Andrew Roberts on Geopolitics, History, and the 'Axis of Ill Will'
Summary
Lord Andrew Roberts argues that an 'axis of ill will' comprising China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea is challenging US leadership, driven by American isolationism rather than inherent US decline. He criticizes the WTO admission of China as a historic mistake and supports US intervention in Venezuela and Iran while drawing parallels to the Suez Crisis. Roberts also analyzes Napoleon's military failures at Waterloo, attributing them to leadership breakdowns, and suggests seizing $300 billion in Russian assets to fund Ukraine's reconstruction.
Episode sections
- 0:00 – 0:50
Geopolitical Risks in Eastern Europe
Roberts argues that Russia would target Moldova and the Baltics rather than major powers like Germany or Poland, citing ethnic Russian populations in Lithuania as a pretext for irredentist movements. He expresses uncertainty about whether NATO would risk nuclear war over Article 5, though he hopes they would, noting Putin's history of recklessness.
- 0:50 – 1:53
Podcast Introduction and Historical Context
Host Anthony Fatsies introduces Lord Andrew Roberts, a military historian and author of several books including 'Napoleon and His Marshals'. They discuss the relevance of history to current global conflicts, noting that human behavior remains consistent over time.
- 1:53 – 3:27
The Axis of Ill Will and NATO
Roberts compares the current era to post-WWII tensions, identifying an 'axis of ill will' comprising China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. He dismisses John Mearsheimer's theory that NATO expansion caused this conflict, attributing the aggression instead to US isolationism and withdrawal from global leadership.
- 3:27 – 4:28
China's Political Trajectory and WTO Admission
The speakers discuss the failure of the assumption that economic integration via WTO admission would lead to Chinese democracy. Roberts calls the admission of China to the WTO a historic mistake made on incorrect grounds, noting the CCP's continued stranglehold on politics.
- 4:28 – 5:30
Thucydidean Trap and US Power
Roberts addresses the Thucydidean Trap between rising China and the US, arguing that America is not a declining power but is acting like one due to isolationism. He suggests this creates a vacuum that adversarial states are filling.
- 5:30 – 6:48
US Foreign Policy: Venezuela and Iran
Roberts views US actions in Venezuela as consistent with historical intervention in its own hemisphere. He supports the June 2025 US attack on Iranian nuclear facilities but criticizes the strategic blunder of fighting Iran without securing the Straits of Hormuz, comparing it to the Suez Crisis humiliation.
- 6:48 – 8:35
Suez Crisis Historical Analysis
Roberts analyzes the 1956 Suez Crisis, noting the military success but political failure due to US opposition. He argues that fighting Arab nationalism in 1956 would have been more efficient than current approaches and avoided the 1973 oil price shocks.
- 8:35 – 32:59
Modern Warfare: Technology and Drones
Roberts describes the Ukraine war as a hybrid of WWI trench warfare and high-tech innovation, including drones and robotics. He highlights Ukrainian industrial capacity and the rapid development of military technology, such as drone-based medical evacuation.
- 32:59 – 36:21
Napoleon's Leadership Failure and Marshal Dynamics
Andrew Roberts explains that Napoleon's leadership collapsed because he stopped trusting his marshals, micromanaged excessively, and placed them in incorrect roles. By the Battle of Waterloo, only two of his original 26 marshals remained loyal, and they were ill-suited for their positions.
- 36:21 – 37:44
Unpredictability of Future Conflicts
Roberts argues that major conflicts historically emerge from 'a clear blue sky' despite intelligence warnings, citing Pearl Harbor, the Korean War, the Yom Kippur War, the Falklands War, and 9/11 as examples of surprise attacks.
- 37:44 – 40:42
Russian Invasion of Ukraine and Asset Seizure
The speaker distinguishes the Russian invasion of Ukraine from previous surprises, noting Western intelligence anticipated it. He claims Putin gained little strategic value, lost significant military assets, and suggests Europe should seize approximately $300 billion in Russian assets held in Euroclear to fund Ukraine's reconstruction.
Claims worth verifying
40% of Lithuanians are Russian.
Unidentified speaker ·0:09
How to verify: Check demographic data from the Lithuanian Department of Statistics or the CIA World Factbook for ethnic composition statistics.
NATO is a defensive alliance.
Unidentified speaker ·2:54
How to verify: Review Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which defines the collective defense clause.
John Mearsheimer's theory that NATO expansion caused Russian aggression is incorrect.
Unidentified speaker ·2:52
How to verify: Compare Mearsheimer's published arguments in journals like Foreign Affairs with Roberts' counter-arguments and historical records of Russian actions prior to NATO expansions.
China's admission to the WTO was a historic mistake made on incorrect grounds.
Unidentified speaker ·3:40
How to verify: Review WTO accession documents for China (2001) and subsequent economic/political analyses evaluating the terms of entry and outcomes.
America is not a declining power but is acting like one due to isolationism.
Unidentified speaker ·5:05
How to verify: Analyze US GDP, military spending, and technological innovation metrics against other nations to assess relative power, then correlate with foreign policy shifts.
In June 2025, the US attacked and took out Iranian nuclear facilities.
Unidentified speaker ·6:00
How to verify: Search for news reports, official US Department of Defense statements, or international news archives from June 2025 regarding military actions in Iran.
The Suez Crisis occurred in 1956, and the Eisenhower administration opposed it.
Unidentified speaker ·7:00
How to verify: Consult historical records of the 1956 Suez Crisis, specifically US diplomatic cables and Eisenhower's public statements.
In 1956, the UK recaptured the Suez Canal in a matter of hours.
Unidentified speaker ·8:23
How to verify: Review military histories of the Suez Crisis, specifically the timeline of Operation Musketeer.
Britain would run out of artillery shells in six days at the firing rate of Ukraine and Russia.
Unidentified speaker ·28:33
How to verify: Check UK Ministry of Defence reports on artillery shell production capacity and compare with reported consumption rates in Ukraine.
Putin's article 'On the Unity of Russians and Ukrainians' mentions Lithuania 17 times.
Unidentified speaker ·30:54
How to verify: Locate and count the occurrences of the word 'Lithuania' in Vladimir Putin's article published in July 2021.
Out of Napoleon's 26 marshals, 16 refused to follow him after his return from Elba, and only two were present at the Battle of Waterloo.
Unidentified speaker ·34:18
How to verify: Check historical records of the Hundred Days and the order of battle for the Battle of Waterloo, such as the National Army Museum archives or military history texts like Roberts' book 'Napoleon and His Marshals'.
