Nick Leiserson discusses AI-accelerated cyber exploits, ransomware evolution, and policy incentives for secure code.
Summary
Nick Leiserson, former White House cyber advisor, joins TRM Talks to discuss how AI is accelerating cyber attacks by rapidly identifying exploitability in known, shelved vulnerabilities like a PHP bug. He notes a strategic shift in ransomware from availability-based attacks to data theft, facilitated by the International Counter-Ransomware Initiative. Leiserson advocates for 'pushing security upstream' and fusing blockchain intelligence with threat data to disrupt shared infrastructure among attackers. He warns that Congress must create incentives for securing AI-generated code as the marginal cost of software drops while security costs remain high.
Episode sections
- 0:01 – 3:34
Intro and Inside the Lab: A7 Crypto Operations
Ari Redbord introduces TRM Labs and the 'Inside the Lab' segment, which analyzes A7, a crypto operation led by sanctioned oligarch Elon Shore. TRM data estimates A7's on-chain volume at over $166 billion, with direct exposure connecting it to Iran's IRGC, North Korean state actors, Hamas, and the Houthis. The segment highlights A7's use of stablecoins like A7A5 to migrate funds after Garantex's 2025 seizure.
- 3:34 – 8:25
Nick Leiserson's Background and Cyber Policy Career
Nick Leiserson recounts his transition from software engineering to cyber policy, starting in 2010 on Capitol Hill. He served as a technical advisor to Congressman Jim Langevin and became the lead staff author for the National Cyber Director Act, which was enacted in the FY2021 NDAA. He later worked with Chris Inglis at the White House before joining the Institute for Security and Technology.
- 8:25 – 16:43
AI-Accelerated Exploits: PHP and Certificate Authority Failures
Leiserson describes an unprecedented acceleration in cyber attacks, citing the PHP 'to shell' vulnerability discovered in late 2023/early 2024 but shelved as too difficult to exploit until an AI model identified the exploit in August 2026. He also discusses a certificate authority in India that issued eight certificates with weak private keys (one with a password of '4'), creating long-term impersonation risks for embedded devices.
- 16:43 – 21:50
Ransomware Evolution and the Counter-Ransomware Initiative
Leiserson contrasts the Colonial Pipeline attack with the current landscape, noting a shift from availability-based attacks (shutting down systems) to confidentiality-based extortion (stealing data). He highlights the success of the International Counter-Ransomware Initiative (CRI), now involving 76 countries, in driving criminals away from critical infrastructure shutdowns toward less disruptive data theft.
- 21:50 – 29:15
Defensive Strategies: Upstream Security and Blockchain Intelligence
Leiserson advocates for 'pushing security upstream' by improving software quality and holding service providers more responsible. He emphasizes fusing blockchain intelligence with threat intelligence to identify shared infrastructure among ransomware affiliates, allowing defenders to disrupt multiple actors simultaneously by targeting the underlying service providers rather than just the affiliates.
- 29:15 – 35:49
Policy Wishlist and Future Threats
Leiserson calls on Congress to create incentives for securing code generated by AI agents, warning that the marginal cost of software is dropping while security costs remain high. He advises focusing on long-term incentive structures rather than chasing current operational threats, noting that under-resourced critical infrastructure operators (schools, hospitals) are most at risk as AI scales attacks.
- 35:49 – 37:05
Personal Interlude
Nick Leiserson and the host engage in lighthearted banter about Leiserson's four-year-old daughter, referencing her 'net neutral' status and whisk skills. The host draws a parallel between cooking and cybersecurity, noting that both require focused attention but not constant total engagement.
- 37:05 – 37:45
Ransomware Evolution and AI Threats
The host reflects on joining TRM Labs prior to the Colonial Pipeline attack, describing it as a watershed moment for tracking ransom payments. He characterizes October 2026 as 'Hacktober,' citing unprecedented attack scales driven by AI.
- 37:45 – 38:23
TRM Labs Product Announcement
The host announces the launch of 'Ardent,' a tool combining on-chain and off-chain data to identify malware and patch vulnerabilities. He positions this as a defense mechanism against the current threat landscape.
- 38:23 – 39:11
Closing and Sponsorship
The host previews the next episode featuring Kate Salotolo, PayPal's global head of AML. The segment concludes with calls to action for reviews and LinkedIn follows, followed by sponsor credits for TRM Labs, Voltage Productions, and Ecolix.
