The Master Investor Podcast with Wilfred Frost

Edward Chancellor argues historical manias and tighter money signal current AI and equity bubble risks

1h 2m Listen to the original Episode page
Financial HistoryAI InvestmentMonetary PolicyMarket BubblesPassive InvestingSpeculationRisk Management

Summary

Edward Chancellor argues that finance is circular and historical patterns, particularly the role of tighter monetary policy, are key to identifying current speculative bubbles. He draws parallels between modern AI enthusiasm and historical manias like the 1840s railway bubble, noting that revolutionary technologies often generate overblown excitement and massive capital investment. Chancellor warns that euphoria peaks when skeptics are eliminated and that momentum investing suffers severe reversals during crashes. He advises against passive index investing due to concentration in speculative themes and suggests waiting for the post-bubble shakeout to identify long-term winners.

Key takeaways

  1. 1
    Yeah, very common. It's sort of boring, but the number one feature of of when a speculative bubble bursts is tighter money.

    Edward Chancellor · 0:37

  2. 2
    The real winners of technological revolutions usually materialize after the bubble bursts and the shakeout, making it sensible to wait for dominant positions to emerge.

    Edward Chancellor · 1:46

  3. 3
    the peak, it's when the the skeptics and the naysayers have really been knocked out of business. Or at least if they haven't been knocked out of business, no one's paying them any attention.

    Edward Chancellor · 7:15

Episode sections

  1. 0:00 – 1:46

    Introduction to Financial Circularity and Bubble Mechanics

    Edward Chancellor argues that finance exhibits profound circularity, making historical analysis useful for identifying current bubbles. He states that tighter money is the primary feature preceding a bubble burst and that manias are more efficient when organized around a 'messianic' leader who generates confidence.

  2. 1:46 – 7:33

    Post-Bubble Investment Strategy and Kindleberger's Framework

    Chancellor asserts that long-term winners of technological revolutions typically emerge after the bubble bursts and the subsequent shakeout. He outlines Charles Kindleberger's three stages of a bubble: displacement, positive feedback, and euphoria, noting that euphoria peaks when skeptics are eliminated.

  3. 7:33 – 12:34

    Social Context and Speculation vs. Investment

    The speakers discuss the social nature of speculation, citing Charles Mackay's work which links financial manias to social phenomena like witch or dancing manias. They contrast Fred Schwed's definition of investment (preservation of capital) with speculation (gambling for quick profits), noting the rise of retail trading platforms.

  4. 12:34 – 18:47

    Tulip Mania and the 1690s Diving Bell Bubble

    Chancellor describes the Tulip Mania as driven by low interest rates, capital inflows, and futures markets, crashing when futures prices divorced cash prices. He also discusses the 1690s diving bell bubble, where Sir Richard Steele identified the speculative mood as akin to fashion, advising contrarian behavior.

  5. 18:47 – 21:24

    South Sea Bubble and the Greater Fool Theory

    The discussion covers the South Sea Bubble, highlighting the 'greater fool theory' and the phrase 'let the devil take the hindmost.' Chancellor notes that participants often believed they could exit before the crash, but collective losses occurred. He mentions retroactive legislation confiscating fortunes after the crash.

  6. 21:24 – 25:05

    Momentum Investing and Modern Market Mechanics

    Chancellor explains that momentum investing has historically generated excess returns but suffers from severe reversals during crashes. He attributes recent momentum dominance to the shift from active to passive investing and the high turnover of retail traders who buy what is going up.

  7. 25:05 – 29:19

    Messianic Leaders in Modern Tech Bubbles

    Chancellor draws parallels between historical figures like John Blunt and modern tech leaders such as Jensen Huang, Sam Altman, and Elon Musk. He argues these leaders promote 'messianic confidence' to raise capital and notes concerns about circular financing and vendor financing in the AI sector.

  8. 29:19 – 32:21

    Political Corruption and Market Valuations

    The speakers discuss political involvement in bubbles, citing the South Sea Bubble's corruption and modern allegations of corruption involving Donald Trump's family and crypto ventures. Chancellor concludes that US stock market valuations are historically high and could face significant blowback if they burst.

  9. 32:21 – 36:10

    AI Mania and Historical Parallels

    Wilfred Frost and Edward Chancellor discuss the current AI market, comparing it to the 1840s railway bubble and the dot-com era. Chancellor notes that revolutionary technologies often generate overblown excitement and massive capital investment, leading to overbuilding, such as redundant railway lines or data centers.

  10. 36:10 – 40:22

    Communication Speed and Irrationality

    The speakers analyze how improvements in communication, from telegraphs to the internet and social media, accelerate the spread of speculative ideas. Chancellor argues that higher connectivity paradoxically leads to more irrational behavior and attracts impulsive new players to speculative markets.

  11. 40:22 – 43:17

    Moral Hazard in Bubbles

    Wilfred Frost highlights the role of moral hazard, where investors believe governments will prevent market crashes, citing the 1980s Japanese bubble and the Chinese real estate bubble. Chancellor agrees that this belief in government backing extends the life of bubbles until authorities intervene.

  12. 43:17 – 48:50

    AI Market Structure and Technology Risk

    Chancellor assesses the AI sector as an oligopoly rather than a monopoly, noting competition from Google, Broadcom, and Chinese open-source models. He warns that the uncertainty regarding which technology will win (e.g., large vs. small language models) creates significant risk of capital misallocation.

  13. 48:50 – 52:25

    Signs of a Broader Bubble

    Edward Chancellor references a paper by Richard Bernstein and his own observations to argue that speculative excesses have returned, citing high leverage, high turnover, the democratization of finance via platforms like Robinhood, and the SpaceX IPO as indicators of a broader market mania.

  14. 52:25 – 1:01:49

    Government Debt and Financial Stability

    The discussion turns to government debt, with Chancellor noting that unlike past bubbles, current major economies (US, UK, France) have poor financial underpinnings and high dependence on foreign borrowing. This contrasts with Japan, which has high debt but also large foreign assets, providing a buffer.

Assets discussed

AssetKindStanceContext
NVIDIANVDAequityneutralOh, I I mean I I think so. I mean with Huang and Nvidia, um, you know, they they um
AmazonAMZNequityneutralBut none, but with the exception of Amazon, whose price stock price went down, you know, 95% or thereabouts in the past, that the real winners, as you know, came out after
AlphabetGOOGLequityneutralget, you know, were Google unlisted, Facebook hadn't been founded by the time. So the real winners of the internet revolution were really not around until until after the bubble bursts.
Meta PlatformsMETAequityneutralget, you know, were Google unlisted, Facebook hadn't been founded by the time. So the real winners of the internet revolution were really not around until until after the bubble bursts.

“Stance” is how the speakers talked about the asset, not a recommendation.

Claims worth verifying

The number one feature of when a speculative bubble bursts is tighter money.

Edward Chancellor ·0:37

How to verify: Historical analysis of central bank interest rate data and market indices during major bubble bursts (e.g., 2026, 2026, 2026) in financial history texts or academic papers. For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Every mania is more efficient when it's organized around a leader who generates a huge degree of confidence.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·0:54

How to verify: Case studies of historical manias (e.g., Tulip Mania, South Sea Bubble, Dot-com) comparing organized vs. disorganized speculative frenzies in financial history literature. For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Amazon's stock price went down 95% or thereabouts in the past.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·1:21

How to verify: Historical stock price data for Amazon (AMZN) from 2026-2026 on financial data providers like Yahoo Finance or SEC filings. For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

Google and Facebook were not established or did not exist as winners during the dot-com bubble burst.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·1:21

How to verify: Corporate founding dates and IPO dates for Google (2026) and Facebook (2026) via company investor relations pages or SEC filings. For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

Charles Kindleberger outlines three stages of all bubbles: displacement, positive feedback, and euphoria.

Wilfred Frost ·5:53

How to verify: Charles Kindleberger's book 'Manias, Panics, and Crashes' or his academic papers on financial history. For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

A rare tulip bulb was selling for the price of an Amsterdam townhouse during the mid-1630s.

Edward Chancellor ·13:19

How to verify: Historical records of Tulip Mania prices, such as those cited in Charles Mackay's 'Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds' or academic economic histories. For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Sir Richard Steele wrote that stocks rise and fall with ladies' headdresses.

Edward Chancellor ·16:13

How to verify: Sir Richard Steele's writings from the 1690s, such as in 'The Tatler' or 'The Guardian', available in historical archives. For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Momentum investing has historically generated a couple of points of excess return.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·22:09

How to verify: Academic research on factor investing, such as studies by Jegadeesh and Titman (2026) or subsequent meta-analyses in financial journals. For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

John Blunt provided leverage through his sword blade bank for the purchase of South Sea stock.