Marshal Ney was emotionally affected by the retreat from Moscow and had a 'death wish' by 1815.
Unidentified speaker ·35:49
How to verify: Review biographies of Marshal Ney, such as those by Andrew Roberts or other historical accounts of the Russian Campaign of 1812.
Marshal Soult had not served as chief of staff since 1800 and made mistakes during the Waterloo campaign.
Unidentified speaker ·36:05
How to verify: Consult military histories of the Napoleonic Wars detailing the staff structure of the French army in 1815, such as David Chandler's 'The Campaigns of Napoleon'.
North Korea attacked South Korea in 1950 without warning.
Unidentified speaker ·36:58
How to verify: Verify the date and nature of the start of the Korean War through historical records from the United Nations or Department of Defense archives.
The 1973 attacks on Israel were surprise attacks.
Unidentified speaker ·37:06
How to verify: Review historical accounts of the Yom Kippur War, such as those from the Israel Defense Forces archives or historical texts on Middle Eastern conflicts.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine was anticipated by Western intelligence services.
Unidentified speaker ·37:52
How to verify: Check declassified intelligence reports or public statements from Western intelligence agencies prior to February 2022 regarding the likelihood of invasion.
Russia lost large parts of its fleet during the conflict in Ukraine.
Unidentified speaker ·39:11
How to verify: Review naval loss records and open-source intelligence reports on the Black Sea Fleet and other Russian naval assets during the 2022-2026 period.
Approximately $300 billion in Russian assets are held in Euroclear in Brussels.
Unidentified speaker ·39:14
How to verify: Check Euroclear's public reports on frozen sovereign assets or European Central Bank data on Russian central bank reserves held in the eurozone.
Do your own research
- Verify the claim that the US attacked Iranian nuclear facilities in June 2025 via news archives and official government statements.
- Check the current status and total value of Russian sovereign assets held in Euroclear and other European clearinghouses.
- Review John Mearsheimer's arguments on NATO expansion and compare them with Roberts' counter-arguments regarding US isolationism.
- Analyze the terms of China's 2001 WTO admission and subsequent political developments under the CCP to assess the 'historic mistake' claim.
- Research the military performance and asset losses of Russia in Ukraine since 2022 to verify claims about strategic value versus losses.
- Examine historical records of Napoleon's marshals at Waterloo, specifically the roles and conditions of Ney and Soult, to verify leadership failure claims.
- Check current NATO Article 5 commitments and public statements regarding potential conflicts in Moldova or the Baltics.
Full transcriptexpand
- 0:00
- Unidentified speaker: They wouldn't start with a powerful country, they wouldn't start with um with Germany or Poland.
- 0:04
- Unidentified speaker: Um, they would start with Moldova and they'd start with the Baltics.
- 0:09
- Unidentified speaker: Um 40% of Lithuanians are Russian.
- 0:12
- Unidentified speaker: You can start an irredentist movement in um in these countries pretty easily.
- 0:18
- Unidentified speaker: And um then you've got to work out whether or not you really think that uh that we would go to the brink of nuclear war um over Article 5.
- 0:30
- Unidentified speaker: I hope we would.
- 0:32
- Unidentified speaker: Um I uh uh don't know.
- 0:35
- Unidentified speaker: Um, but uh if you think what the way that Putin's behaved up till now, there's nothing to suggest he wouldn't um continue to be reckless.
- 0:50
- Unidentified speaker: Hey everyone, my name is Anthony Fatsies, and welcome to another episode of the What the Fight Ends podcasts.
- 0:55
- Unidentified speaker: On this episode, I have the pleasure of welcoming onto the podcast Lord Andrew Roberts.
- 0:59
- Unidentified speaker: Andrew is one of the world's leading military historians, the author of Napoleon the Great, Churchill Walking with Destiny, and with General Petravas, Conflict, the Evolution of Warfare from 1945 to Ukraine.
- 1:10
- Unidentified speaker: His new book, Napoleon and His Marshals, is currently out.
- 1:13
- Unidentified speaker: So, Andrew, thanks so much for coming on the podcast today.
- 1:15
- Unidentified speaker: Thanks very much for having me on the show, Anthony.
- 1:18
- Unidentified speaker: No problem, really looking forward to the conversation.
- 1:19
- Unidentified speaker: And as I was saying before, I've been a big fan of your work.
- 1:21
- Unidentified speaker: And I'm a big fan of history as well.
- 1:23
- Unidentified speaker: And I think there's so much we can learn from history into what we're seeing today.
- 1:26
- Unidentified speaker: You know, humans don't really change that much, at least, you know, and how humans act.
- 1:30
- Unidentified speaker: So I think it's it's a really important sort of link to uh to sort of understands actions that are taken.
- 1:35
- Unidentified speaker: But where I'd really like to start is you know, you spend your career studying how wars and leaders shape their errors with Ukraine in its fifth year, you know, of war, a war in the Middle East that's closed to Hormuz, and a US-China rivalry underneath both.
- 1:51
- Unidentified speaker: When was the last time that I guess we saw the world like this?
- 1:53
- Unidentified speaker: What would you compare it to?
- 1:57
- Unidentified speaker: Um, well, this um has been the largest war in Europe since the Second World War, the um the Russo-Ukraine war.
- 2:07
- Unidentified speaker: So I suppose that would be the natural place.
- 2:10
- Unidentified speaker: Uh, there have been plenty of wars in the Middle East, obviously.
- 2:12
- Unidentified speaker: And um, so whether or not this is 1967 or 1973, all over again, I don't know.
- 2:19
- Unidentified speaker: Um, but uh but yes, it's it's a uh extremely dangerous time.
- 2:24
- Unidentified speaker: The axis of what my friend Neil Ferguson calls axis of ill will, um, China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, um are saber rattling to an extent that they they just simply weren't 10 years ago.
- 2:39
- Unidentified speaker: And and what do you think has led to that saber rattling?
- 2:42
- Unidentified speaker: Is there is anything, you know, is it I know a lot of people have talked about, you know, I guess the John Miersheimers of the world talking about how NATO was actually pushing them to this extreme of uh of a pushback.
- 2:50
- Unidentified speaker: Do you think that's rubbish?
- 2:52
- Unidentified speaker: That is no, it's absolute balls.
- 2:53
- Unidentified speaker: Of course, NATO wasn't.
- 2:54
- Unidentified speaker: NATO is a defensive alliance.
- 2:56
- Unidentified speaker: John Miersheimer's um uh theory doesn't hold water at all, in my view.
