growth that it's been on, over those five years, it'll probably earn something
- 52:31
- Tracy Alloway: like $80 million. Well, $500 million in a context of $80 billion is not that much. Like the partners might just shrug and say, yeah, okay, fine, you're taking 1% of my compensation to benefit the partners of five years from now. That's okay, especially because a lot of those partners will be partners five years from now. The other thing is they're pacing it. over
- 52:51
- Tracy Alloway: five years so that they can align the incurring of an expense with the earning of the revenue, right? As they develop this technology, it will bring in more revenue and they will pace the development of the technology to coincide with the earning of the revenue. The other
- 53:11
- Tracy Alloway: thing I would say about it is, and apologies to the Kirkland. and Ellis people listening to this podcast, they say it's going to be $500 million. Who's keeping track? Like, what is the AI investment? I don't really know. They have an incentive to expansively characterize a lot of what they do as an AI investment. So
- 53:31
- Tracy Alloway: the bottom line is, it's a relatively modest investment spread out over a long period of time that will coincide. with the earning of revenues.
- 53:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, it's not like their outside shareholders are gonna
- 53:42
- Joe Weisenthal: call them
- 53:43
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): up
- 53:43
- Joe Weisenthal: on
- 53:43
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it and be like, you
- 53:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): said 500 million.
- 53:45
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Okay,
- 53:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): so just to wrap all of this up, a lot of people will hear us talking about the sudden collapse of a large law firm and think, okay, so what? Poor lawyers, right? Like the last thing the world needs is another law firm. Why should people care about this? particular topic? The frailties of the big law
- 54:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): business model.
- 54:07
- Tracy Alloway: Well, let me first explain why people do care. It's the wreck on the side of the road. You can't look away. Um
- 54:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): other than Schadenfreude.
- 54:16
- Joe Weisenthal: Or just or just n rubbernecking.
- 54:18
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah, okay. Yeah, rubber
- 54:19
- Joe Weisenthal: necking.
- 54:19
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 54:19
- Joe Weisenthal: don't know.
- 54:20
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Schaden Freud. That's true.
- 54:21
- Joe Weisenthal: That's
- 54:22
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): true. But for lawyers, there's a lot of shock from it.
- 54:25
- Joe Weisenthal: Yeah, yeah.
- 54:26
- Tracy Alloway: Let's ask why people. people should care. Yeah. Okay. I think there's a few reasons. One is it has happened to many other firms. We haven't talked about this, but this has happened to dozens of firms. In my paper, I studied three dozen firms. In the years since I published the paper, there's been more. Bingham McCutcheon, Struck and Strucken Levan. There will be more. I promise you, there will be more. The other is
- 54:46
- Tracy Alloway: that what's happening at law firms is diagnostic of what's happening in the legal industry generally. It's tremendous pressure on profitability, such that if you don't keep up, you're in the doghouse. Huge amounts of lateral partner movement. Also, law firms as microcosms of modernity. I also think that what happens in law firms is consistent
- 55:06
- Tracy Alloway: with what happens in other kinds of what I call impermanent Permanent equity businesses. So there's lots of businesses where equity interests don't last forever, mutual funds and hedge funds, when you redeem, your interest terminates. Mutual insurance companies, which are sort of owned by their policy holders, if you stop renewing your policy, you're no longer an equity holder. They
- 55:25
- Tracy Alloway: experience some of the same problems as law firms. Hedge funds, for example, are famously vulnerable to runs, just like Wild Gotcha. So I study organizations broadly. I write about investment funds, about law firms. about marriage even, and I find law firms an interesting laboratory in which to
- 55:45
- Tracy Alloway: study themes in organization. Maybe here's the biggest one of all. The central ideological study struggle of the Cold War between the United States and Soviet Union was whether the means of production would be owned by investors, that is to say, capitalists, or by workers. And what law firms illustrate is some of
- 56:05
- Tracy Alloway: the perils
- 56:07
- Tracy Alloway: and promise of worker ownership. It's the path not taken by industry more generally.
- 56:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): All right. John Morley, thank you so much for coming on Autalx. Really appreciate it.
- 56:18
- Tracy Alloway: Truly a pleasure.
- 56:31
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So,
- 56:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Joe, I thought that was an absolutely fascinating conversation. And I I do feel like I need to emphasize just how prescient John's paper actually was. If you read it now, it's
- 56:43
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): sort of
- 56:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): line by line what seems to have happened at Wild Gotchol. I do think the question of how to institutionalize. some of those client relationships at law firms is a fascinating one. And we like to say on the show that incentives
- 56:58
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): matter, right?
- 56:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And it just seems really hard to get partners to sort of release their death grip on the big clients if the thing they're paid for is bringing that relationship in.
- 57:09
- Joe Weisenthal: These are definitely some of my favorite conversations that we have, like corporate structure conversations.
- 57:15
- Joe Weisenthal: Um, because again, it's, you know, there are versions of this that we could have talking about multi-strategy hedge funds, et cetera. And the degree to which there and you know, I'm thinking also back to some of our conversations with Scott Bach at Greenhill about investment banking, and the degree to which there is such thing as like franchise value beyond what
- 57:36
- Joe Weisenthal: the Rainmaker brings in and so forth. But as you say, the prescience of his paper is that you could have a company that is growing, that is not spiraling in any business sense whatsoever, that is actually improving profit every single year. But because they're not improving
- 57:55
- Joe Weisenthal: as fast as their neighbor, that is still like
- 57:58
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): this is also peak
- 57:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): capitalism stuff, right? Where like the only thing that matters is the relative. gains,
- 58:03
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): not the
- 58:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): absolute gains.
