The Weekly Briefing from Capital Economics

US-China summit yields little; AI supply shocks and chip controls dominate policy debate

19 min Listen to the original Episode page
US-China RelationsAI RiskSupply ShocksMonetary PolicyExport ControlsGeopolitics

Summary

Leah Fahy reports that the recent US-China-Russia summit produced minimal concrete outcomes, focusing instead on a photo opportunity and minor trade adjustments. She details new US export controls targeting Southeast Asian smuggling hubs and remote data centers to throttle China's AI ambitions, noting internal White House divisions between hawks and doves. Vicky Redwood and Michael Shearing discuss AI as a potential source of supply-side shocks, arguing that digital infrastructure disruptions could lead to stagflation. They suggest central banks may need to raise rates to anchor inflation expectations amid these new vulnerabilities, while regulators might need to intervene to ensure corporate resilience.

Key takeaways

  1. 1
    Other than the brilliant photo, very little to be honest. So, you know, this is all lauded as kind of this historic trilateral meeting. I'd say the one kind of concrete thing that came out of it was the three countries agreeing to increase the global supply of refined oil products, which could lead to a pickup in China's exports.

    Leah Fahy · 1:01

  2. 2
    Yeah, a technological failure or a failure in AI systems would be another type of supply side shock because it would disrupt the ability of firms to produce goods and services.

    Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) · 10:57

Episode sections

  1. 0:46 – 4:13

    US-China-Russia Apex Summit Outcomes

    Leah Fahy notes the summit yielded little concrete progress beyond a photo op and an agreement to increase refined oil supplies. She highlights that the bilateral Trump-Xi talks focused on positive rhetoric while ignoring widening US trade surpluses and tightening export controls.

  2. 4:13 – 7:06

    US Chip Export Restrictions and Geopolitics

    Fahy details new US export controls targeting Southeast Asian smuggling hubs, remote access to US chips via third-party data centers, and Chinese designers using foreign fabs like TSMC. She notes these measures aim to throttle China's AI ambitions by cutting off access to advanced compute.

  3. 7:06 – 10:32

    Internal US Policy Divisions on China Tech

    The speakers discuss internal White House disagreements, with Treasury and State favoring hawkish controls while Commerce and Lutnik prefer leniency to maintain leverage. Fahy suggests the unusual drafting by Treasury indicates pushback against Commerce's preferred approach.

  4. 10:32 – 12:43

    AI as a Source of Supply-Side Shocks

    Vicky Redwood explains that AI failures constitute a new type of supply-side shock by disrupting digital infrastructure essential for production. She argues that while AI can mitigate some risks, it likely increases overall economic vulnerability by creating new dependencies and interconnected points of failure.

  5. 12:43 – 15:38

    Spectrum of Supply Shock Severity

    Redwood and Shearing describe supply shocks on a spectrum from isolated firm-level issues to widespread critical infrastructure failures. They emphasize that severity depends on duration, isolation, and whether the shock affects monopoly suppliers of critical inputs, potentially leading to stagflation.

  6. 15:38 – 17:39

    Central Bank Response to Supply Shocks

    Shearing cites a Bank of Canada paper arguing central banks should raise rates during significant supply shocks to anchor inflation expectations. Redwood agrees that frequent shocks increase the risk of dislodging inflation expectations, making proactive monetary tightening more likely.

  7. 17:39 – 19:07

    Corporate Resilience and Regulatory Role

    Redwood notes firms are increasing cybersecurity spending but may underinvest due to the 'externality' problem where individual benefits don't match societal needs. She suggests regulators may need to step in to ensure systemic resilience against AI-related disruptions.

Assets discussed

AssetKindStanceContext
NVIDIANVDAequityneutralSo the US is essentially cracking down on that, saying that data centers that use NVIDIA chips, any sort of US chip. chips, need US approval to give the scale of compute that would

“Stance” is how the speakers talked about the asset, not a recommendation.