Claims worth verifying
TRM's analysis estimates A7's on-chain volume tops $166 billion.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·1:55
How to verify: TRM Labs public reports or blog posts detailing A7 analysis; verify against Elon Shore's public statements denying crypto operations. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
TRM found $176.6 million in direct exposure connecting A7 to Iran's IRGC, North Korean state actors, Hamas, and the Houthis.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·2:15
How to verify: TRM Labs blockchain intelligence reports or public disclosures linking these addresses to the named entities. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
One A7 address received more than $65 million directly from an IRGC attributed address.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·2:35
How to verify: Blockchain explorer analysis of A7 addresses and IRGC-linked addresses; verify against TRM's specific tracing data. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Roughly $35 billion of A7's reported activity is circular, meaning internal transfers settling on its own books.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·2:35
How to verify: TRM Labs methodology documentation or public analysis of A7's transaction patterns. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
A7's ruble peg stablecoin A7A5 helped migrate frozen Garantex customer balances to successor exchange GrinX after Garantex's 2025 seizure.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·3:15
How to verify: Public records of Garantex's 2026 seizure; GrinX and A7 public statements or blockchain analysis of balance migrations. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Elon Shore told an audience last year, 'We are not a crypto mechanism.'
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·1:33
How to verify: Video recording or transcript of Elon Shore's speech at the cited audience; verify date and quote. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
PHP powers 70% of the websites on the internet.
Nick Leiserson ·9:13
How to verify: W3Techs or similar web technology usage statistics; verify current and historical market share of PHP. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The PHP Foundation found the 'to shell' bug in late 2023/early 2024.
Nick Leiserson ·10:32
How to verify: PHP Foundation security advisories or public statements regarding the discovery date of the vulnerability. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The National Cyber Director Act became law in the fiscal year 2021 National Defense Authorization Act.
Nick Leiserson ·6:07
How to verify: U.S. Code or official text of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 116-282). For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The International Counter-Ransomware Initiative involves 76 countries.
Nick Leiserson ·14:00
How to verify: U.S. Department of Justice or CISA press releases detailing the composition of the CRI coalition. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
TRM Labs announced a product called 'Ardent' two to three weeks prior to the recording date of November 18, 2026.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·37:45
How to verify: Check TRM Labs' official website, press releases, or blog posts from October 2026 for the announcement of 'Ardent'. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Ardent combines on-chain and off-chain data to identify malware and patch vulnerabilities.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·37:52
How to verify: Review the technical documentation or whitepaper for TRM Labs' 'Ardent' product to verify its data sources and capabilities. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The host joined TRM Labs shortly before the Colonial Pipeline attack.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·37:05
How to verify: Check Ari Redbord's LinkedIn profile or TRM Labs' official press releases for his start date relative to March 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Kate Salotolo is the global head of AML for PayPal.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·38:23
How to verify: Search PayPal's official corporate website or LinkedIn for Kate Salotolo's current job title and role. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceTRM Labs is the leading provider of blockchain intelligence and anti-money laundering software.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·38:44
How to verify: Review TRM Labs' marketing materials or independent industry reports (e.g., Gartner, Forrester) for rankings or claims regarding their market leadership position. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The podcast episode was produced in partnership with Voltage Productions.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·38:44
How to verify: Check Voltage Productions' portfolio or press releases for confirmation of their partnership with TRM Labs on this episode. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The music for the show was provided by Ecolix.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·38:44
How to verify: Check Ecolix's website or press releases for confirmation of their licensing agreement with TRM Labs for this podcast. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Do your own research
- Verify the PHP vulnerability timeline and exploitability claims by checking the PHP Foundation's security advisories and CVE databases for the late 2023/early 2024 bug and the August 2026 AI-related disclosure.
- Research the specific certificate authority in India and the '4' password incident by searching for recent cybersecurity reports on weak private key generation and CA compliance failures.
- Review the official membership list and public statements of the International Counter-Ransomware Initiative (CRI) to confirm the 76-country participation and its operational scope.
- Analyze TRM Labs' 'Ardent' product documentation to understand how it fuses on-chain and off-chain data for malware identification and patch vulnerability detection.
- Check the text of CISA 2015 and the Wiretap Act to verify the legal authorities granted to service providers for disruptive action against adversaries.
- Assess the economic incentives for software providers by reviewing industry reports on the cost of secure coding versus the marginal cost of AI-generated code deployment.
- Look for counter-arguments or critiques of the 'push security upstream' strategy from software engineering firms or open-source maintainers regarding resource allocation.
- Investigate the sanctions status and on-chain activity of A7 and Elon Shore using TRM Labs' public blockchain analysis tools or OFAC sanctioned entity lists.
Full transcriptexpand
0:01Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I'm
0:02Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Erie Redboard, and this is TRM Talks.
