Nick Clay discusses Redwheel's income-focused strategy and AI market mispricing
Summary
Nick Clay, portfolio manager at Redwheel, outlines the firm's disciplined approach to global equity income, emphasizing durable cash flows and dividend yields significantly above market averages. He argues that the current market is mispricing AI-related stocks, creating bubbles in winners like NVIDIA and overselling potential losers like Compass. Clay explains how the fund's buy/sell rules help mitigate emotional bias by targeting high yields during periods of market controversy. He also highlights bond market signals as key catalysts for increased volatility, which favors the fund's defensive income strategy.
Key takeaways
- 1 Accenture is used as an example of a company that successfully transitioned through the cloud disruption; 55% of its business is now cloud-related and growing at 10% annually, proving it can adapt to technological change.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) · 13:07
Episode sections
- 0:08 – 2:34
Introduction and Speaker Background
Charlie McCann introduces Nick Clay, portfolio manager of the Redwheel Global Equity Income Fund, detailing his career path from Morley to Newton and finally Redwheel.
- 2:34 – 5:39
Investment Philosophy and Disciplines
Clay explains the fund's focus on durable cash flow and dividend yield greater than the market, emphasizing strict buy/sell disciplines to mitigate emotional bias.
- 5:39 – 9:03
Controversy Framework and Pharmaceutical Example
Clay describes a 'five buckets' framework to distinguish temporary from permanent controversies, citing pharmaceutical companies like J&J and Novartis as examples where market fears were proven wrong.
- 9:03 – 16:20
AI Market Mispricing and Earnings Bubbles
Clay argues the market is extrapolating trends linearly, creating an earnings bubble in AI winners like NVIDIA and overselling losers like Compass and Omnicom.
- 16:20 – 19:10
Fund Performance and Volatility Dependence
Clay states the fund lags in low-volatility bull markets but outperformed in 2025 due to better downside capture during high volatility periods.
- 19:10 – 24:46
Bond Market Signals and Catalysts for Change
Clay identifies bond market signals as catalysts for change, suggesting unsustainable AI CapEx and excessive government debt will lead to higher rates and volatility, favoring the fund's strategy.
Assets discussed
| Asset | Kind | Stance | Context |
|---|---|---|---|
| NVIDIANVDA | equity | neutral | So if you look at NVIDIA today, NVIDIA is expected to be trading on a twenty 24 four times PE next year's earnings. |
“Stance” is how the speakers talked about the asset, not a recommendation.
Claims worth verifying
Nick Clay began his career as an analyst in 1991 working on UK stocks at Morley.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·1:10
How to verify: Check Nick Clay's LinkedIn profile or Redwheel Global Equity Income Fund manager biography for employment history dates and firms. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The fund's buy discipline requires companies to yield 25% more than the world market, which is currently 1.4%.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·3:49
How to verify: Review the Redwheel Global Equity Income Fund prospectus or fact sheet for investment policy on yield thresholds and current market yield data. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Sanofi is priced at an 8x PE, 12.5% free cash flow yield, and 5% dividend yield.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·8:03
How to verify: Calculate Sanofi's (SAN.PA) PE ratio, FCF yield, and dividend yield using current stock price and latest annual financial reports from SEC EDGAR or company investor relations. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceNVIDIA is expected to trade at 24x PE next year's earnings based on a 53% margin.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·9:45
How to verify: Check NVIDIA's (NVDA) current stock price, forward earnings estimates from financial data providers, and gross margin from recent SEC 10-Q/10-K filings. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceNVIDIA's historical margin before becoming an AI GPU provider was 9%.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·10:23
How to verify: Review NVIDIA's historical financial statements (SEC EDGAR) for gross margins during the gaming/graphics processing unit era prior to AI dominance. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceAccenture's last set of results showed 7% growth and a 22% share price increase on the day.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·14:27
How to verify: Check Accenture's (ACN) latest earnings press release for revenue growth rate and stock price movement on the announcement date. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Omnicom has grown its revenue by 68% since 2023.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·15:46
How to verify: Calculate Omnicom's (OMC) revenue growth from 2026 to the most recent quarter using SEC EDGAR filings or financial data platforms. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceIn 2025, the market had 106 down days and fell 50%+ on those days, while the strategy only fell 6%.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·17:46
How to verify: Verify 2026 market performance data (e.g., S&P 500 or MSCI World) for number of down days and cumulative return on down days, and compare with Redwheel Global Equity Income Fund performance reports for 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The market rose 20% in 2025.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·18:17
How to verify: Check total return index performance for the relevant market benchmark (e.g., MSCI World) for the year 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Compass has over 60% of its revenue from hospitals, sports, and education.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·11:42
How to verify: Review Compass Group's (CMG.L) annual report or investor presentation for revenue segmentation by sector. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Do your own research
- Verify Redwheel Global Equity Income Fund's current dividend yield against the MSCI World Index yield to confirm the 25% spread claim.
