Capital Allocators – Inside the Institutional Investment Industry

Paul Enright discusses thesis-driven investing, liquidity constraints, and the shift from performance to AUM in long-short equity.

1h 11m Listen to the original Episode page
Long-Short EquityPortfolio ManagementValuationShort SellingAlpha GenerationMarket StructureDue DiligenceInvestment Psychology

Summary

Paul Enright argues that business quality is no longer a differentiator due to abundant information, advocating instead for thesis-driven investing that identifies disconnects between business quality and market expectations. He emphasizes the importance of valuation, stock dynamics, and liquidity management, particularly for short positions, warning against conflating business analysis with stock picking. Enright notes that the long-short industry has grown to $4-5 trillion, making alpha harder to find and leading many funds to reduce shorting to attract assets under management. He shares his transition from Viking Global to a family office, highlighting the challenges of market structure changes and the importance of maintaining model integrity. Enright advises investors to scrutinize managers' awareness of their alpha sources and to avoid intellectual dishonesty in investment processes.

Key takeaways

  1. 1
    I just don't like intellectual dishonesty. Period. That's investment, that's whatever. Like I believe in anti fragility. Attack it, attack it, attack it, and don't dismiss it. And if you're dismissing whatever it is, then that's because you're just not confident in your ability to defend it. That's my biggest pet peeve. beef.

    Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) · 1:07:19

Episode sections

  1. 0:06 – 5:15

    Introduction and Sponsor Reads

    Ted Sides introduces guest Paul Enright, a private investor managing Krainos Capital after 12 years at Viking Global Investors. The segment includes sponsor reads for AlphaSense, Ridgeline, and Juniper Square.

  2. 5:15 – 10:22

    Paul Enright's Background and Career Path

    Enright discusses his Brooklyn upbringing, Jesuit education, and law school experience. He describes his transition from tax compliance at Pricewaterhouse to sell-side equity research, and finally to buy-side investing at Viking Global, targeting Brian Olson.

  3. 10:22 – 12:21

    Viking Global Training and Mentorship

    Enright details his training under Brian Olson, David Ott, and Tom Purcell at Viking. He emphasizes the lack of formal training but highlights the influence of Tom Purcell's 'tree' of successful alumni and the firm's variant perception investing style.

  4. 12:21 – 14:42

    Business Analysis vs. Stock Picking

    Enright argues that business analysis and stock picking are distinct. He criticizes the conflation of the two, noting that low interest rates previously masked the importance of valuation and stock dynamics, leading investors to believe quality alone was sufficient.

  5. 14:42 – 18:34

    Thesis-Driven Investing and Variant Perception

    Enright advocates for thesis-driven investing over owning 'great businesses' at any price. He argues that with abundant information, business quality is not a differentiator; instead, investors must find disconnects between business quality and market expectations to generate alpha.

  6. 18:34 – 22:14

    Stock Selection: Valuation and Liquidity

    Enright outlines his stock selection framework, starting with valuation and time horizon. He distinguishes between business fundamentals and stock dynamics like liquidity, technicals, and supply-demand, emphasizing that stock picking is about the price paid for quality.

  7. 22:14 – 26:14

    Shorting Strategy and Liquidity Constraints

    Enright discusses liquidity risks, particularly for shorts. He outlines rules such as avoiding stocks with >10% short interest and limiting exposure to one day's volume. He categorizes shorts into offensive, relative, and market-proxy buckets to manage risk.

  8. 26:14 – 31:20

    Portfolio Management and Gross Exposure

    Enright uses a baseball analogy to explain portfolio management. He advocates for high gross long leverage (>100%) to capture upside, dynamically reallocating capital within the portfolio based on performance and conviction, rather than static sizing.

  9. 31:20 – 35:35

    Portfolio Rebalancing and Signal vs Noise

    Speaker_1 discusses distinguishing price action from fundamental signal, advising against selling based solely on price moves. He emphasizes checking consensus estimates to understand why a stock moved and using weekly portfolio reviews to assess if positions would be repurchased if liquidated.

  10. 35:35 – 40:46

    Alpha Sources and Gross Flexing

    Speaker_1 defines long alpha, short alpha, and gross alpha as key performance drivers. He argues that managers must flex their gross exposure based on spread performance, reducing leverage when spreads are wide to avoid chasing performance, a discipline he credits for his fund's historical success.

  11. 40:46 – 44:17

    Industry Scale and Shorting Constraints

    Speaker_1 notes the long-short industry is now $4-5 trillion, making alpha harder to find. He explains that as funds grow, they often stop shorting to increase AUM, becoming de facto long-only. He highlights that shorting becomes dangerous at scale due to squeeze risks, citing the 2008 Volkswagen event.

  12. 44:17 – 46:27

    Compensation Structures and Backtrading

    Speaker_1 describes compensation as subjective and prone to 'backtrading' (changing terms post-hire). He contrasts this with PODS, which have clear written percentages, noting that subjective structures lead to turnover as funds grow and talent changes.

  13. 46:27 – 48:45

    Market Structure Changes

    Speaker_1 identifies three structural shifts: passive flows dominating ownership (reducing sell-side access), pod funds crowding trades, and electronic trading increasing costs. He notes that relationship-based liquidity is harder to access, driving firms like Citadel to become broker-dealers.

  14. 48:45 – 1:10:55

    Career Decision and Family Office Strategy

    Speaker_1 explains leaving Viking to start a fund was paused due to family priorities and changing market dynamics. He now manages capital via a single family office, investing in real estate, private equity GP stakes, and public markets, preferring a long-only approach with occasional shorts.

Assets discussed

AssetKindStanceContext
Meta PlatformsMETAequityneutralThere are various different points in time. And there are a couple of times where I've actually traded out of things where I like I don't own Facebook anymore.

“Stance” is how the speakers talked about the asset, not a recommendation.

Claims worth verifying

Paul Enright opened Krainos after a dozen years at Viking Global Investors.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·0:21

How to verify: Primary source: Paul Enright's LinkedIn profile or Krainos Capital website; verify employment dates at Viking Global via industry press releases or SEC Form ADV filings for Viking Global. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

Viking Global Investors is a multi-billion dollar long-short equity hedge fund.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·0:21

How to verify: Primary source: SEC Form ADV Part 2 for Viking Global Investors; verify assets under management and investment strategy. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

Brian Olson was the co-founder and PM at Viking and Maverick.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·9:01

How to verify: Primary source: SEC Form ADV for Viking Global and Maverick Asset Management; verify Brian Olson's role and firm history. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

The half-life of all companies is 10 years.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·16:04

How to verify: Primary source: Academic research or data studies on corporate survival rates (e.g., from Harvard Business Review or S&P Global); verify specific '10-year' statistic. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Less than 5% of companies compound greater than 20% for more than five years.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·16:23

How to verify: Primary source: Historical market data analysis (e.g., from S&P Dow Jones Indices or academic papers on stock performance dispersion); verify the specific percentage and time frame. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Enright does not short a stock that has greater than 10% of the market cap shorted.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·23:03

How to verify: Primary source: Paul Enright's public writings, interviews, or Krainos Capital investment policy statement; verify the specific 10% short interest rule. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Enright does not short more than a day's volume of a stock that could double in a day.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·23:03

How to verify: Primary source: Paul Enright's public writings or interviews; verify the specific liquidity/volume rule for short positions. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Tom Purcell's 'tree' produced every single big successful person in the first 15 or so years of Viking.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·11:37

How to verify: Primary source: Viking Global alumni lists and industry reports; verify the claim that all early successful PMs were direct protégés of Purcell. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Enright targets gross long leverage greater than 100% of capital.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·28:11

How to verify: Primary source: Paul Enright's public writings or interviews; verify his stated leverage targets for long exposure. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Enright aims for high single-digit annualized volatility.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·29:10

How to verify: Primary source: Paul Enright's public writings or interviews; verify his stated volatility targets. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The long-short equity industry is now a $4-5 trillion industry, with long-short strategies comprising a couple of trillion dollars.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·40:46

How to verify: Check industry size reports from Preqin, eVestment, or HFR for total hedge fund assets under management and long-short allocation percentages. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

In a market down 30%, hedge fund longs are on average down 50-60%, while shorts are down only 10% or don't exist.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·37:14

How to verify: Review HFRX Long/Short Equity Index performance data for bear market periods (e.g., 2026) to compare long and short leg performance. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Paul Enright worked at Viking Global Investors for a dozen years before opening Krainos Capital.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·48:45

How to verify: Check Paul Enright's LinkedIn profile or Krainos Capital press releases/biographies for employment history. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Krainos Capital was up in 2008, but the performance would have been higher if not for the Volkswagen short squeeze.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·42:55

How to verify: Search for historical performance reports or news articles from 2026-2026 discussing Viking Global or Krainos Capital's exposure to Volkswagen. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Paul Enright taught guest lectures at Columbia, Notre Dame, and the University of Texas.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·56:56

How to verify: Check university course catalogs, guest speaker announcements, or Paul Enright's Twitter/X profile for mentions of these teaching engagements. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Paul Enright took a GP stake in an emerging manager named Ricky Walters at Stony Point.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·53:54

