Speakers analyze Binance hack response, Aave freezing mechanisms, and legal risks for ThorNode operators
Summary
Hosts and guests discuss the immediate response to the $6B Binance hack, highlighting how Tether and Circle froze stablecoins within minutes while Aave utilized a multisig to freeze markets. Taylor Monahan and Adam Sadowski detail the technical execution of the hack, where funds were routed through Aave to borrow ETH, and explain the protocol's risk parameters. The conversation shifts to the legal implications for ThorNode operators who processed transactions after FBI attribution to a North Korean group. Finally, speakers note the acceleration of the Ethereum roadmap and the challenges of freezing fiat-linked illicit funds without official victim confirmation.
Key takeaways
- 1 Aave's freeze acts as a one-way valve, preventing new borrowing and supplying while allowing existing users to repay debts and withdraw capital to limit exposure.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) · 22:05
Episode sections
- 0:00 – 2:00
Listener Survey and Intro
Hosts introduce a listener survey for Unchained Premium and welcome Adam Sadowski to discuss the Binance hack and Aave's response.
- 2:00 – 3:58
Initial Reactions to the Hack
Taylor Monahan expresses annoyance at North Korean involvement, while Adam Sadowski describes the stressful night for the LlamaRisk team.
- 3:58 – 5:20
Detection and Freezing Stablecoins
Zero Shadow detected the Binance drain. Tether and Circle froze stablecoins within minutes, with Circle acting rapidly after law enforcement contact.
- 5:20 – 12:16
Aave Market Freeze and Protocol Safety
LlamaRisk froze Aave markets overnight. Adam Sadowski confirms no funds were stolen from Aave; the protocol remained solvent and users could withdraw.
- 12:16 – 15:02
Hacker Strategy and Liquidation Risk
Hackers routed ~$60M USDT into Aave to borrow ~$45M ETH after exhausting DEX liquidity. The position is over-collateralized but vulnerable to liquidation if ETH prices rise.
- 15:02 – 21:45
Risk Parameters and Future Controls
Sadowski explains Aave's configurable risk parameters. The team is building 'risk oracles' to limit borrowing capabilities over time periods to balance usability and security.
- 21:45 – 25:55
Definition of Aave Market Freeze
Aave's freeze prevents new borrowing and supplying but allows existing users to repay debt and withdraw capital, acting as a one-way valve to stop new exposure while allowing exits.
- 25:55 – 30:16
Crisis Response and Aave Governance
Speaker_3 discusses the immediate freezing of stablecoins. Speaker_2 explains Aave's use of a 4-of-7 multisig guardian system to freeze markets and adjust LTV ratios during the hack.
- 30:16 – 37:22
DeFi Risk Management Trilemma
Speaker_2 outlines a trilemma in DeFi risk management involving token governance, delegated operators, and on-chain controllers, highlighting trade-offs between speed, verifiability, and access to risk signals.
- 37:22 – 45:04
Oracle Complexity and Price Feeds
Speaker_2 argues that on-chain finance requires external data, making price feeds critical dependencies. Speaker_0 emphasizes that asset prices are constructs dependent on liquidity and motivation.
- 45:04 – 54:37
Synthetix Hack Response and Authority Contracts
Speaker_0 details how Synthetix identified stolen SNX tokens and used their token authority contract to create a new approval, transferring the stolen tokens to the DAO.
- 54:37 – 1:01:13
ThorChain vulnerability and FBI attribution
Speaker_3 describes ThorChain as a 'janky' protocol that suffered a double-spend exploit. The FBI, IRS, and US Secret Service formally attributed the hack to the North Korean group 'Trader Trader'.
- 1:01:13 – 1:07:22
ThorNode operators and legal risk
Speaker_3 argues that ThorNode operators ignored the FBI's public warning and proceeded to update their nodes, potentially facing criminal liability under OFAC sanctions.
- 1:07:22 – 1:17:51
French bank hack and fiat/crypto convergence
A French bank with ~$235 billion in assets was hacked, with ~$30 million stolen and converted to crypto. Researcher ZachXBT traced the funds but could not freeze them due to lack of public victim confirmation.
Assets discussed
| Asset | Kind | Stance | Context |
|---|---|---|---|
| TetherUSDT | crypto | neutral | And like my response in the chat was like, I'm gonna remain super awesome. optimistic. Let me know when they started dumping the tether. And like five minutes later, he's like, I think we need to call Tether. And I was like, |
| USDCUSDC | crypto | neutral | most of it in uh stablecoins, Tether, and uh and USDC, uh, the the hacker um proceeded to uh funnel most of those funds through Dexpools. |
| EthereumETH | crypto | neutral | clear that was like stables into ETH, right? They were like they were trying to offload the stables into ETH as quickly as possible. |
| AaveAAVE | crypto | neutral | So when when Ave executes a market freeze, that means that uh no one can borrow additional money from the market and no one can supply additional capital into the market. |
| BitcoinBTC | crypto | neutral | like, oh well. what's the price of Bitcoin, right? Depends on how much you have. Depends on how much you have, depends on how motivated you are, right? The price of Bitcoin uh during a hack is not the same as the price of Bitcoin not during a hack, right? Because you have a motivated seller that is willing to sell and therefore, you know, just saying like, |
| Crude oil | commodity | neutral | like when when we first launched uh WTI, right? Like uh this is hilarious, right? So like Chainlink and Synthetics when we were first launching our uh our crude oil prices, right? You got Brent and WTI. |
| ChainlinkLINK | crypto | neutral | like when when we first launched uh WTI, right? Like uh this is hilarious, right? So like Chainlink and Synthetics when we were first launching our uh our crude oil prices, right? You got Brent and WTI. |
| ArbitrumARB | crypto | neutral | Overton window has shifted. Arbitrum shifted |
| Gold | commodity | neutral | I gave a bunch of Bitcoin and gold to these fucking guys. |
“Stance” is how the speakers talked about the asset, not a recommendation.
Claims worth verifying
North Korean hackers pulled roughly $6 billion out of Binance.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·0:00
How to verify: Binance official incident report or press release; blockchain analysis of large outflows from Binance hot wallets to mixer/DEX addresses. For recent events, verify 2026-08-05 through 2026-11-05. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Tether and Circle were freezing stablecoins within minutes of the hack.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·0:00
How to verify: Tether and Circle official Twitter announcements or blog posts detailing freeze actions; blockchain explorer tracking of frozen addresses. For recent events, verify 2026-08-05 through 2026-11-05. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceHackers routed part of the haul through Aave.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·0:00
How to verify: Etherscan or blockchain explorer transaction history linking Binance withdrawal addresses to Aave deposit addresses. For recent events, verify 2026-08-05 through 2026-11-05. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Nothing was stolen from Aave; the protocol worked as intended.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·11:17
How to verify: Aave governance proposals or LlamaRisk incident report confirming solvency and lack of protocol loss. For recent events, verify 2026-08-05 through 2026-11-05. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Circle froze funds in three minutes after Tether.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·8:40
How to verify: Circle official statement or press release regarding the speed of the freeze action. For recent events, verify 2026-08-05 through 2026-11-05. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceHackers supplied $60 million USDT to borrow ~$45 million ETH on Aave.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·13:22
How to verify: Aave blockchain explorer data showing specific loan creation transaction with these values. For recent events, verify 2026-08-05 through 2026-11-05. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceThe hacker position entered liquidation because ETH prices pumped.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·13:27
How to verify: Aave blockchain explorer data showing liquidation transaction for the specific address. For recent events, verify 2026-08-05 through 2026-11-05. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
LlamaRisk is building 'risk oracles' to limit borrowing capabilities over time periods.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·17:24
How to verify: LlamaRisk or Aave governance documentation, whitepapers, or official announcements regarding risk oracle development. For recent events, verify 2026-08-05 through 2026-11-05. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Aave market freeze prevents new borrowing/supplying but allows repayments and withdrawals.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·22:05
How to verify: Aave protocol documentation or codebase analysis of the freeze mechanism. For recent events, verify 2026-08-05 through 2026-11-05. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The Binance hack occurred around 4:30 PM East Coast time.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·6:42
How to verify: Binance incident timeline or blockchain timestamp analysis of the initial large outflow. For recent events, verify 2026-08-05 through 2026-11-05. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
North Korean hackers stole roughly $6 billion from Binance.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·25:55
How to verify: Public reports from Binance and cybersecurity firms (e.g., Chainalysis, TRM Labs) regarding the 2026/2026 hack; verify via Binance official announcements or major news outlets covering the event. For recent events, verify 2026-08-05 through 2026-11-05. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Tether and Circle froze stablecoins within minutes of the hack.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·25:55
How to verify: On-chain block explorers (Etherscan, Tronscan) to identify freeze transactions on USDT and USDC contracts; press releases from Tether and Circle. For recent events, verify 2026-08-05 through 2026-11-05. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceAave uses a 4-of-7 multisig for its Guardians.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·28:31
How to verify: Aave governance proposals or documentation detailing the Guardian multisig composition; on-chain verification of the multisig contract address and threshold. For recent events, verify 2026-08-05 through 2026-11-05. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Elon Musk spoke on social media about AI agents scanning for exploits.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·29:17
How to verify: Search Elon Musk's X (Twitter) profile for posts discussing AI agents and exploit opportunities around the time of the hack. For recent events, verify 2026-08-05 through 2026-11-05. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Synthetix had ~9 million SNX stolen in the hack.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·45:28
How to verify: On-chain analysis of SNX token transfers from known Synthetix treasury or user wallets to attacker wallets; Synthetix official statements. For recent events, verify 2026-08-05 through 2026-11-05. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceSynthetix used its token authority to create a new approval for stolen tokens.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) ·48:57
How to verify: On-chain transaction data showing a call to the Synthetix token authority contract creating an approval for the DAO or a recovery address. For recent events, verify 2026-08-05 through 2026-11-05. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Tokenized stocks are a new asset class on Aave Base chain.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·40:17
How to verify: Aave Base chain documentation or governance proposals listing deployed tokenized stock instances; blockchain explorers for Base chain. For recent events, verify 2026-08-05 through 2026-11-05. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Chainlink CRE allows developers to produce custom oracle logic.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·43:38
How to verify: Chainlink documentation or developer portal describing the Chainlink Runtime Environment (CRE) and its capabilities. For recent events, verify 2026-08-05 through 2026-11-05. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceSynthetix had previously paid a hacker 100 ETH to close out synthetic ether positions.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·47:54
How to verify: Historical on-chain transactions from Synthetix treasury to the hacker's address; past Synthetix community discussions or Discord logs from the KRW hack era. For recent events, verify 2026-08-05 through 2026-11-05. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Arbitrum intervened to stop a hack, shifting industry norms.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·51:35
How to verify: Public reports and Arbitrum Foundation statements regarding the intervention; on-chain analysis of the halted transactions. For recent events, verify 2026-08-05 through 2026-11-05. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceThorChain suffered a double-spend exploit during the hack due to a one-block reorg on Ethereum, allowing attackers to launder funds through the protocol.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·54:45
How to verify: Review on-chain data for ThorChain transactions around the time of the Binance hack to identify double-spends and block reorgs; check ThorChain's official announcements or GitHub for bug reports and updates. For recent events, verify 2026-08-05 through 2026-11-05. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The FBI, IRS, and US Secret Service formally attributed the Binance hack to 'Trader Trader,' a North Korean group, and explicitly asked ThorNode operators to block transactions involving stolen assets.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·58:13
How to verify: Search the FBI's official press releases or the US Department of Justice website for statements attributing the Binance hack to 'Trader Trader' and mentioning ThorNode operators. For recent events, verify 2026-08-05 through 2026-11-05. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceThorNode operators processed approximately $200 million in volume for DPRK-linked addresses within two days of reactivating the network after the FBI's attribution.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·1:03:40
How to verify: Analyze on-chain data for ThorChain transactions involving addresses listed by the FBI as DPRK-linked; sum the transaction volumes over the two-day period following the node update. For recent events, verify 2026-08-05 through 2026-11-05. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
A French bank with $235 billion in assets was hacked, and $30 million was stolen and converted to crypto via centralized exchanges.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·1:07:30
How to verify: Check news reports or the bank's official press release for confirmation of the hack, the amount stolen, and the conversion to crypto; verify with ZachXBT's on-chain analysis. For recent events, verify 2026-08-05 through 2026-11-05. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The Ethereum roadmap has accelerated, with discussions shifting from a 2030 timeline to 2028.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·1:14:32
How to verify: Review Ethereum Foundation's official roadmap documents or announcements from DevCon for updates on timeline changes. For recent events, verify 2026-08-05 through 2026-11-05. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Do your own research
- Verify the exact timestamp and mechanism of Circle's freeze relative to Tether's action via Circle's official blog or press release.
