Damien Talks Money

Speaker critiques 100-year index fund charts for survivorship bias and non-investable history

14 min Listen to the original
Index FundsMarket HistorySurvivorship BiasData IntegrityInvestment Strategy

Summary

Speaker_0 argues that common 100-year market performance charts are misleading due to survivorship bias, non-investable history, and changing methodology. The speaker notes that the S&P 500 index was created in 1957, but the first index fund launched in 1976, leaving a significant gap in actual investable data. Historical data often suffers from errors, such as the exclusion of bankrupt companies before 1934 and methodological shifts like free-float weighting. The speaker cites research indicating that 19th-century returns may have been overstated due to excluded firms. Consequently, the speaker advises investors to stress-test return assumptions rather than relying on average historical performance.

Episode sections

  1. 0:02 – 0:40

    Introduction to Historical Performance Charts

    Speaker_0 introduces a chart showing long-term market performance, noting that while it provides reassurance, past performance is not a guarantee of future returns. Speaker_1 expresses confidence that markets go up over long periods.

  2. 0:40 – 2:12

    Limitations of Early Index Data

    Speaker_0 critiques a chart attributed to a Google/NASA employee, noting the S&P 500 index was created in 1957 but the first index fund tracking it launched in 1976, leaving a gap in investable history. MSCI's world index began in 1986, and its methodology document warns that back-tested data is hypothetical.

  3. 2:12 – 5:46

    Survivorship Bias in Market Data

    Speaker_0 discusses the Dimson, Marsh, and Staunton (DMS) dataset, the gold standard for 125 years of returns. Speaker_2 (Dimson) states previous studies were misleading. Speaker_0 uses a cat fall analogy to explain survivorship bias: only surviving records (companies) are tracked, while vanished companies are lost to history, especially before the 1934 Securities Exchange Act.

  4. 5:46 – 7:46

    Errors in Historical Research Chains

    Speaker_0 highlights that DMS relies on peer-reviewed back histories, which can suffer from a 'Chinese whispers' effect. A paper titled 'Did Cows Get It Right?' found that Alfred C. Cowles and Frederick Macaulay excluded railroads and firms, overstating 19th-century returns and incorrectly showing stocks outperforming bonds.

  5. 7:46 – 9:48

    Evolving Market Definitions and Rules

    The speaker notes that the 'Triumph of Optimists' book by DMS expanded from 16 to 33 markets. Sector classification rules were only created in 1999, and weighting methods like free-float weighting were adopted later, meaning historical comparisons may be flawed due to changing rules.

  6. 9:48 – 11:34

    Structural Changes in Markets

    Speaker_0 compares 19th-century markets (rail-dominated, elitist, manipulative) to modern markets (tech-dominated, global), arguing that comparing them is like comparing horses to jet engines. The composition of global portfolios has shifted from industrials/energy to tech, and emerging markets like China were negligible before the 2000s.

  7. 11:34 – 12:42

    Re-evaluating US Outperformance

    Speaker_0 admits that the common belief of 9% pre-inflation/5% post-inflation returns is based on reconstructed data. The US market's 2-3% annual outperformance since 1900 may be survivorship bias, as the winner was known in hindsight. Betting on a single winner is risky.

  8. 12:42 – 13:57

    Investment Implications and Stress Testing

    The speaker advises against using average historical returns in compound interest calculators. Instead, investors should stress-test a range of returns to account for uncertainty, emphasizing that investing should focus on hitting goals and avoiding catastrophic losses rather than relying on past performance.

Assets discussed

AssetKindStanceContext
S&P 500indexneutralMarch 1957, Standards and Pause expanded its old index of 233 stocks to a newer list of 500 stocks. That's the SP 500.

“Stance” is how the speakers talked about the asset, not a recommendation.

