Lyn Alden and host discuss AI capex cycles, Anthropic IPO risks, and structural inflation drivers
Summary
Lyn Alden and the host analyze the current AI investment landscape, arguing that while semiconductors remain profitable, frontier model developers face thin economic moats and regulatory capture strategies. They identify the Anthropic IPO as a critical inflection point for the venture capital cycle, warning that a failure could accelerate a downturn. Alden highlights a 'two-speed economy' driven by loose fiscal policy and structural deficits, which supports nominal GDP despite deflationary tech trends. The discussion also covers the limited systemic risk of private credit compared to traditional banking leverage seen in 2008.
Key takeaways
- 1 All hyperscaler data center operators except Microsoft are currently free cash flow negative.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) · 3:01
Episode sections
- 0:14 – 1:42
Macro Outlook and AI Trade
Speaker_1 discusses the impact of the war, midterms, and NVIDIA news on investing. She maintains a long-term view, fading political noise, and believes the AI trade has time to run despite froth, preferring semiconductors for their profitability.
- 1:42 – 4:13
Frontier Models and Hyperscalers
Speaker_1 expresses concern about frontier models due to thin economic moats and regulatory capture strategies, noting they are unprofitable. She highlights that all hyperscalers except Microsoft are free cash flow negative, contrasting with their historical low-reinvestment models.
- 4:13 – 5:25
Semiconductor Cyclicality and Strategy
Speaker_1 compares semiconductor investing to commodity producers, noting investors price in cyclicality. She suggests semiconductors are interesting on dips and mentions volatility selling strategies, preferring profitable public market investments over unprofitable ones.
- 5:25 – 8:47
Regulatory Moats and AI Competition
Speaker_0 and Speaker_1 discuss how AI companies use regulatory moats and 'doomerism' marketing to protect trillion-dollar valuations. They note the lack of network effects in AI tools, making switching costs low and competition fierce.
- 8:47 – 9:56
AI CapEx Bubble Cycle
Speaker_0 describes the AI CapEx cycle as an inverted Jenga puzzle, starting with cash flow, moving to debt, then equity dilution, and finally layoffs. He cites Microsoft's recent layoffs as a sign of this late-stage cycle.
- 9:56 – 13:55
Venture Funding and Unprofitable Growth
Speaker_1 explains that venture-funded companies often sell products below cost to capture market share, a strategy that can work if profitability is achieved at scale. She notes that as VCs go public, they face similar funding pressures.
- 13:55 – 17:35
Two-Speed Economy and Fiscal Policy
Speaker_1 describes a 'two-speed economy' where those receiving fiscal deficits or AI CapEx spending do well, while others face higher rates. She argues that structural 7% GDP deficits raise the floor of nominal GDP and inflation, offset by deflationary tech.
- 17:35 – 28:03
Money Supply and Inflation Dynamics
Speaker_0 and Speaker_1 use a 'bucket of water' analogy: fiscal spending is a hose, while credit destruction is a hole. They compare the GFC (large hole, balanced by fiscal) to COVID (small hole, massive fiscal injection causing inflation). Current conditions are 'mildly hot' with moderate lending.
- 28:03 – 35:22
Inflation, Money Supply, and Credit Cycles
Speaker_0 and Speaker_1 discuss how energy price shocks can trigger demand destruction leading to disinflation or deflation, contrasting this with the 2008 crisis where high private sector debt exacerbated the downturn. They argue that the timing and magnitude of fiscal and monetary responses determine whether an economy experiences inflation or a credit crunch.
- 35:22 – 43:12
Banking Leverage and Private Credit Risks
Speaker_1 compares the banking system's leverage in 2008 to March 2023, noting that 2023 vulnerabilities were isolated to banks with both long-duration assets and flighty deposits. They assess private credit as having limited systemic risk to banks because it represents only a small percentage of bank assets and lacks the liquidity mismatch of traditional banking.
- 43:12 – 46:41
Market Volatility and AI vs. Value Rotation
The speakers analyze the recent volatility between the Dow and Nasdaq as a result of capital competition between the AI sector and other industries. They suggest that algorithms amplify this rotation as investors react to marginal data points regarding AI capital expenditure and cycle longevity.
- 46:41 – 49:17
Anthropic IPO and Venture Capital Cycle
Speaker_0 and Speaker_1 identify the Anthropic IPO as a critical signpost for the AI venture cycle, noting the limited pool of capital available for equity issuance. They argue that a failed or delayed IPO would likely accelerate the end of the current venture capital boom, whereas a successful one extends the cycle.
- 49:17 – 51:50
Semiconductor Valuations and Cycle Timing
Speaker_1 observes that semiconductor investors are pricing in significant risk, with companies like NVIDIA trading at lower earnings multiples than stable consumer staples like Coca-Cola. This suggests investors are skeptical of the sustainability of AI-driven earnings growth and are front-running a potential downturn.
- 51:50 – 55:01
Private Equity and Permanent Capital Vehicles
Speaker_1 introduces a new permanent capital vehicle, Orange Juice, which acquires businesses with a long-term hold strategy similar to Berkshire Hathaway. This approach contrasts with traditional private equity by avoiding short-term optimization pressures and aiming for liquidity through the company's own stock rather than a fund exit.
Assets discussed
| Asset | Kind | Stance | Context |
|---|---|---|---|
| AlphabetGOOGL | equity | neutral | There was no real competition for Google. |
| AppleAAPL | equity | neutral | There was no competition, you know, for Microsoft really, or Apple, even to some extent. |
| NVIDIANVDA | equity | mixed | And then I take it the next step, and I'm like, well, who depends on them having an economic model? Well, NVIDIA, and then you look at the circular kind of relationship with the whole ecosystem, and I always look at like a Jenga puzzle. And to me, it looks like that Jenga puzzle is like an inverted pyramid, and there's only one piece at the bottom, and that's the frontier models, and you take out that. one piece and NVIDIA, you know, I'm not saying they go bust, but if you look back at uh, you know, what happened in the dot com, it wasn't necessarily that the revenues went negative for the companies that were making money, it was that they just went from 70% growth down to 50% growth, and and that is the pin that that that pops everything. |
| Crude oil | commodity | neutral | it started with oil going to 140 and the CPI going from sub-2 in 07 to 5.6 in July. |
| Meta PlatformsMETA | equity | neutral | another 100 billion. Then you might have OpenAI, another 100 hundred billion, then Meta just announced ninety-five |
“Stance” is how the speakers talked about the asset, not a recommendation.
