Speaker argues US housing crash stems from buyer disappearance, not forced selling, unlike 2008
Summary
Speaker 0 states that pending US home sales have crashed 18% over six months to a record low, driven by disappearing buyers and weakening consumer psychology rather than the distressed lending that characterized the 2008 crisis. The speaker contrasts the current market, where homeowners hold fixed-rate mortgages and are not forced to sell, with the 2008 era of foreclosures. Data from Redfin and the National Association of Realtors is cited to show record-low buyer participation and high seller inventory. The speaker argues that a macroeconomic feedback loop involving declining construction permits and job insecurity will eventually force the Federal Reserve to pivot to rate cuts.
Key takeaways
- 1 Pending US home sales crashed 18% over the last six months, hitting a new record low. In October alone, down another 4.7%.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) · 0:00
Episode sections
- 0:00 – 1:34
Introduction to Housing Crash and 2008 Comparison
Speaker 0 states pending US home sales crashed 18% over six months, hitting a record low, with October seeing a 4.7% drop. The speaker argues that while comparisons to 2007-2008 are common, the current situation is fundamentally different due to the absence of forced selling.
- 1:34 – 2:46
Regional Data and Consumer Psychology
Pending home sales declined across all major US regions in October, with the West and South seeing the steepest drops. The speaker contends that the housing crash is driven by disappearing buyers and weakening consumer psychology rather than the distressed lending seen in 2008.
- 2:46 – 6:35
Interest Rates vs. Income Confidence
The speaker critiques Larry Young's view that low interest rates will unlock pent-up demand, arguing that mortgages are bets on future income and job security. Survey data shows consumers delaying large purchases and carrying high credit card balances, indicating a lack of confidence in future earnings.
- 6:35 – 8:13
Redfin Data on Buyer-Seller Imbalance
Redfin data shows only three of the 50 most populous metros are seller's markets, a record low. Buyers have more negotiating power, with 70.5% more sellers than buyers in October, yet the total number of buyers is at a record low since 2013.
- 8:13 – 11:04
Structural Differences from 2008
Unlike 2008, where forced sales and foreclosures drove price collapses, today's market is characterized by a disappearance of buyers. Homeowners hold fixed-rate mortgages and are not being forced to sell, which has kept prices stable despite collapsing transaction volumes.
- 11:04 – 12:36
Construction and Builder Confidence
Single-family construction permits fell to a nearly four-year low, indicating builders lack confidence in future demand. While multifamily starts rose, single-family starts remained down year-over-year, and builders are cutting prices and slowing pipelines.
- 12:36 – 17:35
Macroeconomic Feedback Loop
The speaker describes a feedback loop where declining consumer confidence leads to delayed home purchases, which reduces construction, leading to job losses in cyclical industries, further weakening consumer confidence. This fragility is amplified by the reliance on the housing wealth effect.
- 17:35 – 21:30
Yield Curve Signals and Fed Policy
The yield curve is described as steep in the front and flat in the back, signaling market skepticism about the Fed's ability to maintain high rates without causing economic deterioration. The speaker argues that weak housing data will eventually force the Fed to pivot to rate cuts.
Claims worth verifying
Pending US home sales crashed 18% over the last six months, hitting a new record low.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·0:00
How to verify: Check National Association of Realtors (NAR) Pending Home Sales Index data for the six-month period ending October 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Pending home sales fell 4.7% in October, the lowest level since tracking began in 2001.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·0:00
How to verify: Verify NAR Pending Home Sales Index for October 2026 against historical data from 2001 onward. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The West suffered a 6.9% monthly decline in pending home sales, and the South dropped 6.3% in October.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·1:34
How to verify: Check NAR regional pending home sales data for October 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Only three of the nation's 50 most populous metropolitan areas were classified as sellers' markets in October.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·6:35
How to verify: Review Redfin's October 2026 Market Report for seller's market classifications. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
There were 70.5% more sellers than buyers in October, the sixth consecutive record-breaking month.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·7:15
How to verify: Check Redfin's October 2026 data on buyer-seller ratios. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The number of buyers in the market was approximately 895,752, the lowest since records began in 2013.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·7:53
How to verify: Verify Redfin's buyer count data for October 2026 against historical records from 2013. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Single-family construction permits fell to a nearly four-year low in October.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·11:56
How to verify: Check US Census Bureau Housing Starts and Permits data for October 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Multifamily construction starts rose 23.6% to an annualized rate of 445,000 in October.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·11:36
How to verify: Verify US Census Bureau Housing Starts data for multifamily units in October 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
In 2008, forced selling and foreclosures drove price collapses, whereas today's market lacks this structure.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·8:52
How to verify: Compare foreclosure rates and distressed sales data from 2026 with 2026 data from sources like ATTOM or NAR. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The two-year Treasury yield spread remained inverted in late 2023, signaling skepticism about prolonged high rates.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·14:35
How to verify: Check US Treasury yield curve data for the two-year spread during late 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Do your own research
- Verify pending home sales data via the National Association of Realtors (NAR) monthly reports.