Claims worth verifying

The US, Russia, and China agreed to increase the global supply of refined oil products at the Apex Summit.

Leah Fahy ·1:01

How to verify: Check official joint statements or press releases from the US State Department, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, or Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding the Apex Summit in Shenzhen. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The 'border trade' highlighted by Trump covers approximately $30 billion of a $650 billion total trading relationship.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·2:12

How to verify: Calculate the ratio of specific exempted trade categories to total US-China trade using US Census Bureau data. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Around one-third of China's domestic compute comes from smuggled US chips.

Leah Fahy ·6:23

How to verify: Review industry reports from semiconductor analytics firms (e.g., TrendForce, Gartner) or US Commerce Department enforcement reports on chip smuggling. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Approximately 25% of China's compute comes from offshore data centers.

Leah Fahy ·6:43

How to verify: Analyze data center capacity reports in Singapore, Malaysia, and other hubs, cross-referenced with Chinese AI firms' cloud usage disclosures. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

New US export controls expand to cover Southeast Asian economies and Brazil as smuggling hubs.

Leah Fahy ·4:44

How to verify: Check the US Federal Register for the final rule on export controls or press releases from the US Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS). For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Data centers using US chips require US export approval to provide compute for medium-sized models or large consumer pools.

Leah Fahy ·5:43

How to verify: Review the specific text of the new BIS export control regulations regarding 'remote access' and 'compute thresholds'. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Legislation is being passed through Congress to further tighten chip restrictions, expected around December.

Leah Fahy ·6:57

How to verify: Track the legislative status of relevant bills (e.g., CHIPS Act amendments or new export control legislation) on Congress.gov. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Bessent is hawkish on China, while Lutnik pushes for looser controls.

Leah Fahy ·8:17

How to verify: Review public statements, interviews, or policy positions of US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnik. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Central banks should raise interest rates during significant supply shocks to prevent inflation expectations from becoming unanchored.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·16:21

How to verify: Read the specific Bank of Canada paper cited by Rubin, likely published in late 2026, via the Bank of Canada's publications archive. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Do your own research

  • Verify the specific text of the new US export controls targeting Southeast Asian hubs and remote data centers via the Federal Register or Commerce Department press releases.
  • Check the latest US-China bilateral trade data from the US Census Bureau to confirm the $650 billion total and $30 billion border trade figures.
  • Review Bank of Canada working papers on central bank responses to supply shocks to assess the validity of the rate hike argument.
  • Analyze corporate cybersecurity spending reports from major tech firms to evaluate the 'externality' problem in underinvestment.
  • Monitor US Treasury and Commerce Department joint statements for evidence of internal policy disagreements on China tech controls.
  • Assess the actual volume of Chinese AI compute capacity from smuggled chips versus domestic production using industry reports from firms like Gartner or IDC.
Full transcriptexpand

0:01Anthony Rubin: It's Friday the 20th of November and this is your Capital Economics Weekly briefing. I'm Anthony Rubin and I'm joined by our chief economist Neil Shearing. How's your week been, Neil?

0:11Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Hi

0:11Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Anthony. Yes, good, thank you. I've had a weekend on the road. I've been in Zurich seeing clients and presented at conferences, which is always always interesting. So it's been a good week, yeah. Obviously a busy week in markets, which dominated conversations with clients, but also lots of conversations about AI, lots of conversations about the US, China, and the G Putin-Trump summit, which we'll get into, and interestingly, lots of conversations about France, which seems increasingly on investors and clients' radars as we head into next year's elections.

0:46Anthony Rubin: So you mentioned the meeting between the leaders of the US, China, and Russia at the Apex Summit in Shenzhen. Let's find out about it with our senior China economist Leah Fahi. Hello, Leah.

0:57Leah Fahy: Hi Anthony.

0:58Anthony Rubin: So it was a big photo opportunity. Was anything achieved?