0:05Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I'm
0:06Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Global Head of Policy at TRM Labs. TRM is an AI investigations and threat intelligence company combining on-chain and off-chain data to combat modern crime and build a safer world. We use our AI investigations platform, Ardents, along with Chain Abuse and the Beacon Network, to bring together the public and private sectors to defeat scam networks, ransomware gangs, terrorist financiers, and other threats. Prior to joining TRM, I spent 15 years in the U.S. federal government, first as a prosecutor at the Department of Justice, and then as a U.S. Treasury Department official, where I worked work to safeguard the financial system against terrorist financiers, weapons of mass destruction proliferators, drug kingpins, and other rogue actors. On TRM Talks, I sit down with business leaders, policymakers, investigators, and friends from across the blockchain, AI, and technology space who are working to build a safer world.
1:12Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On
1:12Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): today's TRM Talks, I sit down with Nick Leiserson of the Institute for Security and Technology. But first, Inside the Lab, where I share data-driven insights from our blockchain intelligence team. Network gave TRM, working with the Open Source Center, a window into an entity its own leadership has publicly denied is even a crypto operation. Elon Shore, the sanctioned oligarch behind A7, told an audience last year, quote, We are not a crypto mechanism. TRM's analysis tells a different story.
1:55Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
1:55Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): leaked documents estimate A7's on-chain volume tops $166 billion. TRM's own tracing found $176.6 million in direct exposure connecting A7 to Iran's IRGC, North Korean state actors, Hamas, and the Houthis, an unusual cluster of sanctioned actors converging on one Russian financial network. One A7 address received more than $65. million directly from an IRGC attributed address. Another received $5 million from Hamas. TRM also found that roughly $35 billion of A7's reported activity is circular, meaning internal transfers settling on its own books rather than genuine third-party Third party volume. Crypto inside A7 serves two functions. First, converting USDT to rubles for outside parties
2:55and for internal accounting. Separately, A7's ruble peg stablecoin A7A5 helped migrate frozen Gorantex customer balances to successor exchange GrinX Grin X after Garantex's 2025 seizure. Concrete proof. that this infrastructure keeps sanctioned money moving even after a takedown. For compliance teams, treating A7A5 and its affiliated infrastructure as high risk, regardless of counterparty, is the operative lesson here.
3:30Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
3:31Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): now, Nick Weiserson. Nick, thank you so much for joining TRM Talks.
3:36Nick Leiserson: Thanks, Sarry, for having me. It's great to be here.
3:38Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Uh we were on a panel at Finra, I don't know, a couple months ago. And like literally during the panel is like I I was basically like, I gotta get this guy on TRM Talks because he's so smart. And um and quite frankly, this is like a a topic that I think we're seeing more and more interest in from our listeners. And quite frankly, I'm trying to learn a lot more. Um so really excited to learn from you today.
3:58Nick Leiserson: I'm excited to be here.
4:00Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Before we kind of get started, would love to hear a little bit about your journey. into the space.
4:04Nick Leiserson: Sure. Yeah. I mean, I did not really think I was going to go into cyber policy. I thought I was going to be a code monkey. I was uh trained as a software engineer. I had this budding interest in public policy, but it wasn't until right at the end of my undergrad that I learned about the idea of the hill, Capitol Hill, this magical place where policy got made. And I'm like, you know. what? This sounds fun. Maybe I'll go check it out. And when I joined his office in 2010, I was literally on my fourth day in his office when he introduced the original National Cyber Director Act. So he was already into this cybersecurity thing in 2010. This is Congressman Jim Langevin, just a lion of the field. And he liked having me around as, you know. a 22-year-old uh fresh CS grad as a BS detector. Like that was the number one thing. Because people would walk in and say, you know, XYZ claim about what was going on in cyberspace. And then he'd kind of glance over, and I'd either give the, yeah, okay,
5:06Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that sounds like a
5:07Nick Leiserson: a real a real answer. And sometimes it was the thumbs down and like, no, these guys are snowing you. And even in 2010, like there just was not a lot of expertise on the hill. A lot of the conversations you hear today about capacity in Congress wasn't there. And me, little old me, with just my undergrad, was still one of a literal handful of people on the hill who actually had experience coding before they showed up. And then I spent a dozen years with him. He's one of the greatest publicers. public servants you'll ever meet, uh, culminating. I worked with him in every every job you can have in a congressional office, up to his chief of staff on the Cyberspace Hillarium Commission. And eventually, 10 and a half years after I joined his office, the National Cyber Director Act that I ended up inheriting and then became the lead staff author of what we actually got out the door became law. in the 21, the fiscal year 2021 National Defense Authorization Act.
6:07And basically, as soon as we got it funded, it's another story. It took another 11 months. Um, I went over to the White House to join Chris Inglis in his front office first to stand up the office and then heading the critical infrastructure and regulatory work over at the White House, which is was a lot of fun. And today I find myself in civil. society getting to still work on these crunchy cybersecurity problems. And the what's kept me here, right, as someone, again, who originally thought I was going to go develop software, not work on policy to help secure it, way upstream of that or at a higher strategic level, is it's fascinating. It's a bipartisan area. It's an area where, you know, it's new policy, it's new national security policy, truly not anything that we've seen before. And that is a very exciting place to be. And I love talking about it. So you that that's
7:03Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): got the right person. I'm
7:04Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): super excited to talk about it today. One interesting thing, and it's a theme. We've done about a hundred and I don't know, thirty 30 TRM talks, and it's a theme that almost goes through so many of them, and that is understanding the technology in order to. sort of do the policy, do the legal. That has been a huge part of your career, is really being able to do this work at a policy level because you deeply understand the tech.