Claims worth verifying
Speaker_1 tends to fade the importance of politics on investing, taking a longer-term view.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·0:42
How to verify: Review Speaker_1's published investment framework or past interviews for consistent statements on political neutrality in long-term investing. For recent events, verify 2026-08-12 through 2026-11-12. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Speaker_1 believes the AI trade has time to run despite froth.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·1:30
How to verify: Check Speaker_1's recent public commentary or social media posts from 2026-08-12 to 2026-11-12 for AI market outlooks. For recent events, verify 2026-08-12 through 2026-11-12. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Speaker_1 prefers semiconductors over data centers for the AI trade due to profitability.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·1:42
How to verify: Verify against Speaker_1's portfolio disclosures or public investment letters from the specified date range. For recent events, verify 2026-08-12 through 2026-11-12. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
All hyperscalers except Microsoft are free cash flow negative.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·3:01
How to verify: Check the latest quarterly earnings reports (10-Q/10-K) for Alphabet, Oracle, Amazon, Meta, and Microsoft on SEC EDGAR for Free Cash Flow figures. For recent events, verify 2026-08-12 through 2026-11-12. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceMicrosoft is free cash flow positive but at a reduced level.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·3:06
How to verify: Check Microsoft's latest quarterly earnings report on SEC EDGAR for Free Cash Flow data. For recent events, verify 2026-08-12 through 2026-11-12. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceFrontier models have economic moats measurable in months.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·5:40
How to verify: Review industry reports on AI model release cycles and open-weight model adoption rates from 2026-08-12 to 2026-11-12. For recent events, verify 2026-08-12 through 2026-11-12. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Microsoft announced layoffs of 60,000 workers.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·9:51
How to verify: Check Microsoft's official press releases or SEC filings (8-K) for workforce reduction announcements in the specified date range. For recent events, verify 2026-08-12 through 2026-11-12. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceSpeaker_1 describes the US fiscal environment as having structural 7% of GDP deficits.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·14:39
How to verify: Compare US federal deficit data from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) or Treasury Department against US GDP for the relevant period. For recent events, verify 2026-08-12 through 2026-11-12. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Speaker_1 describes the current economic environment as 'mildly hot' with moderate lending.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·22:13
How to verify: Review Speaker_1's recent macroeconomic commentary or interviews from 2026-08-12 to 2026-11-12 for these specific descriptors. For recent events, verify 2026-08-12 through 2026-11-12. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Speaker_0 cites Microsoft's layoffs as evidence of the late stage of the CapEx bubble cycle.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·9:51
How to verify: Check Microsoft's official announcements regarding workforce reductions in the specified date range. For recent events, verify 2026-08-12 through 2026-11-12. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceIn 2008, oil prices went to $140 and CPI rose from sub-2% in 2007 to 5.6% in July.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·28:20
How to verify: Check historical oil price data from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) and CPI data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) for July 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-12 through 2026-11-12. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Banks in 2008 had their generational lowest mix of cash and treasuries as a percentage of assets and a generational high ratio of assets prone to nominal default.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·29:48
How to verify: Review Federal Reserve Financial Accounts of the United States (Z.1) reports for Q4 2026 and bank balance sheet data from the FDIC or Federal Reserve Statistical Release G.20. For recent events, verify 2026-08-12 through 2026-11-12. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Private credit borrowing represents approximately 7% of total bank assets.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·39:17
How to verify: Check the Federal Reserve's Financial Accounts of the United States (Z.1) for private nonfinancial corporate debt held by depository institutions and compare to total bank assets. For recent events, verify 2026-08-12 through 2026-11-12. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
NVIDIA trades at a lower earnings multiple than Coca-Cola.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·49:37
How to verify: Compare the trailing P/E ratios of NVDA and KO using financial data providers like Yahoo Finance or Bloomberg as of the transcript date. For recent events, verify 2026-08-12 through 2026-11-12. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceTrailing 12-month equity issuance was about $200 billion due to companies like SpaceX.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·47:32
How to verify: Review S&P Capital IQ or Bloomberg data for primary equity issuance over the 12 months preceding the transcript date. For recent events, verify 2026-08-12 through 2026-11-12. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Meta announced $95 billion in equity issuance.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·48:00
How to verify: Check Meta Platforms' SEC filings (e.g., Form S-3 or 8-K) for equity offering announcements. For recent events, verify 2026-08-12 through 2026-11-12. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceThe speaker estimates the AI cycle will likely go out to 2028.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·50:55
How to verify: This is a forward-looking statement by the speaker; verify by checking Lyn Alden's published articles or social media posts around the transcript date for this specific forecast. For recent events, verify 2026-08-12 through 2026-11-12. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
In March 2023, Silicon Valley Bank failed due to a combination of long-duration asset exposure and flighty deposits.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·35:39
How to verify: Review the FDIC's report on the failure of Silicon Valley Bank and the bank's quarterly financial statements prior to March 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-12 through 2026-11-12. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Bending Spoons operates as a permanent capital vehicle in the software sector.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·52:39
How to verify: Check Bending Spoons' corporate structure documentation or investor presentations for details on their capital vehicle type. For recent events, verify 2026-08-12 through 2026-11-12. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Illinois Toolworks uses a permanent capital structure for engineering parts.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·52:52
How to verify: Review ITW's annual reports (10-K) and investor presentations regarding their acquisition strategy and capital structure. For recent events, verify 2026-08-12 through 2026-11-12. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceDo your own research
- Verify Microsoft's free cash flow status relative to other hyperscalers using their latest quarterly earnings reports.
- Check Anthropic's IPO filing (S-1) for valuation metrics, revenue growth, and cash burn rates.
- Review US Treasury data for current structural deficit percentages relative to GDP.
- Compare NVIDIA's P/E ratio to Coca-Cola's using financial data platforms like Bloomberg or Yahoo Finance.
- Analyze private credit exposure for major US banks via their 10-K filings to assess systemic risk.
- Research the definition and economic moat duration of 'frontier' AI models versus established LLMs.
- Monitor Microsoft's workforce reduction announcements as a potential indicator of late-stage CapEx cycles.
- Assess the impact of energy price shocks on consumer demand destruction using CPI and PCE inflation data.
Full transcriptexpand
- 0:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Hello, fellow Rebel Capitals. Hope you're well. I am back with my good friend Lynn Alden. And Lynn, it's been too long, hasn't it?
- 0:08
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It's
- 0:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): been way too long. Happy to be
- 0:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): back. What's been on your radar in terms of macro?
- 0:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well,
- 0:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): so I mean obviously,
- 0:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): right? Yeah,
- 0:17
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): there's a lot going
- 0:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): on. I I you know, I think that obviously the the the war is still a big factor. Uh
- 0:21
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): obviously
- 0:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that the most recent, I mean, the combination of midterms uh as well as uh the NVIDIA news, um, you know, it it's kind of been a one-to-punch for headlines. Uh I I tend because I take a fairly longer term view of investing, I tend to fade how important politics is on investing. Like uh you know some
- 0:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): investors, traders will make pretty quick trades based on you know outcomes. Um whereas my my decisions tend to be rarer related to politics. That that includes the US, that includes some places in Latin America. Uh I I tend to have a little bit more of a structural view. Uh and so far, no major surprises. Obviously, I'm I'm you know, moderately surprised like others at
- 1:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the at the maybe the magnitude of of some of these election outcomes. Uh, but they they went directionally like people were expecting. Uh so uh that you know I and I've you know I've been analyzing kind of their their potential impact on the I AI trade. And that's of course
- 1:17
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): where the Nvidia
- 1:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): news factors in as well. Um my my base case is that still has time to run, I think. I I I think that there is froth in the trade, but I I still think that that trade is probably uh active.
- 1:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): What specifically the whole thing, or are you just uh focusing on like the Nvidia's the the the picks and shovels, or is it the data centers or you know are are you getting specific there?
- 1:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, so my my preference has been in the semiconductor space because that that's been more profitable growth. Uh and maybe maybe my bias is uh as uh background in electrical engineering, it's it's just it's it's a comfortable area for me. Uh the the area that I uh am most concerned about longer term is the frontier models. Um uh you know, with the open
- 2:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): weight models. you know, generally months behind and therefore those companies trying to erect uh regulatory moats uh to protect, you know, what are essentially trillion plus valuations. Uh that that's the part where I would be concerned about being an investor unless I already had a very low cost basis in that. So early investors, great job. But I I'd be really
- 2:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): concerned about later capital in those the data centers, um, you know, I they don't have the moat that like a semiconductor company does. Um, I I think when they go down enough, they can they can enter kind of the the value space. Um uh but you know, those are those are chat, those are more challenging. It's generally it's more aggressive
- 2:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): CapEx. Uh that there's generally leverage involved uh to a much greater extent than the semiconductor companies. Uh and I I'm not very bullish on the hyperscale. hyperscalers. Um now they they do have wide economic moats um uh lar partially because of their other businesses uh as well as the sheer scale that they can operate
- 3:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): on. But all of the hyperscalers except for Microsoft are now free cash flow negative.
- 3:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah
- 3:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): so Alphabet, Oracle, Amazon, uh Meta, uh they're all free cash flow negative at the moment. Microsoft uh still has positive free cash flow, but at a much reduced level, uh, which is not always a bad thing, but it just shows that the sheer level of um reinvestment that they have to do. And you know, we're we're trained a lot on their 2010s performance where they
- 3:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): generally had these like network effect businesses with fairly low reinvestment uh needs. Now, because they were so big, their actual dollar numbers of reinvestment were pretty significant, but as a percentage, they were low. So they were able to build Fortress balance sheets, return a cut, you know, do a lot of buybacks, initiate
- 3:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): dividends in some cases. Uh whereas now and they didn't really have each one was kind of without core competition. There was no real competition for Google. There was no competition uh for For Meta, really. There was no competition, you know, for Microsoft really, or Apple, even to some extent. So they they are at had these kind of like the firm motes, but now they're
- 4:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): they're more in direct competition with each other in a very expensive way. Uh and so uh semiconnectors are interesting because
- 4:13
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
- 4:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): know the investors in those spaces are kind of trained to invest recyclicality, right?