- Check NVIDIA's historical gross margins for GPU/gaming segments versus current consolidated margins to assess the sustainability of the 53% figure.
- Review Sanofi's (SNY.PA) latest earnings reports and analyst estimates to evaluate the realism of the 'zero growth' pricing assumption.
- Analyze Compass Group's (CMG.L) revenue breakdown by sector to confirm the 60% resilience claim in food services.
- Examine Accenture's (ACN) recent quarterly reports to verify the 55% cloud-related revenue and 10% growth rate claims.
- Assess the fund's 2025 performance attribution to distinguish between skill and market beta, specifically looking at downside capture ratios.
- Read the 'five buckets' controversy framework documentation if available, or analyze how Redwheel handles temporary vs. permanent controversies in past holdings.
Full transcriptexpand
0:08Charlie McCann: Hello everyone and welcome to another in the Titan Square Mile podcast series of Behind the Screens, hosted by me, Charlie McCann, Senior Investment Research Analyst here at Titan SquareMile. In this series of podcasts, we meet members of the investment teams from across the asset management industry whose funds we rate and spend some time getting to know them and to gain some insights into their thinking. This week, I'm delighted to be joined by Nick Clay, portfolio manager of the A-rated Redwheel Global Equity Income Fund. Nick has managed global equity income portfolios since 2012 and joined Redwheel with his team in 2020, having previously spent over two decades at Newton Investment Management. Nick, a very warm welcome to the podcast.
0:54Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Thank you for having me.
0:55Charlie McCann: Perhaps if we could start with you.
0:57Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): For
0:58Charlie McCann: those listeners who may not be familiar with your background, could you talk us through your route into global equity income investing and explain how your role has evolved over the years?
1:09Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yep, certainly.
1:10Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): So um I mean I bac began a long time ago, 1991 nineteen
1:13Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): ninety
1:14Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): one was
1:14Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): when I began as a as
1:16Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): a little analyst,
1:17Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
1:17Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): working on UK stocks.
1:19Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Progressed into becoming portfolio manager in nineteen ninety-four
1:23Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): on UK
1:24Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): equities
1:24Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): and stayed doing that all the way through to two thousand, uh when I
1:29Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): used to
1:29Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): be
1:29Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): at
1:29Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Morley
1:30Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): back in the days. And at two thousand decided to go global.
1:33Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
1:34Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): left Morley enjoyed Newton and did some global equities and global multi asset. uh over that period and then joined, as you mentioned, Global Equity Income Team in twenty twelve. And the reason for joining that was that, you know, it just took me a while to uh work out what I believed in uh and what I thought was achievable to
1:56Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): deliver for clients. Um and it was around the income side type of things that I w wanted to focus upon. And then became a leader of that team. whilst at Newton. And then the whole team got up and left Newton and came over to Red Will in 2020, where
2:09Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): we just continue to do exactly the same thing as we've always done since the strategy was set up in 2005.
2:15Charlie McCann: Great. And focusing on the income fund itself, as mentioned, it's rated within our Academy of Funds. But for our listeners who may not be as as familiar, could you outline the philosophy behind the strategy? and explain how the quantity companies yielding at least twenty five percent more than the market, together with your focus on durable free cash flow, shapes both the opportunity set and the cell discipline?