7:23Nick Leiserson: Yeah, absolutely. I mean, it is core to what I recommend to people, right? Like that when when people come and say, Nick, you got a CS degree. I just came into this through a more traditional policy area. What what do you think you should do? I'm like, well. take a networking class, because in my networking class in undergrad, our second project, they handed us the RFC, the request for comment from the Internet Engineering Task Force for IP, the internet protocol. And our professor was like, All right, you got like three weeks, go implement IT IP, write your own version of the internet. And there is nothing like that.
8:02Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Digging in a little bit, like I usually I I would start sort of in the past, but instead I'm going to start sort of right now. And that is we are in the midst of a really unprecedented moment in the cyberspace, in that we are seeing bad actors like in the last few weeks engage in attacks at unprecedented speed and scale. Would you sort of walk us through what we're seeing in this moment right now, September, October, 2026?
8:25Nick Leiserson: Yeah, absolutely. It It's uh it's a lot. And um it is the culmination, I would say, of a lot of what we've been talking about since about the March timeframe in the broader community. So the first big story that is a good example of this is PHP to shell. And you know, there's a lot of reasons that this is a really good incident or vulnerability to unpack. One is that it tells you a lot about people's intuition, going back to that word, right? Of people's intuition of how technology works. Where if you go to most policymakers and you say, Hey, did you know that this thing you've never heard of, PHP powers? 70% of the websites that are used in the entire internet? They're like, No, I'd never heard of this. How is it possible that this thing that is so vital? And then you say, And did you know that there are basically a half a dozen people who maintain this thing that keeps the
9:32entire internet or 70% of all websites on the internet going? And they're like, What are you talking about? This is that's that doesn't sound good at all. That doesn't sound very trustworthy. That sounds pretty fragile. And yet, that is the reality of what happens all the time in technology is we place our trust without really examining or really having any intuition as to what's actually underlying these systems that we rely on. The other story though with PHP, beyond the broad scope of the impact of a vulnerability that lets you get remote code execution and take over whatever website it is, is how it came about. And I've seen a lot of people describe these vulnerabilities as being discovered by AI in August of this year. It's like, no, no, they weren't discovered, right? PHP to their credit. The PHP Foundation has been incredibly. transparent. They're like, yeah, we found these in late 23, early 24, that time frame. We found the underlying bug that eventually manifests in October 2026 as a mess. We found the bug, but we didn't know if it was exploitable and it was a real humdinger of an engineering problem. And by the way, we were concerned. concerned that some
10:52of our constituents would be upset by some of the fixes that we had in mind. So we just kind of shelved it and we're like, uh, we're gonna leave this to the side. We'll get to it someday, I'm sure. We're tracking it, but it doesn't seem exploitable. And when you pointed a cyber-capable cyber capable AI model at added it in August, it was like, oh, yeah, it's definitely exploitable. Here's the exploit. Right, right here. I've got it. Like I will break your entire stack off of this memory management problem in PHP. There are few better microcosms of where we stand in 2026 than that. It's like there are problems that we've sort of known about for a while and just relied Relying on the fact that exploiting them was hard. And that's what changed is. no, actually, the exploitation is a lot easier than you thought. And that's a big problem because the reason it got put off in the first place was the fixes weren't that easy to come by. And we're just staring at that all over the place.
11:53Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A
11:54Nick Leiserson: couple of the other things that are happening of late, um, another one that's got me super nervous is uh certificate authority um based. in India that uh had eight certificates that they messed up the signing ceremony for. So instead of having a 116-digit number as the private key, so you can think of that as like the password to get access to this. So it's very, very long. The passwords for all eight of these were less than. it's a number, less than 256. One of them was four. And this is another area where it's just there's trust in the system that breaks people's intuition because they're like, well, you know, what does that mean, Nick? What does it mean that there's this private certificate with a password of four? And the answer for most people, thankfully, is not a lot. The browsers have already revoked. it, you'll be fine. But if you rely on embedded devices or anything that's ever pinned a
12:56certificate, from now till years, like we are years and years going to be dealing with people being able to impersonate literally any website based on this trust. So it's one little failure
13:11Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): of
13:12Nick Leiserson: whoops, we messed up this key signing ceremony. And the result is if you are a medical device, you might trust basically anything someone tells you, whether it's to intercept traffic or to present you with new code and say, oh yeah, I signed this, based on one human error in this case.