- 4:19
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 4:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): they they they treat a RAM, a memory stock in a similar way that they treat a commodity producer, where they know that when when times are good, you put a low multiple. on it because eventually times are not going to be good. So then it becomes a question of timing and and just you know how how long that cycle lasts. Um so I I you know I think semiconductors are interesting on dips.
- 4:38
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um
- 4:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I I think that trade's probably not over yet. There's also potential strategies around kind of volatility selling to some extent, uh if you're cautious. Um but you know I I you know I I I think generally speaking what I when want to get into unprofitable investments, I go into venture. In in the public market space, I generally want to stick to profitable investments. It's that that tends to
- 4:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): align with my strategy, which which puts me which which puts me more
- 5:01
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in the semiconductor. Yeah. Puts
- 5:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): puts me more in the semiconductor camp.
- 5:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah, it's it's funny you say a political moat when referring to the frontier models, because it seemed to me back when they were calling for. like the end of the world due to AI, I was like, okay, it seems like they're all pushing the same narrative here and they're all asking for regulation. And whenever a huge
- 5:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): mega corporation is asking for more and more regulation, it usually ain't because they care about the average Joe and Jane, it's because they care about creating monopoly. They they want to push out all the competitors. So did you see it that way as well?
- 5:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah. Yeah. That's why I think that they're because their economic moat is now fairly thin. I mean it's measurable in months really, uh which wouldn't be a problem if they were a smaller companies. But when you have trillion dollar valuations and your open weight models, uh you're you're in a constant competition against them. They're also unprofitable by the way that the these you know frontier models. So you're you're running
- 5:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): unprofitably uh and and there's always these open weight models nipping at your heels. Um
- 6:05
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
- 6:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): they've kind of shifted toward regulatory mode capture. Uh and this is you know any any kind of large industry that that sometimes becomes a strategy where you try to raise the floor uh and make it harder for new entrants to come in. Yeah
- 6:17
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh you know
- 6:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that the the cost of of things um uh and and so you know there's this kind of this the concern and Um and
- 6:25
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): what
- 6:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the reason it works I think in this case, is because you know there's always a grain of truth with this. So, for example, it's it is no secret that there are in we're in a current era of of cybersecurity risk because these you know the cost of hacking has just gone down considerably. So it takes time for the existing base of code uh and know-how to catch up with that, to have make sure that AI
- 6:44
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): is
- 6:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): also defending against all these things. And whenever you have a transition like that, things are gonna break. Uh, so every time there's a a big breakage, it's easy to say, look, if you
- 6:53
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): know,
- 6:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): if we just banned all open weight models somehow in the world, you know, like then it and that becomes like a convincing narrative. Um, but yeah, I think a lot of it's for regulatory uh concerns. It's also why
- 7:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): both things can be true at once,
- 7:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): both things can be true, and then it's also why uh doomerism Uh sometimes doomerism is is good marketing because you'd you'd have these viral moments where like, you know, someone will be like, hey. this thing almost broke out of the lab. And then it just go all on Twitter. It's like, you know, they're all that basically means they're ahead now. And you get you get this kind of like uh community marketing on your behalf that you didn't have to
- 7:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): pay for. Uh and years go by and it's it's you know, they're they're they're tools that are that are very powerful. Um
- 7:32
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and they and
- 7:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): of course they, you know, this they capture a lot of um uh concern as well.
- 7:39
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
- 7:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it's basically propaganda. And it's it it seems it's necessary because
- 7:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): there is no other moat. Like I know just in my personal day-to-day experience, I just bounce back and forth between like Chat GPT and Gemini. And sometimes I'll go a couple weeks and notice that chat GPT is giving me a little bit better answers, or they're giving me answers that like include grammar. graphs without me having to ask. And I'll be like,
- 8:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): oh, that's cool. And I'll just go over there and use them for two weeks. Then Jim and I will do the same thing and kind of one up them. Then I'll use them for but there's no like there's no network effect whatsoever. So it's like they've either have the option of creating that regulatory moat, like you said, or just you
- 8:23
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): know,
- 8:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): they're too big to fail.
- 8:24
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 8:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I mean that that's really
- 8:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): to me, it looks like their only game. And then I take it the next step, and I'm like, well, who depends on them having an economic model? Well, NVIDIA, and then you look at the circular kind of relationship with the whole ecosystem, and I always look at like a Jenga puzzle. And to me, it looks like that Jenga puzzle is like an inverted pyramid, and there's only one piece at
- 8:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the bottom, and that's the frontier models, and you take out that. one piece and NVIDIA, you know, I'm not saying they go bust, but if you look back at uh, you know, what happened in the dot com, it wasn't necessarily that the revenues went negative for the companies that were making money, it was that they just went from 70% growth down to 50%
- 9:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): growth, and and that is the pin that that that pops everything. So that that's uh, and then also to you know what I'd love to get your opinion on.
- 9:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): is as far as I can tell, these CapEx bubble cycles kind of always play out the same way. It's like it starts with funding from cash flow, and then once that's gone, you start funding it with debt.
- 9:28
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 9:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): then once that's gone, because the interest rates are going too high, then you're like, okay, let's move on to equity.
- 9:33
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 9:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): then once the equity falls in price because you're diluting shareholders, then the only thing you have left is just firing workers. And it and that's kind of how things seem to play out. And you talked about Microsoft being cash flow negative, or excuse me, positive, but they just announced they're laying off like 60,000 workers.
- 9:51
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 9:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it seems like we're kind of in that last stage. Have you have you noticed that studying history?
- 9:55
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Uh
- 9:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): so there's that, and there's also the venture cycle. So we've had a couple parallel funding sources. Obviously, the the the frontier models we were just talking about. they were VC funded. Uh, and you know, the whole the whole process there, uh, and it's it's I mean, for the most part, it's rational, but of course it can get into bubble tears from time to time over over the years and decades that ventures existed,
- 10:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): which is to say there are certain ideas that can scale, you're gonna run unprofitably for a period of time, and sometimes the economics are about trying to capture market share. So you can hit critical mass and then eventually. shift toward a profitable model. That that can be reasonable in certain industries. Uh, you know, there's some businesses that that are not really venture type, so you generally want to be more profitable from the start. And there
- 10:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): are other ones where the the growth potential is so huge, you really want to gun it for several years. And so what you do is you you raise a lot of capital from venture investors. Uh, and then essentially what they do is they underprice their products. So, you know, they'll they'll sell a thousand dollars worth of. basically compute for half the cost for the consumer. Um, uh,
- 10:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): because they and they're and they're kind of looking at the math and saying, well, the cost of compute's going down, you want to capture market share. Uh, so you know, you're it we're we're currently in the business of selling twenty dollar bills for ten dollars and look at our growth
- 11:07
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): numbers.
- 11:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): That's right.
- 11:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Um, and and that again, that can be the right strategy sometimes if you eventually have an eye toward how you could shift toward profitability. once you hit a certain scale. Um, and if you don't overdo it. Um, and I think the challenge, so that was like an early source of funding. Uh, and then of course, you know, when when you when you have those VCs funding it, those those companies can go
- 11:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): out and they can buy compute, you know, they can buy semiconductors, they can, they can rent or buy data center space, and then the hyperscalers get involved. And like you said, they they you know, they fund first with their existing cash hordes that they build up.
