Beyond GDP: The Social Progress Podcast

Anthony Smith discusses democratic decline, trust erosion, and the need for structural renewal in governance.

34 min Listen to the original
DemocracyGovernanceSocial ProgressPopulismTrust in GovernmentGlobalizationAI and Social MediaForeign Policy

Summary

Anthony Smith, CEO of the Westminster Foundation for Democracy, attributes the global decline in democracy to long-term structural inequalities and the economic stress caused by globalization, which predate the 2008 financial crisis. He notes that trust in the US government has collapsed from over 70% in the mid-1960s to 14% by the end of the Biden administration. Smith argues that open societies with accountability perform better in health and service provision than authoritarian regimes. He highlights the role of social media and AI in monetizing polarization and censoring information. Finally, he proposes investing in democracy defenders, innovating democratic structures, and countering undermining forces through international cooperation.

Episode sections

  1. 0:00 – 2:03

    Introduction and Guest Background

    Host introduces Anthony Smith, CEO of WFD, to discuss democratic decline and populism. Smith outlines WFD's history as a UK public body created in 1992.

  2. 2:03 – 5:03

    WFD Global Footprint and Structure

    Smith describes WFD as a UK Foreign Office agency with a cross-party board, operating in ~25 offices globally, focusing on non-EU Europe, Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and parts of the Americas and Middle East.

  3. 5:03 – 6:10

    Decline in Democracy and Social Progress

    Host notes Social Progress Index data shows a decline in rights and inclusion starting around 2012. Smith agrees, tracking democratic decline to the 2008 financial crisis using indices from Freedom House, The Economist, VDEM, and International Idea.

  4. 6:10 – 9:01

    Causes of Democratic Decline: Inequality and Globalization

    Smith argues democratic decline predates 2008, driven by globalization's impact on job security and economic stress. Structural inequalities drive discontent, opening doors for populist authoritarian leaders.

  5. 9:01 – 12:07

    Performance of Open Societies vs. Authoritarianism

    Smith asserts open societies with accountability and rule of law perform better in health and service provision than authoritarian regimes. He notes accountability is crucial but often missing in external donor-led health services.

  6. 12:07 – 14:24

    Trust in Government and Foreign Interference

    Smith cites US government trust dropping from >70% in the mid-1960s to 14% by the end of the Biden administration. He identifies Russia as a strategic actor undermining social cohesion globally, including in Africa.

  7. 14:24 – 15:46

    Role of Social Media and AI in Polarization

    Discussion covers how social media monetizes polarization and AI is used to censor information, such as hiding critiques of authoritarian leaders. Smith emphasizes private sector responsibility in managing information environments.

  8. 15:46 – 33:43

    Renewing Democratic Structures

    Smith proposes three actions: investing in democracy defenders, innovating democratic structures for effectiveness, and countering undermining forces via international cooperation. He notes citizens are willing to trade democracy for effective governance.

Claims worth verifying

The Westminster Foundation for Democracy was created in 1992 as a creature of the post-Cold War era.

Unidentified speaker ·2:13

How to verify: Check the official WFD website or UK government archives for the establishment date of the Westminster Foundation for Democracy.

The Social Progress Index shows a clear inflection point around 2012 where progress on rights and inclusion stops and enters long-term decline.

Unidentified speaker ·5:15

How to verify: Access the Social Progress Imperative's Global Social Progress Index data and review the time series charts for rights and inclusion components from 2010-2015.

Global decline in democracy levels started to be seen by the time of the 2008 global financial crisis.

Unidentified speaker ·5:46

How to verify: Compare trend lines from Freedom House, The Economist Democracy Index, VDEM, and International Idea for the period 2005-2010.

Trust in the US government was in the 70% range in the mid-1960s and dropped to 14% in the last year of the Biden administration.

Unidentified speaker ·12:55

How to verify: Review Gallup Poll historical data on 'Confidence in Government' for the mid-1960s and late 2020/early 2021 period.

Russia has a strategic, long-term interest in undermining social cohesion in many countries, including Africa.

Unidentified speaker ·13:21

How to verify: Analyze reports from the US State Department, EU DisinfoLab, or academic studies on Russian hybrid warfare and influence operations in Africa.

The Meta Oversight Board published data showing it is hard to find AI critiques of authoritarian leaders due to LLM changes.