- Check Redfin's Market Competitiveness Index for current buyer-seller dynamics and inventory levels.
- Review Federal Reserve Beige Books and FOMC minutes for signals regarding housing and consumer confidence.
- Analyze Census Bureau housing starts and permits data to confirm construction trends.
- Compare current mortgage delinquency and foreclosure rates with 2008-2009 data from the Mortgage Bankers Association.
- Assess consumer sentiment surveys (e.g., University of Michigan) for trends in income expectations and large purchase delays.
- Examine the US Treasury yield curve shape to evaluate market expectations for future rate cuts.
- Review builder confidence indices (e.g., NAHB Housing Market Index) for industry sentiment on future demand.
Full transcriptexpand
0:00Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Pending US home sales crashed 18% over the last six months, hitting a new record low. In October alone, down another 4.7%. It's the lowest level since the National Association of Realtors began tracking the data in 2001. Worse than the pandemic, worse than 2008. And so, of course, now everyone is comparing the housing market to 2007 and 2008. But that gets the most important part wrong, and I'll show you why in this video. This is not 2008. But that also doesn't mean what we're watching isn't becoming an honest to goodness crash in housing activity. Buyers are disappearing. Sellers are far outpacing them. Construction is losing momentum rapidly. Builders have already lost confidence. And if prices now begin falling, if for a completely different reason than in 2008, the damage won't remain confined to real estate. It's going gonna to hit an already weakened consumer psychology. and therefore further weaken the so-called wealth effect when all this economy has is a wealth effect. And provide another key reason why the market expects the Federal Reserve to pivot to rate cuts next year. No matter what they say about hawkishness, inflation risk, or whatever,
1:07housing would be a big one. And what we are seeing is an honest to goodness crash. And a crash that could expose an economy that was never resilient to be. begin with. If you haven't noticed recently, especially recently, we talked about the commodity crash. Things are accelerating. We're seeing the cracks open more and more, more and more obvious ways and get wider and wider. We could finally start to see that this economy has been this entire time fragile and housing right at the middle of
1:34Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it. Yes,
1:35Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the housing crash has already begun, it just doesn't look like the last. one. And according to the National Association of Realtors, pending home sales declined across every major region of the United States in October. The West suffered the steepest monthly decline, falling 6.9%, while the South, the nation's largest housing region, that one dropped 6.3%, which wasn't that far behind. The national index was down 4.7% from September and roughly 17% below a year ago. And over the last six months, as I already told you, the decline is almost 18%. This is not some minor slowdown. These are big numbers for a market that's already deep in the hole. Pending home sales, if you don't know, they measure contracts signed for existing homes. And those contracts typically close several weeks later, which means this data gives us an early indication of where completed home sales are going to be going. And the indication here is 10%. terrible. Existing home sales have been stuck near her historically depressed levels, and now the pipeline feeding into those has fallen to a new record low. The market is not simply recovering slowly, it is deteriorating from an already weak position. And that means a lot more than people are paying attention to.
2:46Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
2:46Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): of course, you know the drill by now. You probably heard it if you're paying attention to real estate from the chief. propagandist Larry Young. This is all about interest rates. And when interest rates go down again, there's massive amounts of pent-up demand just waiting to roar into the marketplace because the economy is, according to Young, an economist, resilient, holding up. There's been job growth and wage gains, housing market equity, all that stuff. There's the economy is just great if it wasn't for those pesky interest rates.
3:14Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But a
3:14Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): household doesn't purchase a home based on today's mortgage. It makes a judgment about the next five, 10, 30 years. Will their jobs still be there? Will their incomes be able to rise enough to offset their costs? A mortgage is not merely a bet on interest rates. It's a bet on future income. It's a bet on future smally economics. And that's where the housing market is revealing the deeper weaknesses. The official economic narrative says employment is broadly resilient. Household income is supposedly holding up. Consumer spending, what they always point to, supposedly strong enough to support continued expansion. But consumers don't behave as if that story is reliable. They're not acting like households confident about future income. In fact, they keep telling us over and over and over again, in survey after survey after survey, they're delaying large purchases. It's not just pessimism. They're carrying expensive credit card balances. They're becoming more cautious about changing jobs. They won't quit. They're watching layoffs, hiring freezes, and downward revisions to labor data that more accurately picture the labor market that they perceive, that they actually live in. A
4:19household doesn't need to be unemployed to become financially defensive. It only needs to believe that employment conditions are deteriorating. And that's what all the evidence actually
4:26Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): does.