2:39Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Yeah, certainly. So it's trying to remember that your total return is generated by your capital gain and it is also generated by the compounding of your income. Quite frankly, the latter part of that is is easier. And over time it tends to dominate because that's just maths. But in the short term, you can get bubbles and things like that in the market that may people forget that. And I kind of argue that's where we are today really. And so our process is to focus upon a dividend yield that's greater than the market that we can then compound over of time. So that is to our client's class's advantage. And that means that we need to focus upon companies which will produce a durable cash flow in order to pay those dividends. And that therefore gives you a sort of a quality element to the business models that we're investing in. And that we have a discipline imposed upon us that mean we don't pay too much for those companies, so that the risk reward of the range of outcomes that our company faces skewed in our favour. And as you alluded to, those disciplines that we impose upon ourselves are buy and sell disciplines. We can only buy companies for the first time when they yield 25% more than the world market. In today's market, that is a
3:49Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): mighty 1.4%.
3:51Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): And then we must sell everything in the portfolio that yields less than the market, less than that 1.4% today. delay. And
3:58Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): what's
3:59Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): important about that
4:00Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): is that you know we as human beings on this team are just as weak as every other human being out there. I. We are
4:08Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): exposed to the same emotions that we are prone to fall foul of, and we need those disciplines to try and encourage us to do the right thing at the right time.
4:18Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Because you're only going
4:19Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): to
4:19Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): get those good companies yielding
4:21Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): more than the market
4:22Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): when something is going wrong with those companies, when there's some kind of controversy. surrounding them. And so
4:28Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): every time we're buying a company,
4:30Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): we're
4:30Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): basically
4:30Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): told we're idiots
4:31Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): because everyone can see something is going wrong with those companies. So why on earth would you buy it? And equally, and probably more importantly, actually, when we're selling companies, we're also told we're idiots, because now the whole market's in love with those companies. It can see why it's doing so well. Or we get it wrong and we've made a mistake, and therefore we need to admit to our errors and be forced to sell it and move on. And both of those are very difficult human emotions to overcome. You fall in love with your stock when you get it right, or you won't admit the mistake when you get it wrong. And so we need those disciplines to try and encourage us to do the right thing at the right time. And it's the repetition of that over a whole number of years that helps try to lean the statistics in your favor of being able to get. it more right than wrong over time to deliver a good outcome for the clients.
5:19Charlie McCann: Great stuff. And sticking with the process, a quite distinctive part of the process is your five buckets of controversy. Perhaps if you could explain how those buckets help the team distinguish stocks, you know, with temporary problems from those which are permanently impaired. And if you could bring that framework to life, perhaps with a current holding where the controversy is creating the valuation asymmetry that you've mentioned you're looking for.
5:43Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Yeah, certainly. So you're right. What the 20 odd years of this strategies process has now taught us is that the market repeatedly presents these controversies of companies to us in these five repeating buckets. And it's the repetition of those factors in those buckets that enables us to understand. what are the right questions we need to be able to answer in order to determine whether the controversy is temporary or permanent. And of course that is the very key thing because if it's a permanent controversy, it's a trap, a valuation trap you want to avoid it at all costs. And in a world today where disruption is ever increasing, more and more controversies are becoming permanent. So you need to be able to learn from history to try and shape what it is you need to be able to evidence and prove to determine whether something is temporary. So a good example of that would be in our X-Gen X-growth generating buckets. These are companies where they've got high returns on
6:43their business models, but they've slowed right down in terms of their growth, if not s gone to zero growth. And the market feels their they're internal. in terminal decline. And puts them on a valuation as such. And then you've got to determine whether that element is likely to be true or not. And a sector that consistently falls into this, either as a sector as a whole or as individual stocks, is the pharmaceutical sector, where the market repeatedly uh believes that companies that have been successful therefore normally get very big drugs, blah blah. drugs, are never going to be able to replace those drugs ever again. And therefore that company is going to be in terminal decline. And yet history tells you that when the market is pricing the RD, the research and development budgets of these pharmaceutical companies to produce absolutely nothing going forwards, the chances are that that's unlikely. And you see that. So you know decent performers in the strategy of late in this area have been JJ, which is on the medical device companies as well as the pharmaceutical drug side, Navartis and Roche, all of them were priced at one point to never be able to grow their businesses again, and now they are growing their business. Whereas despite that proof that these companies can do it, we have Sanafi today being priced on an eight times PE, a 12.5% twelve and a half percent free cash a year. flow
8:03yield, and a five percent dividend yield. That kind of valuation is telling you that Sanafi's basically never going to invent another drug again that is going to be able to grow that business. And that seems highly unlikely because there's many ways they can do it. They could find a drug and therefore develop it themselves, or they could just buy one it. But there are many ways for them to start finding a way of growing their pipeline and their drugs again in the future. And yet it's been priced as if that's never gonna happen. That is the kind of risk reward asymmetry that we want, where if it goes under, then we will lose money. But if anything else happens, then we're likely to make money and that's the kind of risk reward we'll need to take on board.