Unidentified speaker ·15:10

How to verify: Search for Meta Oversight Board reports or public statements regarding AI search results and authoritarian content moderation.

In 2024 elections, incumbents were re-elected if they were improving social progress and quality of life, not just if the economy was growing.

Unidentified speaker ·23:19

How to verify: Conduct a statistical analysis of 2024 election results against Social Progress Index scores and GDP growth rates for the respective countries.

WFD delivered climate legislation in Indonesia.

Unidentified speaker ·31:49

How to verify: Review WFD project case studies or news reports from Indonesia regarding recent climate legislation and WFD's involvement.

WFD work delivered improvement to anti-mafia laws in Albania.

Unidentified speaker ·31:49

How to verify: Check Albanian legislative records or WFD impact reports for updates on anti-mafia laws and WFD's role.

The Global Social Progress Index covers 170 countries with data going back to 2011.

Unidentified speaker ·33:15

How to verify: Visit socialprogress.org and review the methodology or data availability section of the Global Social Progress Index.

Do your own research

  • Verify US government trust levels using Gallup Historical Trends or Pew Research Center data.
  • Review Social Progress Index data for trends in rights and inclusion starting around 2012.
  • Examine Freedom House, The Economist Democracy Index, VDEM, and International Idea reports for global democracy metrics.
  • Analyze Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD) annual reports and UK Foreign Office funding disclosures.
  • Research the impact of globalization on job security in mature democracies using OECD or World Bank data.
  • Investigate the role of social media algorithms in polarization through academic studies or platform transparency reports.
  • Check 2024 election results and voter satisfaction surveys to correlate incumbent re-election with social progress metrics.
  • Review reports on Russian interference in global affairs from sources like the Atlantic Council or EU External Action Service.
Full transcriptexpand
0:00
Unidentified speaker: Is democracy in terminal decline?
0:03
Unidentified speaker: Or are our political systems just not delivering for people?
0:07
Unidentified speaker: Today I'm joined by Anthony Smith, CEO of the Westminster Foundation for Democracy.
0:13
Unidentified speaker: And we're going to try and figure out why trust in governments has plummeted, how inequality has opened the door for populism, and why state actors and algorithms are exploiting these divides.
0:29
Unidentified speaker: On today's Beyond GDP podcast, Anthony lays out a clear roadmap for what it's actually going to take to address some of these problems, innovate new solutions.
0:39
Unidentified speaker: It's a really critical issue for the world.
0:41
Unidentified speaker: Stick around, you don't want to miss this episode of the Beyond GDP podcast.
0:56
Unidentified speaker: To kick off this episode today, I thought I would quote the Italian philosopher Antonio Gramsci, who famously said, The old world is dying and a new world struggles to be born.
1:08
Unidentified speaker: Now is the time of monsters.
1:11
Unidentified speaker: Well, he didn't actually say that.
1:29
Unidentified speaker: So today we're going to be talking about governance and specifically democracy.
1:35
Unidentified speaker: It's very clear from social progress index data that the world is suffering from a crisis in rights that's linked to democratic rule.
1:43
Unidentified speaker: So I'm delighted to have with us today an expert on building democracy around the world, Anthony Smith from the Westminster Foundation for Democracy.
1:52
Unidentified speaker: Anthony, welcome to the Beyond GDP podcast.
1:55
Unidentified speaker: Thank you very much, Michael.
1:57
Unidentified speaker: It's great to be part of these conversations.
1:59
Unidentified speaker: Now tell us first of all, what is the Westminster Foundation for Democracy?
2:03
Unidentified speaker: How's it structured and what does it do?
2:05
Unidentified speaker: Thanks, Michael.
2:06
Unidentified speaker: We are the UK public body that is dedicated to supporting democracy around the world.
2:13
Unidentified speaker: And we were created in 1992, so a creature, if you like, of the immediate post-cold war era.
2:21
Unidentified speaker: And we have had the mission continually since that time of supporting democratic development.
2:30
Unidentified speaker: In a way, we've been an international development organization, but focused on politics in the way that mainstream international development tended not to focus on.
2:43
Unidentified speaker: So that's our history.
2:45
Unidentified speaker: Our structure is that we are an agency of the Foreign Office, of the Foreign Ministry, where cross-party, we have on our board members, six members of parliament from different parties representing those in the Westminster Parliament.
3:00
Unidentified speaker: And then we have staff both here in the UK and in our offices overseas.
3:06
Unidentified speaker: We have about 25 offices overseas.
3:09
Unidentified speaker: Most of our staff are in those offices.
3:12