- 3:02
- Unidentified speaker: Uh no, the reason that um the axis of ill-will have been able to get away with so much is that America is withdrawing and showing isolationism and uh not uh considering it to be part of its duty to the free world to um oppose the totalitarian states because they are totalitarian states.
- 3:23
- Unidentified speaker: Um that's what's um that's what's encouraged all of this.
- 3:27
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah, and I think if you look at China, there was a concern that, or that there was a thought that you know the more capitalism sort of integrates within the economy, that then the next stage would be democracy, but it's not something that we've we've currently seen.
- 3:38
- Unidentified speaker: They've just grown with the water.
- 3:40
- Unidentified speaker: No, well that that's also that's also to a great degree our fault as well, because of the um admission of China into the WTO um on completely the wrong grounds, basically on entirely their um their um terms.
- 3:57
- Unidentified speaker: That was a historic mistake that was made by the West, and it's impossible now to uh row back from.
- 4:04
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah, I think it was underestimating uh sort of what they would be like, and it's amazing how how far they've come 20 20 years later.
- 4:12
- Unidentified speaker: The assumption was that uh when the Chinese became rich, they would become democratic, and that is um that is not the uh not the case, not with the way that the uh CCP holds a complete stranglehold over uh Chinese politics and society.
- 4:27
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah, no, definitely not.
- 4:28
- Unidentified speaker: So is this just another case of I guess uh you know great power conflicts?
- 4:33
- Unidentified speaker: Because I think it's I think it's something that we've seen in history where you know once one rising power sort of comes up against the current hegemon, then there's generally goes to war and it generally starts conflict.
- 4:44
- Unidentified speaker: So is that sort of how how you're seeing it?
- 4:46
- Unidentified speaker: This is the the classic uh the Thucydidean trap, as uh as it's called after Graham Allison's excellent book on uh on uh essentially of obviously Athens and Sparta, but uh but also seeing uh China uh coming up vis-a-vis the um declining power of America.
- 5:05
- Unidentified speaker: But the point is, it strikes me that America is not a declining power, it's just acting like one um in terms of economics and so on.
- 5:13
- Unidentified speaker: It's uh still a brilliant, punchy, impressive, aggressive power.
- 5:19
- Unidentified speaker: But um it uh is drawing in its horns all over the world, and um that's obviously creating a vacuum that the axis of ill will are going to fill.
- 5:30
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah, it's interesting because I guess Trump got elected on uh as as a peace president, but he's actually almost expanded the uh sort of the wars or the or the conflicts that you know, maybe withdrawn from Europe, you could say, but then has gone into the Middle East, gone to sort of South America again.
- 5:45
- Unidentified speaker: So it seems like yeah.
- 5:46
- Unidentified speaker: I think the I see the Venezuelan adventure just as part and parcel of what America's done in its own backyard since 1916, you know.
- 5:55
- Unidentified speaker: That's not a um that's not a break really from the past.
- 6:00
- Unidentified speaker: And I also expected the um attack on Iran, which I very much supported when in June 2025 it uh tried to take out or did take out the Iranian nuclear facilities.
- 6:13
- Unidentified speaker: We don't know to what extent it that was successful ultimately, but um but that was the right thing to have done, in my view.
- 6:20
- Unidentified speaker: But the weird one was um fighting a war when you can't keep the Straits of Hormuz open and encouraging the Iranian um opposition to rise up when, and saying you're locked and loaded when you're neither of those things, and they wind up 50,000 of them getting uh shot down in the streets.
- 6:42
- Unidentified speaker: That seems to me to have been a world historical blunder on Mr.
- 6:47
- Unidentified speaker: Trump's part.
- 6:48
- Unidentified speaker: And yeah, many many people have sort of, and I and I think sort of your yeah, your friend Al Ferguson have sort of linked it to the Suez crisis that uh that the British and the French had in the 1950s.
- 6:57
- Unidentified speaker: Do you see sort of similarity similarities to that?
- 7:00
- Unidentified speaker: Um I suppose yes, but um the only drawback is of course with Suez, where we were humiliated, the Americans um uh took part in, in fact, they they really um predicated the humiliation.
- 7:15
- Unidentified speaker: That was the problem.
- 7:16
- Unidentified speaker: The uh Eisenhower administration cut the Eden um premiership um down below the knees by uh by its opposition to what was going on.
- 7:27
- Unidentified speaker: In retrospect, actually, um uh fighting Arab nationalism back in 1956 would have been a far more efficient way of going about it than in uh than the present day.
- 7:38
- Unidentified speaker: And you also wouldn't have got the oil price hikes of 1973 when overnight the Saudis quadrupled the um cost of oil, which has led to a series of dislocating economic shocks ever since.
- 7:53
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah, okay.
- 7:53
- Unidentified speaker: So it actually could have been a beneficial thing to do at the time.
- 7:57
- Unidentified speaker: But I imagine the risk there is that you bring sort of US and USSR come come come to you know conflict there.
- 8:04
- Unidentified speaker: So it's nice sort of another field there.
- 8:06
- Unidentified speaker: That's there was no way that was going to happen.
- 8:07
- Unidentified speaker: They had their hands full with uh with Hungary, invading Hungary in uh 1956.
- 8:12
- Unidentified speaker: In fact, it was the ideal time uh to be able to undertake a operation.
- 8:19
- Unidentified speaker: The actual military side of the Suez operation was uh extremely successful.
- 8:23
- Unidentified speaker: They recaptured the canal in in a matter of hours.
- 8:27
- Unidentified speaker: The big problem, as I say, was um American threats to hit Sterling if they carried on.
- 8:34
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah, but yeah, of course.
- 8:35
- Unidentified speaker: Um if if we go to you know Ukraine at the moment, it has been quite surprising.
- 8:39
- Unidentified speaker: It almost seems like it's a sort of a repeat of World War I with the trench warfare we're seeing, despite there's the fact that you know that there are high technology, there's drones, there's other aspects, but it is really, really brutal warfare.
- 8:50
- Unidentified speaker: Have you been surprised that we've sort of gone back to to that uh type of war?
- 8:55
- Unidentified speaker: Not that surprised.
- 8:56
- Unidentified speaker: I wrote a book with General David Petraeus uh a few years ago in which we we said that this was likely to happen.
- 9:05
- Unidentified speaker: It had already started to happen.
- 9:06
- Unidentified speaker: It's not as though we were nostradamus or anything, you know, it had already started to happen, but my god, it's it's uh continued a pace since.