Edward Chancellor ·28:04

How to verify: Historical records of the South Sea Bubble, including parliamentary inquiries or historical accounts like those by John Carswell. For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The original meaning of the term 'bubble' was fraud.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·28:41

How to verify: Etymological dictionaries or historical linguistic studies on the origin of the term 'bubble' in the context of the 1720 South Sea Bubble. For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Wilfred Frost states that a big sell-off occurred 'last week' and mainstream media discussed an AI bubble.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·32:21

How to verify: Check major financial news outlets (e.g., Bloomberg, Reuters, WSJ) for articles discussing an AI bubble and significant market sell-offs in the week prior to the transcript date (November 2026). For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Edward Chancellor claims the 1840s British railway system had three lines between London and Peterborough and three lines between Leeds and Manchester.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·33:49

How to verify: Consult historical records of British railway construction in the 1840s, such as the 'Railway Mania' historical archives or the National Archives UK. For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Edward Chancellor estimates AI investment could reach $15 trillion over the next five years.

Edward Chancellor ·34:45

How to verify: Search for recent industry reports from major investment banks or research firms (e.g., Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan, McKinsey) published between August 2026 and November 2026 regarding AI capital expenditure forecasts. For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Edward Chancellor states that the Bank of Japan raised interest rates on Christmas Day 1989 to burst the bubble.

Edward Chancellor ·42:02

How to verify: Check Bank of Japan historical interest rate decisions and central bank meeting minutes for December 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Edward Chancellor claims the Japanese stock market took more than 30 years to recover after the 1989 bubble burst.

Edward Chancellor ·42:29

How to verify: Compare the Nikkei 225 index level in late 2026 to its level in 2026 using historical market data from sources like Yahoo Finance or Bloomberg. For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Edward Chancellor states that Chinese open-source AI models are 95% sufficient at 2% of the cost of frontier models like those from Anthropic and OpenAI.

Edward Chancellor ·45:31

How to verify: Review technical benchmarks and cost analyses of open-source LLMs (e.g., Llama, Qwen) versus proprietary models (GPT-4, Claude) published in 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Edward Chancellor cites Richard Bernstein's 2021 paper identifying leverage, high turnover, democratization of finance, and IPOs as bubble factors.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·49:32

How to verify: Locate Richard Bernstein's 2026 research paper or commentary on market leverage and IPO activity. For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Edward Chancellor states that Citadel Securities reported higher retail trading turnover in summer 2026 than at the peak of 2021.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·50:21

How to verify: Check Citadel Securities quarterly reports or SEC filings (e.g., Form 13F, 10-K) for 2026 and 2026 trading volume data. For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

Edward Chancellor claims the US, UK, and France have massive dependence on foreign borrowing and negative net international investment positions.

Edward Chancellor ·53:39

How to verify: Check the latest Balance of Payments data and Net International Investment Position (NIIP) reports from the US Treasury, Bank of England, and Banque de France for 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Edward Chancellor states that real interest rates on inflation-protected securities in the US were 4.5% in 1999-2000.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·59:03

How to verify: Check historical TIPS (Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities) yields from the US Treasury or Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) for 2026-2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Do your own research