13:31Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
13:31Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): no, absolutely extraordinary. How are you seeing AI deployed by cyber actors, you know, over the last year or two? so?
13:39Nick Leiserson: It's a really good question. Uh, I was at uh Singapore International Cyber Week, and this was a question that came up all the time: is threat analysts were briefing policymakers of the counter-ransomware initiative. So it's a year six of this international group of now 76 countries and multi-uh multi-party party agencies. like Interpol all getting together to handle ransomware. And the question on all of the threat analysts' mind is like, where is the AI? And the answer was: we see hints of it, right? We see hints of it. There are penumbras, there are reverberations somewhere, and we're like, we know people are talking about it on dark web forums, we know people are stealing. tokens that they're presumably using for stuff, but we can't like see it manifest in most cases right now in the incident data. And I think that that's actually a really good where things stand right now, right? Which is the bad guys are experimenting. Instrumenting, Some of the areas where they're going
14:47to have the most immediate success is not going. to manifest on your network. It's going to be, oh, I stole five terabytes of data two years ago. That was an impossible task to sort through. I would do a quick a few quick keywords. I would hope that I hit upon, oh, the CEO. Well, I could look up their name and I've got their email. Great. That sounds valuable. I could blackmail against that. But most of the data you've got, it's like, I don't know how. I'm going to read through five terabytes of random stuff. And now it's like, oh, I can feed that into an open weight model and it'll spit out here's the important stuff. Like that doesn't manifest
15:25Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): on
15:26Nick Leiserson: a victim's network, but it certainly manifests in the ransom note that they get. And similarly, the reconnaissance and the stuff that they're talking about on the front end of how do I got onto a system? And so the big picture here, right? And what I was hoping people would take away from uh
15:43Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
15:44Nick Leiserson: threat briefs we were getting in Singapore is there are innovative criminals out there. So the problem is the trend line is the wrong direction. And you need to keep in mind that, like by the time you see this manifesting on defenders' networks every day, you are out of your window to do anything about it. So you should be very grateful that we still have enough of a preview of people who are still working out exactly what these workflows are going to look like in terms of the core part after reconnaissance and before We're processing the exfiltrated data of operations on. defenders' networks if you're a criminal or a nation state. Like the fact that we're working that out is lucky us, but we need to take advantage of that window now, not wait to say, oh my God, did you see this AI thing? It's completely crushing everyone's networks. Like, it was too late then.
16:43Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Tell me a little bit more about the the kind of ransomware initiative, the those sort sort of origin story for you. But then also it must be an incredibly different moment today when you're thinking about that group and this space than it was in the wake of Colonial Pipeline.
16:57Nick Leiserson: We at IST ran the ransomware task force, and this was a convening of um private sector and civil society folks. We came out with a report two weeks before Colonial Pipeline. I was still on the hill. So I say
17:12Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that is wild.
17:13Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Okay.
17:13Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah.
17:13Nick Leiserson: So I was still on the hill. I got the brief from the folks at IST who were doing this excellent work. And then a week later for me, Colonial hit, and all of a sudden, Langevin, who's been talking about ransomware for years, and everyone's like, What the hell are you talking about, dude? Or like, uh, wait, Mr. Langevin, what should we be doing about this? And it was very convenient for me to say, like, hey, we have some ideas. that have been kicking around, but there is this group of experts who have really done a bang up job of laying out 48 separate recommendations of what to do. One of them was to convene an international body around this. And in August of that year, Ann Newberger, who was the is deputy national security advisor for cybersecurity and emerging technology at the time, did just that. She got around 30 countries together into the International Counter-ransomware initiative to say, we need to convene around this issue because it's a national security issue. And as a deputy national security advisor, I recognize that. And saying this is just a law enforcement issue, or we can leave it in the realm of let law
18:23enforcement and technical folks deal with it, not bring the full national security apparatus to bear is not sustainable and colonial and shutting down 40% of the gasoline supply east of the Mississippi River was like the switch that flipped in many people's minds that said, aha, this is a national security issue. If you fast forward now and say we're six years into CRI and or this is the sixth summit, we're five years past colonial. What does the landscape look like? There's good news and there's bad news, right? Uh the the bad news is criminals are very innovative. And thanks in part to uh their ability to use new payment technologies, um, they are finding all sorts of clever ways to continue to threaten. and scam people the world over, not just in the US, the world over, and extract an enormous amount of money from folks.