- 9:15
- Unidentified speaker: Um but then interestingly, the use of tanks has um there have been lots of people that have predicted the end of the tank and um and the end of of uh maneuverability on the battlefield, and it comes in and out.
- 9:31
- Unidentified speaker: And and actually, uh, I don't think you can take the tank entirely out of um the prospect of warfare.
- 9:40
- Unidentified speaker: It uh it it it always seems to make a comeback.
- 9:44
- Unidentified speaker: So um, so yes, we are we are in the uh a sort of hybrid really between the first world war and blade runner.
- 9:51
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah, again, that and that's linked to the the drones, and it is amazing innovations.
- 9:56
- Unidentified speaker: It's sort of just uh um that they they find a way to stop it, and then there's innovations to sort of you know, did you see the other day?
- 10:03
- Unidentified speaker: Uh did you see the other day the um drone that came and took the wounded Ukrainian soldier off the battlefield, picked him up and carried him off the battlefield?
- 10:13
- Unidentified speaker: Extraordinary thing.
- 10:14
- Unidentified speaker: Extraordinary thing.
- 10:15
- Unidentified speaker: And then the next stage has got to be robots.
- 10:17
- Unidentified speaker: You see these Chinese robots uh running the hundred meters.
- 10:21
- Unidentified speaker: Well, imagine them with machine guns in their hands.
- 10:24
- Unidentified speaker: It's only a matter of uh machine guns as their hands, it's only a matter of time before that happens.
- 10:30
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah, it's extremely scary.
- 10:31
- Unidentified speaker: But I can imagine it seems like sort of Russia-Ukraine is is the trial place for many of this technology at the moment.
- 10:37
- Unidentified speaker: So it seems like that'll be the place where we we'd see that happening.
- 10:40
- Unidentified speaker: Yes, and I'm just hoping that the uh Ukrainians get there first.
- 10:44
- Unidentified speaker: It is extraordinary the way in which they've managed in uh in a relatively short period of time to um be at the absolute cutting edge of all the high-tech military equipment.
- 10:56
- Unidentified speaker: I went there, I visited uh General Petraeus uh with um General Petraeus visited Kyiv and Butcher and Irpin um shortly after the war had started, um, actually a year after the war had started.
- 11:10
- Unidentified speaker: And um we were so impressed by the way in which the um defense technology and the the industrial capacity of the Ukrainians had been ramped up.
- 11:23
- Unidentified speaker: I mean, that really is what happens in total war, of course, and um and one has to uh admire hugely their capacity to fight off uh the invasion of a country three times its its um population and six times its size, ten times its size.
- 11:42
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah, I think what we're saying with with with Ukraine, with Iran, it does seem that like the great powers, you know, they they aren't able to just walk over these sort of these countries.
- 11:53
- Unidentified speaker: It it does seem that with the I guess you can say commoditization of many of these sort of uh weapons, it's a lot easier for them to actually be able to fight back and potentially put a lot of these countries under a lot of pressure.
- 12:04
- Unidentified speaker: We're seeing that with the Houthis and and Saudi Arabia as well.
- 12:07
- Unidentified speaker: So it seems like it's a real shift in power versus you know these large large countries versus the smaller ones they're trying to invade.
- 12:14
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah, but none of this means that we shouldn't be uh spending decent amounts of money on our own defence.
- 12:22
- Unidentified speaker: It's utterly pathetic that we seem to be stuck in this rut of arguing whether it should be 2% or uh sorry, 2.6% or or 3%, and not being able to even give a date for it to go to 3%, or at least saying it's going to go till in 2030, but not having a um plan already.
- 12:43
- Unidentified speaker: We've just had a budget and um there was and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who resigned over exactly this issue, has kicked the uh can down the road to the spending review next year.
- 12:54
- Unidentified speaker: Um, and then there's the pie in the sky uh 3.5% in uh 2035, which um if you can't if you can't work out how you're going to uh get to 3%, then I can't see any more uh coming anytime soon, especially as the Treasury has made it quite clear that there's not going to be any um cuts in in uh welfare spending between now and the next election.
- 13:21
- Unidentified speaker: So, you know, we aren't in a position to wag our finger at anybody, frankly, the way we're um we're presently financing our own defence.
- 13:29
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah, I I I think that the the best way to do this would be, you know, the if you look at the absolute number, 2.53% sure.
- 13:36
- Unidentified speaker: But I imagine if there's a relatively more bang for your buck that you could actually invest in these things.
- 13:41
- Unidentified speaker: So going deep into the drones like the Ukrainians have done, they've done on a shoestring budget, you know, probably other submarine drones and other drones.
- 13:48
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah, absolutely, but it's not either or, you know, you can have both.
- 13:51
- Unidentified speaker: In fact, you've got to have both if you're going to have a um a fully efficient and uh and deployable army.
- 13:59
- Unidentified speaker: Does the UK need an army or can they, you know, historically it's not something that they've generally they focus on the navy, they're focused on the air force, and then the army is something they build up during crises?
- 14:10
- Unidentified speaker: Yes, but you can't um you can't build them up during crises any longer because the crises are getting shorter and shorter.
- 14:17
- Unidentified speaker: And um, yeah, so we do need a an army and a much more deployable one than we've got at the moment.
- 14:22
- Unidentified speaker: We've got one brigade in Estonia, and then I mean, only 10-15 years ago we were able to place a division in Iraq.
- 14:30
- Unidentified speaker: It is amazing how our um armed forces have been completely hollowed out.
- 14:36
- Unidentified speaker: And uh yes, you're right.
- 14:37
- Unidentified speaker: I mean, historically, back in the 19th century, this um book that I've just written, Napoleon and his marshals, um, it was a relatively small British army, but an incredibly powerful Royal Navy at a time when the um country spent 660% of its GDP on uh defence, and the lion's share of it went to the navy, both because, of course, it was a uh defensive um manoeuvre, but also it could uh take the offensive in blockading France.
- 15:09
- Unidentified speaker: Well, today uh with F-35 jets and uh and drones, as you mentioned, and cyber and sensors and robotics and AI, um these these wars are going to escalate far, far quicker than ever they did in the 18th century.
- 15:28
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah, that's a that's a great point.
- 15:29
- Unidentified speaker: It seems like everything that we're seeing in the world, you know, market crashes, wars, everything like that is just accelerated to the point where it happens so quickly and you need to be ready at all times.
- 15:40
- Unidentified speaker: And everything's incredibly interconnected as well.