- Review Aave's governance proposals and multisig signatures for the market freeze event to confirm the 4-of-7 Guardian decision process.
- Check Chainlink's documentation on CRE (Chainlink Runtime Environment) to understand how custom oracle logic differs from static price aggregation.
- Examine the FBI/IRS joint statement on the Binance hack to confirm the specific language used regarding ThorNode operators and 'how you can help'.
- Research OFAC sanctions lists and legal precedents like Tornado Cash to assess the liability risk for crypto service providers processing sanctioned addresses.
- Audit ThorChain's documentation on block reorg handling to understand the technical vulnerability that led to the double-spend exploit.
- Monitor Ethereum Foundation blog posts and core developer updates for changes to the 2028 roadmap timeline and technical milestones.
- Investigate ZachXBT's public reports on the French bank hack to verify the $30 million loss and the timeline of victim identification.
Full transcriptexpand
- 0:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): But I would argue it's a good hook to be on. Stopping North Korea from getting money from Binance users is a fine hook. If you find yourself stuck on that hook, you are in a privileged position to actually stop these motherfuckers and you should.
- 0:19
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Hey
- 0:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): everyone, before we start, Unchained is running a listener survey and it decides real things, whether there is a weekly recap show. what time the streams go on, what goes into premium. It is anonymous and takes a few minutes. And everyone who finishes it gets a free month of Unchained Premium. Nothing's anonymous, by the way, anymore. So
- 0:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): don't rely on that advice. Um go to unchainedcrypto.com slash survey. That's unchainedcrypto.com slash survey. And it's open for another three days. till November 8th. Let's go to ads, guys.
- 0:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): This episode is brought to you by Nexo, the premier digital assets wealth platform. Earn daily interest on your crypto or borrow funds, all through one platform trusted by more than 10 million clients. Find out more at Nexo.com. Geovestrictions Restrictions to eligibility and terms apply. Not listening to bits and vips yet? It's our weekly crypto and
- 1:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): macro market show with Ram Alawalia, Austin Campbell, and Chris Perkins. Search Bits and Vips and subscribe.
- 1:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): All right. Hey everyone, I am here with my co-host, Taylor Monahan, security expert. And we have a very special guest this week, Adam Sadalski, uh at Wormhole Aurable, Arable, CEO of Llama Risk. Um so thanks very much for joining us, Adam.
- 1:40
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well
- 1:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): thanks for having me, Kane. Happy to be here and happy to join you as well, uh Taylor.
- 1:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Good week for it. Risk, huh? It's
- 1:49
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): been
- 1:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): a real
- 1:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): experience.
- 1:51
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Are we
- 1:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): doing risk? What are what are we doing about risk? How we do we have a plan for risk?
- 1:56
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We are we
- 1:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): We're are thriving in the risk. rifts.
- 1:58
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We have a plan.
- 1:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): We have a plan for risk sure.
- 2:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): it's
- 2:01
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a it's a tough
- 2:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): world out there, but we we do have a plan.
- 2:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Okay.
- 2:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): And it was it was a i ex extremely stressful uh last week for me as
- 2:11
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I think
- 2:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): it was for a lot of people. For
- 2:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Tay. Yeah. I wasn't stressed actually. I wasn't stressed at all. Um
- 2:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): really?
- 2:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah, I was just like, I don't know, man, And like I don't care anymore. I just don't care.
- 2:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): It's fine.
- 2:23
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It
- 2:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): wasn't because
- 2:24
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it's
- 2:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): finance.
- 2:25
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It was finance. Binance.
- 2:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): It was
- 2:27
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): yeah,
- 2:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it was it was it was partially because it was Binance, partially because it was only six billion. And I was like, that's fine, they'll cover that.
- 2:34
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um
- 2:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): see, I'm not kidding. Like, I'm not kidding. I was like, uh, whatever. Um, I was a I I'll I'll be I'll be honest, I was a little bit annoyed. I was like, fucking North Korea, man. Like, we don't need that's like six nukes for them. We don't need them with any more nukes. So that was annoying,
- 2:50
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and then I
- 2:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): like had like
- 2:51
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a little
- 2:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): bit of like secondary annoyance of like the money launderers, they're gonna help them to like launder the money. Um and then someone pointed out that like, you know, they're buying ETH and I
- 3:03
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): was
- 3:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): like, uh okay, swings and roundabouts, you know, uh that's a phrase we have like ups and downs, like someone's buying ETH, at least
- 3:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): at least temporarily.
- 3:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I mean dude, temporarily is all we've got now. Like
- 3:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Austin's on the show, so we can we can troll uh
- 3:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): they sent him to the Mumbai gulags. Um so so uh let's go through this. Um
- 3:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): yeah
- 3:31
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): yeah
- 3:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): so that was that was my that was my reaction and and we did actually have to do some stuff so we can talk about that um because synthetic synthetics synthetics had like eight million s and
- 3:41
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): oh
- 3:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): yeah I'm sorry you guys wrote
- 3:43
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): them
- 3:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): yeah
- 3:44
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): um site our the
- 3:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): team got them I
- 3:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): know we'll
- 3:47
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): talk about it's under control
- 3:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): now
- 3:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): yeah yeah um
- 3:51
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): all right
- 3:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): so so like yeah walk us through I
- 3:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): give the alpha on the show so I'll say that
- 3:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): let's do it
- 3:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): I have to shout out zero shadow uh specifically this guy Harrison as Zero Shadow freaking GOAT. He just happened to see an alert go off that was like a massive amount of money moving out of Binance. And he put it in the chat. And then I happened to see it. And I wish that I had not seen it. But I happened to see it.
- 4:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): And I was sitting there and I was like,
- 4:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Nope. Nope. And like my response in the chat was like, I'm gonna remain super awesome. optimistic. Let me know when they started dumping the tether. And like five minutes later, he's like, I think we need to call Tether. And I was like,
- 4:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Yeah. And so I call, I didn't call Tether, but I put it in our chat. And I don't know, like, I mean, I think the stars just sort of aligned on this one. It's like
- 4:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the timing seemed like not good timing, right? Like, as in
- 4:48
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It's been
- 4:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): actually, it's been at this time the last. three big four big hacks now. It's
- 4:53
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): morning.
- 4:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah, the thing that's confusing to me
- 4:56
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): is
- 4:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you know, they're they're not idiots, right? Like they know when you're asleep, they know when like the primary actors are asleep, right? Like in every single time anything bad's ever happened at synthetics, it's two a.m. Sydney time every time. Like uh so
- 5:11
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
- 5:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): it it was
- 5:12
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): certainly in the
- 5:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): in the middle of the night from for for many of our team when we were in the war room uh
- 5:18
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
- 5:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): working
- 5:19
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): to to freeze freeze
- 5:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): the Ave markets. I
- 5:21
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I should
- 5:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): probably
- 5:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): preface actually that um uh I'm I'm here today on on behalf of the Lumberish team as the uh the the risk provider to Ave. So uh
- 5:33
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): we
- 5:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): we were working uh
- 5:34
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): long hours into the night when we we're super
- 5:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): fast.
- 5:37
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Like you guys yeah.
- 5:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): So immediately when we saw the drain, we knew that we we needed to uh freeze the markets. And so we convened together and and uh worked out a a solution. So we ended we ended up uh uh freezing the markets overnight until we knew that the the situation was was resolved. Um and this was this was for many of our team, it was going into like four four a.m.
- 5:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): So it was it
- 6:00
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): was
- 6:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): hours and hours that we were working on it.
- 6:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Yeah. Is
- 6:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that because
- 6:03
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it was Euro
- 6:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Euro time zone or what what time zone is that that if you can say? Like
- 6:11
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): was
- 6:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that oh
- 6:11
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): so was that going into
- 6:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the US time zone? Like what like four AM? It seemed like it was morning for the US. So I don't understand how that's
- 6:20
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the Binet no,
- 6:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): the Binance uh incident when um I was I was in the East Coast at the time. Uh this so we s so there was a conference going on, uh Link Link NYC. And uh fortunately we were just coming back from the conference at the end of the afternoon when we were delightfully surprised with with this
- 6:37
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): mess
- 6:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): to have to clean up. Um so so so on East Coast time this was around it was
- 6:42
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh four thirty PM.
- 6:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Okay.
- 6:44
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And and so
- 6:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): for our for our colleagues in in Europe, it was uh we we
- 6:48
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): were
- 6:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): going into late late night. Yeah.
- 6:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Got it.
- 6:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah, even
- 6:53
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you know,
- 6:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it's funny, like even the Aave thing, right? Like I like and this is so bad. This is so so bad, and I and I hate this, but like after Kelp Dow and everything was fine, what I've learned now is nothing bad can happen to Aave. Ave.
- 7:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): That is the lesson that I have taken. I it's not a good lesson to learn, right? Like I like I've got a bunch of money in Ave and I like at no point was I concerned about Ave. I was like, yeah, it'll be fine. Like things are fine. Things just work out. It'll be fine.
- 7:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): I mean there is a sense of
- 7:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): I will say that someone asked me the day I've on Twitter, someone was like, like how like what's Taylor's like square oh ometer meter ad? Like how rage fell this does she? sheet? And I was like, I it caught me super off guard because I was like, what? Like I have been in a state of like
- 7:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): transcendence, like calm. I'm like in my zone right now. Like this is like we're just gonna handle this. Like I don't know what it is. It's like there's so much, so many bad things happen, and then when something this big happens,
- 8:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): it's like I was completely.
- 8:03
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You
- 8:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): feel like you've had preseason training and you're ready for it. Or
- 8:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): it's just like, oh it's six billion dollars, let's fucking go. Like let's like
- 8:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): like like what do you know what I mean? And it's like it wasn't even like oh my God, like let's freak out and who do we need to call? It was like But
- 8:17
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): they were like big
- 8:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): chunks, right? Like it was like a billion dollars of tether. That's like one hit, right?
- 8:22
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Tether
- 8:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): and I was so Polo was the same minute was like, What's up? And I was like,
- 8:29
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): shit, we are
- 8:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): holy shit.