  • Verify current US Treasury yield trends and Federal Reserve policy statements to assess if money is indeed tightening.
  • Review Richard Bernstein's research papers or reports cited by Chancellor regarding current leverage and turnover metrics.
  • Analyze the concentration of the S&P 500 or NASDAQ to evaluate Chancellor's claim of over-concentration in speculative themes.
  • Check the latest capital expenditure guidance from major AI infrastructure providers (e.g., NVIDIA, Microsoft, Google) against the $15 trillion estimate.
  • Examine historical data on post-bubble winners in sectors like railways or dot-com to identify potential long-term investment candidates.
  • Assess the financial health and foreign asset buffers of major economies (US, UK, France) compared to Japan as cited in the discussion.
  • Review the structure of the AI semiconductor and model landscape to evaluate the oligopoly vs. monopoly claim and technology risk.
  • Look for evidence of vendor financing or circular capital flows in the AI sector as described by Chancellor.
Full transcriptexpand
0:00
Edward Chancellor: It's not f foreordained that the future should represent the past. It just happens to be the case in the world of finance, that there is a profound circularity at work, much more clearly to my mind than in the world of, you know, politics or s other types of history. And and that should give one relatively more
0:19
Edward Chancellor: confidence in saying, yeah, But it walks like a bubble, quacks like a bubble, whatever i it is one. And that, you know frankly, one just analyzes it going forward to see whether one might be wrong. But I don't I don't think so.
0:32
Wilfred Frost: How common is it for rising rates to precede a bubble bursting?
0:37
Edward Chancellor: Yeah, very common. It's sort of boring, but the number one feature of of when a speculative bubble bursts is tighter money. Now these guys, they need to promote a sort of messianic confidence. in what they're doing in order to raise the capital
0:54
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in
0:54
Edward Chancellor: order to be able to do it. I'm not saying that every great bubble requires a messianic leader, but it helps, yeah. Every mania is um more efficient when it's organized around a leader who generates a huge degree of confidence. And then with with John Blunt.
1:14
Edward Chancellor: in the South Sea bubble, he oversteps himself. And that is a very common feature
1:21
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): of
1:21
Edward Chancellor: bubbles. So you go back to the internet period, I, with the exception of Amazon, whose price stock price went down 95% or thereabouts in the past. The the real winners, as you know, came out after the, you know, were Google. unlisted, Facebook hadn't been founded by
1:41
Edward Chancellor: the time. So the real winners of the internet
1:46
Edward Chancellor: revolution were really not around until after the bubble bursts. So my view is, you know, one can observe the emergence of revolutionary technology, but by and large, it makes sense to stand back. wait for the bubble burst, observe the shakeout, and
2:06
Edward Chancellor: then see which companies appear to be gathering a dominant position.
2:14
Wilfred Frost: Welcome to the Master Investor Podcast with me, Wilfred Frost, where we celebrate and learn from the success of the greatest investors and business leaders in the world, giving you our listeners the edge. The Master Investor Podcast is sponsored. by Interactive Brokers, the World Goal Council, BMY Investments, and LSAG.
2:33
Wilfred Frost: Please do remember the views expressed in this podcast are for general information purposes only. Nothing in the podcast constitutes a financial promotion, investment advice, or a personal recommendation. More on that in the show notes.
2:49
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): My
2:49
Wilfred Frost: guest today is one of the world's foremost financial historians. He's written many best-selling and critically acclaimed financial books, including Capital Account, Capital Returns, Crunch Time for Credit, The Price of Time, The Real Store of Interest Rates, Jeremy Grantham's Biopic, The Making of a Permabarear, which we of course discussed at length with Jeremy
3:09
Wilfred Frost: on this podcast. But the book in particular we're going to focus on today is Devil Takes the Hindmost, a History of Financial Speculation, which is widely accepted as being the definitive book on bubbles and manias. And Edward, of course, has also worked extensively in the investment world at GMO with Jeremy Grantham, also with Jeremy Hoskin
3:29
Wilfred Frost: and the Marathon and Hosking Partners Group. And he's also a journalist uh primarily with Reuters Breaking Views. Edward, a real pleasure to have you with us today. Thanks for joining us.
3:39
Edward Chancellor: I'm pleased to be here.
3:41
Wilfred Frost: Um, and I have to say, uh Devil Takes the High Most, which uh you published the first time around in 1999. Obviously, there's been a few more financial manias and uh bubbles since then as well that we can reflect on and you've written about. It it was a fantastic read. I really enjoyed it. But I also have to say, I think it's probably one of the most useful books that I have
4:00
Wilfred Frost: turned down and highlighted tons of pages of an and I know I'm going to go back to it many times going going forward.
4:07
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And I
4:08
Wilfred Frost: ideally today I'd love to run through this
4:10
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
4:10
Wilfred Frost: pull out what stood out to me with my modern lens on through all these bubbles in history that you've you've analyzed.
4:17
Edward Chancellor: Yeah. Well, I mean, if it is useful, I I think it's because in the investment world, we have these regular cycles and the behavior doesn't frankly change very much. And
4:30
Edward Chancellor: investors with a with a historical perspective
4:34
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): are
4:34
Edward Chancellor: therefore familiar with events that haven't happened in the last few years. And I think that was particular that book, as you mentioned, came out
4:40
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in
4:41
Edward Chancellor: ninety nine, uh in the middle of the or towards the end of the great sort of dot dot-com com technology bubble. And there were investors who who were, so to speak, skeptical of what was going on. And that for them that book was sort of manner from heaven because they they thought they read it and uh they thought, wow,
5:01
Edward Chancellor: you know, this really does look like um, you know, back in 99, things were looking like uh, you know, the great manias of the past. And that gave them confidence to hold their position, turned out to be a good thing. Aaron
5:13
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Powell
5:13
Wilfred Frost: Well, as I say, it is the defense. definitive book on financial speculation. It's been on my list for ages to read. I'm so pleased I did read it ahead of this. And it also reveals to me how many more of these manias there are going back so long. We know we there's lots that we always talk about nineteen twenty nine and obviously two thousand and eight and n and ninety nine. So
5:33
Wilfred Frost: I so again I think there's lots that that we can unpack in this conversation. Before we get to that, I I'm just interested if you could sum up, because maybe the the Charles Kindleberger uh sort of uh outline isn't what you end up dwelling on. But he he outlines three stages of all bubbles. Just break those down for us. If though if
5:53
Wilfred Frost: those are the definitive bubbles common in all all all of them?
5:56
Edward Chancellor: He starts with displacement, is that correct?
5:59
Wilfred Frost: Displacement, positive feedback and euphoria.
6:01
Edward Chancellor: Yeah that sounds like a reasonable
6:04
Edward Chancellor: category. I I w I knew Kindleberg a bit and went to see him uh while I was um
6:11
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): while
6:11
Edward Chancellor: I was working on the book. I mean I think Kindleberg, if he were live today, might think that that you should say that his book, Maynards Panics and Crashes, has primacy over mine, which um I'd probably agree with. Um the question you know what is a displacement? The displacement may be a technological displacement, like in the Internet in the nineteen nineties or
6:31
Edward Chancellor: AI today. It it could be a um
6:35
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a
6:35
Edward Chancellor: financial displacement. For instance, the book I wrote called The Price of Time on the History of Interest was really about how periods of of ultra easy money, of of abnormally low interest rates, uh, can can create a um
6:51
Edward Chancellor: a uh a displacement if you if you want to call it that. And then yes, uh a feedback loop. What what what do we mean by feed feedback loop is really um
7:00
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
7:00
Edward Chancellor: spective contagion spreading from one person to another. And um
7:07
Edward Chancellor: yes, and and I think I suppose eup euphoria
7:11
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): um
7:12
Edward Chancellor: euphoria at the peak, but also
7:14
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): at
7:15
Edward Chancellor: the peak, it's when the the skeptics and the naysayers have really been knocked out of business. Or at least if they haven't been knocked out of business, no one's paying them any attention. So there might be more apparent euphoria than is actually the case in the in in the world.
7:33
Wilfred Frost: that Kindleberger mentions too, which is
7:36
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it
7:37
Wilfred Frost: it's social as well as economic when the euphoria really takes off. And I mean, put it this way, you write in the book, I believe speculation can only be understood within a social context. And the history of speculation cannot simply be a description of economic affairs. Must be also something of a social history.
7:56
Edward Chancellor: Um yeah, I yeah, I'm glad I wrote that. I mean it and and actually that was a a point I raised with Kindleberger. I mean I was I I trained as a historian, as an undergraduate and postgraduate, not doing economic history. And when I came to write about the sort of financial history, uh it seemed natural to me to set the
8:15
Edward Chancellor: events in their
8:17
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in
8:17
Edward Chancellor: their social context. Whereas um Kindleberger was more of a sort of taxonomy of the bubble, sort of independent of the events. Now we're and we'll probably get on to this a bit later, y the periods of speculative may not often involve um the support
8:34
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): of
8:35
Edward Chancellor: the authorities. Or they may occur or or or the or the or the boom speculative boom may appear at a time of euphoria and a time when communications are changing within a society and so forth. So it clearly is a social movement, the spectrum mania. And actually, think of it, that the first
8:54
Edward Chancellor: book on collecting together accounts of spectrum mania, Charles, Charles Mackay's Extraordinary Popular Delusions, The Badness of Crowds, that's published in in the early 1840s. He provides descriptions of Tulip Mania, Mississippi Bubble, and South Sea Bubble, but he puts them in the context of other social manias, you know, the witch
9:14
Edward Chancellor: mania. the the dancing mania, you know, which uh tar Tarantellism in in Italy, the um and and and other type of of manias. And I th I think one one really has to see, or at least the way I see it, is is a financial spectrum mania is a social mania in the economic sphere, but has