Unidentified speaker: And there are no ex-pat staff.
3:14
Unidentified speaker: They're all nationals of the countries where they're working.
3:18
Unidentified speaker: And what's your global footprint?
3:20
Unidentified speaker: Is it sort of Africa, South Asia traditional British patch, or is it more widespread?
3:26
Unidentified speaker: It's a bit more widespread than that.
3:27
Unidentified speaker: And it depends a bit, it changes from time to time depending on where demand is.
3:32
Unidentified speaker: There is, first of all, um a uh we have a number of offices in Europe, i.e.
3:39
Unidentified speaker: in the non-EU part of Europe, particularly the Western Balkans and Ukraine.
3:44
Unidentified speaker: We have had them in some of the other European countries, but they've closed uh or and reopened at different times, like Georgia.
3:52
Unidentified speaker: In Asia, we have quite a big footprint uh ranging from Nepal through to Sri Lanka, the Maldives, and then into Southeast Asia, Indonesia, Malaysia, uh, Laos, uh, other countries there.
4:08
Unidentified speaker: Uh, we've just closed an office in the Philippines that was dealing with the Banksamoro area of the Philippines, which was changing its political system.
4:18
Unidentified speaker: And then in sub-Saharan Africa, uh bit in it is largely uh countries with a UK heritage footprint in East and West Africa, Kenya, Uganda, Gambia, Sierra Leone, uh, some others, and then uh Middle East and North Africa.
4:36
Unidentified speaker: We have offices in four countries there.
4:39
Unidentified speaker: One only in uh the Americas, which is in Venezuela, a bit in the Pacific as well.
4:45
Unidentified speaker: So relatively widely spread, um uh bigger than some of our counterpart organizations, but smaller than others have been.
4:54
Unidentified speaker: Uh many of the uh the bigger organizations tended to be from the US.
4:59
Unidentified speaker: They've shrunk in the last couple of years.
5:03
Unidentified speaker: So social progress index age obviously is global.
5:07
Unidentified speaker: And yeah, the we are recently released time series data shows a very clear inflection point around 2012.
5:15
Unidentified speaker: That from that point, progress on rights and inclusion stops and the world moves into this long-term decline that's continuing today.
5:24
Unidentified speaker: Is that what a similar pattern that you're seeing in terms of democratic governance globally?
5:30
Unidentified speaker: Yes, it is.
5:31
Unidentified speaker: I would track the decline in the global levels of democracy to a few years earlier than that.
5:39
Unidentified speaker: Certainly by the time of the financial crisis, global financial crisis in 2008, that decline was starting to be seen.
5:46
Unidentified speaker: It predated that a bit.
5:48
Unidentified speaker: There are various uh organizations that produce indices of different kinds.
5:53
Unidentified speaker: Freedom House, The Economist has a democracy index, something called VDEM and International Idea.
6:01
Unidentified speaker: And they vary a little bit in the trends that they see, but certainly since 2008 the trend has been downwards.
6:10
Unidentified speaker: So I want to ask about that causation issue, because I think my assumption is that the global financial crisis happens, this puts strain on economic systems, it puts strain on people's lives, and then there's a sort of a drift towards populist authoritarian leaders.
6:27
Unidentified speaker: Um, but you're suggesting it starts even before then.
6:30
Unidentified speaker: There was a problem brewing already.
6:33
Unidentified speaker: I think that um some analysts would uh point to the way in which globalization was affecting uh a range of populations in parts of the world, including uh developed, uh mature democracies as well.
6:52
Unidentified speaker: And there being uh pressure on uh those who were losing their security, losing their jobs, the industrialization was happening, and the the gap between what they had expected and what was uh playing out in reality was doing exactly what you said, causing significant economic stresses, and those were leading to political discontent, which opened the door for those who suggested that the answer was to get rid of the systems that we had been working under, including the democratic safeguards that we had enjoyed.
7:30
Unidentified speaker: We had a recent episode of the podcast where we looked at the Brazilian election, and uh our commentator were there was saying, you know, why does Latin America have a tendency towards populism?
7:40
Unidentified speaker: And actually, it's fundamentally the inequalities in that region that actually drive the discontent that then someone offering an answer offers.
7:49
Unidentified speaker: So there's actually it's not just about the short-term shock or the long-term shock of the global financial crisis, but the structural inequalities that were emerging in the globalized economy that have been pushing stress on democratic systems.
8:04
Unidentified speaker: I think that's fair.
8:06