- 15:42
- Unidentified speaker: You know, uh there was a time back in the Napoleonic Wars where something could happen in Egypt, uh, like the um the French uh defeat in Syria and uh and later Egypt, and um people in Europe wouldn't find out about it for months.
- 15:57
- Unidentified speaker: Indeed, Napoleon was able to organize a coup in Paris before the news of his defeat in Syria got back to France.
- 16:05
- Unidentified speaker: So you have a um uh a great time lag of uh communication and information, whereas here it's it's tenths of a second that one thing in one part of the world can be communicated to everybody else.
- 16:20
- Unidentified speaker: And um if you have, for example, a humiliation in Ukraine, um, it's going to be felt in Taiwan within moments.
- 16:31
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah, you worry that the rise of hawkishness, I guess, in Europe, uh, especially to do with sort of the military and against against Russia, could actually, it's sort of similar to what we saw with it, you know, I guess you could say, going into World War I, where there was this rise of military hawkishness, and then potentially that just leads to leads to the war because everyone's thinking about it.
- 16:51
- Unidentified speaker: I haven't seen any uh examples of hawkishness against Russia.
- 16:55
- Unidentified speaker: I think it's everybody is being very concerned about Russian hawkishness towards the West.
- 17:01
- Unidentified speaker: Um, that's the thing that is uh is making people worried.
- 17:05
- Unidentified speaker: I can't see uh I don't know of anybody who wants to go to war with uh Russia.
- 17:09
- Unidentified speaker: It's a nuclear power apart from anything else.
- 17:12
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah, I guess it's more preparation.
- 17:13
- Unidentified speaker: I think still something in in the UK saying that we need to be ready for war in a thousand.
- 17:18
- Unidentified speaker: That is not hawkishness, though.
- 17:19
- Unidentified speaker: That's preparation, that's a completely different um thing.
- 17:22
- Unidentified speaker: The resilience and preparation and and getting ready for something is uh is in fact, when it comes to defense terms, the exact opposite of wanting to go to war.
- 17:31
- Unidentified speaker: It's only when you can um and are prepared that um that you can deter war from taking place.
- 17:39
- Unidentified speaker: And the witness of history is universal to the fact that um money spent on on deterrence is is never wasted and always is far, far less than it would cost than uh in an actual war.
- 17:53
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah, that makes a lot of sense.
- 17:55
- Unidentified speaker: So um you know you mentioned your your recent book, you know, in conflict uh with with sort of general petraeus, and you set out four tasks of strategic leadership.
- 18:04
- Unidentified speaker: So get the big ideas right, communicate them, oversee their execution, and then refine them.
- 18:08
- Unidentified speaker: Are there any leaders at the moment or any countries at the moment that you think have sort of got these uh you know strategic leadership uh trends on on track or yes?
- 18:18
- Unidentified speaker: I well I think Zelensky has, um undoubtedly, you know, he's he did all four of those things when his uh country was invaded, and he's on the fourth part, which is constantly uh updating and upgrading your um your leadership um paradigm, and he's uh he's doing that all the way.
- 18:40
- Unidentified speaker: Um uh other than that though, it's very difficult to see um to see really effective leadership.
- 18:47
- Unidentified speaker: Uh Macron hasn't shown it, Mertz hasn't shown it, um, Burnham hasn't shown it.
- 18:52
- Unidentified speaker: It's a um it's a it's a tough one to uh to to point to European successful leaders, frankly.
- 19:02
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah, I agree.
- 19:02
- Unidentified speaker: Potentially would you would you say China uh have shown that?
- 19:06
- Unidentified speaker: Yes, yeah, unfortunately our opponents have shown it.
- 19:09
- Unidentified speaker: Not Putin.
- 19:10
- Unidentified speaker: Putin um is uh is uh caught in this war and um and he's uh not going he's not about to uh make peace on any kind of terms that the Ukrainians could accept.
- 19:26
- Unidentified speaker: Um but uh but he he has failed to to really see the big picture, it strikes me.
- 19:34
- Unidentified speaker: But but um yeah, President Xi at the moment looks um like a uh uh a very effective leader, um according to the to the principles that we set out in in the book.
- 19:47
- Unidentified speaker: Now, were he actually to uh invade Taiwan, I think that um he could find that the Chinese army isn't um all that it's been cracked up to be.
- 19:59
- Unidentified speaker: Uh it hasn't fought a war successfully um since the founding of the um of the modern Chinese state.
- 20:08
- Unidentified speaker: So um we'll we'll see how well they do if uh they make the, in my view, catastrophic um uh decision to um to push the Taiwanese situation to uh kinetic.
- 20:21
- Unidentified speaker: Hey everyone, sorry for interrupting, but just want to say thank you so much for listening and I hope you're getting amazing value out of this conversation.
- 20:27
- Unidentified speaker: If you are, we really appreciate it.
- 20:29
- Unidentified speaker: If you could like, share, and subscribe.
- 20:30
- Unidentified speaker: It really helps the channel and means we can continue to get amazing guests like this one.
- 20:34
- Unidentified speaker: Thanks again, and let's get back to the show.
- 20:36
- Unidentified speaker: Do you see that as a risk in the future?
- 20:39
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah, if if um if America just continues to uh to signify, I mean, the other day the Trump administration stopped um selling arms to a particular massive billion dollar arms um deal was was with Taiwan, was stopped.
- 20:58
- Unidentified speaker: Um, and you know, it's kind of it's exactly that kind of message which comes over as appeasement and which can send the wrong message to Beijing about what would happen if they uh if they actually um you know did something threatening.
- 21:12
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah, it's a great point.
- 21:13
- Unidentified speaker: It it does seem that you know you studied how great powers overextend, and I think it's a great example with Napoleon, with his sort of invasion of Russia, that that that was it seemed like an overextension of of what was possible.
- 21:23
- Unidentified speaker: It does also seem that oh, sorry.
- 21:25
- Unidentified speaker: No, yeah, no, actually, it's it's very it's very often misunderstood Napoleon's invasion of Russia.
- 21:31
- Unidentified speaker: It's people just take it for granted that it was a sort of gigantic act of hubris, rather like Hitler's invasion of Russia 119 years later to the day.
- 21:40
- Unidentified speaker: But actually, uh Napoleon only really wanted to fight 50 miles inside uh Russia.
- 21:47
- Unidentified speaker: He had no plans to go to Moscow when he invaded in June um 1812.
- 21:52
- Unidentified speaker: He had an army twice the size of the Russian army, he'd beaten the Russians twice before.