9:34
Edward Chancellor: has many aspects in common with the other social mania. manias.
9:39
Wilfred Frost: And and I'm interested, we'll we'll come to this later about how the midterm results play into that setup. Before we get into uh
9:46
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a
9:47
Wilfred Frost: a lot of the sort of timeline and individual manias and their relevance to today, one other sort of setup question on investing versus gambling. And you you from McKay to Schumpeter to others, you have lots of great quotes on this, but one you pulled out jumps out to me more than the others was from Fred Schwed, who said speculation's an effort, probably
10:07
Wilfred Frost: unsuccessful, to turn a little money into a lot. Investment is an effort which should be successful to prevent a lot of money from becoming a little, which I I absolutely adore. And this is, I guess, central to these bubbles and manias is when
10:20
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
10:21
Wilfred Frost: majority of people in markets shift from being investors to being gamblers.
10:26
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um yeah.
10:33
Edward Chancellor: Um, which was written in the 1930s and and is actually, you know, a a s you know really superb and amusing cynical take on on what's happening in Wall Street. And um so what what Schwed's Shredd's saying there is is that spec you know that investment,
10:49
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you know,
10:50
Edward Chancellor: put it in prosaic way terms, investment i involves a uh uh a concern about preservation of capital, margin of safety, so forth, and therefore uh an acceptance of the slow incremental return, whereas speculation veers more towards gambling and uh taking if you put
11:10
Edward Chancellor: yeah, i it in which people take bets in order to become to make an a quick profit, but the but the price of the risk i i is is mispriced and therefore they they will uh you know, in a speculative bubble, they will get ultimately a low return because in their
11:29
Edward Chancellor: search for for veri the quick dollar, they end up losing the whole dollar. And and we s we see that, you know, going on now because there's you know tons of retail trading now on on you know Robin Hood apps and other platforms, and and people are investing,
11:48
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
11:48
Edward Chancellor: know, they what they call investing uh i is actually either straightforward gambling, like the prediction markets, or or Or or or s or or just speculative punts.
11:59
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Mm-hmm. So
12:00
Wilfred Frost: so it's perfect kind of to move us on then to the early 1600s, the the the bubble that I guess you s you focus on as happening in the Amsterdam stock market. And what I found interesting in in the early 1600s mania that that you write about
12:16
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): is
12:17
Wilfred Frost: that there is absolutely no rational aspect to it. Like today, we can all argue left, right, and center, centre,
12:24
Wilfred Frost: this P P's is justified, this P P's is not. oh the earnings are growing here or there. Maybe it's all exaggerated. But you your reflections on the early sixteen hundreds, it it really was pure speculation.
12:34
Edward Chancellor: So we're talking about the tulip mania.
12:36
Wilfred Frost: Well leading into the tulip mania, yeah.
12:38
Edward Chancellor: Um I don't know. I mean you have you have the the Dutch East India Company, uh, which was launched at the beginning of the seventeenth century and and and paid dividends and its stock was traded. What what's interesting about
12:53
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
12:54
Edward Chancellor: early seventeenth century Dutch society, it's it's really the first modern commercial society. It's very mercantile. It has uh what you have evolving at that time are the modern attributes of finance, traded markets in debt, traded markets in stocks. And then you get this um sudden bubble in
13:14
Edward Chancellor: tulip bulbs. And in that period,
13:17
Edward Chancellor: it is said that
13:19
Edward Chancellor: a rare tulip gut bulb, one of those bulbs that uh creates a a a flower, a variegated flower, uh that that they were selling for the price of an Amsterdam townhouse. Now, there you have, I think what happens there is you have, you know, Kindleberger's feedback, people start bidding up. the tulip
13:39
Edward Chancellor: pubs. I think I think um the tulip pubs were genuinely rare,
13:44
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): um,
13:45
Edward Chancellor: and it was a very commercial society. Then and what what you have in Holland in the mid-1630s is you have low interest rates, you have large capital flows, and uh capital inflows from abroad, I should say, and you have uh um
14:03
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
14:03
Edward Chancellor: development of a market in futures for the bulbs. So those so leverage capital inflows and low interest rates are all features that one often finds Turin bubbles. Trevor
14:16
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Burrus, Jr.
14:17
Wilfred Frost: And and with that one in the tulip bubble, you write there wasn't an obvious trigger for why it ended.
14:23
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
14:23
Edward Chancellor: think what happened with the tulip tu is that once all the trade was in futures, uh, then there was nothing really going on in the in the cash market and the price became the futures prices became sort of absurdly divorced from the cash market. So it d doesn't really take much of a trigger to crash it.
14:43
Edward Chancellor: And then when the you know in the crash the authorities stepped in and and they frankly they annulled the the contracts.
14:51
Wilfred Frost: The other area in the the 17th century I wanted to dwell on was the emergence of contrarian investors. In particular towards the end of the century, uh th the the late 1690s crash. And John Law and Richard Steele, you uh observe and identify as being some of the earliest contrarians, and it's
15:11
Wilfred Frost: linked to the size of ladies' headdresses.
15:15
Edward Chancellor: Well, st steele, not law. I'm Sir Richard Steele was, you know, journalist, writer, playwright, uh, but also a an entrepreneur. And um he there there is a the first i first stock market bubble in England takes place in the 16 uh nineties, 90s. and
15:35
Edward Chancellor: the displacement in that instance is um a very successful salvaging operation off the coast of Massachusetts that earns investors ton tons of money. And so we have uh the first technology mania in in diving bells. And uh again, this is a period of
15:53
Edward Chancellor: very easy money, sort of collapse of the uh of of the um monetary system in London. It's also a period in which the fur the first newspapers uh appear with with stock prices and so on. So you have their sort of a a medium for the contagion. And Sir Richard Steele writes sort of tongue in cheek
16:13
Edward Chancellor: that stocks rise and fall with ladies' headdresses. And there, you know, the point he's making and
16:19
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
16:20
Edward Chancellor: think probably the first person to make it, is how the the m the speculative mood is really just like a fashion that comes up and down. So that's his sort of his ta and then he also writes, you know, that he also articulates the spective sentiments is is to I can't remember
16:40
Edward Chancellor: his exact words, which was to be
16:41
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): got the
16:42
Wilfred Frost: quote here. Yeah,
16:42
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): yeah, yeah. Yeah,
16:43
Edward Chancellor: read me the exact
16:44
Wilfred Frost: nothing could be more useful than to be well instructed in man's hope and fears, to be diffident when others exult and with a secret joy, buy when others think it's in their interest to sell. I mean, it's
16:56
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
16:56
Wilfred Frost: the the be greedy when others are fearful, but in in more words.
17:00
Edward Chancellor: Yeah, you don't I mean frankly, you don't really need to
17:03
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): if
17:03
Edward Chancellor: you're going to be an investor, a serious investor or a successful investor, you don't really need to know much more than the thought contained in that um in that in those couple. of sentences, that actually intelligent, rational contrarianism when the crowd is, so to
17:23
Edward Chancellor: speak, losing losing its head is actually a wonderful thing. Now, I mean and I mean later um Steele got involved in a um in in in one of the sort of in one of the bubble companies of the South Sea bubble, uh I think for a business uh a a fish transporting fish pool business.
17:43
Edward Chancellor: So it wasn't as if um Estil himself was completely exempt uh as none of us are from the uh from the from the sort of occasional manic behavior.
17:53
Wilfred Frost: He was the first to identify and then didn't learn from his own f fine words perhaps
18:03
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): This
18:03
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18:23
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18:47
Wilfred Frost: Let's move on to the South Sea bubble then. 1720s and
18:51
Wilfred Frost: devil take the hindmost, of course the title you chose for the book, is a phrase, correct me if I'm wrong here, that really started
18:59
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): to
19:00
Wilfred Frost: apply to thinking around the South Sea bubble. Because what stood out to me as you frame this is
19:05
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that
19:05
Wilfred Frost: it's like people were aware that it was a bubble from day one when they invested, but it was just a case of oh, I'm I'm gonna quickly get in and then I'll get out again before it before everything. goes awry.
19:17
Edward Chancellor: Um well, so in modern language, um people, uh finance, academics trying to sort of justify a r the bubble. We'll we'll talk about something called the greater fool theory. So the idea is, you know, I I'll buy I'll buy a stock uh at above its fundamental value um because I believe
19:37
Edward Chancellor: you're a greater fool Anyhow, uh say that that's and and when I was writing the book, um I came across this comment during the South during the South Sea bubble, which was um a sure-lived bubble in in uh in 1720, but uh
19:51
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
19:52
Edward Chancellor: an in enormous one and and and and became very famous, um where where the this bank says when the when the rest of the world is mad, we must imitate the them in some manner and let the devil take the hindmost. And uh there is this idea that that the main that the mania there's a cynical
20:11
Edward Chancellor: aspect to the mania in which people are just playing the game. What we would now call momentum,
20:17
Wilfred Frost: mm-hmm,
20:18
Edward Chancellor: which is, you know, big factor in in the markets today. Uh uh and um they hope to get out. But the banker Martin who who um made that comment. then later lost his shirt and claimed that he'd been uh misadvised. And I think that this is another thing one finds in the manias, a sort of light-headedness. Uh, hey,
20:38
Edward Chancellor: you know, uh you know there's lots of money to be made. Uh it you know, there there will be losses at some stage, and people begin to believe that some or other the losses are not going to fall on them. But collectively, they are.