- 58:05
- Joe Weisenthal: Yeah. I really am a sucker for all of that. Like this is the crisis of modernity stuff. You know, they're trying to no but like the idea that, like, okay, you go back like a hundred years or I don't know, a hundred years, fifty years, whatever, and maybe there was such a thing as like a law firm culture or a family or whatever. And these things like,
- 58:25
- Joe Weisenthal: you know, when maybe give me some perspective, like when someone Lloyd like Lloyd Blankfein is sad about the depart.
- 58:33
- Joe Weisenthal: No, like when he's sad about the end of the partnership model, is he really sad about the end of the partnership model? Or is he really sad about just like when it was a smaller organization that felt more like a family and a club than a big company? Because we are that's like, you know what I'm saying? It's like you get sad, it's like, oh, I miss
- 58:53
- Joe Weisenthal: when we were a partnership. Or are you just sad that you miss when it was like small and cluby and had idiosyncratic culture and not just a sort of like a big corporation? Yeah,
- 59:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the problem is you can't slap a compensation number on like how well someone
- 59:09
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): fits
- 59:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): into a culture or how much they like boost the culture, right? It's more much easier to do it by the amount of revenue they bring in.
- 59:17
- Joe Weisenthal: If any one of us dies, I think the other odd lodge people should be the Paul Bearers. I think we should even thank God, let's knock on wood. Nothing happens to anyone on the team for a long time. Are we making a
- 59:27
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): promise?
- 59:28
- Joe Weisenthal: We're yeah, we should we should institute that.
- 59:30
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Can we do
- 59:30
- Joe Weisenthal: a
- 59:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): tauntine
- 59:31
- Joe Weisenthal: too just while
- 59:32
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): we're
- 59:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): talking
- 59:33
- Joe Weisenthal: about funeral
- 59:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): arrangements? I want to do a tenteen. tontine.
- 59:35
- Joe Weisenthal: Yeah.
- 59:36
- Joe Weisenthal: The last one of us to survive gets six hundred dollars. We're gonna
- 59:39
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): bury
- 59:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): some treasure in the Bloomberg offices
- 59:42
- Joe Weisenthal: and the last
- 59:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): one alive gets it. Um
- 59:45
- Joe Weisenthal: on
- 59:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that happy
- 59:46
- Joe Weisenthal: note, shall
- 59:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): we leave it there?
- 59:47
- Joe Weisenthal: Let's leave it there.
- 59:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Okay, this has been another episode of the Odd Lots Podcast. I'm Tracy Alloway. You can follow me at Tracy Alloway.
- 59:53
- Joe Weisenthal: And I'm Joe Weisenthal. You can follow me at the stalwart. Follow our producers, Kerman Rodriguez at Kerman Erman, Armin, Dash Dasho O'Bennett Bennett at Dashbot, Kale Cale Brooks at Cale KO Brooks. and Kevin Lozano at Kevin Lloyd Lozano. And you can chat about all of these topics 24-7 in our Discord, discord.gg slash oddlots. And for more Oddlaws content, you can check
- 1:00:13
- Joe Weisenthal: out our daily newsletter, which you can find at Bloomberg.com/slash oddlots.
- 1:00:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And if you enjoyed this conversation, if you like it when we talk about law firms as dysfunctional modern families, then please leave us a positive review on your favorite podcast platform. And if you're watching on video and you enjoyed the conversation, then please like or leave a comment or better yet, subscribe. And
- 1:00:33
- Joe Weisenthal: remember, if you're a Bloomberg subscriber, you can listen to all of our episodes absolutely ad-free. All you need to do is find the Bloomberg channel on Apple Podcasts and follow the instructions there.
- 1:00:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Thanks for joining.
- 1:01:16
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Hi,
- 1:01:16
- Joe Weisenthal: I'm Barry Ritholtz inviting you to join me for the Masters in Business Podcast. Every week we bring you conversations with the people who shape markets, investing, and business. I speak with CEOs, Nobel laureates, market innovators, and legendary investors. Whether you own stocks, bonds, real estate commodities, even
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How Wall Street Is Bracing For the Post-Jensen Huang Nvidia Era
Episode discussion: Analysts assess NVIDIA's leadership transition risks, China exposure, and competitive landscape post-Jensen Huang
Speakers’ claims: Joe Weisenthal and Tracy Alloway discuss NVIDIA's upcoming earnings and the 'key man risk' surrounding CEO Jensen Huang, citing analyst Stacy Rasgon's downgrade due to internal relationship disclosures. Rasgon details NVIDIA's geographic revenue shifts, noting minimal direct sales to China due to regulatory restrictions, and argues that selling older chips maintains US technological dominance. The hosts analyze talent retention risks as employees face liquidity events and question whether major cloud providers like Google and Anthropic are successfully diversifying away from NVIDIA's hardware and CUDA software ecosystem. Weisenthal presents revenue projections for NVIDIA, Broadcom, and AMD, highlighting the massive scale required to sustain current growth rates amid increasing competition.