How to verify: Check Stony Point Management's investor updates or LinkedIn profiles for Ricky Walters and his affiliation with Stony Point. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Paul Enright sold his position in Netflix in January, noting he should have sold in November.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·55:45

How to verify: Check Paul Enright's Twitter/X feed for tweets from November and January regarding Netflix sales. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Paul Enright sold his position in Facebook last year.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·55:45

How to verify: Check Paul Enright's Twitter/X feed for tweets regarding Facebook/Meta sales. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The 'Volkswagen effect' in 2008 involved a short squeeze that impacted hedge funds.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·42:55

How to verify: Search historical news archives for 'Volkswagen short squeeze 2026' to verify the event and its impact on hedge funds. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Paul Enright's public market portfolio is almost 100% long with occasional shorts.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·55:32

How to verify: This is a self-reported claim about his personal family office portfolio; verification would require his disclosure or public statements confirming the long-only bias. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Paul Enright spent a dozen years at Viking Global Investors before opening Krainos Capital.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·1:00:33

How to verify: Check Paul Enright's LinkedIn profile or Krainos Capital's official website/about page for career history. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Paul Enright is a rugby nut who played until age 30 and is involved with the New York Athletic Club.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·1:06:11

How to verify: Check Paul Enright's social media profiles or the New York Athletic Club's membership records. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Paul Enright read Carol Dweck's book which changed his life.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·1:09:00

How to verify: Check Paul Enright's social media posts or interviews for mentions of Carol Dweck's 'Mindset'. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Paul Enright learned to ski at age 45.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·1:09:45

How to verify: Check Paul Enright's social media profiles or interviews for personal anecdotes about skiing. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Paul Enright watched the New Zealand All Blacks vs Ireland rugby match over the weekend prior to the recording.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·1:06:30

How to verify: Check rugby match schedules for the period between 2026-08-16 and 2026-11-16 to see if such a match occurred. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Do your own research