Claims worth verifying

The S&P 500 index was expanded to 500 stocks in March 1957, but the first index fund tracking it launched in 1976.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·0:40

How to verify: SEC filings for early index funds (e.g., Vanguard 500 Index Fund prospectus) and S&P Dow Jones Indices historical records. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

MSCI published a world index covering developed market stocks on March 31st, 1986.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·1:20

How to verify: MSCI historical methodology documents or press releases from March 1986. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

MSCI methodology document page 144 states back-tested performance is hypothetical.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·1:39

How to verify: MSCI Index Methodology document, specifically the disclaimer section on back-testing. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

Dimson, Marsh, and Staunton compiled data going back 125 years.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·2:12

How to verify: Dimson, Marsh, and Staunton 'Global Equity, Bonds, and Currency Returns' dataset documentation. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Paul Dimson stated in a 2017 interview that previous studies were misleading.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·2:35

How to verify: 2026 interview with Paul Dimson, likely published in 'The Triumph of Optimists' or related academic press. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 required companies to report bankruptcies and mergers.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·3:43

How to verify: Text of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, specifically reporting requirements sections. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Alfred C. Cowles and Frederick Macaulay excluded railroads and firms, overstating 19th-century returns.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·6:40

How to verify: Paper titled 'Did Cows Get It Right?' and historical railroad stock data archives. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Stocks did not outperform bonds during the 19th century.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·7:01

How to verify: Historical bond yield data (e.g., US Treasury bonds) vs. stock index data (e.g., Cowles Index) for 1800-2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The widely accepted sector labeling system was created in 1999.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·8:48

How to verify: GICS (Global Industry Classification Standard) launch history, jointly developed by MSCI and S&P in 1999. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The US stock market outperformed other markets by about 2-3% a year from 1900 to today.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·12:04

How to verify: DMS dataset comparison of US equity returns vs. other global equity indices from 1900 to present. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Do your own research