- 21:57
- Unidentified speaker: You know, it was it was very much not the same as Operation Barbarossa in um in June 1941.
- 22:05
- Unidentified speaker: But he got drawn into Russia, and as my book points out, um the scorched earth policy led to um the logistics breaking down, and then his personal relationship with his chief of staff, Alexandre Berthier, broke down completely to the point that they refused to uh um to interact with one another.
- 22:27
- Unidentified speaker: Um and so so it's uh it's a little bit more sort of complicated and interesting than just the old hubris lead leading to nemesis uh story.
- 22:39
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah, and I think I uh listening to your your other interviews, you were saying that uh generally Napoleon sort of ignored his marshals, but the one time he listened to him was when they were uh looking to when they when he was talking about evacuation, which was one of the worst decisions.
- 22:52
- Unidentified speaker: Yes, it's very it's very uh ironic.
- 22:54
- Unidentified speaker: It was the um the decision to go after the Battle of Malijaroslavets on the 25th of October 1812, he decided to, on the advice of some of his marshals, not all of them, um, Marshal uh Davo and Marshal Mura had different ways that they wanted to go uh back from Russia back into Germany.
- 23:15
- Unidentified speaker: And either of those would have been much better routes, in fact, um, because the route he did choose, the northern routes from Moscow to Smolensk via Borodino, the battlefield of Borodino, uh, turned out to be catastrophic because the uh blizzards started to hit about a week after the decision was taken.
- 23:36
- Unidentified speaker: Do you see uh after that defeat, was there a way that the pollen could have recovered, or it was just too difficult?
- 23:41
- Unidentified speaker: It was all he should have made peace um when he met Metternich in Dresden in um June 1813, but they and they had a six-hour meeting, and most of the marshals by that stage um wanted peace.
- 23:55
- Unidentified speaker: They had been deluged by Napoleon with titles, and two of them had become kings, six had become dukes, they had um massive estates and Parisian townhouses and millions of francs in cash that were that were um thrust on them.
- 24:12
- Unidentified speaker: And they wanted to enjoy it and they wanted to see their families, and they'd been um they had been fighting for 21 years by then, and uh so perfectly understandably they um they wanted peace, but Napoleon uh couldn't give them peace because um he would have to have therefore admitted uh in the redrawing of the of the uh maps that the last 20 years of um of fighting and last 10 years of his uh of his leadership had all been essentially for nothing.
- 24:47
- Unidentified speaker: So so he kept fighting, lost uh Paris was uh was surrendered by his best friend, um Marshal Um Auguste Marmont.
- 24:57
- Unidentified speaker: And then a few days after that, the marshals got together and forced him to abdicate um at a a big sort of scene that they had in uh the Chateau of Fontainebleau in um early April 1814.
- 25:10
- Unidentified speaker: I imagine it's you know the traits that require someone like that to rise to the top from where they were from, are the traits that then sort of lead to the downfall.
- 25:17
- Unidentified speaker: It seems like the great man theory we've seen all the time, and many of these uh you know great leaders who've sort of shaped the past, such as I guess you could say Alexander the Great, Caesar, they all have similar traits of they rise very quickly, they understand, but they struggle to know when well Alexander the Great you know died on campaign and uh and he was uh successful all the time.
- 25:41
- Unidentified speaker: He hadn't been defeated.
- 25:42
- Unidentified speaker: Similarly, Julius Caesar was assassinated, he hadn't been defeated either.
- 25:46
- Unidentified speaker: Whereas Napoleon is a um uh is the example of somebody who was both both um defeated, even though he won all the battles of the 1814 campaign, the surrender of Paris was such that he he had to go the first time.
- 26:02
- Unidentified speaker: And then, of course, he was comprehensively defeated in the Waterloo campaign uh the following year.
- 26:07
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah, okay.
- 26:08
- Unidentified speaker: If we if we can if we come back to sort of the modern day, I think we were talking about the sort of American overextension.
- 26:14
- Unidentified speaker: Is that something that you see?
- 26:15
- Unidentified speaker: Because it does seem at one point they were sort of fighting in Ukraine, you know, now fighting the Middle East, fighting sort of um South America, they're sort of trying to protect themselves from from China in Asia.
- 26:26
- Unidentified speaker: It does seem like it's a lot for one country to be able to manage.
- 26:29
- Unidentified speaker: Well, I didn't I mean, first of all, they weren't fighting in Ukraine.
- 26:32
- Unidentified speaker: They um they began by giving weapons and now they're selling weapons to the um Ukrainians.
- 26:40
- Unidentified speaker: Um they're fighting in the Middle East in a war that um is against probably the most evil country in the world.
- 26:48
- Unidentified speaker: I mean, a totally monstrous sinister regime.
- 26:53
- Unidentified speaker: Um, so I have no problem with uh with the pointing out that Iran is the enemy.
- 26:59
- Unidentified speaker: It's just the way that he's fighting it seems very um uh strange.
- 27:05
- Unidentified speaker: You know, why go to war with a country if you can't um keep the Straits of Hormuz open?
- 27:11
- Unidentified speaker: Um it doesn't seem to make sense.
- 27:14
- Unidentified speaker: He must have been warned by the admirals that this would not be possible.
- 27:18
- Unidentified speaker: Um so that's that's uh pretty harsh, but but otherwise, you know, the United States has spent 80 years since the Second World War being able to um to confront totalitarianism on multi fronts.
- 27:34
- Unidentified speaker: Um, and um I can't see that it's uh an example of American overextension to continue to do that, especially as obviously they used to be at least the leader of a um of a huge multinational um free world, including NATO.
- 27:51
- Unidentified speaker: I do feel like Trump had a point in terms of the Europeans and the UK weren't actually pulling their weights, they sort of had pulled back the last 20 years on the after the Cold War.
- 28:00
- Unidentified speaker: Definitely, absolutely.
- 28:01
- Unidentified speaker: No, no, no, of course he did, and uh and and he still does, you know, and mentioned earlier, this is um uh we need to be at 4.5% of GDP, not 2.6.
- 28:13
- Unidentified speaker: It's absolutely um it's absolutely pathetic.
- 28:15
- Unidentified speaker: When you've got a uh a genuine fear that if the Russians were successful in um in Ukraine, then um there's no way they just sort of stop there.
- 28:26
- Unidentified speaker: And uh and so NATO needs to be able to be um much more prefer prepared than it is.
- 28:33
- Unidentified speaker: At the moment, we've got shell production, which uh would mean that on the same rate as the Ukrainians and Russians are firing them, Britain would run out of shells in six days.