8:43Charlie McCann: That's great. Thanks Nick. And I've got ten minutes in without talking about it yet, but don't think I can hold off any longer. AI and the perceived winners and and losers and you know, Nick, you you've argued that investors are treating cyclical semiconductor demand as more of a structural trend, uh while pricing is in areas such as consulting and advertising as though that decline were inevitable. What do you think the market is getting wrong and
9:13Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): what
9:14Charlie McCann: evidence would make you change your mind?
9:17Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
9:17Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): what I think the market's getting wrong is what the market is prone to do every single time, which is we use our most dangerous investment tool available to us, which is a ruler, and we
9:28Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): just
9:29Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): extrapolate trends that we see today into the future forever. What that means is the danger you have is that you end up getting what I think we um believe we're in now, which is an earnings bubble uh in the AI space or in the AI winner space, whereas
9:45Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you know,
9:45Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): the seduction of an A of a of an earnings bubble is that it never feels like you're overpaying for anything. So if you look at NVIDIA today, NVIDIA is expected to be trading on a twenty 24 four times PE next year's earnings. But that's because it's making a margin of about fifty 53%. three. Now, 53% historically is incredibly high for not only NVIDIA, but for any kind of chip making company. If, for example, the cycle of chips were to play out as it has historically always played out, and that they ultimately end up monetizing, well then NVIDIA's long term margin that it's made uh, before it became a GPU provider. for AI chips, when it's GPUs, for example, were just doing gaming, was a nine percent margin. So you're not paying twenty-four times, you'd be paying 140 times for NVIDIA. And that is where I think, you know, the market gets it wrong, is that we're seducely seduced into this earnings bubble and believing we're not overpaying for stocks because we're taking up and assuming these margins are structural and can last forever. And then exactly the same thing happens when you look at the assumption that the market's gonna get where everything's gonna lose from AI
11:02and particularly in things like software and advertising, you know, even down to companies that feed people. And we wear our own compass, for example, and everybody's assuming that AI is gonna obliterate all our jobs. no one's gonna work, so there's therefore no one to feed. Well that seems one, unlikely. But two, compass feed people in hospitals, they feed people who play sports and they feed people in education. Well, people are still going to get sick. My team's Arsenal, and I know they play like robots, but I'm sure they're not going to be robots that are playing in the Arsenal team next season. And that people, if we've got no jobs, we might go back and educate ourselves. You know, that's over sixty percent of the revenue of compass. So I think that the market extrapolates these trends in straight lines now and misses the fact that there are a range of outcomes for the future, a future that's wholly uncertain, even more so because of AI. And therefore you want to buy the ones where your risk rewards skewed to more likely you're going to make money with a range of outcomes rather than betting on the company that's going to take over the world and that one outcome is the only way you make money.
12:05Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And I
12:05Charlie McCann: suppose honing in a little bit on that that point there, Nick, you know, a couple of examples in Omnicom and Accenture, businesses where the share prices have fallen, even though those expectations for free cash flow have risen. How are you assessing the the risk that AI genuinely changes their economics? And why do you believe their valuations and dividends leave investors being paid to wait?