Unidentified speaker: I think if you look at the countries which have retained the strongest democracies and the democracies that have been most resilient, they have tended to be ones, our old our friends in Scandinavia in particular, have tended to be ones which had economies which put uh priority on equity, uh, I'm not sure about equality, but certainly equity within their systems, and a strong social contract in which it was clearly understood what the responsibilities were of the state, and citizens understood the the price that they would have to pay to secure that in terms of the structure of the economy and the taxation system.
8:46
Unidentified speaker: Now, I mean, we what we see in our data in recent years is how that long-term decline in rights and inclusion seems now to be metastasizing into a slowdown into other aspects of social progress.
9:01
Unidentified speaker: And certainly a look at some of the countries that have experienced authoritarian rule, whether it's you know Turkey or Hungary under Orban or other places, what we generally see is that is the populists' authoritarian leaders don't deliver on any aspect of social progress.
9:19
Unidentified speaker: It's not as if rights get constrained and then but other things go well.
9:24
Unidentified speaker: Actually, what we see is generally not very good governance in general, not just terms of democratic governance.
9:31
Unidentified speaker: This might be a bit unfair and outside sort of your specialism, but is do you see that as well, that there's actually just the the challenges to democracy then lead to other challenges in governance?
9:43
Unidentified speaker: I think the evidence is pretty clear that um societies and economies which are open, which allow open contestation of leaders and require accountability and have rule of law in place, which limits corruption to some extent or to a large extent, those sorts of societies and economies tend to perform better in a range of ways.
10:09
Unidentified speaker: And that's not just in economic growth per se in GDP, but also in provision of services.
10:16
Unidentified speaker: Health is an interesting area.
10:18
Unidentified speaker: If you have health systems where there is accountability, where the voice of people expressed through elections and in other means is strong, then you tend to get better health outcomes.
10:31
Unidentified speaker: And for those of us like you and me who have a history in the international development field, it is sobering to note that some of that evidence shows that that accountability has been weaker when a lot of the health service has been provided by external funders and donors.
10:50
Unidentified speaker: So there's a bit of a lesson there for us to learn.
10:52
Unidentified speaker: But generally, what you're saying is right that more open uh societies with political systems that have accountability and rule of law perform better.
11:03
Unidentified speaker: I would love to say that those open and accountable systems guarantee effective governance and effective politics.
11:13
Unidentified speaker: I don't think we can do that.
11:15
Unidentified speaker: So part of the challenge of where we are at the moment in the world is that many of our governments in democratic countries have not been responding particularly well to the demands of citizens either.
11:29
Unidentified speaker: And that gap between expectations and delivery opens a place for those who want to exploit discontent to propose simplistic populist measures and then undermine the guardrails of democracy once they gain power.
11:48
Unidentified speaker: So it's a challenge for all of us, not just authoritarians who are already in control.
11:53
Unidentified speaker: Some of these extremist populists who are emerging.
11:56
Unidentified speaker: I mean, there's some debate going on now about how much of this is um bad actors internationally, Russia in particular, that's been driving this.
12:07
Unidentified speaker: But you would say that it's more organic than that, that it there may be bad actors pouring petrol on the fire, but the fire is burning already in terms of discontent.
12:18
Unidentified speaker: I think there's a combination of things.
12:20
Unidentified speaker: I think it is interesting to look at the trends that go even further back than those we spoke about a minute ago before the financial crisis.
12:30
Unidentified speaker: The levels of trust in government, confidence that government is acting on your behalf in well-established democracies has crashed in the last 40 years.
12:43
Unidentified speaker: I saw some statistics recently about the levels of trust in the US government, and by trust I mean confidence that the government is acting in your behalf if you poll people.
12:55
Unidentified speaker: In the mid-60s, it was up in mid-1960s, the level of trust was up in the 70% range, north of 70%.
13:06
Unidentified speaker: In the last year of the Biden administration, it was at 14%, 1-4%.
13:12
Unidentified speaker: So there has been a period where those vulnerabilities on our own societies and economies have opened up and bad actors have stepped in.
13:21
Unidentified speaker: Russia, I think it's worth saying, has had a very strategic, long-term, very widespread interest in trying to undermine social cohesion in many countries, not just in Europe and North America.
13:35
Unidentified speaker: They're very active in Africa now as well.