1:01Leah Fahy: Other than the brilliant photo, very little to be honest. So, you know, this is all lauded as kind of this historic trilateral meeting. I'd say the one kind of concrete thing that came out of it was the three countries agreeing to increase the global supply of refined oil products, which could lead to a pickup in China's exports. But beyond that they agreed not to start a nuclear war, which I think nothing shocking there really. And when it comes to the bilateral Trump Xi summit, we saw very little from that either. According to Trump, apparently nothing can go wrong in the bilateral relationship as long as him and and she are in charge. You know, she could be in power for a long time still, but given Trump only has two years left in his term, that's not really a great sign for the trajectory of kind of the long term relationship between the two sides. And I think the bigger point is, you know, they focused on on all of the positives really, Trump saying that this board of trade has been really successful. This was set up I think it was at their meeting in May. But you know, we've continued to see China's trade surplus with the US with

2:02Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the U.S.

2:03Leah Fahy: widen. And most importantly, we've had this tightening of export controls by the US, which which wasn't really mentioned in the meeting, but bubbling under the surface.

2:12Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I

2:12Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): think that the border trade point's really interesting. Obviously lauded by Trump as a major breakthrough. But when you look at the numbers, it's tiny, right? So I think it covers about 30 billion of trade between the two nations in a trading relationship that was once worth six 650 hundred and fifty billion. So it's relatively small in scope. And perhaps the fact that we're focusing on that or being told to focus on that is a sign of just how limited the ambitions in terms of a reset have become. And there's lots of focus, I think there's a tendency in the West to view all of this through the lens of the the US and in particular Trump and what Trump wants. And that tends to shift and fluctuate. What's your take on how China is viewing all of this? If we were to view the relationship, the US China relationship through the lens of Xi and Beijing, how do you think that's shifting?

3:01Leah Fahy: I think obviously Trump is quite an interesting counterpart to deal with from China, particularly a China that has a much more long termist view than the US at the best of times. And I think it's quite clear that what Trump wants and what the wide wider US government wants isn't always kind of aligned. And that quite likely Beijing and Xi in particular think that they've got kind of a better shot of of getting Trump on side and then potentially getting something from there, more than kind of getting Washington on side more broadly.

3:31Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And

3:32Leah Fahy: I think the bigger point is that this was an opportunity for for Xi she to get a couple major world leaders at the table, get as you say, some great photo opportunities with them, but also speak to leaders from a lot of the rest of the world, CEOs more globally. And she did a speech, I think it was before Trump's arrival, essentially discussing the importance of free global trade, of integrating global supply chains, and really kind of putting China as this, you know, leader of global free trade, not explicitly saying anything about the US, but I think the broader context there, it's is that while the US is shifting towards protectionism, the rest of the world can rely on China for what has kind of traditionally been seen as as the US's role. Aaron Ross Powell

4:13Anthony Rubin: The week didn't go terribly well for Xiu in free trade terms because of the big restrictions on on chip exports from the US. Run us through what was announced

4:22Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): there. Yeah

4:24Leah Fahy: so they're really quite staggering. I mean the first thing to say is that China's still quite dependent on US chips for a lot of different things, but particularly its best chips that are relevant to AI fall well behind the best US ones. There were already some US export controls in place on China's access to these chips, but for context, this all came off the back of this whole Jensen Huang affair. It's become clear since then the scale to which China had been managing to circumvent. these export restrictions, the scale to which US companies had been complicit. So what's happened is there's three key rules that have come into place. The first one is that the US has expanded export controls to cover a handful of Southeast Asian economies, as well as Brazil, that had been the key smuggling hubs. I think the Brazil one might just be more of a jab at Lula than than anything else. And then the second point is they're cracking down on China's remote access of chips. So what a lot of Chinese companies, particularly big AI companies, had been doing is to access the scale of compute and the top chips that they need to train their AI models, they were using data centers in third party countries like Singapore, like Malaysia, to train their models. So the US is essentially cracking down on that, saying that data centers that use NVIDIA chips, any sort of US chip. chips, need US approval to give the scale of compute that would