20:51
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
20:51
Edward Chancellor: so, of course, when the mania ends, they feel absolutely sort of uh pissed off, and and then they go around looking for scapegoats and blaming people, which is, you know, which happened uh in Space after after South Sea bubble burst. Aaron
21:04
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Powell
21:04
Wilfred Frost: So can we just go off on a tangent then before we come back to South Sea? Because your point about momentum investing being the legitimate name in the industry for what is essentially the Greater Fool Theory. Has there ever been a period in time, which I would say is basically since the 2009
21:24
Wilfred Frost: low
21:25
Wilfred Frost: to today where that either call it momentum investing or call it the Greater Fool Theory has worked. Has it in the past worked for as long as it has worked? Because I graduated in 2008, two thousand and I eight. was trained. in a boring asset manager with DCF valuations. But if you've looked at just that for the last best part of
21:45
Wilfred Frost: two decades, you've missed out on huge gains.
21:49
Edward Chancellor: Um so momentum as a
21:53
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you know
21:53
Edward Chancellor: what we now call a factor uh has been back tested to the you know to the nineteen twenties in the States. And it it seems to be
22:04
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a
22:04
Edward Chancellor: fairly r reliable fact in the sense that it it has historically generated
22:09
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
22:10
Edward Chancellor: a couple couple of points excess return. Uh it does it does do particularly well during bubble periods naturally. And then there are these things that are called, you know, momentum reversals that sound sounds sort of pretty harmless, but they're not quite harmless. So when the bubble bursts, which it did you know, in two to 2000, and then again
22:30
Edward Chancellor: uh with the sort of real estate bubble bursting
22:33
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
22:33
Edward Chancellor: during the course of the financial crisis, you get the the you get these severe momentum reversals. So the there were I I saw some research recently that suggested that you know uh from sort of 1995 to 2015, there was no money to be made from
22:48
Wilfred Frost: momentum.
22:49
Edward Chancellor: Uh we have more. moved into a particular momentum market in the last sort of 10 to 15 years. And there might, you know, maybe any number of reasons for that, partly as you say, because sort of what's called value, sort of buying cheap relative to future earnings wasn't working until quite you know until relatively
23:09
Edward Chancellor: recently. The other is I think as you uh shift from active investment. from professional investors choosing stocks to passive investments to investing in index, that actually creates a huge momentum effect. People I mean think of it this way you know, the fund manager who's underperforming holds a load, a whole load of
23:29
Edward Chancellor: small stocks uh uh that are by you know that are doing poorly, underperforming. So that guy gets sacked and the money gets put into the market.
23:39
Edward Chancellor: where it then goes into the large stocks that are doing well. And uh and then there are certain investors who are sort of front running that process. So yeah, that there are the the mechanics, the changing mechanics of the market encourages uh momentum. And then you know, we now have
23:56
Edward Chancellor: a very large, in the states at least, a very large body uh of um a retail. uh retail traders who their turnover is probably twice as big as the, believe it or not, as the professional investors. And those guys, you know, trade on momentum. They d
24:12
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): they
24:12
Edward Chancellor: they buy what's going up. That that's their nature.
24:15
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um
24:16
Wilfred Frost: it's working until it doesn't, and maybe we'll come to those conclusions later on. Hi guys, it's Wilf. I hope you're enjoying this episode. Just a quick reminder to please hit follow or subscribe. on your podcast or video app so that you never miss an episode. And if you've got time, please do give us a five-star rating and leave us a
24:36
Wilfred Frost: comment. It really helps other people find the podcast too. Now, back to the episode.
24:41
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Back
24:41
Wilfred Frost: to the South Sea bubble quickly for another question. Because again, reminder: we're talking 1720s. You talk a lot about Sir John Blunt. around the South Sea bubble. Um, he was a company director, principal, architect of all that was going on, and you talk about his quote,
25:01
Wilfred Frost: overblown messianic manner and sense of boundless power.
25:05
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
25:06
Wilfred Frost: l that jumped out to me because
25:09
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
25:10
Wilfred Frost: would we apply that to some of today's sort of main mouth. mouthpieces for the AI trade? I mean, interestingly, Jensen Huang of after the weekend he's had comes to mind, even if previously he hadn't been top of my list uh of possible names 'cause he seems more principled until he's caught up in a uh, you know
25:29
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
25:29
Wilfred Frost: a a potential spy issue. But there's quite a lot of messianic aspects to some of the tech leaders, aren't there?
25:36
Edward Chancellor: Oh, I I mean I I think so. I mean with Huang and Nvidia, um, you know, they they um
25:46
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
25:46
Edward Chancellor: you know, I think Hu Huang sort
25:48
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): of
25:48
Edward Chancellor: wants to position himself
25:50
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): as
25:50
Edward Chancellor: insta b uh p position Nvidia as a sort of indispensable company of the AI revolution. And he um
25:58
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
25:59
Edward Chancellor: mean I I don't know about the the you know the Chinese spy story, but definitely you know, they've been doing
26:04
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): them
26:05
Edward Chancellor: uh you know, the NVIDIA and Huang have been funding all these quite shaky uh data centre companies and so on. So involved in a massive um vendor financing or circular financing operation, which th s similar but much, much bigger to what we saw during the telecoms boom
26:23
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
26:23
Edward Chancellor: at the turn of the century. And then
26:25
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
26:26
Edward Chancellor: y think of it. the i if you're potentially moving to a world of of artificial general intelligence and
26:35
Edward Chancellor: and um superintelligence, uh of course that's going to bring out the messianic people. Now, these guys, you know, uh and I'm thinking, you know, the the the the the um companies running the sort of frontier labs, uh Amade Amaday at Anthropic and Altman. at uh at OpenAI and Elon Musk uh uh at at
26:55
Edward Chancellor: SpaceX, uh they need to they need to they need to promote a sort of messianic confidence in what they're doing in order to raise the capital in order to be able to do it. Mm-hmm. I'm not saying that every great bubble requires a messianic leader, but it helps, yeah?
27:14
Edward Chancellor: Just like any social mania, you've got to someone, you've got to have someone leading the children's crusade. You know, every mania uh is
27:23
Edward Chancellor: is um more efficient when it's organized around a leader who is who generates a huge degree of confidence. And then with wi um
27:35
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh S
27:35
Edward Chancellor: John Blunt in the South Sea bubble,
27:38
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): he only
27:38
Edward Chancellor: oversteps himself. And that is a very uh common feature
27:44
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): of
27:44
Edward Chancellor: bubbles, that if you're if you're the leader, of course the the part of the feedback loot is you're getting the adulation and the confidence of all these people, so of course uh one is going to be inclined to overconfidence and to overstep the mark. And that's a uh again a very common feature that runs that gets people. into trouble. And the other
28:04
Edward Chancellor: thing about uh Blunt is that he he he provided leverage through his um sword blade bank. So he provided leverage uh against for the purchase of South Sea stock. Um
28:17
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
28:17
Edward Chancellor: suppose you could say that that Huang is providing leverage to the purchasers Purchases of his N GPU chips, and he he he g gave he gave gave out bribes to Parliament, to the King and Prince of Wales. And the the South Sea bubble was the most extensive sort of
28:36
Edward Chancellor: co-option of the political
28:40
Edward Chancellor: class
28:41
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in
28:41
Edward Chancellor: a speculative bubble. And and the term, why they called it bubble uh then was bubble at that time meant fraud. It wasn't just something that blew up. A bubble was a fraud. The original meaning of the term bubble is fraud. And the South Sea bubble was just one giant fraud.
29:01
Wilfred Frost: So so maybe I was gonna talk about the midterms later, but maybe now's a good time to talk about it in relation th there was a great comeuppance politically after the South Sea bubble. Um, you know, there was the Bubble Act in seven twenty 1720, twenty even. though that later got overturned again. But do you when you look at the result in the midterms?
29:19
Edward Chancellor: No, I mean to be precise, 1720, after 1720, retroactive legislation was introduced to take away the fortunes of people that the fortunes that people had made during the bubble. Like the Chancellor, Sir John Aesleby, who'd bought himself a nice big estate in Yorkshire, had that estate. confiscated.
29:40
Edward Chancellor: Uh, Edward Gibbon, the historian's father, whose father was an MP, who'd made some money uh during that period, in Gibbon's view, legitimately, had his fortune taken away. So that that that was by br by British legal stance, pretty unprecedented. And that shows you the the the the se
29:59
Edward Chancellor: severe strength o of the blowback. Um with regards to the midterms, and we were talking earlier that that the sort of social aspect or social and political aspect of the mania often requires that the authorities turn a blind eye or actively support the mania. And well that's clearly what Donald Trump was doing over the last couple of years. He was launching,
30:19
Edward Chancellor: you know, as you know, all these uh Trump uh uh coins crypto cryp crypto coins and then, you know, his although you know Trump was sort of in in theory um
30:30
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh uh
30:31
Edward Chancellor: not not managing his own uh stock investments. There was sort of extraordinary turnover, thousands and thousands of trades on on Trump's accounts. You had uh Trump's greater family involved in various um AI ventures and then, you know, in in sort of real estate ventures here and there wherever
30:51