13:38
Unidentified speaker: And that is part of an effort to lower trust even further, including in countries where there is a relatively high level of trust, and therefore disrupt politics in a way that they can take advantage of.
13:52
Unidentified speaker: Other actors work in a similar way in other regions and other countries.
13:58
Unidentified speaker: But alongside of that, it is absolutely right, as you say, to recognize that in many cases that effort is supporting things which are going on domestically in our countries.
14:13
Unidentified speaker: And people who want to gain political power or want to gain economic power also can have a motive for undermining trust in our systems.
14:24
Unidentified speaker: I think it's probably also worth noting something about the information environment globally, which is important.
14:32
Unidentified speaker: We all know about the ways in which social media has had a responsibility for polarization in many places.
14:41
Unidentified speaker: In effect, polarization is monetized through social media.
14:46
Unidentified speaker: Some of that is the responsibility of outside influences, but a lot of it is domestic influences again.
14:53
Unidentified speaker: But that monetization is something that we need to think about carefully.
14:58
Unidentified speaker: It also extends in some ways to the way in which AI is developing.
15:04
Unidentified speaker: AI is censoring the way that information is provided in many cases.
15:10
Unidentified speaker: The Meta Oversight Board published something recently which showed that it was quite hard to find when searching with AI critiques of many authoritarian leaders because they've taken measures to change the way in which the LLMs searched for that information.
15:29
Unidentified speaker: So there are things which are the result of trends which, in a way, non-state actors that haven't been so present before, the private sector, have some role to play and some responsibility which we need to think about as well.
15:46
Unidentified speaker: So going back to Gramsci, the the new world is not yet is struggling to be born.
15:51
Unidentified speaker: What needs to happen to renew, refresh, rebuild democratic structures around the world?
16:00
Unidentified speaker: It's very tempting to answer that with the name of that film that came out a little while ago.
16:06
Unidentified speaker: We need to do everything everywhere all at the same time.
16:10
Unidentified speaker: It does feel like that sometimes.
16:13
Unidentified speaker: I would say that those that have been focusing in their work or in their interests on the quality of democracy in the world, in their own countries, in other countries, have gone through a period recently when it's felt like there have been very few openings for them.
16:32
Unidentified speaker: The trends have been going strongly in the wrong direction, and political attention has not been focused on this.
16:39
Unidentified speaker: It's not surprising, the last couple of years, political leaders in democratic countries and others have been battered by a range of crises, in fact, before the last couple of years, think of COVID as well.
16:53
Unidentified speaker: And uh the space for thinking about uh the way in which democratic governance plays a role, as your index says, that voice and social inclusion issues, the role that they play in actually delivering things that would help to solve those crises, that space has been very limited.
17:13
Unidentified speaker: I think there's a bit more space now, probably for the terrible reason that we can see how bad things will get if we don't do anything in a number of ways.
17:25
Unidentified speaker: But it does require a lot of different things.
17:27
Unidentified speaker: I could maybe point to a few things which feel important.
17:31
Unidentified speaker: I mean, one is we need to invest in those that are working to either defend or recover democracy in their countries.
17:40
Unidentified speaker: I don't want to paint too gloomy a picture.
17:42
Unidentified speaker: There are bright spots around the elections uh recently in Serbia, arguably in Brazil, things that have happened a little in the last couple of years in other countries, Nepal, Bangladesh, Senegal come to mind where there's been political change driven by people who have been fed up with the lack of voice and inclusion in their societies and their politics.
18:07
Unidentified speaker: So there are things that are happening.
18:09
Unidentified speaker: It's not always easy to get attention paid to those locations and to provide support.
18:16
Unidentified speaker: You have to be a patient supporter, you have to recognize that change takes a long time, that things can go backwards for quite a while before they change.
18:25
Unidentified speaker: So investing in supporting those who are trying to bring change in their countries is important.
18:33
Unidentified speaker: I think, secondly, we are not going to succeed if we say we want to go back to a democracy which existed when you and I were young.
18:43
Unidentified speaker: We need a different democracy.
18:45
Unidentified speaker: It wasn't perfect then, uh, and the context is very, very different now.
18:50