  • Verify the half-life of companies and compound growth statistics cited by Enright using historical company data from sources like Compustat or CRSP.
  • Check consensus estimate databases (e.g., Bloomberg, FactSet) for specific tickers to see historical estimate revisions and understand market expectations.
  • Review 13F filings of large long-short funds to track changes in short interest relative to long positions over time, verifying the trend of reduced shorting.
  • Analyze hedge fund performance attribution reports to break down returns into long, short, and gross components, assessing the manager's actual alpha sources.
  • Check historical news archives and SEC filings regarding specific events mentioned, such as the 2008 Volkswagen short squeeze, to verify claims about industry-wide impacts.
  • Review portfolio turnover reports and trade logs to see if positions are held through volatility or sold prematurely, testing the 'would I buy it back' principle.
  • Compare fund net exposure charts against their reported alpha generation periods to identify factor beta exposure and potential delusion of spread capture.
  • Scrutinize manager interviews and presentations for consistency between stated model and attributed performance, looking for red flags in due diligence.
Full transcriptexpand
0:06
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I'm Ted Sides,
0:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and this is Capital Allocators.
0:12
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): My guest on today's show is Paul Enright, a private investor managing his own capital under single-family office Kranos Capital.
0:21
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Paul
0:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): opened Kranos after a dozen years at Viking Global Investors, the multi-billion multi billion dollar. long short equity hedge fund that also has been one of the most successful breeding grounds for talent in the industry.
0:34
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He
0:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): has a deep understanding of the intricacies of long short equity investing and a knack for explaining it well.
0:41
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Our
0:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): conversation covers Paul's career path to Viking, training while there, and advice to early career investors. We dive into the distinction between business. analysis and stock picking and the importance of portfolio management to investment success.
0:57
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
0:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the process, we discuss liquidity, shorting, portfolio rebalancing, incentive compensation, and market structure. We close with Paul's approach to managing his own money and his answers to a terrific set of questions sourced from his Twitter feed before the show.
1:13
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I hope you
1:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): enjoyed. the show. And if you do, this week it might be time to go back to the office and talk to your boss.
1:21
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Now
1:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): there'll come a time when you have to make small talk in a way that was protected by virtual work. Well fear not, we have a suggestion. Just before that awkward moment hits in the hallway or the elevator, turn to them and say, you know, I had a chance to listen to the Capital Allocators podcast during the pandemic, and I think you'll really love it. You'll earn a few
1:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): brownie points for the idea, and probably a big bonus next year after they've listened all year long. Thanks so much for spreading the word. And while you're at it, leave a rating or write a review. Thanks for your support. Capital Allocators is brought to you by AlphaSense. Every allocator sits at their desk for hours preparing the work
2:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): around investment decisions. getting up to speed on a new theme, prepping for the next investment committee meeting, and tracking what changes across an entire portfolio. AlphaSense just launched something built to help. It's called Super Analyst, an always-on agent that works like a power user on your behalf. It
2:20
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2:40
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the briefs, models, and memos you'd otherwise build by hand. It was designed to work like an extension of your team, so it remembers your projects, follows your templates and processes. and links every output to its source so you can see where each conclusion came from. The best way to judge its quality is to give it a whirl.
3:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Pick the research task on your desk before your next committee meeting and hand it to Superanalyst. Start a free trial at alpha hyphen sense.com/slash com slash capital and see what it has ready for you. Capital Allocators is also brought to you. by Ridgeline, the investment management platform built for firms who are
3:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): rethinking how work gets done. You're at your desk looking at a line graph of your firm's growth. The line is moving sideways, linear growth, and you know exactly why. You're constrained by your operational bandwidth that's been the same for so long, it just feels like the cost of doing
3:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): business. Ridgeline is built to change that line's trajectory, to be the inflection point that takes your growth from incremental to accelerated with the team you already have in place. Ridgeline is the only AI-native investment management platform that brings together the front, middle, and back office with one set of data and
3:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): powerful AI agents that automate away operational drudgery. so your talent can shift from managing old technology to materializing new ideas. Ridgeline helps asset and wealth managers understand and improve their firm's growth trajectory. To see how your firm compares to 16,000 of your peers, visit
4:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): ridgeline.ai slash trajectory. If you file form ADV, your firm is already there.
4:25
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Then
4:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): talk to Ridgeline and about how you can do more with the team you already have. Capital Allocators is also brought to you by Juniper Square, the operations partner trusted by the leading private market GPs. One theme that keeps coming up on the show is GPs that build the strongest and most durable relationships
4:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): with LPs are the ones that have both strong returns and strong operations.
4:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): AI raises the stakes on operations, and having Juniper Square as your operations partner helps ensure your data is organized, accurate, and accessible so you can unlock operational alpha. That's why thousands of GPs trust Juniper Square. Learn more at
5:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Junipersquare.com/slash capitalallocators. Please enjoy
5:14
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the video.
5:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): my conversation with Paul and Wright.
5:18
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Paul,
5:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): thanks for doing this.
5:20
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): You're welcome. Long time coming.
5:22
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Why
5:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): don't we start with your background? We'll just go from there.
5:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I think the thing that stands out to me is that I grew up in Brooklyn, middle class background, never thought about a stock ever. Didn't have family that talked about the market, wasn't in a neighborhood that talked about the market. Everyone talked about the giant. Giants and the Mets back then in the 80s, right? That's all I remember talking about. But the other thing I remember is that I think
5:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it was a community that grew up in the shadow of World War II, where the country was moving from a manufacturing base to a services base. And so the what was beat into my mind as a kid was get a diploma on the wall that they can't ever take away from you, a pedigree. So lawyers. lawyer, doctor, accountant. Those are the three
6:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): things that I was pushed towards. And so I always kind of felt like those were my options, and I never thought about anything else. And I think in some ways the path of least resistance was to be a lawyer. I was Jesuit educated for eight years, and it was a very broad liberal arts education. It wasn't pointing me in any one direction. The range of things that I studied,
6:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): subject matter, as well as the Jesuit way of solving problems through discernment, is something that sticks with me now. And discernment is just Ignation way of awareness in modern terms. Just sit with something and notice the emotions that it makes you feel and discern to
6:44
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): disaggregate Aggregate the thoughts, to respond rather than react. Well, So it wasn't until law school. that A, I woke up and I realized I was never really working particularly hard in my life. I was coasting through and just kind of having fun. And so then I really woke up and started working harder and realized that I probably could have carved out a higher pedigree path had I worked a little bit harder. But then I
7:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): also realized I didn't want to be a lawyer. But I was sort of some cost in it halfway through. And I just continued down the path of what can I learn in law school that could be. applicable to businesses. And then when I get to leave law school, I get to Price Waterhouse and the compliance piece of tax is terrible, you know, filing tax returns and doing that. But what was really
7:24
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): interesting to me was advising on deals. The deal would get done, and then they'd hand it to us and they'd say, make it tax free. And I'd be reading through the documents. I'm like, this is really cool. I want to be on the front end of this. And I was lucky my cousin was a cell side analyst. a DLJ at the time. And he's like, I'll get you interviews with the bankers and you can come talk to him. And I went and I talked to them.
7:44
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And I was like, oh man, I don't know if I want to do this, right? It seems like a lot of grunt work and it doesn't seem to be as substantive as I thought. And then at the same time, he said, I also have a friend who's a cell side analyst who is an a applied mathematics geek. You guys are very complimentary in a way. Maybe you should go meet him. And I met I talked to him,
8:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): and he described the role to me. And I was like, oh, this is it. And I spent two years working with Greg Miller, really getting a nighttime MBA by reading every book I could get my hands on. And it was after those two years that I was like, okay, now I got it. I know what I want to do. I don't want to be a cell side analyst. I actually want to invest. But it was very late. I'm a little late
8:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): bloomer. Very late.
8:26
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
8:26
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): what was the path from that first job to finding yourself in the seat that you wanted to be in?
8:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): People will come to me and ask for advice. And the advice can take two forms. The one form is: can you help me figure out what I want to do? And I'm like, no.
8:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): No. You have to find that for yourself, right? You have to sit, you have to be aware, think about it, decide what you want, and then ask people to help you get what you want. And this goes back to that discernment. I think I sat with it and I always knew what I wanted and what I was leaving something for to go to the next thing. So when
9:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I was on the sell side and I was sitting there and the days were going by, and the idea of I see what this person, the stage they're at, and then the next person's at, I started then looking outward to buy buy-side side firms and saying, who is I operating, who's calling me and asking me questions in a way that I find really impressive. And that
9:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): zeroed me in on Viking and Maverick. Brian Olson was the co-founder and PM at Viking and Maverick. I targeted Brian and I just kept cold calling Brian and saying, I think I could be helpful. I think I'd be helpful. And Brian pushed me off, pushed me off. And I, but I zero it in on the way he thought, the way he asked questions.
9:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the way he carried himself in meetings that we sponsored, and just made it clear that I wanted to work for him.
9:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): What were some of those characteristics of how he asked questions, how he conducted himself in meetings that attracted you?
9:54
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
9:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): just sort of remember the level of detail and then his understanding of union unit economics and the way he asked me questions about unit economics when no nobody else that I knew of in the industry, and this is 2000, 2001, nobody was talking about unit economics. And that really struck me that here's a guy that
10:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): seems to have a knowledge base that you can't learn in books. You can't learn anywhere. I want to learn more from him. That was really the idea behind it.
10:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): You're at a Viking for a long time, and Vikings had a long series of people that it's trained that have spun out that have done well. Not a lot of firms are like that. What was your training like over that period of time?
10:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I think about my Viking experience in two chapters, right? Chapter one is I go, I work for Brian. Brian's only there for like nine months. The whole team was orphaned inside Viking for a little while. And then I worked for David Ott directly for a little while, for maybe six months. And David is I think, the secret weapon inside Viking, right? David is if you took all of the aspects of Michael Mobison that
10:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): everybody thinks is amazing, and then all the aspects of Steve Mandel, and you put them together, that's David Ott. And so I had that one-on-one with Brian, the one-on-one with David. And then ultimately David was the CIO. So I couldn't work for him directly. So then I got really lucky and Tom Purcell took me on his team. I don't know why he did it. I still to this day don't know. why, but he changed my life. And I
11:16
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): think there's no real formal training program there. So I got to see three different styles within a year working with three different folks. And people talk about tiger cubs and tiger grand cubs. I've always joked that there's the tree of Tom Purcell. Every single big successful person in the first 15 or so years of Viking came from Tom.
11:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Everything emanated from Tom for a really period. of time. And it wasn't formal. Tom was just this amazing combination of like a great human being, really thoughtful and a great investor. And he was also really patient, right? Like I'm not the best employee. And he used to just laugh at me. He didn't take things personally when I would like get frustrated or do things. So it was just really great. But it's very
11:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): stylistically the same. We're all gearing towards the same thing, which is to have some sort of differentiated. edge on earnings or some metric that we can then make a bet. It was variant perception investing. But how you got there was not prescriptive at all. There was not that much formality to it.
12:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): I'd love to go through some of your thoughts on let's just start with stock picking.
12:21
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You
12:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): mentioned variant perception, you mentioned thinking about earnings. There's business analysis. and then there's being a good stock picker. How do you think about both of those things?
12:33
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
12:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): don't know why it's a controversial topic, but it is. And I think this is in some way related to the Fed, in that with interest rates being so low and all risk assets being anchored to a zero bound, everybody just assumed that you could just think about business quality because everything went up. Like stocks were missing numbers
12:53
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): and going up because the most important input was what was the risk free rate doing for a really long period of time. And I think people got a little bit confused and got away from that. And so I find it ironic that today everybody's like, Oh, there's no dispersion. There was no dispersion on the way up either. Like, stop pretending like this is something new. Everybody benefited from this. And I think that led people to think
13:12
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): picking a stock and picking a business are the same thing. And I think that they're very, very, very different things. And I think that you have to
13:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): start with understanding the underlying business if you want to be a fundamental analyst. And that is its own set of analysis. And it's talked about all the time. But then separate and apart from that, you have to understand the dynamics of the stock. At a minimum, the table stakes, there's valuation. And then increasingly you have to understand. liquidity, technicals,
13:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): factors, exposure. And then you need to understand those stocks, how they interact with one another. If you underwrite every business, this is where you start to bleed from stock selection into portfolio management. But if you underwrite every single business on its own, but then you don't think about how they are stocks that trade publicly in
14:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): a market that is volatile. and has liquidity, and you have some element of leverage. But if you don't think about how those things all interact with each other, and maybe you don't have 20 discrete business bets, but you have one big factor bet, that's part of the job, right? And I think that there's business selection, there's portfolio management, there's
14:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): stock selection, which sort of bridges the two in a lot of ways. And I think that there should be more focus. on that. And there has to be more focus on that.
14:29
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Let's break down each of them. So, business analysis, we hear a lot about. How do you think differently about business analysis when information is getting disseminated so much more quickly than when you started doing this 20 years ago?
14:42
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Aaron Powell
14:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): The more information gets available, the more information, asymmetry there is in private markets versus public markets. and you see folks wanting to push into private markets, the more I look at public market quality business investing and saying there's no differentiation there at all. So the idea that somebody's like, I love
15:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Snowflake, it's a great business. Like, yeah, who doesn't think Snowflake's a great business? Why is that a thesis? I don't care. I'm just gonna own it. And then the question comes down to, okay, so what is the price you're gonna pay? And if that's your model, right? Like we can talk about game selection. There's the game within the game. If you're investing in public market securities, we're all playing the same game to some extent. If you're
15:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): investing in the public markets, you decide, I just want to invest in stocks for fun. Okay, or are you investing in stocks to outperform? Okay, I'm investing to outperform, going for right tail events. Well, if you're going for right tail events, then you're opening up and subjecting yourself. to the risk of left tail events. And so
15:41
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): if
15:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you're doing those things, how do you figure out where to find the right tail events? Is it just business quality? And to me, with all of the information out there, that can't be the differentiating factor. That can't be the variant perception, the inefficiency, so to speak. It's got to be something that where there's a disconnect
16:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): between expectations.
16:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): between degree of how good the business is, or something, because we know if you're looking for those right tail events, I remember looking at this, the half life of all companies is 10 years. And less than 5% compound it greater than 20% for more than five years, or something like that. There's Those are the stats, right? So if you what you're saying
16:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): is, I want to find a handful of great business. businesses and I just want to sit in them and I want to compound. That's pretty reductive. Like, how? How do you do it? And I don't think how you do it is just by saying, I bought a great business, because invariably I think what you're going to do is you're going to buy a great business that everybody already thinks is great and you're going to overpay for it.
16:44
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And then you're not going to compound. And so that's why I get frustrated with when people like, yeah, I'm just going to own a great business. Like, well, maybe it's been a great business for three years. How do you update? How do you constantly update that view? And how do you constantly refresh that view in your portfolio? So I think it's incredibly silly to start with, I only
17:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): want to own great businesses.
17:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): What's the alternative?
17:07
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): The alternative is to be thesis driven. There's a minimum threshold of the quality of business. It can be a mediocre business. Maybe you say, I have a rule, I'm just not buying a bad business, but I want to buy a business where there are trends that are accelerating or where the market thinks that this is much worse than it is. And then you want to own it for some period
17:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): of time. If you buy a stock and you pay way too much for it, and you look at it and you say, Yeah, my IRR in the first three or four years isn't great, but years six through 10 are going to be amazing. how do you know? The statistics of that many companies generating that much performance for that period of time are so low. So it's like, if you
17:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): think that you can find some variant perception in zero to three months or zero to six months, you're probably diluting yourself, right? Because that's really hard to predict. But if on a rolling nine to 18 months or so and you're updating, you're being very Bayesian and you're updating it in every single day, what you think versus what is
18:07
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): being priced into the market, then I think that's the real way to make money over a real period of time.
18:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Let's turn to the stock picking aspect of it. So let's say you've figured out the theses you want to invest in. You mentioned a bunch of things to assess for a stock. compared to the business, certain factors, liquidity. Why don't you walk through some of those and how you think about it?
18:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah. We'll distinguish between stock selection, longs, and shorts. And when I talk about longs, I'm mostly talking about my experience in a long short context, but I do think some of this has as universal applications to just all long picking in general. And I think the starting point has to be valuation. How you make money is not the quality of
18:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the business you buy, but the price you pay for the quality of the business, period. And that often gets lost in the I want to own great businesses forever concept. And I think there are two ways to think about that. One is this idea of time horizon. Time horizon to me is in isolation and a relevant concept. Time horizon has to be mixed with price. And oftentimes
19:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): when I hear people talk about, well, I just have a longer time horizon, I think the idea is, well, I'm buying something where the downside is really limited and I don't know what's going to work. But I'm going to own it. And perhaps over three years, something good should happen because it's so cheap. And if it doesn't, I don't lose any money. That's how I used to think about time
19:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): horizon. But when you have this crazy bull market that's gone on for all this time, time horizon's turned into well, I bought it pretty well, it's up 300%. I know it's stupid expensive, and I'm gonna take a 50% drawdown because I have a long term horizon. What?
19:51
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
19:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): don't understand that, right? So I think that when you're thinking about the stock, the stock is where is it at this point in time for the quality of the business and relative to my expectations for what I think it can do? And I think not only did we just have a period where it was, I'm gonna just
20:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): take the punch in the face and look, a 10% punch in the face is totally reasonable. Maybe a 15% punch in the face, a 50%, 60%, 70% punch in the face, that's not reasonable. Especially when consensus numbers have continued to creep up, the opinion of the business has continued to grow, and there is no differentiation. there is no edge. I think the starting point always has to be
20:30
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): bottoms up business analysis. What do I think? What are my numbers? What is my belief about this company? And where within one of the three financial statements do I believe that I have some differentiated edge where I take some narrative, convert it to numbers, and then when do I look at the stock? And then I start.
20:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): with valuation. And is this being appropriately valued? Is there some way I'm not looking at it correctly within the valuation that I should be? Is there some hidden asset? These are all stock things. Like a hidden asset isn't a question of the business. And I think if you're looking great business, sit on my hands for 18 months, it finally
21:10
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): pulls in. I want to understand the technicals. I'm not using technicals for anything. else to understand what are the supply-demand dynamics for this stock. And when I look at the supply-demand dynamics and I look at the earnings revisions estimates and I think about the IRR, I want to factor it all together so that if you said to me, here's the greatest business in the world, I think earnings are still 20% too high, and the
21:30
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): stock is a falling knife. Why do I want to buy that? And those are stock elements. Those are not business elements. But if you said to me, look, the stock's down 90. I think it's one of the greatest businesses in the world. I think we've had three cuts. There might be a fourth, and I think it's a 10x from here. Well, I'm gonna buy that. I'm not saying to isolate one variable, and people are gonna
21:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): pick on one variable and be like, I can't believe you do that. I'm saying looking at it in its totality, that is stock picking. Put all of it together and decide: is this a good idea? Not is this a good business, but is this a good idea that? that's going to make me money? That's what I think.
22:06
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): How do you think about liquidity's impact on the framework of whether it's valuation, time horizon?
22:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Mobison did a study where he showed that when large caps outperform, alpha's harder to find because they crowd everything out. And so if funds get bigger and large caps outperform, there's even less alpha to find. And so liquidity. becomes even more important. And so I think about liquidity in those terms to some extent. And in
22:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): terms of, and I thought about liquidity much differently and you know, suffocatingly is sometimes where you'd be like, if I'm gonna do a thesis-driven idea,
22:43
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
22:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): can't own 20 days volume of it because eventually I might have to change my mind. That's one side of it. And then on the short side, which is a totally different complicated set of parameters around stock selection, on the short side, I think you have to have rules. I'm not shorting a stock that has greater than 10% of the market cap shorted. I'm
23:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): not shorting more than a day's volume of a stock that I think could double in a day, right? There's got to be certain parameters around what you're doing to make sure that you don't get caught in a liquidity trap. especially when you're talking about callable debt on the long short model, where everybody always forgets that in a drawdown, your gross
23:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): exposure goes up because your capital base goes down. And I think that that is at least every hedge fund manager forgets that at least once a year.
23:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): What are some of the other differences in shorting?
23:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): On shorts, I think that.
23:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the business quality is important because I do think the business quality determines the underlying beta and underlying riskiness of the stock to a large extent. And I think that in the same way, you can't have 100% of your portfolio all in high quality momentum stocks because you're just in one trade. If your whole
23:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): entire mantra is
24:01
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
24:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): just short bad businesses, eventually you're gonna get caught in a real bad bear trap. So I always thought about the difference between short ideas and short books. Pick an example, right? Like if you're picking a basket of SPACs, there's gotta be a bound for how big you want to be in SPACs, and that you have to
24:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): manage that risk together. So if you decide, oh, I'm gonna put 10% in 10 individuals. individual spacks, and these are the characteristics, and I'm gonna own a hundred basis points of each, but I'm comfortable with that because that's not more than one day's volume in any one of these. So that if things started to go against me, I could shift around and I'm never gonna let it get
24:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): above 12% exposure. And every time it goes up, and then I think where you get down to the stock selection, business selection versus portfolio management decision is that if they work, it goes go against you and they start to grow. you have a choice. You can either say, this is the worst one, I need to get out of this, or you can say, I'm going to evenly reduce each of them. And that's a portfolio risk decision. It's not an individual. I'm
25:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): singling out this one idea. So that's one way you deal with it. And then I think in order to aggregate a book, I do think that sometimes you have to cheat on the short side. And I think as you're building a short book, you have to have some sort of philosophy on how do I want to construct this short book?
25:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Because I can't just have all bad businesses because the volatility of that short book is too much or the number of ideas that I would need in my return on time. Over time, it evolved to I'm gonna have offensive shorts where I'm going after the business. Then I'm gonna think about what I would call moderate shorts, which are relative to my longs, not para trades,
25:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): but relative to my longs, the dynamics. that are affecting the long. And the same way it's misunderstood how positive it's gonna be for the longs, it's misunderstood how negative it's gonna be for the shorts. And then the third batch is uh, where do I feel the market is? Right. And people always get a little upset about this, but like if the market's trading at 23 times
25:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): earnings, maybe you wanna want be to short a couple of stocks that are a proxy for the market being expensive. The market's trading at 15 times. earnings, maybe that third bucket doesn't need to be where it needs to be. And if interest rates is zero, maybe you need something there. If interest rates are at three and a half, you're like, yeah, I'm fine. And that becomes a lever on what you do with your net exposure.
26:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Love to talk on the portfolio management side of dynamically managing a portfolio. So what we've talked about is sort of how you construct it. As markets move, one of the things you hear a lot about is management. of net, management of gross and a hedge fund portfolio. How do you think about both of those?
26:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): So the starting point is having good ideas. And the analogy I would, you and I are both baseball fans, both Yankee fans, right? So the Yankees aren't on a pace to win 120 games because they have no talent and they're great managed, right? There's talent there, but analytics have come into baseball in a way that help Aaron Boone understand. how to put
26:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that talent better together in a way that makes that lineup more effective, that makes the pitchers more effective. And so, for example, historically, your best hitter batted third or fourth. You wouldn't bat him ninth. That would be stupid. Nobody ever did that. But analytics raised the question of well, sh why don't you move them up to one so that they get
27:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the most possible at bats? This idea of a table setter. a contact guy, best hitter in the whole cleanup. Maybe that's wrong analytically. Maybe we're just telling ourselves a story that isn't supported by numbers. And I think about this stock selection to portfolio management in the same way. I've got to have great stock ideas.
27:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): They're probably gonna be mostly in great businesses, but at different times, they may not be in great business. They may be in just really cheap stocks that are really great ideas. And now that takes a constitution to be able to think about that. And then the question is, well, how do I put them all together? I don't want my best idea batting 10th. Do I? And so the starting point has to be, well, how many ideas do I want to
27:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): begin with? And what's the right dispersion? And if I'm going for retail events, I want to be concentrated. And the starting point for me on building gross leverage to begin with is. first thing about gross long leverage. And if my gross longs are going to be less than 100% of my capital, my immediate thought is why? Why am I in
28:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): business? Because if my DNA is to create spread, but for me personally, I'm going to capture more spread on the longs because longs have the potential to triple, quadruple long shorts going down 100, best case but probably like 10 to 20. So I want to be tilted more gross
28:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): exposure in my longs. And if I'm gonna have shorts offsetting that, then I want my gross exposure on my longs to be greater than 100% of my capital. So that if I can generate a 20% unlevered return in my longs and put 20% leverage on it, I've just turned 20% unlevered long exposure as opposed to 24% long. That's the goal, right? And if I can get to 130%,
28:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): even better. And I think how I do that and how much leverage I do, that goes back to that idea of stock selection and how they all sit with each other to the extent that I'm really tilted in high beta growth. And my sharp ratio is going to be really out of whack, perhaps, with what I would want it to be. If I want to have,
29:09
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): say
29:10
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you want high single-digit single digit annualized vol, and you feel like, no, with these ideas, I'm going to have gonna a 15, 16% of annualized vol. Maybe my gross exposure sits at 110 versus 130.
29:20
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
29:20
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): think that's one factor. The other factor is how much upside is there? If I'm looking at all these things and I'm realistically and honestly assessing the stock upside and say they can all double in two years, then I'm gonna lean in on my gross exposure. And as these stocks perform and move, I'm gonna going to force rank each one of them. them
29:40
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): within that gross exposure to always try to have what I think are going to be my five or so best performing stocks towards the top of the portfolio. And when people think about that image, I'm not suggesting you're constantly churning in and out of ideas. I'm just saying that if you have an idea, like you put five ideas in your
29:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): top five and they're all sized. 12%. And the first two start to work immediately and just randomly. And now they're 14, 15% positions. And the other three are 12%. The question I have to ask myself is why are these two ideas
30:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): better now than they were before? Because mathematically I'm saying they are by having them be a larger percentage of my capital. So
30:25
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
30:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): have to assess: is it actually better now? Should I keep them that size? Was I wrong to be equally sized? Or should I take capital out of those two, put it in the other three, and flip my exposure and take advantage of that? Because I had the exact same time horizon, I had the exact same upside expectations. Two just randomly happened to work. I'm going to reallocate
30:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): within that and I'm going to actively dynamically think about the data, think about the reasons why this might have been the case. And then I'm going to react to it if it makes sense to react to it. That to me is the starting point. That is how you manage the gross long exposure.
30:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Within that, there's this question of trading around ideas. So you're two of the five randomly run up. So that's important presumption. It's random. There wasn't some news flow or that necessarily would have changed the conviction. How do you decide at what point to think about rebalancing so that you're not just churning yourself up
31:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): in little movements all the time?
31:20
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And I think that comes down to how much of what you're seeing is just price action, how much of it is a closing of the expectations versus what you thought. That second piece it comes down to what's signal and what's noise. And I think that the last thing you want to do, and this is the instinct for I think all young analysts is like it's up 30, let's sell it. I'll bank it. hit the cash register, and I'll
31:40
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): find another one. And what you learn over time is, well, hold on, why is it up 30?
31:44
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): What
31:44
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): are we missing? Are numbers up? Are expectations closing? Where did consensus go? Where does consensus go for next quarter? Where does consensus go for the quarter after that? Where's consensus for this full year? Where's consensus for next year? Where's consensus for the year after that? What are we missing? That's the immediate thought to prevent yourself from reacting to price, reacting to noise. versus reacting to some
32:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): signal that perhaps your expectation has not changed or has changed. To me, that's number one, right? And then number two is I think the heuristic is at least once a week, if not a couple of times a month, you want to come in, you want to look at your portfolio, and you want to say, based on all the inputs that I'm getting every day to assess these,
32:24
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): if there was a mistake and this book was liquidated, would I buy it back in the exact same form? And if the answer is, yeah, it'd probably be a little bit here. And you're just asking yourself questions, right? Like, why aren't I bigger here? I really like this.
32:38
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
32:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): didn't like it three months ago, and now it's kind of sitting here at 6%. Should I get up? I distinguish between force ranking and trading around ideas amongst themselves because you're looking to improve the portfolio and maximize and work. your capital versus the idea of punching a register and going to cash. And I think they're two very different things because the opportunity cost of going to
32:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): cash is high. The opportunity cost of reacting to signal and being like it was down 10% and I had a stop loss. Like that doesn't make sense to me either. I think it's got to be based on the notion that you are Are working the capital. The idea, if you are an active manager who's looking to add alpha in charge. and active manager fees, is to constantly be working
33:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that capital to get the highest impact to the fund. And how do you get the highest impact to the fund? If I can have a 10% idea that generates 300, 400, 500 basis points of performance, that's the way I can do it. And of however many 300, 400, 500 basis points Point ideas that I get versus how many, what's the worst case scenario I want on a loss?
33:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): 50 basis. points. And that's it. That's the math, right? Like that's that analytical piece that you go back to the Yankees, right? Like, what are you trying to do? Well, I'm trying to performance. Well, how? Well, I want 10 ideas that give me 200 to 400 basis points of performance, or I want six ideas that give me 300 to 400 basis of point of performance. And I want to minimize my losses to 50 basis points. And
33:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): if I can have a handful of 50 basis point losses, that tells me I'm taking enough risk and I'm also maximizing my slugging percentage on the longs. And I want to work the portfolio with the ideas based on the work on the business and the work on the stocks to get that right. That's the goal.
34:16
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34:17
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34:19
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34:54
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): This
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34:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And now back to the show.
35:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): So at the same time that the longs are moving in such a way that you're trying to work the capital, the markets are moving, and then therefore the short book is moving.
35:13
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
35:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): when you start talking about percentages, 12% goes to 13%, 14%. That's a relative move compared to the other names. But at the same time, if the market is moving up in lockstep, now your short book is moving up as well.
35:27
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Would
35:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): love to hear how the two sides of the book work together in that same kind of dynamic thought process.
35:35
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah.
35:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And I think that you got to define alpha to start with. And what are the types of alpha that are available to a long short hedge fund? The first one is long alpha. How much are my longs outperforming the market? And how much are my longs outperforming my shorts? The second one is short alpha. How much are my shorts underperforming the market? And how much are my shorts underperforming my longs
35:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): individually and collectively? So those are your two main sources of alpha. Then the third source of alpha is gross. How much leverage am I putting on this alpha that I'm generating in my longs and my shorts? And then the last piece is a bit of what you were talking about, but it's a little gross and net or both a piece of this, which is how am I sizing my longs and my shorts relative to one another,
36:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): relative to their attractiveness? And if for some reason my longs go up a ton and my shorts do nothing and I create pure alpha, then I've got to recycle my longs or I've got to recycle my shorts. Something's got to change there. I think this is part of what's been going on in the market a little bit is that if you just take your net up and you're really making
36:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): a lot of your alpha, quote unquote alpha, is on long alpha and gross on your longs, and your net is really, really high, you're probably going to gonna delude yourself into thinking that you've captured a ton of spread. But really what you've done is you've picked a factor and you've written the beta of that factor. And then your question
36:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): has to be, what are you doing with the longs? I think more than what you're doing with the shorts. Shorting has gotten so much attention in the last 18 months. I think the drawdowns that we've seen are because hedge fund longs are on average down 50 or 60% in a market that's down 30. And shorts either don't exist or the shorts are down like 10. And
37:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that's because that's a bull market strategy. When you're designed to short stuff that is gonna be not kill you, it's gonna be
37:23
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): up
37:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): 10 to down 10, but you're gonna be long stuff that could be up 50.
37:26
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): That's a
37:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): bull market strategy because when those longs are down 50 and the shorts are still doing the same thing, you'll say, Well, there's no dispersion. Well, there was dispersion, right? Just like it's just the inverse of what you were saying. So I think those are the ways you could trap. get trapped. But to me, the way you really in real time, what I'm looking to do is I'm looking, go back to that business analysis, that
37:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): stock selection analysis, and I'm having my future expected return for the longs here multiplied by the size of the position on the left side. On the right side, my short book, future expected return times the size of the position. When that future expected spread is really,
38:07
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): really high, gross up, when you go through a period where you produce strong spread and that future expected return, you either need to replace those line items with better future expected return, or you need to take down your gross and your net. And to me, that happens historically at least once or twice a year.
38:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): where you've got to be front foot and you've got to behave rationally and follow the analytics, follow what the data is telling you. Don't chase your own performance. And this is like, I think there are amazing things about the neutral model, and there's a reason why Citadel is killing it. The only criticism I ever hear about the Citadel model is the better I do, the more gross they wanna give me. And so I have these
38:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): periods where I produce 13% spread in a quarter. And they're like, great, here's two more billion dollars of risk. And like, I don't want it now. I want to gross down. And that's hard. Once you get on that treadmill, that's hard. I always had the luxury of grossing down after really massive spread production. And I think that that's one of the factors that led to
39:07
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): we know from 2008 really through 2016, we were in top decile performance. And I think that's part of that because we were willing.
39:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): to flex our gross. And again, this is makes people think we're trading around so much. Like I'm talking about
39:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): if you produce 20 points of spread in six months and your longs are now screening like they have 15% upside on a one-year forward basis, and your shorts are like flat.
39:33
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): If
39:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): we were running 200 gross, maybe we should be 160 now. Because invariably, then when you take the drawdown, because your gross is only going to then go from 160 to 165, and then you can go back from 165 back to 200. And I think that's the goal is to flex
39:48
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): because
39:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): spreads an accordion, right? Like it doesn't get captured forever and continue to grow. It will compress and it'll ebb and flow. And the key is to be front foot when it's blowing out and doing great and to be front foot.
40:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): when it feels like it may have gone a little bit too far. And that's people always say, Well, how do you know? How do you know? How do you know?
40:09
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You
40:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): let the numbers tell you.
40:10
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): So, generally speaking, if you just took a high-level long shirt equity sentiment for those strategies, it's pretty bearish, with the exception of the platforms. Citadel Millennium, who are were have that tight risk control.
40:24
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I'm
40:24
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): kind of curious, as you've laid it out, there's there should be a model of this very active management around stocks of good ideas that still works. So much of the tiger mafia came out of the Jones model portfolio construction, used leverage, certain long short ratio, healthy amount of net exposure. We just kind of love your view of the long short
40:44
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): model from here on out.
40:46
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Part
40:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): of the reason why I like talking about this stuff is, you know, it's a four $4 trillion dollar industry now, of which long short, what's long short as a percentage of the four or $5 trillion? It's probably a couple of trillion dollars.
40:55
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): There's
40:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): no sell side coverage of the hedge fund industry. There's no public market comps. And this is an entire industry based on studying businesses. And this is a business where capital has flowed into, capital flowing into businesses makes them definitionally more competitive and perhaps have lower returns. So where is the work being done? to
41:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): study this? I think starting point number one is if you are a fund that has a legacy of doing really well and you're not doing well now, is well, what has been historically your source of alpha? Did you generate most of your alpha on the long side or the short side? Gross or net? And I think for a lot of funds, they generated tremendous amount of alpha on the long side
41:35
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
41:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): with the gross on the long side. And so what they've done in response to that is they've stopped shorting so that they could get their AOM higher. All of a sudden, now your gross long exposure sits somewhere between 85 and 95. And so you're not even getting 100% performance out of your best ideas because that's what you've decided you're doing. You've decided you
41:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): are a primarily a long stock picker fund, and your best feature is long alpha, but you don't have 100% of your capital in your long. longs. Why? Because you're too big and you can't do it and you can't both be nimble and big. And so I think that that's a big part of this is well, how do I generate the returns that I want while also being big?
42:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): There are some funds out there who generated so much alpha on shorts. Like they were amazing, like Mecca of short generating, and then got so big and continued to try to generate alpha on. shorts in the same way they did when they were a fifth of the size. You can't do that because if you short 1%
42:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): of a company and you get squeezed, you can get out of it. You short 14% of a company and you get squeezed, you could be dead, right? I mean, and I saw this firsthand in 2008. We were up in 2008. 08. We were up in equities, and we would have been up a lot in equities. if you strip out the Volkswagen effect, because we got caught up in that just like everybody else. And we used to come
42:55
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in
42:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): and be like, how is this happening? Right. On one idea. And that dynamic, what happened in 08 with just that one company, is happening multiple places all over the place, partially because the funds are so big that it's just easier to happen. And I would also say that the other factor here, too, is what is the risk risk-free free rate and what is your hurtover? hurdle rate, right?
43:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Like if you're an endowment and you have a 4.5% hurdle rate and the risk-free rate's zero, you might accept six percent, right? You might accept eight percent. If the risk-free rate's going to be at three or four percent, all of a sudden, what you expect from a hedge fund might be different. But where do you put it? I don't know the answer. I think there is a place, and I know people that do it, there's an
43:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): amazing opportunity continued for spread, for long. alpha, for short alpha, for gross alpha with a moderate net or a reasonable net. It just doesn't scale. I just think it's too hard. And I don't know how to solve it other than to stay nimble.
43:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): A lot of that ties to this issue of incentives. So we know whatever it is, one and a half and twenty, 20 and what that drives a firm to do where if performance is harder, you gather assets, you make your money that way. I'm kind of curious to ask you a conversation we've had over time about compensation structures within
44:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): an organization, multiple PMs, and what you've seen that's effective.
44:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I've not seen anything that's consistently effective. I think what is effective is consistency, probably, is the answer. People don't like being backtraded, and backtrading back trading happens a lot. Backtrading meaning when you arrive, you have a certain expectation of how you get paid, but it's not in writing. That's probably the best way to say it is like some value accrues to
44:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the seat, and some value accrues to you for doing it. And how does that split go? And how does that work? And I think what the pods do really well is they put it in writing. They tell you what your percentage is going to be, and then you go and you make money. And so that to me seems to be effective. And then what they do is they put a whole hot lot of handcuffs on you and say, we're going to make it really hard for you to get this 20% of this profit you're going to put up. But if you put that
44:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): profit up, you're going to earn that 20%, where everything else is a little bit more subjective. And so it makes it a little bit harder. If you're not a pod, one of the issues that has befallen a lot of the hedge funds is that as financials and energy and industrials have become less investable over the last five to six years. The idea of paying somebody to sit in that
45:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): seat and voluntarily say, I don't think you should invest a dollar of money in my ideas, but please pay me to continue to sit around and do the work. That became less palatable for people, right? And then all of a sudden you come around and you point to the seat and you're like, we where's the energy analyst? Where's the energy PM? Well, they're not here. Why? Because I didn't want to continue to pay them because our incentive
45:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): structure only compensates performance. So there's got to be some element of
45:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): how do we keep people here and make everybody feel a part of it? And it's hard to get right. And the reason why there's quote unquote backtrading is because it changes over time. The size gets bigger, the talent changes, the person sitting in the seats change, and it gets very, very difficult. And that's why it leads to turnover. So I don't know that it's
46:01
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I think
46:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that's as hard. of a question as what's the right fee structure for an evolving hedge fund model for the LPs. Like I think that's as equally as hard.
46:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): You hear a lot about changes in market structure. Some of that's liquidity, some of it's high frequency trading. Love to get your perception on
46:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): that aspect of the markets today, maybe compared to a couple of years ago when you were still in the CW. seated biking?
46:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): The starting point is that there's more passive flows than active flows, right? So there's more blind pools of capital owning machines than individuals. When I first started the Fidelity analyst, they owned 14% of the company. Now, Fidelity still owns a lot of a company, but the companies are bigger and Vanguard has taken a lot of shares. So there's nobody
46:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): showing up from Vanguard to sit next to you to have a conversation with a company. So that's number one. The structure has definitely changed in that way. And then I would say number two is that we talked about it before, the competition, the pods are huge. No one knows how much leverage is even in these pods to how many seats there are within a pod. There could be seven TMT teams managing
47:07
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): $20 billion of risk inside of one pod, maybe $50 billion of risk. I have no idea. And so you take all of that and then you take the style.
47:15
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
47:16
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): everybody wants to own the same good businesses, and no one's looking to be as contrarian as they used to be, and you get this crowding. That's the headline. And then underneath is the plumbing, and the plumbing is changed, right? There's fewer people changing this. So people can be subjective. You could go
47:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): and have a relationship and say to somebody, I really need you. to get me out of this stock. I have something to sell. And they would be like, Yeah, you owe me. It's going to cost you a point, and you owe me. And it's done. And the risk's off your book and it disappears into the ether. And it's Goldman or Morgan Stanley. It's out there. That's just harder to do.
47:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): More and more of the transactions, there's a reason why Citadel has a broker dealer, right? How much of the flow is just internal? I don't know the answer to that, but there's a real reason because that structure has changed. Electronic trading, the pipes, the dark pools, the participation rate. How much of the daily volume could you actually
48:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): be in a stock with leaving as small of a footprint? What is your total cost of trading in specific stocks? And that has gotten more expensive. And a lot of people don't even track it.
48:26
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): You've accumulated.
48:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): just a huge amount of knowledge about how this all works in a way that many people haven't. And yet you haven't decided to start a fund after you have a Viking. So I'd love to hear a little bit of your thought process and leaving and whether you even thought of launching a fund.
48:44
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah.
48:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): So I mentioned before that my experience of Viking was in two chapters, and I only talked about the first chapter. So after I worked for Tom. Viking was a hub and spoke model. And when I worked for Tom, Tom was one of the spokes. Tom eventually became one of the hubs, right? Because we had co-hubs, if people get that analogy. And when I worked for Tom, I was working for Tom within the
49:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): spoke. And then I left Tom to run my own spoke. And then I ran two. And so the dynamic, the way that changes is I went from not really understanding what was going on inside the firm, but just working for Tom
49:19
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
49:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): just doing my job and just going idea to idea, really, and just hoping not to get fired and like literally thinking like I need to make money. And then the second chapter was being a team builder and a portfolio manager. And that actually went in, had two pieces to it too. The one was really much more of a partnership because when I reconstituted the
49:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): TMT team, there were two very senior analysts, junior portfolio managers in Dan Malcoon and Brendan Diaz, who were world class, like lights out, really, really profitable. And they both put their ego aside and said, Yeah, you're the more senior guy. You're next man up. They want you to do this. And we're in. It was much more of a partnership. And I learned so much from them.
49:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And so there was that first stage of it, but they both ultimately wound up moving. on to run their own TMTs elsewhere. And now Brendan runs his own for fun, which was sort of an inevitable. And then I rebuilt it all again and took over the consumer team. And that period of time felt like I was managing my own business inside of a larger business with
50:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): one LP. And then you start to become aware of all the other ways that this is a business and the things you control. and things you don't control. And that just gets complicated, right? And so when I left, my thinking was, well, I'm just going to recreate that, but with 50 LPs. And I went down the path of doing that.
50:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And two things I would say stopped me to pause. Number one was, and this is going to sound crazy crazy, but there's a blogger named Tim Urban. And Tim Urban has this your life. in weeks visual that I had printed on my desk. And I always used to look at
50:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it and say, this doesn't make sense that you work for all of these weeks and then you are retired for only this few weeks. There should be a midlife break here. And I was It like, I'm going to take a break here when my kids are of the age where I can be impactful and really
51:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): present in their lives. So I am pressing pause and I'm not going to do this. And I had multiple people tell me I was crazy. And I said, look,
51:27
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I'm
51:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): going to invert the Jeff Bezos regret minimization framework. I would regret jumping into this and continuing to make trade-offs personally in my relationship. relationships and in my presence and my distraction, as well as physically. Like I was sacrificing a lot of myself. I would regret more jumping into it to make more money to say that I did it than
51:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I would if I don't. And I think it's easier for me to go back and start a fund than it is for me to go back and get that time. And so that was part one of it. And then part two was the more time I spent away exploring curiosities, the more. market structure was changing and a lot of things, things were changing. And I was just like, I don't want to jump into
52:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): this. This same question you had of like, there's got to be a way to do this. I just kept banging my head against the wall and I was enjoying doing so many other things that I don't know what the right model is. And I've explored doing a long only more recently than doing the, I've explored doing the leverage. levered long, but that doesn't make
52:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): sense to me. And thinking about privates, like someone else can do that. And I'm happy to pay fees to the folks that I trust to do that. So I don't know. And the older I get, then the question becomes okay, do I continue to do this? And I like doing what I'm doing because I'm going to take seven weeks of vacation and no one's going to bother me. But there is a part of me that thinks, well, maybe the next
52:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): stage is more.
52:49
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): do
52:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I become more of like an advisor and do something like that? Because what I miss is I miss teaching. I miss explaining this stuff and helping. And that's what I miss more than anything. If I was thunderbolt stricken with the right model, I would definitely raise capital. I 100% do it.
53:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And if the right consigliari rabbi type job opened up with somebody I really loved and respected and was going to have fun with. And it was time for me not to manage risk down the road, then I could see myself doing something like that later in life too, as well. But for right now, this feels okay.
53:29
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): What's been your investment model as a single family office?
53:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): A lot of experimentation for the first two years and then settle. So then by then that I mean sat on the board of a startup software company and was really involved and was like, this is just the wrong founder and the wrong situation, but I get it. And then I, with a friend, made a loan to a CBG company and sat on and was an
53:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): observer on that board and watched and how different that was, right? So things like that, very small experimentation to also take taking a GP stake in an emerging manager, Ricky Walters, Stony Point, and really helping him learn a lot of the things that we were just talking about, right? He's an excellent stock
54:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): picker, but he had no idea how to be a portfolio manager and trying to help him do that. And what I've settled into on a day-to-day basis is I probably spend about 20% of my time talking to and working with a handful to a dozen. real estate developers, trying to find amazing multifamily opportunities where I
54:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): can be an LP with a group of folks that I'm closely affiliated with in parts of the country where the basis in the land is really cheap. And the rest of the time I spend in two buckets. One is, I mentioned, I'm a LP in a lot of different. stage private vehicles with people that
54:53
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I know pretty well. And there's somewhere between frequently and from time to time, there's a steady flow of opportunities to do co-invests. And I like that because I'm lazy, right? Like I don't
55:04
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): want to do the work to
55:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): get like the things that I hated about this job at the end were I remember going to Davos and people like, wow, that's so awesome. That's so prestigious. And I remember being on the plane to switch. I'm like, I'm so miserable. I do not want to be doing this. That's the part of the job that I didn't really like. So having folks that I can work with and I really can roll up my sleeves and say,
55:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): hey, I
55:25
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): want
55:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): to get in the data room too. And I would do this. So I spent some time doing that. And then the rest of the time is public markets.
55:30
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): What
55:30
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): does that public market portfolio look like?
55:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Almost 100% long, the occasional short, and still gross up and down a lot,
55:41
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): but
55:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it's been pretty much the same stocks
55:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): for five years. There are various different points in time. And there are a couple of times where I've actually traded out of things where I like I don't own Facebook anymore. Last year I was like, I'm out. Netflix, I was out in January. Should have been out in November, but I in January, I was like, this is broken. I'm out. And things like T-Mobile, T Mobile,
56:01
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I've
56:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): owned it. I've made it my biggest position by a lot. And then I've taken it down.
56:06
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): So one of the things you've also been in and out of is Twitter. And we'd just love to hear your thoughts on the why and the interaction on that platform.
56:16
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I was curious as to whether or not there were things that I knew. And based on some of the dynamic of what I was seeing in the market from like 2018 into nineteen 19 into 20. And I was, I was just watching this and have this network of people that I'm always talking to. And I was like, I wonder if there's an opportunity for me to just kind of share some knowledge. And I
56:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): think what was a bit of a changer for me is my friend Yen Lau, who you know, Yen taught this class at Columbia for years. And I always used to come and give a guest lecture. And the response that I would get from that and the follow-ups and the questions. and just the sort of clarity, I think, of clarity of
56:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): explanation in what it means to be an analyst at a hedge fund and what it means to be a stock picker versus a business picker, and how you transition from a stock picker to a portfolio manager and what that path looks like and how you should think about that. I just think that maybe this comes back to that whole idea of Jesuit discussion. discernment again. I
57:16
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): like deconstructing it and explaining it to people. These are teachable things. There's certain things that are not teachable. And if you're not good, you're not good. I can't teach you to be good. But if you're good, here are some other ways you can think about it to take being good to the next level. And that experience at Columbia, then I was invited to do it in Notre Dame. I was invited to do it at the University of Texas and a couple other places. And then I was like, oh,
57:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): there's a there's a reception here. Maybe I should just go out a little broadly and see. if it could be a two-way street. And I'd say it's been fine. That was the idea behind it.
57:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): So in prep for this, you sent out a tweet and had a bit of a rabid response of like questions we might ask. And there are a couple of good ones. So maybe we do this in pseudo-rapid fire. But I'm gonna ask you a couple of questions that people posed posted, that I thought were pretty good ones. So what's the process for getting up to speed on a new internet? industry?
58:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): So
58:05
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
58:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): think the the most important thing is to understand the financial statements as quickly as you can without reading a sell side report and try to contextualize it too, right? Think about the seven powers or porters competitive advantage, right? Think about it as you're going through it. Okay, I got it. These guys are
58:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): a network effect business.
58:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): They're looking to acquire subscribers. This is the monetization mechanism. When you're going through it, got it. And that's step one. Get up to speed as quick as you can on the economics. Then distill it down into the unit economics if you can. Okay. I understand what the whole PL looks like, but what would the unit economics look like if I could figure that out? Okay,
58:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): great. And then from there, depends on how. old the industry is and how young the industry is. I think that if it's a really old industry, grab a book and learn about the history of it. There's nothing better. So when I wanted to learn Formula One, there's a great book that Ross Braun wrote. Like it was an oral history of Formula One. There was no
59:07
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): better way to get up to speed on Formula One than to read that book, period. It There's was the single best thing I did. So then when I was thinking about, oh other adding new races, like, oh, this is why, because there's always been this legacy of this, because I heard and I heard the whole story behind it. And there's generally a lot of books for industries that have been around a really long period of time. So I think that that's really helpful.
59:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And then I think the most important thing, you have to figure out the competitors and you have to figure out ways to understand and make sure you go through the filings of all the competitors too. And then once you do that. and that's what I would call your inside view, Mobison again, then I flip it out and I you have to have an outside view. And you have to understand the context. Because I think the biggest mistake people make when they
59:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): get up to speed on the new industry is they think they've discovered plutonium. Like, oh my God, this is the greatest business in the world. I want to buy it. And then you buy it and you lose 20%. You're like, well, what the hell? Well, oh, because that numbers, like they miss numbers or they beat by 3%. three percent. Yeah, everyone thought they were going gonna to beat by 20%, twenty percent, right? Like you have to have the outside view. If you don't have the outside view, once you get up to speed, you're killing yourself. You're setting yourself up for
1:00:07
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): failure.
1:00:07
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): How can a young portfolio manager adapt and evolve portfolio management skill over time?
1:00:13
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