Edward Chancellor: wherever the the the fly flying diplomats were going, they were striking real estate deals on the side. And I think that you know there was a huge um from what one reads, you know, uh i in in the uh analyses uh of the post-midterm elections, there was a huge resentment in the uh among the public
31:11
Edward Chancellor: for uh for the sort of corruption uh or perceived corruption uh of the administration. Can
31:18
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that
31:18
Wilfred Frost: pop a bubble?
31:19
Edward Chancellor: Well I uh
31:21
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): yeah
31:22
Edward Chancellor: I mean anything can pop a bubble. But I um my own view is, you know, the st stock market is still very elevated. Uh the the real estate market i is unpopular in the States because it's inflated in price and most people can't get into it. Uh I th the the US stock market is very um it's
31:42
Edward Chancellor: very you know the valuation is very high relative to historic valuations. So if that were to burst, I think the the sort of blowback against it would be uh um let's say far greater than anything we've seen to date.
31:55
Wilfred Frost: But but I guess not a trigger in itself the midterm result, uh based on that framing. Let's talk next about the railway bu book bubble. Um and and what stood out to me, I mean, I think everyone who listens to this podcast obviously knows the details of the the broad details of the railway bubble. What stood out to me is the fact that everyone was talking about and
32:15
Wilfred Frost: writing about there being a railway bubble and yet it still popped. Because often we think, I
32:21
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
32:21
Wilfred Frost: now is a great example of this. You know, last week big sell-off on a single day all of the mainstream media on both sides of the pond write about is there an AI bubble? And it almost makes you step back and think
32:34
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): if it
32:35
Wilfred Frost: if it's crossed this threshold of discussion, it probably means there's another leg higher to come. Um the the railway bubble kind of shows
32:43
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that
32:43
Wilfred Frost: at the point of
32:44
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it
32:45
Wilfred Frost: popping, it might well be that everyone's already aware there's a bubble.
32:49
Edward Chancellor: Yes. I mean I think that's reasonable for you. I I th you the railway bubble,
32:53
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I mean
32:54
Edward Chancellor: we're talking about the the massive and rapid expansion of British Railways system in in in the middle of the 1840s. And that has um
33:05
Edward Chancellor: certain quite compelling similarities to today, and and also to the internet period bubble period, is that you have, first of all, revolutionary technology that people get. excited about, and their excitement is a bit overblown. You know, they say things like, you know, the railways are gonna bring universal peace and that sort of stuff. We'll all be talking in one language, which
33:25
Edward Chancellor: incidentally is another claim made by you know the AI, possibly with more
33:31
Edward Chancellor: possibly with more justification. Uh so you have this sort of um you know
33:36
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
33:36
Edward Chancellor: messianic for for want of a better word, excitement. about the new technology. You have massive capital investment. So they they lay out a um a railway system in which, you know, there are
33:49
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): they
33:49
Edward Chancellor: end up with sort of three lines between London and Peterborough and three lines between Leeds and Manchester. So overbuilding. Um and and that's what we I you know, frankly, we what we saw with the laying out of telecommunications telecommunication systems. system, uh you know, what they used to call the information superhighway in the early two thousands. And I think it's probably what
34:09
Edward Chancellor: we're seeing today, 'cause you've got all these um
34:11
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): sort
34:12
Edward Chancellor: of fairly undifferentiated uh AI models uh competing with each
34:17
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): other,
34:18
Edward Chancellor: and and a massive build out of um
34:22
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): of
34:22
Edward Chancellor: these so data centers
34:24
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): full
34:24
Edward Chancellor: of chips uh to run the AI models.
34:27
Edward Chancellor: And
34:28
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
34:28
Edward Chancellor: you know people have been sort of running the numbers and they say, well, uh the the n you know the numbers of of AI investment at least and in particular if you include sort of putative investment going forward for the next five years. You know, people say, oh well we're gonna
34:44
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): get, I
34:45
Edward Chancellor: don't know, fifteen trillion dollars worth of data and instead s of AI investment. And that sort of puts it um, probably makes it a bit bigger than the railway,
34:54
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): um
34:55
Edward Chancellor: r than the railway mania of the eighteen forties. So so yeah, it's not surprising that people start uh, you know, say, well, isn't this, you know, is is isn't this a bit fragile? Isn't this a bubble? So, um but just yeah, uh but the mere observation that someone says is the a bubble doesn't um actually tell you it's going to
35:14
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): to
35:14
Edward Chancellor: burst. because there can be such momentum behind
35:17
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it.
35:22
Wilfred Frost: This episode is sponsored by Interactive Brokers. Building wealth starts with the right broker, and Interactive Brokers helps you reach your goals with powerful tools, global market access, low costs, and unmatched financial strength. That's why the best informed investors.
35:39
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36:10
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Let's
36:10
Wilfred Frost: move on to the 1920s. Um, and
36:13
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
36:14
Wilfred Frost: one pi part in particular stood out to me. You've kind of loosely alluded to it earlier,
36:18
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): but
36:19
Wilfred Frost: radio was a really big factor in the 1920s. nineteen twenties, Um, and you talk about the greater speed of information spreading uh um, which obviously then came again in in the internet bubble and probably again today with with the AI um trade. You wrote this quote There's little historical evidence to suggest that improvements in
36:38
Wilfred Frost: communications create docile financial markets or better informed investment behavior. If anything, the opposite appears to be the case.
36:45
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
36:45
Wilfred Frost: the past, wider availability of financial information and improvements in communication have tended to attract impulsive new players to the speculative game. And you go on to then analyze how, in a lot of these bubbles, not all of them, there were step-ups in communication. You mentioned it already with daily
37:05
Wilfred Frost: newspapers.
37:06
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well,
37:06
Edward Chancellor: no, yeah. So newspapers uh in the in the late 17th seventeenth century, talking about the railway, the railways, they also can't. coincide with telegraph. So you actually have information passing through from faster through railways and through the electric telegraph. In the nineteen twenties you get um radio, as
37:26
Edward Chancellor: you mentioned, but also telephone and also actually the electronic ticker, beginning of the ticker, uh so that people can see stock how stocks are moving. Uh then you know i in the in the nineteen nineties, internet connectivity. So you have both trading uh people trading in
37:46
Edward Chancellor: internet stocks through internet brokers and communicating with each other uh on internet investment bulletin boards. And then you go through to the current you know, you move forward and it becomes much more uh the connectivity i is i is m more seamless and you have I mean
38:06
Edward Chancellor: take the um the meme stock bubble of twenty twenty-twenty one and if you remember that starts with with uh with the date with the sort of retail traders uh on the su subreddit Wall Street bets and they you know and they decide to to ramp uh these
38:26
Edward Chancellor: these meme stocks and and they can only that could only have occurred in a very in a world in which um which was highly highly connected. And I think now, and I think that this also helps to explain why things like the crypto bubble, we can call it that, That's has been going on for so
38:46
Edward Chancellor: long, because we now really w the whole world
38:49
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): is now
38:50
Edward Chancellor: connected. connected, and therefore these um speculative, contagious ideas spread around the world. I'm I I live down in in in West Somerset most of the time, and I'm I'm always amazed how people in my village are speculating in AI and cryptos, because you
39:07
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): know,
39:07
Edward Chancellor: this is sort of backwater. They should really, you know, I don't know, should they should be spent using the money to buy an extra field or something like that, not not buying crypto. So that tell that tells me at least uh that the uh that the that the sort of potential community of spectators is much larger and they're much more connected. And and I
39:27
Edward Chancellor: and I I'm glad I wrote th that that comment back twenty-six, twenty-seven years ago, because I feel it more strongly now that that the more connected we are, the more information. we have, paradoxically, the more irrational
39:44
Edward Chancellor: our behaviour becomes and the worse our decisions. And that really is, you know, for me a
39:51
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a
39:51
Edward Chancellor: pretty worrying
39:53
Edward Chancellor: I mean, this is not merely just an, you know, financial stuff. I think this also works in the political sphere and so forth, that a highly connected world is one in which irrationality seems to come to the fore really quickly. And and and as I say one sees that in the political world. But the
40:13
Edward Chancellor: nice thing about writing about finance is we can we can write, you know, we can talk about these things, you know, investment stuff um very uncontentiously. Contentiously.
40:22
Wilfred Frost: Um
40:22
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
40:23
Wilfred Frost: there's so many I we could dwell on the nineteen twenties, but I'm going to move on to Japan. in the nineteen eighties because of of all of the bubbles and manias in the book and the phrases I've pulled out, that this one actually strikes me the most about thinking I could have been reading USS Today. You you write
40:41
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
40:41
Wilfred Frost: danger that arises when investors believe that market risk is shouldered by the government rather than by themselves, what economists refer to as moral hazard. Throughout the nineteen eighties, skeptics were told that Japanese government would not allow the share prices to fall and that Japanese banks and brokerages were too big to fail. When the bubble collapsed, this belief was revealed for what
41:01