- 28:44
- Unidentified speaker: So we are just not prepared in any way, really, enough for this.
- 28:48
- Unidentified speaker: We've got half our fleet uh seems to be in dry dock all the time.
- 28:52
- Unidentified speaker: We've got the smallest armed forces um since the Napoleonic Wars, and um, and we're not putting money into enough money at least into the really advanced uh RD that's um that's necessary at the same time as losing our most powerful ally who seems to have um essentially be absent without leave.
- 29:14
- Unidentified speaker: Do you think Russia would sort of go further than Ukraine into Europe?
- 29:17
- Unidentified speaker: Because I guess where I struggle with that is they've struggled to get through Ukraine, so then then going on to these more powerful countries further.
- 29:25
- Unidentified speaker: They wouldn't start with a powerful country, they wouldn't start with um with Germany or Poland.
- 29:30
- Unidentified speaker: Um, they would start with Moldova and they'd start with the Baltics.
- 29:35
- Unidentified speaker: Um 40% of Lithuanians are Russian.
- 29:38
- Unidentified speaker: You can start an irredentist movement in um in these countries pretty easily.
- 29:44
- Unidentified speaker: And um then you've got to work out whether or not you really think that uh that we would go to the brink of nuclear war um over Article V.
- 29:56
- Unidentified speaker: I hope we would.
- 29:58
- Unidentified speaker: Um I uh uh don't know.
- 30:01
- Unidentified speaker: Um, but uh if you think what the way that Putin's behaved up till now, there's nothing to suggest he wouldn't um continue to be reckless.
- 30:12
- Unidentified speaker: Okay, so when he talks in negotiations about it being about NATO and Ukraine, you don't believe not.
- 30:20
- Unidentified speaker: I've actually read the 6,500-word um article that he wrote called uh um on the um on the unity of the rushes, uh and the it's all about it goes back to the sort of 14th century.
- 30:35
- Unidentified speaker: Um, and um it basically argues that the Ukrainians are um uh just part of Russia and that he's just walking into his own backyard, uh, that he doesn't recognize the um independence of of Ukraine over the last 30 years.
- 30:54
- Unidentified speaker: And he um also mentions Lithuania 17 times in that article.
- 31:00
- Unidentified speaker: So the idea that were he successful in Ukraine, he would just sort of sit back and and retire is is pie in the sky, as far as I'm concerned.
- 31:08
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah, it's interesting, but it's for his actions in Ukraine have really pushed Ukrainians away from Russia, because I think you say that you see that the sort of language is just to be used.
- 31:16
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah.
- 31:17
- Unidentified speaker: So you could say maybe before 2014 there was sort of a bit of a okay, where we're you know, we're comrades or where we we sort of we there's similarities between us, and now it's just completely the opposite.
- 31:28
- Unidentified speaker: For the rest of the for the rest of their lives, the entire population of Ukraine will hate uh the Russians.
- 31:35
- Unidentified speaker: Of course they will.
- 31:37
- Unidentified speaker: Um, but that doesn't mean that there isn't some kind of a deal that could be struck, a line that could be drawn down the Donbass, Russia possibly keeping the um uh Crimea, you know, all wars end in some kind of negotiation.
- 31:54
- Unidentified speaker: But the point is that we shouldn't, you know, it's not my son who's going to be fighting in this war.
- 31:59
- Unidentified speaker: We shouldn't be putting any pressure on the Ukrainians to come to a deal that they don't feel comfortable with.
- 32:06
- Unidentified speaker: In fact, what we should be doing is trying to persuade the Americans to um put together a proper uh guarantee for after the war and once the border is uh is drawn.
- 32:19
- Unidentified speaker: I mean, it might could be you in the same situation as you are with um the Koreas, North and South Korea, where there's a uh demilitarized line, no particular actual peace treaty, and um and it lasts for 75 years.
- 32:35
- Unidentified speaker: Anything's possible.
- 32:37
- Unidentified speaker: I mean, you you get this also with with Napoleon.
- 32:39
- Unidentified speaker: There's um in 1813 and 1814, um, there are negotiations about where the uh extent of the borders of France are.
- 32:50
- Unidentified speaker: Now they weren't good enough for for Napoleon, but they were good enough for the um allies, including France, in 1815.
- 32:59
- Unidentified speaker: I mean, this is the whole point of diplomacy and um uh you know trying to come to some kind of uh agreement.
- 33:06
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah, so if we go back to Napoleon and I guess the marshals, it's sort of it seems like a story where a leader he sort of stopped trusting the people who he he most relied on and most depended on previously.
- 33:18
- Unidentified speaker: Why do you think that was the case?
- 33:19
- Unidentified speaker: And I guess is there any can you see any sort of similarities to that?
- 33:23
- Unidentified speaker: Well, he he micromanaged to an extraordinary degree.
- 33:26
- Unidentified speaker: Um he was very good at choosing people, absolutely superb at spotting majors and colonels who would be make great generals, and ultimately, obviously, 26 of them became marshals.
- 33:39
- Unidentified speaker: Uh, he was superb at inspiring the ordinary soldier.
- 33:43
- Unidentified speaker: Um, the the charisma and inspiration that he showed electrified the soul in his um own words.
- 33:50
- Unidentified speaker: And um, and so it was all the more strange that his leadership um fell down when it came to dealing with the some of, not all of, but some of the 26 uh marshals, um, some of which turned against him, and and when he came back from Elba of the twin, who's in exile for 10 months, of the 26 marshals, 16 refused to follow him, and and six uh agreed to follow him.
- 34:18
- Unidentified speaker: So my story really is about why was it trying to answer the question why was it that out of 26 marshals, there are only two with him on the battlefield of Waterloo?
- 34:28
- Unidentified speaker: Um, and uh it's a it's a tour uh story of of you know great victory at the beginning, immense rivalry halfway through, and then um and then the collapse at the end, um, with all these 26 totally extraordinary characters who all fall out with one another.
- 34:49
- Unidentified speaker: And uh four times they actually challenge each other to duels, once actually in the middle of a battle.
- 34:56
- Unidentified speaker: Uh so uh so yeah, there's a loss, there's a lot of um uh testosterone flying around between the 26.
- 35:05
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah, definitely.
- 35:06
- Unidentified speaker: And I know you sort of mentioned that Waterloo, it was uh one of the main problems for Napoleon was there was only two marshals and they both hated each other.
- 35:13
- Unidentified speaker: And they're in the wrong jobs as well.