- 11:39
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Uh
- 11:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): then they say, you know, uh we actually, you know, we we have a low cost of capital, so let's issue some debt to do it. Uh and we're gonna stop it. They also just stop buying back their own shares. So, you know, free cash flow, existing cash, debt and equity, depending on the company in question. They they kind of, you know, you start with the lowest cost of capital, and as you know, as you exhaust some of those, you get into the higher cost cat
- 11:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): source of capital or the higher risk. Uh, and then there's also, of course, the the venture. side can run out, which is i if if if enough venture investors or uh now that now that they're in the game of trying to go public, right? So so you know, these companies will be in the in also in a kind of a similar game of either issuing equity or debt to to fund their growth and their
- 12:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): unprofitable uh uh baselines. Uh you know, if enough investors say, I'm not sure if want to pay a trillion dollars for this kind of not not. wide moat company it's not to say that they have no moat like the frontier models like there there's still economy of scale of of hiring the best people and you know having a really good funding source and all that I mean there there's some scale there but like you said there's switching
- 12:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): costs are low no real network effect uh really hard to build a moat I think the actually the end the end um you know the I think there eventually will be a bust of course I mean this we didn't end cyclicality here um uh but I think structurally speaking that the winner will be kind of the the businesses and the individuals that make use of these. Because I do think that the cost of
- 12:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): compute's gonna go down. I I think that you know the the effectiveness of these models is gonna keep going up for quite a while. Uh open weight models are gonna keep it um pretty competitive, I think. It's uh it's hard to stamp them out, um, gl especially globally. Um and so I think at the end of the day. the winners are going to be individuals and businesses that are
- 13:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): effectively using AI uh versus those that are either late to the game or not using it effectively.
- 13:23
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I mean
- 13:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it's the same thing as the internet. I
- 13:24
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): mean
- 13:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): if you look at the big winners in the internet or the companies that leverage the internet to change the game and disrupt an industry. I mean Amazon's a perfect example of that.
- 13:34
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Or
- 13:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Netflix, you know, those are were the big winners from the internet. It wasn't necessarily the guys that were laying out the the fibers and whatnot, you know. So I think it it's it's rational to assume that we're gonna see the exact same thing play out in this in in this cycle when when everything is is said and done. I I know you talk about fiscal
- 13:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): a lot. How does fiscal play into everything that we're discussing?
- 13:59
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
- 13:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): good question. I often say that uh we have this two speed economy now. I'm not the obviously not the first person to point that out. But it's like, why do we have that two speed economy? It's well, if you're if you're on the right side, if you're on the receiving side of either those deficits or that cat that capex spending, the AI capex spending, those are the two main areas that have been in a really good place. Whereas
- 14:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): if if you're not, and if you're on the the you know the kind of the wrong side of say higher rates, like you're a younger family looking to buy a home, you're not very asset rich, that that's when you're you're facing kind of the the challenges. You're on the other side of this K uh economy. So basically the where fiscal ties in is I mean, you know, when you're running structural 7% of GDP deficits, you know, it's
- 14:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): not like COVID-era hyperstimulus, uh, but it is uh historically a hot fiscal environment, a loose fiscal environment, which all else equal tends to. raise the floor of nominal GDP, raises the floor of inflation compared, you know, which is then offset by other things, you know, deflationary tech and so forth. But you're
- 14:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): all else being equal compared to a two percent deficit, you're raising the floor of of what's happening. Um, you know, bank lending
- 15:07
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): which raises
- 15:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): rates, by the way.
- 15:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, which raises rates, uh, generally speaking. And and you know, bank lending is is moderate at the at the moment. So it's not it's not like uh super aggressive. But when banks uh buy treasuries on fractional reserve, I mean they're basically lending to the government, which is then spending into the economy. So you still get you get money supply growth that way. Uh so you know you're you're you're it's contributing
- 15:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): to money supply growth and GDP growth, despite if you just looked at, for example, the housing market, it would look like a recession in a sense. Like the the sheer, the the the lower. low amount of turnover,
- 15:40
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh,
- 15:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the difficulty of affording a home, uh, those are all real things. Uh obviously there's this, you know, certain issues in commercial real estate and private credit and all this, but then it's offset by fairly large deficits uh that uh is is for the most part hitting spendable areas in the economy. So for example, Social Security goes out to seniors, and seniors then spend it, either
- 16:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): sometimes on you know, uh their own adult child. children, sometimes on just things they are consuming themselves. Uh, then you know a lot of that deficit's going to healthcare. So, you know, those healthcare workers and the companies, uh, they're that that's revenue and income from them, and then they're spending it into the economy. Uh the defense uh industry, you know, they're receiving money and then they're
- 16:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): spending it into the economy. And then now the interest expense is that it's over a trillion dollars. Uh, you know, many pool, there's there's there, that's spendable money for a lot of people. There are people with money market accounts that, you know, kind of by extension have treasuries. Uh and then every time the you know the Fed raises rates, they actually get a small raise and they can actually go out and and spend a little bit more
- 16:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): potentially. And so that that that's you know it it that the that's currently a s a slight source for running it hot.
- 16:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah. I think the key there is something we've talked about a lot over the last six years of knowing each other. And that's the concept of it being higher than it otherwise would have been.
- 17:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah.
- 17:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So you can have uh that that term you came up with that I use all the time is it doesn't necessarily have to be inflationary, but it can be anti-deflationary. anti deflationary.
- 17:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah.
- 17:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And
- 17:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and that's really an important concept here. So when you're talking about the fiscal, you can have all this fiscal and you can still have a poor nominal GDP, but we can but it's definitely higher than it otherwise would have been, that's for sure. And so the way I always try to look at that is as I try to look
- 17:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): at it as though it's a bucket of water.
- 17:37
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 17:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you've got this hose which is the fiscal at the top,
- 17:41
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): but
- 17:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): then you also have a hole at the bottom. So a lot of it depends on how big that hole is at the bottom that determines if the water level is staying the same, or maybe even going down or going up. I think that's a good visual for people to really think about that goes back to that. Well,
- 18:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the water level is higher than it otherwise would have been, but it doesn't necessarily mean that the uh water level is increasing. And I saw Druckenmiller make this argument the other day where he was talking about exactly what you're saying, how fiscal is adding to nominal GDP and we wouldn't have nominal at 6%. And he was going back
- 18:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): to the GFC, you know, the times when we had these big recessions recession and huge deficits, and he's pointing out the fact that the hole at the bottom of the bucket during those times was a lot bigger than it is when you have the unemployment rate at 4.1%.
- 18:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So do you think about it in those terms? So it's not just fiscal, but it's what is fiscal doing based on everything else that we're looking at in the macroeconomy. economy.
- 18:45
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Uh,
- 18:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I do. And and this was a a big topic I had back in 2020, twenty twenty, 2021 twenty twenty one when I, you was
- 18:50
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): know,
- 18:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I was having debate. debates with with say uh uh investors about you know inflation versus deflation, bond bear versus bond bull. Uh uh and and so when I would kind of debate my defle deflationista friends uh as I was in more of the inflation camp, my I had charts on this where you have to you have to take into account not just the fiscal side, but then also
- 19:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): what's going on in the private sector. For ex example.
- 19:12
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): so for
- 19:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): and that that's you know that's either a a uh hole in the bucket in some cases, or it's another um faucet into the bucket. And so, for example, if you have a a uh a booming credit environment, uh that that's a source of fractional reserve money creation that that's out there adding adding to the hotness that the higher cycle. On the other hand, if you have loan destruction, you're you're destroying broad
- 19:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): money in that sense. Yeah,
- 19:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): bigger hole.
- 19:35
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
- 19:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): and and so for example, in the global financial crisis, um the the the the fiscal injection was in terms of order magnitude, roughly on the on the same scale as loan destruction that was occurring. Uh and so you had money supply that it was in the broad sense, broad money supply did not have a big uptick. Uh, you know, if you look at
- 19:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the M2 chart itself, you'd barely say anything crazy happened, right? Because there's other things that were crazy, but they were they were kind of big. balancing each other out. Whereas, for example, when you fast forward to COVID, you had the sheer scale and speed of the fiscal injections before you really had too much loan
- 20:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): destruction, resulted in just a huge, you know, you're you're pouring money in a lot faster than it's draining out, which is why that that time we did get that inflationary wave, both in terms of money supply growth and then in terms of price impact. impacts compared to the global financial crisis. And
- 20:30
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you had the
- 20:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): credit pose as well. Yeah,
- 20:32
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the credit
- 20:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): everyone is pulling down their line of credit, which really contributed to that twenty five percent increase in M two, you know, that that
- 20:39
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): we
- 20:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): saw. So you got the Fed, you got the banks, you got everybody. And then on top of that, the government spending the money. I used to say they're taking money from savers and giving it to spenders. So on top of the the two hoses going into the bucket, you have the velocity of the money increasing dramatically as well. It's like, what do you think is going to
- 20:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): happen?