- 8:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Tether is the best. But I mean, even Circle stepped up this time, they were able to freeze really fast as well. How
- 8:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): is
- 8:39
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that the case?
- 8:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Circle got their freeze in just like three minutes after Tether.
- 8:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Can someone explain that to me? Like, because we've talked about this for the longest time that uh Circle needs like the fucking president. to like make a decree before they fucking do anything.
- 8:55
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well,
- 8:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): circle circle has insisted that law enforcement got in contact with them.
- 9:03
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And that this was but I'm telling
- 9:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): you, no,
- 9:06
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I'm gonna
- 9:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): give me the alpha on the show, guys. There's there's no way.
- 9:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): There's no way. Like, are we like how dumb do you think we are, man? Like, come on.
- 9:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 9:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): I
- 9:15
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): know the
- 9:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): FBI called Jeremy and was like, hey, Jeremy, just a heads up.
- 9:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Not that and not that fast. Like, the thing is, like, you know, Binance has been has cooperated with law enforcement for a really long time. They have relationships with law enforcement. Like, that's like one of the reasons why there was law enforcement on this all weekend long. FBI was in offices all weekend long. But that it's just it was so fast. And I'm so glad that they
- 9:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): froze. But I think that they are perhaps
- 9:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): changing, changing their
- 9:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): perhaps
- 9:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): strategy.
- 9:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Yeah. And especially for this amount of money. And you know, the knowledge that this is Binance, as long as Binance acknowledged it as like a theft, like you know, they can And get got and will get got
- 9:58
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it. too big to
- 9:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): fail, man. Too big to fail. So
- 10:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): and you know.
- 10:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): can you walk walk me through the because like genuinely in this I like again, I I understand that I'm retarded, but like I didn't even bother to look at the Aave situation. So can you walk walk like Adam, can you walk us
- 10:17
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): through the
- 10:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Aave situation? Like what what ex what happened? What Well like yeah, play by play.
- 10:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): So the the first thing that I should say about this, and I'm gonna I'm gonna preface with this because after the event, my dad messaged me and was like, Hey, I heard Binance got hacked and Ave uh funds routed through Ave. And my dad is not somebody who is interested in crypto at all. I
- 10:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): was gonna say, like, that's impressive.
- 10:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): You'd
- 10:41
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): be like,
- 10:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Hey, I heard Bitcoin got hacked.
- 10:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): No, no, my mom has asked me about
- 10:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): two hacks. My mom has asked me about two hacks in the history of ever. The first was the Dow.
- 10:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Wow. And
- 10:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): the second was Binance.
- 10:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Amazing. Yeah.
- 10:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): So it
- 10:55
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): was so this obviously
- 10:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): has has widespread, you know, mainstream media is covering this. Um, but there's nuance to the situation that I think a lot of people are missing. And so they they hear uh Ave Ave Aave is associated in some way. Does this mean Ave had funds stolen from it? And the answer. is uh resounding no. There was
- 11:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): nothing that was stolen from Ave. Um the the protocol itself uh worked as it was intended, which is that users can supply collateral and create an over-collateralized loan, um, maintaining the solvency of the protocol and users so so suppliers to the to the lending market can always
- 11:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): withdraw their money. Uh Um so in so in this particular case what we what we're concerned about is that Ave doesn't want to have uh stolen funds on its books um although it's it's it's not actually uh interfering with the protocol operation in any way. So that's why we needed to take uh to to take action.
- 11:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): I think um at the time that the the funds were drained and there was about three $3 billion dollars that landed on Ethereum, most of it in uh stablecoins, Tether, and uh and USDC, uh, the the hacker um proceeded to uh funnel most of those funds through Dexpools. And then um about
- 12:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): 35 minutes into the exploit, uh, they decided to route some of that money through Ave. And they did so, presumably because they were running out of on-chain. liquidity that was immediately accessible to them. Uh and so the next best way of exiting from
- 12:33
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and sorry just to be
- 12:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): clear that was like stables into ETH, right? They were like they were trying to offload the stables into ETH as quickly as possible. And then they hit some
- 12:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Yeah, exactly. Because as as you guys are describing, there there were uh um motions to freeze the the hackers' funds to to tether and and circle, and they were moving pretty quickly actually to do those freezes. And so the the hacker only had so much time uh to exit out of the freezeable uh stable coins they were holding into
- 13:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): something that would um not be recoverable. So in in this case, they were exiting uh into ETH. So they were supplying tether uh USDT as collateral and then taking uh an ETH loan. against it. And so they they supplied uh sixty sixty million dollars of USDT and uh and
- 13:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): borrowed forty-five million dollars-ish uh worth of ETH. And
- 13:27
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): actually,
- 13:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): as of as of today, that position has started to enter liquidation um because they they uh opened a loan at the maximum loan to value that they what that was allowable. uh with very little buffer uh before it would enter liquidation. So the markets pumped a little bit today and uh yeah
- 13:45
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
- 13:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): the the position. So
- 13:46
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): if ETH
- 13:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): goes up, they get liquidated. It's like bizarro
- 13:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): ETH.
- 13:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Yeah. Also it's worth noting that these are the same exact hacker thieves as the layer zero cult kelp Dow DAO situation, which might explain why they were kind of quick to go to office. Ave because
- 14:03
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that
- 14:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): was sort of like their whole not their whole strategy, but like they weren't familiar with that path from the Kelp DAO situation, right?
- 14:13
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um
- 14:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): one one question, like I know you said uh Ave uh you know worked as intended
- 14:19
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): um
- 14:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): as like a you know decentralized uh over collateralized
- 14:25
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): um
- 14:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): lending market um which like I think is true. We've talked about this before, right? We talked about this with the $50 million fat finger thing, we've talked about it with Kelp Dow. Like, is it a good idea that someone can deposit a billion dollars?
- 14:42
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 14:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): like, let's ignore flash loans for a second, because like slightly different use case, right? But like, is it a good idea that someone can deposit a billion? dollars worth of stable coins in one block and then borrow like all the ETH?
- 14:57
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Like,
- 14:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): what is what purpose does that serve?
- 15:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Yeah. So so what I would say is that um, first of all, uh the the way that Ave works is that it has a configurable tool set of all kinds of risk parameters that it can maintain. And so for an on chain on-chain lending protocol, it's it's important to have active uh risk management um according to the profile of the assets and as that
- 15:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): profile changes. And in particular for um the these assets that were involved, USDT and uh WET, these are um some of the uh you would say like the the the central or like the blue trip assets that are listed on uh that are used in in on-chain lending. And
- 15:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): they're very liquid assets. And uh we size markets according to the risk and the liquidity of of those assets. So um it it it was the case that there was uh a large amount that somebody could uh use for this purpose, but it was it there is uh a uh an intended
- 16:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): uh use. or a a viable use for um for taking these actions to uh if if for example you wanted to short um eath a a legitimate use would be to supply stablecoin and to to borrow
- 16:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a
- 16:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): weath against it
- 16:15
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): but
- 16:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): like a billion dollars like realistically like
- 16:18
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): is
- 16:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it a good idea like and and and just to be like a hundred percent clear right like these are configurable parameters this is not us saying like hey, should we update the protocol to like make it able to stop this? Like we could the like the parameters could exist to
- 16:37
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
- 16:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): make it so that there's some kind of like
- 16:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): ratcheting or something. Like, do we really need someone
- 16:45
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): to be able
- 16:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): to to short a billion
- 16:47
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): dollars worth of it
- 16:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): certainly is uh a trade trade-off off that needs to be decided on how much do you want to allow for um just open uh operation of the market and how much do you want to kind of limit that that operation organ organic demand in order to, like you say, to like ratchet the ex exposure
- 17:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): potential. And that's actually exactly um work that we we've been uh uh working to implement. So we're we're building a solution right now that is um so you might be familiar with the the term risk oracles. Uh so these are uh taking
- 17:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): oh yeah
- 17:25
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): taking signals
- 17:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): they're taking signals from the the real world as data, interpreting them into an action that should uh be appropriate for the the DeFi protocol and then executing those. And so in this case, uh we're we're going to be interested
- 17:38
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in the
- 17:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): implementing um a solution that uh that um limits the the borrowing capability over certain time periods. Um so that's now
- 17:49
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): is that
- 17:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): because obviously you know like this is not a simple thing, right? Like as a amateur mechanism designer myself, right? Like you can't just be like, oh why don't you just make it hard to do the thing, right? Because it's on-chain and Sybil and and and right. Like, and you know, it's very easy if you say, Okay, like the maximum amount that a single you know
- 18:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): account can borrow through there is a million dollars per minute or whatever, and then you can just sible it, and otherwise the entire market grinds to a halt and everyone's like waiting because you know North Korea's dumped a billion dollars in, and so now no one can borrow for the next month because the ratchet is sitting there. Like these are all non-trivial things
- 18:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): to solve, right? Like clearly you guys are trying to balance this. But
- 18:33
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): well,
- 18:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): yeah, there's always a trade-off to any kind of risk management action. And that and that would go back to the the situation that has happened on on Binance, that they have, of course, they have uh internal security systems in place to to prevent what happened from an unauthorized withdrawal from the extra. exchange. Um but they're also
- 18:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): uh um forced to to uh constrain themselves by this this trade-off between how much usability sure um and and immediate access to capital do we want to allow versus how much security and sort of decentralized kind of using MPC um uh sign you know multiple signatures across multiple parties distributed so how
- 19:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): how difficult we want to make it to access those funds and and use put put their money to use.
- 19:19
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You
- 19:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): know it's interesting, right? Because uh uh uh someone I know uh in in one of the groups I'm in was like do we remember the BIMX days of like the daily withdrawal window? Uh and everyone was like holy shit, no, we actually didn't Did all not remember that. Uh you were the only one.
- 19:36
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um
- 19:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and it's kind of you know it's kind of funny, right? Because there is this like bank run risk that every exchange needs to balance. If you say, you know, if finance were to turn up today and say, All right, hey guys, you can only take out a billion dollars a day for the next 90 days, it
- 19:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): would be over.
- 19:57
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Like
- 19:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you can't say that because immediately the adversarial nature of crypto is people go, Oh, you only have a billion dollars, and you're like scrounging through you know uh CZ's couch cushions to find the next billion for tomorrow to let us out, and everyone would freak out and start muking everything, and the world would would explode, right? Um, and so
- 20:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you can't just be like, you can't have your money.
- 20:20
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You
- 20:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): need to like, and you sep definitely can't change the rules,
- 20:25
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): but
- 20:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): at the same time, you've got to have this balance. of like, should we uh allow someone to be able to pull out six and this is a different situation because they pulled it out by like bypassing the actual uh you know,
- 20:37
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
- 20:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): security um
- 20:39
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
- 20:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): of the the like withdrawal factory that they've created, right?
- 20:44
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um,
- 20:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you know, there it it wouldn't have even worked, I think, if they had had ratcheting on Binance to like withdraw this, but like
- 20:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): if you couldn't even withdraw at all,
- 20:55
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): like
- 20:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): there was no way, like the the faucet was completely empty except for like one hour a day. And then everyone at Binance got together and like really focused on that for like that one day, like you know, once a day for an hour, they're like, All right, guys, like let's really make sure that no one steals the money. during this hour,
- 21:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): right? It would make it make North Korea's lives a lot harder, but you just can't do that because people are like, No, I want my money when I want it. Um so
- 21:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Yeah. Yeah. Yeah.