12:27Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): You're entirely right that AI does pose a big challenge to these kinds of businesses, consulting businesses, advertising businesses, etc. And don't get me wrong, we are a believer that many businesses are going to be disrupted by AI. So what is it that we're looking for in companies to try and understand whether they can suffer that transition in their business? They're going to have to transition to AI within their business, but their business still remains relevant. And what we look for is either some repetition in those businesses where they've transitioned before to meaningful technological change. So Accenture is a good example of this. Whereas the global consulting company and the leading consulting company in the world, we had a very similar concern hanging over Accenture when cloud came in, and apparently all all the businesses of customers were going to go cloud and were going to go to the Microsoft's and Amazons of the world and we didn't need consultants anymore. And that's turned out to be rubbish. 55% of um Accenture's business is now cloud related and it's still growing at 10% per annum. And it's shown and demonstrated that it can transition through that technological change. I i.e., e cloud definitely disrupted a part of its business and made a part of its business a commodity. But what cloud did was open up the opportunity to do many more things for its client. We think AI is going to
13:47do exactly the same. It will commoditize a part of its business so it won't charge as much for its clients for it. But equally the amount of things it can do for its client and the more complexity of that of what it can do for its client means its business still remains credible. and its business is able to continue to grow into the future. And that is what we're now starting to see coming out of Accenture. Its last set of results is exactly the same. We are continuing to perform in the way we have always performed, growing at around seven percent, improving our margin very slightly, and the share price on the day of its results went up twenty-two 22%, percent because it had fallen to a level where it was trading on a single digit PE, a double digit free cash flow yield, and was yielding around 4%, as I was talking about Sanafi earlier, therefore priced to effectively go bust in about seven years. And it came out and proved that that isn't the case. It's just continuing as is. But the market as yet is not being consistent in reading that through across everywhere. So if you look at Omnicom, global advertising company. everybody thinks advertising is going to be replaced by AI, it's going to do it for you. And yet again, we are seeing the evidence within Omnicom that yes, AI is a part of its business, the creative part, etc., far more efficient and therefore easier to do, quicker to
15:07do. But then that opens up the availability for them to do more for their clients. And yet the complex side of it, actually knowing where to place your advert and how to get the biggest bank field buck remains the skill set. And yet again, Omnicom today is trading on seven times PE, seventeen percent free cash flow yield and a four percent dividend yield. Again, price to go bust. And yet, its latest set of results, it's also growing at seven percent per annum, as it always has, and yet the share price has not reacted at all. In fact, since twenty twenty three, Omnicom has grown its revenue by six sixty-eight percent over that period. It is a growth company, and yet the market's pricing it to go bust. Now we think the probability of the largest, most profitable global advertiser in the world not being required anymore by anyone is a very low probable outcome. And yet that is basically what it's being priced for. So anything else as an outcome ultimately will make us money over time.
16:00Charlie McCann: Great. And in terms of the fund and its return profile, you've already alluded to it somewhat there. But historically, you know, it's offered a a lower downside capture that than the market. Conversely, I suppose, you know, during strong ball runs a little bit lower in terms of that upside capture. But that differentiated return profile has been a little more tested of late, especially in this era of increased market concentration. I guess
16:27Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
16:27Charlie McCann: question I would ask is how should investors judge that recent relative performance versus the market? And what would you need for the approach and the focus on income valuation and downside protection characteristics for that to become more influential again?
16:42Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): In a single word,
16:43Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): answer
16:44Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): to that question, volatility.
16:46Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): So when the market goes up in a straight line and there's no volatility as we saw in twenty three and twenty four, it's very difficult for this strategy to be relevant. And that's because our disciplines preclude us from being able to own the sex and violence stocks that everybody wants to own. They don't yield enough, they're way too expensive, and so there's nothing we can do about it. And so when those things go up in a straight line, we will lag those markets. It's why you shouldn't just hold our portfolio and obviously hold some different other strategies as well. However, when volatility returns to the market, then mathematics tells you that things start to change. And what matters most when things become volatile, whether it's going up or down, is your downside capture matters again. And that's just the mass of negative numbers are more powerful than positive numbers in your total return series. And that volatility is now starting to return. So for example, in 2025, uh we saw 106 days where the market went down. And if you uh look across those 106 days, the market fell 50 plus percent over those 106 days. And yet the strategy only fell about six. Now, in the other two hundred or so days, the market went up.