- 35:15
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah, that's another important thing about leadership, of course, is to uh make sure that people fit into the into the right roles that you have for them.
- 35:23
- Unidentified speaker: And uh and Napoleon made Marshal Ney, the bravest of the brave, most famous of the marshals, uh battlefield commander, when frankly his um his fighting abilities had been very badly, they were off by the time because he'd he'd uh been in charge of the rearguard in the retreat from Moscow and and had been uh sort of very emotionally affected.
- 35:49
- Unidentified speaker: Uh he had a death wish by by 1815.
- 35:52
- Unidentified speaker: And um and he also had Marshal, Napoleon also had Marshal Soult as his chief of staff, and um and that was a great mistake as well.
- 36:05
- Unidentified speaker: Soult was a perfectly reasonable independent commander, but he hadn't been a chief of staff since 1800 and um and made mistake after mistake during the um during the Waterloo campaign.
- 36:19
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah, it's it's really interesting.
- 36:21
- Unidentified speaker: So if we if we go to today, are there any sort of other areas of the world that you're concerned that there could we we could see conflicts in the future?
- 36:28
- Unidentified speaker: Well, funny enough, they tend to come out of a clear blue sky.
- 36:32
- Unidentified speaker: Um, this is the thing, um, people have um been very bad essentially at predicting um where the next conflict happens.
- 36:43
- Unidentified speaker: Um one's always expecting it in one place and then it takes place somewhere completely different.
- 36:47
- Unidentified speaker: If you think about the history since the 1940s, um nobody was expecting uh Pearl Harbor to be the place that uh the Japanese attacked in 1950.
- 36:58
- Unidentified speaker: It was completely uh out of a clear blue sky that North Korea uh attacked South Korea.
- 37:04
- Unidentified speaker: Nobody saw that coming either.
- 37:06
- Unidentified speaker: In uh 1973, the uh attacks on Israel also were surprise attacks, and then in the 1980s, you have the uh invasion of the Falkland Islands by Argentina.
- 37:19
- Unidentified speaker: Again, our intelligence services didn't see that one coming.
- 37:23
- Unidentified speaker: 9-11, of course, was a uh was a massive assault on the West, and that was a surprise attack as well.
- 37:31
- Unidentified speaker: And there have been others.
- 37:32
- Unidentified speaker: In fact, um Mr.
- 37:34
- Unidentified speaker: Um Wolfovitz, Paul Wolfovitz said that the surprising thing in history is that we're still surprised by surprise attacks, which is is true, you know.
- 37:44
- Unidentified speaker: And so um the in fact, the the um Russian invasion of Ukraine uh was not a surprise attack.
- 37:52
- Unidentified speaker: I mean, by that stage, the uh Western intelligence services had uh they did know that this was going to happen.
- 37:58
- Unidentified speaker: Um but by and large, you go through history, there have been an awful lot of complete um surprises.
- 38:06
- Unidentified speaker: So when you ask me where the next um the next danger is going to come from, I would automatically, of course, say maybe Taiwan, maybe somewhere else in the Middle East.
- 38:18
- Unidentified speaker: But um, but I'm I'm probably completely wrong.
- 38:21
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah, maybe El Salvador in in Haiti seems to me that that was not one of my bigger cards that we're seeing currently.
- 38:27
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah, exactly.
- 38:28
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah.
- 38:29
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah, it was quite interesting with the Russia invasion, how you know it was all the information was there, but then people just didn't believe that he'd he'd take the risk.
- 38:38
- Unidentified speaker: So it's quite interesting how I feel like that was the one thing, it's like, oh no, everyone's like, oh, he wouldn't be so stupid to do that.
- 38:43
- Unidentified speaker: But then he said, then he was.
- 38:47
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah, yeah.
- 38:48
- Unidentified speaker: And when one thinks that uh of all the all the Russian youth that have that died, and the what it's done to the Russian economy and to the to the you know general goodwill um as well, that's completely evaporated in the West uh for for him and for Russia.
- 39:06
- Unidentified speaker: And what's he got?
- 39:07
- Unidentified speaker: He's got a few towns in the Donbass, and he's got the Crimea.
- 39:11
- Unidentified speaker: He's lost his uh large parts of his fleet.
- 39:14
- Unidentified speaker: Um, and uh, you know, with any luck, when the Europeans get their act together, they're going to take the $300 or so billion dollars in um in euro clear in Brussels of um of Russian assets and give them to Ukraine, um, both to carry on fighting and also to rebuild the infrastructure that uh that Putin's been hitting so and so appallingly successfully over the last four years.
- 39:42
- Unidentified speaker: Yep, Andrew, thank you so much for your time today.
- 39:44
- Unidentified speaker: Really appreciate it.
- 39:45
- Unidentified speaker: We've we've covered so much.
- 39:46
- Unidentified speaker: So, my last question is what is one message you want people to take away from the conversation?
- 39:51
- Unidentified speaker: Um, to buy my book.
- 39:53
- Unidentified speaker: Napoleon and his marshals.
- 39:55
- Unidentified speaker: That's the that's the central uh issue uh facing the world today.
- 40:01
- Unidentified speaker: Thank you very much, Anthony.
- 40:02
- Unidentified speaker: I appreciate it.
- 40:03
- Unidentified speaker: Never at all.
- 40:04
- Unidentified speaker: And I've got the uh yeah, you can see the copy of the book here.
- 40:06
- Unidentified speaker: It's uh yeah, very good.
- 40:08
- Unidentified speaker: I've only got through some of it so far, but I highly recommend.
- 40:10
- Unidentified speaker: Um yeah, that thanks so much, Andrew.
- 40:12
- Unidentified speaker: I'll put that all in the description below so people can access it there.
- 40:15
- Unidentified speaker: Very kind of you.
- 40:16
- Unidentified speaker: Bye-bye, Anthony.
- 40:17
- Unidentified speaker: Hey everyone, thank you so much for listening.
- 40:19
- Unidentified speaker: Really appreciate your support, and I hope you found amazing value out of this interview.
- 40:23
- Unidentified speaker: If you really enjoyed it, we'd appreciate if you liked and subscribe or share.
- 40:26
- Unidentified speaker: Uh, it really helps with the podcast.
- 40:28
- Unidentified speaker: We're still trying to expand, get to more people to help make sure that everyone understands and decode what's really happening in the world of finance, investing, macroeconomics, and geopolitics.
- 40:37
- Unidentified speaker: If you enjoyed this one, then you might enjoy this other interview as well.
- 40:40
- Unidentified speaker: So really appreciate it, and thank you.
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