- 21:25
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So this
- 21:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): this actually um reminds me of an another point that I wanted to make about the the incident and the response on Ave. So when we uh convened at the war room and made the decision to freeze the markets, I I also wanted to talk a little bit about uh what freezing means because going off of what you you're saying, Kane, about like limiting people's access to their own money,
- 21:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): um, the the one of the big advantages of of on-chain finance is that we can take remediation re remediating action without um like forcing uh kind of, you know, uh limiting control of people's own own capital. And so the action that was taken in this place, we we call it a market freeze, but this is
- 22:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): sort of a confusing term. So I'll just uh suss it out a little bit. So when when Ave executes a market freeze, that means that uh no one can borrow additional money from the market and no one can supply additional capital into the market. But it still uh keeps the um uh the ability for
- 22:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): users to repay their debt and to withdraw their money from the capital. So they're they're never actually locked into the protocol and liquidations continue to to operate as as they normally do.
- 22:38
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um
- 22:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): and so this you could think of this as kind of a one way valve where users can always exit but no new exposure can come in. So this is um this is Ave's way of of having like a a way of of kind of saying we're closed for business temporarily, um, but we're not going to impact the the users who
- 22:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): are already in the protocol.
- 23:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah, cool. Okay. Um all right, let's go to ads. We'll come back and we'll we'll talk some more about this because this is definitely the biggest
- 23:10
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): thing
- 23:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): to talk about.
- 23:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah. Yeah. All Alright, right. Uh we'll be back in a minute.
- 23:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): What if your crypto could do more than just sit in your wallet? Nexo is a digital assets wealth platform where you can generate daily interest on your crypto or borrow funds against your assets. Today, Nexo serves more than 10 million clients. Find out more at Nexo.com.
- 23:35
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): If
- 23:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you like this show, there's another one from our network you should be. listening to. Bits and Bips is our weekly market show. On Mondays, Ram Allawalia, Austin Campbell, and Chris Perkins chat about where crypto and macro collide. It's sharp, it's fast, and it has its own channel. Search Bits plus sign bips and subscribe.
- 23:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Alright, All right. um yeah, so so you know, there have been a number of uh actions, I guess, taken by by a bunch of different uh teams and and you know, people across the space uh that jumped in quickly to like try and you know limit how much money uh that that
- 24:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): North Korea could could uh could extract from this uh thing. And I and I think like t tet in the grand scheme of things, this is one of the more successful anti-heist maneuvers that we've pulled off collectively. I mean it you know as you said it's such a large amount of money everyone's like all right we better fucking get our shit together and
- 24:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): who's gonna but um but yeah Tay you were saying uh you you had some quite some other questions about Ave.
- 24:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Yeah yeah so I just wanna wanted, so I think maybe let's just take a step back and walk through like the series of that first sort of day or two. It's like the first thing that happens is that Binance gets hacked, right? So there's this large exodus of money that has that is flowing out of Binance on a number of chains. And
- 25:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): on the,
- 25:04
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I guess
- 25:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): on like the initial incident response side, we're like trying to coordinate with Binance. We're like trying to get all the addresses. Binance obviously is in their systems trying to shut things down. This one was interesting because there was like the way that DPRK had gotten into their systems, made it a bit hard for Binance to just like stop
- 25:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): the flows perfectly, like as like a hard stop. Um, the attacker did some like crazy shit with 7702 that was like sweeping things, so it's like they had to keep some of the systems on in order to uh rescue their own money and know what was happening. At the same time, that would that was
- 25:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): allowing sort of like the sweeps and the deposits to continue, which then was allowing the on-chain contract to like keep sweeping funds to the attacker. Um meanwhile,
- 25:55
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): we're
- 25:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): starting to see responses from like, you know, every
- 26:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): obviously you have the stable coins, which are sort of classic at this point, right? They can freeze, they have a block list function built into the smart contract. Those are pretty straightforward. The second round was like basically everyone asking what can we do to stop
- 26:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): this, right? Um, and I think that there was actually two, I guess there's like sort of two ways to look at the actions that were taken. Some of the actions that were taken were this is like it's a lot of really stolen money.
- 26:34
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um,
- 26:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): it belongs to Binance, it's been stolen, it's probably DPRK, right? Sanction Threat Actor.
- 26:40
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well, I
- 26:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): mean, it belongs to Binance users, right? Like
- 26:43
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Binance users, yeah.
- 26:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): You know,
- 26:45
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): yeah.
- 26:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Um,
- 26:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): but I mean, there's a clear victim, right? There's a clear victim. Binance is has obviously. obviously been a large part of this industry for years. A lot of those token teams have relationships with Binance, right? Because if Binance has the token to be stolen, that means that the token was listed on Binance. So there's
- 27:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): just like a lot of sort of interesting dynamics at play. I think that the decision that each team was making, and what I wanted to talk about with like Ave is like some. of the teams did make the decision to freeze the assets because it was a uh the risk was that they don't want DPRK to have that money. They don't want to support DPRK, they don't want to support
- 27:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): theft, et cetera. But I think there's actually a more interesting risk, which is when a huge amount of money gets stolen, that can create secondary risk to markets, right? Or to your token.
- 27:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): or to your protocol or to whatever else. Um and so I want to ask like how does Ave think about those sorts of things or how do you guys think about those sorts of things? Right. Because it's
- 27:49
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): not just as simple as the
- 27:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): the most the most critical thing to address, I think, with a protocol like Ave that's trying to uh that needs to to be able to close shop essentially when when shit hits the fan. So there's been a giant hack that happens. We need to do something about it. So the way that Ave works right now is it can delegate
- 28:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): uh certain risk management actions to uh a trusted entity. So in this case, it has it has two different functions. It has the risk stewards and it has the guardians, and both of these are manual uh multi-sigs and the In the case of the Risk Steward, it's it's operated by Lombarisk and uh Ave Labs
- 28:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): jointly. And in the case of the uh the Guardians, it's a distributed set of it's a it's a four of seven multisig that have to align to take action. And and for this type of incident where we need to close the markets quickly, the guardians is the lever that we use. It's the one that has the capability to to freeze the markets or set LTV
- 28:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): zero. Basically risk-reducing action instantaneously.
- 28:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): So the the uh the problem with relying on manual actors is that we're living in an age now where uh, and and Elon Musk went went on the record on social media talking about this: that we're having AI agents that are scanning for exploit opportunities and taking advantage. of them. And um so
- 29:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): very much like you know, automated exploit systems uh that are probably going to be accelerating over time. And we need to have systems in place that are not manual systems that will get a group of signers together and and execute. I think that in this particular case, uh the um uh
- 29:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): the the Guardians. Guardian signers on Ave did everything that they should have done correctly and I'm really proud of my my team uh how everyone came together, initiated the war room, quickly came to a decision, gathered the signers, created the payload. So it's a whole there there's a number of steps involved in doing these things. But um ultimately we need to
- 29:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): arrive at uh an automated system that can defend adequately against uh against you know the the reality of the world that we're we're faced with um i think that we have a good pathway to do it um and i would i would um point to what i think is a trilemma right now in in how to uh
- 30:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): appropriately manage risk in defy today so there's there's really three main paths that we have available to us so either you have uh token governance or you have a delegated operator, um, or you have an on chain controller like a smart contract that has simple logic that it'll implement, implement. And all three
- 30:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): of these options really have a trade off that they make uh in terms of either speed or uh the verifiability of the action and the consistency of the action, um, and the the sophisticated access to uh to rate. risk signals that it can use to act upon. So all three of those uh options we have available
- 30:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): have some kind of shortcoming. And what we what we need to arrive at is a system that can be um all three of these things at once. So it can it can uh work autonomously and and basically instant, Extent, um very low latency. Um it should be verifiable, so it should run on program. programmable logic that
- 31:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): uh all parties kind of understand and agree on that the protocol has uh knowledge about how the the operation works and has control over what that logic is. Um and it should be uh powered by um by data rich uh risk signals to be able to derive appropriate responses based on that. So this is
- 31:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): it's this is kind of a lot of information. that I'm that I'm trying to
- 31:40
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): do. So just on that
- 31:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): last just on that last question, right? Like you know,
- 31:45
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
- 31:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): call me cynical,
- 31:48
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): um
- 31:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): if you will. Uh but like the unintended consequences of changing the systems is extremely high. Like extremely high, right? Like Aave in particular,
- 32:01
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): um,
- 32:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you know, we've talked about this on the show many times. Like the worst thing that you can do sometimes is to do something, right? Now, like
- 32:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): obviously, you guys are thinking about this, and you're trying to be judicious and cautious and careful about how you roll these things out. Uh, but you know, the most stable complex systems come from
- 32:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): small components being built up over time, right? That get Lindy and Ave is one of those. Aave is more complex today than it was when it was Eatland, right? Eatland was very simple, very simple set of contracts. And you know, it now has the scale and complexity that it has, and it's earned it by like layering on these things. But you know, complexity is
- 32:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): complexity. Um, and so I do have like a visceral immediate reaction to like, oh, we're gonna add
- 32:50
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): these
- 32:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): like. off-chain signals and stuff uh, you know, to to help uh defend against these things. How are you guys thinking about it?
- 33:01
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I think that
- 33:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): the important thing to understand is that with any kind of delegation that the Ave DAO gives to a risk manager, and that is the the same case for uh if it's the risk steward, which is a manual multi-sig. or the guardian, which is a manual operator. Uh it it's the DAO is always scoping what
- 33:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): the capabilities are of whatever whoever it's delegating to. So if it's delegating to an off-chain system, uh a risk oracle system, um, it's not just giving free reign for that risk oracle to just make whatever change to whatever parameter it wants without. bounds. So there
- 33:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): there are uh contracts that sit between the the off chain system and the the Ave markets that are dictating um both the the frequency that the that the um delegated operator can act and the bounds with which it can change parameters and which parameters it's it's allowed to change.
- 34:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): So um we we want to arrive at a system where the the the DeFi protocol is never relinquishing its control to uh a third party operator, whether that is a a trusted single entity or whether that is a risk oracle or whether it's a multi-sig. We wanna we wanna have a system where the the DeFi protocol is empowered in the
- 34:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): sense that it has uh um it has ownership over its contracts and all of the logic that's running on them. Um, it can remove delegation and it can dictate uh what the bounds of any kind of delegation are. So
- 34:35
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): um
- 34:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): and
- 34:36
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the really the really
- 34:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): great thing about Ave, in my opinion, is that it is a protocol that is built uh with lots of modularity and configurability uh in mind. So there's there's a there's there's a spectrum, I think, in how uh DeFi protocol um philosophy on whether you should be like totally uh decentralized in the sense that it's
- 34:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): all it's all like it's it the contract's deployed and it can never change. And then you have the other side where it's like totally configurable. And I I find that Ave has to me the right the right kind of balance of like we need to have certain configurability figurability and be able to adapt and compete. as the market develops. Um, but we also
- 35:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): have the assurance that the protocol is always in control. It's always the owner.