1:00:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): think a lot would probably depend on where you are and what the rules are of engagement, where you are and what you're doing. It are you neutral? Do you have freedom around your net? I guess this is the best way I can explain it. If you are a sole proprietor portfolio manager. you're both wearing your analyst hat and your PM hat. And I think the first thing to do to
1:00:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): transition is to consciously make the decision in the moment to decide am I wearing an analyst hat right now or am I wearing a PM hat right now? And this was one of my observations from last fall was the analysts seemed like they were still. in charge when the PM should have taken
1:00:53
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): over. And what I mean by that is it's the analyst's job to fall in love. It's the analyst's job to get this idea, to pitch it, to have passion, to know that they are going to be so invested in this that they're gonna stay on top of every signal. You've gotta believe that. If that person is you, you have to have that. And then you've got to have the ability
1:01:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): to step away. look at the portfolio, and objectively decide how it fits with everything else. And I think that self-awareness is the first step. And then fitting that into whatever risk model you happen to be a part of. And then through reps, you'll figure out how to do it and you'll learn and you'll understand. And I think these are
1:01:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): understand where your sources of alpha are and understand what your alpha curves are. If you're an analyst who's constantly pitching things through. three, three months early,
1:01:40
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): take
1:01:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): your analyst hat off and be the PM and be like,
1:01:43
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): hmm, should
1:01:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I be buying this right now? This idiot over here who's sitting in the other seat, who's me? That guy's always early, right? Why am I listening to him? I'll talk to him in October. I don't need to talk to him now. You've got to be have that self awareness to do that.
1:01:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): What advice do you give portfolio managers that are going through a tough period of performance?
1:02:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): If you're going through a bad period, I think you need somebody.
1:02:08
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): This
1:02:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): is probably the single hardest thing, right? Like VCs are always advising founders of businesses, get a partner.
1:02:14
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You
1:02:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): don't want to go through this alone. It's lonely. But LPs are always advising hedge funds don't be a multi multi-manager, manager. Don't have partners. It gets complicated. And so it can be a very isolating thing. And then what you wind up doing is you wind up having this circle of people and you all just have the same ideas and you all just commiserate and you all do this thing. So it's like, how do you
1:02:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): break free of that? And I think the the single most important thing is move the body, go for a swim, go for a run, do something that's going to take your mind off of it, and then have somebody who you can talk to who's gonna help you understand the that you're stuck because the biggest thing is to step away
1:02:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): and to get unstuck.
1:02:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): We covered some of this, but what will the best funds, let's just say hedge funds of tomorrow look like?
1:03:02
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
1:03:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): question is sort of what will the best, like, is that mean the best performing? Because I think the definition of what best is and what success is is changing, right? Like I think people's identities used to be really wrapped up in I was up 50, and now people people's identities are wrapped up in I raised another fund or I was in this deal or I have 50 billion dollars of AUM. So
1:03:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I think a lot of this will depend on how you define great, right? Because I think the assets are going to continue to be centralized unless something happens on the side to decentralize it. And the question then is, well, what results in performance? So there's two types of suffering. I'll put it this way, right? There is the I own a great
1:03:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): business and I'm suffering because the stock is down and I love it and I'm an idiot because I paid too much for it. And there's the suffering of I own this mediocre business that trades at seven times free cash flow or four times free cash flow, and it doesn't go up. And I'm really frustrated and I'm suffering and I hate myself for owning this, right? And some people have just decided I don't have the constitution.
1:04:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): to do the latter. The former, I don't care. And so the funds that are going to do really well are the funds that have the constitution to absorb that kind of volatility, but also the humility to sell the stock when it goes up. I just think that this is not about like the type of fund or the whatever. I think this is human behavior. I think the models are the models. Like I just
1:04:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): think what is your human tolerance for? certain types of risk? And can you constantly see the two sides of these elements and make sure that you're not just focused on one side of it? I don't know that a new model needs to exist. The long, short, moderate to mediocre net at like a
1:04:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): billion to three billion dollars of capital should still do really, really well. It should. All
1:04:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): right. Last one from the crowd.
1:04:51
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
1:04:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): then this is from the other side. What are the best questions to ask a manager in the due diligence process for looking at investing in a hedge fund?
1:04:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I think every single question has to come down to the model. I think more and more people think they're paying for a model, but they're really just paying for a story. And the story changes as things change, as the market changes, performance. changes. Like it drives me insane to hear people take
1:05:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): credit for their performance in 2020 as great stock picking and then blame 21 and 22 on a lack of dispersion, a lack of spread. So the strategy that's going to work is the strategy that's true to the model. So much of what
1:05:35
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): has
1:05:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): become true over the last five years, all this is about is marketing and telling a story. It's gotten away from the purity of executing to what you say you're going to execute against because most of it's just about collecting assets and chasing beta.
1:05:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): What questions would you ask to try to figure out if someone is sticking to their model?
1:05:53
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I would probably
1:05:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): focus very much on how aware somebody is of where their alpha is going to come from. Long, short, net, and gross. If you don't know where your alpha comes from, but you still think you're going to just produce alpha, that's a problem.
1:06:11
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): All
1:06:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): right, Paul. Gonna ask you a couple of closing questions before we wrap up. What's your favorite hobby or activity outside of work and family?
1:06:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I'm a rugby nut. I played rugby until I was 30 years old and I'm still actively involved with the New York Athletic Club. And I'm just really passionate about it. I it's think the perfect sport in a lot of
1:06:26
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): people.
1:06:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): ways. That's probably the thing that I'm most passionate about. I just watched the uh
1:06:30
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): New
1:06:30
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Zealand All Blacks Ireland match over the weekend. Love it.
1:06:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): What makes it a perfect sport?
1:06:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): So I think soccer and rugby are interesting in that there's no timeouts. So it's continuous play. All the work, all the preparation is done before the match starts. Coaches don't stand on the sidelines calling timeouts and scripting plays. You get out there, you play,
1:06:52
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
1:06:52
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): have half time to make some adjustments, and then you play again. And when it's over, you shake hands, you have a beer, and you socialize and you talk about what you did. And the whole point of rugby is you play offense and defense.
1:07:05
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You
1:07:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): don't get to choose,
1:07:07
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
1:07:07
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it's physical, and you're on the ground a lot. And so the team that gets off the ground the fastest and the most often. will most likely win.
1:07:16
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): What's your biggest investment pet peeve?
1:07:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I just don't like intellectual dishonesty. Period. That's investment, that's whatever. Like I believe in anti fragility. Attack it, attack it, attack it, and don't dismiss it. And if you're dismissing whatever it is, then that's because you're just not confident in your ability to defend it. That's my biggest pet peeve. beef.
1:07:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): What type of investment do you? gravitate to, like a moth to the flame?
1:07:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I think that the best ideas I've ever had is when I can isolate a change in trajectory in revenue at the same time that there won't be a commiserate change in expenses. So I love when you can
1:08:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): isolate. a company coming out of an investment period or going into a pricing period that people don't fully understand how to model. That is
1:08:12
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): so, so attractive.
1:08:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): That's so attractive.
1:08:17
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): How
1:08:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): about on the other side? What are your biggest investment blind spots?
1:08:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I would say the biggest ones are subject matter, right? There are certain subjects that I just won't touch.
1:08:26
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): What
1:08:26
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): teaching from your parents has most stayed with you?
1:08:29
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): My parents were
1:08:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): very humble and very focused on giving back and generosity. And I think that that
1:08:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): is a very, very big part
1:08:42
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): of
1:08:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): probably why I
1:08:45
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): do
1:08:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): what I do, like in terms of like just giving away advice and things like that. They were very, very generous people in our neighborhood, in our church, to us, to our community. And that sticks with me more than anything.
1:09:00
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): All right,
1:09:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Paul, last one. What life lesson have you learned that you wish you knew a lot earlier in life?
1:09:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Reading Carol Dweck's book changed my life. I coasted through so much of the early part of my life because people were always telling me I was good at stuff. and I only did the stuff I was good at. And if things were hard, I just didn't do it. And thank God that I changed that later in life. In hindsight, that was a real
1:09:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I'm glad it's all worked out, but I definitely limited it myself and limited my exposure to doing certain things. Even sports, like if sport came more easy to me, I continue to play it. If a sport started, if I started hit a wall, I'd be like, Yeah, I don't like it anymore. But it was wasn't that I didn't like it. It's just that I think I got scared that I was no longer as good as I thought I was, or other people were getting.
1:09:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And I was like, oh no, this let's run. And I'm glad that I was able to adjust that later in life. And I think I have a more passionate desire to attack new challenges because of that. Learn how to ski at age 45 was one. But I wish I had learned that earlier. I'm not sure anything would have. changed, but it was it's definitely a mindset shift and it's
1:10:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): something that I try to teach my kids as much as possible.
1:10:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Paul, thanks so much for taking time.
1:10:10
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Awesome. It's good to catch
1:10:12
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): up.
1:10:12
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Thanks for listening all the way to the
1:10:15
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): end. If
1:10:16
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): you made it this far, how about one ask for me? Tell one friend about the show. It's the best way to keep growing this incredible community. Thanks so much. And until the next one, stay curious and keep compounding knowledge, relationships, and capital a little bit at a time.
1:10:37
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): All
1:10:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): opinions expressed by TED and podcast guests are solely their own opinions and do not reflect the opinion of capital allocators or their firms. This podcast is for informational purposes only and should not be relied upon as a basis for investment decisions. Clients of capital allocators. or podcast guests, may maintain positions and securities discussed on this podcast.
This page was produced automatically: the audio was transcribed with nvidia/parakeet-tdt-0.6b-v3+sortformer-v2.1 and interpreted by Qwen3.6-35B-A3B-UD-IQ3_S.gguf. Transcription and interpretation can contain errors; always confirm against the original episode. Nothing here is investment advice.

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