Unidentified speaker: So innovation is going to be very important.
18:53
Unidentified speaker: And there's quite a bit of that going on in different places, but we need a lot more.
18:58
Unidentified speaker: We've seen that there are groups in polling in very long-established democracies who would say, I heard from a French researcher the other day, that a significant proportion of their population, in France, he said 40%, would trade in some democracy in order to get the state to operate more effectively.
19:24
Unidentified speaker: There will be people who feel that there is some justification for that, but it's a very dangerous place for any society to be in.
19:33
Unidentified speaker: So innovation in turbocharging the effectiveness of all our states, in thinking of different ways in which, with the communication information we're environmented in, we're in different ways in which people can participate in their decision-making in their democracy, is really important.
19:54
Unidentified speaker: So innovation, I think, is really important.
19:57
Unidentified speaker: And then maybe the third thing I could point to is thinking about those forces who are deliberately trying to undermine democracy.
20:06
Unidentified speaker: Be they the authoritarians, be they those non-state actors, either deliberately or inadvertently, who are having a damaging impact on our political systems.
20:18
Unidentified speaker: We have to think of ways of doing something about that.
20:20
Unidentified speaker: That needs international cooperation.
20:22
Unidentified speaker: It needs bravery at political amongst our political leaders, and it needs support from all of us, recognition of what the challenges are throughout our societies.
20:32
Unidentified speaker: It can't be something that's left to leaders.
20:35
Unidentified speaker: We have to show and explain to societies more broadly how important this is.
20:42
Unidentified speaker: Well, I mean, that's I mean, issue is, of course, is the other part of this context is the collapsing global governance systems.
20:49
Unidentified speaker: And some of these challenges can't be done on one country alone.
20:53
Unidentified speaker: I mean, thinking of something you mentioned earlier, social media companies, this new media environment, clearly is something that needs some regulation, but is very hard to do on one country alone.
21:05
Unidentified speaker: What can be done about that?
21:08
Unidentified speaker: I think that's something that will require time and consistent effort.
21:14
Unidentified speaker: And I think that there is increasing recognition of the risks and the dangers.
21:19
Unidentified speaker: Every country in the world, I hope, is hearing the warnings from the media and digital companies themselves about the impact that certain forms of technology can have, principally AI.
21:33
Unidentified speaker: There are a lot of countries which are describing the harms that can come from online platforms and taking action on that, legislative action and other action.
21:45
Unidentified speaker: And the more that we can bring others along to see how important that is, the better.
21:52
Unidentified speaker: Important not just for democratic governance, but it but important for all of our societies.
21:57
Unidentified speaker: But it needs democratic accountability and rules to make that work.
22:04
Unidentified speaker: Just building on that, Michael, I would say that following Gramsci, um the international system that we have known has, I think Mark Carney would say, has disappeared now.
22:19
Unidentified speaker: And we need to find something to replace it.
22:23
Unidentified speaker: I think that it is pretty clear that international rules of some kind worked out in different ways will continue to be really important for all of us.
22:34
Unidentified speaker: The more that we can work to support democratic governance at country level, which brings with it a respect for rules and for the rule of law, the greater the chance we have of tackling that international cooperation element as well, and recognizing again the importance of the multilateral system of international cooperation.
23:00
Unidentified speaker: I mean, when it comes down to it, I mean I still fundamentally believe that people aren't stupid.
23:07
Unidentified speaker: There can be structures that transmit what they want in strange ways and generate some bad outcomes.
23:13
Unidentified speaker: And what we did a bit of uh rough research, I must admit, a couple of years ago.
23:17
Unidentified speaker: We'd love to do more about this.
23:19
Unidentified speaker: And we looked at all the elections around the world in 2024.
23:23
Unidentified speaker: And what we saw was that incumbents only got re-elected, not just if the economy was growing, but actually if they were improving social progress, real quality of life.
23:35
Unidentified speaker: So people could spot when actually their lives weren't getting better.
23:39
Unidentified speaker: Now, obviously, there's exceptions, you know.
23:41
Unidentified speaker: In Russia, elections are completely managed, there's no accountability, but where elections are contested, the public do seem to understand what's going on.
23:50