4:27Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): shows. It's why the mortgage rate argument is at best incomplete. High rates may be the immediate obstacle for a lot of families, but weakening confidence is what makes the obstacle impossible to overcome. In a genuinely strong economy, historically normal financing costs, because that's where interest rates are, they're not that high historically. They don't destroy the housing market. For example, during the 1990s, mortgage rates were far higher than they are today, and far higher than many buyers would tolerate today. Yet households purchase homes because they had greater confidence in employment and future income. And they had every reason to have that confidence. So, yes, the payment matters, but the expected ability to make the payment matters even more. That's the variable that everyone leaves out because Kevin Wars says the economy and labor market is resilient. it's roughly in balance, and we need to be worried about slowing the economy down for inflation. No, it's the labor market that matters and the housing market, the labor market is the one that's driving everything. That's what we see in real estate and homes. Most people spend a lot of time worrying about financial risk. Inflation, the economy, the banking system, what might happen to their investments. But there's another financial risk that doesn't get near. nearly enough attention identity theft. Think about how much of your financial life exists online, your personal information,
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6:552020 for the fewest dating back to 2016 when they started. And those three remaining sellers' markets were in Nassau County, New York, Newark, New Jersey, and Montgomery County, Pennsylvania. And even those markets weakened during the month of October. Nationally, buyers now have more negotiating power than at any point in Redfin's records. Nationally, buyers have more negotiating power than at any point in Redfin's records. There were an estimated 70.5% more sellers than buyers in October, which was the sixth consecutive record-breaking month. And the imbalance widened because would-be buyers continued to retreat while sellers continued listing their homes.
7:33Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
7:33Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you'd think with more negotiating power that buyers would be rushing in if the economy was truly resilient and income. incomes truly were growing, people would be taking advantage of these buyer markets all over the country. Instead, according to Redfin, there were approximately 895,752 buyers in the market nationwide, the lowest number in records dating back to 2013. This is the crucial distinction. The housing market is not collapsing because millions of desperate borrowers are being forced. to sell like they did in 2007 and 2008, and then 2009 and afterward. It's weakening because the buyer pool is disappearing, the complete opposite case. So when even a modest increase in listing meets a historic decline in buyers, the market shifts rapidly in favor of those buyers who do remain in the marketplace, which means longer listing times, more price reductions and concessions, and eventually lower transactions. transaction prices all across the board. We're already on the verge of it according to the data that we have. The process begins with volume, and then prices they usually follow later on. So that's why this is not 2008. In 2008, what really happened was you had a collapse in volume, sure, but you also had a collapse in prices that was due to forced and distressed selling. People bought houses they couldn't afford. they defaulted on them, they
8:52were foreclosed on, and the banks they sold them onto the marketplace regardless of conditions in that marketplace, pressing prices down substantially. That forced selling was the central feature. Borrowers defaulted, lenders foreclosed, properties were repossessed and immediately sold, often at heavily discounted prices. Banks just wanted to get the hell out of the marketplace, didn't care at what cost. Financial institutions, they couldn't hold those properties indefinitely because they were not set up to be landlords. They had to liquidate the assets, recognize the losses, and reduce their exposure. This was before the frozen market can kicking that we now see commonplace everywhere today. Back then, though, it created a vicious cycle. Falling prices increased losses. Higher losses produced more caution and tighter lending. Tighter lending created more defaults and fewer buyers. More foreclosures produced more forced inventory. The system just kept feeding on itself one after another after another. Today's housing market does not have that same structure. Most existing homeowners hold fixed-rate mortgages, and many of them refinance during the period of exceptionally low interest rates. Their monthly payments are comparatively cheap, and their balance sheets just aren't immediately under the same pressure as borrowers were in that prior housing bond. bust. There's no comparable wave of adjustable rate mortgage resets, nor an equivalent level of speculative construction in every single marketplace. That's why prices have remained
10:12generally stable even as transactions have collapsed. The lack of forced sellers prevents a 2008-style price implosion, but this stability or seeming stability can be misleading. A market can have stable prices and still be deeply unhealthy. If homeowners refuse to sell because they're locked into low rate mortgages while buyers can't afford current prices, transactions simply freeze. It's sort of like the labor market equivalent. The market becomes or appears to become artificially stable because both sides retreat. But that equilibrium can change. If more homeowners decide they must sell, or if new construction adds inventory, or if economic weakness reduces buyer demand. even further, which is exactly what we're seeing, the shortage of buyers becomes impossible to hide. Then prices don't need foreclosures to fall. They only need sellers who are willing or have to negotiate.