- 35:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah. And and I mean, you know, again, like there there's a trade-off space here. Like there's trade-offs all the way down. There's nothing you can do. There's no free lunch, right? Like you, you know, saying we're gonna hermetically seal our contracts, right, on the Ethereum chain and nothing, you know, other than the like one you know input from an on-chain uh
- 35:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): transaction can can change the state within these contracts like uni univ two let's say right like you know there's a factory but like once the thing's there, you know, if there is a bug in Uni V two, it's over. There is no mechanism by which you can, you know, like obviously you can
- 36:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): freeze the funds that are in there if there's a bunch of tether in there or USCC or whatever. Um, but like the wet,
- 36:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): everything else is gone, right? Arguably you would say, well, what are the odds that that would happen, right? It's been sitting on
- 36:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and like, you know, I'm not, I'm not, I'm not, I don't even know, man. Like, but like, you know, you would hope. and this is where in fairness, right? Like I I think, you know, the Vitalik's talk, we were we were talking about this before the show started, right? Like a big chunk of Vitalik's talk was like um, you know, uh formal verification,
- 36:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): verifiability, etc. Um a hermetically sealed contract that is formally verified to you know that every state transition is going to work the way that you think with with the inputs that you expect,
- 36:52
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): um,
- 36:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): is arguably better. But Aave is not that thing. There's no world where Ave can have that thing because it must have inputs that come from the real world. Once you crack that door open, then now you're making judgment calls about what inputs are okay, et cetera. And so, like, this is not even me saying, like, don't add extra checks and balances. I'm
- 37:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): just saying. like, adding things is in some way the most dangerous thing you can do, right? And and I'm sure you guys are
- 37:21
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): thinking
- 37:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): about it.
- 37:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): I
- 37:22
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I think
- 37:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): that the the the way that the on-chain financial system is going is that there's there's always in order to have a sophisticated financial system on chain, we're always going to need uh external data that's coming in. And and lending protocols have demonstrated this because you know. since since we've had on chain lending we've had to have price
- 37:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): feeds that are uh really critical dependencies that are determining what's the value of this collateral and and main enforcing the solvency for the protocol. That that price feed goes out and you lose everything. You know you the protocol could become insolvent or existing users can lose you know their their entire position
- 38:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): in uh instantaneously basically
- 38:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): yeah
- 38:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): and um
- 38:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): the this is just to to me it's it's the reality that the the that on-chain finance will always be defined by uh the how sophisticated uh sort of information um can we have about the real world to power these applications and a 100%
- 38:23
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): hundred percent
- 38:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): for price feeds have have always been sort of prevented as presented as like this is just like the the true number of how this this uh you know the the true asset uh asset price for this thing. But but there's you know under under the hood there's a methodology that's defining what that price is. And that has been pretty simple for
- 38:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): crypto assets because we have access to exchange data for multiple exchanges. We can do an aggregation method and it's pretty straightforward. Uh, but we're we're starting to see with more sophisticated or or more um novel kind of collateral types that are coming on chain now that this uh assumption is is um starting to change.
- 39:03
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So like
- 39:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it's always been wrong, man. Like it's always been wrong. There's no such thing as a price of an asset. That's like uh it's a construct that it like people don't
- 39:13
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): they
- 39:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): like, oh well. what's the price of Bitcoin, right? Depends on how much you have. Depends on how much you have, depends on how motivated you are, right? The price of Bitcoin uh during a hack is not the same as the price of Bitcoin not during a hack, right? Because you have a motivated seller that is willing to sell and therefore, you know, just saying like,
- 39:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): oh yeah, it's mid market on Binance or whatever, right? Like what happens if Binance is having a bad day? Um so I think it's it's never it's unfortunately never been that simple. Anyone who's built an Oracle know, you know, you go down a rabbit hole really quickly. You're like, oh you just like point at that price, CoinGecko. Those guys are pretty accurate. And it's like, no, no, well hang on a
- 39:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): second. Like what's the latency on CoinGecko? Oh, it's fifteen 15 minutes. Okay. Well, so it's the price fifteen 15 minutes ago. Like it it's it's unending. As I as I know you know, right? But like it's not a trivial thing to know about the real world, unfortunately.
- 40:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): And with uh and I'm I'm starting to get towards uh the the novel asset class that's that's becoming popular lately. So tokenized stocks are uh
- 40:17
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the the
- 40:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): latest craze. Um
- 40:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): yeah
- 40:20
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
- 40:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): and they've been coming to Ave. So we we have a tokenized stock instance on base chain uh that just deployed. um two two months ago. Um, and the the this asset class has some unique characteristics. And so when you're creating a price feed, you have the uh the normal market trading hours, and then you have the overnight session, and then you
- 40:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): have the early morning session, and the so you have multiple exchanges where you're getting this data from and uh
- 40:47
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): with
- 40:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): varying sort of like you know, liquidity uh and various kind of like like trading volumes that happen on these exchanges and having to stitch together um between the different trading sessions to have a coherent price between them. Um and th this is a problem that that we've been uh working with with Chainlink on. Chainlink is is
- 41:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): uh
- 41:08
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): dude
- 41:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): like when when we first launched uh WTI, right? Like uh this is hilarious, right? So like Chainlink and Synthetics when we were first launching our uh our crude oil prices, right? You got Brent and WTI.
- 41:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah, yeah. You got you got the you got these two options, right? And it took six months, man. It took six months to find out what the price of oil was on chain, because you couldn't trust this particular price service, this particular price service, you had to
- 41:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): aggregate them, but then you couldn't trust the aggregator price. And then you know they had like all the the the complexity of trying to construct information about the real world is just like so much higher than your intuition.
- 41:56
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um
- 41:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and and it's just a it's a really hard thing to do.
- 42:00
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um
- 42:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it's a really hard
- 42:01
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): thing to
- 42:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): do.
- 42:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): And and what we believe is that there's there's always been uh risk j risk judgment that has been embedded into how we construct price feeds. Um and going back to crypto price feeds, it's like what's your aggregation method on how you derive this price? Cause there's
- 42:18
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): yeah,
- 42:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): multiple different strategies you could choose. Um and different Oracle providers choose different strategies, whether it's a median or it's a volume volume-weighted weighted asset. price, for example. And as we're getting uh more types of financial products that are coming on chain, we're starting to recognize more and more that there's there's much more complex uh
- 42:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): um risk judgment that is involved in in creating price feeds for these assets. And uh it's it's our belief that um there is kind of a an un sort of an unremitable. unrecognized uh layer of the stack of power in the financial system for for on-chain products. Um, because we have
- 42:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): data infrastructure through Oracle networks like like Chainlink, which I'm I'm a big fan of Chainlink personally. Um they have proven that they're they're one of the best off-chain Chain uh in data infrastructure providers for for blockchain networks. Um but what we believe is that there's there's a uh a risk layer that
- 43:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): is is not yet uh fully kind of understood. Uh and it's now possible for risk managers like Llama Risk and and other risk managers in the space um to kind of take advantage of this opportunity because of um uh it's Chainlink chain link CRE is the chain link runtime environment
- 43:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): where um developers can uh produce their own custom Oracle logic within Chainlink infrastructure. So that risk judgment call do no longer has to be kind of offloaded to
- 43:51
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): infrastructure provider.
- 43:53
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It's not baked into
- 43:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): the price feed. It's something that a risk manager or a protocol uh team can develop their own custom methodology on on how do we create pricing for this asset, or how do we create uh some sort of risk judgment that how do we um that might uh action upon our protocol to protect it
- 44:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): in various conditions. Uh, we can run that logic and and own uh the logic, although it runs off chain. We can own uh what workflows are running and integrated into our on-chain. system. So this is really what's exciting to me, is that now for it's really the first time this has been possible to have like
- 44:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): a neutral infrastructure that has proven high integrity, where um developers, risk managers, protocol teams can implement their own custom logic into um into these off-chain systems that integrate with with the on-chain component of the system.
- 44:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): All right. Let's let's uh go through a couple more of the uh incidents here. So one involved uh synthetics um so I can I can speak to that directly um so so
- 45:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we got up and I think like twenty
- 45:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): maybe twenty million or twenty 25 five million or something like that uh S SNX NX it's like solidly like 10 15% of the total supply of SNXs on Binance right so anything happens to Binance I'm like the definitely that's waking me up right so um so it was my morning and I was like okay let's figure out what's going on here
- 45:27
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): um
- 45:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): yeah we we identified the wallet uh I think it was about nine million SNX had been stolen
- 45:34
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): um
- 45:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): but because synthetics has historically said eh this there's nothing we can do,
- 45:40
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): um,
- 45:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): they didn't bother to do anything with it. They just let it sit there. They're probably like, yeah, we got years before these guys fucking figure their shit out, right? Um, but unfortunately it was it was not to be um because we were like, all right, hang on a second. This is clearly North Korea, biggest hack in history. Like we cannot sit here and and do nothing. Like
- 46:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): let's go back to first principles and ask the question like, what can we do? Right. Um, and uh, and it's funny because I I vividly recall these debates in the synthetics discord in like 2019. And I even had a clanker go back and like find my prior statements about like what I what did I said about this, right? And and there was
- 46:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): um at the time of the uh KRW hack, I was like, listen, we have proxies.
- 46:27
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 46:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we could do anything. A proxy allows you to do anything. We could replace the entire contract with one token that's owned by me and call it a day. Right. Um, so you have to you have to be aware of the the you know uh kind of uh power that the the synthetics DAO has, right? Which
- 46:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): is ultimate power to do anything to any part of the system to be completely clear. And like that statement is out there, like at the time of this, right? But then the caveat to that statement is, but we would never do that because, like, you know, vibes and decentralization and stuff, right? And then it would be
- 47:03
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): because
- 47:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): you'd be prosecuted by the
- 47:06
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): bad guys.
- 47:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Exactly, right? Um, and and that was kind of it. Like, that was it. No one ever challenged that for like another
- 47:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): like
- 47:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): six. fucking years, man. It's crazy. So the thing that we explicitly said is we could replace the token authority contract and the token state and change the state of, and this was in relation to synths, right? Which was like a sub-token inside of, but we could just go and say the guy that has 110
- 47:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): billion synthetic ether, which at the time he had, has Dero. zero, right? We could do that. We had the ability to do that. We chose not to. Instead, we paid him, I think, 100 ETH and he traded through the Oracle. We fixed the Oracle. Speaking of Oracles, right? Like I got some history with Oracles. Um, we fixed the Oracle and he traded through
- 47:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the Oracle and sold the 11 billion ETH eighth synthetic ether that he had for like a dollar or whatever, right? To close it out. So then we were like, ah, see, like all we did was change the article. It was fine. Like we didn't, you know, no hand of God involved here at all. Um, which doesn't stand up scrutiny in hindsight, but whatever.
- 48:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Um, and so
- 48:15
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): we
- 48:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): said, let's go back to first principles and what options do we have here? And I cannot tell you how fucking retarded I would have to be. in the level of retarded that this never occurred to me that we could do this. We always, whenever we consider something like this, it was like we would have to change the token
- 48:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): state, right? But no, actually, there's a much more elegant solution that the clanker found in like seven seconds. It's like crazy you spent your whole life doing this shit, and then the clanker is just like so much smarter than you. And like literally it was like, why don't you just use the token authority to create uh an approval to
- 48:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): transfer the tokens?
- 48:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Oh, and
- 48:57
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I was like,
- 48:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): No, no, no, we can't do that. Literally, like this is in the office. And I was like, No, no, no, that wouldn't work. We can't do it because it wouldn't work. And one of the guys is like, uh, Opus is pretty convinced that it would work. And I was like, Fuck that guy, he doesn't know what he's talking about. They
- 49:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): thought
- 49:12
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): we can
- 49:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): just create a new approval. Yeah, that'd be
- 49:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): just. It created
- 49:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): a new approval. And so we switched the token state, uh the token authority uh out.