5:43be required to train medium-sized model or service a big pool of kind of consumer demand for a model. You require US export controls for that now. And then the third one is restrictions on Chinese chip designers using major fabs outside of China. So we're thinking TSMC, Samsung, for example. it's worth noting that a lot of the kind of big players in the China chip scene, so your Huaways were already banned, but this is expanding that, tightening any sort of loopholes. And it also means that China's smaller chipmakers are also cut off there. So it's really targeting all of the key leakages that existed in the old US chip controls. And I think it might do quite a bit to throttle China's AI ambition ambitions, not least because as I said, China's still very dependent on US chips. It's difficult to get an exact number, but apparently around a third of China's domestic compute comes from smuggled US chips, so that's your top NVIDIA chips and so on. And then then another 25%

6:43or so coming from these kind of offshore data centers. So all really quite quite staggering. And I guess the other point to add there is this came from the Commerce Department, but we've also got actual legislation being passed through Congress in the US, which I think might come through around December time, that would further tighten these restrictions and codify them in US law.

7:06Anthony Rubin: Yeah, I think that's interesting because it was always seen that Trump was more friendly towards China in this sense than Congress was. But then these restrictions came from the White House.

7:17Leah Fahy: Yeah, and I do wonder to what extent all the pomp and pageantry and the friendliness around Trump over the past couple of days comes from this, because, as you say, when we saw all the NVIDIA things go down last week and early this week, what we were really expecting was this legislation to come through quite swiftly, but maybe not an immediate reaction from the White House. So it does suggest that maybe Trump is turning a bit more hawkish on China too. The one thing I would mention is that apparently the only time that the whole debacle came up during the US China meeting was for Trump to to reportedly kind of bemoan what had happened to to Jensen, given he was such a great guy, quote unquote. So it's still slightly unclear where exactly he stands, and I don't know if it's internal pressure or Trump himself having a shift in view. The other point to add is that even within the White House there's a lot of disagreement. So Besson apparently a lot more hawkish on China, whereas Lutnik has been pushing to keep controls relatively loose. And so one of the interesting things with these these new export controls that came out is that they were published by the Department of Commerce, but it was explicitly stated that they'd been drafted by the US Treasury, which is really quite unusual, and perhaps a sign that this is being driven by certain parts of the White House and there's maybe a bit more pushback elsewhere.

8:36Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I think that's exactly right, Lear. I think one of the things that we've learned over the past week, it does seem that there are increasing divides within the US government about how to approach China. And yes, it's commerce and Lutnik in particular that seems to be wanting to take. a slightly more lenient line. And this is the idea that A, you can make money from selling advanced technology to China and the US should do that. But also if you get that technology embedded in the Chinese ecosystem, then that perhaps gives the US a a point of leverage over China in the future. That's the kind of thinking. Set against that, it seems that states state and now national security given Rubio has responsibility for both, and Treasury under Bessent are seeming to be more hawkish. Then Trump, as ever, is kind of somewhere in the middle, fluctuating, it seems, depending on the last person he spoke to. And so I think that is the reason why we've got this extraordinary statement from Commerce saying basically they hold the pen as it were, but they're being forced to do this, or there's this been being drafted by Treasury and the White House. And it does speak, I think, to one of the more remarkable shifts in US policy under Trump. It's just that there is no coherent approach, it seems to me, on technology policy and what the approach to selling technology to China should be, where there was a coherence and a consistent line under Biden.

9:55Leah Fahy: Yeah, yeah, that's certainly true. I mean a lot of what came through under Biden was scrapped by the Trump administration, for example. And I think it will be interesting to see how things develop over the next couple years, but also moving into a potential democratic presidency after this. But I think it's it's fairly clear that China hawkishness is one of the more bipartisan issues in Washington right now. And this kind of confusion and uncertainty and back and forth is is mostly constrained to the White House itself. And if we were to look a few years into the future, it looks pretty clear the direction that Washington's China policy is going to go.