- 21:00
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah.
- 21:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): So that was a very inflation environment. And you know, at the current time, you know, we're fortunately in a a more muted environment than that. But uh when you add the components together, basically you have above, you know, so above baseline fiscal, uh, largely for. reasons that are pretty locked in. I mean, so no recession, but above target fiscal, largely because of
- 21:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): demographics reasons and you know, healthcare expenses, and you know, all the all the reasons, and and now interest expense is is a big component. So uh uh there's all of that. And then you have a fairly moderate lending environment. So there's you know, loan loan imbalances balances are going up, they're not above target, so that's not really the the core cause of of inflation. the way it was. For example, in the
- 21:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): 70s, that was peak bank lending.
- 21:42
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): That was baby
- 21:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): boomers entering their home buying years and therefore peak credit formation. So if you look at just like loan growth year over year, that was like the 70s were where it was at. Now it's it's moderate. So it's not like it's not like Japan. It's not like you know it's not like one of those like deflationary loan areas. Um but it's just it's just it's moderate to
- 22:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): even slightly below like below baseline a little bit, uh, offset by above baseline fiscal. Uh and so it's I would I describe it as a mildly run in a hot environment. Uh
- 22:13
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 22:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): also describe it as a gradual print environment with a Fed that's kind of you know treading water on its balance sheet, going up for periods of time, nothing, nothing particularly large. Uh so I tend to fade the narratives that a um a very large print is around the corner. a very large crash is around the corner. I mean there's always risks that can happen, but in a probability sense I've been fading those narrative.
- 22:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And it's more been uh kind of expecting this these this kind of grindy, slightly hot um you know investing and GDP type of environment.
- 22:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah pretty much what we've seen over the last couple of years or so. How What okay so I think what's good for investors is we don't have to wonder about the hose that's coming in from fiscal. We know that's a constant, if not going to increase, right, as far as government spending.
- 23:03
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah.
- 23:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): We we could say that with a lot of confidence. So then the only other, I guess, variables you have is credit growth, which you said is pretty mild. Uh that I I consider that more money printing, right? Because that's going directly into the economy as far as M2. But then the other variable there would be the size of the hole at the bottom of the bucket. So what
- 23:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): indicators do you use to determine how big that hole is now and how big it might be in six months or a year?
- 23:33
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
- 23:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): good set of questions. I mean, one is one is kind of the structural one, which would be productivity growth. right? And and you know, new technology unlocks can give you more productivity growth. For example, like, you know, the the you know build out of of uh you know uh industrialization, for example, is a huge tech unlock. Uh the the internet
- 23:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): build-out was a big tech unlock. Uh Japan's productivity after World War II, which was is just a massive, just hugely productive. Um uh the rise of China when they when you know when they kind of shifted toward a more workable economic model, uh, that that was a huge kind of economic unlock. And then it spilled over into countries like Australia that are, you know,
- 24:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): commodity producers that that's you know had to supply. Uh so they would they went this really long period of time without a recession and just above average productivity. Um uh and and right now we're obviously in a in a potential area of of AI productivity. Uh uh where um some economists have kinda kind of pointed out that it's it it shows up kind of irregularly. Uh so
- 24:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it's not as though we've seen some uh giant uptick in in uh AI related productivity. It's I think it's probably because in an economic sense, it's still fairly early in terms of of of if it being incorporated and the expenses are still uh here with us. And so so we're kinda kind of in the investment phase. So it's actually more uh balances out because obviously things like
- 24:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): building data centers, building all these chips, trying to get more power online, that's actually in the near term potentially inflationary. You have more entities fighting over some in some cases pretty scarce resources. Um uh but once that's built out, and then potentially once we have this, you know, potential down Downcycle cycle we were talking about earlier in the conversation, right? When when we
- 25:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): overbuild some of this and some of this leverage. and funding pops, we're probably gonna have overcapacity. And then that'll be deflationary on a lot of I think goods and services. Uh, because we'll have all this this more productivity in place and less, you know, it's let less uh aggressive new uh capacity coming online. Uh and so I think that'll be deflationary. So
- 25:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I certainly watch the uh AI cycle, the funding cycle, the demand and supply bottleneck cycle. So that's a key thing. I'm watching. The other one would be war, of course. I mean, you know, war generally is inflationary. If you're if you're
- 25:45
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
- 25:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): know, when you build refineries, you're you're being more productive. When you're blowing up refineries, you're you're being you're you're you're destroying productivity, you know, you're creating bottlenecks, or or you know, if you're making it harder or or more blockages to move around energy or supplies. Um when you when you add the cost of insurance, when you uh do all this, uh when you when
- 26:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you spend money on missiles, so all all these things around the margins are are generally inflationary. And so whenever that's heating up, that's obviously uh adding to it. Uh it's adding to diesel prices uh over time, which then of course contribute to just higher costs of businesses getting, you know, food and other other things on the shelves for for for consumers and businesses to to
- 26:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): to buy. Uh and so, you know, th it's those things mainly. And then I'm also always just kind of monitoring the credit cycle. So what's happening uh both in in private credit, uh private equity, as well as uh, you know, what is the current rate of bank lending uh out there? Uh and is it is it you know, is it accelerating or decelerating?
- 26:44
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 26:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): here it is, guys. This is the rebel capitalist newsletter delivered to your inbox twice a week. completely and totally free of charge. But this isn't just a newsletter that tells you what's going on, although you'll get some of that. It's gonna help you set up your portfolio in a way that will help you achieve your
- 27:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): financial objectives. So we have two emails per week. One is the macro alert, it's gonna going to tell you exactly what you need to know about what's happening in the macro space that week. And the second is the trade alert. And I'll give you an example of that right here. That's going to be my trade idea of the week. Now, this is not investing advice.
- 27:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): This is for let's say educational purposes only, but it's going to help you see possible opportunities that are out there as we go through this credit cycle, as we go through this crash, or as we go through. a potential reset. This newsletter is all about giving you the valuable
- 27:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): information you need quickly and concisely, and doing so in a way that is actionable. So if you want to prepare yourself before it's too late, if you want to take advantage of opportunities that we absolutely will have regardless of what plays out over the next year.
- 28:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Sign up totally free of charge. You don't have to give your credit card or anything like that. Just go ahead and click the link in the description below. How far can inflation go before it comes disinflationary?
- 28:17
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 28:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): what I'm talking about specifically like 08.
- 28:19
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Right?
- 28:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Like, like we're all good at the so many people remember how that movie ended and they forget how it started.
- 28:25
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 28:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it started with oil going to 140 and the CPI going from sub-2 in 07 to 5.6 in July. And you get to a point where the higher energy costs
- 28:42
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): are
- 28:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): trickling through the economy, but then that creates the demand destruction, which ironically leads to disinflation and sometimes outright default. deflation. So how how do you reconcile that with the supply shocks that have definitely contributed and I I would say are probably uh
- 29:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): mostly responsible for the increase in CPI that we've had since the Middle East conflict?
- 29:08
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
- 29:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that's where I think that money supply would come into play, uh, both in terms of the credit cycle and in terms of fiscal. And so you know. you can imagine a couple different scenarios. So in 2008, obviously you know, obviously, pri prior to that, energy prices, like you said, were getting very high. Uh, while money supply growth was still normal for the most part. Um, uh, and you had a somewhat
- 29:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): of a crowding out effect where we're, you know, basically people have people and businesses are spending more money on energy. Uh and you know, they they we we then were, you know, they had the uh of course the adjustment. adjustable rate, mortgages, the over-leverage housing, which is now inching up in interest rates because the Fed's trying to fight that inflation. Yep. Uh so you're you're popping a credit bubble. And that was also
- 29:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): peak private sector uh debt. So in terms of say uh uh mortgage debt relative to GDP, but more broadly, I mean, just like banks had you know three percent base cash compared to assets, for example, or they had the you know, they had their generationally lowest. mix of cash and treasuries as a percentage of assets and a generationally high
- 30:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): ratio of uh assets that are that are more prone to nominal default. So different types of lending or securities. So banks were at their peak level of leverage, you know, s going back literally to the the the time you you compare to this would be the the uh Great Reset Recess uh a Great Depression. Um so uh but you know in our
- 30:25
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): powder times kegs,
- 30:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it's a discount. disinflationary, deflationary powder keg. And by the way, I want to point out for the viewers who might not have caught that, when you're talking about private sector debt being at all time high, the the reason that's really important is because you increase interest rates, that's going to be a higher tax burden on the average Joe and Jane in aggregate total. Where if the private sector debt isn't that high and you
- 30:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): increase interest rates, it's not going to be as much of a tax.