Wilfred Frost: it was, an ignis fatuous that had led the banks to their ruin. I mean, that sentiment is very present today, isn't it?
41:09
Edward Chancellor: Um Well, I think there's an element of moral hazard of the I uh
41:15
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): i
41:15
Edward Chancellor: behind many of the great bubbles. I I mean it was particularly true
41:20
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): if
41:20
Edward Chancellor: you remember about the Chinese real estate bubble that took place well frankly, I
41:26
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): mean
41:27
Edward Chancellor: it sort of it became very strong after the global financial crisis. And there it w really was um constantly argued. People like me would say, Look, you know, they're fifty million empty apart. apartments and the valuations make no sense and blah blah blah. Um and um people say, well no, actually the all you know, Beijing won't
41:46
Edward Chancellor: won't let the bubble won't let the bubble burst. And I think that that that moral has it that that underpins many bubbles. It means they often last a a bit longer. Uh then o often the authorities eventually get kept cold feet in in um
42:01
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in the
42:02
Edward Chancellor: Japanese bubble burst when the when the Bank of Japan uh rate raised interest rates in um On
42:09
Wilfred Frost: Christmas Day, I think.
42:09
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah, on
42:10
Edward Chancellor: Christmas Day. I don't know why the w well of course you know it's not Christian countries. They anyhow they seem to be working on Christmas Day, jacked up interest rates. But we but and the governor uh bank Governor Miyeno, his his deliberate uh aim was was to burst the real estate bubble. And and he and and and he did that and and and and he you know and he
42:29
Edward Chancellor: burst the stock market bubble too and it took, I don't know, you know, 30 30 more than 30 years for the stock market to recover. And then then you know um President Xi Jinping did really the same th to the uh Chinese real estate bubble in in late 2020 when he introduced restrictions on
42:49
Edward Chancellor: on Chinese uh um real estate developers access to to the credit to credit.
42:56
Edward Chancellor: So yes the moral hazard r drives the market. It it it creates a sense that your risk is being um underpinned. So
43:05
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): if
43:05
Edward Chancellor: you've got the upside and potentially not the downside, And said, of course you're we're going to take more risk. That That's the nature of moral hazard.
43:12
Wilfred Frost: Absolutely. Um Let's move on to the dot com bubble. And again, lots of parts
43:17
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that
43:17
Wilfred Frost: we could pull out. But but one in particular stood out to me, which was sometimes these massive technological revolutions can prove to be good investments. And you separate out the phone and the telegraph where there was basically a monopoly play compared to to when there's, you know, many
43:37
Wilfred Frost: competing companies or indeed still even an oligopoly. It
43:41
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
43:41
Wilfred Frost: then and then the overinvestment means there's a lot of losers, even if the the technology kind of shines, shines through.
43:49
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
43:49
Wilfred Frost: the 90s into the early 2000s, that turned out to be the case.
43:53
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Do
43:53
Wilfred Frost: do you assess today as there's only one company in town, NVIDIA, or there's an oligopoly of companies when we talk about the hyperscalers and and there's going to be a big handful of losers, even if there's going to be a couple of winners?
44:07
Edward Chancellor: Um I so I think what in the AI world today, you've got
44:13
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
44:13
Edward Chancellor: NVIDIA
44:14
Edward Chancellor: appears to
44:15
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): have
44:16
Edward Chancellor: uh well has a very dominant position with these GPU chairs, but it's not the only one. You know, Google
44:22
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
44:23
Edward Chancellor: Broadcom are doing these uh tensor processing units, TPU. TPUs.
44:28
Edward Chancellor: The Chinese are developing uh competition. It's not clear,
44:34
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
44:34
Edward Chancellor: this is what people I think what makes the AI
44:38
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
44:38
Edward Chancellor: investment boom really potentially most perilous of all these investment booms, it's not clear what the eventual winning technology will be. I mean, there are a lot of people out there who think that we're going to move from these large language models with these data centers half the size of Manhattan to small language
44:58
Edward Chancellor: models that you can run in your office or even on your smartphone,
45:04
Edward Chancellor: in which case uh you're probably not going to need so many other TPUs. So so I think that that there, you know, the potential misallocation of capital is huge going, and it's not clear on the model front, as you probably know, the what they
45:23
Edward Chancellor: call the frontier models, anthropic and OpenAI, have been losing market share
45:31
Edward Chancellor: to these Chinese open source models that that that really are. you know, from what one reads, you know, 95% sufficient, but at 2% of the cost. So I mean anyone anyone who isn't just um what what used to be called until recently token maxing, anyone who wants to actually keep
45:52
Edward Chancellor: an eye on their costs, it is um is only using these frontier models for something. You know, they really have to. Otherwise they're using cheaper competitors. A And in all and I really do I think in the
46:06
Edward Chancellor: remember in the doc
46:08
Edward Chancellor: com period, we we all we all got sort of very excited about people putting fiber optic cable into the ground, people providing internet,
46:16
Edward Chancellor: internet, you know, internet service internet service providers. But in the end, those were just, you know, what do we don't see them. They were just commoditized businesses. No one no one gives a damn at that. No one even gives a damn about the mobile phone operators. Who, you know, were one uh you know, back in '99, 2000, I think Vodafone was 17% of the British market. Uh
46:37
Edward Chancellor: now no one gives a damn about them. There were too many. In the end, there were too many mobile phone operators, there were too many ISPs, there was too much fiber Fibre optic cable, they brought, you know, the alternative telecom companies were fundamentally uneconomic. in a way that prop possibly these um you know these independent data center providers
46:56
Edward Chancellor: are uneconomic today.
46:58
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
46:58
Wilfred Frost: mean and you you've written recently about that saying that on the way up bubbles are quite bad at identifying the winners as it happens, not not least that there's a a collapse to come.
47:07
Edward Chancellor: Yeah, yeah, I mean i i i it there there is a you know there is a sh by definition a shake shakeout. out.
47:13
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
47:14
Edward Chancellor: in the shakeout lots of businesses go bust. It's not clear who's going to be the winner from the shakeout. And sometimes
47:23
Edward Chancellor: the eventual winners come along afterwards. So if you go back to the internet period, I often think that the people who were talking up the internet revolution in the early 1980s, they were broadly correct. It's It was going to change everything. everyone's lives. It was going to change the way they do business. It was a huge, I mean, really the most,
47:43
Edward Chancellor: you know, really big information revolution, a civilizational revolution. But none, but with the exception of Amazon, whose price stock price went down, you know, 95% or thereabouts in the past, that the real winners, as you know, came out after
48:02
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the.
48:03
Edward Chancellor: get, you know, were Google unlisted, Facebook hadn't been founded by the time. So the real winners
48:11
Edward Chancellor: of the internet
48:13
Edward Chancellor: revolution were really not around until until after the bubble bursts. So my view is, you know, one can observe these um
48:25
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): these
48:26
Edward Chancellor: revolutions. revolution the emergence of revolutionary technology, but by and large it makes sense to stand back,
48:34
Edward Chancellor: wait for the bubble burst, observe the shakeout, and then see which companies appear to be um
48:42
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): to
48:42
Edward Chancellor: be gathering a dominant position. And and and Um perhaps that will happen in the AI space
48:48
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
48:48
Edward Chancellor: as it has happened before.
48:50
Wilfred Frost: Um you wrote an article in September,
48:53
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
48:53
Wilfred Frost: for Reuters Breaking Views saying that everything bubble is back and bigger than ever. And you were comparing to the twenty twenty-two peak following the meme stock craze. Just dwell on the gist of that article. Are you implying
49:08
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that
49:09
Wilfred Frost: the craziness of that meme stock bubble is being outdone by what you observed over the summer?
49:14
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Uh
49:15
Edward Chancellor: Um so what I was I was drawing on on a paper written in 21 by um an investor called called Richard Bernstein, and um he he points to several factors and he talks the presence of of leverage
49:32
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in
49:32
Edward Chancellor: the market, the talks of high turnover in the market, he talks of the existence of a um so-called democratization
49:45
Edward Chancellor: of finance. And uh he he talks about IPOs. So those are the factors he and I was just saying, well, actually, you know, we've got the SpaceX IPO. I mean, back in 2020, 2020-21, 21, we had a lot of these flaky little spacks. Um,
50:01
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): but
50:02
Edward Chancellor: you know. SpaceX, you you could see it was the biggest IPO of all time. Uh and you could see it as you know the biggest meme stock in in history. I think it is. Uh, you've got um very high turnover in the market. So um
50:21
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
50:21
Edward Chancellor: Citigel citegel Citadel Securities, which which um handles a lot of the retail
50:26
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
50:27
Edward Chancellor: trading in the US points to higher turnover uh it this summer than than at the peak of the 2021. Uh you've got, you know, the Robin Hood people
50:39
Edward Chancellor: they've you know they've extended their product offering. They've got, I don't know, several times more customers now, and they're, you know, they're they're now not just offering product, products in in in um trading in in in meme stocks and and and and big tech names but they're also doing crypto and and and prediction
50:59
Edward Chancellor: markets and the prediction markets uh have taken off um so so that that that's another feature. And then there's m absolutely masses of leverage everywhere. You you've got I mean you know the the um you're are on these gaming exchanges and uh they're moving towards