19:23The good news is the quality of some of these hacks is going down. And that's good, right? Like if you look at colonial, we did not have the option to turn the systems back on. That was not, there's one part of the colonial pipeline that actually ran while this incident was going on. It was between uh Baltimore and BWI, the airport in Baltimore, because there's one customer on that little spur of the pipeline. It was the airport. Every packet of oil that entered in Baltimore into that part of the pipeline went to the airport. So you didn't need any IT to run it because you're like, there's one. customer. I just need to run this flow. I know how many, you know, gallons per minute are moving. Great. The rest of the system was shut out. There's nothing you could do. And that's why it was a national security issue. Today, and one of the things we talked about at the CRI meeting is you see extortion-based attacks, but they tend to be based on confidentiality. That is to say, I stole your data. I'm going to publish it on a leak site unless you pay me a ransom. And that's not good. But it is better for my money than saying you can't get access to your systems. And I think it's important for policymakers and folks in this
20:42community to look at like, well, where are we succeeding in driving away from availability attacks and into confidentiality attacks? Because that's a better class of problem. Still a problem, but it's a better class of problem. And if part of the reason, for instance, that if you as a victim feel the need to pay a ransom is because you're afraid of lawsuits about a breach of data, well, can we do something on that side of things, which doesn't look the same as when it's availability and I just can't turn the pipes back on. I'm
21:13Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): being a little glibier, glib here,
21:13Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): but
21:13Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): like other than negotiating. our way out of this with ransomware groups, right? Um, you know, I think we've gotten a little bit into sort of like how bad actors are at least experimenting with AI to supercharge these types of operations, right? Targeted phishing attacks, deep fakes, much more sophisticated cyber attacks. But moving a little bit to sort of the solution piece, you know, I've been arguing for some time that it's critical that that national security agencies, defenders, right, law enforcement have these same the access to tools, that they're able to use tools to uh use AI to run over systems in order to identify vulnerabilities. But how do you think about the solutions here as you're talking about the problems?
21:50Nick Leiserson: The first most important thing is we have to be in this together, right? Like that is core to our success in this space as defenders is
22:01Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
22:01Nick Leiserson: bad guys look for C seams. They look for gaps in our broader trust ecosystem. That's what they exploit. Chris Inglis said it much more elegantly than I ever could, which is, you know, what we are aiming for in this space more than anything is to create a situation where you have to beat all of us to beat one of us. That this is a team sport. and that team sport extends from private industry to government. Like if we are not working together in this space, we will lose. So that is foundational to everything else that I'm going to say in terms of what the solutions look like. Some of them look like pushing things upstream, right? That that was a major focus of the strategy that we work with. worked on in the last administration. And it remains true. There are places of higher leverage in the ecosystem, whether it is software and taking advantage of the amazing tools that are finding vulnerabilities to say, hey, we can actually reduce vulnerability density. We can use technology to make more secure,
23:10higher quality software for the first time. And
23:14Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): those
23:14Nick Leiserson: kinds of improvements redound across the entire ecosystem. Everyone benefits when your software quality is going up. Or with service providers and saying there's more that service providers can do to protect their customers. And that
23:29Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in
23:29Nick Leiserson: a shared responsibility model where it's customers and its providers that have some responsibility for their security, but the area arrow needs to go towards more responsibility on the providers. And that remains true as well in an era of who's going to be able to take advantage of new technologies like AI first. Then there is the how do you take advantage of new data streams that new but better ability to process data streams. And I will tell you like the first times I was getting briefed in 2016 and 17 on like what does blockchain intelligence look like? Like what do analytics look like? I said, wow, this is going to be really useful for cyber defenders, separate and apart from like you can get tactical information about what are tactics, techniques, and procedures that carry across from group to group by understanding how the money flows in the background of that. And that still in 2026 isn't done as much as I would have thought at the time. And it's because it's hard. Like it's hard to map this stuff.
24:46But there are technological changes that are making that easier. And so just as the bad guys are getting better at taking a blob of data that they've stolen and figuring out this is what I want to extort from, we need to do a better job of saying, hey, we've got intelligence across all of these different sensors, including non-traditional ones, and fusing Using them in to a more complete picture of, like, oh, actually, we know something about how to defend our networks and our systems because we know something that looks orthogonal about how the money is moving over here. And drawing those connections was important 10 years ago. It's just as important today, but we keep seeing better backstopping Happening from a technological standpoint in our ability to do so. So that's another thing that I think, you know, you look at what does defense look like and what gives me hope. If we can be as nimble as the criminals in terms of saying we need to take take advantage of these new opportunities, we can make progress. We've done it before, we'll do it again.
25:55Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Any sort of cool examples that resonate for you in terms of what you just described?