- 30:49
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
- 30:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): exactly. Yeah. So we had this we had a private sector debt bubble, uh, then we had inflation uh and we had higher rates and it pops that. So then what we talked about before, low loan destruction is money destruction. Uh as well as just consumers say, Look, I I spent all my money on on gasoline this month, my spare money. I I can't I have to I can't go to the movies or I can't go out to dinner, or I can't,
- 31:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you know, but I can't uh do the remodel that I was gonna do, right? So so that's when you start to get that disinflationary cycle.
- 31:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Now um it took a while it took a little while for money printing to kick in before they did in fiscal injections, before they, you know, they they increased the base money to the to to to do stuff like that. So it took a while for these you know, and like we said, by the time that they hit, they were roughly the same magnitude as the as the losses. Um so we didn't get that big uptick in in money supply.
- 31:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Whereas if you had a different scenario where just as soon as you like like this, let's say in 2007, you started seeing just these increase. If you said, okay, we're gonna give every American $5,000 and we're gonna issue a ton of bonds to do it. And if the bonds run into liquidity problems, well, the Fed's gonna increase their balance sheet to buy those bonds, right? Um, you would then front run
- 31:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): uh the kind of it'd be more like COVID in that sense. You'd be front running the the loan destruction cycle. Uh you'd be fr front running that and you'd be basically supplying more dollars out there. Uh which would then you'd get that you'd you'd you'd add to the inflationary fire in the nominal sense. You'd have
- 32:13
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you'd
- 32:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): obviously have other problems, but you wouldn't have that same credit crunch. Uh
- 32:18
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): which would support the
- 32:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): labor market as well. So you wouldn't have that spike in unemployment.
- 32:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah and but and of course the challenge you look you look more like COVID or you look more like um Argentina. Like like how how does Argentina often avoid deflation? It's I mean the money supply growth is is insane in in in places like that or Turkey. Uh and and so it becomes a a question of what's real versus nominal in that sense. Uh so basically where where inflation
- 32:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): becomes deflation or or or triggers a deflationary cascade is generally when it triggers a private sector debt bubble that is then not offset by immediate and massive
- 32:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): fiscal and money supply growth uh responses.
- 32:56
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): When
- 32:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we go back to the powder keg, um I I totally get what you're talking about as far as credit. My mind, the first thing that I would do if I was trying to make that analysis, because it does go back to money supply growth. Because if just for the audience, guys, if you have the money supply growth where it needs to be, then that would imply that income. incomes can go up
- 33:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): at the same rate or almost as high as the energy prices, and you might get that wage price spiral where you're not having to rob Peter to pay Paul. Uh, but if the money supply isn't going up as fast, that implies that you're not gonna be, or the the businesses aren't gonna going to be able to afford to increase their wages.
- 33:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Um, so that's why it's extremely important. So, what I would do is I would look at the rate of change in M2 money supply versus other time frames throughout history. Uh, because you can't just say, well, the money supply increased by 40%. Okay. Is that high? Is that low? Is that what does that even mean? So
- 33:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): if we go back and see that the, let's say the money supply growth over the last five years was 80%.
- 34:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and then you go back to like the 1970s and it was 70% during that same time frame, then you'd be like, okay, this could be the 1970s. But in the if the 70s were 70% and now we're at let's just say 30%, then you'd be like, okay, this is likely gonna be more like the the GFC. That's where I
- 34:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): would start. Tell me, is that
- 34:25
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): does
- 34:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that make sense to you?
- 34:27
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Uh
- 34:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it does. It it's certainly a big component of what I would look at. I I would look at money supply growth, but also I would look at the source of money supply growth. So what's happening with bank lending? Uh
- 34:36
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): what's happening
- 34:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): with with private set with private credit, which is different a little bit different than bank lending. Uh I would look at, you know, what's happening with fiscal, uh, uh and and then who's buying the bonds. Are the bonds being bought by um things that generally if they buy the bond, they be b can't buy something else or are they buying be buying uh being purchased on fractional reserve uh and
- 34:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): and so you can you can you can shift the ratio of say broad money to base money uh depending on either various bank regulations or or just risk on or risk off decisions. Uh so it's it's it's money supply growth but it's it's a little bit more granular it's like sources of money supply growth uh and how they how they net together. Uh and then also just look at things like where is
- 35:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): their potential powder kegs in the form of too much leverage.
- 35:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And what I mean by that is, for example, like in the global financial crisis, banks were were like in in couldn't be in worse shape going into that. Like it's like
- 35:30
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): global
- 35:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): depression territory. Whereas, for example, the reason uh you know, in March of 2023, when we, you know, Silicon Valley Valley Bank was failing. and you
- 35:39
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): know,
- 35:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): a couple a couple others, I I was right there on Twitter saying, look, this is not going to be a a giant bank failure. Like it's not gonna keep cascading to other banks because it's it was a fundamentally different problem. Like a handful of banks had a very had a specific problem and it and they got blown up. Um, but the the broader system was actually not nearly as
- 35:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): leveraged uh as as 2008. Uh so banks for example, had a higher ratio of cash and treasuries as a percentage of assets. Um and of course some of them did did have significant problems. Um but you know once once that initial wave went down, uh it and and you know the the res of course there was a federal response,
- 36:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): but in the grand scheme of things, I mean look at total bank assets of you know 25 plus trillion, the the response was tiny. Um And the the issue kind of at that point worked itself out. Uh the the the rates were no longer rising. Um the uh the the the most vulnerable banks, which means a combination of ones
- 36:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that were um you know very exposed to long duration as a percentage of their capital, while also So having flighty deposits, you generally needed both of those problems. If you had one of or the other or neither, you generally survived. But if you had both, uh, you were generally in trouble. Um, so for example, Schwab had exposure to the long duration, but they didn't have the
- 36:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): flighty deposits. Um uh and City, uh, you know, City had in theory exposure to flighty deposits because um they had a high ratio of business deposits that were not fully FDIC insured, but because they were so big uh and because they didn't really have the duration process. problems, they didn't get a they didn't have an issue. Uh whereas when you
- 37:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): have uh, you know, Republic or Silicon Valley, you had both. Uh, and and that's where the the crisis was limited to. But basically it that's a long way of saying that in addition to those money supply growth uh and the granular aggregates that lead up to it, it's also where do we have just sheer amounts of leverage? You know, where where do we have these upside-down upside down pyramids?
- 37:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): and how how wide is the top versus how narrow is the bottom? Like how fragile
- 37:43
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): are
- 37:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): private credit too. What do you think about that as far as that? Do you think there's systemic risk there with the bank's balance sheet?
- 37:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): So I I'm on record saying I don't think there's that much systemic risk, which is different than saying I don't think there's risk for private credit investors. Uh, because in some sense, what private credit is, it's actually it's actually kind of close to full reserve banking. Uh so instead instead of making a a uh liquidity mismatch promise, like a normal bank, uh you you know, you're told you can pull
- 38:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): your money at any time, and then the bank goes and puts a percentage of that into longer duration assets and they play the odds, you know, that not too many investors are going to want to pull out at the same time. And if they do, that's where they they would either borrow from another bank or from the Fed uh using collateral. Uh whereas a a credit fund basically says, okay, you're an institution or you're you're or you're in a credit investor
- 38:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): and you have spare capital and you're going to invest in this fund. And we're not going to promise that you can get it all at any time. Like, you know, we're going to try to make quarterly liquidity possible, but it depends how many of you want money back. It depends on the financial conditions of the investment.