- 49:19
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): That's a solid rug.
- 49:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): That's a
- 49:22
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and just create an
- 49:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): approval and then transferred the tokens to the DAO. It was so simple. It was so fucking simple. Um and it just never had occurred to us. And it was even to the point where I was like man surely we thought about this. And I went back through everything and at no point could I find anything where we thought of
- 49:42
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): this. Oh
- 49:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): interesting. So this is, I think, okay.
- 49:45
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But we didn't
- 49:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): want to try. This is the thing.
- 49:47
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We didn't want
- 49:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): to try.
- 49:49
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We never
- 49:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we didn't want to try. So
- 49:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): we'll
- 49:53
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): figure
- 49:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): out a solution.
- 49:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): We'll probably talk about thoratin
- 49:56
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in
- 49:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): a minute here. I don't actually want to talk about thoratin, thorough team, but we will. But the biggest thing that we asked. ask teams to do in crises like this is we ask the question, what can you do? And
- 50:09
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): try.
- 50:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): You ask them to try. What a crazy thing to ask them to do.
- 50:12
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 50:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): like we can lead them, we can hold their hand, we can morally support. We can do all these things, but ultimately it is the team and the team alone who can figure it out or cannot figure it out. And everyone has a threshold. and everyone has illogical and logical reasons for where that
- 50:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): threshold is. But I think that like what you've just said hits the nail just on the head. It's like there was never a situation prior to this that was the right combination of circumstances that got you to like really actually sit down and ask the question in like a in a fully like
- 50:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): authentic
- 50:53
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): way. Since
- 50:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): 2019, right? Like since 2019, like that's seven years ago now, right? Like in in almost a decade, we were like, no, we've litigated this. We had a conversation at Discord. We decided how it will be. And then we just shut
- 51:07
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that part of our
- 51:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): brain off and
- 51:09
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): threw away the
- 51:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): key and never thought about it again.
- 51:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): But also there was nothing like, I don't know, people. ask me all the time, like, well, what's the threshold then? And they want me to like put like an arbitrary threshold. Like if it's a million dollars and you have to do something. No, that's not how it works. Like there are a huge number of circumstances and and it's like the it's the totality of all those circumstances that
- 51:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): determine like when things can happen. Have it. But
- 51:33
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): dude, it's the overton the
- 51:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Overton window has shifted. Arbitrum shifted
- 51:37
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it.
- 51:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Arbitrum like after Arbitrum, like literally in the there was one guy um that we're like, we're in the office, and again, we're talking about it. And and I think there's only one person that was like, uh, really? And I was like, listen, after Arbitrum,
- 51:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you can't sit here with a straight face
- 51:56
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and have the power
- 51:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): to do it and not do it, right?
- 52:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Yeah.
- 52:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Um, and so yeah, we were like fine. fuck it, like let's let's not.
- 52:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): And by the way, Arbatum did it again too. They got
- 52:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I know, of course they did, of course they did, and on some level, they're now on the hook for doing this,
- 52:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): yes,
- 52:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): right? Um, but I would argue it's a good hook to be on. Stopping North Korea from getting money from fucking Binance users is a fine hook if you find yourself still. stuck on that hook, you are in a privileged position to actually stop these motherfuckers and you should. Sorry.
- 52:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Yeah. And aga and again, things did have to come together because there was actually like everyone was flying to Mumbai.
- 52:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Like
- 52:43
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it's a certain amount of there is a certain
- 52:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): amount of fate that like plays a role in in
- 52:48
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): these Mumbai. things. You know,
- 52:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): it's
- 52:49
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): stars
- 52:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): aligning and stuff. So yeah. Um, but I just I don't know. I find it all so interesting. I think it's also like worth acknowledging, just since we've been talking about risk, like there is a risk to doing these things and to having these controls, right? And so a lot of times people again.
- 53:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Up and sue tries to sue me.
- 53:11
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Like
- 53:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): that's a risk.
- 53:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Gonna be a fucking dumbass lawyer, though not North Korea. But
- 53:20
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): so yeah, in
- 53:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): a really yeah
- 53:22
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): like
- 53:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): general sense for for anyone who's building a protocol or or needs to manage the protocol operations, um it's uh seems kind of simple, but like just having a game plan beforehand for any kind of incident that could happen and what is your a pre-agreed response action
- 53:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): is really, really great practice, just in general, because uh I don't think that anybody is really uh can be prepared fully and when an incident happens and you have to respond to it, how chaotic it gets very quickly. So if you haven't been in if you've been in those situations, then you never
- 53:58
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): know. The
- 53:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): alternative is just be in the situations enough where you just don't care and you give zero five. fucks and you can think clearly. It doesn't matter. Um, like I want
- 54:06
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): as I said, my heart rate
- 54:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): went up
- 54:08
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): like zero
- 54:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): my heart rate was like zero beats per
- 54:12
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): minute
- 54:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): higher when I found out about this. I was like, All right, what are we gonna do? And we looked at it and we're
- 54:16
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): like,
- 54:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah, fuck it, let's just do this. Like it would be
- 54:18
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): like
- 54:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): wild. It's a lot.
- 54:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I wouldn't recommend
- 54:21
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that as like a live life
- 54:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): choice to go through that journey, but like if you happen to have been through it, then it's uh it's fine
- 54:28
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it's
- 54:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): fine
- 54:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): so it's it's a good place to be in in your opinion
- 54:31
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it's a
- 54:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): good place
- 54:31
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): to be in it's not a fun it's
- 54:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): not a pro it's not a good
- 54:34
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): process to go
- 54:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): through to get there. It's
- 54:36
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a long trauma. What else have we
- 54:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): what else what other there has to have been some other Thor chain let's talk Thor chain. What are
- 54:43
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): what were
- 54:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the other things
- 54:44
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Thor chain out
- 54:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): nervous of this?
- 54:46
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): This
- 54:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): is a janky ass fucking protocol. Thor chain double spent immediately during the hack the hack well sorry the hack happened they start laundering the funds through thor chain of course right thor chain somehow double spent meaning thor chain paid out because there was a one block reorg on ethereum i just
- 55:05
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): want to
- 55:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): emphasize like i'm sorry what
- 55:08
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that
- 55:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): is your protocol is so janky bro what the fuck? like this is the core thing like you have to process the swaps.
- 55:16
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Uncles. And if there's
- 55:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): no
- 55:18
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Uncles. What
- 55:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): about uncles?
- 55:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): I'm sorry. What? So anyway, so Thor chain, this happened. This happened. Luckily for Thor Chain, they double spent to a person who's like a a Thor Chain cult member or whatever. So he returned the money. But that doesn't fix the underlying bug because, like, spoiler, there is there's little one block, two blocks. block reorgs that
- 55:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): happen constantly. So they had to turn off and then they had to push an update. And here's where it gets really
- 55:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): nasty. And I'm I'm gonna be just super blunt about this. Like, this is nasty shit. This is we are very firmly
- 55:55
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
- 55:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): US feds are have set them up like hook, line lion, it and sinker, and Thor Chain has taken it. So wow. they shut down on Friday
- 56:05
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): because
- 56:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): of this re-org. So because of a protocol pro problem, they literally shut down the protocol. Or most, I guess there was a couple chains that were still on, but like the whole thing was basically off.
- 56:17
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 56:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): order to turn back on, they had to update the code that the Thor nodes run
- 56:25
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Uh
- 56:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): to fix the bug, right? Because you can't just have like double stuns going through left, right, and center, right? The protocol's gonna lose money. That's dangerous. That's bad. So fix
- 56:32
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it. Especially once
- 56:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): someone sees that it's a thing that can happen, right?
- 56:35
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): That becomes an exploit factor.
- 56:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Wait
- 56:38
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a second.
- 56:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I didn't realize that this cause yeah, yeah, yeah.
- 56:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Especially with the volume being hurled. I mean, just freaking guys, the laundry on this is like nothing anyone has ever seen. It is faster, it is harder. The I think there's like already like 50,000 addresses. Like it is
- 56:54
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a
- 56:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): wild
- 56:55
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): amount.
- 56:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): My my sense from the timeline is that like they stumbled across this like eight days before, as in like realizing that they'd be able to take over the finance
- 57:09
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): control
- 57:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): infrastructure. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Sorry. Like
- 57:11
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): as in North Korea
- 57:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): October 20th twentieth or something, right? Was like the timeline.
- 57:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): No. So we have on chain going to October eighth.
- 57:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Okay.
- 57:20
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So But like that's not surely that's not
- 57:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): enough time to like get your laundering.
- 57:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): No, no.
- 57:26
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): They
- 57:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): were they were also still laundering bitget.
- 57:29
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Right.
- 57:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Right.
- 57:29
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Done
- 57:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): doing BitGet. Bit get which
- 57:31
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): we're
- 57:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): three weeks ago. Four weeks ago now? Five
- 57:33
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): weeks ago maybe.
- 57:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Okay.
- 57:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Yeah. So So
- 57:36
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): their
- 57:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): laundry, their laundry
- 57:37
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): was already
- 57:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): cranking. when this happened.
- 57:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Yeah, they just started bringing in it. Seems like they found some new guys who are using like some really crazy automated scripts. Like, and we've seen them script stuff before, but this
- 57:49
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): is next
- 57:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): level.
- 57:50
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It's
- 57:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): named Claude.
- 57:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Yeah. So there's a human in the loop, but there's well, yeah, I think there's a Claude in the loop as well. Maybe not literally Claude, but one of them.
- 58:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): No. Probably
- 58:01
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): obliterated
- 58:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): uh just. GLM.
- 58:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Yeah. There's just a lot going on. So this is where it gets nasty for Thorchain, though, is like
- 58:10
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): so
- 58:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): they're turned off. Okay.
- 58:13
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): They
- 58:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): have to do a distribution to fix the vulnerability. During this time, Thorchain is not processing any stolen funds. During this time, over the weekend, the FBI, IRSCI, USC. US Secret Service release a formal statement attributing the hack to Trader Trader, which is North Korea.
- 58:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): It's a specific
- 58:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): aside here. Who in we should ask our friend, but who gets to decide these names?
- 58:42
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Trader
- 58:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Trader? Um, Trader Trader, they're all security researchers. Trader Trader is a really old name. I don't know who decided it, but it was back when um they originally would always hack people through these malicious trading applications. So they would
- 58:59
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): get
- 58:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): the centralized exchange operators to run these applications. And so it's like a funny little pun. You get it, trader, trader? Right. It's trader, like a on-chain on-tean trader, and then you get, you know, betrayed trader.
- 59:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): right
- 59:17
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): so
- 59:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): clever but
- 59:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): like Lazarus like yeah
- 59:21
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that Lazarus
- 59:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): is security researchers as well like it's the security community that names you get to name the
- 59:27
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): name if
- 59:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): you find if you find and organize and collect all the intel around a new campaign or a new threat group or a sub-threat sub threat, right if you do if your work is good enough you get to pick their name. You
- 59:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): get to pick their name. It's like naming a star. If you find a star if you discover a star, you get to name it. So
- 59:47
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I do wonder
- 59:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): whatever you want to
- 59:48
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): do. But I
- 59:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): do wonder what they think about this, like internally,
- 59:52
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): right? Like
- 59:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): those teams. Like they must have their own teams, surely. Like their
- 59:55
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): own
- 59:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): team names.