11:03Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
11:04Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): as we also saw in recent data, the weakness is not limited to existing homes. Home construction is undergoing the same decline and deterioration, especially where it comes to construction of. single family homes.
11:17Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): While
11:17Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): October housing starts rose to an annualized rate of 1.309 million, up almost 10% from September and up almost 3% from a year earlier. At first glance, that sounds like a recovery, but almost all of that improvement came from multifamily construction, which is incredibly noisy. Multifamily starts rose 23.6% to an annualized rate of 445,000. Single family starts, again, starts on the other hand, only increased 4% from September and remained down 3.2% from a year earlier. But more importantly, vastly more importantly, single family permits a measure of future construction intentions. That one fell to a nearly four-year four year low. And as you can see, it's falling pretty rapidly more recently. A start tells us what builders are doing now, but a permit tells us what they're willing to do next. And builders are not behaving like companies who are confident where housing is now and where it might be heading. They're cutting prices, offering incentives, and slowing down the pipeline. That's what businesses do when demand isn't believed to be there for the long haul. So that leaves the economy in precarious shape for two reasons. One is what all of this says about where we are now, fragility, not resilience. And the other, what this potentially indicates for where the whole system goes from here, and not just homes either, home
12:36prices, the entire economy, its wealth effect, interest rates, and more. It is essentially amplifying macroeconomic weakness from the past and on into the future, because the sequence is pretty easy to follow. It really is straightforward. Consumers become less confident about jobs and income, so they delay home purchases. Builders see fewer buyers and so they reduce their construction. Construction companies cut their hours, hiring and orders of key jobs, especially in these cyclical industries. Suppliers receive fewer purchases, commodities, employment income weaken weakened further, especially at the margins, which reinforces consumer confidence. It's not necessarily a subject. sudden collapse. It's a feedback loop. And feedback loops are often missed by economic models because each individual deterioration appears manageable. Pending sales are down, construction is slowing, builder confidence is weak, hiring, not good. Consumer confidence is in the toilet. None of those developments alone prove some kind of severe 2009-style recession. Together, though, they describe an economy at least without forward. momentum, and that's what they call resilient. This is also why, for example, the bond market may respond before the official data does. Headline statistics are backward looking and, as we know, heavily revised. Market prices attempt to discount future conditions. And this is where the comparisons
13:55to 2023 in the marketplace they really apply. The parallels from just before when the job losses started to show. up by 2024. During late 2023, if you remember, treasury yields absolutely surged. Deficits, treasury supply, inflation fears, higher for longer, those were all blamed for the rise in interest rates. Commentators kept predicting the Federal Reserve would need to keep rates higher for longer, or even just raise them further and further and further forever forward into double digits or something. But the yield curve never fully accepted that. idea of an unlimited hiking cycle. The two year tenure spread, for example, that one remained inverted, which was a key warning that nobody paid attention to. SWAT markets, as we've gone over ever since then, they resisted those most extreme interpretations. They didn't price a permanent inflation regime or an endlessly expanded level of policy rate hikes. The message was not that the economy would collapse the following week, the message was that it had already lost its ability. to grow and therefore was in a precarious position, which left it vulnerable to take another hit, which it did, and transited even lower into more flat beverage in 2024 and beyond. That's the kind of potential we're getting warned about. And housing is a key one that would potentially add to that same negative pressure. That's because for years, homeowners
15:15felt more wealthy. They had home prices that were expanding, especially from the big expansion in 2021 and 2022. So you had a wealth effect. A wealth effect, even though it wasn't necessarily as broad based as many economists and central bankers would have liked, it was substantial and sizable to begin with. It was substantial and sizable enough to make an increasingly difficult situation appear to be resilient. in some perceptions. Homeowners felt wealthier, which helped cushion their worries on the job market, their growing worries on the job market. They refinance, they borrowed against their equity, which they've done a lot more recently. They did a whole bunch of other things, including purchasing vehicles and tolerating higher prices everywhere. This is the so-called wealth effect. It doesn't require households to actually sell their houses. They only need to believe the asset is becoming more valuable. But the wealth effect works in both directions. If home prices begin falling, homeowners could become less willing to borrow and spend. Potential buyers may wait for better prices. Existing owners feel less secure. The system gets locked into a downward feedback loop. There's that again. Banks could become more cautious about lending against collateral, that's now questionable. In and the broader economic news, narrative gets even harder to sustain than it already is because let's face it, Americans don't buy this resilience nonsense.