26:00Nick Leiserson: Yeah, I I think that you've seen really just this. year, right, a a fair uptick from the Bureau continuing to do disruption operations and prioritizing that in their cyber strategy. And that runs the full gamut of of what they're doing from residential proxy networks, which are just a completely underdeveloped story of where bad things are going to be coming from for the next several years. to you know, Russian networks that have been used by the GRU as as obfuscation relays as well. But even then, you know, I think that the the next the next level of how do you use this intelligence is to say, yeah, you know, first order is follow the money so we can get it back and we can say, hey, the criminals want a crime because they can make money out. of it. If we could take the money out, then they're not going to be as interested. But the next level is to say, hey, knowing that all of these seemingly disparate uh affiliates are actually using the same core infrastructure. Ransomware affiliates are using the same core infrastructure. And the way that I knew that is that I've I followed the stuff that went from a ransom
27:18payment into an affiliate's wallet. And then I track that over to the actual service provider that's providing the backbone for all of this, and saying, Oh, with that, I can as a defender protect myself because I know I that's actually the target. That's what I should be looking at. That's how I should be dealing with what the threat environment is, not the little fish on in the affiliates who are coming after me directly, and simultaneously feeding that into disruption operations and saying, hey, regardless of whether it's happening through law enforcement or with what service providers can do, like we're we're right working on. a paper right now taking anecdotes of what service providers can do with no additional legal authority, right? Not with a court order, not with a warrant, nothing else. What they can and have done to take disruptive action just when they have the right incentives, um, and what that looks like from a legal standpoint. But the fuel to those ends. engines, right? If we say like, okay, we've
28:30using CISA 2015, the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015, and the broad discretion you've got to monitor there and the Wiretap Act and the exceptions in there for service providers, and a couple other things, you know, just common law defenses tied to protecting your own property, you're going to take action to disrupt an adversary. You have already all of the authority you need. You just need to be motivated or have the appropriate risk appetite to do so. That's great, but it's still going to need intelligence from a whole horse of folks to say, okay, but what am I going to take action against?
29:08Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): What
29:08Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): is your wish list right now of um as we're seeing cyber activity scale with AI? What do we need to
29:14Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): do?
29:15Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): from policymakers on the defense side
29:17Nick Leiserson: what a great question how long you got um
29:19Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): so look
29:20Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): what do you want this Christmas shopping
29:23Nick Leiserson: i think that the first thing that i want from policymakers is to understand where we are in this technological evolution because different players are going to have a different role to play so like Congress you know, pick on Congress since I spent a lot of my career there. I want Congress to be looking and saying, on the software quality issue, how do we ensure the incentives are such so that when the marginal cost of software falls to almost zero, which it's already almost there, but the cost of securing that software is not almost zero, that the incentives are in place so that we are still actually going to secure the code that's being produced by AI agents. That is not a today problem. It's a three years from now problem once we get over the hump of dealing with the legacy software. But if we wake up in three years and say, oh man, you know, we need we really need to change this incentive structure some and like we need some change. changes to the law to do that. Having worked in Congress, you're not gonna get that on the timeline that you want. Like you need to do that today in Congress. That's where you need to skate to where the puck is going. You know, to do the Gretzky. Don't sit here and chase after
30:43the thing that is operationally relevant right now, which is where, you know, back to how do we address the software question? quality issue? Okay, clearing houses. How do we make sure that the PHP Foundation, we go find any other skeletons in their closet, every other bug that looks like that? We're going to go exhibit that right now and make sure they have the engineering resources they need to fix that. That's a tomorrow problem or a yesterday problem. It's not a three years from now problem. I don't need Congress focusing on that. I need the White House focusing on that. And CISA focusing on that. And that's in the software quality sort of sphere. The other side of this is AI as a uh capable offensive operator in its own right, right? Like the hugging face, oh, can AI agents just run end-to-end uh cyber operations? And then how do they in a jagged way affect different parts of the kill chain? And what I need policymakers to be doing is saying, okay, in that world, what kind of investments do we need for defense? And how do we make sure those scale? And again, strategically, I would say focus on pushing them
31:59upstream and not saying to everyone. who's going to exist on the internet, you better figure out your own AI-powered defense. But those are the conversations that need to be happening right now with policymakers.
32:14Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): It feels to me like things are going to get worse before they're going to get better. We're just not ready, right? Bad actors are Are moving faster than we are, which is
32:24Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): um kind
32:25Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): of historically true. right? Automobiles and encrypted messaging apps, crypto, uh now AI.
32:32Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um we're
32:33Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): building defenses, but it's it's inevitably slower. Um are we going to continue to see this really unprecedented scaling of attacks, numbers, and sophistication?
32:42Nick Leiserson: The odds are definitely better that we'll continue to see
32:45Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah.