- 59:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): It's actually funny. Our friend asks, he he calls them Traitor Trader too, but he doesn't know anything.
- 1:00:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah, that's what's that's what's crazy, is like It's internally, like it's like a meme now where like he knows the name of them based on the
- 1:00:08
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): external
- 1:00:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Yeah. He's different though. He's in a different group and he's
- 1:00:12
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in a
- 1:00:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): different group. He's in the like shitty snow fan.
- 1:00:15
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Sorry, man. He's in the one that talks to
- 1:00:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Taylor and Kane.
- 1:00:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah. Yeah.
- 1:00:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Um
- 1:00:21
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I don't think anyone
- 1:00:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): from Trader Trader talks to me. So
- 1:00:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): No. But they all kind of look up to Trader Trader. Those are like the big boys. They're like the serious OGs. Like it's really fascinating. The culture is like just impeccable. Okay, so Dax and Thor trade. Okay. Oh, are we ready? This is so bad.
- 1:00:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Halloween Saturday FBI attributes formally to Trader Trader.
- 1:00:45
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A
- 1:00:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): big fancy statement, puts addresses out there, and they explicitly call out the Thor Thorn nodes nodes as as the first party in the how you can help section.
- 1:00:55
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): They
- 1:00:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): explicitly ask the Thornodes and then like RBC guys, whatever their name for sexes is uh VASPs, right? Just like the swappers, whatever they name all these different parties that are gonna be having fun funds scope go to them. But the first one
- 1:01:10
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): of those DI ask
- 1:01:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): asked Thor ThorChain Chain for help.
- 1:01:13
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): They asked
- 1:01:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Thor Thornode nodes.
- 1:01:15
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): to block.
- 1:01:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): They literally asked Thornode operators to block the transactions involving assets.
- 1:01:22
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 1:01:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): involving the stolen assets. And then providing
- 1:01:25
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it. It doesn't sound like
- 1:01:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): something Thorchain is inclined to comply with.
- 1:01:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): I mean, absolutely not. So
- 1:01:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): um but but they be they they made a very explicit request.
- 1:01:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): So that's that's some nasty work. Okay.
- 1:01:43
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You know,
- 1:01:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): we like feds when they're helping us on hacks, but like when they're supposedly calling you out by name, this was not and this is not all the other ones are like, yeah, also if you run like a centralized service or I
- 1:01:55
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): be
- 1:01:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): aware.
- 1:01:56
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah, no,
- 1:01:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Thor nodes, capital T H R O R N, you like they were. like full more. Okay, so then the next thing that happens
- 1:02:09
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): is,
- 1:02:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): and this is just all foreshadowing for what's coming to the pipeline, guys. Okay, so the next thing that happens is that all the Thornode operators and all the Thornode builders comment on this article and basically say, like, we can't do anything,
- 1:02:22
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): which
- 1:02:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): is a really bad plan because the whole
- 1:02:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): purpose of this attribution thing, right? Is to put everyone on notice that these addresses and these stolen funds are North Korea, and that makes them fucking sanctioned. Okay, they are sanctioned as hell. This is an OFAC thing, this is criminal liability, this is not regulators anymore, right? It's
- 1:02:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): DOJ shit, right? Like you're now
- 1:02:44
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): like Oh,
- 1:02:45
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): at the top of the
- 1:02:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): three-letter
- 1:02:47
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): three
- 1:02:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): letter chain. Yeah.
- 1:02:49
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Okay. And the
- 1:02:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): thing about OFAC. and sanctions law is that it actually makes a huge difference whether you know versus not knowing. And so
- 1:03:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): now they've formally attributed, they said it's DPRK, they've explicitly called out ThorNode operators. The ThorNode operators have read this thing and acknowledged acknowledge that they read this thing because they are incessantly talking about it on the fucking timeline and on fucking podcasts and in the fucking Discord in a fucking public. The next thing that they do
- 1:03:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): is they do a private distribution for the new updated Thornode that they release to all the Thornodes. The Thornodes then vote to turn the network back on. And in doing so, they process transactions that were involving addresses that were explicitly on the FBI's list.
- 1:03:40
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Uh
- 1:03:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): and now it's turned back on and it's like they've already done like almost 200 million dollars in volume for DPRK in like two days.
- 1:03:48
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It's
- 1:03:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): crazy.
- 1:03:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): What's gonna happen next, guys? I don't know. But uh I'm fucking over our builders when
- 1:03:56
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I'm gonna do it.
- 1:03:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): They're uh dude, like talk about commitment to the bit, they're extremely committed to this. bit. Like
- 1:04:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): I I have such disrespect for Thor Chain. I hate them. I think the shit is changed. Like I have so many different problems with them. But at the end of the day, I do not want to see builders going to prison. Period. End of conversation. They don't belong in prison.
- 1:04:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): See You got it was a warning shot. It was such a loud warning shot. It was the same warning shot that they shot in 2022 when Ronan got hacked, right? And we learned our fucking lesson, and it's so it is so painful to me because it's like watching it's like watching the
- 1:04:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): same slow motion train wreck again, you know, and we're not even Roman Man is still sitting here waiting for his next fucking trial.
- 1:04:48
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
- 1:04:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it's not
- 1:04:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): and that was way Tornado Cash has.
- 1:04:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): This is like if if
- 1:04:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): it's like if Roman, Roman, and Alex Leap were like
- 1:05:01
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): like
- 1:05:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Ronan gets hacked, the FBI is like, this is DPRK, don't touch these addresses. And then they updated Tornado Cash. Like the pro.
- 1:05:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah. Yeah.
- 1:05:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): to the to explicitly let the Ronin funds go through like we would
- 1:05:19
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): be
- 1:05:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): done with that case
- 1:05:20
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it's crazy
- 1:05:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it's crazy it's
- 1:05:22
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): like it's
- 1:05:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): so crazy there there's
- 1:05:24
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a
- 1:05:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): level of delusionalness that as I said like they're committed to the bit of like no no no we can't do anything and therefore we can do anything that we want because of this we can't do anything. And the problem is, you know, as we saw with fucking tornado, like they got Alexis phone,
- 1:05:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): clearly. Like, we don't know exactly where those fucking signal chats came from, right? But then they just screenshot the like thing where the guy's like, holy
- 1:05:53
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): shit.
- 1:05:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): But it's not even a bad line. You know, in context that it was like,
- 1:05:59
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): holy
- 1:05:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): shit, like we should
- 1:06:01
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): stop. we
- 1:06:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): should stop this, right? And then and they make it out like it was like, ah, fuck these guys, we're not gonna do shit. And it was like, no, no, that's not the what the message was saying, and you know it, but you know, in the fucking court of law, you get to put up a screenshot of like the one cropped out
- 1:06:19
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): one line of like
- 1:06:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): the rest of the lines,
- 1:06:21
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): they don't have to put
- 1:06:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the rest up, they can do whatever the fuck they want. So
- 1:06:24
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and I'll just say the
- 1:06:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): lines for this are way more mu they're so much worse. All free Roman Storm hashtag like
- 1:06:30
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 1:06:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): don't I genuinely for all the issues I have with Orchane and their decisions and like every I just disagree with them so vehemently. I do I still do not want to see our builders
- 1:06:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): going it's a bad precedent right like it's bad precedent to to be even fucking getting close to this thing yeah uh
- 1:06:53
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): also
- 1:06:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): have you seen these thorough node operators like they they're not prison guys it's not
- 1:07:01
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it's
- 1:07:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): like
- 1:07:02
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): if you
- 1:07:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): put me in prison like it's not gonna end well like I don't
- 1:07:09
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): oh
- 1:07:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): man all right um let's uh let's wrap it up here devcon none of us are at dev DevCon. Um well actually Austin.
- 1:07:17
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Austin's at
- 1:07:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): DevCon.
- 1:07:18
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Oh, sorry, the French thing. Let's
- 1:07:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): do the French thing quickly. Um so
- 1:07:22
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): good. Uh
- 1:07:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Zach Zach found that uh a bank got heisted.
- 1:07:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): A bank got hacked, guys.
- 1:07:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): But also this bank has like what two and a half times as many assets as Binance? 235 billion or something. Um
- 1:07:38
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and this is like a bank never heard of it. Is this
- 1:07:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): confirmed
- 1:07:41
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): by the way, or
- 1:07:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): this is
- 1:07:42
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): this is still alleged?
- 1:07:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Yeah, no, this
- 1:07:44
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): is confirmed.
- 1:07:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): This is Zach. This is Zach. No,
- 1:07:46
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): no,
- 1:07:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): no, this is
- 1:07:47
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): confirmed
- 1:07:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): by Zach.
- 1:07:47
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): No,
- 1:07:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): confirmed by the bank now.
- 1:07:49
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Oh,
- 1:07:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): they've said it. Okay, cool.
- 1:07:51
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah, they did
- 1:07:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): a little press release saying like
- 1:07:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): it was a super sophisticated external attack and it's continuing.
- 1:07:58
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It always
- 1:07:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): is.
- 1:07:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So sophisticated. So fucking sophisticated. You would not believe the sophistication of this thing. So
- 1:08:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): they are
- 1:08:07
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): more sophisticated than anything you've
- 1:08:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): ever seen.
- 1:08:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): They're one, a real ass bank, two, yeah, it's like two hundred billion assets under management or something. Like it's it's a real I you guys, it's a real bank. It's a French bank. But
- 1:08:19
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): let's not forget
- 1:08:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): banks lose money all the time. The only reason why it's not a problem is because the fucking database and they just like call up the other guy.
- 1:08:25
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): They just say,
- 1:08:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Oh, sorry. Oops, fat fingered it. Like,
- 1:08:29
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): yeah,
- 1:08:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): that's what people were like. People were saying earlier, because CZ actually went on an interview and said, like, you know, like you know, sort of all eyes are on us right now, but like wait until the
- 1:08:42
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): realize that
- 1:08:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): my favorite thing is the CZ stick of like
- 1:08:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): pretending like he's just heard about something. for like the first time. And and you could see him being on there being like, guys, I've just heard about these banks.
- 1:09:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Do you realize how much money these guys have so much money? It's crazy. Why do they have this much money? And they're just losing it.
- 1:09:06
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 1:09:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): didn't even know these guys existed. One of my team told me today about these banks. What are they doing over here? Why is everyone paying attention to us?
- 1:09:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): It's so good. And
- 1:09:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it's like, bro, like what? Like, come on, man. Like, I love it. I love it.
- 1:09:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): It's a good bit. It's a good bit. Every time something weird happens, he's like, I just heard about this.
- 1:09:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): One
- 1:09:29
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): of my team just told me in a
- 1:09:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): meeting this morning.
- 1:09:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Um
- 1:09:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): oh man. So
- 1:09:33
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): yeah, so
- 1:09:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): the bank the bank got hacked. We don't know how exactly it is confirmed. The reason why Zach XPT knows about it is because they apparently stole the money out of the accounts at the bank.
- 1:09:45
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Okay.