- 38:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And uh so, you know, when that when that has losses, it's not as bad as a bank losing pay rate. payroll of of companies or bank losing the checking accounts of of of people. Uh it's losing basically institutional and and wealthy money that that was kind of going in knowing that there was risk there. Uh and then some
- 39:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): of those private credit funds do borrow from banks. Uh
- 39:09
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): That's
- 39:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): kind of where I was going with it.
- 39:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): So that's where you gotta watch out for, but then you quantify it. So you you look at how much. in the aggregate are they borrowing from banks?
- 39:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): You
- 39:17
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): look at
- 39:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): total bank lending books and you say, okay, well, how does that amount compare to their total books? And it's something like seven percent of bank assets. Uh, and and it's it's generally still smaller than total bank capital. Uh in addition, though those banks are kind of first in line. Um, uh so for example, the the investors would have headaches before the
- 39:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): bank wouldn't get paid. back. You'd have to have pretty severe losses in private credit before you'd have, you know, kind of banks start to get hit. And then when if banks do start to get hit, that's 7% of their asset book is what's getting hit. Now, of course, if that's happening, probably other parts of their asset books are getting hit. Right. So, but that's where you want to look at things
- 39:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): like how much of the bank assets in cash and treasuries, so those things that are kind of nominally resistant to define. default, unless we have a political crisis or something, uh, versus how much is is private sector exposed. Uh, and and you know, and that and that front, I'm not that concerned. Now, you know, I can imagine you're, you know, at some point some bank's gonna fail
- 40:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): and it's gonna be, you know, some smaller mid sized bank that people probably didn't hear of ahead of time because that happened to be the one that's like, you know, 30% exposed to to credit. credit private credit lending. Like you're gonna have probably the Silicon Valley bank situation, like a niche thing that explodes. And it's like, look at that. But that's different than systematic bank
- 40:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): failure. So uh I tend to be concerned around private credit investors themselves and less concerned around spillover Over into the banking system, with the exception that you know, of the thousands of banks in the country, there are probably
- 40:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): some that are over their skis and exposed there.
- 40:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah, where I get concerned, in addition to what you were saying, is how the increase in perceived counterparty risk impacts the banking liquidity. So if you got, you know, one of these funds blows up and all of a sudden, you know, everyone overreacts and like, okay.
- 41:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we're going to cut off all lending to private credit. So money gets super tight in that industry, which can lead to kind of this domino effect that becomes much, much bigger than it otherwise would have been. That that's kind of I I see things through the lens that you were just talking about, but I also try to look at it
- 41:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and layer over, okay, what happens to how tight money is with. within that industry and how important is that to the industry?
- 41:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah. And that's that's where uh I I think the investors would start taking the brunt of the hit because that's where you'd have to see, you know, close end fund investors would be told, hey, like you're not getting your money out anytime soon. Is it's different than saying we're insolvent, but it's basically saying, you know, at at the moment, because our bank stopped lending to us, um, uh and because, you know, twenty 20% percent of
- 42:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you want out this quarter. and you know, we have two, we have three percent available liquidity, uh, so most of you are not getting out, um, you you can contribute to a down liquidity cycle. Uh
- 42:12
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): which
- 42:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): which can uh you know eventually that can well, it's like, well, if if you're an institution and you you're you're your private credit's more locked up than you thought, bought then maybe you have to trim some equities to meet obligations. So then you you sell a stock you might not have otherwise. sold. Um uh and and so you any part that's you know subject to inflated valuations or is done
- 42:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): well as potentially at risk or just in general market risk. Um and and but I would still separate that to some extent from a from a systemic bank crisis.
- 42:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah.
- 42:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Uh I there I mean there's there's levels to this, right? So obviously a a a you know a a down liquidity cycle that also contributes to a you know say a twenty 20% percent correction in the SP and you know maybe eventually start starts to calling causing higher inflation, um, you know, I mean a higher unemployment, I meant to say. Uh that is a cycle that I would absolutely be on the lookout for
- 43:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): should it start to materialize, uh, which is a little bit different than just you know straight to bank crisis.
- 43:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Have you noticed lately this
- 43:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): tug of war? That's how I've been explaining. on my videos between the Dow and the Nasdaq.
- 43:18
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 43:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): mean, outside of the blue wave and kind of, you know, Jensen and the Chinese gal and whatnot. Um, it seemed to me like it was one day, Dow up, NASDAQ down. The next day, NASDAQ up, Dow down. And There's it was just basically capital going from here to here to here to here to here to here. And it was like they
- 43:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): were in this tug of war to determine, you know, who's gonna win. Is it gonna be the Dow? I'm talking about the companies there, or is it going to be the the the Nasdaq? Did you notice that? And if so,
- 43:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): in I know you're a student of history, is that typically what happens in these in these cycles?
- 43:58
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um,
- 43:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): so obvious obviously when you go back far enough, things get different. Uh, but I have been noticing this. I mean, it sometimes it even gets more specific. Like you'll have you'll have an AI trade versus software trade, for example. Yeah.
- 44:08
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And then
- 44:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): and sometimes you'll have AI just more broadly versus value. Uh I think there's a couple reasons for that. One is um, I mean, there is uh competition for capital. And so if you have an unusually fast build-out in one industry, in this case AI, you know, data centers, semiconductors, and so forth, that is a massive source of capital. uh, which means, you know, they're raising a lot of
- 44:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): debt uh and financing in general. Uh so if you're if you're if you're also trying to raise, you know, financing or or equity or stuff and you're in a you're a complete different industry, you know, you're in the grocery industry or you're in the chemical industry, um, you're you're competing with like Microsoft raising bonds, or you're competing with like meta raising bonds or or you know
- 44:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): a hot new venture fund that that's that that's coming out uh saying we're AI focused and we're raising all this money. And if you're a venture fund that's you know trying to do something different, you're you I mean you're just you're not out of the conversation, right? So it's just your your cost of capital is higher now, and that generally includes those those value companies. So that that's like
- 45:05
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a
- 45:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): funding source for this other thing. Now, anything that that tells investors or or these days more realistically their algorithms, anything that says, Hey, here's a new signal. point that might or at least even even even around the margin slow down AI capex right
- 45:20
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): like
- 45:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): hey we're worried about this company or hey this here's this um data center that just announced this or here's this thing then algorithms or investors can say hey if that slows down slightly then maybe these other things have been punished maybe they deserve an update now because we have a slightly new piece of information that gives us an idea of what next year might look like. Yeah. I
- 45:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): think that that's one factor. Then of course, like algorithms just amplify anything because it then algorithms can try to front run that and say, well, other algorithms are going to think that. So even if we're not sure, let's just, let's just, you know, it was up yesterday, is let's go back to the Dow today. Um, but yeah, and and it's just, you
- 45:55
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): know,
- 45:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it's a it's it's competing for capital in that sense. And I think that that in some ways it makes sense for any volatile uncertainty.
- 46:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): which is you have a new technology or at least a new technology at scale, uh, and and you there are kind of valid different opinions on how big or how long the cycle will be. And to some extent, it's a very binary outcome. You know, I mean, if the if the AI cycle ends in 2027, that's a very different situation than that if it ends in 2028 twenty twenty eight or
- 46:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): 2029. twenty twenty nine. And so any kind of new data point that gives us an indication of how long or how big this cycle's gonna go before it eventually has a down cycle
- 46:32
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): i
- 46:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): is kind of trading information. Uh and and so it it's it it's it's a you know it it adds to volatility and in kind of that seesaw.
- 46:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): How important do you think the anthropic IPO is
- 46:44
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): um
- 46:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I mean I think it's it's it's it's quite important. Uh you
- 46:48
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): know
- 46:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I it it's um but I I still like I because I'm bearish on the frontier models, um, you know, if it's it's certainly it's important for that unlock, it's important for for the employee liquidity, it's important uh for uh just
- 47:04
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I'm talking about
- 47:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the ecosystem. Yeah,
- 47:06
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): because if that if
- 47:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that takes a dump, right? If that then what happens to OpenAI,
- 47:11
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): they
- 47:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): can't go
- 47:12
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): public.