32:45Nick Leiserson: that, right? And I think j it really depends on your market segment. exactly how sure I am. If you are in, you know, what we call the target rich cyber poor, if you are an under-resourced critical infrastructure operator, absolutely. Like that, that I can say unequivocally. And a lot of those folks are like, that's when I say it as an under-resourced critical infrastructure operator, people are like, Well, what does that mean? I'm
33:13Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): like,
33:14Nick Leiserson: okay, it means you're scrolling. your school, right? It
33:15Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): means where your kids are going
33:17Nick Leiserson: to school right now. It means your water utility. It means your hospital. Exactly. And like they are going to suffer a hundred percent. There's there's very little we can do about that as this problem scales and they urgently need policy help. The race at the more top end is a little less clear, right? Because again, there's one way to look at PHP and say, what a mess. And there's another way to say, we did get a head start on the on the bad guys. Right. Like we did with AI tooling, we were able to say, yep, the exploitability is definitely there. Get a patch in place and beat out. this being, oh, it's O day, or worse, the PLA has been quietly, or the Ministry of State Security has been quietly uh sort of exploiting websites like this for years before we figured it out. And instead, we found out and the bad guys found out at about the same time. That's not ideal. Ideally, we beat them.
34:27by a lot, not by, oh my God, patch now, right? The prime minister of Japan sending a tweet to the whole country at 6 a.m. saying, like, if you own a web server, please patch today. Like, I'm not on my bingo card of what I expect to see. So if you look at it through the lens of, well, we see PHP HP like incidents go up, like, yeah, definitely. It's still a little early to say exactly how bad that is. other than exposing what it is demonstrating is, oh man, we've built on a house of sand, right? Like that this is we've built a whole lot on a foundation that's not too steady. But
35:06Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): we
35:06Nick Leiserson: are at least racing some to catch up there.
35:10Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): There's no way I can end this on civilization level threats to hospitals. water filtration, and electric grids. Nick, what do you do when you are not trying to stop attacks on U.S. critical infrastructure?
35:24Nick Leiserson: So of late, a lot of it is uh is baking with my four-year-old daughter. So this weekend, you know, we we just made yesterday a uh an apple cake with some farmers market apples and a bunch of banana bread, but she's she's into whatever whatever. we're baking this week. It's like it's like, okay, what are what are we doing? So that that is, you know, I
35:44Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): love that. Are
35:45Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you guys good? Have you made anything that you're like, wow, this is amazing?
35:49Nick Leiserson: Um, I mean, I'm pretty she she's someone asked me today, they're like, is she net is she net chaos? And I'm like, she's about net neutral now. So good
35:59Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): for you, Amelia. Like, as a four-year-old,
36:01Nick Leiserson: it's pretty, it's pretty good to be net. neutral.
36:03Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um,
36:04Nick Leiserson: we'll we I think we'll get to to value add, but she's like, I've got my whisk skills way up.
36:09Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I think that's
36:09Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that's really cool. It's also like this whole idea of like making things, right? Like of of putting the ingredients together and coming up with something better than what you started with. I love that.
36:17Nick Leiserson: Yeah, and it's uh super not like tie like it's one of the things
36:22Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that you
36:23Nick Leiserson: can do.
36:23Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): No
36:23Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): screens.
36:24Nick Leiserson: Cooking, cooking is like, yeah, it requires. just the right level of attention, you gotta pay it, you gotta pay some attention, you gotta use 30% of your brain. You cannot ignore your banana bread in the oven or your you know stew on the stove or whatever else it is. But it also does not require like complete engagement in a way that when you're thinking about, you know, what exactly does this mean for hospitals? Like, no, I I better be bringing my full attention to this issue.
36:55Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I love it. Nick, thank you so much for joining TRM Talks.
36:58Nick Leiserson: I appreciate you having me and thanks for uplifting the issue.
37:05Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You know
37:05Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it's interesting. I um I joined TRM not all that long before Colonial Pipeline, which was a really I I think it was a real watershed for the world when it comes to ransomware and cyber. It was a watershed for me. I'll never forget, you know, being on calls with the FBI, um, more or less for the first time, I think, as a private company, uh, thinking through how we can attack, track and trace the ransom payment in that case. But it's amazing how far uh things have gone and how fast they've moved. And I think that having this conversation uh in this moment, which feels to me like another watershed. I heard someone refer to October 2026 as Hacktober, we are seeing unprecedented scale when it comes to these attacks because of AI. And you know, two weeks ago or three weeks ago we announced Ardent, which is the defense. It's how we can combine on and off-chain data in order to deploy that type of data across systems in order to identify malware. to patch vulnerabilities. So what an incredible moment to have this conversation on really understanding the threat landscape that Nick is so expert on. But
38:12then also loved hearing from him on what we can do potentially from a policy perspective, what we can do from an operational perspective. So I said at the end, I I learned so much today, and I hope all of you do too. On the next TRM talks, I sit down with the global head of AML for PayPal, Kate Salotolo.
38:32Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): If
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38:44Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): TRM Talks is brought to you by TRM Labs, the leading provider of blockchain intelligence and anti anti-money money laundering. software. This episode was produced in partnership with Voltage Productions. The music for this show was provided by Ecolix.
39:00Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Now, let's get back to building