Unidentified speaker: And if even if there are, you know, you know, what we know a lot of the populist politicians do is dole out public spending like Sweetie's to buy people off, but people actually do understand when their life is getting and not, and that ultimately if systems don't deliver, as long as those elections are contestable, it does seem that a response comes.
24:13
Unidentified speaker: Am I being hopelessly optimistic?
24:16
Unidentified speaker: I don't think you're being hopelessly optimistic.
24:19
Unidentified speaker: I think the challenge is that even for a government that is performing well, crises keep coming.
24:27
Unidentified speaker: So things beyond their immediate control can make things worse for their citizens, despite their best efforts.
24:37
Unidentified speaker: I think one of the things that we are learning about this is that it's related to two things.
24:44
Unidentified speaker: First of all, the extent to which governments can actually deliver basic things well.
24:50
Unidentified speaker: If they can, that will build up credit for them when tackling harder things.
24:55
Unidentified speaker: The countries that do worst, and I haven't seen your your research, but I can imagine some correlation with election results.
25:05
Unidentified speaker: The countries which do worst are those which are not very good at delivering basic services.
25:10
Unidentified speaker: And then when they have to tackle more difficult, complex emergencies, citizens don't cut them any slack in that.
25:18
Unidentified speaker: And there is a price to pay for that in terms of trust, certainly.
25:23
Unidentified speaker: If you do the basics right, you build up some credit when tackling the harder things.
25:28
Unidentified speaker: It doesn't rebuild trust completely, but it gives you a base to work with.
25:33
Unidentified speaker: So that is something that I think is right.
25:36
Unidentified speaker: I do think that in general, politics is very hard.
25:40
Unidentified speaker: In open societies, politics is quite tricky.
25:43
Unidentified speaker: Communications about what you're trying to do is really important, getting that right.
25:50
Unidentified speaker: And there are circumstances where some of those things that we've just been talking about, people who are deliberately trying to undermine confidence, have to be dealt with as well.
26:01
Unidentified speaker: So there's no free pass in politics, in democratic politics, especially.
26:07
Unidentified speaker: You need to constantly work at communicating with people about what it is that you are trying to do.
26:14
Unidentified speaker: And if you can engage people, uh help them participate in politics in different ways, the evidence seems to show that you have a better chance of uh building that understanding that you need.
26:26
Unidentified speaker: Well, another thing I'd want to ask about was um the division within society in terms of intergenerational conflict.
26:33
Unidentified speaker: And I'm very struck, you know, we've had protests in Europe that are about the young.
26:38
Unidentified speaker: We have the cockroach movement in India, and on the other hand, you've got this issue about this aging population in some countries clinging on to certain benefits and not wanting to release them.
26:52
Unidentified speaker: Do you think that this intergenerational conflict is going to become a bigger issue?
26:57
Unidentified speaker: And how do we manage that within society?
27:02
Unidentified speaker: I think that there is certainly a risk that in some political systems the combination of institutions of democracy, be it a parliament or political parties, are not keeping up with the expectations of the Gen Z and others who are used to operating their lives in a way which provides much faster responsiveness.
27:30
Unidentified speaker: And uh therefore they feel alienated from the political system.
27:35
Unidentified speaker: I I wouldn't attribute some of the things that we've been seeing around the world, including in Europe recently, as being due to that, uh as much as to the economic pressures which are felt and the limited ability of countries to respond to those.
27:52
Unidentified speaker: But that intergenerational thing is clearly critically important in many, many societies, demographics in Africa in particular and some other regions, are such that unless young people, younger people are able to exercise political leadership, there will be crises in those countries.
28:13
Unidentified speaker: So that's really important.
28:15
Unidentified speaker: But luckily, we have seen that happening.
28:17
Unidentified speaker: We have seen uh younger generations actively doing something about the situation they find themselves in, often through protests, but not only.
28:29
Unidentified speaker: Uh, there have been movements in some countries in Nigeria about uh lowering the age at which people can uh be elected to parliament and be active, which has boosted political participation of younger generations.
28:44
Unidentified speaker: Younger generations are great at much better than me at thinking of ways in which technology can help with some of the engagement and activism.
28:54