51:18
Edward Chancellor: perpetual futures that that offer, you know, um perhaps you know a hundred, two hundred times leveraged position uh positions. You've got these uh three times leveraged uh exchange traded funds in stocks like, you know, Nvidia or or or or or or um
51:37
Wilfred Frost: Space Space
51:38
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Order.
51:38
Edward Chancellor: Space Space Ed. Edge. Well, so in the the the South the really strangely, the most speculative, um, the greatest speculative Euphoria has actually been in the Korean market. We had the speculators who call themselves ants. And um they they were um in you know in the early summer ramping up uh leveraged uh uh
51:58
Edward Chancellor: Chinese uh sorry, uh Korean semiconductor stocks like SK Heinex. And instantly there with the active support
52:06
Edward Chancellor: of the Korean Prime Minister. So nice case of sort of moral hazard taking place at the same time.
52:15
Wilfred Frost: Let's just um talk about something else you've written about recently, which is just the government debt position as well at the same time. Um, And you have observed
52:25
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a
52:25
Wilfred Frost: critical changing factor as it relates to to the US, but other countries, sadly, like the UK too, which is the amount of domestic versus foreign ownership of of the debt, and how that I guess creates a bigger problem going forward
52:41
Wilfred Frost: when um as as is the case at the moment, you're you're having to refinance uh at a fast pace.
52:48
Edward Chancellor: Um yeah, uh so the so situation today, and I think this is what makes the current speculative uh
52:59
Edward Chancellor: environment particularly dangerous, i i is that the underpinning of government finances is poor. And um so that wasn't the case. I mean we're we talking about these earlier, but like the nineteen 1920s twenties, uh US government um was running a surplus. So US government was running a surplus in in
53:19
Edward Chancellor: 99-2000, and debt levels were relatively low during the global financial crisis. So the government could come out and and support the market. So you know the moral hazard could kick in. Uh now it looks um more questionable, doubtful, and particularly for countries like Britain.
53:39
Edward Chancellor: United States, and France, with massive dependence on foreign borrowing and massive negative net international investment positions. In other words, they owe more to the rest of the world than
53:55
Edward Chancellor: they own of the rest of the world. And and And I think that that's why Japan, people often point to Japan having the highest. uh outstanding debt, but that Japan also has uh the highest um the world's largest foreign assets. Um so that actually provides support. So I I think when this
54:15
Edward Chancellor: um
54:16
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): well
54:16
Edward Chancellor: let's just say when this when this unravels, it'll be sort of interesting to see what happens on the government debt side. And then as I mentioned earlier, you know, what will the what what will the backlash and scapegoating be when people, you know, find that their that their investments are are are are are marked sharply down. I don't
54:36
Edward Chancellor: think it's going to be a very pleasant situation.
54:38
Wilfred Frost: So so as we start to wrap up, Edward, I mean so when this unravels,
54:43
Wilfred Frost: I guess you are certain we're in a bubble and it will unravel?
54:50
Edward Chancellor: I mean, yeah, it looks to me that's that way. I mean, anyone who you know, if you
54:56
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
54:56
Edward Chancellor: longer and one of the good things about you know doing investment is one's constantly proven wrong and therefore, you know, it it it should help one calibrate to not be overconfident. Um and in the sense I'm not overconfident, you know, I don't it's not gonna make much difference to me whether whether the buttons bubb personally whether bubble
55:16
Edward Chancellor: uh uh breaks or or not. But it it it certainly ticks off all
55:23
Edward Chancellor: all the um factors. And I wrote a paper with Jeremy Grantham earlier this year, uh which is available on the GMO website, which sort of goes through the historic uh features. Uh you know, I can't remember you probably listed ten 10 features. including some of those ones we just mentioned. Um, and
55:43
Edward Chancellor: um it it's all there. So um it it would be, I mean, what can one say?
55:50
Edward Chancellor: That you know, it it's not foreordained that the future uh should represent the past. It's just it just happens to be the case in the world of finance that there is a profound circular. circularity at work, much more clearly to my mind than in the world of you know politics or s other types of
56:09
Edward Chancellor: history. And and that should give one relatively more confidence in saying, yeah, it walks like a bubble, quacks like a bubble, whatever it it is one. Um and um
56:21
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
56:22
Edward Chancellor: I and that, you know, frankly one just analyzes it going forward as to to see whether one might be wrong. But uh but I don't I don't think so.
56:30
Wilfred Frost: How common is it for rising rates to precede a bubble bursting?
56:35
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
56:35
Edward Chancellor: very common. I mean it's sort of boring. But you know, if it yeah, I mean just you know in 1929 uh Fed started raising interest rates in in 28 and and eventually the cost of leverage margin loans became very expensive.
56:51
Edward Chancellor: We talked earlier about Bank of Japan raising rates in 1989.
57:05
Edward Chancellor: The property bubble in the US
57:10
Edward Chancellor: was really created by the ultra-low interest rate periods after. the dot-com bubble, but that started to pop after the Fed uh raised interest rates uh by by a number of different consecutive moves from sort of 2004 onwards. Uh uh and um
57:29
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
57:30
Edward Chancellor: so there there is this um really quite common feature. Then even actually go back to 2022, uh we you know they the everything bubble burst when the Fed started raising interest rates, which was the sort of my book, The Price of Time, which is the history of interest, came out in 22, and it said,
57:50
Edward Chancellor: well, the bubble is going to burst when the Fed raises interest rates. That's correct with regard to you know the so-called everything bubble. What my book didn't anticipate is we were going to get a sort of, you know, a a a a re a a r renaissance of speculation on the back of the AI boom. Um so yeah, so th I would say it's
58:10
Edward Chancellor: boring, but the number one feature of of when a speculative bubble bursts is tighter money.
58:17
Wilfred Frost: And with rates as they are in the last, you know, couple of central bank meetings going up at the short end and the long end, would
58:25
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you be
58:25
Wilfred Frost: more wary than ever?
58:27
Edward Chancellor: I mean, it's always a question of timing. The interest rates in the States and you you know are are relatively high, certainly very high compared to where they were five years ago.
58:38
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Uh
58:38
Edward Chancellor: and and real interest rates from inflation protective bonds are uh you know fairly decent, and the yield and the you know the comparable yield on the US stock market is much lower. So the there is no, there's very little, you know, what the what what the finance academics call equity risk premium out there. Now, I'm not saying it can't
58:58
Edward Chancellor: get worse. There was, you know, you know, in in in 99-2000, you were getting,
59:03
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you know,
59:03
Edward Chancellor: four and a half percent real yields on inflation-protected securities in the States, uh uh at at a time when the market was more expensive than ever. So yeah, you know, these things can go further. But yeah, i it it it does I mean if one didn't if one didn't have a concern ultimately about the solvency of
59:23
Edward Chancellor: government and the ability th then it would make much more sense to um
59:29
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): to
59:29
Edward Chancellor: scale down your equity holdings at the moment and and have more bonds in the portfolio. idea.
59:33
Wilfred Frost: But
59:33
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): yeah.
59:34
Wilfred Frost: Um and so uh Edward, just to finally wrap up we always like to end by asking what is the overriding piece of investment advice for our listeners.
59:45
Edward Chancellor: Um
59:46
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): so
59:46
Edward Chancellor: I think my overriding advice would be to avoid passive or index investing.
59:54
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
59:54
Edward Chancellor: think it's gone too far. I think the indexes themselves are um over concentrated and over concentrated in the most speculative themes and I think that investors uh it makes more sense to um put your money with uh actual human
1:00:14
Edward Chancellor: investors who are working out what's uh reasonable value.
1:00:18
Wilfred Frost: Many of whom have been guests on this podcast including ones you know you know all too well like like Jeremy um Grantham. Um
1:00:24
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): we're
1:00:25
Wilfred Frost: out of time Edward it's been an absolute pleasure Um thank you so much for for joining us on the Master Investor Podcast. And I I so enjoyed the first of your books that I've read. I guess sorry, the second, because Joe, although I put Jeremy this
1:00:37
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): down. This is
1:00:37
Edward Chancellor: first, this is first.
1:00:38
Wilfred Frost: But Jo j the one you co helped Jeremy Grantham write. Um but I look forward to reading the others and I hope you'll come back and discuss those.
1:00:45
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Okay,
1:00:45
Edward Chancellor: look forward to that. Um
1:00:46
Wilfred Frost: Edward Chancellor there are on the Master Investor Podcast. Um stay tuned. uh and hit follow or subscribe on your podcast app if you haven't done so uh already. Next week we will be joined by the former UK Chancellor, not Edward Chancellor, uh George Osborne will be here on the podcast. Uh until then, thanks so much for tuning
1:01:05
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in. The
1:01:06
Wilfred Frost: Master Investor Podcast is sponsored by Interactive Brokers, the World Goal Council, BMY Investments, and LSAG. Please do remember the views expressed in this podcast are for general information purposes only. Nothing in the podcast constitutes a financial promotion, investment advice,
1:01:26
Wilfred Frost: or a personal recommendation. More on that in the show notes.
1:01:31
Wilfred Frost: This podcast is produced by Paradim Paradine Productions and Master Investor Limited in association with Birdline Media. If you've enjoyed the show, please do subscribe on YouTube or click follow on your podcast platform, and you'll be automatically notified each time a new episode drops.
This page was produced automatically: the audio was transcribed with nvidia/parakeet-tdt-0.6b-v3+sortformer-v2.1 and interpreted by Qwen3.6-35B-A3B-UD-IQ3_S.gguf. Transcription and interpretation can contain errors; always confirm against the original episode. Nothing here is investment advice.

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