17:57Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
17:57Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): we were lagged that market as we've we have always been lagging up upward-only Padoni markets. But because of the 106 days where it went down, we were still able to outperform in 2025, despite the fact the market went up another 20%. And that's the key, is the pathway. If everything is going to go up in a straight line to AI Utopia, you definitely don't want this portfolio. This is not the one for you, you want your three times geared NASDAQ 100 and be done with it. However, if things become more volatile and that is more normal as a market. backdrop, then a characteristic in a portfolio where your downside capture is good, i.e., you don't lose as much money on the downside, that becomes more important. And over the longer term, that's the element that compounding a dividend income gives to you. My companies always pay me a dividend. Yeah, bar me being a complete idiot media and picking forty 44 four companies that all cut their dividend to zero, we're always going to get paid that dividend. And that consistency and therefore low volatility helps you in a market that becomes more volatile.
18:56Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
18:56Charlie McCann: guess sticking with that Nick, what would you say is going to be the catalyst or likely catalyst for your approach and and the types of companies that that you pick to return to sort of the fore of investors' attentions?
19:10Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
19:10Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): think we're seeing those catalysts happen now. We're starting to see them play out. It's beginning in the bond market, which is unusual obviously for an empty market for Manager to talk about the bond market, but we're seeing it there. We're seeing it on two fronts. We're seeing it first at the corporate level, where the bond market is now starting to tell you that the level of CapEx expenditure going into artificial intelligence capex Apex build out is it's becoming unsustainable. That the belief that we're going to make a decent amount of returns out of this is becoming less and less. And therefore, they're charging more and more to lend money, andor refusing to start to lend money to this area. And of course, that will undermine the growth trend that everybody is believing is going to go on forever. Therefore, also undermining the chip stocks and the demand for their chips, and everything starts to unravel. And we're starting to see some signs of that already. Not at the index level, the index is still right near its. highs, but internally within the index you're starting to get a lot more volatility. And so valuations are starting to come back into question again, something we've ignored for a while and that they're starting to matter again. And so something that has kind of valuation discipline is starting to become far more appropriate in this market. And then the second part where the bond market is is warning you is in the government level where it's telling you that government debt around the
20:29world is basically excessive, is unsustainable, and yet the most likely solution to that level of government debt is inflation. And that inflation is probably going to run hotter for longer. Now that means higher rates for longer, that means more volatility Facility in returns and asset classes for longer. And then once again, you're starting to see that play out in the markets, and you need companies that are going to be suffer that kind of backdrop pricing power, stable businesses, businesses that can cope within an inflationary backdrop, and maybe even a weaker economic backdrop because of the higher rates for longer.
21:05Charlie McCann: That's really helpful. Thanks, Nick. Before we close, it would be remiss of me not to ask a little bit more about the nick nitplay play that exists beyond the screens. You You've already mentioned our Arsenal, but what do you enjoy getting up to outside of our management?
21:18Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Any mention arsenal these are sort of sighting finally starting to win something. Well,
21:22Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): I yeah, I'm kept
21:23Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): pretty busy uh with my three cost centres at home. So they take up most of my time. However, when I do get a little bit of spare time, I've now started doing woodworking, which is a brand new thing for me. I do like a lot of art in the past, uh, but now trying to make something even more tangible. So woodworking I've just begun. And there's the beauty of YouTube is it can teach you how to do things incredibly well. It's unbelievable. And so I've literally just finished making my first ever chest of drawers, which now sits proudly in a room for my wife to fill up with stuff that she wants to put in it. And so it's it's very just supposed to what we do obviously what we do is variably spend our whole time talking about things that you can't touch and can't see and you walk away, you've got nothing to show for it. To actually produce something physical in front of me that I can see every day is really rewarding. And to teach yourself a brand new skill is something that particularly at my age, I think it's quite an important thing to do.
22:17Charlie McCann: That's a the great answer. Yeah, definitely. Couldn't agree more. Well, look, I think that's that's all we have time for today. Um thanks Nick for for being our guest today and all your insight on the Red Wheel Global Equacy Income Fund, as well as your thoughts on markets, income valuation, investing against the prevailing consensus. And last but not least, a big thanks to all of our listeners for tuning in. If you would like to contact us, please do so either via our webpage, www dot titansquare TitansquareMile mile dot com or by email at info.tsm. at TitanSquareMile dot com. Thank you and goodbye.
23:02Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): This
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