Unidentified speaker: So, you know, we have to work together to address these things.
28:58
Unidentified speaker: Any political system which thinks it can stand in the way of that is going to be in trouble pretty soon, I would think.
29:04
Unidentified speaker: Amen to that.
29:05
Unidentified speaker: Um, and one final question is I'd love for you to hear what's one of the things that Westminster Foundation Doctor has done that you're most proud of.
29:14
Unidentified speaker: And maybe to help you thinking about that.
29:16
Unidentified speaker: I mean, I know a lot of people are very excited about citizens' assemblies as a new structure for democracy.
29:21
Unidentified speaker: I'd love your comment on that and then your example of your one of your favorite pieces of work.
29:27
Unidentified speaker: Well, citizens' assemblies are clearly one of those things which people are trying out to see whether they can make a difference in the way that politics works in in many countries, maybe cutting through what feel like stale, two-sided debates between opposing political groups, which don't really try to get at solutions but just undermine the arguments of the other side.
29:53
Unidentified speaker: Whether they will work and make a difference will depend on what's around them, the context that they're working in.
30:00
Unidentified speaker: And in some countries, we have seen spectacular successes of citizens' assemblies in dealing with really difficult issues.
30:07
Unidentified speaker: So I think they're they're a really interesting tool, among many interesting tools, which are going to need to be tested and tried in different contexts to find the right ones at the right time to make a difference to those politics.
30:22
Unidentified speaker: I think your first question is like choosing your favorite child.
30:26
Unidentified speaker: There are so many, so many examples.
30:31
Unidentified speaker: I mean, I think that what we are really trying to do, maybe put it in this context.
30:37
Unidentified speaker: In the days when democracy was really popular, what we did was a capacity-building thing.
30:43
Unidentified speaker: Everyone wanted their parliament to be effective, they wanted to see accountability and rule of law in their country.
30:49
Unidentified speaker: Sharing the tools which were effective in different places was all that was needed, and uh one assumed it would take off.
30:56
Unidentified speaker: These days, the uh context is very different to that.
31:02
Unidentified speaker: So we have to be seen in our work to help people solve the problems that they're facing.
31:09
Unidentified speaker: And that can sometimes be about the democratic institutions themselves, how they're working, but most often it's about a topic which we would all recognize from the headlines, be it climate change or economic inequality or debt, uh, or um the ability of women to um uh exercise their political leadership without violence.
31:36
Unidentified speaker: So I think it's hard to pick one thing out, but perhaps the things which feel as though they have had really direct impact on populations would stick in my mind.
31:49
Unidentified speaker: And recently we've had work that has delivered climate legislation in Indonesia, we've had work that has delivered improvement to anti-mafia laws in Albania, we've had a range of things around debt management improving at a time when debt is really getting dangerous in in some West African countries, enabling much more granular oversight of debt management strategies in some highly indebted countries.
32:18
Unidentified speaker: So things that are going to make a real difference that will be felt by citizens are probably what all of us in WFD are really trying to achieve.
32:28
Unidentified speaker: So we're delighted when we have those examples, but we know it takes a long time to get to a position where you can deliver those, help deliver those.
32:36
Unidentified speaker: Anthony, thank you so much.
32:38
Unidentified speaker: First of all, for all the work and you and the WFD are doing to build democracy and build more open and rights-based societies around the world.
32:46
Unidentified speaker: Secondly, thank you so much for being our guest and for giving us such a fantastic oversight of the issues and the challenges, but also some hope as well.
32:55
Unidentified speaker: So thank you so much.
32:56
Unidentified speaker: And thank you everyone for watching.
32:58
Unidentified speaker: Uh, do uh tune in again for another episode and do like and subscribe to make sure you find out about the next one.
33:05
Unidentified speaker: Thank you very much.
33:07
Unidentified speaker: Goodbye.
33:08
Unidentified speaker: If you want to learn more about going beyond GDP, Social Progress Imperative has the tools to help you.
33:15
Unidentified speaker: Our flagship Global Social Progress Index covers 170 countries with data going back to 2011.
33:24
Unidentified speaker: Through 57 different indicators, the Global Social Progress Index gives you a rigorous and comprehensive assessment of how countries are performing on real quality of life.
33:37
Unidentified speaker: For information on all of these tools, go to our website at socialprogress.org.
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