16:34It's why even the modest home price decline could have an outsizological impact. The decline wouldn't need to resemble 2008 at all. It would be enough to tell households that housing is no longer a guaranteed source of wealth. It's not something they could just depend on like they have been. It would also weaken the argument. that American consumers remain unbreakable. And that argument has always depended heavily on asset values, increasingly heavily as we move forward here. If homes stop appreciating, consumers have fewer reasons to feel financially secure. So the danger is not only the direct loss of housing wealth, it's whether or not it changes expectations. And expectations are what determine whether households buy, borrow, or invest. And that also leads into expectations, market expectations over interest rates. Because if you get a real flip in the housing market, especially where prices are concerned, suddenly the Federal Reserve you'll see won't be nearly as aggressively hawkish. They may not be hawkish at all if the housing market shows more obvious signs of stress and strain.
17:35Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): While
17:35Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it's very likely the Federal Reserve is going gonna to continue to focus on inflation. and sound aggressively hawkish in the short run, the markets continue to price expectations that will all change at some point. And again, housing would be a big one to refocus the Fed's attention where it truly should belong. So the front end of the yield curve, this weird shape that we've been in, steep in the front, flat in the back, the front of the yield curve may continue reflecting the possibility of more rate hikes out of the Fed. But the longer end, the flat in the back, is asking a completely different question. It's asking whether the economy can sustain all of these headwinds once housing, construction, employment, the credit cycle, maybe the AI bubble. What happens when they're all weakening together? After all, the commodity crash that we're seeing is asking the same thing and already not liking the likely answer. The flat yield curve we have today. may not be identical to the inverted one from three years ago, but it communicates a related warning. The market doesn't believe the FOMC will be able to follow through with their hawkish script more than part way. Swap spreads add another piece to that same message. If Fed communication genuinely represented a durable change, swap markets would be expected to show more persistent repricing across all maturities. Instead, the response has been crucially selective. So the front end of the yield curve reacts
18:55to central bank language, but longer maturities remain less convinced. That's steep in the front, flat in the back. Meanwhile, swap spreads, they haven't budged. So it resembles the late 2023 pattern when officials emphasized inflation risk, while bond markets continue to price eventual economic weakness. The bond rally wasn't simply trade. traders betting on a few rate cuts. It was a response to deteriorating capacity. The Fed can delay recognition of that deterioration, but it can't repeal the consequences. And eventually, this time around in 2026, weak housing demand becomes too much to ignore, especially if home prices start fading. That's what would really force policy outlook to change because it would be a serious escalation in a fragile situation that can't really afford that much more negative. So the numbers may look as bad as 2008, especially in the housing market, but that doesn't mean this is a replay of that previous crisis. In fact, in many ways, they're night and day different. But that also doesn't diminish the severity of what we're facing here at the end of 2026 and what it means for a whole bunch of stuff heading into 2027. Making that comparison is too simple, too surface level. In 2008, forced selling caused prices to collapse and transmitted losses through the financial system. Today, the primary problem is the disappearance of buyers
20:14due to the disappearance of jobs and job growth. Prices in the housing market have remained more stable because homeowners are not being forced to liquidate at distress distressed prices, at least not yet. But that stability is not evidence of health. Pending home sales haven't just fallen to a record low, they're actually crashing to a record low. Existing home transactions are hugely depressed. Buyers at a record low, sellers outnumber them by more than 70%. Single family construction is starting to crack where permits have fallen to a nearly four-year low. This is a housing crash in activity before it becomes a crash in prices. And prices may now be approaching. the point where they begin falling for a completely different reason than they did in 2008. Not because banks are dumping foreclosures, because there are simply more sellers than buyers. The central bank can continue talking about resilience. The housing market is saying something else entirely and from all angles. Americans are disappearing from the housing market because they do not trust Kevin Warsh Walsh when he said.
21:15says the economy is resilient. In fact, they vehemently disagree with the guy. And as buyers disappear, what that means is it won't take a mortgage crisis for the housing market to break. It may only take time.