- 47:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): they have to have the money, and then it goes back to the gen. Jenga puzzle. And also, too, I I did a video the other day about trailing 12 month equity issuance. Because to your point, there's a limited pool of capital that's willing to go into these entities. You know, it's not like treasuries or something where or banks can buy that, put it on the their their balance
- 47:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): sheet. So what ends up happening is over the last 12 months you've had about 200 billion. in issuance because of SpaceX and all these things. And that's actually really high relative, you know, going back 20 or 30 years. So on top of this 200 billion, now we're gonna have oh uh anthropic, say
- 47:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): another 100 billion. Then you might have OpenAI, another 100 hundred billion, then Meta just announced ninety-five
- 48:00
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in
- 48:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): equity issuance and different tranches. So at some point it's like, okay, we've got a deluge of supply of equity. And to your earlier point, not that much capital. So I I think those are the reasons why I think that anthropic IPO is pretty important.
- 48:18
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): No,
- 48:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I I agree with you there. And I think I mean if if you were to have a total failure of it, like if you just if you just end up having to to delay it uh because you, you know, you couldn't get the valuation evaluation you expected. Uh that would I mean that would
- 48:29
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): like
- 48:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I said before that that that whole venture cascade would be at risk of of triggering because all
- 48:34
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): this
- 48:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): venture money that expects the next round to be higher or expects
- 48:37
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): an
- 48:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): exit in the near term, they would have to re-evaluate all of that. Um and I I think we we will hit that point eventually. Now the question is do we hit it? Obviously, the other way of hitting it is do that you have successful IPOs, but then over time they stagnate. and and then you know obviously in investor interest in them dries up, venture interest starts to dry up. So that
- 48:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that becomes a question of timing. If you have if you have a a f a f flawed or shelved IPO, that generally would likely pull forward our estimate for when the cycle's going to to have a down cycle. Whereas if you land the IPO, um that's a data point that you know you you still have likely have time. Uh so these are
- 49:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): all signposts on the way toward how how long and in high duration the cycle is going to be. And what's interesting about the semiconductors is, I mean, they are trying to play this game. It's not, it's not, it's not super dumb money, which is, you know, a lot of besters have it in their mind that semiconductor companies are expensive. And of course, in in in market cap terms, they are. But for example, NVIDIA trades at a
- 49:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): lower earnings multiple than Coca-Cola. And that was even before this recent news, right? And and so part of that is because NVIDIA investors are, and if you look at what like what Wall Street analyst consensus expect, they expect way faster earnings growth for NVIDIA than Coca-Cola. So investors in NVIDIA investors are paying lower multiples for a company that uh
- 49:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): in theory has higher growth uh and a very strong balance sheet. Um uh But investors are are just more doubtful of of the cycle than they are, for example, of the soda cycle. Uh and so there's actually some rational fear, I would say, in in NVIDIA investors that are actually
- 50:15
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): kind of looking
- 50:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): at Wall Street analysts and saying, I'm not truly full, I uh I'm not swear, I'm not um sure I believe you. And then for example, ex in memory stocks, it's of course even more extreme, which is you'll have in some cases single digital. digit earnings multiples or cash flow multiples, um, because you know, they're looking at margins, they're looking at the growth, and they're trying to say, well, when does this cycle end? I don't want to be
- 50:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): holding the bag when it when it has a downturn
- 50:38
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): because
- 50:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it's historically very volatile. So semiconductor investors are often already trying to front run when when this starts to to roll over.
- 50:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah. So that would imply that we're in nineteen ninety ninety-eight eight. and not two thousand.
- 50:52
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 50:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): mean that's that's my estimate. Um I I I think
- 50:55
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): we
- 50:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): we probably see this going out to twenty twenty eight. Um but I'm always evaluating if I'm wrong or not, right? I mean it's always like a a m matter of probabilities. And so for example, if if we were if if we saw an anthropic IPO get shelved, right, uh we we'd be having a different conversation probably around timing.
- 51:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Right.
- 51:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah,
- 51:15
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): exactly. Yeah.
- 51:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And it's not, it's not always the case that every bubble has to just completely go off the rails. I mean, sometimes, you know, a bubble can peak at a lower ratio than people expect. Um, so there were only there were certainly already parts in the semiconductor cycle where they got a little bit ahead of their skis, you know, back in June of this year, for example. Um uh and so they they have gotten ahead of their skis.
- 51:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Uh, but yeah, at the moment, uh semiconductor investors are you know, a little bit spooked around um uh they seem to be somewhat doubtful of the Wall Street analysts for for their earnings, and you know, perhaps rightly so.
- 51:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah. What have you been thinking about the last couple of weeks?
- 51:50
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Uh
- 51:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): well, a lot of it's private equity, just because of the um the orange juice uh company that that um uh we've been involved in, Jeff Booth and and a couple of uh others partners were
- 52:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I I didn't I didn't hear about that.
- 52:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Uh so yeah, we we uh raised capital, uh this is public to uh acquire um businesses uh in a similar way that private equity does, uh except uh instead of a fund structure, uh uh we have a uh a company structure. So it's a permanent capital vehicle. So the difference is that we acquire, we we we seek to acquire
- 52:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): companies more like Berkshire Hathaway would, which is you buy and hold indefinitely. Um uh versus buying to uh flip and optimize and and get out quicker. Um
- 52:33
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
- 52:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): so uh yeah, it's it's a it's a uh new
- 52:35
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): research. Kind of
- 52:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): like what Hermosy does.
- 52:39
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Uh
- 52:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): there's there's a handful of companies that do it. There's like Bending Spoons is doing it in the software sector. Berkshire, like I mentioned, does it in the and the at the largest scale. Uh there's also niche ones like Illinois Toolworks does it for engineering partners. parts. Uh and anyway, but
- 52:52
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it's basically you're taking
- 52:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): a long-term equity position. You're not buying the company outright. You're just buying like a a a majority position or
- 53:00
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it's buying
- 53:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the comp buying the companies outright in a similar way that
- 53:03
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): private
- 53:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): equity would. Yeah. Except
- 53:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): okay.
- 53:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): In instead of a fund structure where you're on this, you know, you're
- 53:07
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): on
- 53:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): like a ten-year clock to uh, you know, rate you raise capital, you deploy it, and then you generally uh lever and uh uh try to find a new buyer for the business, either
- 53:17
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): probably depending on
- 53:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the size. Uh this one, the exit is that eventually the goal is for the company itself, the shares to become liquid. So that investors can get liquidity that way. And so it just changed the incentive structure. I mean a lot of people for example, you know, they had their veterinary clinic or their or their taco shop and and suddenly private equity bought it and kind of the quality deteriorated
- 53:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): over time because you have
- 53:39
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
- 53:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): know, not there's anything wrong with PE per se, but when it's the only game in town, you get an incentive structure that's inherently short-term focused. Uh we you're more incentive to to optimize for the next call three years rather than build a 10 plus year or or just indefinite business. Um and so we we think there's a differentiated strategy for that. So uh
- 53:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): uh, you know, people that are either in interest uh interested in selling businesses or uh you know potentially investing. We have orange juice.com. We managed to get the domain. Uh so uh
- 54:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): are you serious? Yeah,
- 54:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): orange juice.com. Yeah.
- 54:15
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 54:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): uh well, I I I could go down this rabbit hole all day long, but Lynn, how can people find out more about what you do?
- 54:21
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Uh
- 54:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): lynalden.com, lynnalden.com. people can check it out. Um uh uh or uh orange. yeast.com if they're interested in uh some private equity work.
- 54:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): That sounds really cool. Yeah.
- 54:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): So
- 54:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I wish we would have had a lot more time because I I I wanted to dive into that. So we'll have to have you back on soon so we can discuss kind of what you're doing in your in the investing world, uh which not too many people know about. They just know you from the macro stuff. But more recently um you're you're you're you're really all about kind of
- 54:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): investing directly in these companies that got massive upside growth so exciting stuff
- 54:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): definitely thanks for having me and of course always happy to come back