10:32Anthony Rubin: Thank you, Leah. Now, Neil, you were saying that everyone had been talking about AI again this week in Zurich. And we know that technology promises improvements to productivity in the coming years, but it also creates risks. And Chief Economic Advisor Vicky Redwood Edward has been writing about the technological risks this week. Hello, Vicky.

10:48Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Hello.

10:49Anthony Rubin: So we know about the whole range of supply shocks that we're in danger of suffering. How does AI fit into that framework?

10:57Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Yeah, a technological failure or a failure in AI systems would be another type of supply side shock because it would disrupt the ability of firms to produce goods and services. And there's different types of supply shock. Some restrict the availability of essential inputs such as oil or energy, others damage physical infrastructure, for example an extreme weather event. But when we're thinking about a technological failure and a failure of the sort of complex digital systems that now underpin the economy, that would mean that the systems which businesses depend on to operate would essentially become disabled and disrupted and and that would hamper production of goods and services in the economy.

11:36Anthony Rubin: We had those problems at Microsoft last week which reminded us how vulnerable we are to technology outages. And you're arguing AI could make this worse?

11:45Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Yeah, it's not entirely clear cut. So there's some ways in which the growing use of AI is likely to exacerbate these technological vulnerabilities in the economy. It's introducing new points of failure, creating new dependencies. It could make cyber attacks easier and easier to do at scale. And it's also increasing the interconnectedness of the economy and the dependence of firms on a small number of technological providers. So in those ways, the use of AI increases these risks. But it's not all one way. And there's some ways in which AI can help to mitigate these risks. So it can help to identify faults before they occur, contain problems before they spread, help solve problems when they occur. So, yeah, yes, it's not. clear cut which effect will dominate, but our feeling is that overall AI probably does increase the risk of technological vulnerabilities and increase the economy's vulnerability to something

12:40Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): going

12:40Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): wrong and having economic effects.

12:43Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): How do you think that fits into a To kind of broader framework for thinking about supply shocks, Vicky? So one of the things that we've talked about a lot in our research and talk a lot about internally too is how the world's become more prone to supply shocks, right? So you had COVID is obviously the biggest one in 2020, but then we had the energy shock that followed Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, 2023, the closure of the Red Sea, 2025, Twenty twenty five we had tariffs, 2026, twenty twenty six we've had the straight reform moose. Now we've got some technology outages too, to add into the mix. But the economic damage created by those supply shocks

13:23Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh

13:23Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): has varied enormously. So we can see that these supply shocks are becoming more frequent, and that speaks to a need for greater focus on economic resilience and so on that we can get into. But just in terms of thinking about the economic damage created by those supply shocks, it's varied so enormously. So what's the what a way of approaching that or way of thinking about which supply shocks do damage and which ones don't?

13:45Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Yeah, I think the same lesson applies to this. So as you say, previous supply shocks have varied enormously in their effects and the severity of their adverse economic effects. And the same applies to technological shocks. The economic effects would vary enormously depending on the nature of the shock, in particular how isolated or widespread it was, whether it affected critical infrastructure, how long it went on for before a fix could be found. And so you can think of this as being on a spectrum really. So at the milder end of the spectrum, you've got maybe an isolated instance at a firm, which might have significant effects on that individual firm, but the wider economic effects would be minimal. Then you might have in the middle something affecting systems that would affect critical infrastructure more generally, and that could have knock on effects across a whole range of firms and sectors. And then you probably would have a significant drop in output in the near term, but that might be made up for quite quickly, no permanent effects. But then you get the most serious incidents where maybe there is a permanent loss of output, maybe the incident does last a long time, and maybe you even have knock on effects to aggregate demand, which you've had in some supplies. supply shocks in the past. So I think the key point to take away is that there's a huge range of outcomes depending on quite what the nature of the shock is. And I think that's in line with the the lessons of what's happened with supply shocks in the past.