- 1:09:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And
- 1:09:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): they put them in, I guess, new bank accounts somewhere else. And then from those bank accounts, they then purchased cryptocurrency via a whole bunch of centralized exchanges. Um, because of just the volume and everyone being on high alert due to the Binance hack, um, I'm guessing that there's like a whole bunch of people. having a whole bunch of conversations like, wait, this is super
- 1:10:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): anomalous behavior. What the hell is going on? Um, and then when they were tracing it on-chain, it's basically huge outflows coming from all these centralized exchanges and then like commingling and then doing some really filthy laundering. Um and so Zach was able to like basically cluster all that activity, trace it back. I assume talk talked and more warned with the
- 1:10:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): centralized exchanges. And then
- 1:10:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): uh apparently the bank was not aware.
- 1:10:33
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He
- 1:10:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): was Zach was trying to like freeze funds, coordinate with the exchanges and stuff to freeze funds. But in order to do that, you have to have some confirmation that this is like illicit activity.
- 1:10:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah. I mean in the real world,
- 1:10:43
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): yes.
- 1:10:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): You can't just be a a a guy on the internet that like tweets things, right? It works in
- 1:10:48
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): crypto, but
- 1:10:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): not for banks, I don't think. I don't think they
- 1:10:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): and so he wanted to at least at least identify the victim,
- 1:10:57
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): at
- 1:10:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): least get some sort of like this is super, you know. Um, but he was unable to because it goes, it crosses back into fiat and because the bank hadn't made a statement. Um
- 1:11:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): and so I think Zach cited 30 million, basically he was watching about 30 million dollars that should. have been stopped and should have been frozen, but couldn't because there was no victim identified.
- 1:11:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Which is
- 1:11:23
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
- 1:11:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we don't know we don't know who's on the other side of this yet. This could be anyone, right? It's not
- 1:11:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): right. All we know is that it's definitely not Lazarus. So not only did this bank get hacked, but they got hacked by not the best hackers in the world.
- 1:11:37
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 1:11:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): mean, dude,
- 1:11:38
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): their they're banks
- 1:11:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): man. Like, they're banks. Like the these guys, like, uh see as funny as CZ pretending like he'd never heard of banks was like banks are not prepared for this shit. Like, he's right.
- 1:11:51
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Like
- 1:11:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): banks are not fucking prepared for this shit. Like, you know, the thing that banks The have relied on for whatever, like a hundred years, right? Is like the slow. slowness of them.
- 1:12:04
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): That it like you can't
- 1:12:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): even the banks aren't slow anymore. Like, there's it's not just like
- 1:12:09
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): no no no, they're faster now.
- 1:12:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): They're faster, and they're like crypto is much more connected to trad fi. There's many more egress vectors for money. It's not like you just call up your friend at the other French bank in fucking, you know. Marseille. We're
- 1:12:27
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): not,
- 1:12:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): we're not.
- 1:12:28
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So like, hey, bro, like sorry,
- 1:12:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): can you just send me the database back? Like, that's not like now, like there's fucking a million different ways to get this shit out.
- 1:12:40
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah.
- 1:12:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So And
- 1:12:41
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): then they
- 1:12:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): also there was a there's a few people on my timeline being like, no, no, no, Know because the banks don't hold all the money, so you can't steal the money. And I was like, I'm sorry, well,
- 1:12:51
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): like the whole
- 1:12:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): the fact that's
- 1:12:52
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): not how money
- 1:12:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): works, man. It's not it's not a sack of diamonds and gold at the bottom of halt.
- 1:13:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): What in the hell are you talking about?
- 1:13:03
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It's just the
- 1:13:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): database, like that's
- 1:13:05
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it makes it even worse. It's worse, it's
- 1:13:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): actually worse. It the it only
- 1:13:08
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): works You
- 1:13:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): had to steal the actual funds, funds.
- 1:13:11
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 1:13:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): had to actually
- 1:13:12
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): steal the funds.
- 1:13:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): you can
- 1:13:13
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): just change the
- 1:13:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): line in the database
- 1:13:15
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
- 1:13:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): get the actual funds. You
- 1:13:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): get the money back.
- 1:13:17
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): What?
- 1:13:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): The money's not real. Guys, just a heads up in case you were not aware of this. Money is not real. It's not a real thing. So it that works really well when you can be like, hey, give me my fake money back to the other guy who runs the fake money business. Uh that breaks down if the fake money can
- 1:13:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): be connected. to real money really quickly and people can actually steal it because then now the person who gave the real money is not going to be willing to give the fake money back. They're gonna say, No, that's my money now, man. I'm not I gave a bunch of Bitcoin and gold to these fucking guys. I'm not giving you, I'm not just crediting your database back here.
- 1:13:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Yeah.
- 1:13:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): All right. Um
- 1:14:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): so
- 1:14:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): let's let's
- 1:14:02
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): wrap up.
- 1:14:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): here. Uh let's talk DevCon uh quickly. Um
- 1:14:07
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): so
- 1:14:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I mean the thing that we've been saying the entire time that we hoped would happen both for good and ill, I guess. Um, and you know, maybe maybe uh Adam, you've got some insight into this. Uh because hopefully the EF is talking to Aave people about their whatever the fuck they're planning. Um but like the
- 1:14:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): acceleration of the roadmap finally has hit Ethereum,
- 1:14:32
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh,
- 1:14:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the sleepiest
- 1:14:34
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
- 1:14:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): region
- 1:14:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): of
- 1:14:37
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
- 1:14:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): cryptocurrency. And they're like, all right, we gotta no one's thinking 2030 anymore. It's crazy. We had remember this was like two years ago that 2030 came out. Now we're two years later. We're at the like the end of twenty 2026, twenty six, and now we're talking 2028. I'm so here for this. This is like my bet the best timeline for me. Everyone was complaining
- 1:14:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): about 2030, and now we're saying all of these things. Usually it would have been we've been talking 2035 by now. Instead, we're talking 2028. This is amazing. I'm so fucking confident that the clankers are you going to whip Ethereum into shape and get this thing working.
- 1:15:13
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It's
- 1:15:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): amazing. Good times.
- 1:15:16
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Is
- 1:15:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): that that's all we got in DEFCON? I was hoping that you guys bring me the alpha. Like I
- 1:15:20
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): just think.
- 1:15:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): We're going faster. The the alpha is we're
- 1:15:24
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): doing the
- 1:15:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): same things faster. It's as
- 1:15:27
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): simple as that.
- 1:15:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Let's not overcomplicate it.
- 1:15:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Have you been following DEF CON things? Is there anything uh I
- 1:15:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): I I want wanna to like watch the talks and stuff. I'm not there, but
- 1:15:37
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): yeah,
- 1:15:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): I I just know. about uh Vitalic's uh hood and his uh his his scam artist antics.
- 1:15:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah.
- 1:15:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Yeah, that was
- 1:15:47
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Oh
- 1:15:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Ethereum.
- 1:15:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Oh Ethereum.
- 1:15:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Never change.
- 1:15:54
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Never change. Actually,
- 1:15:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): please change just just
- 1:15:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): change a little bit. Okay.
- 1:15:59
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
- 1:15:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): be careful what you wish for. Be careful what you wish for.
- 1:16:02
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I mean it's
- 1:16:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): true. This
- 1:16:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): is what I'm saying. Don't change, just go faster. I'm like
- 1:16:06
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): honestly,
- 1:16:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): this the simplest thing.
- 1:16:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): So my
- 1:16:09
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): team
- 1:16:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): is planning to go to uh ETCC as we do every year in the springtime.
- 1:16:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Is that
- 1:16:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): a conference you guys are looking forward to?
- 1:16:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I you know it's funny. I used to go to Ecc every year when it was in Paris, and then when they moved it to the south of France, I went to the Belgian one. as well.
- 1:16:27
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um
- 1:16:29
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
- 1:16:30
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh,
- 1:16:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): but when they moved it to the south of France, I was like, yeah, that's a lot of effort from Sydney. It's like seven flights.
- 1:16:37
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Oh,
- 1:16:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): do you have to do yeah, I was about to say you have to do like seven flights.
- 1:16:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): It's just
- 1:16:40
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): not worth it.
- 1:16:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Like Paris, I'm
- 1:16:42
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): like,
- 1:16:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I'll go to Paris. Although now I probably wouldn't. If you if you said to
- 1:16:45
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): me,
- 1:16:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Hey, do you want to go to a conference in Paris? I'd probably say no, I'd rather not get murdered.
- 1:16:51
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): This
- 1:16:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): is a weird place.
- 1:16:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Dude,
- 1:16:54
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): um,
- 1:16:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): I might.
- 1:16:55
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): All
- 1:16:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): right.
- 1:16:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Uh we'll see. We'll see. All
- 1:16:57
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): right, let's wrap it
- 1:16:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): up here. Yeah. Let's wrap it up here. All right. Um, thank you very much, Adam, for joining us. Uh, we will be back next week with Austin, assuming he makes it back safely from Mumbai, hopefully.
- 1:17:09
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um,
- 1:17:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): hopefully, then we'll have the alpha. Then we'll have the real
- 1:17:12
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): alpha
- 1:17:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): for you.
- 1:17:13
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You
- 1:17:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): won't tell us. You'll keep
- 1:17:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it.
- 1:17:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): secret.
- 1:17:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): All right.
- 1:17:18
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Thank
- 1:17:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you everyone for joining
- 1:17:19
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): us for this
- 1:17:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): episode.
- 1:17:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Great to
- 1:17:20
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): hang out with
- 1:17:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): you guys. Thank you.
- 1:17:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah, thank you. Thank you. Thanks, Adam. Um, all right, remember what happens on chain never stays on chain. We'll be back next week. See you guys. Nothing you hear on uneasy money is financial advice. We're just three builders talking about what's happening on chain, and we want you to always do your own research before aping it. in. You can find all our disclosure. disclosures at unchaincrypto.com slash
- 1:17:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): uneasymone
More from Unchained
Is Ethereum's $240 Billion Market Cap Justified With Only $6 Million in Monthly Fees?
Episode discussion: Jeff Dorman argues Ethereum's $240B market cap is unjustified by its $6M monthly fees, labeling most value as 'hopium'.
Speakers’ claims: Jeff Dorman contends that Ethereum's value is predominantly social rather than financial, estimating only $50 billion of its $240 billion market cap is tangible based on $6 million in monthly fees and idle wallet utility. He contrasts this with application-layer tokens like Hyperliquid, which he claims generate significantly more revenue, arguing that the 'fat protocol thesis' is wrong and value accrues to apps, not layer-one networks. Dorman dismisses Ethereum's 'store of value' thesis as misguided in a multi-chain future and proposes that Ethereum should tax applications to capture revenue. Laura Shin and Speaker_1 challenge these views, noting that Dorman's proposals conflict with Ethereum's decentralization principles and that the network's value may stem from factors beyond immediate fee capture.
Uneasy Money: Why Ethereum's 'Ultrasound Money' Meme Finally Ran Out of Road
Episode discussion: Speakers critique Ethereum's 'ultrasound money' narrative, discuss core dev bottlenecks, and analyze AI inference arbitrage opportunities.
Speakers’ claims: Hosts Austin Griffith and Kain Warwick, along with guest Greg Markou, argue that Ethereum's 'ultrasound money' thesis has lost momentum and lacks a compelling institutional value proposition beyond meme-driven narratives. The discussion highlights growing tensions between core and application developers regarding gas repricing and the challenges of testing upgrades in a monolithic codebase. Markou criticizes Ledger's SDK for privacy-invasive telemetry and advocates for clear signing standards to improve security. Finally, the panel explores MegaETH's pivot to an AI inference marketplace, identifying significant arbitrage opportunities between subsidized subscription costs and API rates.