  • Verify the launch date of the first S&P 500 index fund (Vanguard S&P 500 Index Fund, 1976) against the index creation date (1957) using Vanguard or S&P Dow Jones Indices historical records.
  • Read the MSCI methodology documents regarding back-tested data disclaimers and free-float weighting changes to understand how historical comparability is affected.
  • Review the paper 'Did Cows Get It Right?' by Dimson, Marsh, and Staunton to assess the impact of excluded firms on 19th-century return calculations.
  • Check the 1934 Securities Exchange Act provisions to understand the regulatory shift in reporting requirements for bankruptcies and mergers.
  • Compare pre-1970s index methodologies (e.g., price-weighted vs. market-cap weighted) to evaluate the validity of long-term return comparisons.
  • Stress-test investment plans using a range of return assumptions (e.g., 4% to 8%) rather than relying on a single historical average.
  • Look for conflicts of interest in any source promoting specific long-term index fund products that rely heavily on 100-year historical charts.
  • Review the Dimson, Marsh, and Staunton (DMS) dataset methodology for details on how they handled survivorship bias in their 125-year return analysis.
Full transcriptexpand
0:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): A chart like this one is probably the reason most of you invest, myself included. It's this long-term historical performance demonstrated by this lovely line upwards that kind of gives us the reassurance of returns in the future.
0:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I I know what markets are going to do over a long period of time. They're gonna go up.
0:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): It's often repeated that past performance like this is no guarantee of future returns. But today. I hope to show you really that when it comes to past performance, that's not even a guarantee of, well, past returns.
0:40
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I want
0:40
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): to start by coming back to this chart. It was compiled by a guy who works at Google and NASA, so yeah, must be good, right? But let's just add a few key dates onto this thing. March 1957, Standards and Pause expanded its old index of 233 stocks to a newer list of 500 stocks. That's the SP 500. What this
1:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): chart is looking to plot the performance off going all the way back to 1871. But when they introduced the list, you still couldn't buy it at that point. You had to wait until 1976 before the introduction of the first publicly available index fund that tracked the top 500 companies was available. to buy. So that's a hundred years after this chart started. Okay, what about for people like me,
1:20
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): global investors? MSCI published a world index covering developed market stocks on March 31st, 1986. I dug into their methodology, it's this massive document here. It basically outlines how they compile their indexes.
1:33
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
1:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): at the bottom, very last page, pretty much page 144, in suspiciously small writing, it says this.
1:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): The information may contain back-tested data. Backtested performance is not actual performance, but is hypothetical. There are frequently material differences between back-tested performance results and actual results.
1:52
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): You'd think that market returns were just facts, wouldn't you? That what we're told was the return for any given year was set in stone. But here's MSCI saying that, you know, going backwards, that's just not the case. So the question is then, what sort of witchcraft are they using to go back and calculate all of these returns? This right here is what I would call
2:12
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the gold standard of stock market returns data. So it was compiled by Dimson, Marsh, and Staunton, and it goes back 125 years, and they rigorously try to put together what they think the global stock market has done for five different asset classes. I'm gonna say up front: this work here is excellent, in my opinion. In an interview in 2017, Dimson
2:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): said this about why they started compiling their data.
2:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): We were initially interested in creating an asset return history for the UK. We didn't trust the then standard data series for long-term UK investment returns. When we recollected Collected the data ourselves, the previous study was very misleading.
2:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Misleading is a strong word when it comes to a compiling stock market returns, isn't it? But once you dig into some of the ways that they compile their data,
2:56
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
2:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): think you might agree with them.
2:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): When looking at a given group, you focus only on examples of successful individuals.
3:04
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
3:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the 80s, there was this study into cats, specifically ones that had fallen from buildings. It's a weird thing to study, right? But they looked at vet records and they found something that was pretty surprising. The cats that had fallen from six floors or above had less injuries than the ones that had fallen from lower down. Second floor jumpers. To the scientists, the explanation for this was simple.
3:24
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Cats that fell from higher heights had more time to react, more time to brace for the landing. But there was a flaw in this thinking. Who is taking a dead cat to the vet? The truth was the majority of cats falling from six floors and up died on impact. Only a lucky few survived with minor injuries. Those are the ones that made it to the vet, and as such, they
3:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): influenced the data. This is literally a form of survivorship bias. And we see this in the way that market data is reported as well. Dimson admits himself that compiling market data depends on surviving investor records. But before the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, companies weren't even required to report things like bankruptcies or mergers. Entire companies may
4:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): have vanished, just lost to history because of this. We have no idea that they even existed. We only track the winners or the ones where there's records, so we get survivorship bias. Dimson Marsh and Staunton have gone to great lengths to try and counteract this survivorship bias. They've done things like include failed markets like Russia in 1917. They even dig through old
4:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): newspapers and archives hunting for vanished companies. But what about the records that were just simply lost? When this chart specifically started all the way into the 1900s, where DMS measure, stock prices were quoted manually, people shouting and chalkboards. They were then relayed to other parts of the world using telegraph and ticket tape machines. How much of stock market returns
4:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): history then is lost, forgotten, never written down? In times of war, hyperinflation and crisis, people might not price. prioritize keeping accurate records. And let's just not ignore the fact that there's high potential here for fraud or even lies. Just because someone wrote something down a hundred years ago doesn't mean that it was true. In a hundred years is someone gonna find
5:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): this newspaper and be like, wow, these guys were really living life back then. DMS go further than anyone to combat survivorship bias. But you don't know what you don't know. And can we really trust what we do
5:15
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): know?
5:17
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It
5:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): isn't worth the paper, it's printed up.
5:20
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
5:20
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): just want to bring you back to what Dimpson said in his interview in 2017.
5:24
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): The previous study was very misleading.
5:26
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It's
5:26
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that whole survivorship bias thing again. They've gone back in time to look at the returns, but they know which companies won and they only measured those companies. This methodology is flawed. DMS used use peer-reviewed back histories for each country. So where they don't have data for other markets or countries around the world, they rely on other academics compiling that data. And the whole
5:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): peer-reviewed thing means that other academics have checked that academic work and gone, yeah, we think this is rigorous and reliable. But even when it's peer-reviewed, there is the ability for human error to creep in. For this period of time, here, if I just zoom right in, 1871 till about 1900,
6:06
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the expert on market returns is a guy called Alfred C. Cowles. His work focused on tracking the returns of railroads because this was the dominant sector back then. And his work in turn relied on the research from this guy, Frederick Macaulay, who was born in 1882. So you can already see there's a potential problem here. Research is often formed on the basis of other people's research.
6:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): There's this chain of trust of information that potentially could form like a Chinese whispers effect. The work of Cows is widely cited and referenced by loads of academics, but
6:36
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
6:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): stumbled across this paper called Did Cows Get It Right?
6:40
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
6:40
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): found numerous excluded railroads and an assortment of errors made by Cows and Macaulay. I also found a set of industrial firms excluded because of judgment calls that Cows made. These errors were small, but the overall effect was to overstate market returns throughout the 19th century, and that completely changed the narrative around stock market performance throughout that time.
6:59
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Stocks did not outperform
7:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): bonds
7:01
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): during the 19th century.
7:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Scientists once believed that the Earth was the center of the universe, that humans couldn't travel over 30 miles per hour, that a computer would never beat a human at chess, and that ulcers, stomach ones, came from stress. and eating spicy food. Then Dr. Barry Marshall drank a solution infected with bacteria to prove the real cause and won a Nobel Prize for it.
7:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): If
7:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I'd never won the Nobel Prize, I think I still would have been pretty satisfied about the discovery that we made that the Helicobacter is the cause of peptic ulcer.
7:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Look, I'm not saying that academics are wrong, many of which are Nobel Prize winners, but we constantly discovered. discover new things, change our understanding, debunk old wisdom, we even rewrite the rules.
7:46
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
7:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): rules of the game change to fit the moment.
7:49
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
7:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Triumph of Optimists is the book that started all this dimpson Martian Staughton research off. Published in 2002, it covered 101 years of market returns, and at the time it focused on 16 markets. Today it's 125 years of returns, and they now look at 33 different markets. It's a testament to their rigorous data collection, but also a reminder of the
8:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): global stock market problem. What is the globe when it comes to stock market returns? If your data leaves out countries, are you really measuring global performance? Before the 1970s, detailed stock market data was very limited, especially outside of the US. Even where indexes existed for a country, they often only track the biggest companies. It's like saying the
8:29
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): SP 500 is the American stock market. It's a pretty good proxy, but those 500 companies are only a fraction of the thousands of listed companies that make up the total American market. When people talked about global stock markets in the past, they usually meant the US, UK, and Japan. A quick Google search Which tells me there are 60 major markets across the world, which is almost double again
8:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): what DMS are tracking today. The data we have on a lot of those markets is pretty new as well, especially outside of the USA. You're looking at the 80s and beyond. And one thing that surprised me when researching all of this, the widely accepted way of labelling what sector a company falls into, was only created in 1999. So before that, there was no these are the clear rules on what is a
9:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): tech stock and what is an industrial stock. We'd We've been inventing the rules of the game in my lifetime. How we measure, track, and what's included in an index, all of this has been shifting and evolving recently. For example, MSCI and SP eventually adopted what's called free-float weighting. So this ignores what are called closely held shares, and closely held shares are ones that
9:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): are held by a few individuals that are not widely available to the public, maybe the owners of the business. It's sort of changing the rules of the game while we play it. So then when we look back at incomplete records, of course, the outcome. outcomes are gonna change, aren't they? And will this trend continue? Will we keep changing the rules? And more broadly, when does the comparison to the past just
9:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): become a bit pointless? In 1870, when this chart started, horses were still one of the quickest ways for people to travel. Unless you jumped on a steam locomotive with an estimated 6,000 horsepower. Fast forward to today, and the Boeing 747 AI, according to AI, is a about 100,000 horsepower. It's probably wrong, but all my plane geeks are gonna be screwing their faces anyway at me, counting
10:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): jet engines in horsepower, because it's a stupid comparison. You could line up a hundred thousand horses, do whatever you want to them within reason, and they ain't taking off. They're never gonna fly. It's a silly comparison to compare the horses to the jet engine. In the same way, is it a silly comparison? to compare the stock market
10:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): today to the one in the 19th century? The dominant sector back then was rail. Today it's tech companies that our great grandparents would struggle to comprehend. They also wouldn't grasp the size, scale, and importance of the financial markets today. And this idea that the chart presents that you could have just stuck a hundred quid in the SP 500 P500 back then. What does that even mean? Who was seriously
10:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): buying the stock market in the 1800s? You weren't just DCAing into an index fund, were you? Markets were elitist and riddled with manipulation and fraud.
10:57
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
10:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): mean, they probably still are, but one thing is certain: the markets have changed. Over this period, sector and country weights have changed dramatically. In 1970, a global equity portfolio was dominated by industrials, energy, and manufacturing, with barely any tech. Today it's heavy in technology.
11:14
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Japan
11:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): was too tiny in the 1950s, it dominated in the 80s, and then it shrank again. And China and other large emerging markets barely featured before the 2000s. At what point do we admit that what markets were back then versus what they are today is like comparing horses to jet engines? So, how useful is that for forecasting returns going forwards? I'll admit that
11:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): this research humbled me. I've sat here with conviction multiple times saying. the global stock market has returned on average over 9% before inflation and 5% after inflation for more than 100 years. What I haven't explained, and I will be going forwards from now on, is that much of that return is based on reconstruction, backtesting,
11:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and hypothetical data. If you want rock solid market data written in stone, I'd say it's 1990s onwards really for the global market. markets.
12:03
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So,
12:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): what does all that mean for investors? DMS are clear that markets have produced positive returns for investors, and they continue to show that year after year. I won't be changing my investment approach, but I think we should be more realistic about market returns going forwards. The US stock market from 1900 to today is believed to have outperformed other markets by about 2-3% a year. This is
12:24
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): often the reason people say you should just buy the American market. But with that logic, are you falling victim to survivorship bias? You know who the winner is today, so you can project that backwards. This is the same mistake that DMS set out to correct in the first place. If I took you back to 1900 and said you have no idea what's coming,
12:42
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): one
12:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): of these markets will win more than any of the others, you can either bet on all of them and you'll do okay, or you can just risk going all in on the one that you think is going to win. But if you get it wrong, it might be catastrophic failure. What would you choose? Investing should always be about hitting our financial goals and avoiding catastrophic losses. Which I think is
13:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the key insight from this. It's nothing new, but I hope this uncertainty about past results really frames it for you.
13:08
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Next
13:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): time you're on a compound interest calculator like this one, which I've linked below, I made it. It's great, it allows you to add fees and all sorts of
13:14
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): things.
13:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I pin it as a bookmark for all my compounding needs. But next time you're on one of these and you're planning your future and working towards your investment goal, don't just bang in the average return of the last hundred years. Stress test a range of returns. Because the confidence people have in past performance hides the truth of this chart. The further back we go, results start to look less like science and a little bit more
13:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): like.
13:35
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the plenty
13:38
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): of war.
13:53
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I should
13:53
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): have jumped off a six-story building instead.
This page was produced automatically: the audio was transcribed with nvidia/parakeet-tdt-0.6b-v3+sortformer-v2.1 and interpreted by Qwen3.6-35B-A3B-UD-IQ3_S.gguf. Transcription and interpretation can contain errors; always confirm against the original episode. Nothing here is investment advice.

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