15:02Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yes. So it's partly about duration, but also as you say, I think one of the things when we've looked at it increasingly, it's about whether that supply shock affects a critical input or a monopoly supplier of a critical input and therefore takes that out. I think the other point I'd stress is that it's a really interesting point that supply shocks can then feed back into a weakness in aggregate demand and the whole thing becomes self fulfilling. At the same time, if there's no weakness of aggregate demand, then the supply shock itself pushes up prices and you get an inflation problem. So they they're become becoming inherently heavily stagflationary, these supply shocks.

15:38Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): That's right. I think especially when you throw any disruption to supply chains into the mix, which is often a

15:43Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): common

15:43Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): feature of these supply shocks, then you start to get inflationary implications coming through.

15:48Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): One of the things that caught my eye earlier this month, or maybe it was the back end of last month, was a paper by the Bank of Canada. Because the conventional wisdom amongst economists is that set central banks should basically look through these supply shocks because they can't do much. Monetary policy can't. do anything to address the supply shortage itself. Most of the time, these supply shortages are transitory. So central bankers should look through it, not really just policy and leave interest rates unchanged. The point that the Bank of Canada paper was making, which I thought was interesting, was that actually that's wrong because if the supply shock is either longer in duration or the economic damage caused by it, particularly the increase in prices caused by it, is more substantial, then the eventual amount of monetary tightening that's required is greater if if central banks fail to act immediately. So it was actually making the case that central banks should respond to supply shocks by raising interest rates if they think there's going to be even a temporary increase in inflation, because better to tighten policy and then unwind it if needed than to delay action and then have to be forced into tightening more aggressively later and further down the line. I think that's interesting because it speaks to the way that policymakers are starting to think about supply

17:00shocks when setting policy, but it's also I think that the way that economists are thinking about these supply shocks is shifting too.

17:08Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Yeah. And I think if you get repeated supply shocks, more frequent supply shocks as we have done in the last few years, if you as say you said, then again that perhaps increases the chances of the central bank acting because there's more chance of these supply shocks eventually dislodging inflation expectations. And if we look back, it's interesting that you have had these more frequent supply shocks in the last few years, because before that it was mainly demand shocks for a number of decades that had hit the economy, but it certainly feels that they've increased in frequency in the last decade or so.

17:39Anthony Rubin: Can I take you back to this question about the balance between AI increasing or reducing the risks? How much of that is down to whether firms are willing to invest the amount that's needed on things like backup systems?

17:51Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Yeah, well, firms are not helpless in the face of all this. They can do more, as you say, create backup systems, use multiple providers to prevent dependency on just one or two providers, spend more on cybersecurity, and there is evidence that. they're doing that sort of thing. For example, spending on cybersecurity has been increasing as a share of IT budgets. But the question, I suppose, is will they do enough? It's quite hard, this sort of thing, because the benefits only materialize for the firms when something goes wrong. So it can be quite hard to persuade people of the need to spend enough money on these things. And there's also an externality point. So what's

18:24Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the

18:24Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): most beneficial from the point of one individual? firm isn't necessarily what's best for the economy as a whole. So firms might be spending what they deem sufficient from their individual point of view, but from the collective good they should be spending a lot more. And I think that's when there's then a role for regulators to step in, as indeed they've been doing, to make sure that these systems are resilient enough.

18:45Anthony Rubin: Thank you. So I'll put the analysis that both of you have been doing of this into the show notes. If you have any questions for Neil, Vicky, Leah, or any of our experts across global macroeconomics, commodities, or commercial property, you can get in touch at podcast at capitaleconomics.com. But that's all for now. We'll be back with another podcast next week. Goodbye for

19:04Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): now.

This page was produced automatically: the audio was transcribed with nvidia/parakeet-tdt-0.6b-v3+sortformer-v2.1 and interpreted by Qwen3.6-35B-A3B-UD-IQ3_S.gguf. Transcription and interpretation can contain errors; always confirm against the original episode. Nothing here is investment advice.
All insights